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La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne apporte des précisions quant à la détermination du juge compétent et de la loi applicable dans une hypothèse où la responsabilité d’une société grand-mère est recherchée à la suite de l’ouverture d’une procédure collective à l’égard de sa filiale.

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RT France / Conseil
Opération militaire en Ukraine : le président du Tribunal rejette la demande de RT France visant à suspendre les sanctions adoptées par le Conseil

T-324/17 SAS Cargo Group e.a./Commission, T-325/17 Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij/Commission, T-326/17 Air Canada/Commission,
Concurrence
Entente sur le marché du fret aérien : le Tribunal se prononce sur les recours introduits par plusieurs compagnies aériennes

The author of this post is Julian Henrique Dias Rodrigues, lawyer in Lisbon.

On 27 January 2022, the Lisbon Court of Appeal gave a decision concerning the (non) recognition in Portugal of notarial deeds attesting a de facto union.

The Case

A suit for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment (“ação especial de revisão de sentença estrangeira”) was filed in Lisbon in November 2021 by a Portuguese citizen and a British citizen, based on a Declaration of de facto union signed earlier that year before a notary public in London, where the couple lived.

The couple claimed that the above deed corresponds, under English law, to a judgement, and that it confers on the authors of the declaration the status of a relationship equivalent to that of spouses under English law.

The Portuguese Court analyzed the English Civil Partnership Act of 2004 (CPA).

For the Court, the civil partnership corresponding to the Portuguese de facto union is formalised by means of registration before a registry office, which results in the signature of a civil partnership document before the registry officer, with the presence of two witnesses (Article 2, Section 2, of the CPA).

The decision highlights that, under English law, a simple civil partnership agreement does not have any legal force (“does not under the law of England and Wales have effect as a contract giving rise to legal rights”, as stated in Article 75 of the CPA).

The Court acknowledged that it had previously recognized a public deed of de facto union of Brazilian origin. However, according to the reporting magistrate “[t]he legal situation brought in these proceedings is not analogous to the união estável recognized in Brazil. The English legal institute equivalent to the Brazilian stable union, foreseen and regulated in the United Kingdom, is the civil partnership”.

Relying on English legislation and case-law, the Court concluded that the document does not produce legal effects in the English legal order that go beyond the mere evidential force of the declaration. The legal significance of a partnership does not arise from it. That formal declaration is merely an additional element which the authority deciding whether or not to grant a claim based on the partnership will take into account in deciding in favour of the applicant.

In the Court’s view, the Deed in question was something different than a “civil partnership” under British law. For this reason, the Court refers to civil partnership to underline the difference between the situation created by the Deed and the situation of parties to a civil partnership agreement under UK law.

Returning to the Brazilian example, the judgment highlights that

contrary to what happens in Brazil, where the marriage and the ‘união estável’ can be dissolved by notarial deed, in the United Kingdom the divorce and the dissolution of the civil partnership need the intervention of a court according to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and as for the dissolution of the civil partnership, article 37 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004.

In conclusion, the Lisbon Court of Appeal rejected the request as it considered that the “statutory declaration” is not equivalent in the United Kingdom – or in Portugal – to a judgement or judicial decision, not producing the respective effects.

Public Deed of Brazilian de facto Union: Divergence Continues

The Lisbon Court of Appeal issued between 2019 and 2021 a series of judgments admitting the recognition of a public deed of de facto unions established in Brazil, by means of the suit of recognition of foreign judgment. However, there is no consensus on the matter.

In most cases the requests for recognition are made in the context of the acquisition of Portuguese nationality by the de facto union.

At least three judgments of the Supreme Court of Justice (“Supremo Tribunal de Justiça – STJ”) contradict the trend of the Lisbon Court of Appeal (Case 106/18.0YRCBR.S on February 2019, Case 559/18.6YRLSB.S1 on March 2019 and Case 249/18.0YPRT.S2 on December 2019).

For the STJ “the applicants declaration in a Public Declaratory Deed of De Facto Union, before a foreign administrative authority (notary public) that they live in a de facto union since July 2013, should not be considered as covered by the provision of Article 978 no 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and cannot be revised and confirmed to produce effects in Portugal” (Case 249/18.0YPRT.S2).

However the divergence remains open in the STJ itself.

By a ruling of 8 September 2020 the Court granted recognition to a declaration of a de facto union, issued before a notary public, and stating “The contracting parties expressly recognize the fact that they have been living as if they were married since January 2005” and that “they have said so, I, the undersigned, have requested and drawn up this instrument, which, having been read aloud and found to be in conformity, they have accepted, granted and signed, together with the witnesses, present at all acts” (Case No. 1884/19.4YRLSB.S1).

To reach this understanding, the reporting magistrate observed that

the Brazilian ‘união estável’ is a fact and not a legal act. The intervention of the public official foreseen in the legal system is constitutive, in the sense of producing effects in the legal order, namely the declarative one of the verification of the situation of de facto union.

As seen above, the matter is likely to continue to be the object of controversy among Portuguese courts.

Written by Catherine Shen, ABLI

The Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI) has recently released a free publication titled Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in ASEAN: Ranking the Portability of ASEAN Judgments within ASEAN, a derivative publication under its Foreign Judgments Project.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. These jurisdictions are of different legal traditions of civil law (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Thailand and Vietnam), common law (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore) and hybrid law (Philippines) tradition. There are two primary hurdles for increasing the portability of ASEAN judgments within the bloc. First, some ASEAN jurisdictions, such as Indonesia and Thailand, have no law that allows foreign judgments to be recognised and enforced. Second, most civil law jurisdictions in ASEAN still have rather rigid requirements on reciprocity. These two hurdles are the main influencers of the ranking.

Three key takeaways can be gleaned from the ranking.

First, Vietnamese judgments claim the crown of being the most portable of ASEAN judgments within ASEAN. They can be enforced in seven out of the other nine ASEAN countries, provided, of course, that the requirements for enforcement under the laws of those countries are satisfied. This is a portability rate of close to 78%. Compared to other ASEAN jurisdictions, Vietnam has the benefit of having bilateral agreements with Cambodia and Lao which allow its judgments to be enforced in the latter two jurisdictions. Cambodia requires a guarantee of reciprocity while Lao PDR requires a bilateral treaty with the relevant country covering the enforcement of each other’s judgments before reciprocity is satisfied.

Second, judgments rendered by the other civil law countries of ASEAN come in second place. They can be enforced in six out of nine ASEAN countries.

Third, judgments from the common law countries of ASEAN and the hybrid law jurisdiction of the Philippines are jointly in third place. They can be enforced in five out of nine ASEAN countries, namely in the other common law and hybrid law jurisdictions, as well as Vietnam. Although Vietnam, being a civil law jurisdiction, imposes a condition of reciprocity, it appears relatively easy to satisfy this requirement.

This result may be surprising or even perverse since most civil law jurisdictions, i.e., Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao and Thailand, have comparatively illiberal regimes for the enforcement of foreign judgments (whether due to the rigid requirement of reciprocity or the lack of relevant laws), while the common law and hybrid law jurisdictions in ASEAN have comparatively liberal rules for foreign judgments enforcement. This “asymmetry” is mainly due to the inability of those civil law jurisdictions to return the favour of the more liberal rules of the common law and hybrid law jurisdictions in ASEAN given the state of their laws, namely, the requirement that there be reciprocity between the two countries.

The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in ASEAN: Ranking the Portability of ASEAN Judgments within ASEAN is available for free and can be downloaded here. ABLI regularly publishes latest developments in the field of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Asia on its website and LinkedIn.

La guerre que, sous la dénomination euphémique d’« opération militaire spéciale », la Fédération de Russie a déclenchée contre l’Ukraine le 24 février 2022 provoque des conséquences matérielles et surtout humaines dont la tragique ampleur n’est pas encore mesurée. Le jour viendra sûrement où la question de leur qualification en crimes de guerre, en crimes contre l’humanité ou en crimes d’agression, voire en crimes de génocide, sera posée devant les juridictions compétentes. En attendant, le cataclysme de 2022 aura immédiatement entraîné des conséquences juridiques exceptionnelles. Dès le 25 février, le comité des ministres du Conseil de l’Europe avait décidé de suspendre les droits de représentation de la Fédération de Russie en son sein et à l’Assemblée parlementaire, puis, le 16 mars 2022, il a décidé que cet État membre depuis 1996 cesserait immédiatement de l’être.

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In Farrar & Anor v Miller [2022] EWCA Civ 295, the issue is whether a firm of solicitors which has been acting for a claimant in litigation pursuant to a damages-based agreement can validly take an assignment of their client’s cause of action.

It is the common law of champerty which militates against law firms acting ostentatiously as a party with a purely commercial interest in the litigation and it is their role as officers of the court which is cited as being core of the hesitation (see inter alia the EP study on third party litigation funding here). In England and Wales it was the rules against maintenance and champerty that, prior to 1990, led to solicitors ia not being able to conduct litigation pursuant to conditional fee agreements -CFAs.

Statute then intervened to change this in narrowly defined circumstances  (CFAs and damages-based agreements only) however that did not lift the common law’s general opposition to same and it is this opposition which both the first instance judge and the Court of Appeal refer to to reject the possibility of assignment: [52]

the Assignment is neither a conditional fee agreement nor a damages-based agreement: what section 58(1) and section 58AA(2) show is that Parliament, being well aware of the common law rules, decided to go so far towards relaxing them as sections 58 and 58AA provide and no further.

Permission to appeal with the Supreme Court is being sought.

Geert.

Litigation funding. common law principles of assignment, including champerty
Whether solicitors acting pursuant to damages-based agreement can validly take assignment of client's cause of action

Farrar & Anor v Miller [2022] EWCA Civ 295https://t.co/On1VyazyO8 pic.twitter.com/hvG1kU07bO

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 12, 2022

Getin Noble Bank
Rapprochement des législations
Le simple fait qu’un juge a été nommé à une époque où l’État membre dont il relève ne constituait pas encore un régime démocratique ne remet pas en cause l’indépendance ni l’impartialité de ce juge

In this post, Marylou Françoise presents her doctoral work on the role of courts in choice of law from an EU law perspective (‘L’office du juge en conflit de lois : Étude en droit de l’Union européenne’). This is a important issue for all EU PIL experts and obviously a recurring topic in France (see here, here, here and here).

Introduction

This work raises a topical issue at the crossroad of private international law, EU law, and civil procedure. It aims at rethinking the national procedural system of EU Member States to accommodate more efficiently European choice-of-law rules. The status of EU choice-of-law rules before national courts can legitimately be questioned in the light of the objectives pursued by these rules.

The Functional Nature of the EU Choice of Law Rules

EU choice-of-law rules are part of a specific policy of the European Union based on Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. According to this provision, the EU has the competence to develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications. The main goals are to encourage accessibility to justice for European citizens, to offer a predictable justice based on clear articulation of national provisions and to achieve international harmony of solutions. In this context, the European regulations applicable to conflict-of-laws are adopted to ensure that the same national law is designated irrespective of the national court hearing the case. Thus, EU choice-of-law rules have a functional nature. To achieve their goal, they need to be applied uniformly. Yet, there is no common procedural framework along with the European regulations in conflict-of-laws matter. Their uniform application depends on various national procedural provisions of the Member States.

The National Heterogeneity of Procedural Rules in Conflict-of-laws

According to the Latin maxim forum regit processum, the procedural status of choice-of-law rules depends on the national law of the court hearing the case. Several studies, including the study conducting by the Swiss institute of comparative law, have shown the diversity of national procedural provisions. The French system is particularly complex because it requires that courts distinguish between rights according to their availability (i.e. whether the parties may dispose of their rights). On 26 may 2021, the French supreme court for private and criminal matters added a new criterion that requires to apply ex officio EU choice-of-law rules when they are mandatory. For the first time (to the best of our knowledge), a national court made a distinction between conflict-of-law rules according to their European origin. If this ruling has to be welcomed according the EU principles of primacy and effectiveness to which the French court referred, the regime of the conflict-of-laws rules becomes more complex : only the choice-of -law rules which do not allow a derogation shall be applied ex officio. Yet, the vast majority of EU choice-of-law rules may be derogated from.

The French system reflects the complexity to define the procedural status of the European conflict-of-laws. More broadly, according to the national court hearing the case, the application of EU choice-of-law rules become unpredictable. The ex officio implementation of EU law directly depends on the competent court. This seems to be in complete contradiction with the purpose of EU choice-of-law rules. The unpredictable nature of the choice-of-law rule is strengthened by the lack of a European corrective mechanism.

The Lack of European Procedural Rules in Conflict-of-laws

The principle of procedural autonomy of EU Member States allows them to adopt procedural provisions to implement EU law. However, this principle is bounded by two conditions : equivalence and effectiveness ( see the Comet and SpA San Giorgio cases). These requirements are generally used by the European Court of justice to limit the autonomy of Member States. Regarding the ex officio application of EU provisions, the Court provides for a flexible approach. In its Van Schijndel case, the Court of justice held

Community law does not require national courts to raise of their own motion an issue concerning the breach of provisions of Community law where examination of that issue would oblige them to abandon the passive role assigned to them by going beyond the ambit of the dispute defined by the parties themselves and relying on facts and circumstances other than those on which the party with an interest in application of those provisions bases his claim.

In other words, national courts shall apply ex officio the European provision only if the parties ask for it. An exception is made for certain provisions in consumer law (see the Pannon case). The Court justifies this specific position by the public interest attached to European consumer provisions.

Against this background, the control of the procedural autonomy of the Members States led by the ECJ is not sufficient to establish an efficient system of conflict-of-laws. The intervention of the EU is clearly incomplete to pursue the goal of a European civil justice area. Therefore, how can EU choice-of-law rules achieve international harmony of solutions if there is no common provisions to support their application ? In this context, a new framework should be drawn up to ensure a uniform application of EU choice-of-law rules.

A Critical Thinking on a European Procedural Status of Choice of Law Rules

Firstly, it is necessary to analyse the EU acquis regarding the application of choice-of-law rules, in particular the overriding mandatory provisions, in cross-border situations and the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law. The application of national mandatory rules is generally strictly controlled by the European Court of justice (see the Nikiforidis case). At the same time, the identification of EU mandatory provisions is confusing (see the Unamar and Da silva cases). Then, the possibility for the parties to choose the applicable law is widely accepted by European conflict of laws rules (in contractual and non-contractual matters) – except for articles 6-4 and 8 of the Rome II Regulation. EU choice-of-law rules become optional for both the parties and courts. Indeed, if the European provisions allow a derogation, they are not compulsory for the judge according to national procedural systems. These two examples illustrate that EU law is already influencing the national application of EU choice-of-law rules. However, this influence is incomplete and flawed. The procedural status of the European rule depends on the interpretation by national courts of the mandatory nature of a law or of the existence of a choice of law agreement by the parties.

EU choice-of-law rules must be applied consistently. They should have a uniform procedural status. The latter can depend neither on the substantive nature of the respective rights, nor on the national interpretation of the mandatory nature of the rule. EU choice-of-law rule must be mandatory for national courts. This solution may be seen as radical in particular since the freedom of the parties is a key component of civil procedure. It could also generate an increase of procedural costs because of the recurrent application of foreign laws. That is why this obligation to apply the choice of law rule ex officio should be limited. Party autonomy wit respect to the applicable law should be maintained but it should be exercised after the ex officio application of the choice of law rule by the court. This private choice must also be strictly framed by the choice-of-law rules themselves. The material scope of the procedural choice should comply with the individual choice allowed by the EU regulations and the procedural choice should be express. In other words, the EU choice-of-law rules should be applied automatically by the Court and parties should be informed of the potential application of foreign law.

This proposition can be loudly criticised according to the civilian procedural system. National courts cannot be a substitute for negligent litigants and several questions arise. How much litigation will cost ? How long it will last ? Are national courts well trained in European private international law ? Can they have an easy access to foreign law ?

At the same time, these arguments seem outdated. EU law is now part of national law in the Member State. The rise of international disputes requires full awareness of EU provisions and a close collaboration between EU judicial systems.

The uniform application of EU choice-of-law rules is the only way to achieve the objective of a European civil justice area. In this context, the PhD dissertation concludes by providing a proposal for a European regulation on a common procedural frame in choice of law. This proposal – based on Article 81-1 and Article 81-2 c), e) and f) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union – could be included into the existing regulations on choice of law. It could also appear in a future European code of private international law or in a regulation on procedural aspects of choice of law rules.

This proposal finally requires an inevitable adaptation in practice. Judicial practitioners, such as judges and lawyers, must be trained in European private international law. The ex officio application of EU conflict-of-law rule would be a revolution for many national procedural systems. But it seems to be a necessary evolution for the European judicial system.

La France préside le Conseil de l’Union européenne pour six mois. À cette occasion, la Délégation des Barreaux de France et Lefebvre Dalloz s’associent pour vous proposer ce podcast dont la vocation est de sensibiliser sur les travaux et les actions conduites dans le domaine de la justice au plan européen.

Dans ce podcast, Laurent Pettiti reçoit Sabine Thillaye, Députée d’Indre-et-Loire et Présidente de la Commission des Affaires Européennes de l’Assemblée nationale.

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On 31 March 2022, 4-7pm CEST, the German Association of International organizes an online panel, in German, on question of public and private international law regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine: The topics are as follows:

• Public international law questions of armed conflict (Paulina Starski)
• Public international law questions “off the battlefield” (Markus Krajewski)
• The enforcement of claims from Russian government bonds: potential scenarios (Peter Kindler)
• The status of Ukrainian refugees in private international law (Jan von Hein)

More information here.

 

In 2019 in Würzburg a group of young researchers from several EU Member States met for a comparative Private International Law project and to create what later became the EAPIL Young Research Network.

The first project, initiated by Susanne Lilian Gössl (Germany) and  Martina Melcher (Austria), dealt with the national implementation of the CJEU/ECtHR case law regarding the so-called “recognition of status”.

The results, a comparative report and most of the national reports, of this project have now been published in the latest issue of the open-access journal Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional.

The issue comes with national reports from Austria (Florian Heindler and Martina Melcher), Belgium (Sarah Den Haese), Baltic States (Katažyna Bogdzevič and Natalja Žitkevitš), Croatia (Tena Hoško), France (Marion Ho-Dac), Germany (Susanne Lilian Gössl), Hungary (Tamás Szabados), Italy (Marta Giacomini and Martina Vivirito Pellegrino), the Netherlands (Tess Bens and Mirella Peereboom-Van Drunick), Poland (Natalja Žitkevitš) and Spain (María Asunción Cebrián Salvat and Isabel Lorente Martínez)

A report from Sweden, by Laima Vaige, will be published in the forthcoming issue, in Autumn 2022.

I have reported on conflict of laws (jurisdictional and applicable law) angles to the EP’s draft proposals on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence before. As I discuss in those posts (more analysis is on NOVA’s site here), many of the suggested routes created more difficulties than they solved. In the eventual February proposal (with 71 recitals: that is poor legislative drafting), the conflict of laws ambitions are much reduced. Leigh Day have a good summary of the issues here. Thank you Jorian Hamster for poking me to put my thoughts to paper.

The jurisdictional ambition is now merely expressed in terms of regulatory scope. On p.15 under the proportionality assessment, the proposal justifies its public international scope using the effects doctrine:

The EU turnover criterion for third-country companies creates a link to the EU. Including only turnover generated in the Union is justified since such a threshold, appropriately calibrated, creates a territorial connection between the third-country companies and the Union by the effects that the activities of these companies may have on the EU internal market, which is sufficient for the Union law to apply to third-country companies.

Proposed A2(1) focuses on ‘EU corporations’ (“companies which are formed in accordance with the legislation of a Member State) and proposed A2(2) looks at non-EU corporations (“companies which are formed in accordance with the legislation of a third country”), each with relevant thresholds distinguishing between quantitative (turnover) and qualitative (risk sectors: textiles, agriculture, extractive industries) criteria.

I am not sure why the lex incorporationis is preferred as the trigger criterion. Domicile as defined in Brussels Ia‘s Article 63 could be more attractive, seeing as it captures corporations with statutory seat outside of the EU but with their central administration or principal place of business here.

‘Turnover generated in the EU’ is bound to provoke some discussions however experience from in particular competition law should be able to help here.

The most obvious anchor point for applicable law is proposed A22. This sets out the requirement for Member States to define rules governing the civil
liability of the company for damages arising due to its failure to comply with the due diligence requirements, and then suggests in (5)

Member States shall ensure that the liability provided for in provisions of national law transposing this Article is of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the law of a Member State.

The intention of this Article is to make the national civil liability rules which Member States are due to ensure in follow-up of the future Directive, so-called ‘overriding mandatory law’ aka ‘lois de police’ aka ‘lois d’application immédiate’ under A16 Rome II. The challenge for the EU to harmonise private law, such as civil liability rules, shows in this formulation. The EC makes recourse to a Directive, not a Regulation, since (p.17)

The proposed instrument is a Directive, since Article 50 TFEU is the legal basis for company law legislation regarding the protection of the interests of companies’ members and others with a view to making such protection equivalent throughout the Union. Article 50 TFEU requires the European Parliament and the Council to act by means of directives.

Hence rather than formulating the future Directive’s liability provisions itself as of overriding EU law nature (a possibility expressly foreseen in Rome I’s rules on applicable law for contracts, but not impossible I believe within Rome II), the Directive will oblige Member States to ensure the lois de police character of their future rules implementing the Directive. I understand the difficulty yet I think the proposal could shortcut the discussion (and avoid difficulties in case a Member State fails to declare the lois de police nature) by declaring ‘Member States’ provisions of national liability law transposing this Article are of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the law of a Member State.’

(the latter part I believe is simply redundant).

In claims based on tortious liability, the Directive is most likely to be used to help establish fault (by action or omission). The remainder of the action (solidarity between various tortfeasors, damage calculation etc) will remain subject to the lex causae otherwise applicable. In claims based on unjust enrichment (a business and human rights route much worth exploring for supply chain cases) the Directive will most likely remain of smaller use seeing as these claims do not aim to establish liability, however the  paper trail which the Directive will ensure, may be of documentary use here, too.

Geert.

At first sight few conflict of laws anchors in EU's proposed due diligence law
EU turnover as threshold is reminiscent of EU competition law
Registered office as compliance anchor
A22 qualifies the Dir as lois de police viz Rome I, II
71 recitals – yukhttps://t.co/JV1dip9gfW pic.twitter.com/Obhkn3qXR8

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 23, 2022

Several French learned societies (International Arbitration Institute, Comité français de l’arbitrage, Comité français de droit international privé, French Branch of the International Law Association, Société de législation comparée) will pay a tribute to Emmanuel Gaillard in a conference held in the Grand Amphithéâtre of the Sorbonne in Paris on 15 April 2022.

The conference Emmanuel Gaillard Theory in Action will feature testimonials of a variety of professionals and discussions of some of the theories promoted by Emmanuel Gaillard, including the arbitral legal order and the boundaries of private international law.

The sudden passing of Professor Emmanuel Gaillard on 1 April 2021 came as a shock for the legal world. One year later, five learned societies, of which Professor Gaillard had been an active member, on whose governing board he had served or which he had founded, are endeavouring to pay tribute to his manifold contributions to the world of law as well as the depth of his thinking, in arbitration law and beyond. The testimonials, analyses and discussions that will be shared during this event will highlight Professor Gaillard’s ability to combine theory and practice. Though he is no longer with us, he will forever remain an inspiration to generations of lawyers, as they strive to carry forth his legacy: theory in action.

The full programme of the conference is available here. Registration to the conference is possible here.

Gaillard was a prolific author, who wrote many books and articles. He also liked to draw, and made some drawings which aptly summarise some of his theories.

Le maintien en zone d’attente d’un étranger pendant un délai de quatre jours sans l’intervention du juge judiciaire ne porte pas atteinte à la liberté individuelle, juge le Conseil constitutionnel.

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The war in Ukraine has also affected the lives of legal researchers. The Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law is extending support to these individuals.

The Institute would like to assist scholars who have had to discontinue their research activities because of the war in Ukraine. Towards this end, the Institute is offering scholarships supporting a stay in Hamburg for research in the field of private law. In addition to office space and access to our library, we can also provide assistance in locating housing.

Affected researchers can contact the Institute’s Welcome Center. The offer is directed at doctoral candidates as well as individuals who have already earned their doctorates.

© shutterstock / MAKSIM ANKUDA

 

Under the Insolvency Regulation 2015, a transfer of the centre of main interests (COMI) of the debtor after lodging of the request for opening of insolvency proceedings affects the exclusive jurisdiction of the court seised with that application prior to the transfer?

This is the legal issue that the Court addresses in the judgement delivered this morning in the case Galapagos BidCo, C-723/20.

Factual context

A holding having its registered office in Luxembourg since 2014 contemplates, in June 2019, to move its actual centre of administration to England. In August 2019, its directors lodge a request before the High Court to have insolvency proceedings opened in respect of the debtor’s assets.

The following day the directors are replaced by a new one, who sets up an office for the holding in Germany.

The request to have insolvency proceedings opened before the High Court is not withdrawn. Quite to the contrary, they seem to continue although a decision opening these proceedings has not yet been delivered.

That being said, a request for the opening of insolvency proceedings is lodged by the holding also with a German court.

This court orders preservation measures and appoints a temporary insolvency administrator. The capital market and bondholders are informed that the centre of administration of the holding have been move to Germany. However, the second instance court ruling on an appeal introduced by the creditors reverses the order of the first instance and dismisses the debtor’s request to have insolvency proceedings opened, due to the lack of international jurisdiction.

Next, the creditors request to have insolvency proceedings opened, still in Germany, in respect of the debtor’s assets. The German court considers that it has jurisdiction to rule on the request as the centre of main interests of the holding is situated in Germany. It orders preservation measures and appoints a temporary insolvency administrator.

A subsidiary of the holding brings an appeal against the order. It argues that the German courts lack jurisdiction as the centre of administration of the holding has been moved to England in June 2019. The appeal is dismissed by the second instance court.

An appeal on a point of law is brought before the Bundesgerichtshof, which lodges a request for a preliminary ruling before the Court of Justice.

 

Preliminary questions

Is Article 3(1) of [the Insolvency Regulation 2015] to be interpreted as meaning that a debtor company the statutory seat of which is situated in a Member State does not have the centre of its main interests in a second Member State in which the place of its central administration is situated, as can be determined on the basis of objective factors ascertainable by third parties, in the case where, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, the debtor company has moved that place of central administration from a third Member State to the second Member State at a time when a request to have the main insolvency proceedings opened in respect of its assets has been lodged in the third Member State and a decision on that request has not yet been delivered?

If Question 1 is answered in the negative:

Is Article 3(1) of [the Insolvency Regulation 2015] to be interpreted as meaning that: the courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of the debtor’s main interests is situated at the time when the debtor lodges the request to have insolvency proceedings opened retain international jurisdiction to open those proceedings if the debtor moves the centre of its main interests to the territory of another Member State after lodging the request but before the decision opening insolvency proceedings is delivered, and such continuing international jurisdiction of the courts of one Member State excludes the jurisdiction of the courts of another Member State in respect of further requests to have the main insolvency proceedings opened received by a court of that other Member State after the debtor has moved its centre of main interests to that other Member State?

 

The judgement of the Court

The Court decided to answer the preliminary question without first requesting its Advocate General to present an Opinion.

In its judgement, the Court focuses its attention on the second preliminary question.

Its considers that, by this question, which it is appropriate to examine first, the referring court seeks to establish, in substance, whether Article 3(1) of the Insolvency Regulation 2015 is to be interpreted as meaning that the court of a Member State to which an application for the opening of main insolvency proceedings has been made retains exclusive jurisdiction to open such proceedings where the centre of the debtor’s main interests is transferred to another Member State after that application has been lodged but before that court has given a decision on it (paragraph 24).

The Court answers in the sense that the court of a Member State seised of an application for the opening of main insolvency proceedings retains exclusive jurisdiction to open such proceedings where the centre of the debtor’s main interests is transferred to another Member State after the application has been lodged but before that court has given a ruling on it. Consequently, and insofar as that Regulation remains applicable to that application, the court of another Member State subsequently seised of an application made for the same purpose may not, in principle, assume jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings until the first court has given judgement and declined jurisdiction (paragraph 40).

Having in mind the specificity of the case which concerns the UK, the Court makes some additional remarks as to the implications of Brexit. Indeed, the aforementioned passage relating to the fact that “the Regulation remains applicable to the application” echoes this issue.

In essence, the Court clarifies that if on the date of expiry of this transitional period (31 December 2020), High Court had still not ruled on the application for the opening of main insolvency proceedings (it seems that it is not clear whether this was the case), it would follow that Insolvency Regulation 2015 would no longer require that, as a result of this application, a court of a Member State, on the territory of which debtor’s centre of main interests would be located, should refrain from declaring itself competent for the purposes of opening such proceedings (paragraphs 38 and 39)

Given the answer to the second question and having in mind that at least potentially the court seized first with the request for the opening of main insolvency proceedings may have retained its exclusive jurisdiction, the Court deems it not necessary to address the first preliminary question  (paragraphs 41 to 43)

The judgement can be consulted here.

Austro-Mechana
Liberté d'établissement
L’exception dite de « copie privée » au titre de la directive sur le droit d’auteur s’applique au stockage sur le nuage (cloud) d’une copie à des fins privées d’une œuvre protégée

Upfield Hungary
Agriculture
La liste des ingrédients d’une denrée alimentaire contenant une vitamine ne doit pas obligatoirement mentionner la formule vitaminique spécifiquement utilisée

Guillaume Laganière – Professor of Law at the Université du Québec à Montréal – has recently published a monograph (based on his doctoral dissertation) titled Liability for Transboundary Pollution at the Intersection of Public and Private International Law. The book was published by Hart Publishing within its series Hart Monographs in Transnational and International Law.

The publisher informs that:

This book focuses on how public and private international law address civil liability for transboundary pollution. In public international law, civil liability treaties promote the implementation of minimum procedural standards in domestic tort law. This approach implicitly relies on private international law to facilitate civil litigation against transboundary polluters. Yet this connection remains poorly understood. Filling the gap, this book engages in a meaningful dialogue between the two areas and explores how domestic private international law can reflect the policies developed in international environmental law. It begins with an investigation of civil liability in international environmental law. It then identifies preferable rules of civil jurisdiction, foreign judgments and choice of law for environmental damage, using Canadian private international law as a case study and making extensive references to European law. Liability for transboundary pollution is a contentious issue of the law, both in scholarship and practice: international lawyers both private and public as well as environmental lawyers will welcome this important work.

Table of contents may be consulted here.