A further effort in tackling the blog queue. Those with an interest in the application of Rome II to purely economic damage will be interested in Uzdaroji Akcine Bendrove “Palink” et al v CNH Industrial NV et al ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2023:7093 and most probably will have seen my Tweet on the case at the time (January 2024).
The Dutch Supreme Court (the referring court oddly calling claimants “claimanten” in Dutch; my Dutch colleagues will correct me however surely this is a novel Anglicism and one which must be firmly stopped and pronto; what’s wrong with *eisers*?) has been seized with a preliminary reference on the application of Article 6 Rome II.
That Article identifies the applicable law for infringement of competition law and acts restricting free competition and it is a calamitous statutory provision.
Article 6. Unfair competition and acts restricting free competition
1. The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of an act of unfair competition shall be the law of the country where competitive relations or the collective interests of consumers are, or are likely to be, affected
2. Where an act of unfair competition affects exclusively the interests of a specific competitor, Article 4 shall apply
3. | (a) | The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a restriction of competition shall be the law of the country where the market is, or is likely to be, affected. | (b) | When the market is, or is likely to be, affected in more than one country, the person seeking compensation for damage who sues in the court of the domicile of the defendant, may instead choose to base his or her claim on the law of the court seised, provided that the market in that Member State is amongst those directly and substantially affected by the restriction of competition out of which the non-contractual obligation on which the claim is based arises; where the claimant sues, in accordance with the applicable rules on jurisdiction, more than one defendant in that court, he or she can only choose to base his or her claim on the law of that court if the restriction of competition on which the claim against each of these defendants relies directly and substantially affects also the market in the Member State of that court.
4. The law applicable under this Article may not be derogated from by an agreement pursuant to Article 14.
A first question referred relates to the qualification of infringement of competition law, Article 101 TFEU (prohibition of cartels) in particular as a singular, continuous event or rather a chain of new events: if it is a simple and continuous unlawful conduct it would lead to separate claims for damages at the time the damage is suffered; the alternative is that it results in a single claim for damages per victim, consisting of various damage items.
The conflicts relevance also kicks in ratione temporis viz the singular /continuous qualification: what is the decisive point in time for determining the applicable conflict rule?
Furthermore, the first instance court has referred on A6(3)(a) Rome II. Should the determination of the applicable law be based on the country where the first purchaser of the truck to which the claim relates is established (also in the case of transport services)? Or must this be connected to the place where the truck or transport service was purchased? Or does another criterion apply?
If it is held that competitive conditions have been affected at least throughout the internal market, how can A 6(3) b Rome II be applied (choice of law by claimant for the lex fori: “the person seeking compensation for damage who sues in the court of the domicile of the defendant, may instead choose to base his or her claim on the law of the court seised”)?
With regard to Article 6(3)(b) Rome II, the court asks the Supreme Court whether a choice of law for the lex fori can be made if the following requirements are met: that the market is or is likely to be affected in more than one country; that one of the defendants be brought before the court of his place of residence; that the market in the Member State of that court is directly and significantly affected by the restriction of competition.
Or does the (additional) requirement that the consequences for the victim must have occurred in different countries, including (in this case) the Netherlands, also apply to the application of Article 6(3)(b) of Rome II?
This will be an interesting SC judgment on one of the most dense Rome II Articles. Will the SC at its turn refer to the CJEU?
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 4.53 ff.
Truck cartel, applicable law
First instance Amsterdam refers to Dutch Supreme Court for clarification of A6 Rome II: applicable law for competition law infringement
UZDAROJI AKCINE BENDROVE "PALINK" et al v CNH INDUSTRIAL N.V., et al https://t.co/ezzYWT1SAC
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 17, 2024
A quick note on the first instance court in Amsterdam in B&C v Atlas Flexibles e.a. ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2023:4982. Relevant parties are bound by an SPA (share purchase agreement) with binding arbitration clause (pointing to Germany). B&C are pondering the viability of a pauliana (set-aside). To assist them with the viability decision they would like to depose a Netherlands-domiciled director of one of the corporations involved.
[4.3] the court holds that under the New York Convention (Article 2) the recognition of an arbitration agreement only extends to the subject-matter capable of settlement by arbitration. There is no indication that the arbitral panel could be asked to order deposition of a fact witness in The Netherlands hence it is held that the NY Convention is not engaged.
As for Brussels Ia, [4.4] the court holds that A35 is not engaged, either: fact witnesses depositions, it holds, are not a ‘provisional or protective measure’, merely a preparatory one with a view to pondering future litigation.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.576 ff.
.
Court Amsterdam: A35 Brussels Ia does not apply to, and New York Convention does not restrict, witness questioning subject to Dutch CPR civil procedure rules, in claim which in substance will be dealt with in an #arbitration proceedinghttps://t.co/O78b77BIXi
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) August 29, 2023
I have been absolutely swamped in recent months and as a result, the blog has suffered. In coming up for some air, I decided to first tackle some of the oldest drafts in my blog queue. First up is CJEU C-832/21 Beverage City & Lifestyle GmbH et al v Advance Magazine Publishers Inc held let’s say a little while ago (September 2023; did I flag I have been busy?) which in essence clarifies CJEU Nintendo.
The EU Trademark Regulation 2017/1001 has lex specialis conflict of laws provisions viz Brussels Ia. However it does not specify an anchor mechanism and therefore [26] Article 8(1) Brussels Ia applies in full.
I discussed Richard de la Tour AG’s Opinion here. As I summarised when I tweeted the judgment, the CJEU has essentially followed the AG’s suggestion of a flexible interpretation of the A8(1) conditions:
with respect to the the A8(1) (compare CJEU The Tatry) condition relating to the existence of the “same situation of law”, this [31] “appears to be satisfied” (final check is for the national court) where the claim concerns the protection of claimant’s exclusive right over EU trade marks, which is based on EU trademark law identical to all EU Member States. [29] Any difference in the legal bases under national law of claims relating to that protection is irrelevant to the assessment of the risk of conflicting decisions.
further, with respect to the condition of “same situation of fact”, [37]
“the existence of a connection between the claims concerned relates primarily to the relationship between all the acts of infringement committed rather than to the organisational or capital connections between the companies concerned. Similarly, in order to establish the existence of the same situation of fact, particular attention should also be paid to the nature of the contractual relationship between the customer and the supplier.”
[38] Anchor defendant Beverage City & Lifestyle was connected to Beverage City Polska by an agreement for the exclusive distribution of the energy drink ‘Diamant Vogue’ in Germany.
“That exclusive contractual relationship between those two companies may make it more foreseeable that the acts of infringement of which they are accused may be regarded as concerning the same situation of fact, capable of resulting in a single court having jurisdiction to rule on the claims brought against all of the actors who committed those acts.”
The CJEU throughout the judgment emphasises the sound administration of justice objective supporting the joinder mechanism.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2023, 2.505 ff, 2.518.
#CJEU this morning in C‑832/21 Beverage City#Trademark infringement, 'anchor' jurisdiction, A8(1) BIa
Confirming the flexible approach advised by Richard de la Tour AG (discussed here https://t.co/ODrh3F4pKB)https://t.co/nOc8C25mF0 pic.twitter.com/2bndwSS95Z
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) September 7, 2023
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