Agrégateur de flux

The Court of Justice delivered last Thursday (17 June) its judgment in case C-800/19 (Mittelbayerischer Verlag KG v SM), which is about Brussels I bis. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 7, point 2, du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que la juridiction du lieu où se trouve le centre des intérêts d’une personne prétendant que ses droits de la personnalité ont été violés par un contenu mis en ligne sur un site Internet n’est compétente pour connaître, au titre de l’intégralité du dommage allégué, d’une action en responsabilité introduite par cette personne que si ce contenu comporte des éléments objectifs et vérifiables permettant d’identifier, directement ou indirectement, ladite personne en tant qu’individu ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243103&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1427608

At issue in  Khalifeh v Blom Bank S.A.L. [2021] EWHC 1502 (QB) is inter alia whether an anti-suit injunction is available to  a claimant who purports to have the protection of Section 4 of the Brussels Ia Regulation. That is the section which protects consumers by granting them a forum actoris and by limiting suits against them to, in principle (limited extensions are possible) their place of domicile. The contract is one in the banking sector, for the opening of 2 USD accounts. Defendant is a Lebanon-incorporated bank. The proceedings which are to be restrained, take place in Lebanon. Current order concerns anti-suit only. Other issues, including applicable law per Rome I (where of course the consumer title also plays a role) are not addressed.

The case is part of my essay questions in a conflicts exam at Leuven today. I would expect students to refer to the discussions in Gray v Hurley and to any reasons for EU courts to exercise, or not, judicial muscle-power in upholding the jurisdiction of courts in the EU as against that of courts outside it.

Claimants calls in support upon Samengo-Turner v J & H Marsh [2007] EWCA Civ 723 and Petter v EMC Europe Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 828. In those cases, concerning employees, anti-suit was employed viz employers’ potential action outside the EU. Defendant doubts the authority of both (and in particular of Samengo-Turner, a first instance judgment). It refers to both scholarly criticism of the position, and to the Court of Appeal’s recent finding in Gray v Hurley, referred to the CJEU but unfortunately (for reasons of legal certainty) since dropped.

At [38] Freedman J holds he need not make a ‘binary’ decision at this stage, and refuses the application for anti-suit, leaving the discussion for full debate at trial. Part of his reason for doing so is defendant’s commitment not to take the case in Lebanon any further at this stage (no commitment has been made of it to be dropped). At that trial, the ATI debate may continue (this, one imagines, will depend on defendant’s actions in Lebanon), as of course will the applicability of Rome I’s protected categories of consumers.

A trial to look out for.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 2.24.

Khalifeh v Blom Bank [2021] EWHC 1502 (QB)
Echoes of Gray v Hurley
Whether anti-suit injunction may be issued, targeting Lebanese proceedings, to protect rights as a consumer under Brussels Ia
Analysis forthcoming on the bloghttps://t.co/9fX1ecn2SZ

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 14, 2021

On 14 June 2021, the Research Service of the European Parliament released a briefing paper related to the proposal for a regulation on a computerised system for communication in cross-border civil and criminal proceedings (e-CODEX system), authored by Rafał Mańko (EP Research Service).

The abstract reads:

The e-CODEX system is the digital backbone of EU judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters. e-CODEX comprises a package of software products that allow the setting up of a network of access points for secure digital communication between courts and between citizens and the courts, while also enabling the secure exchange of judicial documents.

The project, which was launched in 2010 with EU grant funding, is managed by a consortium of Member States and other organisations and is coordinated by the Ministry of Justice of the German Land of North Rhine-Westphalia. Even though it is currently used by 21 Member States, e-CODEX lacks a clear, uniform and EU-wide legal basis. To remedy this situation, on 2 December 2020 the Commission put forward a proposal for an e-CODEX legal instrument (a regulation) to formally establish the e-CODEX system at EU level. The management of the project would be entrusted to eu-LISA (the EU Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice).

Within the European Parliament, the LIBE and JURI committees are jointly in charge of the file, and the draft report is expected shortly.

The Briefing can be freely downloaded here.

Thanks to Jorg Sladic for the tip-off.

I reviewed the AG’s Opinion in C-800/19 Mittelbayerischer Verlag KG v SM here. The CJEU held yesterday (no English version yet at the time of posting). Tobias Lutzi already has analysis up here.

As I reported at the time, the AG suggested that despite the need for restrictive interpretation of the special jurisdictional rules, in the case at issue there was foreseeability of many a Pole’s centre of interests as a tort gateway, given the predictable fall-out of protest among Poles given the contents and context of the article (please refer to earlier post for detail): an ‘objective foreseeability test’.

The CJEU however restricts the availability of the centre of interests gateway further:  [46]

article 7, point 2, du règlement no 1215/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens que la juridiction du lieu où se trouve le centre des intérêts d’une personne prétendant que ses droits de la personnalité ont été violés par un contenu mis en ligne sur un site Internet n’est compétente pour connaître, au titre de l’intégralité du dommage allégué, d’une action en responsabilité introduite par cette personne que si ce contenu comporte des éléments objectifs et vérifiables permettant d’identifier, directement ou indirectement, ladite personne en tant qu’individu.

The aggrieved needs to be identifiable, at the time of publication, as an individual, not as belonging to an abstract group of offended persons.

With Gtflix TV pending, the CJEU will have a further opportunity to clarify the A7(2) gateway for defamation.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.12.2.5, and para 2.598 in fine.

Judgment just out in Mittelbayerischer Verlag: jurisdiction in online defamation cases
For my review of AG Opinion see https://t.co/2d2Fjp70KT
Court takes a strict line of foreseeability, insists on nominatim or in abstracto identification of the victimhttps://t.co/EqSmpCeVol

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 17, 2021

AG Bobek delivered today his opinion in case C‑55/20 (Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości joined parties: Pierwszy Zastępca Prokuratora Generalnego, Prokurator Krajowy, Rzecznik Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie), which is about the Rule of Law in Poland.

Context: “  In July 2017, the Prokurator Krajowy – Pierwszy Zastępca Prokuratora Generalnego […] (‘the National Prosecutor’) requested the Rzecznik Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie (Disciplinary Agent of the Bar Association in Warsaw, Poland) […] to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer of the former President of the European Council, Donald Tusk. In the view of the National Prosecutor, the statements made by that lawyer when publicly commenting on the possibility of his client being charged with a criminal offence amounted to unlawful threats and disciplinary misconduct. Twice, the Disciplinary Agent either refused to initiate such proceedings or decided to discontinue them. Twice, the Sąd Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie (Disciplinary Court of the Bar Association in Warsaw, Poland) […], following an appeal lodged by the National Prosecutor or the Minister of Justice, overturned those decisions and remitted the case back to the Disciplinary Agent.

2. The present request for a preliminary ruling has been made in a third ‘round’ of those proceedings, within which the Disciplinary Court is examining the decision of the Disciplinary Agent to discontinue once more the disciplinary inquiry against that lawyer, following an appeal lodged again by the National Prosecutor and the Minister of Justice. The referring court seeks to know whether Directive 2006/123/EC (‘the Services Directive’) (2) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) are applicable to disciplinary proceedings pending before it. However, it appears that the crux of the matter before the referring court lies elsewhere: what concrete consequences, in procedural terms, is the referring court to draw from the Court’s judgment in A. K. and Others, (3) in view of the fact that its ruling might be subsequently appealed before the Izba Dyscyplinarna Sądu Najwyższego (Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, Poland)? How can that court, in specific and practical terms, ensure compliance with EU law?”

The suggested decision (Extract): “On the basis of the primacy of EU law:

–  A national court is required to set aside the provisions of national law which reserve jurisdiction to rule on cases to a court which is not an independent and impartial tribunal, so that those cases may be examined by a court which meets the requirements of independence and impartiality and which, were it not for those provisions, would have jurisdiction.

– A national court must, if necessary, disregard the rulings of a higher court if it considers that they are incompatible with EU law, including situations in which incompatibility derives from the lack of independence and impartiality of that higher court”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=243109&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=14807561

Dès lors que la persistance de troubles mentaux était avérée, la CEDH valide le refus des autorités belges de remettre en liberté deux auteurs d’infractions, internés et atteints de symptômes persistants, après l’adoption d’une loi nouvelle réservant le prononcé de cette mesure à des infractions plus graves que celles pour lesquelles ils avaient été internés.

en lire plus

Le Conseil d’État précise les modalités de retrait du statut de réfugié à un étranger ayant commis des infractions pénales.

en lire plus

Indemnité d'occupation

Copropriété

Assurance

Indemnisation des victimes d'infraction

Experts judiciaires

The CJEU has just rendered its decision in Case C-800/19 Mittelbayerischer Verlag (currently only available in French). The Court held that the courts of the claimant’s ‘centre of interests’ have jurisdiction (on this basis) only if the content complained of contains ‘objective and verifiable elements allowing to identify, directly or indirectly, the claimant as an individual’ (para 46). Accordingly, a Polish Holocaust survivor could not sue a German publishing house over the use of the term ‘Polish extermination camp’ in an online article in Poland.

The factual and legal background of the case are described in some detail in our report on the AG Opinion – in a nutshell, the case is about whether a Polish survivor of the Holocaust can sue the publisher of a German newspaper in Poland for an alleged violation of his personality rights (including his national dignity) by an online article containing the phrase ‘Polish extermination camp’. As the claimant sought a range of remedies, at least some of which should only be available in a court with ‘full’ jurisdiction (as per the Court’s decision in Case C-194/16 Bolagsupplysningen, para 48), he needed to rely on the Court’s ‘centre of interests’ criterion to seize the Polish courts. Yet, both the referring court and AG Bobek had doubts if this criterion would not require some kind of limit to prevent the publisher of an online article to be sued in all member states in which a person potentially affected in their national dignity might have their centre of interests.

Upon a first reading of the decision, four aspects may be noted:

(1) The Court appears to have followed the AG’s proposition to adopt “a narrow and minimalist approach [to] this case” (Opinion, para 43). Thus, instead of a full reconsideration of the ‘centre of interests’ criterion, let alone of its interpretation of Art. 7(2) Brussels Ia with regard to personality rights as a whole (as Geert van Calster was hoping for), the Court has opted for its incremental readjustment.

(2) But the importance of the readjustment should not be underestimated. Despite giving access to the ‘full’ range of remedies, the Court has never had an opportunity to specify the exact requirements of ‘centre of interests’ jurisdiction as introduced in Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate. Although clearly intended to protect the claimant (see eDate, para 47), para 50 of the decision certainly left room for additional requirements regarding the connection between the publication in question and the forum.

The CJEU now has indeed picked up this paragraph and argues that in a situation such as the present one, in which the claimant has – unlike in eDate and Bolagsupplysningen – not been directly targeted by the publication in question, it would hurt the aim of predictability if the claimant could sue for the entirety of the damage (and all injunctions) at their ‘centre of interests’, which the defendant could not reasonably predict (paras 35–38). In support, the Court also cites the need for a particularly close link between the case and the forum for special jurisdiction (para 40), as well as the aim to prevent a multiplication of grounds of jurisdiction (para 39 – a point not easily reconcilable with the Court’s continued adherence to the mosaic principle). On this basis, it formulates the rule cited above:

[46] article 7, point 2, du règlement no 1215/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens que la juridiction du lieu où se trouve le centre des intérêts d’une personne prétendant que ses droits de la personnalité ont été violés par un contenu mis en ligne sur un site Internet n’est compétente pour connaître, au titre de l’intégralité du dommage allégué, d’une action en responsabilité introduite par cette personne que si ce contenu comporte des éléments objectifs et vérifiables permettant d’identifier, directement ou indirectement, ladite personne en tant qu’individu.

(3) It is certainly a step forward that for once, the Court acknowledges the difficulties that its previous case law created for defendants of claims of alleged violations of personality rights through the internet (as to which see Lutzi, Private International Law Online, 2020, paras 4.75–83).

Yet, the Court does not go as far as proposed by AG Bobek, who, like AG Cruz-Villalón did before him, suggested the introduction of an objective foreseeability test, focusing on the relationship between the forum and the content in question (Opinion, paras 58–74; which would not necessarily have prevented the Polish courts from taking jurisdiction here). As a consequence, the new criterion introduced by the Court will raise many of the difficult questions of fact that AG Bobek warned against (Opinion, paras 45–57).

(4) The fact that the Court only considered ‘centre of interests’ jurisdiction may be seen as confirmation that at least some of the remedies sought by the claimant were ‘indivisible’ and therefore required ‘full’ jurisdiction. In this regard, the decision lends support to the reading of Bolagsupplysningen according to which most, if not all injunctions fall into this category (see Stadler, JZ 2018, 94, 95; Lutzi (2018) 34 LQR 208, 212).

With regard to the case at hand, the Court has been very clear that it does not pass the newly introduced threshold for ‘centre of interests’ jurisdiction (see also paras 36, 43, 45):

[44] Or, en l’occurrence, [le demandeur] n’est manifestement pas identifié en tant qu’individu, que ce soit directement ou indirectement, dans le contenu mis en ligne sur le site Internet de Mittelbayerischer Verlag […].

Accordingly, the Court did not need to engage with a number of follow-up questions raised obiter by AG Bobek (paras 75–87), including the potential role of the e-Commerce Directive.

Overall, it seems like the court has added another piece to the mosaic (pun intended) that is its case law on international jurisdiction for violations of personality rights through the internet. It appears not unlikely that the Court will continue to incrementally readjust individual pieces of this mosaic, rather than ever reconsidering it in its entirety – the next opportunity for which is just around the corner with Case C-251/20 Gtflix Tv.