Where does one look first? : as I reported last week, Ms Kiobel is now taking her US case to The Netherlands (this case essentially involves human rights), at a time when Shell is still pursued in the Netherlands by Milieudefensie, in a case involving environmental pollution in Nigeria. That case now is being mirrored in the High Court in London. The dual proceedings are squarely a result of the split listing of Shell’s mother company, thus easily establishing jurisdiction in both The Netherlands and London, under Article 4 Brussels I Recast.
The only preliminary issue which the High Court had to settle at this early stage was whether Shell’s holding company, established in the UK, can be used as anchor defendant for proceedings against Shell Nigeria. It held that it could not. The questions dealt with are varied and listed as follows:
1. Do the claimants have legitimate claims in law against RDS?
2. If so, is this jurisdiction the appropriate forum in which to bring such claims? This issue encompasses an argument by RDS that it is an abuse of EU law for the claimants to seek to conduct proceedings against an anchor defendant in these circumstances.
3. If this jurisdiction is the appropriate forum, are there any grounds for issuing a stay on case management grounds and/or under Article 34 of the Recast Regulation in respect of the claim against RDS, so that the claim against SPDC can (or should) proceed against SPDC in Nigeria?
4. Do the claims against SPDC have a real prospect of success?
5. Do the claims against SPDC fall within the gateway for service out of the jurisdiction under paragraph 3.1(3) of CPR Practice Direction 6B?
This issue requires consideration of two separate sub-issues, namely (a) whether the claims against RDS involve a real issue which it is reasonable for the Court to try; and (b) whether SPDC is a necessary or proper party to the claims against RDS.
6. Is England the most appropriate forum for the trial of the claims in the interests of all parties and for the ends of justice?
7. In any event, is there a real risk the Claimants would not obtain substantial justice if they are required to litigate their claims in Nigeria?
In detailed analysis, Fraser J first of all seems to accept case-management as a now established route effectively to circumvent the ban on forum non conveniens per Owuso (see Goldman Sachs and also reference in my review of that case, to Jong and Plaza). Over and above case-management he refers to potential abuse of EU civil procedure rules to reject the Shell Nigeria joinder. That reference though is without subject really, for the rules on joinders in Article 8 Brussel I recast only apply to joinder with companies that are domiciled in the EU – which is not the case for Shell Nigeria.
Of specific interest to this blog post is Fraser J’s review of Article 7 Rome II: the tailor made article for environmental pollution in the determination of lex causae for torts: in the case at issue (and contrary to the Dutch mirror case, which is entirely being dealt with under residual Dutch conflicts law) Rome II does apply to at least part of the alleged facts. See here for my background on the issue. That issue of governing law is dealt with at para 50 ff of the judgment.
For environmental pollution, plaintiff has a choice under Article 7 Rome II. Either lex damni (not appealing here: for Nigerian law; the judgment discusses at some length on the extent to which Nigerian law would follow the English Common law in issues of the corporate veil), or lex loci delicti commissi. This, the High Court suggest, can only be England if two questions are answered in the affirmative (at 79). The first is whether the parent company is better placed than the subsidiary to avoid the harm because of its superior knowledge or expertise. The second is, if the finding is that the parent company is better placed, whether it is fair to infer that the subsidiary will rely upon the parent. With reference to precedent, Fraser J suggest it is not enough for the parent company simply to be holding shares in other companies. (Notice the parallel here with the application of ATS in Apartheid).
The High Court eventually holds that there is no prima facie duty of care than can be established against the holding company, which would justify jurisdiction vis-a-vis the daughter. At 106, the Court mirrors the defendant’s argument: it is the Nigerian company, rather than the holding, that takes all operational decisions in Nigeria, and there is nothing performed by the holding company by way of supervisory direction, specialist activities or knowledge, that would put it in any different position than would be expected of an ultimate parent company. Rather to the contrary, it is the Nigerian company that has the specialist knowledge and experience – as well as the necessary licence from the Nigerian authorities – to perform the relevant activities in Nigeria that form the subject matter of the claim. … It is the specialist operating company in Nigeria; it is the entity with the necessary regulatory licence; the English holding company is the ultimate holding company worldwide and receives reports back from subsidiaries.
Plaintiffs have been given permission to appeal. Their lawyers have indicated to rely heavily on CJEU precedent, particularly T-343/06 Shell v EC. This case however concerns competition law, which as I have reported before, traditionally has had a theory on the corporate veil more easily pierced than in other areas. Where appeal may have more chance of success, I believe is in the prima facie character of the case against the mother company. There is a thin line between preliminary assessment with a view to establishing jurisdiction, and effectively deciding the case on the merits. I feel the High Court’s approach here strays too much into merits territory.
Geert.
Le code marocain de famille en Europe – Bilan comparé de dix ans d’application, edited by / a cura di Marie-Claire Foblets, La charte, 2017, ISBN 9782874034312, 720 pp., EUR 80.
Dans cet ouvrage sont regroupés les résultats d’une recherche comparée qui s’est penchée sur l’application concrète du Code dans cinq pays d’Eu¬rope (la France, les Pays-Bas, l’Espagne, l’Italie et la Belgique) ainsi qu’au Maroc, en portant un intérêt particulier pour les situations de familles de MRE résidant dans ces pays. La recherche couvre deux volets, d’une part, sont étudiées les principales questions que soulevaient depuis 2004 les dossiers et litiges impliquant des MRE vivant en Europe et la manière dont ceux-ci sont traités non seulement par les tribunaux et les administrations publiques, mais également par les services consulaires marocains ; d’autre part, comment sont reçus en droit interne marocain, les décisions judiciaires ainsi que les actes délivrés par les autorités compétentes en matières civiles et familiales dans les pays de résidence de MRE en Europe. À ce jour, très peu est su à propos de cette réception. Ce qui rend cet ouvrage si précieux et utile est la démonstration qui est faite, à travers les diverses contributions, de la difficulté majeure qui – plus de dix années à compter depuis l’entrée en vigueur du Code – continue à se poser pour les autorités administratives et judiciaires des deux rives de la Méditerranée et qui consiste à savoir comment correctement appréhender la manière dont en Europe, d’une part, et au Maroc, de l’autre, est conçue la famille et la manière de réguler les relations, tant entre partenaires, qu’entre parents et leurs enfants.
Manlio Frigo, Circulation des biens culturels, détermination de la loi applicable et méthodes de règlement des litiges, Brill, 2016, ISBN: 9789004321298, 552 pp., EUR 18.
La pratique internationale des différends concernant la circulation des biens culturels est devenue très riche pendant les dernières années, grâce à la prolifération de normes internationales applicables et à la multiplication de juridictions compétentes à saisir les litiges. La recherche des liens entre biens culturels et collectivité humaine et territoriale et de l’intérêt protégé à la lumière de l’expérience directe en matière de différends et de négociations, conduisent l’auteur à examiner les critères de rattachement utilisés, aussi bien que la question de la loi matérielle applicable par rapport à l’issue des différends. Les problèmes sont abordés soit par rapport à la spécificité des biens culturels vis-à-vis des règles ordinaires en matière de circulation des meubles, soit en fonction de la recherche du rattachement à l’ordre juridique d’origine des biens concernés. Cet ouvrage évalue les inconvénients découlant de l’application des règles générales édictées par les principaux systèmes de droit international privé en matière de circulation de biens et de constitution de droits réels. L’analyse est conduite aussi à l’égard de la validité des solutions proposées, sur le plan du droit international privé et du droit uniforme, notamment en cas de revendication, de retour ou de restitution de biens culturels, ainsi que de la vérification de l’efficacité des réponses données par la jurisprudence et la doctrine concernant les règles nationales et internationales applicables.
I am happy to post here the link to the statement which I signed together with 62 colleagues from various walks of (trade) life, on the EU’s modus operandi for the signature of trade agreements. Post-CETA, we strongly believe that current procedures, when properly implemented, ensure democratic legitimacy for the EU’s international agreements at multiple levels. The statement is available in English, French and German: EU noblesse oblige.
Geert.
La giurisprudenza italiana sui regolamenti europei in materia civile e commerciale e di famiglia, edited by / a cura di Stefania Bariatti, Ilaria Viarengo, Francesca Clara Villata, Cedam, 2016, pp. 527, ISBN 9788813358686, EUR 55
Il volume che si licenzia rappresenta l’opera conclusiva delle attività svolte da un gruppo di ricerca dell’Università degli Studi di Milano nell’ambito del progetto internazionale di ricerca “Cross-border litigation in Europe: Private International Law – Legislative framework, national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union” – EUPILLAR, finanziato dalla Direzione generale Giustizia e consumatori della Commissione europea, iniziato il 1° ottobre 2014 e conclusosi il 30 settembre 2016. Oggetto dell’indagine sono stati alcuni regolamenti dell’Unione europea in materia di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, adottati nel settore della cooperazione giudiziaria in materia civile, e la relativa giurisprudenza italiana, anche sotto il profilo di un proficuo dialogo dei giudici nazionali con la Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea. L’indagine è stata condotta in parallelo dai partner del consorzio di ricerca, vale a dire, accanto all’Università degli Studi di Milano, nelle sue due componenti del Dipartimento di Diritto pubblico italiano e sovranazionale e del Dipartimento di Studi internazionali, giuridici e storico-politici, l’Università di Aberdeen (Scozia), che ha coordinato il progetto, le Università di Anversa (Belgio), Breslavia (Polonia), Friburgo (Germania), Leeds (Inghilterra) e Madrid (Universidad Complutense, Spagna).
There is as yet no EU harmonisation on amino acids, in so far as they have a nutritional or physiological effect and are added to foods or used in the manufacture of foods. A range of EU foodlaws therefore do not apply to national action vis-a-vis amino acids, in particular Regulation 1925/2006 – the food supplements Regulation. In the absence of specific EU law rules regarding prohibition or restriction of the use of other substances or ingredients containing those ‘other substances’, relevant national rules may apply ‘without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty’.
In C-282/15 Queisser Pharma v Germany, moreover there were no transboundary elements: Articles 34-36 TFEU therefore do not in principle apply.
No doubt food law experts may tell us whether these findings are in any way unusual, however my impression is that the Court of Justice in this judgment stretches the impact of the ‘general principles of EU food law’ as included in Regulation 178/2002. Indeed the Court refers in particular to Article 1(2)’s statement that the Regulation lays down the general principles governing food and feed in general, and food and feed safety in particular, at EU and national level (my emphasis). Article 7 of the Regulation is of particular relevance here. That Article gives a definition of the precautionary principle, and consequential constraints on how far Member States may go in banning foodstuffs, as noted in the absence of EU standards and even if there is no cross-border impact.
Article 7 Precautionary principle
1. In specific circumstances where, following an assessment of available information, the possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further scientific information for a more comprehensive risk assessment.
2. Measures adopted on the basis of paragraph 1 shall be proportionate and no more restrictive of trade than is required to achieve the high level of health protection chosen in the Community, regard being had to technical and economic feasibility and other factors regarded as legitimate in the matter under consideration. The measures shall be reviewed within a reasonable period of time, depending on the nature of the risk to life or health identified and the type of scientific information needed to clarify the scientific uncertainty and to conduct a more comprehensive risk assessment.
Germany on this point is probably found wanting (‘probably’, because final judgment on the extent of German risk assessment is left to the national court) – reference is best made to the judgment for the Court’s reasoning. It is clear to me that the way in which the Regulation defines precaution, curtails the Member States considerably. Further ammunition against the often heard, and wrong, accusation that the EU is trigger happy to ban substances and processes in the face of uncertainty.
Geert.
A quick note on second-hand goods and VAT. For my review of Bot AG’s Opinion in C-471/15 Sjelle Autogenbrug, see here. The Court held yesterday and defined (at 32) second-hand goods essentially as follows: in order to be characterised as ‘second-hand goods’, it is only necessary that the used property has maintained the functionalities it possessed when new, and that it may, therefore, be reused as it is or after repair.
The Court does not refer to EU waste law yet the impact on that area of EU law is clear.
Geert.
Handbook of EU Waste Law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 1.
Regulation (EU) n. 655/2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters is applicable as of today, 18 January 2017. The relevant section of the European e-Justice Portal has been updated: the application forms can be completed online.
È applicabile da oggi, 18 gennaio 2017, il regolamento (UE) n. 655/2014 che istituisce una procedura per l’ordinanza europea di sequestro conservativo (OESC) su conti bancari al fine di facilitare il recupero transfrontaliero dei crediti in materia civile e commerciale. La sezione del Portale europeo della giustizia elettronica relativa al regolamento è stata aggiornata: i relativi moduli possono essere completati online.
The issue under consideration in Citysprint was whether claimant, Ms Dewhurst, a cycle courier, was an employee of Citysprint or rather, as defendant would have it, a self-employed contractor. I am not a labour lawyer but I do have an interest in the ‘gig economy’, peer to peer etc. [Note Google defines (or conjures up a definition of) the gig economy as a labour market characterized by the prevalence of short-term contracts or freelance work as opposed to permanent jobs].
I also have an interest in language and the law. After an employment tribunal in Uber blasted the company’s use of byzantine language, in Citysprint, too, (in particular at 64 ff) the tribunal looks beyond the fog of legalese to qualify the contract for what it really is. A great development.
Geert.
DOOR PHILIPPE NYS. “Wie willen we de volgende keer uitnodigen? Angela Merkel misschien, via een eredoctoraat van de KU Leuven?” Het was een lachende opmerking, net na de Ekonomikalezing van Guy Ver…
Source: Oog in oog met Angela Merkel, leider van de vrije wereld
Hooley [Hooley v The Victoria Jute Company Ltd and others [2016] CSOH 14] has been sitting in my in-box for a few months. It concerns the liquidation (particularly: selling of companies’ assets by liquidators under Scots law) of companies incorporated in Scotland but with COMI (centre of main interests) outside the EU. In particular, India.
Given the presence of COMI outside the EU, the Insolvency Regulation does not apply. Indeed the Court of Session (Lord Tyre) does not refer to it at all.Findings would have been very different were the Regulation to apply: place of incorporation has to give way to COMI, where these two do not coincide, in which circumstance the place of incorporation at best may open secondary proceedings.
At issue was among others (and for the first time in a Scots court, I understand) the consideration of ‘modified universalism’: ie what is the practical impact of there being a company incorporated in Scotland, given Scots courts and administrators jurisdiction over the insolvencies, when the companies’ business is mainly carried out abroad and when proceedings are also pending abroad.
Per Rubin v Eurofinance, Universalism” means the “administration of multinational insolvencies by a leading court applying a single bankruptcy law.” The principle of modified universalism was stated by Lord Sumption in Singularis Holdings Ltd v Pricewaterhouse Coopers [2015] AC 1675 (PC) at para 15 as being that “the court has a common law power to assist foreign winding up proceedings so far as it properly can” (see also Lord Collins at paragraph 33 and Lord Clarke of Stone‑cum‑Ebony at paragraph 112).
Essentially Lord Tyre had to decide whether the Scottish administrators’ powers were only exercisable to the extent that their exercise was recognised as legally valid by the law of the relevant non-UK jurisdiction. He held (at 36) that the proceedings taking place in India were ancillary to the administration proceedings in Scotland. The powers of a validly appointed administrator to a Scottish company were therefore not limited by the Indian winding up.
As often of course this judgment is but one side of the coin. Indian courts are at liberty to disregard the Scots findings. Any purchasers of Hooley assets therefore will have a compromised title. One assumes this has an impact on price.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.1, Heading 5.5.
Reinhard Bork, Principles of Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Intersentia, 2017, ISBN 9781780684307, 290 pp., EUR 94.
The thesis of this book is that cross-border insolvency rules of all kinds (e.g. European Insolvency Regulation, UNCITRAL Model Law, ALI Principles for the NAFTA States, national laws such as Chapter 15 US Bankruptcy Code or Sch. 1 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation 2006) are founded on, and can be traced back to, basic values and that they aim to pursue and enforce such standards. Furthermore, several principles can be identified, distinguished and sorted into three groups: conflict of laws principles (e.g. unity, universality, equality, mutual trust, cooperation and communication, subsidiarity, proportionality), procedural principles (e.g. efficiency, transparency, predictability, procedural justice, priority) and substantive principles (e.g. equal treatment of creditors, optimal realisation of the debtor’s assets, debtor protection, protection of trust (for secured creditors or contractual partners), social protection (for employees or tenants)). Using the principle-oriented approach, the book will have a significant impact for both deciding cases and shaping cross-border insolvency law. It offers both legislators and courts new substantive and methodological support in making decisions, for example where the treatment of secured creditors, support for foreign insolvency practitioners or even harmonisation of cross-border insolvency laws is at stake.
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