Conflictoflaws

Written by Danilo Ruggero Di Bella,
attorney-at-law (Bottega DI BELLA), member of the Madrid Bar and the Canadian Institute for International Law Expertise (CIFILE)

The USA is a Contracting Party to the 1965 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (the “Hague Service Convention”, which it ratified in 1967. The Hague Service Convention is a multilateral treaty whose purpose is to simplify, standardize, and generally expedite the process of serving documents abroad, thus it plays a central role in international litigation. The Hague Service Convention specifies several allowed methods of service to provide due notice of a proceeding in one Contracting State to a party in another.
The primary method (and main alternative to service through diplomatic channels) — laid out in Articles 2 to 7 of the Convention — is via a designated Central Authority in each Contracting State. When a Central Authority receives a request for service, it must serve the documents or arrange for their service. This method is usually faster than service through diplomatic and consular agents (which remain available under Article 8 of the Convention), along with the possibility that two or more Contracting States may agree to permit channels of transmission of judicial documents other than those provided for in the Convention.
Further, at Article 19 the Convention clarifies that it does not preempt any internal laws of its Contracting States that permit service from abroad via methods not otherwise allowed by the Convention. Thus, it could be argued that a sort of favor summonitio (borrowed by the principle of favor contractus) permeates the entire instrument, in that the Convention strikes a fair balance between the formal notice of a proceeding and the validity of an effective summon in favor of the latter, to allow for swift international litigations. Indeed, another fast method of service expressly approved by the Convention is through postal channels, unless the receiving State objects by making a reservation to Article 10(a) of the Convention. This is considered the majority view shared by multiple jurisdictions. However, in the United States different interpretations existed on this point, because Article 10(a) of the Convention does not expressly refer to “service” of judicial documents (it instead uses the term “send”). Consequently, it was an unsettled question whether Article 10(a) encompassed sending documents by postal channels abroad for the purpose of service, until the US Supreme Court has been called to interpret this instrument.
US Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention
The USA did not make any reservation objecting to service by mail under Article 10 of the Convention. In Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U.S. ___ (2017), the US Supreme Court pronounced itself on Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention to resolve these conflicting views, according to some of which the Convention was to be read as prohibiting service by mail.
After a detailed contextual treaty interpretation and also a comparison of the text with the French version (equally authentic), the US Supreme Court found that that Article 10(a) unmistakably allows for service by mail. The Supreme Court further clarified that “this does not mean that the Convention affirmatively authorizes service by mail.” It held that “in cases governed by the Hague Service Convention, service by mail is permissible if two conditions are met: first, the receiving state has not objected to service by mail; and second, service by mail is authorized under otherwise-applicable law.” This means that it is not The Hague Service Convention to authorize service by mail, but it must be the lex fori to do so (the Convention simply permits service by mail). So, where the Convention applies, it is not enough to make sure that a summon effectuated abroad is valid under the Convention just because that foreign jurisdiction allows for service by international registered mail. It further must be ascertained that the jurisdiction in which the case is pending authorizes service by mail requiring a signed receipt. However, by a simple reading of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is possible to note how this set of rules misunderstood the scope of The Hague Service Convention.

The US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Service Convention
In cases pending before a US federal court where the Hague Convention applies and where the foreign jurisdiction (in which the defendant resides or is registered) allows for service by mail, the plaintiff – who serves the defendant abroad – should further wonder whether US Federal law authorizes serving the defendant in a foreign country by mail.
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), dealing with summons, answers this question. In particular, Rule 4(h)(2) FRCP deals with serving a corporation abroad by remanding to Rule 4(f) FRCP, which in turn deals with serving an individual. So, the same rule applies to serving either an individual or a corporation abroad. Rule 4(f)(1) FRCP makes express reference to the Hague Service Convention:
“(f) Serving an Individual in a Foreign Country. Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served at a place not within any judicial district of the United States:
(1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;”
However, as stated by the US Supreme Court in Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, the fact that Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention encompasses service by mail does not mean that it affirmatively authorizes such service. Rather, service by mail is permissible if the receiving State has not objected to service by mail and if such service is authorized under otherwise-applicable law.
Probably, the words “[…]as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;” in Rule 4(f)(1) FRCP should be more correctly rephrased with “[…]as those allowed by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;” in order to be in line with the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court.
So, as Rule 4(f)(1) FRCP does not provide the final answer, the plaintiff needs to look at Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii) FRCP, which expressly authorizes the use of any form of mail that requires a signed receipt.
Hence, in cases pending before a federal US court where the Hague Service Convention applies and the receiving states permits service by mail, a plaintiff may serve a company or an individual abroad by means of international registered mail by virtue of Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii) FRCP (rather than Rule 4(f)(1) FRCP remanding to The Hague Service Convention). Consequently, the FRCP should be amended to avoid further misunderstandings as to the scope of application of the Hague Service Convention by replacing the word authorized with the term allowed at Rule 4(f)(1).

Article 27/A of Law on Civil Registry Services provides an exception to the recognition and enforcement regime under Turkish law. Foreign decisions that shall be subjected to the recognition process envisaged under Article 27/A of the Law on Civil Registry Services are specified as those relating to divorce, annulment or nullity of a marriage or a declaratory action to show the existence or non-existence of a marriage. In this regard, the decisions relating to custody, child maintenance, marital property or compensation shall not be given any effect pursuant this new process under Article 27/A of Law on Civil Registry Services. “Regulation on Registration of Decisions Rendered by Administrative or Judicial Authorities to Civil Registry” (Regulation) further stipulates conditions required for a divorce decision to be recognised pursuant this new process.

For the realisation of the recognition under this process, the foreign decision on the aforementioned subject matters, shall be final and rendered by a duly authorised administrative or judicial authority. Where the foreign divorce decision is manifestly contrary to Turkish public policy, it shall not be recognised. Finally, there shall not be any ongoing legal proceedings or dismissed claims relating to the decision which is subjected to recognition pursuant Article 27/A of the Law on Civil Registry. Where the conditions under Article 27/A are not fulfilled and hence the registration request at the civil registry is denied, recognition proceedings may be initiated before Turkish courts pursuant the Turkish Private International Law and International Civil Procedure Code (PIL Code).

When compared with the recognition and enforcement regime under the PIL Code, two significant differences are particularly noticed. Firstly, through this new process the foreign decision is given an affect outside of the court proceedings, though a direct amendment made at the civil registry provided that the aforementioned conditions are fulfilled. In order to be able to make the amendment regarding their civil status, the parties, their legal representors or attorneys shall apply to the civil registrar either together or separately provided that there shall not be more than 90 days between the separate applications of each party or their representatives.

Secondly, the administrative decisions may also be recognized in Turkey pursuant this process. In principle, pursuant Article 50 of the PIL Code, there needs to be a court decree as a pre-requisite for recognition of a foreign decision and thus, the administrative decisions will not be recognised in Turkey. Indeed, prior to Article 27/A being implemented, foreign divorce decisions rendered by foreign municipalities were refused to be enforced in Turkey. Non-recognition of foreign municipality decisions caused criticism amongst Turkish legal scholars. Whilst this exception regarding recognition of administrative decisions under Article 27/A of the Law on Civil Registry is considered as a positive development certain issues are open for discussion. Amongst the issues that raised doctrinal discussions are the appeal procedure regarding the registration made at the civil registry made pursuant this process and the interpretation of public policy exception by the civil registrar bearing in mind that Turkish statutory sources do not provide a definition for Turkish public policy and that interference of public policy requires a complex legal reasoning. Finally, the legal nature of the process under Article 27/A is also argued as to whether it may be considered as a recognition decision in its technical sense.

An action brought between parties to a contract in a scenario where the consent to at least some of the contractual terms was allegedly expressed by the plaintiff only on account of the dominant position of the defendant is to be considered as falling within the concept of ‘matters relating to contract’ [Article 7(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation] or within the concept of ‘matters relating to delict or quasi-delict’ [Article 7(2) of the Regulation]?

In his Opinion delivered last Thursday, 10 September 2020, Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe addresses that question for the purposes of the reference for a preliminary ruling in the case C-59/19, Wikingerhof.

Legal and factual context

A company established under German law and operating a hotel in this Member State, Wikingerhof GmbH & Co KG, signs a contract with Booking.com BV, a company which its registered office in the Netherlands that operates a hotel reservation platform. On the basis of the contract, the hotel is to be listed on that platform. The general terms and conditions that are supposed to apply to the contract contain a clause according to which the place of jurisdiction for all disputes arising from that contract, with the exception of payment and invoice disputes, is Amsterdam.

Wikingerhof brings and action for cessation against Booking.com before German courts and argues that it expressed its consent to at least to some of the contractual terms only on account of the dominant position of the defendant. The plaintiff views some of the practices of the defendant in connection with hotel reservation intermediation as an infringement of competition law. It seeks an order restraining the defendant from carrying on with these practices.

The defendant objects, inter alia, to the jurisdiction of the courts seised in the matter. The first instance court agrees and rules the action inadmissible. It considers that the parties have concluded an agreement conferring jurisdiction and as a consequence the action should have been brought before the courts in Amsterdam.

The second instance court dealing with an appeal brought by the plaintiff also views the action as inadmissible, yet on the different grounds.

It considers that the German courts do not have jurisdiction under Articles 7(1) and (2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. For the second instance court, the action seeks to change the content of the contract and to alter the defendant’s practices. The action in question should therefore receive a contractual qualification, yet ‘the place of performance’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Regulation is not situated in Germany. For that court, the question of whether an effective agreement conferring jurisdiction was entered into is therefore irrelevant. It seems that this court considers that under no circumstances the German courts hold jurisdiction over the action brought by the plaintiff.

Ultimately, the case comes before the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof). The latter considers that the parties have not entered into an effective agreement conferring jurisdiction. The requirements relating to the form of such agreement, set in Article 25(1)(a) and (2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation have not been met. However, the Federal Court of Justice refers a preliminary question relating to the characterization of the action brought by the plaintiff:

‘Is Article 7(2) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation] to be interpreted as meaning that jurisdiction for matters relating to tort or delict exists in respect of an action seeking an injunction against specific practices if it is possible that the conduct complained of is covered by contractual provisions, but the applicant asserts that those provisions are based on an abuse of a dominant position on the part of the defendant?’

Opinion of Advocate General

According to the Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, a civil liability action based on a breach of competition law falls within the scope of ‘matters relating to delict or quasi-delict’ within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, also when the plaintiff and the defendant are parties to a contract and the alleged anticompetitive conduct materializes itself in their contractual relationship.

The analysis that precedes this conclusion begins with an observation that the action brought by the plaintiff in the main proceedings is ‘based’ on the violation of the rules of German law prohibiting, like Article 102 TFEU, abuse of dominant position (point 19).

Next, the Opinion acknowledges that while it results from the case-law that the actions on anticompetitive conducts – including those constituting an infringement under Article 102 TFEU – fall within the scope of Article 7(2) of the Regulation, the particularity of the proceedings at hand stem from the fact that the alleged anticompetitive conduct occurred within the context of a contractual relationship (point 26).

After that, a reminder of case-law on Article 7(1) and (2) of the Regulation leads the AG to the judgments in Kalfelis and Brogsitter. Concerning the latter, he considers that two interpretations of the judgment are a priori possible (point 68). First, which the AG describes as ‘maximalist’, would imply that an action based on delict falls under the concept of ‘matter relating to contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) if the action concerns a harmful event that could (also) constitute a breach of a contractual obligation. In other terms, a national court would have to verify whether an action could also have been brought on the basis of breach of a contractual obligation. For the AG, that interpretation would imply that the contractual characterisation of a claim prevails over its characterisation as a matter relating to delict (point 69).

The AG rejects such ‘maximalist’ interpretation. First, an analysis allowing to establish a potential breach of a contractual obligation would be too burdensome at the stage where the jurisdiction is determined and could require consideration of the substance of the case (point 76). Next, under the Regulation, no hierarchy exists between the rules on jurisdiction provided for in Articles 7(1) and (2) (point 79). In this context, the AG resorts to an argument based on the idea that the solution adopted in relation to the rules on jurisdiction would have to be followed in relation to the conflict-of-laws rules of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations: the contractual characterisation would have to prevail also under these Regulations (points 81 and 82).

As a consequence, the AG pronounces himself in favour of a second interpretation of the judgment in Brogsitter that he describes as a ‘minimalist’ one. Here, an action would fall within the scope of Article 7(1) of the Regulation where ‘the interpretation of the contract […] is indispensable to establish the lawful or, on the contrary, unlawful nature of the conduct complained of against the [defendant] by the [plaintiff]’ (point 70).

At points 90 et seq., the AG describes the method of characterisation that results from his ‘minimalist’ interpretation of the judgment in Brogsitter. He discusses the cases where a plaintiff invokes rules of substantive law in his submission of action and where he or she does not – according to the AG, in the latter scenario, his method does not change fundamentally. He argues that on the basis of other elements of the submission of action, a judge has to identify the ‘obligation’ relied on by the plaintiff (point 96).

At points 100 and 101, the AG furtherly explains and recaps the method: where the plaintiff invokes, in his submission of an action, rules of substantive law imposing a duty on everyone and it does not appear ‘indispensable’ to establish the content of a contract in order to assess the lawful or unlawful nature of the conduct alleged against the defendant, the action is based on a non-contractual obligation (the Opinion uses the term ‘obligation délictuelle’) and therefore falls within the scope of ‘matters relating to delict or quasi-delict’ within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. However, where, irrespective of the rules of law relied on, a judge can assess the legality of the conduct only by reference to a contract, the action is essentially based on a ‘contractual obligation’ and therefore falls within the scope of ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Regulation.

It is yet to be seen to what extent the importance of the rules of substantive law invoked by a plaintiff will play a role in the future judgment of the Court. In any case, on the basis of these findings, the AG concludes that the contractual characterisation of the action brought by the plaintiff before the German courts should be rejected.

The Opinion can be found here (no English version yet).

On a side note…

The lecture of the Opinion presented above raises a point that could on its own inspire an interesting discussion. It seems that, for the AG, what is true under the Brussels regime, should also stand as true under the Rome I and II Regulation. In fact, an argument relating to the consistency between the solutions adopted with regards to the Brussels I bis and Rome I/II Regulations is invoked in the Opinion in order to reject the interpretation which, for the AG, would imply the priority of contractual characterisation over non-contractual characterisation (see points 81 and 82).

Against this background, in his Opinion in Bosworth and Hurley (points 91 to 103), AG Saugmandsgaard Øe seemed to consider that the contractual characterisation of an action should be favoured over the non-contractual characterisation where an individual contract of employment is at stake. That consideration was made in relation to the rules of jurisdiction and more precisely – to Article 18 of Lugano II Convention. As it was not necessary to answer the preliminary question that inspired the aforementioned considerations of the AG, the Court did not have an opportunity to clarify in its Judgment whether such preference of contractual characterisation does indeed occur.

Yet, if that is the case and the argument on the consistency of solutions adopted under the Regulations is valid, should the Rome I and II Regulations be read as implying a priority (or even exclusivity) of a contractual characterisation also for the conflict-of-laws purposes in a situation where a harmful conduct concerns employee – employer scenario?

An online roundtable addressing the coordination between the Brussels Ia Regulation and other instruments of EU law will take place next 24 September, 3 p.m., on Teams channel.

The event is part of the EU co-financed “EN2BRIa” Project and scheduled within the PEPP Programme (Programme in European Private Law for Postgraduates). EN2BRIa mainly aims to shed light on how the relationship between the Brussels Ia Regulation and other EU law instruments is to be handled. The upcoming roundtable will showcase and discuss the preliminary results of the investigation conducted by the Partners of the Project, namely the Universities of Genoa, Nice, Valencia, and Tirana. Chaired by Chiara E. Tuo (Univ. Genoa), the roundtable features as speakers Jean-Sylvestre Bergé (Univ. Nice), Guillermo Palao Moreno (Univ. Valencia), Giulio Cesare Giorgini (Univ. Nice), Rosario Espinosa Calabuig (Univ. Valencia), Rosa Lapiedra Alcami (Univ. Valencia), Isabel Reig Fabado (Univ. Valencia), and Stefano Dominelli (Univ. Genoa).

Participation is free; more info, specially about the access to the Teams channel, may be found here.

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:

D. Coester-Waltjen: Some Thoughts on Recital 7 Rome I Regulation and a Consistent and Systematic Interpretation of Jurisdictional and Choice of Law Rules.

Decisions of the ECJ in recent years have cast some new light on recital 7 of the Rome I Regulation. These decisions will be analysed regarding the limits of and the guiding principles for a consistent and systematic interpretation of the rules in the Brussels Ibis Regulation on the one hand and the Rome I Regulation on the other. The analysis proves that the understanding of a term in the jurisdictional framework need not necessarily influence the interpretation for private international purposes.

U.P. Gruber/L. Möller: Brussels IIbis Recast

After complicated negotiations, the Council of the EU has finally adopted a recast of the Brussels IIbis-Regulation. The amendments focus primarily on parental responsibility. As far as the enforcement of foreign judgements is concerned, the new regulation provides for a delicate balance between different positions of the Member States. While the new regulation abolishes exequatur, it also introduces new reasons which can be invoked against the enforcement of foreign decisions. At first, the reform did not aim at changes in the field of divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment. However, in the course of the legislative procedure, new provisions allowing for the recognition of extra-judicial agreements on legal separation and divorce were added.

C. Kohler: Mutual trust and fundamental procedural rights in the framework of mutual assistance between EU Member States and beyond

In case C-34/17, Donnellan, the ECJ ruled that the recovery of a fine by way of mutual assistance between EU Member States pursuant to Directive 2010/24 may be refused by the requested authority if the decision of the applicant authority imposing the fine was not properly notified to the person concerned, so that the person’s right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has been infringed. The Court restricts the principle of mutual trust which, pursuant to Opinion 2/13, prevents the requested authority in principle to check whether the applicant Member State has infringed a fundamental right of Union law. The ECJ’s ruling takes into account the case-law of the ECtHR and, by admitting a “second look”, strengthens the protection of fundamental rights in the internal market and within the framework of the judicial cooperation in civil matters.

S. Huber: Broad Interpretation of the European Rules on Jurisdiction over Consumer Contracts

The jurisdiction rules for consumer contracts established in Articles 17 to 19 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and 15 to 17 of the Lugano Convention respectively lead to the question whether the trader has directed his professional activities to the jurisdiction in which the consumer is domiciled. The German Federal Court of Justice had to decide on this question in the context of several similar cases where Swiss solicitors had concluded a contract with several persons living in Germany. The crucial point was a document that the Swiss solicitors had sent to these persons via their German solicitors. The question was whether this document was a sufficiently clear expression of the Swiss solicitors’ intention to conclude contracts with consumers domiciled in Germany. In this context, the German Federal Court of Justice (cf., for example, the case IX ZR 9/16) held that the intention to conclude contracts with consumers living abroad could not only be expressed by general forms of advertising addressed to the public abroad, but also  y documents that are sent to individual consumers. The line of reasoning of the Court reveals a certain sympathy for the position that even one single document sent to one individual consumer in a foreign jurisdiction might constitute a sufficient expression of the trader’s intention to conclude contracts with consumers of that jurisdiction – but this was of no relevance in the cases at hand where the document had been sent to a group of 60 to 100 persons. Whether the document is sent on the initiative of the trader or at the request of the consumer seems to be of no importance. In addition, the court argued that the acts of the German solicitors were to be attributed to their Swiss colleagues as both law firms had cooperated with the aim of permitting the Swiss solicitors to conclude contracts with clients from Germany. Finally, the court was confronted with the question whether in case of a reorganisation of the trader’s business, a consumer can bring a claim against the newly created company in the courts of its domicile. The Court answered this question in the affirmative even for the situation in which the trader’s entity that had concluded the consumer contract remained liable besides the new company. The analysis of the Court’s decisions shows that the Court has formulated guidelines which are based on the case law of the European Court of Justice and allow the lower courts to apply the rules on jurisdiction over consumer contracts in a way which implements the idea of consumer protection and at the same time takes into account the traders’ interests under the general principles of procedural fairness. The clarifying guidelines have enhanced legal certainty and might thus contribute to reducing time and cost-intensive discussions about jurisdiction issues.

K. Duden: Amazon Dash Buttons and Collective Injunctive Relief in E-Commerce: Ju-risdiction and Preliminary Questions

The decision of the Munich Court of Appeals relates to a preventive action brought by a consumer protection association against the so-called Amazon Dash Buttons. The decision is guided by the 2016 ECJ decision in Amazon (C-191/15), which it develops further. The Munich decision contains far-reaching statements that are of vital importance to e-commerce and the internet of things. On a substantive level the Court of Appeals finds the Dash Buttons to be an infringement of consumer protection laws. This finding has already led to Amazon’s withdrawal of Dash Buttons from the German market. On the level of conflict of laws and international civil procedure, which this paper focusses on, the court starts by rightfully declaring a nationwide jurisdiction under article 7(2) Brussels Ibis-Regulation for preventive actions brought by consumer protection associations. Since the associations pursue the collective interests of all consumers the place where the harmful event may occur is, after all, any place where a potential consumer might be injured. In determining the applicable law, the court distinguishes between the main question of a claim to injunctive relief and the preliminary question of an infringement of consumer protection laws. In doing so it qualifies the pre-contractual obligations of § 312j BGB as part of the law applicable to consumer contracts, even though a qualification under Art. 12 Rome II-Regulation would be more convincing. Because of the potential importance of the content of the decision to the business model of Amazon it can be assumed that Amazon will pursue this case further and try for its reversal.

L. Kuschel: Blocking orders against host providers: Content and territorial scope under the E-Commerce-Directive

In its recent decision (C-18/18) on hosting provider liability, the ECJ set out guidelines on the substantial extent and territorial reach of court orders in cases of online personality rights violations under the E-Commerce Directive. The court held that a hosting provider can be ordered to remove not only identical but also information that is equivalent to the content which has been declared unlawful. Moreover, the E-Commerce Directive does not preclude a court from ordering a hosting provider to remove information worldwide. The article examines critically the broad substantial scope of potential takedown orders and in particular the possibility of worldwide court orders. As to the latter, the article argues that there is neither a contradiction to the ECJ’s previous decision in Google v. CNIL nor a conflict with European jurisdiction law, namely the Brussels Ibis Regulation. A national court should, however, take into consideration the highly differing views among jurisdictions on what content is unlawful and what is protected as free speech, before issuing a global take-down order. The article thus pleads for a nuanced treatment of the subject matter by courts and legislators.

L. Colberg: Damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement

In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Justice (“FCJ”) decided for the first time that the violation of a choice-of-court agreement can give rise to damages claims. The question had previously been the subject of intense discussions in German academic literature. In the case before the FCJ, a US party violated a jurisdiction clause in favor of the courts of Bonn, Germany by bringing a claim in a US District Court. Based on the valid and unambiguous choice-of-court agreement, the US court held it lacked jurisdiction. As US courts do not award costs to the winning party, the German party, however, had to bear its own lawyers’ fees. When the US party brought the same claim in Germany, the German party counter-claimed for damages. The FCJ decided that parties who are sued abroad despite the existence of a choice-of-court agreement in principle have a right to damages. However, some uncertainty remains as to the exact terms under which courts will award damages. The academic debate therefore is likely to continue.

J.D. Lüttringhaus: Jurisdiction and the Prohibition of Abuse of Rights

Does the Lugano Convention allow for an abuse of rights exception? A recent decision by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe draws upon the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights in order to disregard the defendant’s attempt to challenge jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 24 Lugano Convention. The Court found the defendant’s contesting of jurisdiction in the main proceedings irreconcilable with his pre-trial application for independent proceedings for the taking of evidence in the same jurisdiction. This reasoning does, however, not take into account that jurisdiction for independent proceedings for the taking of evidence may well differ from jurisdiction for the main proceedings. Against this backdrop, the article provides a critical analysis of the abuse of rights exception under both, the Lugano Convention and the Brussels Ibis Regulation.

F. Maultzsch: International Jurisdiction and Service of Process in Cross-Border Investment Torts under the Lugano Convention 2007/Brussels Ibis Regulation

The Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of Austria (OGH) had to deal with issues of international jurisdiction for cross-border investment torts. Besides general problems of jurisdiction under Art. 5 No. 3 of the Lugano Convention 2007/Art. 7 No. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the case touched upon the relation between service of process and possible jurisdiction by way of submission according to Art. 24 of the Lugano Convention 2007/Art. 26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The OGH has decided that jurisdiction by way of submission may not be inhibited by a preceding denial of service of process. This article outlines the state of discussion under Art. 5 No. 3 of the Lugano Convention 2007/Art. 7 No. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation concerning problems in investment torts (in particular regarding the location of the place in which pure economic loss occurs) and agrees with the OGH’s account of the relation between service of process and jurisdiction by way of submission. This account is consistent with the concept of jurisdictional submission as being akin to an ex post choice of court agreement.

J. Rapp: The recovery of erroneously paid insurance benefits under the Brussels Recast Regulation

In what is probably one of the last judgments of the UK Supreme Court on the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Court addressed three fundamental questions on Article 10 et seq., 25: Is an assignee and loss payee bound by an exclusive choice of court agreement in an insurance contract between the insurer and the policyholder? And is the insurer’s claim for the recovery of erroneously paid insurance benefits against the assignee a “matter relating to insurance” within chapter II, section 3 of the Regulation? If so, is the assignee entitled to rely on section 3 even if he cannot be regarded as the economically weaker party vis-à-vis the insurer? In the given judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that the assignee is usually not bound by a choice of court agreement between the insurer and the policyholder; rather, pursuant to Article 14 of the Regulation, he can only be sued in the courts of the member state in which he is domiciled, even if the protection of the economically weaker party as basic concept enshrined in Art. 10 et seq. of the Regulation does not apply to him.

C. Madrid Martínez: The political situation in Venezuela and the Conventions of the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law of the OAS

The government of Nicolás Maduro withdraws Venezuela from the OAS and it has an impact on the Venezuelan system of Private International Law, particularly in the application of Inter-American conventions. In this article, we want to show the erratic way the Case Law has taken and the dire consequences that a political decision has had on the Venezuelan Private International Law.

The most recent issue of the German Journal of Comparative Law (Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft) features three articles on private international and comparative law.

The abstracts read:

• Katharina Beckemper: Bestechung und Bestechlichkeit im geschäftlichen Verkehr – Die gegenläufige Umsetzung des EU-Rahmenbeschlusses 2003/568/JI in Spanien und Deutschland, ZVglRWiss 119 (2020), 277-313

Criminal law on corruption is largely determined by Union law. This can make a comparison of the national law of two Member States interesting if there have been different implementations in detail as Union law leaves room for interpretation. However, the German legislator did not see any such room for interpretation when, in 2015, it reorganized the facts of bribery and corruption in business dealings. Rather, he felt compelled to introduce the so-called business owner model. Meanwhile, Spain removed a comparable regulation from the relevant facts in the same year. This raises the question of whether European law offers more scope for implementation than the German legislator assumed or whether the Spanish legislator violated the requirements.

• Patrick Hell: Die Shareholder Proposal Rule des US-amerikanischen Kapitalmarktrechts als Instrument des nachhaltigkeitsorientierten Aktionärsaktivismus, ZVglRWiss 119 (2020), 314-338

Environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues play a major role on both sides of the Atlantic in the current discussion in corporate and capital market law. Investors are increasingly developing their own ESG standards and are trying to influence ESG issues through direct dialogue with their companies and through voting. This sustainability-oriented shareholder activism has a long tradition in the United States. The Shareholder Proposal Rule enables non-binding decisions initiated by shareholders. This has led to a significant increase in sustainability-oriented shareholder proposals in recent years. In the following article, this rule will be presented from a historical, dogmatic and functional perspective in order to take a comparative look at German stock corporation law.

• Frederick Rieländer: Der Schutz von Geschäftsgeheimnissen im europäischen Kollisionsrecht, ZVglRWiss 119 (2020), 339-368

Whilst the Directive (EU) 2016/943 ensures that there is a consistent level of civil redress in the internal market in the event of trade secret violations, the determination of the law applicable to non-contractual claims arising out of trade secret violations raises several unresolved questions. As will be shown hereafter, non-contractual obligations flowing from infringements of trade secrets within the meaning of the Directive ought to be governed by the lex loci protectionis principle as enshrined in Art.?8(1) Rome II Regulation. Nevertheless, the law of the country in which the market is distorted applies in so far as claims are based on trade secret violations by means of ”unfair competition” within the meaning of Art.?6(1) Rome II Regulation.

The Journal can be accessed here (no open access)

By Francisco Javier Zamora Cabo

Despite the progress made towards its prevention and resolution, contemporary history continues to show us examples of human-induced catastrophes, such as the genocides in Rwanda and the Balkans or, in our days, the one that afflicts the Rohingya ethnicity.

These are events that impact the conscience of humanity and that, unlike linear explanations, are usually based on a set of causes that are not always easily discernible. For instance, this is the case of the Rohingya Conflict, which, in its various phases, has generated a great deal of information and evidence, among which it is necessary to glean with a critical spirit, so as to fix the problem and, consequently, proceed to its much-needed denounce and to the pursuit of a path to a solution. To this end, and from the performance of the sciences, interdisciplinary approaches are required, the only ones that can give a full measure of the magnitude of such conflicts and of the means that must be prepared to address them.

In this order, and complemented by contributions from other branches of knowledge, international law, both public and private, constitutes an essential element to face the aforementioned conflict, by arbitrating mechanisms that enable its control and also necessarily opening ways for the remedy of victims and the punishment of those responsible for a calamity of such caliber, which affects more than a million human beings of the ethnic group mentioned above, which currently is the most persecuted on the planet and is also exposed to suffer in a special way the effects of the pandemic that afflicts the world.

The Rohingya conflict thus constitutes a field of choice at the interface between public international law and private international law, in which, for instance, actions are complemented according to the institutional channels established by the international community or, with the technical resources provided by the conflict of laws, through state-based international litigation or the implementation of elements belonging to its body of laws and with an imperative nature, such as international sanctions. Based on this, we then propose, on the occasion of the aforementioned conflict, a private international law in accordance with world governance and mobilized towards the achievement of peace, which is the ultimate foundation on which it coincides with the law of nations.

We have focused our modest contribution to the study and solution of the Rohingya conflict on these ideas, after exploring its actors, causes, and ominous results, from a wide range of sources. Written in Spanish, it is accessible here: http://www.rivistaoidu.net/sites/default/files/2_FZamora%20Cabot%20%20Marullo.pdf. Its abstract in English can be accessed here: http://www.rivistaoidu.net/sites/default/files/Abstract%20Zamora%20Cabot%20Marullo.pdf.

Profesor Dr. Francisco Javier ZAMORA CABOT,
Catedrático de Derecho Internacional Privado
(Chair Professor of Private International Law)
Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Económicas
Universitat Jaume I de Castellón

On 3 September 2020, the Court of Justice delivered its Judgment in the case that had sparked considerable scholarly interest in recent months, namely in the case Supreme Site and Others, C-186/19.

Back in June, due to the courtesy of María Barral Martínez, we presented an analysis of the case itself and of the Opinion issued by AG Saugmandsgaard Øe.

Preliminary questions and their context

As a reminder, in the background of this case is a contractual dispute over the payment of fuels supplied by companies to an international organisation, in the context of a military operation carried out by the latter.

The legal question at stake concerns, primarily, the applicability and/or the scope of application of the Brussels I bis Regulation in the context of a case where the international organisation brings an action to, firstly, lift an interim garnishee executed in another Member State by the opposing parties, and, secondly, prohibit the opposing parties from levying, on the same grounds, an interim garnishee in the future and all that on the basis of an immunity of execution that this international organisation allegedly enjoys.

Subsequently, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 24(5) of the Brussels I bis Regulation is to be interpreted as meaning that the action for interim relief falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in which the interim garnishee order was executed.

Judgment of the Court and its consideration of the questions referred

In relation to the question of the applicability/scope of application of the Brussels I bis Regulation, the Court begins its analysis by affirming, at paragraph 54 of the Judgment, that the interim measures in question should be considered as the ‘provisional measures’ within the meaning of the Article 35 of the Regulation. The inclusion of these measures in the scope of the Regulation is determined by the nature of the rights that they serve to protect.

Next, at point 55, the Court acknowledges the two sets of criteria used in its case-law in order to characterize whether or not an action is covered by the concept of ‘civil or commercial matter’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. These are ‘the elements which characterise the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the dispute or the subject matter thereof’ and – as the Court puts it – ‘alternatively’, ‘the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of the action’. Both sets of criteria are afterwards applied in relation to the case at hand, at paragraphs 65 to 67. It may seem that the first set of criteria is used in order to determine the nature of rights that the provisional measure serves to protect, while the check of the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of the action (second set of criteria) is done in order to ensure that the request for the measure does not consist on exercise of public powers and as such could potentially exclude the measure from the scope of the Regulation (Cf. paragraph 62 of the Court’s Judgment in case C-73/19, Movic and Others).

Interestingly, in relation to ‘the elements which characterise the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the dispute or the subject matter thereof’ (first set of criteria), the Court seems to be taking the view that the purpose of the contract on the supply of fuel is not of a decisive importance. As under public international law the purpose of a transaction may arguably have some significance in determining whether that transaction was performed iure gestionis and is therefore not covered by the immunity, it is worth noticing that the Court indicates that the criteria for the determination of a ‘civil and commercial’ character are established for the purpose of the application of EU law (see paragraph 68: ‘neither the legal relationship between the parties to an action such as that in the main proceedings nor the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of that action can regarded as showing the exercise of public powers for the purposes of EU law‘; see also paragraph 69 as well as in the operative part 1 of the Judgment: ‘action in question is not pursued under public powers, within the meaning of EU law‘).

Finally, at paragraph 74, the Court indicates that the fact that an international organisation relied on the immunity from execution in support of its action for interim relief does not preclude examination by the court of its international jurisdiction under the Brussels I bis Regulation. For the Court, the issue of whether that immunity is a bar to the court seised having jurisdiction to hear and determine such an action arises at a later stage, after the international jurisdiction of that court has been determined.

On these grounds, the Court considers that:

Article 1(1) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation] is to be interpreted as meaning that an action for interim relief brought before a court of a Member State in which an international organisation invokes its immunity from execution in order to obtain both the lifting of an interim garnishee order executed in a Member State other than that of the forum and a prohibition on levying such an order in the future on the same grounds, brought in parallel with substantive proceedings concerning a claim arising from alleged non-payment for fuel supplied for the purposes of a peacekeeping operation carried out by that organisation, is covered by the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’, in so far as that action is not pursued under public powers, within the meaning of EU law, which is a matter for the assessment of the referring court.

In relation to the question on the interpretation of Article 24(5) of the Regulation, the Court takes, as observed by one commentator, a restrictive view: it seems that only proceedings that concern per se the enforcement of judgments fall within the scope of that provision.

The Judgment itself can be consulted here.

As mentioned earlier this summer, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg will host the third conference for young German-speaking scholars in private international law (“IPR-Nachwuchstagung”) in March 2021. The conference will focus on the theme of PIL for a better world: Vision – Reality – Aberration? and will include a keynote by Angelika Nußberger, former judge at the European Court of Human Rights, and a panel discussion between Roxana Banu, Hans van Loon, and Ralf Michaels.

The organisers are inviting contributions that explore any aspect of the conference theme, which can be submitted until 20 September 2020. The call for papers and further information can be found on the conference website.

Although the conference will mainly be held in German, English proposals and presentations are also most welcome.

Of course, the organizers are mindful of the current Corona pandemic and will adjust the planning accordingly.

The DIRECTORATE-GENERAL JUSTICE AND CONSUMERS of the Commission has recently published a further notice on the EU-Brexit saga in the field of civil justice and private international law.

The notice covers core aspects, such as international jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement, specific European procedures (EPO, ESCP), judicial cooperation instruments (Service and Evidence Regulations), insolvency, ans other pertinent issues (public documents, legal aid, mediation).

The full text of the notice may be retrieved here.

Written by Bebizuh Mulugeta Menkir, Lecturer of Laws, University of Gondar

babimulugeta@gmail.com

Ethiopia, located in east Africa, is the second most populous country in the continent. The Ethiopian parliament has recently ratified, through proclamation No 1184/2020[1], the “Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards” which is commonly known as “New York Convention” (here after referred as “the Convention”). This short piece aims to reflect some points in reaction to this ratification proclamation, specifically changes that this will bring to the approach to arbitration in Ethiopia.

As stated in the Convention, state parties are obliged to recognize and give effect to arbitral agreements including an arbitral clause; and ordinary courts are precluded from exercising their jurisdiction on the merits of the case.[2] In addition, unless in exceptional circumstances recognized under the convention, foreign arbitral awards shall be enforced just like domestic arbitral awards.[3]

By ratifying the Convention, Ethiopia undertakes to perform the above-mentioned and other obligations of the Convention. As a result, some of the hitherto debatable issues are addressed by the terms of the Convention. For instance, the Ethiopian Supreme Court cassation bench had previously passed a decision that rejects the parties’ agreement that makes the outcome of the   arbitration to be final.[4] In its decision, the cassation bench contends that its mandate given by the Ethiopian constitution as well as the “Federal Courts Proclamation re-amendment Proclamation No 454/1997” cannot be limited by an arbitration finality clause.  But now, this power of cassation can be taken to have ceased at least in relation to cases falling under the scope of application of the Convention.

The declarations and reservation that Ethiopia has entered while ratifying the Convention should not be forgotten though. As such, Ethiopia will apply the Convention only in relation to arbitral awards made in the territory of another contracting state.[5] In the Civil Procedure Code of Ethiopia, Art 458 and Art 461(1) (a), the law that had been in force before the ratification of the Convention, reciprocity was one of the requirements that need to be fulfilled before recognizing and giving effect to the terms of foreign judgments as well as foreign arbitral awards.

Ethiopian courts require the existence of a reciprocity treaty signed between Ethiopia and the forum state whose judgment is sought to be recognized or enforced.[6] It is fair to assume that Ethiopian courts would have the same stand in relation to foreign arbitral awards. And Art 2(1) has fulfilled this requirement because the arbitral award has been given in the member state to the Convention by itself warrants the recognition and enforcement of the award in Ethiopia.

Moreover, Ethiopia also declares that “the convention will apply on differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered commercial under the National Law of Ethiopia.”[7] But here, a national law that provides a comprehensive list or definition of commercial activities hardly exists. As a result, while giving effect to the terms of the Convention, Ethiopian courts are expected to answer what sort of activities shall be deemed to be commercial activities according to Ethiopian law.

The definition contained under Art 2(6) of the “Trade Competition and Consumers Protection Proclamation” will provide some help  in identifying “commercial activities” in Ethiopia. Accordingly, “Commercial activities are activities performed by a business person as defined under sub-Art 5 of this article.”[8] And Art 2(5) defines a business person as “any person who professionally and for gain carries on any of the activities specified under Art 5 of the Commercial Code, or who dispenses services or who carries those commercial  activities designed as such by law”. [9] Moreover, it is to be noted that the “Commercial Registration and Licensing Proclamation (Proclamation No. 980/2016)” also provides the same kind of definition for commercial activities.[10]

From the combined reading of the above provisions, commercial activities are those activities listed under Art 5 of the Commercial Code, when they are performed by a person professionally and for gain.  However, this cannot be a comprehensive answer to the question, as there can be areas other than those listed under Art 5 of the Commercial Code that can be characterized as commercial activities. In addition, there are numerous service deliveries that can be considered as commercial activities. In such cases, Ethiopian courts will have to consult other domestic laws and decide whether the activity in question can be considered as commercial or not.

Last but not least, even if ratified treaties are declared to be an integral part of the law of Ethiopia[11], the domestic application  of treaties whose contents have not been published in domestic law gazette has been a debatable issue for long. As there are points that are not incorporated under the ratification proclamation, the same problem may probably arise in relation to the New York Convention. To avoid this challenge, the Ethiopian parliament should have published the provisions of the Convention together with the ratification   proclamation.[12] As per its responsibility under Art 5 of the ratification proclamation the Federal Attorney General, should at least have the Convention translated to Ethiopian working languages.

[1] The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Ratification Proclamation, Proclamation No 1184/2020, Federal Negarit Gazette, 26th  year No 1, Addis Ababa,  13th  March 2020.

[2] Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958), Art. II(1),(2),(3)

[3] Id.Art I and V

[4]  National Mineral Corporation Plc. vs. Danni Drilling plc., Federal Supreme Court, cassation bench

[5] Ratification Proclamation, supra note 1, Art  2(1)

[6] See paulos papassinus case, Federal Supreme court File no 1769/88;  Yosera Abdulmuen et al.  vs. Abdulkeni Abdulmuen, Federal Supreme Court of Ethiopia, Cassation Bench , Fed Sup. Court File No 78206

[7] Ratification Proclamation, supra note 1,  Art  2(2)

[8] Trade Competition and Consumers Protection Proclamation, Proclamation No 813/2013, Federal Negarit Gazette, 20th  year No 28, Addis Ababa,  21st   March 2013, Art 2(6)

[9] Id. Art. 2(5)

[10] The Commercial Registration and Licensing Proclamation, Proclamation  No 980/2016,  Federal Negarit Gazette, 22nd   year  No. 101, Addis Ababa,  5th   August 2016,  Art 2(2)&(3)

[11] Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation  No 1/1995,  Federal Negarit Gazette, 1st    year  No.1 , Addis Ababa,  21st    August 1995,  Art 9(4)

[12] International Agreements Making and Ratification Procedure (Proclamation  No 1024/2017) states that  “The House of Peoples’ Representatives may decide to publish the provisions of the international agreements with the ratification proclamation.”(Art. 11)

Readers previously obtained a preview of the 13 principles which make up the Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, a publication by the Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI). I am delighted to be informed by ABLI that the Asian Principles has been formally released today.

The blurb is below:

“Authored by leading academics and practitioners with extensive regional exposure, the Asian Principles is a set of 13 overarching principles that underpin the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the Asia Pacific. Each principle comes with a detailed commentary fully supported by citations, distills the commonalities and differences of the law on foreign judgments recognition and enforcement in 15 countries (all ten ASEAN member states, plus Australia, China India, Japan and South Korea) for its readers, and where appropriate, suggests ways forward for the development of the law in this area.

The first of any such publication in the world, the Asian Principles is available here where you can download the first chapter free of charge. The table of contents and a detailed FAQ list are also available at the link. It is hoped that the release of the Asian Principles can serve to promote convergence in this area of the law by facilitating greater portability of judgments within ASEAN and its major trading partners, which can in turn facilitate cross-border transactions by reducing legal uncertainties, lowering transaction costs and minimizing associated legal frictions.”

The contributors to the Asian Principles are:

• Dr Adeline CHONG (Project Lead and editor, Singapore Management University)
• Dr Bích Ngoc DU (Dean of Faculty of Law, Ho Chi Minh City Open University)
• Dr Yujun GUO (Professor, China Wuhan University Institute of International Law)
• Dr Colin ONG QC (St Philips Stone Chambers, London)
• Dr Yu Un OPPUSUNGGU (Lecturer, Faculty of Law Universitas Indonesia)
• Professor Narinder SINGH (Former Chairman, International Law Commission (UN); Maharishi Law School)
• Dr Poomintr SOOKSRIPAISARNKIT (Lecturer in Maritime Law, Australian Maritime College, University of Tasmania)

ABLI has kindly offered readers of ConflictofLaws. net an exclusive discount of 10% off for the Asian Principles. Please write to catherine_shen@abli.asia to get your unique coupon code.

I. Introduction: Foundations of Mutual Trust

A crucial element element for running a system of judicial cooperation on the basis of mutual trust is sufficient trust in the participating judiciaries. EU primary law refers to this element in a more general way in that it considers itself to be based on „the rule of law“ and also „justice“. Article 2 TEU tells us: „The Union is founded on the values of (…) the rule of law (…). These values are common to the Member States in a society in which „(…) justice (…) prevail.“ Subparagraph 2 of the Preamble of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, recognized by the EU as integral part of the Union’s foundational principles in Article 6 (1) TEU, confirms: „Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union (…) is based on (…) the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by (…) by creating an area of freedom, security and justice“. Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial when EU law is „implemented“ in the sense of Article 51 of the Charter, as does Article 6(1) European Convention on Human Rights generally.

The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has indeed become a primary objective of the EU. According to Article 3 (1) TEU, „[t]he Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.“ Article 3 (2) TEU further spells out these objectives: „The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime“. Only in the following subparagraph, in Article 3 (2) Sentence 1 TEU, the original objective of the EU is listed: „The Union shall establish an internal market“.

II. No „blind trust“ anymore

Based on these fundaments, the CJEU, in its Opinion Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, paras 191 and 192, against the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, explained: “[t]he principle of mutual trust between the Member States is of fundamental importance in EU law (…). That principle requires (…) to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (…). Thus, when implementing EU law, the Member States may, under EU law, be required to presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so that not only may they not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State than that provided by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU”. Hence, the Court concluded, at para. 194, that “[i]n so far as the ECHR would, in requiring the EU and the Member States to be considered Contracting Parties not only in their relations with Contracting Parties which are not Member States of the EU but also in their relations with each other, including where such relations are governed by EU law, require a Member State to check that another Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member States, accession is liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law”. This is why (inter alia) the CJEU held that the accession of the EU to the ECHR would be inadmissible – based on the promise in Article 19(1) Sentences 2 and 3 TEU: „[The CJEU] shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.“ When it comes to judicial cooperation, these Member States are primarily the Member States of origin, rather than the Member States of destination, unless „systemtic deficiencies“ in the Member States of origin occur.

It did not come as a surprise that the European Court of Human Rights rejected the claim made by the European Court of Justice that mutual trust trumps human rights: In Avoti?š v. Latvia (ECtHR, judgment of 23 May 2016, Application no. 17502/07), the applicant was defendant in civil default proceedings in Cyprus. The successful claimant sought to get this judgment recognized and enforced in Latvia against the applicant under the Brussels I Regulation. The applicant argued that he had not been properly served with process in the proceedings in Cyprus and hence argued that recognition must be denied according to Article 34 no. 2 Brussels I Regulation. The Latvian courts nevertheless granted recognition and enforcement. Thereupon, the applicant lodged a complaint against Latvia for violating Article 6 (1) ECHR. The ECHR observed, at paras. 113 and 114:

„[T]he Brussels I Regulation is based in part on mutual-recognition mechanisms which themselves are founded on the principle of mutual trust between the member States of the European Union. (…). The Court is mindful of the importance of the mutual-recognition mechanisms for the construction of the area of freedom, security and justice referred to in Article 67 of the TFEU, and of the mutual trust which they require. (…). Nevertheless, the methods used to create that area must not infringe the fundamental rights of the persons affected by the resulting mechanisms (…)“.

The Court further held, in direct response to Opinion 2/13 of the ECJ that „[l]imiting to exceptional cases the power of the State in which recognition is sought to review the observance of fundamental rights by the State of origin of the judgment could, in practice, run counter to the requirement imposed by the Convention according to which the court in the State addressed must at least be empowered to conduct a review commensurate with the gravity of any serious allegation of a violation of fundamental rights in the State of origin, in order to ensure that the protection of those rights is not manifestly deficient“.

Thus, a court must, under all circumstances, even within the scope of the „Bosphorus presumption“ (European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 30 June 2005 – Bosphorus Hava Yollar? Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim ?irketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, paras. 160-65, ECHR 2005?VI), „[v]erify that the principle of mutual recognition is not applied automatically and mechanically to the detriment of fundamental rights – which, the CJEU has also stressed, must be observed in this context. In this spirit, where the courts of a State which is both a Contracting Party to the Convention and a member State of the European Union are called upon to apply a mutual-recognition mechanism established by EU law, they must give full effect to that mechanism where the protection of Convention rights cannot be considered manifestly deficient. However, if a serious and substantiated complaint is raised before them to the effect that the protection of a Convention right has been manifestly deficient and that this situation cannot be remedied by European Union law, they cannot refrain from examining that complaint on the sole ground that they are applying EU law“. To cut it short: mutual trust does not (fully) trump human rights – “no blind trust” (Koen Lenaerts, La vie après l’avis: Exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust, Common Market Law Review 54 (2017), pp. 805 et seq.).

III. What does this mean, if a Member State (Poland) undermines the independence of its judiciary?

This question has been on the table ever since Poland started “reforming” its judiciary, first by changing the maximum age of the judges at the Polish Supreme Court and other courts during running appointments, thereby violating against the principle of irremovability of judges. The Polish law („Artyku?i 37 i 111 ust?p 1 of the Ustawa o S?dzie Najwy?szym [Law on the Supreme Court] of 8 December 2017 [Dz. U. of 2018, heading 5]) entered into force on 3 April 2018, underwent a number of amendments (e.g. Dz. U. of 2018, heading 848 and heading 1045), before it was ultimately set aside (Dz. U. of 2018, heading 2507). The CJEU declared it to infringe Article 19 (1) TEU in its judgment of 24 June 2019, C- 619/18 – Commission v. Poland. The Court rightly observed, in paras. 42 et seq.: “[t]he European Union is composed of States which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them, EU law being based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values. That premiss both entails and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States and, in particular, their courts that those values upon which the European Union is founded, including the rule of law, will be recognised, and therefore that the EU law that implements those values will be respected“. Indeed, the principle of irremovability is one central aspect of judicial independence; see e.g. Matthias Weller, Europäische Mindeststandards für Spruchkörper: Zur richterlichen Unabhängigkeit, in Christoph Althammer/Matthias Weller, Europäische Mindeststandards für Spruchkörper, Tübingen 2017, pp. 3 et seq.). Later, and perhaps even more worrying, further steps of the justice “reform” subjected judgments to a disciplinary control by political government authorities, see CJEU, Ordonnance de la Cour (grande chambre), 8 avril 2020, C?791/19 R (not yet available in English; for an English summary see the Press Release of the Court). The European Court of Human Rights is currently stepping in – late, but may be not yet too late. The first communications about filings of cases concerning the independence of Poland’s judiciary came up only in 2019. For an overview of these cases and comments see e.g. Adam Bodnar, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Republic of Poland and Professor at the University of the Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw, Strasbourg Steps in, Verfassungsblog, 7 July 2020.

IV. What are the other Member States doing?

     1. The Netherlands: Suspending cooperation

One of the latest reactions comes from the Netherlands in the context of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, namely in respect to the execution of a European Arrest Warrant under Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. In two rulings of 24 March and one of 26 March 2020 (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2020:1896, 24 March 2020; ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2020:1931, 24 March 2020; ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2020:2008, 26 March 2020) the Rechtbank Amsterdam stopped judicial cooperation under this instrument and ordered the prosecutor and the defence to take the entering into force of the latest judicial reforms in Poland into account before deciding to transfer a person to Poland. For a comment on this case line see Petra Bárd, John Morijn, Domestic Courts Pushing for a Workable Test to Protect the Rule of Law in the EU Decoding the Amsterdam and Karlsruhe Courts’ post-LM Rulings (Part II). Marta Requejo Isidro, on the EAPIL’s blog yesterday, rightly asked the question what a decision to reject judicial cooperation in criminal matters would mean in relation to civil matters. For myself, the answer is clear: if the fundaments for mutual trust are substantially put into question (see above on the ongoing actions by the Commission and the proceedings before the CJEU since 2016 – for a summary see here), the Member States may and must react themselves, e.g. by broadening the scope and lowering the standards of proof for public policy violations, see Matthias Weller, Mutual Trust: In search of the future of European Private International Law, Journal of Private International Law 2015, pp. 65, at pp. 99 et seq.).

       2. Germany: Pushing standards beyond reasonable degrees

Against these dramatic developments, the decision of the Regional Court of Erfurt, Germany, of 15 June 2020, Case C-276/20, for a preliminary reference about the independence of German judges appears somewhat suprising. After referring a question of interpretation of EU law in relation to the VW Diesel scandal, the referring court added the further, and unrelated question: „Is the referring court an independent and impartial court or tribunal for the purpose of Article 267 TFEU, read in conjunction with the third sentence of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?“ The referring court criticizes blurring lines between the executive and the judiciary – which is the very issue in Poland. It explained:

„The referring court, a civil court in the Thuringia region of Germany, shares the concerns and doubts of the Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden (Administrative Court, Wiesbaden, Germany) as to the institutional independence of the German courts and their right of reference pursuant to Article 267 TFEU … . The court refers to the question referred by the Administrative Court, Wiesbaden, on 28 March 2019 and the proceedings pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union (… C-272/19 …). (…). According to the [CJEU’s] settled case-law, a court must be able to exercise its functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever (see judgment of 16 February 2017, C-503/15, paragraph 36 et seq.). Only then are judges protected from external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardise their independence and influence their decisions. Only that can dispel any reasonable doubt in the mind of an individual seeking justice as to the imperviousness of the courts to external factors and their neutrality with respect to the conflicting interests before them.

The national constitutional situation in Germany and in Thuringia does not meet those standards (see, with regard to the lack of independence of the German prosecution service, judgment of 27 May 2019, C-508/18). It only recognises a functional judicial independence in the key area of judicial activity, which is a personal independence. However, that is not sufficient to protect judges from all forms of external influence. The additional institutional independence of the courts required for that is by no means guaranteed. However, the independence of individual judges is guaranteed by the independence of the judiciary as a whole.

In Thuringia, as in every other federal state in Germany, the executive is responsible for the organisation and administration of the courts and manages their staff and resources. The Ministries of Justice decide on the permanent posts and the number of judges in a court and on the resources of the courts. In addition, judges are appointed and promoted by the Ministers for Justice. The underlying assessment of judges is the responsibility of the ministries and presiding judges who, aside from any judicial activity of their own, must be regarded as part of the executive. The Ministers for Justice and the presiding judges who rank below them administratively and are bound by their instructions act in practice as gatekeepers. In addition, the presiding judges exercise administrative supervision over all judges.

The formal and informal blurring of numerous functions and staff exchanges between the judiciary and the executive are also typical of Germany and Thuringia. For example, judges may be entrusted with acts of administration of the judiciary. The traditional practice of seconding judges to regional or federal ministries is one particular cause for concern. Seconded judges are often integrated into the ministerial hierarchy for years. It is also not unusual for them to switch back and forth between ministries and courts and even between the status of judge and the status of civil servant.

The judge sitting alone who referred the question has personally been seconded three times (twice to the Thuringia Ministry of Justice and once to the Thuringia State Chancellery).

This exchange of staff between the executive and the judiciary infringes both EU law and the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct applied worldwide (see Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, www.unodc.org, p. 36: ‘The movement back and forth between high-level executive and legislative positions and the judiciary promotes the very kind of blurring of functions that the concept of separation of powers intends to avoid.’).

Most importantly, these informal practices sometimes appear to be arbitrary. While the courts guarantee the absence of arbitrariness outwardly, informal practices may expose judges to the threat of arbitrariness and administrative decisionism. Inasmuch as ‘expression-of-interest’ procedures have been initiated recently, including in Thuringia, as awareness of the problem increases, for example on secondments and trial periods in higher courts or on the management of working groups for trainee lawyers, there is still no justiciability (enforceability).

All this gives the executive the facility to exert undue influence on the judiciary, including indirect, subtle and psychological influence. There is a real risk of ‘reward’ or ‘penalty’ for certain decision-making behaviours (see Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, Germany) order of 22 March 2018, 2 BvR 780/16, … , paragraphs 57 and 59).”

The close interlock in Germany between the judiciary and the executive and the hierarchical structure and institutional dependence of the judiciary are rooted in the authoritarian state of 19th century Germany and in the Nazi principle of the ‘führer’. In terms of administrative supervision, the entire German judiciary is based on the president model (which under National Socialism was perverted and abused by applying the principle of the ‘führer’ to the courts … ).“

Although these submissions appear to go way over the top: mechanisms to incentivise (which inenvitable contain an aspect of indirect sanction) are well-justified in a judiciary supposed to function within reasonable time limits. Comparing the voluntary (!) temporary placement of judges in justice ministries or other positions of the government (or, as is regularly the case, in EU institutions), while keeping a life-time tenure under all circumstances (!) can hardly be compared or put into context with methods of the Nazi regime at the time whereas cutting down currently running periods of judges and disciplinary sanctions in relation to the contents and results of judgments evidently and clearly violate firmly established principles of judicial independence, as well as a direct influence of the government on who is called to which bench. Yet, the German reference illustrates how sensitive the matter of judicial independence is being taken in some Member States– and how far apart the positions within the Member States are. It will be a delicate task of the EU to come to terms with these fundamentally different approaches within the operation of its systems of mutual recognition based on mutual trust. Clear guidance is needed by the CJEU in the judicial dialogue between Luxemburg and the national courts. One recommendation put on the table is to re-include the Member States in its trust management, i.e. the control of compliance with the fundaments of judicial cooperation accordingly; concretely: to re-allow second and additional reviews by the courts of the receiving Member States in respect to judicial acts of a Member State against which the EU has started proceedings for violation of the rule of law in respect to the independence of its judiciary.

The European Law Institute informs us that the ELI-UNIDROIT Model European Rules of Civil Procedure were approved by the ELI bodies on 15 July and 5 August 2020. The UNIDROIT Governing Council will vote upon the Model European Rules of Civil Procedure soon at its meeting on 23–25 September 2020.

if adopted as wll there, the ELI/UNIDROIT Rules may contribute harmonising the national procedural rules of the EU Member States and as such broaden the basis for mutual trust in the Member States’ judicial cooperation in civil matters. The Rules may be taken as a kind of minimum standard or best practice, as the case may be in the respective issue in question, and the more a national rule of civil procedure deviates from these standards, the more justifications and explanations are invited, if not expected (see e.g. Matthias Weller, in Matthias Weller/Christoph Althammer, Mindeststandards im europäischen Zivilprozessrecht – Grundvoraussetzung für gegenseitiges Vertrauen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2015, Vorwort, p. VI, comparing this mechanism to some extent with the control of standard terms).

The full text of the ELI announcement and further information can be found here.

Gilles Cuniberti (University of Luxembourg) and Manuel Segovia (European Law Institute, formerly University of Monterrey) will soon publish an empirical study of choice of law in Latin American arbitration in the THEMIS-Revista de Derecho (Choice of law in Latin American arbitration: Some Empirical Evidence and Reflections on the Latin American Market for Contract).

The abstract reads as follows:

The aim of this Article is to assess the preferences of parties to Latin American international business transactions when they choose the law governing their contracts. For that purpose, we have conducted an empirical analysis of data that we were able to gather from arbitral institutions active in Latin America, with a focus on years 2011 and 2012. We then offer some reflections on the results and assess whether they can be explained by the territorial approach of choice of law in Latin America, the importance of the United States as a trading partner for Latin American countries and the extent to which Anglo-American lawyers are present on Latin American markets.

The Article is a follow-up of similar studies conducted by G. Cuniberti, including one on Choice of Law in Asian Arbitration.

On Tuesday, Sep 1, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its third monthly virtual workshop in private international law, again in German. Giesela Rühl (Jena, soon Humboldt University Berlin) will speak in German about private international law and comparative law aspects of distribution chains, followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships at the HCCH Permanent Bureau in The Hague, for the period from January to June 2021.

Interns work with our legal teams in the areas of family & child protection law, legal cooperation, dispute resolution, commercial & financial law. It’s a great way to gain practical experience, deepen your knowledge of private international law, and to understand how the HCCH functions.

Due to the current global situation and the associated travel limitations and restrictions, the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH may consider the possibility that internships be carried out remotely. Interns may also be eligible for a monthly stipend.

We encourage you to share this opportunity with law students and graduates within your networks.

Applications close on 30 September 2020. For more information, please visit the Internships page of the HCCH website.

This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH). 

Written by Mayela Celis – The comments below are based on the author’s doctoral thesis entitled “The Child Abduction Convention – four decades of evolutive interpretation” at UNED (forthcoming)

As indicated in a previous post, the comments on the HCCH Guide to Good Practice on the grave-risk exception (Art. 13(1)(b)) under the Child Abduction Convention (subsequently, Guide to Good Practice or Guide) will be divided into two posts. In a previous post, I analysed the Guide exclusively through the lens of human rights. In the present post, I will comment on some specific legal issues of the Guide but will also touch upon on some aspects of human rights law.

Please refer to Part I. All the caveats mentioned in that post also apply here.

The Guide to Good Practice is available here.

I would like to touch upon three topics in this post: 1) the examples of assertions that can be raised under Article 13(1)(b) and their categorisation; 2) measures of protection and 3) domestic violence.

1) One of the great accomplishments of the Guide to Good Practice is the categorisation of the examples of assertions that can be raised under Article 13(1)(b) of the Child Abduction Convention. While at first sight the categorisation may appear to be too simplistic, it is very well thought through and encompasses a wide range of scenarios.

I include below the assertions as stated in the Guide:

Examples of assertions that can be raised under Article 13(1)(b)
a. Domestic violence against the child and / or the taking parent
b. Economic or developmental disadvantages to the child upon return
c. Risks associated with circumstances in the State of habitual residence
d. Risks associated with the child’s health
e. The child’s separation from the taking parent, where the taking parent would be unable or unwilling to return to the State of habitual residence of the child
    i. Criminal prosecution against the taking parent in the State of habitual residence of the child due to wrongful removal or retention
    ii. Immigration issues faced by the taking parent
    iii. Lack of effective access to justice in the State of habitual residence
    iv. Medical or family reasons concerning the taking parent
    v. Unequivocal refusal to return
f. Separation from the child’s sibling(s)

Nevertheless, while this categorisation is very comprehensive, there are a few matters that are mentioned only very briefly in the Guide and could have benefited from a more in-depth discussion. One of them is the extensive case law on what constitutes “zone of war” or a place where there is conflict. See footnotes 88 and 89 of the Guide under the heading c. Risks associated with circumstances in the State of habitual residence.

Perhaps due to political sensitivities, it would be hard to pinpoint in the Guide jurisdictions that have been discussed by the courts as possibly being a “zone of war”. Among these are Israel (most of the case law), Monterrey (Mexico – during the war on drugs) and Venezuela. See for example: Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) [INCADAT reference: HC/E/USf 530] (United States); Kilah v. Director-General, Department of Community Services [2008] FamCAFC 81 [INCADAT reference: HC/E/AU 995] (Australia) and other references in footnotes 88 and 89 of the Guide.

Some of course may argue that “zone of war” is a gloss on the Convention and that as such it should not be analysed. However, one may also describe such situations without labelling them as “zone of war”, such as a State where there is conflict, be it military, social, political, etc. Perhaps this could have been expanded under the heading c. Risks associated with circumstances in the State of habitual residence of the Guide referred to above.

While the “zone of war” exception has hardly been successful, it would have been beneficial to discuss some of the arguments set forth by the parties such as: the fluctuation of violence throughout the years, terrorist attacks, a negative travel advice by a government concerning the State of habitual residence of the child, the specific place where the family lives and the risks of terrorism, the violence of drug cartels, and the fact of being a political refugee in the State where the child was abducted. The negative travel advice is particularly apposite to our times of Covid-19 as that would have given some guidance to the courts.

Another assertion made under Article 13(1)(b) of the Child Abduction Convention that could have been analysed in more depth by the Guide – perhaps under a. Domestic violence against the child and/or the taking parent – is the sexual abuse of children. The Guide includes very brief references to sexual abuse in the glossary, paragraphs 38 and 57, and footnote 76.

Undoubtedly, sexual abuse is a terrible and unbearable experience for children but it is still a taboo to single out this topic, let alone explain the current trends existing in the case law when this issue has been raised. Nevertheless, from my research there seems to be a very clear distinction in the case law: when the sexual abuse has been raised in the State of habitual residence and no action or insufficient action was taken by such authorities, and there is evidence of sexual abuse, the State where the child has been abducted tends to reject the return of the child to his or her State of habitual residence. In cases where this is not the case, the child is ordered back to the State of habitual residence, often with measures of protection. See for example: the multiple-layered decisions in the case of Danaipour v. McLarey, see for example the decision Danaipour v. McLarey, 386 F.3d 289 (1st Cir. 2004) [INCADAT reference: HC/E/USf 597] (United States). This brings us to:

2) The second topic of this post: measures of protection (also referred to as protective measures). The paragraphs dedicated to this topic in the Guide are 43-48. The Guide is absolutely at the forefront of the latest developments and social research on the effectiveness of measures of protection. It has answered the call of many professors/scholars and practitioners, who have cautioned about the indiscriminate use of measures of protection, in particular of undertakings, when the person causing the violence is known to infringe orders and not to heed the warnings of the courts. The Guide is to be commended for this great step forward.

The Guide defines undertakings as follows: “an undertaking is a voluntary promise, commitment or assurance given by a natural person – in general, the left-behind parent – to a court to do, or not to do, certain things. Courts in certain jurisdictions will accept, or even require, undertakings from the left-behind parent in relation to the return of a child. An undertaking formally given to a court in the requested jurisdiction in the context of return proceedings may or may not be enforceable in the State to which the child will be returned.” Because undertakings are a voluntary promise, their enforcement is fraught with problems, especially if the left-behind parent refuses to comply once the child has been returned. Where the primary carer (usually the mother) returns with the child to a “domestic violence” situation and it is not possible to enforce undertakings, both the mother and the child may be subject to a grave risk of harm. For more information, see Taryn Lindhorst, Jeffrey L. Edleson. Battered Women, Their Children, and International Law: The Unintended Consequences of the Hague Child Abduction Convention (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2012). This leads us to:

3) The third topic of this post: domestic violence. Many claim that domestic violence is a human rights violation. In a wider context, there is indeed a correlation between domestic violence and human rights and this has been recognised by resolutions of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. See for example AT (Ms) v. Hungary, (Decision) CEDAW Committee and Opuz v. Turkey (Application No. 33401/02), respectively.

While the issue of domestic violence in the context of Article 13(1)(b) of the Child Abduction Convention was the one topic that sparked concern among the Contracting States to the Child Abduction Convention, as well as judges and the legal profession alike, the Guide only dedicates a few paragraphs to it. See paragraphs 57-59 of the Guide. It also arrives at a conclusion, which raises some doubts.

In particular, the Guide states that “Evidence of the existence of a situation of domestic violence, in and of itself, is therefore not sufficient to establish the existence of a grave risk to the child.” There are a few problems with such a statement. Domestic violence comes in different shapes and sizes and the level of violence can be high or low. This statement is a “one-size-fits-all” and thus is necessarily flawed. In addition, it does not say what it means by “in and of itself”, does it mean prima facie? Also, it does not elaborate on what is necessary to invoke and substantiate domestic violence in order for this assertion to be considered sufficient. It also appears to set a standard of proof when it says that it “is not sufficient”, which might perhaps not be appropriate for a soft law instrument, such as a Guide to Good Practice, to do.

Some scholars have analysed and criticised this statement of the Guide. In particular, Rhona Schuz and Merle H. Weiner in the following article “A Small Change That Matters: The Article 13(1)(b) Guide to Good Practice” (Family Law LexisNexis©, January 2020) I refer to their arguments and prefer not to replicate them in this post.

Despite the weakness mentioned above and in Part I of this post, I believe that this Guide would be of great benefit to the legal profession.

Having all the above in mind, I would like to conclude with some words of the renowned American judge Richard Posner: “[t]here is a difference between the law on the books and the law as it is actually applied, and nowhere is the difference as great as in domestic relations.” (Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2005) [INCADAT reference: HC/E/USf 812] (United States)).

As indicated in a previous post, the Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) will be holding its XLIII Seminar entitled “Private International Law in the current international climate” from 18 to 20 November 2020 for the first time online. See here.

The deadline for the submission of papers was today (16 August 2020). Due to the difficult times we are all facing with the Covid-19 pandemic, the deadline has been extended to Sunday 6 September 2020.

AMEDIP is looking forward to receiving your contributions!

by Achim Czubaiko, Research Fellow at the Institute for German and Foreign Civil Procedural Law at the University of Bonn, Germany

In a decision of 22nd July 2020, the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) rendered its second opinion on the German Law to Combat Child Marriage of 2017,[1] which established a special ordre public-clause (public policy) for marriages concluded outside Germany.[2]

I. Facts of the Case[3]

The spouses, Lebanese citizens at the time, married in Lebanon in September 2001. At this moment, the bride was 16, nearly 17 years old, and the groom had recently turned 21. She had been living in Germany and acquired the German citizenship in 2002. In August 2002, the groom followed to Germany, where the spouses lived together from April 2003 to 2016 and got four children (born 2005, 2008, 2009, 2013). After separation the four children lived with her mother who had a new partner. The spouses were divorced according to Islamic law. On the occasion of a registration at the civil registry (Standesamt) in October 2018, the wife declared that she did not want to continue the marriage. Thereupon, the competent authorities filed a motion for the annulment of the marriage to the local court, as the wife had been a minor at the conclusion of her marriage. This motion was dismissed by the Local Court (Amtsgericht) Tempelhof-Kreuzberg as well as at the Higher Regional Court (Kammergericht) Berlin. The authorities lodged an appeal with the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof).

II. Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court

The Federal Supreme Court held that the decision to annul a marriage concluded by a minor, who has reached the age of 16, is subject to the (restricted) discretion of the court. Thereby, confirming the decision of the lower courts and upholding the marriage, it makes clear that the appropriate legal instrument for the wife to dissolve her marriage is divorce law.

This opinion is comprised by the general principles of legal interpretation underpinned by guiding constitutional considerations.

First of all, section 13 (3) n. 2 of the Introductory Law of the German Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – EGBGB) states that a marriage of a minor older than 16 years is voidable under German Law, even if the capacity of that particular fiancé to enter into marriage is governed by a different foreign law. As a result, non-German spouses must comply with at least two different legal systems concerning age limits. That points directly to the substantive provisions of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB).

Secondly, the court refers to the possibility of confirmation by the minor spouse after reaching full age according to section 1315 (1) n. 1 lit. a) BGB. However, such confirmation needs at least some basic awareness of the respective defects of the marriage to be effective. Since the wife, until her religious divorce, had no reason to doubt the validity of her marital status, none of her acts can be reasonably interpreted to constitute such a confirmation. The same goes for the hardship clause of section 1315 (1) n. 1 lit. b) BGB, because the court sees no proof of any exceptional circumstances resulting in hardship for the wife, if the decision were to uphold the marriage. Consequently, the annulment of the marriage is not prima facie precluded by the substantive law provisions of the German Civil Code.

Finally, the ratio decidendi of the opinion focuses on the question, whether the annulment of “child marriages” is mandatory if no exception applies. Section 1314 (1) n. 1 BGB provides that a marriage “may” (“kann”) be dissolved, if concluded contrary to the provision of section 1303 cl. 1 BGB, which basically reproduces the text set out in section 13 (3) n. 2 EGBGB. Apparently, the wording is not clear as to whether the court has discretion in the decision. In order to overcome that ambiguity, the Federal Supreme Court resorts to the doctrine of an interpretation in light of the constitution (verfassungskonforme Auslegung) as developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). This doctrine requires the courts to construe the existing law as far as possible in conformity with the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). For the case in hand the Federal Supreme Court explained that a mandatory annulment would treat foreign marriages differently than marriages concluded solely under German Law and foreign marriages involving minors younger than 16 years, thereby resulting in a violation of Article 3 Basic Law (principle of equal treatment). Furthermore, the Court stressed that a mandatory annulment of the marriage is not always in the best interest of the minor spouse, who is protected by Art. 6 Basic Law.[4] Therefore, the court argues that in the light of the Constitution some leeway has to be reserved for the courts to deal with the particular circumstances in individual cases. Nevertheless, the application of judicial discretion must take in account the objective of the Law to Combat Child Marriage. As a consequence, annulment must be the “default” rule, while only in exceptional cases the judge may uphold a marriage. Within this margin, the law grants the court (a limited measure of) discretion.

III. Conclusion

The decision of the German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) is in line with the efforts of German courts to mitigate the harsh effects of the Law to Combat Child Marriage.[5] The former status quo allowed a case-by-case analysis by the instrument of ordre-public. In this context, special attention should be given to the decision of 14th November 2018, Case No. XII ZB 292/16,[6] in which the court considered the parallel section 13 (3) n. 1 EGBGB unconstitutional, because it renders any marriage with a minor younger than 16 years void without reference to the individual situation and circumstances. Both decisions illustrate a consistent approach of the German Federal Supreme Court to the issue of Child Marriages.

The Press Release (available in German only) for the judgment can be found here (the full text is not yet published).

—

[1] Law to Combat Child Marriages (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Kinderehen) of 17 July 2017, BGBl. I 2017, 2429; see also von Hein, “Germany: Legal Consequences of the Draft Legislation on Child Marriage” on Conflict-of-Law.net of 24th March 2017, https://conflictoflaws.net/2017/germany-legal-consequences-of-the-draft-legislation-on-child-marriage/.

[2] See Antomo, ZRP 2017, 79 (82); Majer, NZFam 2017, 537 (541).

[3] As reported by the recent press release of the Federal German Supreme Court n. 108/2020 of 14th August 2018, https://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2020/2020108.html?nn=10690868.

[4] One might think of situations in that the social status of the minor depends on being a married person or regarding non-beneficial matrimonial property issues, see Rath, “Underage, married, separated” on mpg.de of 9th March 2019, https://www.mpg.de/12797223/childmarriage-legislation-germany.

[5] See e.g. Antomo, ZRP 2017, 79 (82); Hüßtege, FamRZ 2017, 1374 (1380); Schwab, FamRZ 2017, 1369 (1373); for a more positive perception compare Majer, NZFam 2017, 537 (541).

[6] Press release of the Federal German Supreme Court n. 186/2018 of 14th December 2018, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&pm_nummer=0186/18.