Agrégateur de flux

Written by Harshal Morwale, Counsel, Singularity Legal

Introduction

The precise determination of the laws that will govern different aspects of international arbitration is a crucial matter, given that there could be a substantial divergence between different laws, such as the law of the seat and the substantive law of the contract on the same issue. One such issue is limitation.

The determination of the law applicable to limitation is a complex exercise. The different characterization of limitation as a procedural or substantive issue adds more to the complexity. This issue could not be simpler in India. This post is prompted by a recent decision of the Delhi High Court (“DHC”) in Extramarks Education India v Shri Ram School (“Extramarks case”), which although on domestic arbitration, makes various obiter observations on the nature of limitation and flexibility of parties to contract out of the same.

The aim of this post is to explore how would Indian substantive law of the contract impact limitation period and party autonomy, especially in the context of contracting out of limitation in a foreign-seated international arbitration. It will also look at the legality of limitation standstill agreements to defer the limitation period in the context of foreign-seated arbitration by examining prevailing legal principles together with relevant case laws and through the prism of the decision in the Extramarks case.

Classification of limitation in the context of foreign-seated arbitrations – procedural or substantive?

The limitation in India is governed by the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”).

The Supreme Court of India (“SC”) and the Law Commission of India have characterised the law of limitation as a procedural law. That being stated, the SC has also proposed a more nuanced approach to classifying law of limitation noting that while limitation is prima facie a procedural law construct, its substantive law characteristics cannot be wholly discounted.

This distinction was affirmed by the DHC in the NNR Global Logistics case, which concerned the enforcement of a foreign award where the seat of arbitration was Kuala Lumpur and the applicable substantive law of the contract was Indian law. Under Indian law, the limitation for the type of cause of action at stake, in this case, was three years as opposed to Malaysian law, where the limitation was six years. The respondent argued that since Indian law is the substantive law governing the contract, and given that the Limitation Act could be substantive law, Indian limitation law would apply. The DHC rejected this contention and held that the law of limitation is procedural, and the issues of limitation would be governed by procedural/curial law governing the arbitration, i.e., the lex arbitri. However, the DHC’s reasoning is suspect insofar as it makes the link between limitation law and procedural law uncritically, discounting the impact or connection of limitation with the remedy, and the substantive law implications therewith.

While the premise that since the arbitral procedure is governed by the lex arbitri and since limitation is generally a procedural law subject, the lex arbitri must govern the limitation might appear fairly straight forward, there exists a degree of tentativeness as to the characterisation of limitation in the context of international arbitration. The recent DHC decision in the Extramarks case makes some interesting observations which could have a deep impact on the mentioned premise.

In the Extramarks case, the issue at stake was the limitation period for filing an application before the High Court for the appointment of the arbitrator, for a purported India-seated domestic arbitration. The DHC held that conceptually, limitation bars a legal remedy and not a legal right, the legal policy being to ensure that legal remedies are not available endlessly but only up-to a certain point in time. The DHC further held that a party may concede a claim at any time; but cannot concede availability of a legal remedy beyond the prescribed period of limitation. In essence, according to the DHC, passing of limitation bars a remedy, which would generally mean that limitation is a procedural law subject. This distinction is in line with the traditional ‘right is substantive and remedy is procedural’ divide that exists in the common law. However, this position is not a settled one and remedy, could, arguably, be governed by the substantive law governing the contract.

Interestingly, the Singapore Court of Appeal in BBA v. BAZ, drew a distinction between procedural and substantive time bars in the context of international arbitration, noting that time bar of remedy is procedural in nature. Simultaneously, it was also observed that choice of seat does not automatically require application of the seat’s limitation period and the applicable substantive law will have to be looked at. Consequently, the principle that limitation is a procedural law issue and subject to lex arbitri cannot be relied on reflexively.

If the position of the DHC in NNR Global Logistics case is contrasted with the position in Extramarks case, acknowledging the difficulties in making substantive and procedural classification vis-à-vis limitation in international arbitration, then the choice of Indian substantive law in a foreign-seated arbitration could potentially mean that the tribunal presiding over in a foreign-seated arbitration with Indian substantive applicable law could potentially be required to engage in the limitation period analysis from the perspective of the seat as well as the Limitation Act and might be confronted with conflicting limitation periods. However, there lacks judicial clarity as to how to resolve the conflict when there is repugnancy in limitation prescribed in the lex arbitri and the Limitation Act, which would more often be the case.

Notably, Schwenzer and Manner argue that choice of substantive law should prevail over choice of seat and lex causae must govern the question of limitation of actions, notwithstanding whether it is classified as substantive or procedural. Indeed, this is the prevalent position in the civil law jurisdictions. However, this argument, if accepted, will have certain repercussions on the party autonomy, especially from an Indian perspective in the context of standstill agreements, as explored below.

Suspending/Extending Limitation in Foreign-seated Arbitrations

A standstill agreement is a contract between the potential parties to a claim to either extend or suspend the limitation period for a fixed time or until a triggering event occurs without acknowledging the liability.

The legality of such agreements is not entirely clear under Indian law. For instance, Section 28 of the Limitation Act expressly bars agreements that limit the time within which a party may enforce its rights. However, the converse, i.e., the possible extension of limitation, is not discussed in the Limitation Act. According to Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, the parties can enter into an agreement to enforce a time-barred debt as long as there is a written and signed promise to pay the debt, essentially acknowledge the debt/liability. However, as noted above a standstill agreement is not an admission or acknowledgement of liability and hence Section 25(3) would not applicable. It has also been noted that the legality of standstill agreements in India is sub-judice before the Madras High Court.

From an India-seated domestic arbitration perspective, in light of DHC’s ruling in the Extramarks case, that a “party may concede a claim at any time; but cannot concede availability of a legal remedy beyond the prescribed period of limitation”, it would mean that limitation standstill agreements would not be valid.

From a foreign-seated arbitration with Indian substantive applicable law perspective, relying on the NNR Global Logistics case, it may be argued that the seat’s procedural law, including limitation law provisions, will apply and as long as limitation standstill agreements are permitted under the lex arbitri, there should not be an issue. However, given that merits of the claim would be anchored in Indian law, if limitation is viewed from a substantive law perspective, the impact of the Extramarks case ruling on the parties’ ability to enter into standstill agreements in foreign seated arbitration with Indian substantive law appears precarious.

Essentially, the legality of standstill agreements in foreign seated arbitration with Indian substantive law faces a critical impediment explored above, i.e., the divide between substantive and procedural classification. One possible view could be that since the parties have already chosen the seat of the arbitration, all procedural law issues will be governed by law of the seat, if, indeed, limitation is treated as a procedural issue. A second, contrary view may be that the legality of a standstill agreement would be tested on the touchstone of Indian law, since the choice of applicable substantive law of the contract is Indian law under which limitation cannot be conceded beyond the prescribed period by consent.

Given that the impact of Indian substantive law on the issue of limitation and standstill agreements is not entirely clear, in light of the Extramarks case, the tribunals might now be required to consider a relatively unique issue of limitation period alongside large number of other considerations in an international arbitration with Indian substantive applicable law.   

Conclusion

In the process of exploring the impact of Indian substantive law of the contract on parties’ freedom to contract out of limitation in a foreign-seated international arbitration, the tensions between procedural law and substantive law in foreign-seated arbitrations vis-à-vis limitation become apparent. The tensions are further compounded by the ruling in the Extramarks case that limitation bars remedy and that the parties cannot contract out of limitation. The exact impact of the Extramarks case on the parties to an international arbitration contemplating standstill agreements remains unclear and the connected issues in this context remain to be seen.

(The opinions of the author are personal and do not represent the opinion of the organisations he is affiliated with.)

On 6 December 2022, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in the Danish surrogacy case of K.K. and Others v. Denmark.

In a 4–3 judgment, the ECtHR held that Denmark violated the rights enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as claimed by  two children born through a commercial surrogacy arrangement in Ukraine, by not recognizing their intended Danish mother as a legal parent. However, the three dissenting judges held that there was no violation of Article 8 in the circumstances. According to the minority, a State must be able to have a policy opposing commercial surrogacy arrangements. They emphasized that Denmark recognized the legal relationship between the father and the children.

Facts

In December 2013, twins were born by a surrogate mother in Ukraine after a commercial arrangement. Ukrainian authorities issued birth certificates for the children. In the birth certificates, a Danish wife and husband were registered as mother and father. Upon their return to Denmark, the Danish authorities refused to recognize the Danish woman named in the birth certificate as a legal parent under Danish law, as she had not given birth to the children. The father was recognized, as he indeed was the biological father of the children. Due to their family connection to the father, the twins obtained Danish citizenship.

The woman continued her struggle with the Danish authorities to become registered as mother of the twins. Shortly after the refusal to recognize her as a mother, she was granted joint custody of the children together with the father. To become a legal parent, she applied for adoption of the children as a step-mother. That application was processed in different Danish authorities and court procedures for more than six years. Eventually, the Danish Supreme Court held that adoption would be contrary to Section 15 of the Danish Adoption Act as the Ukrainian surrogate mother had received remuneration.

The woman and the father filed an application to the ECtHR, claiming that their rights to a family life under article 8 of the ECHR had been violated.

Judgment

The ECtHR found, with smallest possible majority, that Denmark had violated the family rights of the two children who were also applicants in the case. In its judgment, the ECtHR referred to the principles primarily set out in the landmark judgments Mennesson and Paradiso and Campanelli. Those principles, which were effectively summarized in the ECtHR’s 2019 advisory opinion, can be said to indicate that article 8 of the ECHR, read in the light of the principle of “the best interests of the child,” protects the rights of children produced through surrogacy. Non-recognition of a parent-child relationship is therefore a violation of the children’s article 8 rights. Following those principles, the ECtHR held that Denmark did not violate article 8 in relation to the woman by not recognizing a legal parent-child relationship. However, the children’s rights under article 8 were violated by not having their relationship to the intended mother recognized. In its conclusion, the court stressed that it was in the best interests of the children to have the legal relationship recognized.

Dissenting Opinions

It is noteworthy that the judgment was a close call for the applicants. Only four of seven judges voted for the judgment. In stark contrast to the majority, the remaining three judges’ joint dissenting opinion was that Denmark had not violated any ECHR rights at all. Emphasizing that there is no consensus within the member states of the Council of Europe on the sensitive matter of commercial surrogacy, the dissenters initially held that there must be a margin of appreciation for states to strike a balance between private and public interests or convention rights. According to the minority, the judgment “practically eliminate[s] altogether, in substance, the margin of appreciation” for foreign commercial surrogacy arrangements. The minority also questioned the majority’s application of the principle of the best interests of the child. In the judgment, it is held that the best interests of the children are “paramount”. For its part, the dissenting opinion states that the best interests of the children shall be a “primary consideration” which is the standard set out in international law.

Analysis

It is illustrative of the split opinions that the judgment only gathered the narrowest possible majority. For states opposed to commercial surrogacy arrangements, there seems to be very few tools in the toolbox. On the other hand, it is clear how hughly the best interests of the child are valued. For the time being, it seems hard to bridge the differing values underlying the judgment’s majority opinion and the dissenting minority opinion, respectively.

The following information has kindly been provided by Tess Bens, Research Fellow at the Luxembourg Max Planck Institute:

In September 2022, an EAPIL Working Group met for a conference in Luxemburg to discuss the perspectives and prospects of a reform of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. There were panels on the role and scope of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, collective redress, third state relationships, jurisdiction and pendency, and recognition and enforcement. As a result of the conference, Professor Hess and a team of Researchers of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg published a preliminary Working Paper which put forward 32 proposals for the reform of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.

Parallel to the preliminary Working Paper, a survey was set up to collect reactions and comments on the proposals. By now, over 60 participants from many different Member States have answered the survey. Participation in the survey is open to anybody interested in the reform of the Brussels I bis Regulation, irrespective of whether they are a member of the European Association for Private International Law. Your input is greatly appreciated. Please note that the survey will be open until 15 April 2023.

The following information has kindly been provided by Professor Sarah Green, UK Law Commissioner for commercial and common law:

Thank you for your interest in our project Digital assets: which law, which court?. We would like to draw your attention to an opportunity to join the team, as the Law Commission is currently recruiting for a lawyer or legal academic to lead this project. This is an exciting opportunity to be at the forefront of legal policy development in this cutting-edge and complex area, working with a range of domestic and international stakeholders.

We are ideally looking for specific experience or demonstrable interest in the private international law of England and Wales. This role will ultimately require a good knowledge of conflict of laws, digital assets and electronic trade documents. However, we are also interested in receiving applications from lawyers or academics with different commercial or common law backgrounds, with an interest in law reform and who can demonstrate a capacity to quickly acquire knowledge of complex areas of law.

Details of how to apply, along with the full job description, essential qualifications and other details, are available at this link: Law Commission: Commercial and Common Law Team, Lawyer(Ref: 73409) – Civil Service Jobs – GOV.UK

We would be grateful if you could draw this opportunity to the attention of anyone who might be interested. The role is also potentially available as a secondment opportunity from a business or academic institution. Please note that, due to civil service policies, the candidate must be UK-based.

If you would like to discuss further, please contact:

Laura Burgoyne, Head of the Commercial and Common Law Team
Email:  laura.burgoyne@lawcommission.gov.uk
Telephone: 07793 966 296

Internationale Wirtschaftsverträge edited by Patrick Ostendorf (Berlin University of Applied Sciences) but otherwise exclusively written by practitioners occupies a unique position with the German literature on international transactions. It is undeniably aimed at practitioners, featuring a great number of check lists, English sample clauses, and practical tips. Accordingly, most of the book is structured around specific elements of international contracts such as penalties (ch. 6), indemnities (ch. 7), limitations of liability (ch. 8), force majeure (ch. 10), choice of law (ch. 13) and so on. In addition, the book features a number of cross-cutting chapters dedicated to particular types of contracts (ch. 18–23). But despite this hands-on approach, the book’s authors reflect on, and draw from, a wealth of academic material, which they condense into immediately applicable guidance.

Although coming out a mere five years after the previous edition, the third editions contains significant updates to most chapters in light of Brexit, Covid 19, Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the updates to Incoterms (2020) and the ICC Arbitration Rules (2021), and some significant legislative activity in Germany and Europe, e.g. with regard to international supply chains. Of course, these rapid developments make the book all the more useful for German lawyers navigating the high seas of international transactions.

Written by Bill Dodge, the John D. Ayer Chair in Business Law and Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law at UC Davis School of Law.

On the question of foreign state immunity, the world was long divided between countries that adhere to an absolute theory and those that adopted a restrictive theory. Under the absolute theory, states are absolutely immune from suit in the courts of other states. Under the restrictive theory, states are immune from suits based on their governmental acts (acta jure imperii) but not from suits based on their non-governmental acts (acta jure gestionis).

During the twentieth century, many countries adopted the restrictive theory. (Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Erik Voeten have a useful list of the dates on which countries switched on the last page of this article.) Russia and China were the most prominent holdouts. Russia joined the restrictive immunity camp in 2016 when its law on the jurisdictional immunity of foreign states went into effect. That left China. In December 2022, Chinese lawmakers published a draft law on foreign state immunity, an English translation of which has recently become available. If adopted, this law would move China to into the restrictive immunity camp as well.

China’s draft law on foreign state immunity has important implications for other states, which would now be subject to suit in China on a range of claims from which they were previously immune. The law also contains a reciprocity clause in Article 20, under which Chinese courts may decline to recognize the immunity of a foreign state if the foreign state would not recognize China’s immunity in the same circumstances. Chinese courts could hear expropriation or terrorism claims against the United States, for example, because the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) has exceptions for expropriation and terrorism.

In this post, the first of two, I look at the draft law’s provisions on foreign state immunity from suit from a U.S. perspective. In the second post, I will examine the law’s provisions on the immunity of a foreign state’s property from attachment and execution, its provisions on service and default judgments, and its potential effect on the immunity of foreign officials.

It is clear that China’s draft law has been heavily influenced by the provisions of the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, which China signed in 2005 but has not yet ratified. But the purpose of the draft law is not simply to prepare China for ratification. Indeed, Article 21 of the law provides that when a treaty to which China is a party differs from the law, the terms of the treaty shall govern. Rather, the purpose of the law appears to be to extend the basid rules of the U.N. Convention, which is not yet in effect, to govern the immunity of all foreign countries when they are sued in Chinese courts, including countries like the United States that are unlikely ever to join the Convention.

China’s Adherence to the Absolute Theory of Foreign State Immunity

The People’s Republic of China has long taken the position that states and their property are absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of other states. The question rose to the level of diplomatic relations in the early 1980s. China was sued in federal court for nonpayment of bonds issued by the Imperial Government of China in 1911, did not appear to defend, and suffered a default judgment. After much back and forth, the State Department convinced China to appear and filed a statement of interest asking the district court to set aside the judgment and consider China’s defenses. “The PRC has regarded the absolute principle of immunity as a fundamental aspect of its sovereignty, and has forthrightly maintained its position that it is absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts unless it consents to that jurisdiction,” the State Department noted. “China’s steadfast adherence to the absolute principle of immunity results, in part, from its adverse experience with extraterritorial laws and jurisdiction of western powers.” In the end, the district court set aside the default, held that the FSIA did not apply retroactively to this case, and held that China was immune from suit. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed.

In 2005, China signed the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. The Convention (available in each of the U.N.’s official languages here) adopts the restrictive theory, providing exceptions to foreign state immunity for commercial activities, territorial torts, etc. Although China has not ratified the Convention and the Convention has not yet entered into force—entry into force requires 30 ratifications, and there have been only 23 so far—China’s signature seemed to signal a shift in position.

The question arose again in Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates LLC (2011), in which the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal had to decide whether to follow China’s position on foreign state immunity. During the litigation, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote several letters to the Hong Kong courts setting forth its position, which the Court of Final Appeal quoted in its judgment. In 2008, the Ministry stated:

The consistent and principled position of China is that a state and its property shall, in foreign courts, enjoy absolute immunity, including absolute immunity from jurisdiction and from execution, and has never applied the so-called principle or theory of ‘restrictive immunity’. The courts in China have no jurisdiction over, nor in practice have they ever entertained, any case in which a foreign state or government is sued as a defendant or any claim involving the property of any foreign state or government, irrespective of the nature or purpose of the relevant act of the foreign state or government and also irrespective of the nature, purpose or use of the relevant property of the foreign state or government. At the same time, China has never accepted any foreign courts having jurisdiction over cases in which the State or Government of China is sued as a defendant, or over cases involving the property of the State or Government of China. This principled position held by the Government of China is unequivocal and consistent.

In 2009, the Ministry wrote a second letter explaining its signing of the U.N. Convention. The diverging practices of states on foreign state immunity adversely affected international relations, it said, and China had signed the Convention “to express China’s support of the … coordination efforts made by the international community.” But the Ministry noted that China had not ratified the Convention, which had also not entered into force. “Therefore, the Convention has no binding force on China, and moreover it cannot be the basis of assessing China’s principled position on relevant issues.” “After signature of the Convention, the position of China in maintaining absolute immunity has not been changed,” the Ministry continued, “and has never applied or recognized the so-called principle or theory of ‘restrictive immunity.’”

The Draft Law on Foreign State Immunity

China’s draft law on foreign state immunity would fundamentally change China’s position, bringing China into alignment with other nations that have adopted the restrictive theory. The draft law begins, as most such laws do, with a presumption that foreign states and their property are immune from the jurisdiction of Chinese courts. Article 3 states: “Unless otherwise provided for by this law, foreign states and their property shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the People’s Republic of China.”

Article 2 defines “foreign state” to include “sovereign states other than the People’s Republic of China,” “institutions or components of … sovereign states,” and “natural persons, legal persons and unincorporated organisations authorised by … sovereign states … to exercise sovereign powers on their behalf and carry out activities based on such authorization.” Article 18(1) provides that Chinese courts will accept the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ determination of whether a state constitutes a sovereign state for these purposes.

These provisions of the draft law generally track Article 2(1)(b) of the U.N. Convention, which similarly defines “State” to include a state’s “organs of government,” “agencies or instrumentalities” exercising “sovereign authority,” and “representatives of the State acting in that capacity.” The draft law differs somewhat from the U.S. FSIA, which determines whether a corporation is an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state based on ownership and which does not apply to natural persons.

Exceptions to Immunity from Suit Waiver Exception

China’s draft law provides that a foreign state may waive its immunity from suit expressly or by implication. Article 4 states: “Where a foreign state expressly submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of the People’s Republic of China in respect of a particular matter or case in any following manner, that foreign state shall not be immune.” A foreign state may expressly waive its immunity by treaty, contract, written submission, or other means.

Article 5 provides that a foreign state “shall be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of the People’s Republic of China” if it files suit as a plaintiff, participates as a defendant “and makes a defence or submits a counterclaim on the substantive issues of the case,” or participates as third party in Chinese courts. Article 5 further provides that a foreign state that participates as a plaintiff or third party shall be deemed to have waived its immunity to counterclaims arising out of the same legal relationship or facts. But Article 6 provides that a foreign state shall not be deemed to have submitted to jurisdiction by appearing in Chinese court to assert its immunity, having its representatives testify, or choosing Chinese law to govern a particular matter.

These provisions closely track Articles 7-9 of the U.N. Convention. The U.S. FSIA, § 1605(a)(1), similarly provides that a foreign state shall not be immune in any case “in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication.” Section 1607 also contains a provision on counterclaims. In contrast to China’s draft law, U.S. courts have held that choosing U.S. law to govern a contract constitutes an implied waiver of foreign state immunity (a position that has been rightly criticized).

Commercial Activities

China’s draft law also contains a commercial activities exception. Article 7 provides that a foreign state shall not be immune from proceedings arising from commercial activities when those activities “take place in the territory of the People’s Republic of China or take place outside the territory of the People’s Republic of China but have a direct impact in the territory of the People’s Republic of China.” Article 7 defines “commercial activity” as “any transaction of goods, services, investment or other acts of a commercial nature otherwise than the exercise of sovereign authority.” “In determining whether an act is a commercial activity,” the law says, “the courts of the People’s Republic of China shall consider the nature and purpose of the act.” Unlike the FSIA, but like the U.N. Convention, the draft law deals separately with employment contracts (Article 8) and intellectual property cases (Article 11).

In extending the commercial activities exception to activities that “have a direct impact” in China, the draft law seems to have borrowed from the commercial activities exception in the U.S. FSIA. Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA applies not just to claims based on activities and acts in the United States, but also to activities abroad “that act cause[] a direct effect in the United States.”

The draft law’s definition of “commercial activity,” on the other hand, differs from the FSIA. Whereas the draft law tells Chinese courts to consider both “the nature and purpose” of the act,” § 1603(d) of the FSIA says “[t]he commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.” (Article 2(2) of the U.N. Convention makes room for both approaches.) Considering the purpose of a transaction would make it easier for a government to argue that certain transactions, like issuing government bonds or buying military equipment are not commercial activities and thus to claim immunity from claims arising from such transactions.

Territorial Torts

Article 9 of the draft law creates an exception to immunity “for personal injury or death, or for damage to movable or immovable property, caused by that foreign state within the territory of the People’s Republic of China.” This exception corresponds to Article 12 of the U.N. Convention and § 1605(a)(5) of the U.S. FSIA. Unlike § 1605(a)(5), China’s draft law contains no carve-outs maintaining immunity for discretionary activities and for malicious prosecution, libel, misrepresentation, interference with contract rights, etc.

The English translation of the draft law does not make clear whether it is the tortious act, the injury, or both that must occur within the territory of China. The FSIA’s territorial tort exception has been interpreted to require that the “entire tort” occur within the United States. Article 12 of the U.N. Convention does not. This question has become particularly important with the rise of spyware and cyberespionage. As Philippa Webb has discussed at TLB, U.S. courts have dismissed spyware cases against foreign governments on the ground that the entire tort did not occur in the United States, whereas English courts have rejected this requirement and allowed such cases to go forward. If the Chinese version of the draft law is ambiguous, it would be worth clarifying the scope of the exception before the law is finalized.

Property

Article 10 of the draft law creates an exception to immunity for claims involving immoveable property in China, interests in moveable or immoveable property arising from gifts, bequests, or inheritance, and interests in trust property and bankruptcy estates. This provision closely parallels Article 13 of the U.N. Convention and finds a counterpart in § 1605(a)(4) of the FSIA.

Arbitration

The draft law also contains an arbitration exception. Article 12 provides that a foreign state that has agreed to arbitrate disputes is not immune from suit with respect to “the effect and interpretation of the arbitration agreement” and “the recognition or annulment of arbitral awards.” Like Article 17 of the U.N. Convention, the arbitration exception in the draft law is limited to disputes arising from commercial activities but extends to investment disputes. The arbitration exception in § 1605(a)(6) of the FSIA, by contrast, extends to disputes “with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.”

Reciprocity Clause

One of the most interesting provisions of China’s draft law on state immunity is Article 20, which states: “Where the immunity granted by a foreign court to the People’s Republic of China and its property is inferior to that provided for by this Law, the courts of the People’s Republic of China may apply the principle of reciprocity.” Neither the U.N. Convention nor the U.S. FSIA contains a similar provision, but Russia’s law on the jurisdictional immunities of foreign states does in Article 4(1).  Argentina’s law on immunity also includes a reciprocity clause specifically for the immunity of central bank assets, apparently adopted by Argentina at the request of China.

The reciprocity clause in the draft law means that Chinese courts would be able to exercise jurisdiction over the United States and its property in any case where U.S. law would permit U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over China and its property. The FSIA, for example, has an exception for expropriations in violation of international law in § 1605(a)(3) and exceptions for terrorism in § 1605A and § 1605B. Although China’s draft law does not contain any of these exceptions, its reciprocity clause would allow Chinese courts to hear expropriation or terrorism claims against the United States. The same would be true if Congress were to amend the FSIA to allow plaintiffs to sue China over Covid-19, as some members of Congress have proposed.

Conclusion

China’s adoption of the draft law would be a major development in the law of foreign state immunity. For many years, advocates of the absolute theory of foreign state immunity could point to China and Russia as evidence that the restrictive theory’s status as customary international law was still unsettled. If China joins Russia in adopting the restrictive theory, that position will be very difficult to maintain.

[This post is cross-posted at Transnational Litigation Blog.]

This post was written bu Begüm Kilimcioglu, PhD candidate at the University of Antwerp

On 23 February 2023, one of the biggest commercial banks in the Eurozone, BNP Paribas (BNP) was sued by Oxfam, Friends of the Earth and Notre Affaire à Tous for having allegedly provided loans to oil and gas companies in breach of the vigilance duty enshrined in la Loi de Vigilance (2017) of France. This case constitutes an important hallmark for the business and human rights world as it is the first climate action case against a commercial bank and so timely considering that the European Union (EU) is currently discussing whether or not to include the financial sector within the scope of the proposed Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) (see here).

Article 1 of  la Loi de Vigilance imposes a duty to establish and implement an effective vigilance plan on any company whose head office is located on French territory and complies with the thresholds stated. This vigilance plan is supposed to include vigilance measures for risk identification and prevention of severe violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, serious bodily injury or environmental damage or health risks resulting directly or indirectly from the operations of the company and of the companies it controls, its subcontractors and suppliers with whom the company  has an established commercial relationship. As such, there is no distinction under the French law regarding the sector in which the company is operating which is in line with the United Nations Guiding Principles. Thus, it was surprising to see that France was quite vocal about not including the financial sector within the scope of CSDDD, as France was the first Member State to adopt a law on the duty of vigilance of the multinational companies and la Loi de Vigilance itself does not make distinctions based on the sector in which the company is operating.

According to la Loi de Vigilance, companies are required to conduct human rights and environmental due diligence which includes the following steps: identification and the analysis of the risks, regular assessment of the situation (in accordance with the previously identified risks) of the subsidiaries, subcontractors or suppliers with whom the company has an established commercial relationship, mitigation and prevention of serious violations through appropriate means, establishment of an alert mechanism which collects reports of existing or actual risks, establishment of a monitoring scheme to follow up on the measures implemented and assessment of their efficiency. This plan must be publicly disclosed.

In case the company does not comply with its vigilance obligations, a court can issue a formal notice, ordering the company to comply with la Loi de Vigilance. Furthermore, la Loi de Vigilance also provides for a civil remedy when a company does not meet its obligations. If damage caused by non-compliance with la Loi de Vigilance, any person with legitimate interest can seek reparation under tort law. Consequently, as a company headquartered in France and complying with the thresholds in Article 1 of la Loi de Vigilance, BNP has the duty to effectively establish, implement and monitor a vigilance plan to prevent, if not possible mitigate and bring an end to its adverse impacts on human rights and the environment.

The case against BNP before the French courts is a reminiscent of the case against Shell before the Dutch courts in 2019 where the environmental group (Milieudefensie) and co-plaintiffs argued that Shell’s business operations and sold energy products worldwide contributes significantly to climate change (and also much more than it has pledges to in its corporate policies and to the levels internationally determined by conventions) was a violation of its duty of care under Dutch law and human rights obligations. It is important here to highlight that the plaintiffs took Shell to the Dutch courts based on the environmental damage caused in the Netherlands, due to Shell’s operations worldwide.

In the said case, the applicable law to the dispute was determined by Rome II Regulation on non-contractual obligations, article 7. Article 7 presents an additional venue to the general rule for determining the applicable law (article 4) and grants the victims of environmental damage an opportunity to base their claims on the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred. As such, the claimant primarily chose to base its claims on the law of the country in which the even giving rise to the damage occurred, as they claimed that the corporate policies for the Shell group were decided in its headquarters in the Netherlands. The Court considered the adoption of the corporate policy of the Shell group as an independent cause of the damage which may contribute to environmental damage with respect to Dutch residents. Thus, the Court considered that the choice of Dutch law by Milieudefensie was in line with the idea of protection of the victims behind the applicable law clauses in Rome II Regulations and upheld the choice to the extent that the action aimed to protect the interests of the Dutch residents (see paragraphs 4.3-4.4 of the decision).

In 2021, the Hague District Court ordered Shell to reduce both its own carbon emissions and end-use emissions by 45% by 2030 in relation to the 2019 figures. Naturally, the legal basis in the Dutch case was different than the legal basis in the French case, considering that the Netherlands does not yet have a national law like la Loi de Vigilance. Consequently, the core of the arguments of the applicants lied on the duty of care in Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code and Articles 2 (right to life) and 8 (rights to private life, family life, home and correspondence) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In contrast, the BNP case has a more preventive nature and aims to force BNP to change and adapt its actions to the changing climate and scientific context. The NGOs primarily request an injunction for BNP to comply with the obligations provided for in the French Vigilance Law, as BNP falls within the scope of the French Law. More specifically, the NGOs request that BNP publishes and implements a new due diligence plan, containing the measures explained in the writ of summons. Therefore, the obligations arising from the French Vigilance Law are of a civil nature. Consequently, the law applicable to this dispute should also be determined by Rome II Regulation on non-contractual obligations. As explained above, Rome II Regulation gives an additional option for the plaintiffs to choose the applicable law in cases of environmental damage as either the country of damage or the country where the event that gives rise to the damage occurred. In the BNP case, the plaintiffs’ claim was based on French law. Applying Rome II Regulation, France can be considered as the country of the event which gives rise to the damage because it is where the corporate policies are prepared. Alternatively, it is also where the environmental damage occurs, as well as the rest of the world. Moreover, the plaintiffs relied on the general obligation of environmental vigilance as enshrined in the Charter of the Environment, which is considered an annex to the French Constitution and thus has the same authoritativeness. Invoking the constitution might bring in an argument on the basis of Article 16 Rome II, namely overriding principles of mandatory law.

If we rewind the story a little bit, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) stated above, firstly, served a formal notice to BNP on 26 October 2022 to stop supporting the development of fossil fuels. In the formal notice, the NGOs state that, to achieve the Paris Agreement trajectories, no more funding or investment should be given to the development of new fossil fuel projects, either directly or to the companies that carry out such operations (see p 3). They also draw attention to the fact that BNP has joined the Race to Zero campaign which aim for the inclusion of the nonstate actors in the race for carbon neutrality (p 3).

Basic research into BNP’s publicly available documents reveals that it, indeed, has committed to sustainable investment, acknowledging that air pollution and climate change deplete many resources. BNP further claims that it only supports companies that contribute to society and the environment and exclude coal, palm oil and nonconventional hydrocarbons. Moreover, as can be seen from its 2021 activity report, BNP presents itself as organizing its portfolios in a way that upholds the aims of the Paris Agreement. Lastly, BNP’s code of conduct, states that it commits to limiting any environmental impact indirectly resulting from its financing or investment activities or directly from its own operations (p 31). Furthermore, BNP also presents combatting climate change as its priority while stating that they finance the transition to a zero-carbon economy by 2050 by supporting its customers in energy and ecological transitions (p 31).

However, the NGOs claim that contrary to these commitments, through various financing and investment activities, BNP becomes one of the main contributors to the fossil fuel sector by supporting the big oil and gas companies (p 4 of the formal notice). In this regard, BNP allegedly provides funds for the companies that actually put fossil fuel projects into action rather than financing these projects directly. As such, the NGOs aver that BNP’s vigilance plan is not in compliance with la Loi de Vigilance or its obligations to limit the climate risks resulting from its activities (p 6 of the formal notice). In this regard, the report draws attention to BNP’s prior public commitments to strengthen its exclusion policies regarding coal, oil and gas sectors (see pp 8-9 of the formal notice). Consequently, claiming that BNP has failed to comply with the notice, NGOs have referred the matter to the court.

In a bid to address the negative allegations on its behalf, BNP stated that it is focused on exiting the fossil fuel market, accelerating financing for renewable energies and supporting its clients in this regard. Furthermore, BNP also stated its regret in the advocacy groups choosing litigation over dialogue and that it was not able to stop all fossil-fuel financing right away.

In the course of these proceedings, the applicants will have to prove that if BNP were able to establish, implement and monitor a vigilance plan, the damage caused by these fossil fuel projects put into motion by different energy companies could have been avoided. In other words, the fact that BNP (or any other provider of the financial means) is the facilitator of these projects and that the damage is indirectly caused by its actions, make it more difficult for it to be held liable. As such, it may be more difficult for the claimants in the BNP case to prove the causality between the action and the damage than the Dutch case.

Consequently, this intricate web of interrelations demonstrates how important it is to include the financial actors within the scope of the CSDDD and explicitly put obligations on them to firstly respect and uphold human rights and environmental standards and then to proactively engage with an effective due diligence mechanism to prevent, mitigate and/or bring an end to actual/potential human rights and environmental impact.

Therefore, I hope that the European Commission and the Parliament will hold strong positions and not cave in to the proposal by the Council to leave it up to the Member States whether or not to include the financial sector within the scope. Such a compromise would significantly hinder the effectiveness of the proposed Directive.

 

Tobias Lutzi (Junior Professor for Private Law at the University of Augsburg) made available on SSRN a pre-print short contribution that is forthcoming in Dalloz IP/IT entitled The Scope of the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act: Thoughts on the Conflict of Laws.

The abstract reads as follows:

The DSA and the DMA both define their territorial scope of application through a unilateral conflicts rule following a marketplace approach; but they remain silent on any other question of private international law. This paper will explain why this provides an unsatisfactory answer to the many problems arising out of the inevitable overlaps of national laws in the digital space, including in areas that will soon be governed by the two new regulations. While this approach appears to be part of a wider trend to delegate any question of private international law other than the definition of an instrument’s territorial scope to the general instruments that exist in that area, this paper will argue that a true ‘Digital Single Market’ can only be achieved by addressing the specific challenges it raises for private international law through multilateral conflicts rules.

The points this contribution raises are valuable as they bring to the forefront some of the challenges digital technology is posing for users and the EU internal market when dealing with cross-border aspects. As the DSA and DMA do not contain dedicated private international law rules addressing jurisdiction and matters of applicable law, the challenge remains with private international law instruments. Hopefully, contributions such as these can play a valuable role in raising awareness as to the importance of dedicated rules and mechanisms to be added in the process of review of the EU private international law instruments. In this way a ‘missed opportunity’ may turn into a broader gain for the Digital Single Market from a Private International Law perspective.

À l’issue de longues et complexes négociations, un accord a enfin été trouvé sur un texte révisé permettant de répondre aux principales objections de la CJUE, à l’exception de l’épineuse question des actes relevant de la PESC. Dans un contexte européen troublé, le chemin vers l’adhésion reste long.

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At the ArbMetaBlock2023 Conference leading experts in technology and dispute resolution will discuss the impact of blockchain, the Metaverse, and Web3 on arbitration. These concepts have become part of the conversation in the arbitration community, but few understand their true significance and potential impact.

Panelists will discuss the impact of blockchain and the Metaverse on arbitration, the changing role of lawyers and arbitration institutions, and the effect of new technology on arbitration fundamentals during our full-day event.

Confirmed speakers include Mihaela Apostel, Pedro Arcoverde, Elizabeth Chan, Paul Cohen, Dirk De Meulemeester, David Earnest, Elizabeth Zoe Everson, Anna Guillard Sazhko, Wendy Gonzales, Emily Hay, Cemre Kadioglu Kumptepe, Creguta Leaua, Matthias Lehman, Niamh Leinwather, Aija Lejniece, Maud Piers, Colin Rule, Sean McCarthy, Sophie Nappert, Ekaterina Oger Grivnova, Pietro Ortolani, Amy Schmitz, Takashi Takashima, David Tebel, Leandro Toscano, and Dirk Van Gerven.

The event is organized by the Center for the Future of Dispute Resolution at the University of Ghent in collaboration with leading organizations, including ArbTech, Arbitrate.com, Cepani, Cepani40 CyberArb, MetaverseLegal, and UNCITRAL.

See here for more information and registration.

The School of Law of the University of Aberdeen is organising a hybrid even on Diversity & Inclusiveness In International Arbitration: Challenges, Progress and Excuses on Monday 24 April (13.00 – 14.15 British Summer Time).

Despite the broadly accepted desirability and value of diversity in international arbitration, statistics show that very little changes in the appointment practices in international arbitration. Tribunals remain largely non-diverse – with the exception of a growing number of female arbitrators. In this context, there is a clear need to reconceptualize the approach to diversity efforts, starting with the questions guiding the diversity debate, the parameters of success and the methods of their realization.

The speaker is Fahira Brodlija.

The event is free. Please contact Mr Georgi Chichkov for more information at georgi.chichkov@abdn.ac.uk or enrol here.

Mediation has acquired a growing and unstoppable implantation during the last years, becoming an alternative dispute mechanism for the resolution of international disputes in civil and commercial matters with a great impact on the comparative and international arena. As a result, the normative responses that have been developed to face the challenges generated by the organisation of cross-border mediation have been successive in recent years, both at national and regional level. However, it was not until recently that the international legislator paid attention to this matter. In this framework, the publication of the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements resulting from Mediation (Singapore Convention) constitutes a significant step forward in this direction.

Undoubtedly, one of the major practical difficulties raised by the implementation of mediation to resolve international commercial disputes lays with the cross border enforcement of the agreements resulting from it. Hence the logical aspiration to provide mediation with an international regulatory framework of multilateral origin favoring the international circulation of the agreements resulting from a mediation procedure. This ambition culminated finally in the approval of the Singapore Convention, whose negotiation was not, however, a simple task, but rather plagued by obstacles and complications.

The Singapore Convention represents an outstanding conventional instrument, drawn up within the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), approved by Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) on 20 December 2018; its adoption was accompanied by the publication of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 2018 (amending the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, 2002). Consequently, the approval and entry into force of the Singapore Convention, on 12 September 2020, is of an extraordinary importance for the global development and promotion of mediation, since it is the first conventional instrument drawn up in this field by the UNCITRAL –and which has already been ratified by 10 States, Parties to the Convention-.

The Singapore Convention constitutes a concise text (with 16 articles), endowed with great flexibility and a clear functional character. Resulting from a high level of compromise, this UNCITRAL Convention not only builds on its precedents and normative models – mainly the 1958 New York Convention on international arbitration – but also offers novel responses and a uniquely advanced circulation model aiming at solving the main obstacle for mediation practitioners: the international effectiveness of mediation agreements.

A timely Commentary, edited by Guillermo Palao Moreno (Professor of Private International Law, University of Valencia) and published by Edward Elgar in its Commentaries in Private International Law Series, offers academics and practitioners an article-by-article examination of the Singapore Convention, as well as insights into the negotiation process through which the Convention was developed.

It provides deep theoretical and practical analysis of the Convention and its consequences for the promotion of mediation as a mechanism to solve commercial conflicts with a cross-border character. In particular, this work includes a comparative approach with perspectives from five continents and a variety of legal traditions, a critical discussion of every stage from the negotiation to the conclusion of the Convention, with proposals for the Convention’s implementation and application by States and regional organisations. A particular feature of the work is that it provides contributions of a diverse group of leading practitioners and academics from diverse legal backgrounds and jurisdictions, including some who participated of the negotiation of the Singapore Convention itself.

Contributors to the commentary include Itai Apter, Gabriela Balseca, Roni Ben David, Ximena Bustamante, Pablo Cortés, Stefano Dominelli, Carlos Esplugues, Nuria González Martín, Mark T. Kawakami, Gyooho Lee, Dulce Lopes, Peter Mankowski, Théophile M. Margellos, Cedr Mciarb, Achille Ngwanza, Guillermo Palao, Afonso Patrão, Ilaria Queirolo, Valesca Raizer Borges Moschen, S.I. Strong, Sven Stürmann, Dai Yokomizo

See here for the table of contents.

La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne admet la possibilité pour un héritier d’inscrire, dans un État de l’Union, la déclaration de renonciation à la succession établie par un second héritier dans un autre État.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Droit patrimonial de la famille 2021/2022 Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Dr. León Castellanos-Jankiewicz

Researcher, International Law T.M.C. Asser Institute for International & European Law, The Hague

Mexico’s ongoing transnational litigation against the firearms industry in U.S. courts is raising important questions of private international law, in particular as regards the application of Mexican tort law in U.S. courts. In its civil complaint against seven gun manufacturers and one wholesale arms distributor filed in federal court in 2021, Mexico argues that the defendant companies aid and abet the unlawful trafficking of guns into Mexico through irresponsible manufacturing, marketing and distribution practices. On this basis, Mexico claims that all relevant illegal conduct—resulting in human casualties, as well as material and economic loss—occurs on its territory and that, therefore, Mexican domestic tort law applies to six of its claims following the principle of lex loci damni.

Last September, the defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted by the District Court for the District of Massachusetts largely on the basis of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903). PLCAA prohibits bringing a “qualified civil liability action” in federal or state court against gun manufacturers and distributors for harm “solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm products” by third parties. On appeal in the U.S. First Circuit, Mexico argues that the district court’s application of PLCAA to bar its claims under Mexican tort law was “impermissibly extraterritorial”. In particular, the claims that PLCAA prohibits, avers Mexico, only prohibit damages arising from the “criminal and unlawful misuse” of firearms in the U.S. and in respect to U.S. legislation—not Mexican laws. The high profile nature of the case suggests that the First circuit might address the extent of PLCAA’s scope of application, including whether the district court’s interpretation was “impermissibly extraterritorial”.

For a detailed outline of the litigation history and the transnational issues at stake, including a discussion of two amicus briefs filed by professors of international and transnational law, you are welcome to read my recent post in Just Security, available here.

As already reported here, the European Kommission adopted a Proposal for a Regulation in December 2022 which aims to harmonize at the EU level the rules of private international law with regard to parenthood. In May the EAPIL is organizing a series of four webinars to discuss the main elements of the proposal, find weaknesses and possibilities of improvement.

Each Wednesday, the webinar will start at 6 pm and end at 8 pm CET. It will focus on two topics, each presented by one expert, who will discuss the content of the proposal and examine the questions and possible improvement it raises. There will be ample room for discussion.

The programme of the series is as follows:

• 3 May 2023, chaired by Claire Fenton-Glynn:
  • The EU Proposal on Parenthood: lessons from comparative and substantive law (Jens Scherpe)
  • What’s in it? Subject matter, scope and definitions (Cristina González Beilfuss)
• 10 May 2023, chaired by Fabienne Jault-Seseke:
  • The EU Proposal and primary EU law: a match made in heaven? (Susanne Gössl)
  • The law governing parenthood: are you my father? (Tobías Helms)
• 17 May 2023, chaired by Nadia Rustinova:
  • The mutual recognition of decisions under the EU Proposal: much ado about nothing? (Alina Ontanu)
  • Who decides on parenthood? The rules of jurisdiction (Maria Caterina Baruffi)
• 24 May 2023, chaired by Steven Heylen:
  • Authentic documents and parenthood: between recognition and acceptance (Patrick Wautelet)
  • The European certificate of Parenthood: a passport for parents and children? (Ilaria Pretelli)

For more information please visit the Website of the EAPIL.

17 years ago on this day, the very first post was published on conflictoflaws.net. While the Rome I Regulation has remained relevant, the discipline has certainly undergone significant changes throughout the years – without losing any of its importance. Many, if not most, of those changes have been covered across the over 5,000 posts that have appeared on this blog. More than 2,500 readers are subscribed to our e-mail newsletter, while an even larger number of people now follows us on Twitter and LinkedIn.

In light of our continued commitment to cover all relevant developments in PIL, regionally and globally, we are happy to use the occasion of the blog’s birthday for two announcements.

Most significantly, Thalia Kruger and Matthias Weller are handing over their responsibilities as General Editors to us, Jeanne Huang and Tobias Lutzi.

Matthias initially assumed this position alongside Giesela Rühl in 2017. He continued to serve as General Editor when Giesela handed over the baton to Thalia in 2019. It is no overstatement that without their tireless work behind the scenes, the blog would be unlikely to exist in its present form. During their tenure, they put the blog on a solid technical foundation, secured its funding, and ensured quality and diversity of its Editorial Board.

As new General Editors, we are deeply grateful for the excellent shape in which they are leaving this project – although it makes us all the more aware of the big shoes we have been asked to fill.

What is more, after several years of fruitful partnership with Hart Publishing, we are happy to announce that we have been able to secure a new sponsor for the blog. The Lindemann Foundation, a German non-profit foundation dedicated to supporting research in private international law, will allow us to continue running the blog. We are deeply grateful for the trust they are putting into us and this blog. We also appreciate the support from Hart in the past, and we will keep in touch with them.

Speaking on behalf of the entire Editorial Board, we are reiterating our heartfelt gratitude to Thalia and Matthias and look forward to the next seventeen years of News & Views in Private International Law.

Jeanne and Tobias

Le 22 mars 2023, la Commission européenne a présenté un projet de directive sur les allégations environnementales et les écolabels. Celle-ci vise à introduire des obligations exigeantes de justification des allégations environnementales afin de mieux orienter les consommateurs.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de l’environnement 2023, annoté & commenté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Le 29 mars 2023, dans le cadre de la révision de la directive 2008/99/CE1 sur la criminalité environnementale, les eurodéputés ont adopté à l’unanimité l’inscription de l’écocide dans le droit européen2. À l’aune de la nécessité de réguler les infractions les plus graves causées à l’environnement, dont la répression se retrouve parfois face à un vide juridique (et notamment lorsqu’elles sont transfrontalières) ou à une insuffisante prise en considération, les députés se sont mis d’accord pour combler ces incertitudes.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de l’environnement 2023, annoté & commenté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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El Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea y el Derecho Internacional Privado (The Court of Justice of the European Union and Private International Law), is a compilation of essays conceived to pay a tribute to the lawyers who dreamed of a European society where people could freely move and circulate among Member States.

Since the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968, the Court of Justice of the European Union has interpreted, applied and complemented the rules of European private international law with a ‘fist of iron’ and ‘kid gloves’. It has been a legislating court when needed. It has carried out a European reading of European rules against the pro lex fori vagaries of certain Member States. It has shown the way to follow so that the European Union is more than a political sum of States. The Court of Justice of the European Union has believed in Europe. It has believed in free movement and in the freedom of people. The outcome of its work in this regard is inconmensurable.

The book brings together 22 studies devoted to the work of the Court of Justice in the field of European private international law. The Court’s case law is thoroughly examined in individual chapters addressing the EU Regulations on judicial cooperation in civil matters: the Brussels I-bis Regulation (international contracts, non-contractual obligations, express and tacit submission of the parties, exclusive jurisdiction, consumer and employment contracts, and free movement of judgments), the Brussels Ia Regulation (divorce disputes, disputes concerning children), the Rome III Regulation, the Maintenance, European Insolvency and European Succession Regulations, the Service and Evidence Regulations, the Regulation on the European Enforcement Order and the Regulation on the European Account Preservation Order, and the Regulations on European Order for Payment and Small Claims. In addition, it explores as well the principle of mutual recognition, PIL aspects of company law, the free movement of lawyers in the European Union and issues of family reunification.

The book can thus be described as a compilation of research, reflections and comments on the main contributions of the Court of Justice of the European Union in its interpretative, enforcement and regulatory work on European private international law. The Court’s input in the most representative sectors of European private international law is analysed in depth with a view to explaining its contribution to the building of the European system of private international law. In this sense, it is a very useful book for both theoretical and practical purposes – for, as it is well known, law reigns, but case law governs. Those who know jurisprudence master the law; and by mastering the law they dominate the world of private international law. In this way, the dream of creating a free Europe for free people can become a reality.

El Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea y el Derecho Internacional Privado, edited by A.-L. Calvo Caravaca and J. Carrascosa González, Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2021, ISBN: 978-84-1345-495-5, 630 pp.; see here the table of contents.

Par un arrêt du 9 mars 2023, la Cour de justice fournit de nouvelles indications pour distinguer le consommateur du professionnel.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Droit et pratique de la procédure civile 2021/2022 Voir la boutique Dalloz

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