Agrégateur de flux

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Basse-Terre, 1re chambre civile, 4 septembre 2017

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Caen, chambre de l'instruction, 28 août 2018

I earlier posted a guest blog on the qualification of the Dutch Peeters /Gatzen suit, a damages claim based on tort, brought by a liquidator against a third party having acted wrongfully towards the creditors. Bobek AG opined two weeks back in C-535/17 NK (insolvency practitioner for a baillif practice) v BNP Paribas Fortis.

His Opinion is of relevance not just for the consideration of jurisdiction, but perhaps even more so (for less litigated so far) for the analysis of applicable law.

Roel Verheyden has commented on the Opinion in Dutch here, and Sandrine Piet had earlier contextualised the issues (also in Dutch) here. She clarifies that the suit was introduced by the Dutch Supreme Court in 1983, allowing the insolvency practitioner (as EU insolvency law now calls them) to claim in tort against third parties whose actions have diminished the collective rights of the creditors, even if the insolvency person or company at issue was not entitled to such suit. The Advocate General himself, in his trademark lucid style, summarises the suit excellently.

Importantly, the Peeters /Gatzen is not a classic pauliana (avoidance) suit: Bobek AG at 16: ‘The power of the liquidator to bring a Peeters-Gatzen action is not limited to cases where the third party belongs to the circle of persons who, based on a Paulian (bankruptcy) claim .. would be liable for involvement in allegedly detrimental acts. The liquidator’s competence relates more generally to the damage caused to the general body of creditors by the wrongful act of a third party involved in causing that damage. The third party need not have caused the damage or have profited from it: it is sufficient that that third party could have prevented the damage but cooperated instead.’

In the case at issue, the third party is BNP Paribas Fortis, who had allowed the sole director of the company to withdraw large amounts of cash from the company’s account.

Firstly, on the jurisdictional issue, Nickel /Goeldner and Nortel had intervened after the interim judgments of the Dutch courts, creating doubt in their minds as to the correct delineation between the Insolvency and Brussels I Recast Regulation. The Advocate-General’s approach in my view is the correct one, and I refer to his Opinion for the solid arguments he deploys. In essence, the DNA of the suit are the ordinary rules of civil law (re: tort). That it be introduced by the insolvency practitioner (here, the liquidator) and that it is the case-law on liquidation proceedings which has granted that right to the liquidator, is not materially relevant. Note that the AG correctly adds in footnote 40 that even if the suit is not subject to the Insolvency Regulation, that Regulation does not disappear from the litigation. In particular, given that liquidation proceedings are underway, the lex concursus determines the ius agendi of the liquidator to bring the suit in tort, in another Member State (Belgium, on the basis of Article 7(2) or 4 Brussels I Recast).

Now, for applicable law, the AG first of all completes the analysis on the basis of the Insolvency Regulation, in the unlikely event the CJEU were not to follow him on the jurisdictional issue. Here (para 85 ff) the referring court wishes to know whether, if the Peeters-Gatzen action is covered by the Insolvency Regulation, such a claim would be governed, pursuant to Article 4(1) of that Regulation, by the law of the Member State where the insolvency proceedings were opened as regards both the power of the liquidator to bring that claim and the substantive law applicable to that claim. This question seeks to determine whether it is possible to follow the approach of the second-instance court in the main proceedings, and separate the law governing the powers of the liquidator (ius agendi) from the law applicable to the merits of the claim. The powers of the liquidator would then be governed by the lex fori concursus (Dutch law, per Article 4(2)(c) Insolvency Regulation). That article states that ‘the law of the State of the opening of proceedings … shall determine in particular … the respective powers of the debtor and the liquidator’. However, the merits of the claim would then be governed by the law applicable by virtue of the general (non-insolvency) conflict of law rules. In the present case that would lead to application of residual Dutch conflict of law rules, because the Rome II Regulation does not apply ratione temporis as the AG further explains. These rules lead to Belgian law being the lex causae.

Within the assumption of the Insolvency Regulation determining jurisdiction (for see footnote 40 as reported above, re ius agendi) the AG emphasises the Regulation’s goal of Gleichlauf: at 89: If the Peeters-Gatzen action were covered by the Insolvency Regulation, all its elements would be governed exclusively by the conflict of law rules of that regulation.

(Current) Article 16’s exception such as in Nike and Lutz does not come into play for as Bobek AG notes at 94, ‘It is difficult to see how the Peeters-Gatzen action at issue in the main proceedings could be qualified as a rule ‘relating to the voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all the creditors’, in the sense of Article 4(2)(m) [old, GAVC] of the Insolvency Regulation. The purpose of such an action is not a declaration of the voidness, voidability or unenforceability of an act of the third party, but the recovery of damages based on the wrongful behaviour of that third party towards the creditors. Therefore, as Article 4(2)(m) [old, GAVC] of the regulation would not apply in the main proceedings, the exception in Article 13 [old, GAVC] could not apply either.’

The AG finally discusses the referring court’s question whether if the Peeters-Gatzen action is exclusively subject to the lex fori concursus, it would be possible to take into account, whether directly or at least by analogy, and on the basis of Article 17 Rome II read in conjunction with Article 13 (now 16) of the Insolvency Regulation, the security regulations and codes of conduct applicable at the place of the alleged wrongful act (that is to say, in Belgium), such as financial rules of conduct for banks. Article 17 Rome II reads ‘In assessing the conduct of the person claimed to be liable, account shall be taken, as a matter of fact and in so far as is appropriate, of the rules of safety and conduct which were in force at the place and time of the event giving rise to the liability.‘

I have argued before that Article 17 Rome II does not have the rather extensive impact which some attribute to it. The AG, after signalling that the Article is yet to be applied by the CJEU, notes that Rome II does not apply here ratione temporis. He then concludes with an aside (it is not articulated as a proper argument – which is just as well for it is circular I suppose): at 104: ‘the more pertinent question is… whether it is really necessary to have recourse to a cumbersome legal construction, in this case the application of rules by analogy, outside of their material and temporal scope, in order to reach a solution (the application of Belgian law) which solves a problem (the applicability of Netherlands law by virtue of the Insolvency Regulation) that should not have been created in the first place (since the Peeters-Gatzen claim at hand should fall within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation). In any event, I am of the view, also in this regard, that these questions by the referring court rather confirm that there is no close connection between that action and the insolvency proceedings.’

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.4.1, Heading 5.7.

 

 

Tempus Energy et Tempus Energy Technology / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal annule la décision de la Commission de ne pas s’opposer au régime d’aides instaurant un marché de capacité au Royaume-Uni

Kuhn
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Le règlement « Bruxelles I bis » n’est pas applicable pour déterminer quelle juridiction d’un État membre est compétente pour statuer sur les demandes formées contre l’État grec par un particulier détenteur d’obligations souveraines grecques suite à leur échange forcé en 2012

Yesterday, on 14 November 2018, the UK cabinet, after five hours of deliberation, accepted the Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, as agreed at negotiators’ level on the same day. The text (TF 50 [2018] 55) contains provisions on judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters in Articles 66 to 69. Pursuant to Article 66(a) of the Draft Agreement, the Rome I Regulation shall apply in the UK in respect of contracts concluded before the end of the transition period, which will be on 31 December 2020 (Article 126 of the Draft Agreement). Under Article 66(b) of the Draft Agreement, the Rome II Regulation shall apply in the UK in respect of events giving rise to damage, where such events occurred before the end of the transition period. The remaining EU Member States will continue to apply the Rome I and II Regulations in EU-British relations anyway following the principle of universal application (Article 2 Rome I, Article 3 Rome II).

Article 67 of the Draft Agreement deals with jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions, and related cooperation between central authorities. This article reads as follows

“1. In the United Kingdom, as well as in the Member States in situations involving the United Kingdom, in respect of legal proceedings instituted before the end of the transition period and in respect of proceedings or actions that are related to such legal proceedings pursuant to Articles 29, 30 and 31 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 or Articles 12 and 13 of Council Regulation (EC)  No 4/2009, the following acts or provisions shall apply:

(a) the provisions regarding jurisdiction of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012;

(b) the provisions regarding jurisdiction of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, of Regulation (EC)  No 6/2002, of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94, of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council and of Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council;

(c) the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 regarding jurisdiction;

(d) the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 regarding jurisdiction.

 

2. In the United Kingdom, as well as in the Member States in situations involving the United Kingdom, the following acts or provisions shall apply as follows in respect of the recognition and enforcement of judgments, decisions, authentic instruments, court settlements and agreements:

(a) Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments given in legal proceedings instituted before the end of the transition period, and to authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and court settlements approved or concluded  before the end of the transition period;

(b) the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 regarding recognition and enforcement shall apply to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted before the end of the transition period, and to documents formally drawn up or registered as authentic instruments, and agreements concluded before the end of the transition period;

(c) the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 regarding recognition and enforcement shall apply to decisions given in legal proceedings instituted before the end of the transition period, and to court settlements approved or concluded, and authentic instruments established before the end of the transition period;

(d) Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council shall apply to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted before the end of the transition period, and to court settlements approved or concluded and authentic instruments drawn up before the end of the transition period, provided that the certification as a European Enforcement Order was applied for before the end of the transition period.

 

3. In the United Kingdom, as well as in the Member States in situations involving the United Kingdom, the following provisions shall apply as follows:

(a) Chapter IV of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 shall apply to requests and applications received by the central authority or other competent authority of the requested State before the end of the transition period;

(b) Chapter VII of Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 shall apply to applications for recognition or enforcement as referred to in point (c) of paragraph 2 of this Article and requests received by the central authority of the requested State before the end of the transition period;

(c) Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council shall apply to insolvency proceedings, and actions referred to in Article 6(1) of that Regulation, provided that the main proceedings were opened before the end of the transition period;

(d) Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council shall apply to European payment orders applied for before the end of the transition period; where, following such an application, the proceedings are transferred according to Article 17(1) of that Regulation, the proceedings shall be deemed to have been instituted before the end of the transition period;

(e) Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council shall apply to small claims procedures for which the application was lodged before the end of the transition period;

(f) Regulation (EU) No 606/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council shall apply to certificates issued before the end of the transition period.”

 

Article 68 of the Draft Agreement concerns ongoing judicial cooperation procedures, in particular within the framework of the EU Regulations on cross-border service of documents and the taking of evidence. Article 69 of the Draft Agreement contains miscellaneous provisions dealing, inter alia, with legal aid, mediation, and relations with Denmark.

The full text of the Draft Agreement is available on the Commission’s website here and in the press, e.g. via the Guardian’s website here. It remains to be seen, however, whether the British Parliament will ratify this text (see here). Stay tuned!

Verbraucherzentrale Baden-Württemberg
Transport
Les transporteurs aériens qui n’expriment pas les tarifs des passagers pour les vols intracommunautaires en euros sont tenus d’indiquer ces tarifs dans une monnaie nationale objectivement liée au service proposé

Deutsche Telekom / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal confirme les décisions de la Commission européenne qualifiant le régime fiscal espagnol d’amortissement de la survaleur « financière » d’aide d’État incompatible avec le marché intérieur

Mercredi, l’avocat général a requis 6 ans d’emprisonnement contre Georges Tron, pour viols en réunion et agressions sexuelles contre deux ex employées, et quatre ans contre Brigitte Gruel, pour complicité de ces infractions. Les avocats de la défense ont plaidé l’acquittement.

en lire plus

Les procès-verbaux de l’inspection du travail constatant des infractions font foi jusqu’à preuve contraire et la valeur probante des constatations s’étend à celles qui résulteraient des documents fournis par l’employeur.

en lire plus

Legal Aid Reform in the Netherlands: LASPO 2.0?

By Jos Hoevenaars, Erasmus University Rotterdam (postdoc researcher ERC project Building EU Civil Justice)

Early November, the Dutch Minister of Legal Protection Sander Dekker presented his plans for the overhaul of the Dutch system for subsidized legal aid. In his letter of 9 November 2018 to Parliament Dekker cites the increasing costs of subsidized legal aid over the past two decades (42% in 17 years) as one of the primary reasons underlying the need for reform.

The proposed intervention in legal aid follows after years of research and debate. Last year, the Van der Meer Committee, the third committee in 10 years, concluded that the legal aid system is functioning well, but that it was suffering from ‘overdue maintenance’ and that especially the fees for legal aid professionals are no longer up to date. Currently, lawyers miss out on about 28 per cent of the hours they work on legal aid cases. According to said Committee, an additional 127 million euros would be needed annually to compensate for that gap in income. Such an increase in expenditure seems off the table given that the coalition agreement of the current government stipulates that ‘the legal aid system will be revised within the current budgetary framework’. A budget that has come under additional pressure due to recent failed attempts at digitizing Dutch procedure under the Quality and Innovation Program (KEI) (see this blogpost).

Strikingly, these reform plans coincide with alarming criticism from the Dutch judiciary as to the current state of affairs in the Dutch justice system. On 8 November, in an unprecedented move, a group of concerned judges and counsellors sent a letter to Parliament expressing their concerns about the conditions under which they have to work and the perceived threat to the future independence of the judiciary and in which they denounce the exclusive focus on finances.

Those with an international outlook will recognise these suggested reforms as part of an international trend in constricting public spending on the civil justice system in general and subsidized legal aid specifically. Especially the fairly recent reforms in England and Wales following the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (LASPO) of 2012 may provide a cautioning example for other jurisdictions.

The proposed changes to the Dutch legal aid system, as well as the rhetoric used to justify such reforms, closely resembles developments in the English civil justice system over the past two decades. As Dame Hazel Genn analysed in 2008, looking back at the beginning of transformative changes in England and Wales proposed in the infamous Woolf report on Access to Justice in 1995: “On the one hand the report seeks to break down barriers to justice, while on the other it sends a clear message that diversion and settlement is the goal, that courts exist only as a last resort and, perhaps, as a symbol of failure.” Similarly, the current Dutch government has as one of its aims to stimulate out-of-court dispute resolution, and the proposed reforms are geared significantly towards pre-judicial triage, (online) information and advice, and out-of-court settlement.

In many ways the problem analysis presented by the Minister mirrors those made in England at the end of the 20th Century: the ever-increasing cost of legal aid (now over 400 million annually) is seen as unsustainable and perverse incentives in the current system encourage misuse by lawyers. However, the Minister also looks closer to home and concludes that the government is the counterparty in the majority (about 60 percent) of the cases in which subsidized legal aid is used. Most of these cases include criminal law and asylum law, but also (almost 11 percent) other administrative procedures with government bodies and municipalities. This is often based on complex legislation, or legislation in which much of the details are deliberately left to practice, with court proceedings as a result. The implicit call for de-judicialization is therefore accompanied by a call for de-juridification.

If the discussed English reforms are any gauge of what we can expect in the Netherlands, those with their eye on the access to justice ball are paying attention. The reforms in England included drastic cuts to legal aid, which saw entire categories of litigants, especially in family law, suddenly unable to access legal aid. As a result the English system today is filled with litigants without legal representation.

While such a dramatic increase in litigants in person is not likely to present itself in the Netherlands – the Dutch system has mandatory legal representation for all but sub-district courts – the reforms are bound to leave some portions of potential justice-seekers out in the cold. The Minister’s proposal includes the creation of so-called ‘legal aid packages’ aimed at a more holistic approach to legal issues, and with much more focus on self-reliance of the citizen, seemingly underplaying the fact that those citizens that rely on legal aid are generally less self-reliant.

What may provide a sense of cautious optimism is that the proposal includes a commitment to ongoing and iterative review of the measures and experiments that are part of the overhaul. In that sense, the proposed reforms to the Dutch system, at least as far as legal aid is concerned, do not seem to be destined to make the mistake made in other jurisdictions, where sweeping reforms were implemented in the absence of any research or understanding of the dynamics of civil justice.

Much hinges on the degree to which this commitment finds meaningful and consequential follow-up. The proposed reforms will be discussed in the Dutch Parliament on 19 November 2018

More information on this topic? Don’t hesitate to contact us (hoevenaars@law.eur.nl).

Société comerciale

Agent immobilier

Durée du travail

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Paris, pôle 5, chambre 12, 23 janvier 2018

Memoria et Dall'Antonia
Liberté d'établissement
La réglementation italienne interdisant aux entreprises privées d’exercer une activité de garde d’urnes funéraires est contraire au droit de l’Union

Milivojević
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
L’avocat général Tanchev propose à la Cour de juger qu’une loi nationale qui permet d’annuler rétroactivement des contrats de crédit conclus avec des prêteurs étrangers qui n’étaient pas autorisés à fournir des services de crédit dans ce pays est contraire au droit de l’Union lorsque la même loi ne s’applique pas aux prêteurs croates

Commission / Grèce
Aide d'État
Pour ne pas avoir récupéré les aides d’État octroyées à Ellinika Nafpigeia, la Grèce est condamnée à payer une somme forfaitaire de 10 millions d’euros et une astreinte de plus de 7 millions d’euros par semestre de retard

I have reported twice before on the BIBC – once viz the initial version and a second time with my short report for the Parliamentary Hearing. I have now had a minute to review the Council of State’s comments on the amended version – among others with a view to preparing for next week’s conference on hybrid courts in Doha. Note that the Council of State here acts in its advisory function: essentially its opinions aim to improve draft statute so as to avoid future litigation.

What is clear from these recent comments is that the Council does not at all embrace the regulatory competition incentives which lie at the heart of the proposal, in particular in its view on how a matter may be made ‘international’ so as to justify engagement of the BIBC. Its view (let alone the Justice Council’s fear for forum shopping?!: encouraging such shopping being the very raison d’etre of the Act) contradicts the CJEU’s flexible stance on the issue as apparent eg in Vinyls Italia. As I noted in my comments before the Committee, it is a rather odd indeed parochial requirement to insist on parties having used English in their correspondence, before they can validly engage the BIBC. Even the suggested amendment that the use of languages other than Belgium’s three official ones (French, Dutch, German) should suffice, is not convincing to the Council. One hopes the drafters will ignore the Council’s hesitation at this point.

The Council does not of course engage in the political discussions surrounding the proposal: in particular, whether in a country in which the court system arguably does not operate to satisfaction, the creation of an international commercial court may compound, rather than remedy issues.

Geert.