Flux Belges et Lux

X v Coinbase Ireland Ltd ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2023:5305 is of interest to the blog for its imho shaky finding on the law applicable to the claim. The case is a so-called pig butchering scam, a term I had never before heard of. Sites like these will tell you what it means. Essentially, in the case at issue the claimant had acquired cryptocoins on a Coinbase account and was subsequently tricked into transferring those into a ‘wallet’ over which she lost control.

Coinbase is defendant, for the fraudsters clearly are nowhere to be found. The claim in a variety of ways attempts to have Coinbase cover the €170,000 or so damage. Jurisdiction is established per A17 ff Brussels Ia (the consumer title). [4.2.4] its activities are found to have been directed at The Netherlands even without it having a Dutch banking licence: it facilitated use of the Dutch iDEAL payment option; it listed The Netherlands as one of the countries in which crypto coin exchange services were available; it offered a Dutch app and a Dutch website; it had paid for Coinbase to appear in Dutch-instructed search engine queries for coinbase and for a link to its website following up on such queries.

Applicable law is held to be Dutch law, applying Rome I. The court first asks itself whether the claim is covered by Rome I or Rome II. With reference to the need for consistency between Brussels Ia and the Rome Regulations (regular readers of the blog know that I am not convinced; see eg tag ‘consistency’ or ‘reading across’ in the search box of the blog) and to CJEU Reliantco, the court holds it is Rome I that is engaged. This is despite the claim largely being based on unfair trading, a statutorily circumscribed tort in The Netherlands. In that respect the claim echoes CJEU Winkingerhof, yet the Dutch court here opts for contract in Sharpston AG Ergo style: [4.3.4] without the contract between the parties there would not currently have been a claim.

The court’s application of Article 6 Rome I then cuts many corners: it notes Coinbase’s argument that its GTCs identify Irish law as the lex contractus, acknowledges that per Rome I (only) mandatory Dutch law trumps Irish law, yet then [4.3.7] rules out the entire application of the lex voluntatis in the GTCs merely on the basis that applying Irish law would be ‘too onerous’ for the consumer, ‘if only’ because it is much more difficult to find legal advisers in The Netherlands with knowledge of Irish law. All of that is sloppy at best.

The remainder of the judgment then dismisses the claim on the basis of Dutch law.

Geert.

Platform liability, 'Pig Butchering Scam'
Consumer's claim against Irish 'Coinbase' fails (essentially on lack of causal link)
Of interest: shaky Rome I, II finding of Dutch law as lex causaehttps://t.co/MejK4lSVTw

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 13, 2023

Leuven term is finally wrapping up and I am hoping to post more of the promised updates over the course of the next few weeks.

In Stichting Massaschade & Consument [SMC] v Airbnb Ireland UC ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2023:8562, the Hague court of first instance held the Dutch courts do not have jurisdiction in a collective claim under the  Dutch WAMCA (mass torts managed by a collective claim).

SMC on behalf of the class members, claims a refund of the service costs which Airbnb charged to the short-term tenants (the claim is not related to the landlords using the platform).

Airbnb’s GTCs include inter alia

“As a consumer, you may bring any judicial proceedings relating to these Terms before the competent court of your place of residence or the competent court of Airbnb’s place of business in Ireland.”

The court first of all reviews the application of the consumer title in particular Article 18(1):

“A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a contract either in the courts of the Member State in which that party is domiciled or, regardless of the domicile of the other party, in the courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled.”

The court [4.7] is wrong in my opinion to hold that Article 18 only applies when the consumer him /herself brings the claim. Dutch courts most certainly in my view have jurisdiction.

The Court finds support for its argument that A18 only applies when the consumers bring the claim themselves in CJEU Schrems,

Rather, in Schrems the CJEU [48] with reference indeed to Bobek AG’s Opinion in the case, holds “an assignment of claims such as that at issue in the main proceedings cannot provide the basis for a new specific forum for a consumer to whom those claims have been assigned.” Meaning, in my view, the assignee must bring the claim (presuming it does not bring it in the defendant’s domicile, here Ireland) as A18 instructs “in the courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled”. A18(1) as far as the consumer is concerned, assigns not just national but also territorial jurisdiction (see also Mankowski, BIbis, 2nd revised ed., p.516), vide “the courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled” as opposed to, for the business, “the courts of the Member State in which that party is domiciled” (emphasis added)

This of course is inconvenient for SMC which for that reason [4.4] had suggested that all Dutch courts have jurisdiction and that seeing as a considerable part of the claimants are domiciled in The Hague, that is where the claims ought to be consolidated. That does not follow in my view from Article 18 and /or Schrems.

The court then rejects A19’s possibility for a more generous choice of court purely because SMC is not a consumer, misapplying Schrems again. Some kind of SMC-favourable choice of court clause under A25 linked to Airbnb’s GTCs is rejected (the judgment seems to suggest it was not even prompted by SMC). SMC had it seemed subsidiarily argued A7(1) jurisdiction, I think (but the judgment is brief on this issue) arguing that the service charge element of the agreement somehow is different from the consumer contract. Here, with reference to CJEU C-19/09 Wood Floor Solutions, the competing arguments of ‘place of performance’ viz A7(1) BIa are Ireland as the place from which the platform is run (Airbnb) and The Netherlands as the place to which that platform is directed, in Dutch (SMC, [4.17]). Here, [4.19], the court goes with Airbnb’s suggestion as the one element that is predictable, while looking at it form the user’s points of view leads to unpredictability seeing as the platform can be used by anyone anywhere in the world. On this I think more can be said.

Overall however as noted, the court in my view misapplied Article 18. Whether that may lead on appeal to consolidation at The Hague, is a different matter.

Geert.

EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.222 ff.

Dutch court finds it does not have jurisdiction in 'WAMCA' class action v @Airbnb
Rejects A19, 25, 7(1) BIa jurisdictionhttps://t.co/ZcGaEcjUIj#Airbnb

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 26, 2023

Thursday’s Court of Session’s rejection of the defendant’s forum non conveniens objection to jurisdiction in Hugh Campbell KC v James Finlay (Kenya) Ltd [2023] CSOH 45 means the class action lest appeal can now go ahead . More than 700 workers are suing James Finlay Kenya Ltd (despite its name, a Scotland-incorporated company) under a class action suit. As BHRRC summarise, the former tea pickers claim they suffered serious neck and back injuries due to the poor working conditions on the company’s tea farms in Kericho.

Scotland is the home of forum non conveniens and the case is important with a view to the future direction of the doctrine.

Lord Weir first of all dealt at length and with the help of expert evidence on Kenyan law, with a number of issues under Kenyan law, essentially suggesting exclusive jurisdiction for the Kenyan courts as a result of choice of court in the employment agreements and /or by implication of mandatory Kenyan collective labour law. Eventually he rejects that suggestion and then deals more succinctly [146 ff] with the forum non challenge, which requires defendants show it is clearly and distinctly more appropriate that the group members’ claims be heard in Kenya.

[150] He is unpersuaded on the pleadings and the evidence led that there are significantly complex and disputed issues of Kenyan law (which he holds at the level of general duties is similar to Scots common law) that would require to be resolved in dealing with the group members’ substantive claims.

Other arguments cited pro forum non, are [151]

that the proceedings were likely to raise issues which required an  understanding of Kenyan culture, behaviour and custom.

At an important, though practical level, investigations would require to be undertaken locally.

There was uncertainty over the enforceability of any order made by the Scots court concerning the inspection of property, including judicial accessibility for site inspections.

It was unsatisfactory, from the point of view of assessing credibility and reliability of evidence, that interpreters would be required to translate
evidence, the nuances of which could be lost.

The requirement for translation would inevitably prolong proceedings.

Moreover, there was also no certainty that the evidence of numerous witnesses to fact could be heard remotely.

The attitude of the Kenyan state had to be considered and the correct processes followed. (The evidence of witnesses heard remotely from Kenya could only be granted without objection by the Kenyan state).

[152] Kenya is held clearly to be an appropriate forum. Again, Gleichlauf (Kenyan courts applying their own law, the lex causae) was not considered to be very relevant. Other issues though, were: The group members all live in Kenya. They all sue on the basis of having sustained injury on tea estates in Kenya as a result of the defenders’ breach of duty there. The defenders, although retaining a registered office in Scotland, have no other operations, factories or other discernible business in Scotland. They operate as a branch in Kenya. Senior officers are all based, and live, in Kenya. The circumstances giving rise to the claims, including the processes said to have given rise
to injury, will inevitably require to be investigated in Kenya. Moreover, the defenders have raised practical but nonetheless important issues about the extent to which orders normally pronounced as a matter of routine (eg specifications of documents and property, and the taking of evidence remotely) could be enforced in Kenya.

[153] Yet eventually the balance tilts in favour of Scotland: the judge holds there is cogent evidence of a material risk that the group members may not obtain justice if they are obliged to litigate their claims in Kenya. Lord Weir conducts that exercise at a very practical level, not as a systemic critique of the Kenyan legal system:

“(i) The group members’ duties involve tea harvesting on the defenders’ tea estates. The evidence, derived from the specimen contract, was that tea harvesters earned about Kshs 11,616/=. Although I was not furnished with a direct sterling equivalent Mr Nderitu’s evidence, which I accept, was that Kshs 15,000 was worth about £100 at current rates (March 2023). …a medical report might cost around Kshs 10,000. That…would suggest that a tea harvester who was looking to source their own medical report for litigation purposes would have to spend an entire month’s salary to meet the cost of doing so.
(ii) Tea harvesters working on the defenders’ tea estates were afforded
accommodation but required to purchase their own food. Their
remuneration can properly be described…. as subsistence pay.
(iii) It is probable that many of the group members cannot read or write. …
(iv) It is unlikely that any non-governmental organisation in Kenya would be in a position to fund litigation of the nature and character of these proceedings in Kenya.

(v) Although a Legal Aid Act came into force in Kenya in 2016 it is not yet fully implemented and the group members are unlikely to be able to secure legal aid and assistance in representation to advance their claims in Kenya.
(vi) Contingency fees are prohibited under Kenyan law and group  members would be potentially liable for adverse awards of costs.
(vii) Although there are provisions within the Kenyan Civil Procedure Rules 2010 which permit a group’s interests to be canvassed through a single pursuer or defender …, there are no provisions equivalent or
comparable to the rules governing group proceedings in Scotland. The group members’ claims do not fall into any of the limited categories of claim which would allow for the pursuit of such proceedings, there being no formal procedural basis to enable that to be done.
(viii) There are few lawyers in Kenya who would have the skills and resources to handle mass litigation of this kind. For those larger farms (sic) which could theoretically do so, there are likely to be a commercial disincentives because of (i) the likelihood that such firms would be looking for payment of fees and disbursements as and when they occurred, and (ii) the commercial undesirability of litigating against substantial commercial entities in Kenya.
(ix) In the foregoing circumstances, it is unlikely that the group members would be able to prosecute their claims, individually or collectively and whether or not represented, to a conclusion and to secure justice.”

This is an important finding and it emphasises the importance of practical achievability of properly bringing a claim (that is an echo of Lord Briggs’ ‘substantial justice’ considerations in the forum non conveniens part of UKSC Vedanta, which is not referred to in current judgment).

Geert.

Court of Session rejects exclusive jurisdiction for KEN courts and forum non conveniens defence. judge finds against forum non essentially on grounds of substantive justice

More soon

For background to the jurisdictional tussle see https://t.co/64kZyfDuOK

via @StevePeers https://t.co/ufOy1sUG3v pic.twitter.com/RHVWih2MtH

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 13, 2023

I have reported before on the European Commission’s reasoning to refuse to support the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention. Leigh Day and Daniel Leader in particular report here on a recent initiative of note: a letter by Dr Yeophantong, Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, has written to the European Commission asking it to explain its refusal to endorse the UK request to join.

Dr Yeophantong suggests the EC recalcitrance “may limit the legal accountability of UK domiciled businesses’ behaviour outside the UK, for which she refers in particular to the expected trend post Brexit, for even UK incorporated business to try and deflect jurisdiction in the UK courts viz claims pursuing these corporations for their or others’ business and human rights record outside the UK. The vehicle for this to happen is of course forum non conveniens. As readers know (otherwise try ‘CSR’ or ‘forum non’ or ‘Article 34’ in the search box), the UK have for a long time applied forum non conveniens, a mechanism not known in the Brussels regime other than in the reduced form of Articles 33-34 Brussels Ia, and not known at all in the Lugano Convention.

As Leigh Day summarise, Dr Yeophantong posed six questions in her letter, including asking Ms Von der Leyen, Commission President:

• • To explain how its refusal to allow the UK to join the treaty conforms to the EU’s support for the UN Guiding Principles;
  • For clarification on the processes within the EU which have led to the UK being refused accession to the Lugano Convention;
  • What process will be used to consider the UK’s request to re-join Lugano, and whether the European Commission is the competent authority to oversee this process; and
  • For an explanation how the Hague Conventions can provide the same protection as the Lugano Convention from the behaviour of UK businesses operating in other countries.

At first sight it may seem odd to ask the EU to justify its actions vis-a-vis a mechanism (forum non) that is part of all of the UK’s common laws: rather, one might say, the obvious target is UK law itself. However politically speaking, it is most certainly correct that EU support for UK Lugano accession would with one swoop pull the carpet from underneath an important mechanism for UK corporations to try and avoid discipline for human rights abuses abroad. This is arguably in line with the EU’s committments under human rights law. Moreover, there is as I suggested here, inconsistency in the Commission’s approach to external judicial cooperation policies of relevance to Lugano.

To be continued.

Geert.

EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 1.7.

Working Group is concerned that the EC’s refusal to the UK’s accession to the Convention “may limit the legal accountability of UK domiciled businesses’ behaviour outside the UK https://t.co/MLCgbWIUlr

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 4, 2023

See here for one of the questions I asked one cohort of students in this term’s exam, the other group got this question:

In Case C-81/23 FCA Italy and FPT Industrial, an Austrian court has asked the CJEU the following Q: (I simplified the Q for exam purposes)

Must point 2 of Article 7 of [Brussels Ia] be interpreted as meaning that, in an action for tortious liability against the developer (domiciled in Member State A, Italy) of a diesel engine with a prohibited defeat device…, the “place where the harmful event occurred or may occur” in a case where the vehicle was bought by the applicant domiciled in Member State B (in this case: Austria) from a third party established in Member State C (in this case: Germany) is a) the place where the contract was concluded; b) the place where the vehicle was delivered, or c) the place where the physical defect constituting the damage occurred and, therefore, the place where the vehicle is normally used?

‘Prohibited defeat devices’ are the kind of devices which led for instance to the Volkswagen dieselgate scandal. Their use leads to an artificially low fuel consumption in test circumstances, meaning in reality a car consumes more than the tests indicate. Once this was exposed, the second hand value of these cars plummeted, and owners had been spending much more on petrol for the car than they would have expected.

For your info, under Austrian law, ‘purchase’ (in the sense of acquisition of ownership) consists of the transaction that creates the relationship of obligation (title) and the dispositive transaction (procedure, in particular transfer). In the event of a discrepancy between the place of conclusion of the contract and the place of transfer, ownership is acquired only at the place of the transfer of the movable property. By contrast, under other national laws, French law for example, ownership is transferred, as a general rule, as soon as the contract is concluded.

How do you suggest the CJEU respond to this question? Argue with reference inter alia to relevant CJEU case-law.

I would have expected students to reply along the following lines.

Firstly, as always with these essay questions as indeed with the CJEU’s approach to same, they should remind themselves of the main CJEU lines of interpretation of the relevant provisions of in this case, here: Brussels Ia and in particular Article 7(2). The principles of autonomous interpretation (seeing as A7(2) is engaged reference to CJEU Melzer would have been obvious), of predictability; the need restrictively to apply variations (here: A7(2) forum delicti) to A4 actor sequitur forum rei while at the same time honouring the spirit of CJEU Bier and its distinction between locus delicti commissi and locus damni.

Further on the latter, the question clearly engages with Bier’s locus damni rather than locus delicti commissi (CJEU Kainz useful reference for the latter, and (see also below) lack of clarification of locus delicti commissi in Volkswagen).

Many of the students of course would have heard the echo of CJEU Volkswagen, and reference should have been made to [30] ff ‘place of purchase’ by the downstream acquirer as the way in which the Court identifies locus damni. Here, things get messy (as A7(2) often does) for as the reference indicates, there is no ius commune on the place of purchase, neither European harmonisation. The CJEU bumping into the limits of harmonisation (my students know this as the ‘Truman Show’; CJEU Tessili v Dunlop and Jaaskinen AG in Maison du Whisky /Corman-Collins good references) would have been a good comment to make, with answer a) perhaps having the upper hand (although at this stage I am less interested in a, b or c and more in clear structure and plan of attack; proper reference to case-law; and discussion of the general principles).

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.460.

I asked one group of my students of private international law in the most recent exam session the following question:

In Case C-429/22 VK v N1 Interactive Ltd, an Austrian court has asked the CJEU the following Q:

Is Article 6(1) of [the Rome I Regulation] to be interpreted as meaning that the law of the country in which the consumer has his or her habitual residence is not applicable if the law applicable under Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, the application of which the applicant seeks and which would be applicable if the applicant lacked consumer status, is more favourable to the applicant?

‘VK’ is a natural person and he is the applicant.

How do you suggest the CJEU should respond to this question? Argue with reference inter alia to relevant CJEU case-law.

I would have expected them to answer along the following lines.

Overall (and perhaps mostly meant for consumption by the students; forgive the rant therefore) of course it is disappointing to see how many students, despite repeated calls to the contrary and despite having 1 hour and 25 minutes to answer the question with a 2-page essay, omit to bring structure to their answer, with an introduction clarifying the plan of attack, a main body arranged alongside preferably underlined or highlighted main arguments and authority, and a conclusion. Instead they reply with a laser shoot of possible approaches without any landscaping in the text.

Now, to the case at hand. Firstly, one should point to the Regulation’s overall goal of predictability (a general theme of course in EU private international law), as illustrated by recital 16 Rome I, yet also, for the specific issue of the protected categories, its goal to protect weaker parties (illustrated by recital 23).

Recital 16 itself indicates the ordinary variation the Regulation allows to the topic of predictability, seeing as it reads

To contribute to the general objective of this Regulation, legal certainty in the European judicial area, the conflict-of-law rules should be highly foreseeable. The courts should, however, retain a degree of discretion to determine the law that is most closely connected to the situation.

That extract should have triggered the student’s attention to the various instances in the Regulation where a court may indeed correct the ordinarily applicable law by reference to a ‘most closely connected law’. In particular, attention should have been paid to the contrast between A6 Rome I, the consumer title, which does not have a ‘most closely connected test’, and that other category of protected parties, employees, who in A8(4) do have a most closely connected exception. A contra legem reading of a ‘most closely connected test’ in A4 would seem to be out off the question and even if it were not out off the question, the most closely connected law need not necessarily reflect the one more favourable to the consumer. This is also illustrated by CJEU Schlecker where the criteria for this determination were not inspired by seeking the greatest protection for the employee.

Students pushing for the alternative (the CJEU might go contra legem in the interest of consumers), would have certainly had to refer to CJEU authority supporting this and would have been most probably been referring to case-law under Brussels Ia to make that point (ex multi in particular Commerzbank (a Lugano case) and Markt24), in turn also referring to recital 7 Rome I for the need for ‘consistency’ between Brussels Ia and Rome I.

Reference can also be made to the protected categories provisions being ‘insulated’, self-sufficient Articles. This is particularly the case of course for Brussels Ia, slightly less so perhaps for Rome I seeing as the latter’s provisions for the protected categories do cross-refer to Article 3.

All in all the most likely direction of travel for the judgment is likely to be a reply in the negative. Finally, however, a good reply would have included an acknowledgment that this might not deter the cleverly litigating consumer from dipping its hands into Article 4 anyways, by reverse engineering or arguing his /her claim as one that does not engage the consumer title: suggesting professional use (with pro inspiratio reference to CJEU Gruber), for instance.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 3.2.5.

A late note on ClientEarth v Shell Plc & Ors (Re Prima Facie Case) [2023] EWHC 1137 (Ch) in which Trower J refused to give permission to Client Earth (qualitate qua Shell shareholders) to bring a derivative claim in lieu of Shell, against the corporation’s directors.

The breaches alleged in ClientEarth’s claim are said to arise out of the Directors’ acts and omissions relating to Shell’s climate change risk management strategy as described in relevant corporate documentation. It also alleges breaches relating to the Directors’ response to the order made by the Hague District Court in Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell plc which I reviewed here.

[3]:

The reason the legislation imposes an obligation on a shareholder to obtain permission to bring a derivative claim is that such a claim is an exception to one of the most basic principles of company law: it is a matter for a company, acting through its proper constitutional organs, not any one or more of its shareholders, to determine whether or not to pursue a cause of action that may be available to it. ClientEarth must therefore show that the limited and restricted circumstances in which it is appropriate for the court to authorise it, as a shareholder of Shell, to continue a derivative action against the Directors for breach of duty are present.

Current stage of the process is said to provide a filter for “unmeritorious” or “clearly undeserving” cases, with importantly [5] the applicant having to show that its application establishes a prima facie case before a substantive hearing is held. The substantive application for permission is set out in s.263 of CA 2006, as to which:

i) s.263(2) provides that an application for permission must be refused if the court is satisfied (a) that a person acting in accordance with his duty to promote the success of the company would not seek to continue the claim or (b) / (c) that any act or omission from which the cause of action arises has been authorised or ratified by the company before or since it occurred;

ii) s.263(3) makes provisions for a number of discretionary factors which the court must take into account in reaching its decision – they are (a) whether the member concerned is acting in good faith in seeking to continue the claim, (b) the importance which a person acting in accordance with his duty to promote the success of the company would attach to continuing it, (c) / (d) whether any act or omission from which the cause of action arises would be likely to be authorised or ratified by the company, (e) whether the company has decided not to pursue the claim and (f) whether the act or omission in respect of which the claim is brought gives rise to a cause of action that the member could pursue in his own right rather than on behalf of the company; and

iii) the court is also required by section 263(4) of CA 2006 to have particular regard to any evidence before it as to the views of members of the company who have no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter.

[14] The duties relied on by ClientEarth include two of the statutory general duties owed by the Directors to the Company pursuant to s.170 of CA 2006: the duty to promote the success of the Company (s.172 of CA 2006) and the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence (s.174 of CA 2006s).

[16] The duties owed by the Directors are also said to include what are pleaded as six necessary incidents of the statutory duties “when considering climate risk for a company such as Shell”. These are said by ClientEarth to be:

i) a duty to make judgments regarding climate risk that are based upon a reasonable consensus of scientific opinion;

ii) a duty to accord appropriate weight to climate risk;

iii) a duty to implement reasonable measures to mitigate the risks to the long-term financial profitability and resilience of Shell in the transition to a global energy system and economy aligned with the global temperature objective of 1.5°c under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change 2015 (“GTO”);

iv) a duty to adopt strategies which are reasonably likely to meet Shell’s targets to mitigate climate risk;

v) a duty to ensure that the strategies adopted to manage climate risk are reasonably in the control of both existing and future directors; and

vi) a duty to ensure that Shell takes reasonable steps to comply with applicable legal obligations.

[21] ClientEarth is not proposing any specific strategy which it requires the Board to adopt. Instead, it alleges that the Board’s current approach falls outside the range of reasonable responses to climate change risk. [26] ClientEarth needs to show that that the Directors’ current approach falls outside the range of reasonable responses to climate change risk and will cause harm to Shell’s members.

Conflicts lawyers will be interested in the two additional duties which are referred to as the further obligations [22]. They are that, pursuant to the common law of England and Dutch law respectively, a director who is aware of a court order is under a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that the order is obeyed. This is pleaded as a precursor to ClientEarth’s allegation that Shell has failed to comply with the Dutch Order. Shell argue that there is no recognised duty owed by directors to a company in which they hold office to ensure that they comply with the orders of a foreign court and Trower J agrees there is no such authority:  [23] he holds that

while a director of a company is under a legal obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure that an order made by an English court is obeyed, the case on which ClientEarth relied (Attorney-General for Tuvalu v Philatelic Distribution Corpn [1990] 1 WLR 926 at 936E-F) is not authority for the proposition that there is any such duty owed by the directors to the company itself, which is separate or distinct from the duties they owe to the company as codified in Part 10 Chapter 2 of CA 2006. 

and [24]

the nature and extent of the Directors’ duties to Shell are governed by English law as the law of Shell’s incorporation, as to which the underlying point is the same. There is no established English law duty separate or distinct from the general duties owed by the Directors to Shell under CA 2006, which requires them to take reasonable steps to ensure that the order of a foreign court is obeyed, let alone to ensure compliance with that order. It follows that, even if as a matter of Dutch law, the Directors were to owe duties to Shell to take reasonable steps to ensure that the Dutch Order is obeyed, that would be irrelevant to the claims sought to be made in these proceedings, governed as they are by English law. So far as Shell’s potential claims against the Directors are concerned, the only question is whether their response to the Dutch Order rendered them in breach of an English law duty.

No reference here to anything like mutual trust such as by the Dutch courts in Heirs to the Sultan of Sulu v Malaysia.

[25] the judge refers to Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Ltd [1974] AC 821 at 832E/F:  “There is no appeal on merits from management decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of law assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions within the powers of management honestly arrived at.” A classic reminder of merits review v judicial review, in other words.

Then follows a discussion of the evidence (I do not think CPR would have allowed expert evidence at this stage nb so the evidence is provided by in-house-experts) put to the court by ClientEarth and the long and the short of it is the judge’s finding [47] that

“the evidence does not support a prima facie case that there is a universally accepted methodology as to the means by which Shell might be able to achieve the targeted reductions referred to in the ETS. This means that it is very difficult to treat what is said as providing a proper evidential basis for alleging that no reasonable board of Directors could properly conclude that the pathway to achievement is the one they have adopted.”

In the light of Shell’s effective abandonment of climate engagement beyond greenwashing (I realise I am not mincing my words here yet the company’s climate reversal under its new CEO is marketed purposely to attract investors), this is imho a wrong approach to the test. It also underscores the tragedy of climate change’s multi-facetted challenges: because of the extent of the challenge, no singular approach is singlehandedly either efficient or sufficient, yet the opponents of climate action use that as a smokescreen to bedazzle judges with a labyrinth of inaction. Industry’s Merchants of Doubt approach has clearly worked here.

As for the Dutch judgment, the judge is not convinced of the nature of what the judgment really orders, and here, too, CPR rules on evidence seem to have put a spanner in the works (prof Toon van Mierlo’s Opinion not being addressed to the court etc: [53]).

[63] the judge adds obiter that in light of the de minimis extent of ClientEarth’s shareholder interest in Shell, some doubt must be cast on its ulterior rather than derivative interest in the claim. [64]

“it seems to me that where the primary purpose of bringing the claim is an ulterior motive in the form of advancing ClientEarth’s own policy agenda with the consequence that, but for that purpose, the claim would not have been brought at all, it will not have been brought in good faith. The reason for this is that it will be clear to ClientEarth that it is using an exceptional procedure in the form of a derivative action, for a purpose other than the purpose for which the legislation has made it available. If, on the evidence adduced by the applicant, that remains an open and unanswered question irrespective of what Shell might say at the substantive hearing, the court cannot be satisfied that ClientEarth is acting in good faith, a situation which will count strongly against a conclusion that it has established a prima facie case for permission.”

I.a. the judge’s approach [65] of the collateral motive of the shareholder I imagine must be appealable as a point of law.

Geert.

Judgment in Client Earth v #Shell is now here

ClientEarth v Shell Plc & Ors (Re Prima Facie Case) [2023] EWHC 1137 (Ch)https://t.co/vYTtbJgc5T #climatelitigation https://t.co/9RS3k2gNtX

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 17, 2023

Update 6 July 2023 my thoughts on the funding issue are here.

The Heirs of the Sultan of Sulu v Malaysia at the end of June saw both the Paris Court of Appeal declare as inadmissible (due to late introduction) their appeal against the earlier decision suspending the exequatur, in France, of the final arbitral award (issued in Paris as locus arbitri, but under Spanish law as lex arbitrii) granting them close to 15 billion USD in a saga dating back to colonial times, and the Hague courts (also upon appeal) confirm the unenforceability of the same award in The Netherlands.

The latter judgment found that

a Madrid court judgment of 19 June 2021  annulling the appointment of the sole arbitrator has to be recognised in The Netherlands on the basis of the Dutch Supreme Court’s criteria in Gazprom; of note is the court’s confirmation of the issue not being included in CJEU Marc Rich (and see also CJEU Gazprom), however it also [6.7] emphasises that even outside the scope of Brussels Ia, there is mutual trust between the courts of Member States of the EU;

the relevant agreement at issue (confirmed in 1903) did not include an agreement to arbitrate; and

the stay (in the meantime confirmed by the Paris Court of Appeal: see above) in enforcement of the award by the French courts would likely also lead to the annulment of the award.

The heirs may still consider a further appeal to the French Supreme Court and the award itself has not yet been annulled however the case is notorious in international arbitration and, it is suggested, can only have been this long running due to what is said to be inappropriate third party funding.

Geert.

Confirmation of unenforceability of the Heirs of the Sultan of Sulu v Malaysia #arbitration award in The Netherlandshttps://t.co/w3OLK9xVep pic.twitter.com/7wyOdQOJH3

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 4, 2023

Thank you Anil Yilmaz, whose reply to a Tweet made me aware of the judgments of end of February in the claim brought by a number of NGOs against Total viz its activities in Uganda. The claim is an ex ante claim brought on the basis of the French statute which introduced the so-called devoir de vigilance or duty of care in the business and human rights sector. It argues that Total’s plan for the Ugandan activities at issue, fail the standard of the Act.

I had earlier flagged the procedural issue in the case and Cédric Helaine has review and links to the judgments here. The court (p.18) notes that the implementing decree which is supposed to detail the requirements of the law, has still not been adopted and that the law itself does not offer a blueprint, a decision tree, a list of indicators, merely indicating that the plan needs to include a ‘reasonable’ list of both pressure points and measures to address these, and that the plan moreover is to be drafted in consultation with stakeholders. In the absence of Government clarification of what this might entail, the court then points out that the reasonable or not character of the plan needs to be assessed by the courts themselves yet (p.20-21) and that a judge in an interlocutory proceeding in particular, can only be asked to discipline those plans which are non-existent, or clearly insufficient (which the judge finds is not the case here), yet cannot be expected to judge the plan’s reasonableness:

S’il entre dans les pouvoirs du juge des référés de délivrer une injonction en application des dispositions susvisées lorsque la société, soumise au régime du devoir de vigilance n’a pas établi de plan de vigilance, ou lorsque le caractère sommaire des rubriques confine à une inexistence  du plan, ou lorsqu’une illicéité manifeste est caractérisée, avec
l’évidence requise en référé, en revanche, il n‘entre pas dans les pouvoirs du juge des référés de procéder à l’appréciation du caractère raisonnable des mesures adoptées par le plan, lorsque cette appréciation nécessite un examen en profondeur des éléments de la cause relevant du pouvoir du seul juge du fond.

The judge concludes that in the case at issue, there is no such obvious shortcoming and that the request therefore is inadmissible given the role of the interlocutory proceedings.

This judgment of course says little on the role of the Act in claims on the merits of duty of care in which Acts such as these play a role (as opposed to claims merely arguing the planning stage is insufficient) however it clearly puts pressure on the French government urgently to produce its more detailed order, and it confirms the need to introduce detail either in these Acts (including in the recently adopted EU Directive) themselves or, swiftly, in executive follow-up. This avoids that judges use trias politica as a way out of having to judge the issues on their merits.

Geert.

Droit de vigilance, #bizhumanrights #mHRDD
French SC in tribunal de conflits role, assigns jurisdiction to civil court of first instance, not the commercial court.
Case may now finally continue on the merits. https://t.co/ERbD6r6Lsm

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 16, 2021

In Popescu v Essers the Antwerp Court of Appeal has confirmed jurisdiction in a claim by a Romanian driver against a Belgian-incorporated freight company, and applied Belgian labour law to the their contract.

The case echoes social dumping issues, relevant earlier posts on the blog include CJEU Gruber Logistics, and Altun. Outside of Brussels Ia and Rome I, CJEU AFMB and others is of note.

I do not have access  to the first instance judgment and the Court of Appeal’s judgment is a touch cryptic on a first issue of note which is the impact of the earlier decision by the Romanian courts and the extent of res judicata: I cannot say much about that for want of the first instance judgment and /or further info in the court of appeal’s judgment, however that issue seems to have engaged factual findings in the Romanian courts.

What is clear is that on the basis of Article 21 BIa, jurisdiction in the domicile of the employer was easily established [p.6].

With respect to applicable law and Rome I, the Court of Appeal refers to the CJEU in Koelzsch [42] holding “in so far as the objective of Article 6 of the Rome Convention is to guarantee adequate protection for the employee, that provision must be understood as guaranteeing the applicability of the law of the State in which he carries out his working activities rather than that of the State in which the employer is established. It is in the former State that the employee performs his economic and social duties and, as was noted by the Advocate General in point 50 of her Opinion, it is there that the business and political environment affects employment activities. Therefore, compliance with the employment protection rules provided for by the law of that country must, so far as is possible, be guaranteed.” (emphasis added by me, GAVC). The Court of Appeal also recalls the criteria of the CJEU in C-64/12 Schlecker, notes that the contract does not have a lex voluntatis (although the contract does refer to Romanian law in a number of instances) and holds p.12 ff that Belgium, not Romania was the place of habitual employment:

on-board diagnostics and trip reports reveal that most of Mr Popescu’s routes started from the corporation’s headquarters in Belgium, most of them to and fro Belgium’s neighbouring countries, and even if they were further afield, return was always to Belgium; no routes led him to and /or fro Romania;

dispatch for the routes was organised from Belgium, with largely the Belgian corporations of the group as the contracting party for the freight concerned;

the work tools, i.e. the trucks, even if they carried a Romanian number plate, were put at the the disposal of the drivers, and serviced, in Belgium, and (off)loading largely took place in Belgium.

Other factors pointing to Romania, were held not to displace the finding of Belgium as the place of employment: this includes Mr Popescu’s Romanian nationality and domicile; and his contract being subject to Romanian national insurance and income tax: these two latter elements, the Court held, simply reflect Mr Popescu’s domicile, not his place of employment.

The Court of Appeal also held [p.17-18] that it need not apply the posted workers Directive, with reference to CJEU FNV v Vanden Bosch, and that instead of a temporary posting there is a clear place of habitual employment with all the consequences of Rome I.

The remainder of the judgment then deals with the consequences of the application of Belgian law.

A case of note!

Geert.

Judgment (Court of Appeal in fact) is here https://t.co/JpvhwEBlzI h/t @jurinfo_eric) and analysis forthcoming on my blog. https://t.co/LWyYwbZ73B

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 27, 2023

Diamedica Therapeutics Inc v Pharmaceutical Research Associates Group BV NCC22/018 ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2023:2540 highlights the IMHO troubled Rome I implications for property rights as opposed to contractual rights. The judgment was issued by the NCC, the Netherlands Commercial Court. (The NCC origin also explains the judgment already being available in English).

The claim is one for revindication by PRA of documents and digital data pertaining to the clinical trials regarding a medicine developed by DiaMedica. The court held that whereas the contractual relationship between the parties is governed by the laws of the State of New York as the lex voluntatis (the law parties chose to apply to the contract), Dutch law governs the question whether a property right can be created on documents and data situated in the Netherlands.

In discussing the applicable law issues, the court in my view lacks the clarity of approach required in this area, particularly seeing as a State’s approach towards digital data clearly is an important element in the attractiveness of its contract law for the sector.

[4.5] the Court holds that per Article 3(1) Rome I, the lex voluntatis, the laws of New York, covers the interpretation of the agreement. This includes the existence of a right to suspend contractual obligations, here: whether PRA may retain the Documents or suspend surrendering the Documents in order to secure payment of its final invoice. It equally holds however that the existence of a property right (footnotes omitted)

is not a matter of contract but a matter of property law. The Rome I Regulation is not applicable. As there is no treaty or regulation guiding this issue, the rules of Dutch domestic private international law apply. Under Article 10:127(1) of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) the property law regime relating to things, as a rule, is the law of the state in whose territory the thing is situated (the lex rei sitae). The ‘thing’ in question are the Documents which are situated in the Netherlands. Therefore, Dutch law governs the manner in which rights in rem arise, whether such rights can be created, and if so, what the requirements are for a transfer or creation of rights (Article 10:127(4) DCC). Also, the question whether a revindication claim can be initiated, and if so by whom, is governed by the lex rei sitae. Hence: Dutch law.

, leading to a finding in favour of DiaMedica on the basis of Dutch law.

The merits of the case are not of interest to this blog: the identification of applicable law to the property rights, is. The NCC’s analysis shows the difficulty with the in my view unsatisfactory, if seemingly solidly rooted (see the Guiliano-Lagarde Report most succinctly p.10; Dicey 33-033 and 33-054; other standard works pay less attention to the issue) conclusion that ‘property’ rights are not caught by the Regulation, only contractual rights. See here nota bene for an Opinion of Vlas AG for the Dutch Supreme Court, flagging that in restitution cases the analysis may be more complicated than the NCC in current case suggests.

In the discussion of digital assets in particular (see eg here re UNIDROIT work on same, and here for the UK Law Commission paper), the property rights element surely is essential. This in my view gives those States with lex voluntatis also covering the property aspects (such as arguably Belgium’s residual private international law rules) an edge when it comes to regulatory competition in the area.

Nota bene just this morning, professor Lehmann posted a paper on the wider issue, calling for people to drop focus on the property analysis. Rebus sic stantibus however, the issue of relevance in the case here, remains: parties in my view would do well to identify a lex contractus which encompasses property rights in party autonomy. Unusually perhaps and most probably not by design, this makes laws such as those of Belgium, a clear winner (whether as lex contractus for the whole contract of merely, by way of dépeçage, for the property aspects only).

Geert.

May personal data be subject to property rights?
Challenging 1st instance decision A'dam

Revindication of documents and data. Ownership over digital data in clinical trials
Held despite NY law as lex contractus per Rome I to be subject to NL property law https://t.co/pC6N9sAuZ3

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 28, 2023

In Kvist v GippsAero Pty Ltd & Anor [2023] VSC 275, Dixon J refused an application for forum non conveniens in a judgment that is good material for the comparative conflict of laws binder.

On 14 July 2019, at Storsandskar near Umeå in Sweden, a small plane being used for skydiving crashed, resulting in the deaths of the pilot and all eight passengers on board. Claimants are relatives of some of the victims of the crash, and they claim damages from the defendants for negligence. None of the claimants reside in Australia. Apart from 2, who are American, all claimants are Swedish. Defendants are incorporated in Australia and carry on business in Gippsland, Victoria. The first defendant (Gippsareo) manufactured the Airvan GA8-TC 320 in 2012. Second defendant GA8 Airvan holds the ‘Type Certificates’ that certify the Airvan meets the requisite standards for airworthiness. Certificates were issued to the second defendant by the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the European Safety Authority, and the US Federal Aviation Authority in respect of the aircraft.

Gippsaero sold the Airvan to a Swedish company, GCC Capital, a financier, on 17 May 2013. The parent companies of GCC Capital AB were placed in liquidation on 2 December 2021. At the time of the crash, the Airvan was owned by a Swedish company called Skydive Umea AB (a customer of GCC Capital). Skydive Umea AB was placed in liquidation on 5 October 2022. It held, apparently, a policy of insurance in respect of the plane. The Airvan was being used by Umeå Parachute Club from Umeå airport in Sweden. The Umeå Parachute Club is a non-profit association.

An earlier Swedish claim (seemingly wrongly invoking the Montreal Convention) was withdrawn, meaning there are no competing Swedish proceedings afoot. Claimants allege the defendants were negligent in failing to include critical information in an operating manual supplied with the aircraft at the time of purchase and in failing to ensure the aircraft was suitable for parachuting operations. Passengers in the aircraft moving rearwards preparing to skydive altered the weight distribution in the aircraft in a manner that required a critical response from the pilot, a response the pilot did not adequately provide.

[11-12] the Australian proceedings are used to take advantage of common law discovery rules. Preliminary expert evidence indicates an Australian judgment might not be enforceable in Sweden (odd, I find) however could be used for evidentiary purposes in subsequent Swedish proceedings.

[19] ff the factors suggesting forum non are listed. This includes the suggestion that Victoria is a clearly inappropriate forum because the lex loci delicti indicates that the lex causae is Swedish law. This is directly contradicted by claimants [32] ff,  who argue the lex loci delicti is Victoria.

The judge discusses [42] ff, insisting ia [46] that the distinction between the English ‘more appropriate forum’ test [the away forum being a more appropriate forum, GAVC]  and the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test applicable in Australia [whether the home, Australian forum is clearly inappropriate, GAVC] is important. [56] ia evidentiary advantages to claimant are listed as kosher for jurisdictional purposes. [78] Swedish ‘advice’ that Swedish law will be the lex causae is dismissed, seemingly for it was utterly incomplete and without much justification. [82] the Airvan was built in Australia and intended for worldwide use. All of the manuals and certifications originated from Australia and have just been adapted where required to ensure registration was permissible in Europe or America, wherever the aircraft might be. [84] The relevant actions of the defendants were antecedent to the sale and to the characteristic of the sale on which the defendants rely for their contentions. The aircraft was designed, the manual was written, and in relevant respects, the fit out of the aircraft was set, well before the sale of the Airvan to Sweden.

[89] The judge concludes that at this point [for the purposes of the forum non analysis, GAVC] he is satisfied that the substantive law of the (Australian) forum is the lex causae.

A good illustration of the role of the likely lex causae in forum non.

Geert.

Claimants allege defendants' negligence in failing to include critical information in operating manual at time of purchase and in failing to ensure the aircraft was suitable for parachuting operations.
Lively lex causae discussions expected at trial. https://t.co/pkRAibZMNd

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 5, 2023

In MF Tel Sarl v Visa Europe Ltd [2023] EWHC 1336 (Ch), Marsh M admirably summarises the extensive authorities both English and CJEU (and almost all of them discussed on this blog) on ‘purely economic damage’, in the case at issue at the applicable law level with a view to identifying overcharging on card transaction services. The claim is non-contractual for claimant operated through a ‘sponsor’, RRS, a London-based bank.

[55] Visa’s primary case is that the direct damage occurred at the time when Visa messaged RRS with transaction amounts that are said to be incorrect. Visa invites the court to follow a line of cases dealing with negligent misstatement. In a case of negligent misrepresentation it is said the damage will occur at the place where the misstatement is received and relied upon (compare the discussion in Kwok v UBS). Visa’s alternative case is that direct damage occurred when RRS failed to collect an Optional Issuer Fee – OIF, as a result of the defendant’s inaccurate messaging, for onward transmission to the claimant in France. [57] On either case the defendant says that damage occurred in England being the “direct” damage resulting from the wrong and that the loss felt ultimately in the claimant’s bank account in France is indirect damage.

the judge [68-5] holds that

where the claim is for the non-receipt of OIFs, the wrong only has a direct economic effect upon the claimant by non-receipt of OIFs. That effect is likely to have been felt by the claimant in France. It is not at all obvious that the effect of the wrong as it resonated in financial terms should be seen as an indirect consequence of the previous events.

The case of course once again shows the intricate difficulty of the (in)direct damage distinction and I agree with Master Marsh  that certainly at the level of an application for strike-out, Visa’s arguments are not convincing to blow the suggestion of French law being the applicable law, out off the water.

Geert.

Failed application to strike out the applicable law part of a claim as being French law
Discussion on applicable law for purely economic damage, A4 Rome II, must go to trial

MF Tel Sarl v Visa Europe Ltd [2023] EWHC 1336 (Ch)https://t.co/AAQRDh4yrM

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 6, 2023

One my of students, Jules Culot, has excellent analysis of the recent Belgium Supreme Court’s turnaround (T BV v S-O GmbH – what is with the anonymisation?!) on Belgium’s rule for dispute resolution in the context of exclusive distribution agreements: see here. I am a great believer in progress via (acknowledged) assimilation and I am happy largely to refer to Jules.

As Jules notes, the Supreme Court has taken a similar approach as the final Court of Appeal ruling in the infamous Unamar case: the granted concessions for exclusive distribution are said primarily to safeguard “private interests” and consequently not to qualify as specific mandatory laws under Article 9(1) Rome I. It is by far certain that for national laws to qualify as lois de police or as the Belgians call it, lois d’application immédiate, they necessarily must safeguard general interests.

With our head librarian, Christoph Malliet, I share the frustration that the appealed judgment of the Antwerp Court of Appeal of 10 March 2021, is not available anywhere – but I shall not start raging about the so 1950s approach to publication of case-law in Belgium: I want to start the week-end later with positive vibes.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 3.88.

Great primer by @TheLegalSmeagol on the Belgian Supreme Court reversing half a century of authority on arbitration and exclusive distribution (re: lois de police, overriding mandatory law) https://t.co/ovCCgkG4M7 pic.twitter.com/JgwSkC8fXR

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 26, 2023

In Athenian Brewery and Heineken v Macedonian Thrace Brewery ECLI:NL:HR:2023:660, the Dutch Supreme Court is likely to refer to the CJEU on the approach to ‘relatedness’ in competition law cases, required to substantiate anchor jurisdiction. It is the Greek authorities that have held that  Heineken’s Greek daughter, in which it held close to 99% of shares, had infringed competition law.

Competition law works with an assumption of attributability of daughter undertakings’ infringements to their mother corporation: see CJEU ENI and recently C-377/20 SEN /AGCM. The SC now should like to ask the CJEU how that assumption relates to Article 8(1) Brussels Ia’s anchor defendant mechanism, which requires claims to be ‘closely related’, whether the case needs to be distinguished from CJEU CDC seeing as it is the Greek, not the EU competition authorities which held the infringement, and what impact the issue has on the assessment required per CJEU Universal Music and Kolassa.

An impending reference of note.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.13.1.

Competition law, jurisdiction
Dutch SC minded to refer to #CJEU on role of EU competition law's presumption of mother corp involvement in daughter's abuse of dominant position, for purposes of A8(1) BIa's anchor defendant mechanism, 'closely connected'https://t.co/Mum1uuMWzT

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 28, 2023

In ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2023:887 (parties names anonymised given the nature of the case; husband and wife have been divorced under civil law since 2018; the ex-husband is domiciled and lives in France; the ex-wife is also domiciled in France yet is habitually resident in Israel) the courts at Amsterdam held upon appeal that the mere rabbinical (Conference of European Rabbis) instruction for a husband to appear before the Amsterdam Beth Din so as to grant get to his wife, does not suffice to make Amsterdam either locus delicti commissi or locus damni.

The French courts have already granted damages to the wife on the basis of the husband’s continued refusal to engage with the Beth Din. Authority referred to viz A7(2) BIa includes CJEU Vereniging van Effectenbezitters, and leads the court to conclude that Amsterdam is not a new locus delicti commissi viz the husband’s continued refusal to engage with the religious courts, but rather a continuation of the same delicti commissi which led to the French allocation of damages [3.11]. [3.12] the wife’s Mozaik reference to CJEU Shevill is not accepted with reference to the possibility under Jewish law of other Beth Dins to have jurisdiction in the case.

On locus damni and per CJEU Universal Music, I understand the reluctance to identify Amsterdam as locus damni given the lack of links between the case and the parties, to The Netherlands. Per CJEU Ofab I would suggest however that a different outcome on locus delicti commissi could have been possible.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.432 ff.

Interesting judgment Amsterdam
A7(2) Brussels Ia

Rabbinical instruction for husband to appear before Amsterdam Beth Din to grant Get to his wife, does not suffice to make A'dam locus delicti commissi
No locus damni in A'dam, eitherhttps://t.co/hClfbCYVwe #lawandreligion

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 28, 2023

A late post on the Amsterdam courts’ injunction, in interlocutory proceedings, ordering Hammy Media to remove secretly filmed amateur adult content. The judgment will be of interest to both privacy lawyers and jurisdictional aficionados.

The court is not too bothered with a neat and exhaustive analysis of the jurisdictional issue. This could have brought it to a discussion of CJEU e-Date, Bolagsupplysningen, etc,  removal orders as also applied in the context of the right to be forgotten, and of course the complex relationship between Brussels Ia and the GDPR when it comes to jurisdiction.

Instead, it identifies The Netherlands as a Member State with full jurisdiction as locus delicti commissi (ldc),  seemingly arguing [4.2] (it reasons are a bit muddled) that the use of a specific internet domain name to target Dutch customers, and the use of (whether not automatically translated) Dutch on that site, makes The Netherlands the (or perhaps: ‘a’?) ldc, which in one breath it mentions as meeting with the foreseeability requirement that is part of the general DNA of Brussels Ia. It supports its jurisdiction with a refernece to A79 GDPR’s ‘habitual residence’ of the data subject’s gateway as I discuss here.

Except for that material for which Hammy Media can show consent of all persons involved, the court then bans distribution of the material, worldwide as far as those resident in The Netherlands is concerned, and in The Nethelrands as far as the data subjects not resident in The Netherlands is concerned.

It does not specify why it introduces that distinction, although it is clearly linked to jurisdictional limitations it feels itself limited to.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.256.

Adult website ordered to remove secretly filmed and amateur nude content, unless it can show consent of all involved

Worldwide removal viz NL domiciled, NL removal viz non-NL doms

Jurisdiction based on A7(2) Brussels IA and A79 #GDPR

SEOK v Hammy Mediahttps://t.co/67YHgvCt5L

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 19, 2023

Gilles Cuniberti reviewed the CJEU’s judgment in C‑264/22 FGTI v Victoria Seguros here, and I agree the judgment in convoluted terms replies to a fairly obvious question. Obvious, for with Giles, I would suggest the

‘result of the subrogation is clearly to transfer to the Fund the rights of the victims. Subrogation does not establish new rights. It merely transfers existing rights from one person (the victim) to another (here the Fund).’ (The Fund is the French public body compensating the victims of certain torts, whereupon it is subrogated in the victim’s rights).

The CJEU much more verbosely comes to the same conclusion, without making reference to the potential complication signalled by Giles, with respect to a likely or at the least potential French judgment eg confirming a relevant settlement, which could lead to novatio arguments.

Geert.

#CJEU C‑264/22 FGTI v Victoria Seguros
Rome II
Lex causae (incl for rules on limitation) for action of third party subrogated to rights of injured party, v person who caused the damage is, in principle, that of the country in which that damage occurshttps://t.co/YYFUSlutB9

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 19, 2023

This post merely to cross-refer to my thoughts on Pikamäe AG’s Opinion in Joined Cases C 73/22P and C 77/22 P Grupa Azoty S.A. et al v European Commission, over at prof Peers’ EU Law Analysis blog.

Geert.

Infrastructure Services Luxembourg SARL ea v Kingdom of Spain [2023] EWHC 1226 (Comm) adds to the Smorgasbord of ECT ICSID (and other) award enforcement issues which I also signalled here, and links of course to CJEU Achmea, Komstroy and the like. (Note this point does not discuss the disclosure issues raised).

The Spanish Government is of course duty bound to fight all these awards (around 60 cases have been brought against it), and it is fighting the awards on many fronts (first by advocating for a different interpretation of the FET – Fair and Equitable Treatment standard in the ECT, further by trying internal ICSID or other review processes; subsequently by trying to have the awards annulled on a variety of grounds in the courts in ordinary of the curial seat; finally by resisting enforcement in the many jurisdictions where investors try to have the awards enforced.

The case at issue, in which Spain argues against registration of the relevant ICSID award, [56] deals with adjudicative jurisdiction: not jurisdiction for enforcement (compare the Australian decision in [2023] HCA 11, were recognition and enforcement were granted, but not execution). Fraser J first discusses Spain’s sovereign immunity argument, aptly summaring [57] ff the CJEU authority in Achmea and Komstroy. [67] he holds

Spain argued before me the questions of EU law set out above in a manner that elevated the status of these decisions of the CJEU, almost as though they were decisions of an over-arching international court that must bind all nations. For example, Spain referred to what it called “the international law aspects of the EU legal order” and also stated in its supporting documents for the application that “EU law is an inextricable part of international law.” There is no doubt that the law of the EU is correctly described as being international law, as self-evidently it governs relations between Member States which have collectively entered into international treaty obligations under the EU Treaties including the TFEU. Those treaty obligations have international effect and the institutions of the EU have primacy over domestic organs in certain important respects. However, as the claimants point out, this argument ignores the other aspects of international law that requires observance of existing express treaty obligations, and it also ignores the effect of Spain having pre-existing treaty obligations under other treaties such as the ICSID Convention and the ECT. The EU treaties do not trump these, nor do they override the relevant domestic law mechanism in the United Kingdom.

That is different for the UKSC authority in Micula. The judge here [79] concludes his recollection of the Micula principle with the observation that

The availability of defences to a foreign state faced with an application to register an arbitral award under the ICSID Convention is far narrower than those that would be available if an award were being enforced under the New York Convention.

[89] ff he further explains that the narrow set of grounds for refusal (immunity and, although he does not think these actually qualify as exception, lack of a written agreement to arbitrate and the validity of the Award itself) of an ICSID award, left open by the Supreme Court in Micula, and rejects them all. He does in my view considers this set too narrowly.

His conclusion [80]:

with the greatest of respect to the CJEU, it is not the ultimate arbiter under the ICSID Convention, nor under the ECT, and the difficulties in which Spain finds itself does not assist it here, given the United Kingdom’s own treaty obligations under the ICSID Convention, which are owed to all signatories of the ICSID Convention. The domestic mechanism established under the 1966 Act was enacted specifically in order to comply with these.

Obiter [81] ff he suggests the VCLT would lead to the same result, concluding on that point [87]

I consider that there is a clear conflict between the EU Treaties, as their application to international arbitration involving Member States has been decided by the CJEU and explained by Mr Baloch, and each (or more accurately both) of the ECT or the ICSID Convention. If intra-EU arbitration is contrary to EU law principles governing either primacy of the CJEU or EU principles generally, then this must (and can only) arise from the EU Treaties themselves. I cannot see how it can arise in any other way. Therefore, if that is the case, there must be a conflict. That conflict does not mean that the latter EU law principles as enunciated by the CJEU remove Spain from the ambit and scope of the ECT, or from the ICSID Convention. Spain’s arguments, as either amplified or further explained in submissions (including a letter to the court after distribution of the draft judgment) was that there was a conflict between articles 267 and 344 of the TFEU on the one hand, and article 26 of the ECT on the other. In those circumstances, Spain maintained that this conflict should be resolved in favour of the articles of the TFEU by what it called “the treaty conflict rule of EU primacy”. However, in my judgment that is simply a different way of Spain maintaining that both the ECT and the ICSID Convention – both of which clearly have signatories who are not Member States of the EU – should be interpreted by ignoring their clear terms regarding dispute resolution, in preference to granting the decisions of the CJEU complete primacy over those pre-existing treaty obligations of all states. I do not accept that is the correct approach, and I do not consider that such a result can be achieved by applying international law principles to conflicting treaty provisions.

His ‘overall conclusions’ on the EU law questions, are [88]

Question 1. Achmea arose out of the BIT between the Slovak Republic and Netherlands. Does Achmea‘s reasoning also apply to the ECT?

Answer: The reasoning in Achmea probably does also apply to the ECT, in terms of the applicability of EU law, as considered by the CJEU. This means that the CJEU would be most likely to reach the same conclusion on any EU law question referred to it under the ECT as it did under the BIT in the Achmea case. However, these are matters of EU law only. The conclusion does not “apply to the ECT” in the sense contended for by Spain. That conclusion is a purely EU law issue.

Question 2. Do TFEU Articles 267 and 344, as interpreted by the CJEU, have primacy over Article 26 of the ECT as a matter of international law?

Answer: No, they do not. Even if they did, this would go to the jurisdiction of the ICSID arbitral tribunal, and the ICSID Convention makes clear that this is a matter that is reserved to, and can only be resolved by, the procedure set down in the Convention, and not domestic law. This is helpfully stated in the commentary by Professor Schreuer on Article 54 which stated that “A domestic court or authority before which recognition and enforcement is sought is restricted to ascertaining the award’s authenticity. It may not re-examine the ICSID tribunal’s jurisdiction. It may not re-examine the award on the merits. Nor may it examine the fairness and propriety of the proceedings before the ICSID tribunal.” This passage was expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Micula at [68] which definitively states the approach under English law to this issue.

The answers to the series of questions that followed at sub-issues 2(a) to (e) are therefore of academic interest only and need not be addressed on this application.

[111] ff upon claimant’s appeal to these cases, the judge considers many of the cases I refer to here, and finds them largely to plea in claimant’s favour.

A stinging rebuke follows [122-123]

What Spain’s main EU law argument amounts to is this, at its heart. Spain accepts that it is a party to the ICSID Convention; it accepts that it is a party to the ECT. It freely acceded to both of those treaties. There is no doubt that the ECT expressly incorporates the ICSID arbitration provisions within it, adopting international arbitration to resolve disputes between Contracting Parties (which includes Spain) and private international investors, who are resident or domiciled in other countries. Yet Spain relies upon its membership of the EU, the EU Treaties that created that union, and the strictures imposed on those Member States by the CJEU’s rulings on the EU Treaties. These rulings have determined – again, outlined here only in summary – that there can be no valid arbitration provision adopted by Member States which grants jurisdiction to any arbitral tribunal that may touch upon matters of EU law. This is due to the primacy of the CJEU to determine all such EU law matters. Therefore Spain argues that there can be no jurisdiction, even for a properly constituted ICSID arbitral tribunal, to determine any dispute under the ECT between Spain and an investor from any other state. This is the case regardless of whether that investor is within, or without, another Member State, although it runs both lines of argument in the alternative. It also argues that any ICSID award, such as the Award in this case, must therefore have been reached without jurisdiction and so cannot be a valid award; and/or that it has immunity from recognition in the courts of the United Kingdom for what may broadly be described as the same, or similar, reasons.

The logical consequence (or extension) of this argument for it to be correct is that these decisions of the CJEU must be taken as binding all the parties to the ECT and to the ICSID Convention – whether Member States of the EU or otherwise – and take priority over all other treaty obligations entered into by any other state, even those obligations assumed by treaty prior to the creation of the EU. What this would mean, were Spain to be correct (and I am confident that it is not correct) is that by reason of the terms of the EU Treaties, and by reason of the rulings of the CJEU and its supremacy over EU law matters, the EU and the CJEU would have unilaterally changed – if not removed – all the existing treaty obligations of all the Contracting Parties to the ICSID Convention. I know of no framework of international law in which such a position could be correct. I would go further and observe that it simply cannot be correct. It would mean that the existing treaty obligations of any Contracting Party to the ICSID Convention would have been changed, without any intention or involvement on the part of that Contracting Party, a sovereign nation, as a result of rulings by the CJEU. That is not a conventional analysis of how international obligations work, and I reject Spain’s arguments. This completes my consideration of what I consider is the longer route.

I myself have argued, based on the ECT’s travaux, that the applicable law clause of Article 26 ECT includes the application of EU (State Aid) law and must be so applied by arbitration Panels applying the ECT. However we are yet to hear from the Panel in that particular case.  I would suggest that is a neater way to go about the issue.

Geert.

1/2 Unsuccessful application to set aside registration of #ICSID Energy Charter Treaty #ECT award

Foreign Sovereign Immunity (and impact on jurisdiction) per CJEU Achmea; non disclosure

Infrastructure Services Luxembourg SARL ea v Kingdom of Spain [2023] EWHC 1226 (Comm)

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 25, 2023