Flux des sites DIP

Yaqub on Parental Child Abduction to Islamic Law Countries

EAPIL blog - mer, 12/21/2022 - 08:00

Nazia Yaqub (Leeds Beckett University, UK) authored a book titled Parental Child Abduction to Islamic Law Countries – A Child Rights Analysis of the Legal Framework, published by Hart / Bloomsbury in its Studies in Private International Law.

As the world becomes smaller, family law is becoming truly global, giving rise to more and more questions for private international law. This book looks at the sensitive and complex question of child abduction, with a unique child rights perspective. Taking Islamic law as its case study, it delves into child abduction in key jurisdictions from Iran to Saudi Arabia and Libya to Pakistan. Rigorous doctrinal analysis is enhanced by empirical insights, namely interviews with abductees, parents and professionals. It is an excellent guide to a complicated field.

 The table of contents can be accessed here.

Teva UK v Novartis. Court of Appeal confirms restraint in abetting forum shopping in aid of German proceedings.

GAVC - mar, 12/20/2022 - 16:23

The Court of Appeal in Teva UK Ltd & Anor v Novartis AG [2022] EWCA Civ 1617 has reaffirmed the principle that while it is not as such unkosher to petition the English courts subsequently to use the spin-off value of that judgment in other jurisdictions (related in some way to using English courts for discovery purposes), it is not proper for E&W courts to make a declaration solely for the purpose of influencing a decision by a foreign court on an issue governed by the law of that very foreign court (here: Germany).

In the case at issue, the claim involves an Arrow declaration (a declaration that a product, process or use was lacking in novelty or obvious as at the priority date of a patent application) with respect to a German patent (admittedly subject to European law which is largely harmonised with the UK approach).

Per Arnold LJ [51-52]

It is not the function of the courts of England and Wales to provide advisory opinions to foreign courts seised of issues which fall to be determined in accordance with their own laws. The English courts have no special competence to determine such issues. If anything, it is likely that they have less competence than the local courts. It makes no difference that the English court and the foreign court are applying the same basic law. Furthermore, comity requires restraint on the part of the English courts, not (to adopt Floyd LJ’s graphic phrase) jurisdictional imperialism. Otherwise the English courts would be enabling forum shopping.

In saying this, I am assuming that the parties have full and unimpeded access to the foreign court. I recognise that the position might possibly be different if that were not the position; but it is not necessary to consider this further for the purposes of the present case, since there is no suggestion that either of these parties lacks full and unimpeded access to the courts of Germany or Country A.

Geert.

Comity, forum shopping
Assisting a foreign court to decide an issue under its own law is not a legitimate reason for the grant of declaratory (patent infringement) relief by the courts of E&W

Teva UK Ltd & Anor v Novartis AG [2022] EWCA Civ 1617 https://t.co/3vQldi2ple

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 9, 2022

The Role of Notaries in Private International Law

EAPIL blog - mar, 12/20/2022 - 08:00

The proceedings of the Conference on the Notary’s Role in Private International Law (L’office du notaire en droit international privé) which took place on 25-26 November 2021 in Toulouse University, have been published by Dalloz.

The book, edited by Estelle Gallant, contains eighteen contributions (in French) from experts of private international law, scholars or practitioners, namely.

Contriibutors form academia include: Hugues Kenkack (Toulouse), Fabienne Jault-Seseke (Paris-Saclay), Patrick Wautelet (Liège), Pierre Callé (Paris-Saclay), Christine Bidaud (Lyon 3), Hugues Fulchiron (Lyon 3), Eric Fongaro (Bordeaux), Michel Farge (Grenoble-Alpes), A. d’Abbadie d’Arrast (Toulouse), Hélène Péroz (Nantes), Nathalie Joubert (Bourgogne-Dijon), Sara Godechot-Patris (Paris-Est Créteil), Sandrine Clavel (Paris-Saclay), Marc Nicod (Toulouse), Lukas Rass-Masson (Toulouse), Estelle Gallant (Toulouse) & Cyril Nourissat (Lyon 3).

The following authors are either notaries or legal practitioners working with notaries: Caroline Deneuville (Paris), Richard Crône (Paris), François Tremosa (Toulouse), Mariel Revillard, Marion Nadaud (Bordeaux).

The volume deals with three main topics: (1) the notary as an authority in private international law; (2) Reception and circulation of documents; (3) the drawing up of documents. It is complemented by sectoral analyses on divorce, matrimonial property regimes and international succession, and by concluding remarks on the main findings of the research.

The blurb (originally in French) reads:

The main objective of the research is to identify precisely the instruments and rules or methods of private international law the notary has to use and implement in his European and international notarial practice, whether he is drawing up or receiving deeds in his office, or circulating them across borders, in the European Union or outside the Union.

Against this background, the book’s contributions are drawing up the contours of the notary’s role in private international law, analysing and discussing its foundations, consequences and challenges.

The table of contents of the book can be accessed here.

Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 1/2023: Abstracts

Conflictoflaws - lun, 12/19/2022 - 12:12

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:

(These abstracts can also be found at the IPRax-website under the following link: https://www.iprax.de/en/contents/)

 

R. Wagner: European account preservation orders and titles from provisional measures with subsequent account attachments

The enforcement of a claim, even in cross-border situations, must not be jeopardised by the debtor transferring or debiting funds from his account. A creditor domiciled in State A has various options for having bank accounts of his debtor in State B seized. Thus, he can apply for an interim measure in State A according to national law and may have this measure enforced under the Brussels Ibis Regulation in State B by way of attachment of accounts. Alternatively, he may proceed in accordance with the European Account Preservation Order Regulation (hereinafter: EAPOR). This means that he must obtain a European account preservation order in State A which must be enforced in State B. By comparing these two options the author deals with the legal nature of the European account preservation order and with the subtleties of enforcement under the EAPOR.

 

H. Roth: The „relevance (to the initial legal dispute)“ of the reference for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU

The preliminary ruling procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) exists to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. The conditions under which national courts may seek a preliminary ruling are based on the established jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) and are summarised in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU. One such condition is that the question referred to the court must be applicable to the decision in the initial legal dispute. Any future judgement by the referring court must thereafter be dependant on the interpretation of Union law. When cases are obviously not applicable, the European Court dismisses the reference for a preliminary ruling as inadmissible. The judgement of the CJEU at hand concerns one of these rare cases in the decision-making process. The sought-after interpretation of Union law was not materially related to the matter of the initial legal dispute being overseen by the referring Bulgarian court.

 

S. Mock/C. Illetschko: The General International Jurisdiction for Legal Actions against Board Members of International Corporations – Comment on OLG Innsbruck, 14 October 2021 – 2 R 113/21s, IPRax (in this issue)

In the present decision, the Higher Regional Court of Innsbruck (Austria) held that (also) Austrian courts have jurisdiction for investors lawsuits against the former CEO of the German Wirecard AG, Markus Braun. The decision illustrates that the relevance of the domicile of natural persons for the jurisdiction in direct actions for damages against board members (Art 4, 62 Brussels Ia Regulation) can lead to the fact that courts of different member states have to decide on crucial aspects of complex investor litigation at the same time. This article examines the decision, focusing on the challenges resulting from multiple residences of natural persons under the Brussels Ia Regulation.

 

C. Kohler: Lost in error: The ECJ insists on the “mosaic solution” in determining jurisdiction in the case of dissemination of infringing content on the internet

In case C-251/20, Gtflix Tv, the ECJ ruled that, according to Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, a person, considering that his or her rights have been infringed by the dissemination of disparaging comments on the internet, may claim, before the courts of each Member State in which those comments are or were accessible, compensation for the damage suffered in the Member State of the court seized, even though those courts do not have jurisdiction to rule on an application for rectification and removal of the content placed online. The ECJ thus confirms the “mosaic solution” developed in case C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising, and continued in case C-194/16, Bolagsupplysningen, for actions for damages for the dissemination of infringing contents on the internet. The author criticises this solution because it overrides the interests of the sound administration of justice by favouring multiple jurisdictions for the same event and making it difficult for the defendant reasonably to foresee before which court he may be sued. Since a change in this internationally isolated case law is unlikely, a correction can only be expected from the Union legislator.

 

T. Lutzi: Art 7 No 2 Brussels Ia as a Rule on International and Local Jurisdiction for Cartel Damage Claims

Once again, the so-called “trucks cartel” has provided the CJEU with an opportunity to clarify the interpretation of Art. 7 No. 2 Brussels Ia in cases of cartel damage claims. The Court confirmed its previous case law, according to which the place of damage is to be located at the place where the distortion of competition has affected the market and where the injured party has at the same time been individually affected. In the case of goods purchased at a price inflated by the cartel agreement, this is the place of purchase, provided that all goods have been purchased there; otherwise it is the place where the injured party has its seat. In the present case, both places were in Spain; thus, a decision between them was only necessary to answer the question of local jurisdiction, which is also governed by Art. 7 No. 2 Brussels Ia. Against this background, the Court also made a number of helpful observations regarding the relationship between national and European rules on local jurisdiction.

 

C. Danda: The concept of the weaker party in direct actions against the insurer

In its decision T.B. and D. sp. z. o. o. ./. G.I. A/S the CJEU iterates on the principle expressed in Recital 18 Brussels I bis Regulation that in cross-border insurance contracts only the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules. In the original proceedings – a joint case – the professional claimants had acquired insurance claims from individuals initially injured in car accidents in Poland. The referring court asked the CJEU (1) if such entities could be granted the forum actoris jurisdiction under Chapter II section 3 on insurance litigation against the insurer of the damaging party and (2) if the forum loci delicti jurisdiction under Art. 7(2) or 12 Brussels I bis Regulation applies under these conditions. Considering previous decisions, the CJEU clarified that professional claimants who regularly receive payment for their services in form of claim assignment cannot be considered the weaker party in the sense of the insurance section and therefore cannot rely on its beneficial jurisdictions. Moreover, the court upheld that such claimants may still rely on the special jurisdiction under Art. 7(2) Brussels I bis Regulation.

 

C. Reibetanz: Procedural Consumer Protection under Brussels Ibis Regulation and Determination of Jurisdiction under German Procedural Law (Sec. 36 (1) No. 3 ZPO)

German procedural law does not provide for a place of jurisdiction comparable to Article 8 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation, the European jurisdiction for joinder of parties. However, according to Sec. 36 ZPO, German courts can determine a court that is jointly competent for claims against two or more parties. In contrast to Art. 8 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation, under which the plaintiff has to choose between the courts that are competent, the determination of a common place of jurisdiction for joint procedure under German law is under the discretion of the courts. Since EU law takes precedence in its application over contrary national law, German courts must be very vigilant before determining a court at their discretion. The case is further complicated by the fact that the prospective plaintiff can be characterised as a consumer under Art. 17 et seq. Brussels Ibis Regulation. The article critically discusses the decision of the BayObLG and points out how German judges should approach cross-border cases before applying Sec. 36 ZPO.

 

M.F. Müller: Requirements as to the „document which instituted the proceedings“ within the ground for refusal of recognition according to Art 34 (2) Brussels I Regulation

The German Federal Court of Justice dealt with the question which requirements a document has to comply with to qualify as the “document which instituted the proceedings” within the ground for refusal of recognition provided for in Art 34 (2) Brussels I Regulation regarding a judgment passed in an adhesion procedure. Such requirements concern the subject-matter of the claim and the cause of action as well as the status quo of the procedure. The respective information must be sufficient to guarantee the defendant’s right to a fair hearing. According to the Court, both a certain notification by a preliminary judge and another notification by the public prosecutor were not sufficiently specific as to the cause of action and the status quo of the procedure. Thus, concerning the subject matter of the claim, the question whether the “document which instituted the proceedings” in an adhesion procedure must include information about asserting civil claims remained unanswered. While the author approves of the outcome of the case, he argues that the Court would have had the chance to follow a line of reasoning that would have enabled the Court to submit the respective question to the ECJ. The author suggests that the document which institutes the proceedings should contain a motion, not necessarily quantified, concerning the civil claim.

 

B. Steinbrück/J.F. Krahé: Section 1032 (2) German Civil Procedural Code, the ICSID Convention and Achmea – one collision or two collisions of legal regimes?

While the ECJ in Achmea and Komstroy took a firm stance against investor-State arbitration clauses within the European Union, the question of whether this will also apply to arbitration under the ICSID Convention, which is often framed as a “self-contained” system, remains as yet formally undecided. On an application by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Berlin Higher Regional Court has now ruled that § 1032 (2) Civil Procedural Code, under which a request may be filed with the court to have it determine the admissibility or inadmissibility of arbitral proceedings, cannot be applied to proceedings under the ICSID Convention. The article discusses this judgment, highlighting in particular that the Higher Regional Court chooses an interpretation of the ICSID Convention which creates a (presumed) conflict between the ICSID Convention and German law, all the while ignoring the already existing conflict between the ICSID Convention and EU law.

 

L. Kuschel: Copyright Law on the High Seas

The high seas, outer space, the deep seabed, and the Antarctic are extraterritorial – no state may claim sovereignty or jurisdiction. Intellectual property rights, on the other side, are traditionally territorial in nature – they exist and can be protected only within the boundaries of a regulating state. How, then, can copyright be violated aboard a cruise ship on the high seas and which law, if any, ought to be applied? In a recent decision, the LG Hamburg was confronted with this quandary in a dispute between a cruise line and the holder of broadcasting rights to the Football World Cup 2018 and 2019. Unconvincingly, the court decided to circumnavigate the fundamental questions at hand and instead followed the choice of law agreement between the parties, in spite of Art. 8(3) Rome II Regulation and opting against the application of the flag state’s copyright law.

 

T. Helms: Validity of Marriage as Preliminary Question for the Filiation and the Name of a Child born to Greek Nationals in Germany in 1966

The Higher Regional Court of Nuremberg has ruled on the effects of a marriage on the filiation and the name of a child born to two Greek nationals whose marriage before a Greek-orthodox priest in Germany was invalid from the German point of view but legally binding from the point of view of Greek law. The court is of the opinion that – in principle – the question of whether a child’s parents are married has to be decided independently applies the law which is applicable to the main question, according to the conflict of law rules applicable in the forum. But under the circumstances of the case at hand, this would lead to a result which would be contrary to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on names lawfully acquired in one Member State. Therefore – as an exception – the preliminary question in the context of the law of names has to be solved according to the same law which is applicable to the main question (i.e. Greek law).

 

K. Duden: PIL in Uncertainty – failure to determine a foreign law, application of a substitute law and leaving the applicable law open

A fundamental concern of private international law is to apply the law most closely connected to a case at hand – regardless of whether this is one’s own or a foreign law. The present decision of the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court as well as the proceedings of the lower court show how difficult the implementation of this objective can become when the content of the applicable law is difficult to ascertain. The case note therefore first addresses the question of when a court should assume that the content of the applicable law cannot be determined. It examines how far the court’s duty to investigate the applicable law extends and argues that this duty does not seem to be limited by disproportionate costs of the investigative measures. However, the disproportionate duration of such measures should limit the duty to investigate. The comment then discusses which law should be applied as a substitute for a law whose content cannot be ascertained. Here the present decision and the proceedings in the lower court highlight the advantages of applying the lex fori as a substitute – not as an ideal solution, but as the most convincing amongst a variety of less-than-ideal solutions. Finally, the note discusses why it is permissible as a matter of exception for the decision to leave open whether German or foreign law is applicable.

 

M. Weller: Kollisionsrecht und NS-Raubkunst: U.S. Supreme Court, Entscheidung vom 21. April 2022, 596 U.S. ____ (2022) – Cassirer et al. ./. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation

In proceedings on Nazi-looted art the claimed objects typically find themselves at the end of a long chain of transfers with a number of foreign elements. Litigations in state courts for recovery thus regularly challenge the applicable rules and doctrines on choice of law – as it was the case in the latest decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Cassirer. In this decision, a very technical point was submitted to the Court for review: which choice-of-law rules are applicable to the claim in proceedings against foreign states if U.S. courts ground their jurisdiction on the expropriation exception in § 1605(3)(a) Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The lower court had opted for a choice-of -aw rule under federal common law, the U.S. Supreme Court, however, decided that, in light of Erie and Klaxon, the choice-of-law rules of the state where the lower federal courts are sitting in diversity should apply.

Michiel Poesen on the Extension of the Brussels I bis Regulation to Third-State Defendants

EAPIL blog - lun, 12/19/2022 - 08:00

Michiel Poesen has published an interesting article in the Common Market Law Review (issue 6 of 2022), titled Civil Litigation Against Third-Country Defendants in the EU: Effective Access to Justice as a Rationale for European Harmonization of the Law of International Jurisdiction.

The abstract reads:

The European Union has taken on an active role in harmonizing the law of international jurisdiction over civil and commercial court disputes. However, the jurisdictional rules contained in the key instrument in the area – the Brussels Ia Regulation – only apply to disputes involving EU-based defendants, save for a few exceptions where defendants domiciled in third countries are also covered. This article will explore the rationale for harmonizing the law of jurisdiction applicable to third-country defendants. This central theme is of particular interest, since further harmonization is once again on the EU’s agenda because of the upcoming revision of the Brussels Ia Regulation. The article will outline that proposals for harmonization are rooted in the aspiration to further effective access to justice. Moreover, it will demonstrate that far from a readily implementable programme, furthering access to justice is a multifaceted aim, the pursuit of which potentially has profound ramifications for the EU rules on civil jurisdiction.

Arbitration-Favored Policy Has its Boundary: Case Study and Takeaways for China

Conflictoflaws - sam, 12/17/2022 - 13:40

(This post is written by Chen Zhi, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Macau, a trainee lawyer in Mainland China)

The arbitration-favored policy has been adopted by many jurisdictions across the world in recent years, as the support of arbitration by local judiciaries has been viewed as an important standard for gauging the business environment of a jurisdiction.  While the decision of Morgan v. Sundance Inc. rendered in May 2022 by the Supreme Court of the USA illustrates that arbitration-favored policy has its boundary, this seems a trend emerging from the laws and legal trends in other jurisdictions.

Summary of the Fact

This case concerned a class action initiated by a former employee, Morgan against Sundance Incorporate (the owner of a Taco Bell franchise restaurant, hereinafter “Company”) regarding the arrear of overtime payment in the context of Federal law of the USA.

Albeit there was an arbitration agreement incorporated in the contract between Morgan and the Company, the Company failed to raise any motion about the arbitration agreement at the outset and defended as if the arbitration agreement did not exist.

Nearly 8 months after the commencement of the litigation, the company raised jurisdictional objection by invoking the omitted arbitration agreement and filed the motion to compel arbitration under the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter “FAA”). Morgan argued that the Company had waived the right to arbitrate. By measuring the case against the standard for the waiver as set out in the precedent of the Court of Appeal of Eighth Circuit, the court of first instance ruled in favor of Morgan and rejected to refer the case to arbitration.

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal of the Eighth Circuit had adopted the requirement for waiver based on the “federal policy favoring arbitration”. Under the new requirement, Morgan shall furnish the proof showing prejudice incurred by the delay, and overturns the trial court’s decision thereby.[i] The case was subsequently appealed before the Supreme Court of the USA.

Supreme Court’s Decision

It is not surprising that lower courts in the USA have been consistently adopting specific rules for arbitration in the name of the arbitration-favored policy, which is contradictory to the proposition of the Supreme Court.[ii]

In the Morgan case, the Supreme Court holds that the Appeal Court of the Eighth Circuit has erred in inventing a novel rule tailored for the arbitration agreement, and reiterates that the arbitration agreement shall be placed on the same footing as other contracts. In the unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court explicitly states that:

Accordingly, a court must hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind. But a court may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation.”  [iii]

In this regard, the arbitration agreement shall not be distinguished from other types of contracts in the context of Federal Law, under which the prejudice will generally not be asked about in the assessment of waiver. By Stripping off the requirement of prejudice, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Court of Eighth Circuit for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court does not delve into the jurisprudence behind arbitration-favored policy but simply states that the purpose of this policy is to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more. [iv]

The Main Concern of Morgan v. Sundance Inc.

In the context of American law, the grounds for equal treatment emerges from Section 2 of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act, which stipulates that an arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable unless the grounds for revocation of any contract as set out in law or equity were found. Against this backdrop and in collaboration with the drafting history of the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court has set out the basic principle that the arbitration agreement shall be placed on the same footing as other contracts, by which the arbitration-favored policy does entitle a higher protecting standard for arbitration agreement, as stated in Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters:

“[…]the ‘policy’ is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.[v]

Through the decision in the Morgan case, the equal treatment principle is recapped and stressed, by which the arbitration-favored policy creates no new rules tailored for waiver of arbitration clauses under the legal framework of the USA.

The Complexity of Arbitration-favored Policy and the Boundary

Recent years have witnessed state courts’ preference to embrace the notion of “arbitration-favored policy” or “pro-arbitration policy”. Nonetheless, the arbitration-favored policy is a sophisticated and vague concept without an agreed definition worldwide. In principle, this policy flows from the well-recognized characteristics of international commercial arbitration such as autonomy, expediency, efficiency, and enforceability across the world. As per the analysis of Prof. Bremann, there are at least 12 criteria for gauging the arbitration-friendliness policy.[vi]

Likewise, Justice Mimmie Chan at the Court of the Instance of Hong Kong SAR fortifies 10 pro-arbitration principles employed by courts in Hong Kong towards enforcement of arbitration awards in the case of KB v S and Others, which sets up relatively high thresholds for parties to challenge arbitral awards in the enforcement stage, as the Chan J. highlights: (1) the courts’ reluctancy to looking to the merits of the case, (2) challenger’s duty to make a prompt objection against any alleged irregularities under the bona fide principle and, (3) the court’s residual discretion to enforce the award albeit the statutory grounds of rejection has been made out.[vii] Similar principles can also be extracted from decisions by courts in other jurisdictions like Singapore. [viii]

In the author’s view, these considerations for arbitration-favored policy can be distilled as the following four limbs:

(1) adherence to the parties’ autonomy to the largest extent,

(2) promoting the fairness and efficiency of commercial arbitration,

(3) minimizing the judicial interference throughout the arbitration proceedings, including the stages before and after the issuance of the arbitral award, among others, refraining from conducting the review on the merits issue of the case unless in exceptional circumstances and nullifying arbitral award based on trivial errors,

(4) providing legal assistance to arbitration proceedings for the promotion of fairness, expediency and efficiency (i.e., auxiliary proceedings for the enforcement of arbitration agreement and award, issuance, and execution of interim reliefs, taking of evidences).

As to the field of arbitral jurisdiction, the arbitration-favored policy always takes the form of the validation principle, where at least four scenarios are present in legal practice:

First, when confronted with the issue of the law governing arbitration agreement, and more than one laws are relevant, courts are required to apply laws that are in favor of the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement, either by virtue of statutory regulations[ix] or provided as one of the considerations in judicial practice.[x]

Second, courts are declined to intervene in the dispute over arbitral jurisdiction before the decision of the arbitration tribunal is rendered, as a result of the negative effect of the competence – competence principle to ensure the integrity and efficiency of arbitration proceedings.[xi]

Third, the invalidity of the matrix contract does not necessarily negate the arbitration agreement incorporated therein as per the widely-accepted separability doctrine.[xii]

Fourth, the courts will interpret in a manner that is likely to give effect to the arbitration agreement, particularly where the arbitration agreement is pathological in form or substance.[xiii]

At least one of the aforesaid scenarios emerges from legislation or judicial practices in jurisdictions featuring or advocating arbitration-favored policy, in which courts are always inclined to refer the case to arbitration. Nonetheless, the arbitration-favored policy does not mean that the court will give effect to the arbitration agreement unconditionally. The aforesaid Morgan case demonstrates that arbitration-favored policy has boundaries in the context of American law, taking the form of the equal treatment principle.

The boundary of arbitration-favored policy also emerges from laws and legal practices in other jurisdictions, as representative examples, the BNA case by the Court of Appeal of Singapore, the Kabab-Ji case by the Supreme Court of the UK, and the Uber case by the Supreme Court of Canada will be further illustrated below:

BNA Case

In this case, at issue before Singaporean courts was the law governing arbitration agreement, where the parties had designated PRC law as the governing law of the contract and expressly set out the term “arbitration in Shanghai” in the arbitration clause. The plaintiff objected to arbitral jurisdiction after the commencement of arbitration proceedings before the tribunal and subsequently resorted to courts in Singapore for recourse against the tribunal’s decision ruling that the arbitration agreement was valid under the laws of Singapore.

The plaintiff contended that the laws of China shall be applied, while the respondent argued that the arbitration clause in dispute was alleged to be invalid under PRC law, and submitted that the Singaporean court shall apply laws that are more in favor of the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement under validation principle hence the governing law shall be the laws of Singapore. The Singapore High Court applied Singaporean law and the dispute was filed before the Court of Appeal of Singapore.

The Court of Appeal opines that the validation principle can only be taken into consideration when there are other laws that can compete with PRC law to be the governing law of arbitration clause,[xiv] as all factors point to China as the proper law and Singapore was not the seat in the context of Article 10 of International Arbitration Act, this case shall be given to Chinese courts to decide.[xv] Therefore, the Appeal Court overturned the controversial decision by the Singapore High Court which determined Singapore as the seat by twisting the meaning of arbitral seat.[xvi]

Per the decision in the BNA case, the validation principle is only applicable where some prerequisites are met. While parties expressly reach an intention likely to negate the arbitration agreement without other competing factors, the court shall not rewrite the contract to nakedly validate the arbitration agreement.

Kabab-Ji Case

In this case, a Paris seated tribunal decided to extend the arbitration agreement to Kout, the parent company to the signatory which had been actively engaging in performance and re-negotiation of the contract in dispute, while not being a signatory to the contract. The tribunal’s decision was under the scrutiny of judiciaries in the UK at the enforcement stage.

Unlike the scenario in the BNA case, there were two competing factors regarding the determination of the proper law of arbitration agreement in Kabab-Ji: laws of England as the designated laws governing the main contract and the laws of France as the lex arbitri fixed in the contract. While the French laws turn out to be more in favor of the effectiveness of the arbitration clause, the Supreme Court of the UK rejected enforcing the arbitral award for lack of valid arbitration agreement via the application of English law as the proper law of arbitration clause. The court stresses in the decision that the validation principle does not apply to issues concerning the formation of a contract, and hence this principle was not relevant in deciding the issue of non-signatory.[xvii] And departing from the validation principle as set out in its precedent.

Per the decision of the Supreme Court of the UK, the extension of the arbitration agreement to non-signatory pertains to the formation of an arbitration agreement rather than the interpretation of the contract, which is contrary to the approach employed by French courts over the same case scenario. The decision in the Kabab-Ji case has given rise to controversies, as a commentator pointed out, the English court may be criticized for stepping over the line.[xviii] Nonetheless, the decision of Kabab-Ji is to some extent in line with the stringent attitude toward the non-signatory issue of arbitration agreement that judiciaries in England have consistently taken.[xix]

Uber Case

The dispute arose out of the putative employment relationship between Heller, a delivery driver, and UberEATS, a Toronto-based subsidiary of Uber. During the litigation, UberEATS filed a motion to compel arbitration by invoking the arbitration clause embedded in the boilerplate service agreement between Uber and all drivers who sign in for service of Uber.

The Supreme Court of Canada finds the arbitration clause unconscionable based on two main findings: (1) inequality of bargaining power between Heller and Uber, (2) improvidence produced by the underlying arbitration clause. The court stresses the fact that according to the arbitration clause, arbitration proceedings shall be administered under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, which requires US$14,500 in up-front administrative fees for the commencement of the putative arbitration proceedings. Also, Amsterdam shall be the place of arbitration per the arbitration clause, hence further fees for traveling and accommodation will be incurred thereby. The court ruled that the arbitration clause was invalid and rejected to compel arbitration.[xx]

The judgment also discusses the arbitration-favored policy contention, stating that arbitration is respected based on it being a cost-effective and efficient method of resolving disputes.[xxi] By this logic, arbitration clauses creating a hurdle toward cost-effective and efficient resolution of disputes will not be safeguarded albeit the arbitration-favored policy is applicable.

The Uber case illustrates that different values may at odds with each other in the application of arbitration-favored policy, hence trade-offs will be presented before decision-makers. As discussed by Prof. Bremann, one given policy or practice may be pro-arbitration in some respects while anti-arbitration in other respects, further, the implication of arbitration-favored policy may also be detrimental to policies extrinsic to arbitration.[xxii] In the Uber case, two kinds of conflict are present simultaneously, first, upholding the effectiveness of the underlying arbitration clause may be detrimental to the policy for the protection of those who are vulnerable(trade-off between arbitration-friendly policy and extrinsic policies), second the enforcement of alleged parties’ autonomy taking the form of “arbitration administered by ICC in Netherland” is likely to be detrimental to the expediency and efficiency nature of arbitration(trade-off between arbitration-favored policy and extrinsic).

The answer to the said trade-offs remains unresolved, as there is no agreed standard by far, and courts in different jurisdictions can be divergent on this issue. As a prime example, while there is a discrepancy regarding the number of tribunal members between the rules of the arbitration institution and the arbitration clause, where the former provides a mandatory sole-arbitrator regulation for consideration of expedition and efficiency, the latter had designated a three-member-tribunal, the court of Singapore upheld the preemption of arbitration rules over the arbitration clause,[xxiii] while Chinese court once ruled in favor of the arbitration clause and rejected to enforce the award rendered by the sole arbitrator.[xxiv]

Takeaways for China

The arbitration-favored policy is a complicated notion that includes a myriad of separate and to some extent, conflicting considerations. In a general sense, courts embracing arbitration-favored policy are reluctant to negate the arbitration agreement. However, there are some exceptional instances where:

(1) the vindication of the arbitration agreement will produce prejudice to other values that are extrinsic to arbitration, such as the rule of law principle, the consistency of legal practice, policies for the protection of vulnerable parties, etc., like the situations in Morgan case and Uber case, and,

(2) the interpretation or implementation of the arbitration clause will undermine other considerations among the arbitration-favored policy, for instance, while the enforcement of the arbitration clause can be low-efficient and costly, or the validation principle may be contrary to the parties’ true intention, like the situations in BNA case and Kabab-Ji case.

Therefore, every jurisdiction shall tailor the arbitration-favored policy for its legal system and meet its own needs, instead of employing a dogmatic understanding of the policy.

Like other rising economic bodies like India,[xxv] China is also moving toward a jurisdiction that is “arbitration-favored” under the Belt and Road imitative and the blueprint for the construction of the Guangdong- Hong Kong- Macao Greater Bay Area. Against this backdrop, judiciaries are taking more liberal approaches that are tended to give effect to arbitration agreements that are likely to be considered invalid previously, particularly in disputes regarding the choice of law issue and the substance of the arbitration agreement. [xxvi]As to the formal requirement of arbitration agreement, the Supreme People’s Court also made a great leap in dispensing with the stringent approach by acknowledging the effectiveness of an arbitration clause as set out in a draft contract not being signed by neither party, based on the findings that the parties have discussed and finalized the arbitration clause in the draft of the contract during the negotiating phase.[xxvii]

Moreover, the Draft Revised Arbitration Law released in late July 2021 provides more liberal approaches for the validity of arbitration agreements, which includes:

(1) the recognition of ad hoc arbitration agreement in foreign-related disputes,

(2) the relaxing requirement for a valid arbitration agreement, where parties’ failure to designate a sole arbitration institution does not negate the arbitration agreement,

(3) the promulgation of extension of the arbitration agreement to non-signatories in some types of disputes, and

(4) the adoption of a new framework of competence-competence principle that is more in line with the international framework as set out in UNCITRAL Model Law.[xxviii]

These attempts have been heatedly debated and are by and large arbitration-favored and laudable by lifting the unreasonable hurdles for the autonomy, expediency, and efficiency of arbitration. Nonetheless, recognizing the validity of arbitration agreement is not the sole consideration, lawmakers, judiciaries, and other participants in commercial arbitration of Mainland China will confront trade-offs during the law-making and implementation of the rules under the arbitration-favored policy. As a corollary, an arbitration agreement can be safeguarded to the extent it is in line with the basic principles that are placed at a higher level.

[i] Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. 596 U. S. ____ (2022) (Supreme Court of USA, decided on 23 May 2022).

[ii] Amicus brief of Law Professors in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. ___ (2022), pp. 11- 12, available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21-328/207550/20220106140817376_Morgan%20amicus%20brief%20final.pdf last visited on 21 November 2022.

[iii] Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. 596 U. S. ____ (2022) (Supreme Court of USA, decided on 23 May 2022).

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 487(1989), as quoted in Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 302 (2010) (Supreme Court of USA, decided on 24 June 2010).

5 These considerations are: (1) to what extent does it render international arbitration economical in term of time or cost? (2) to what extent does it ensure consent to arbitrate and enhance the scope for party autonomy? (3) to what extent does it effectuate the likely intentions or expectations of the parties? (4) to what extent is it consistent with the lex arbitri or the institutional rules chosen by the parties? (5) to what extent does it, consistent with party intent, enable the tribunal to exercise sound discretion and flexibility on matters of arbitral procedure? (6) to what extent does it ensure the independence and impartiality of arbitrators? (7) to what extent does it protect a party’s right to be heard? (8) to what extent does it promote accuracy in the administration of justice? (9) to what extent does it minimize, to the fullest extent reasonably possible, the intervention of national courts in the arbitral process? (10) to what extent does it help ensure that the resulting award will be an effective one? (11) to what extent does it enable the resulting award to withstand challenges in an annulment or enforcement action? (12) to what extent does it expand the categories of legal claims treated as arbitrable? See George A. Bermann, What Does it Mean to be ‘Pro-Arbitration’?, Arbitration International, Volume 34 (2018), p. 343.

[vii] KB v S. and Others, [2015] HKCFI 1787, para.1(Hong Kong Court of First Instance, decided on 15 September 2015).

[viii] China Machine New Energy Corporation v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC, [2020] SGCA 12, para. 87(The threshold for the finding of breach of natural breach for the purpose of vacating arbitral award is a high one and can only be crossed in exceptional cases.) (Appeal Court of Singapore, decided on 28 February 2020).

[ix] See Article 178 (2) of Private International Law of Switzerland (“As regards its substance, the arbitration agreement shall be valid if it conforms to the law chosen by the parties, or to the law applicable to the dispute, in particular the law governing the main contract, or to Swiss law.”).

[x] Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v. OOO Insurance Company Chubb, [2020] UKSC 38, para. 97 (Where the clause in question is an arbitration clause, because of its severable character its putative invalidity may support an inference that it was intended to be governed by a different law from the other provisions of the contract […]) (Supreme Court of the UK, decided on 9 October 2020). See also BCY v. BCZ, [2016] SGHC 249, para. 74 (“[…] governing law of the main contract should only be displaced if the consequences of choosing it as the governing law of the arbitration agreement would negate the arbitration agreement even though the parties have themselves evinced a clear intention to be bound to arbitrate their disputes.”) (Singapore High Court, decided on 9 November 2016).

[xi]Article 16(1) of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration(“[…] an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract.”)

[xii] Tomolugen Holdings Ltd and Another v. Silica Investors Ltd and other appeals, [2015] SGCA, para. 60 (Singapore court should adopt a prima facie standard of review when hearing a stay application) (Court of Appeal of Singapore, decided on 26 October 2015). Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov [2007] UKHL 40 para. 13, (Arbitration clause shall be construed in accordance with the presumption that parties are likely to have intended any dispute arising out of the underlying contract to be decided by the same body.) (House of Lords of the UK, decided on 17 October 2007).

[xiii] “[W]here the parties have evinced a clear intention to settle any dispute by arbitration, the court should give effect to such intention, even if certain aspects of the agreement may be ambiguous, inconsistent, incomplete or lacking in certain particulars…” Insigma Technology Co Ltd v Alstom Technology Ltd [2009] 3 SLR(R) 936, para. 31, as quoted in HKL Group Co Ltd v Rizq International Holdings Pte Ltd, [2013] SGHCR 5, para. 13 (Singapore High Court, decided on 19 February 2013). See also ?????? and ??? v. Ace Lead Profits Ltd and another, [2022] HKCFI 3342? para. 53 (Arbitration clause is not nullified by the non-existence of putative arbitration institution) (Hong Kong Court of First Instance, decided on 4 November 2022).

[xiv] BNA v. BNB and another, [2019] SGCA 84, para. 95. (Court of Appeal of Singapore, decided on 27 December 2019).

[xv] Ibid., at para. 102.

[xvi] See BNA v. BNB, [2019] SGHC 142, para. 101(agreement referring to Shanghai instead of PRC is not a reference to seat) (Singapore High Court, decided on1 July 2019). Ironically, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion and the Singapore court’s wariness, the validity arbitration clause at issue was subsequently confirmed by the Chinese court following the conclusion of judicial review proceedings before the Singapore Court of Appeal, as set out in Daesung Industrial Gases Co Ltd v. Praxair (China) Investment Co Ltd (2020) Hu 01 Min Te No.83 (Shanghai No.1 Intermediate People’s Court, decided on 29 June 2020). See also José-Antonio Maurellet, Helen Shi, et al., PRC Court Confirms Validity of “SIAC-Shanghai” Clause, available at https://dvc.hk/en/news/cases-detail/prc-court-confirms-validity-of-siac-shanghai-clause/ last visited on 21 November 2022.

[xvii] Kabab-Ji SAL v. Kout Food Group, [2021] UKSC 48, para. 51 ([Validation principle] is not a principle relating to the formation of contracts which can be invoked to create an agreement which would not otherwise exist.) (Supreme Court of UK, decided on 27 October 2021).

[xviii] Andrew Tweeddale, The Validation Principle and Arbitration Agreements: Difficult Cases Make Bad Law, The International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management, Volume 88, Issue 2 (2022), p. 248.

[xix] The restrictive approach emerges from the Peterson Farms v. CM Farming Ltd., [2004] EWHC 121, as cited in Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration (UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 156.

[xx] Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16, paras. 93 – 94(Federal Supreme Court of Canada, decided on 26 June, 2020).

[xxi] Ibid., at para. 97.

[xxii] George A. Bermann, What Does it Mean to be ‘Pro-Arbitration’?, Arbitration International, Volume 34 (2018), pp. 343-353.

[xxiii] AQZ v. ARA, [2015] SGHC 49 (2015) (Singapore High Court, decided on 13 February 2015).

[xxiv] Noble Resources International Pte Ltd v. Good Credit International Trade Co Ltd, (2016) Hu 01 Xie Wai Ren No. 1 (Shanghai No.1 Intermediate People’s Court, decided on 11 August 2017).

[xxv] Like India, see Aditya Singh Chauhan and Aryan Yashpal, Change to Improve, Not to Unhinge—A Critique of the Indian Approach to International Arbitration, Indian Journal of Arbitration Law, Volume X, Issue 2 (2021), pp. 1-11.

[xxvi] See Helen Shi, Have Chinese Courts Adopted an Arbitration- Friendly Approach Towards International Arbitration?, in Neil Kaplan, Michael Pryles, et al. (eds), International Arbitration: When East Meets West: Liber Amicorum Michael Moser(Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2020), pp. 235-244.

[xxvii] Luck Treat Limited v. Zhongyuancheng Co, Ltd, 2019 Zui Gao Fa Min Te No.1(Supreme People’s Court of China, decided on 18 September 2019).

[xxviii] Terence Wong et al, China: Draft Revised Arbitration Law of PRC Published for Comments, available at https://www.mondaq.com/china/arbitration-dispute-resolution/1104356/draft-revised-arbitration-law-of-prc-published-for-comments- last visited on 4 December 2022. See also Weina Ye et al, Key Changes under Revised Draft of PRC Arbitration Law, available at  https://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2021/08/11/key-changes-under-revised-draft-of-pcr-arbitration-law/, last visited on 4 December 2022.

Call for papers: Tangier Statute Centenary Conference, 18 December 2023, Tangier.

GAVC - ven, 12/16/2022 - 15:33

I do not often use pictures on the blog but this one is just too evocative to let pass:

On 18 December 2023 (i.e. a year from now), Willem Theus (KU Leuven – UCLouvain), Dr Michel Erpelding (University of Luxembourg), Prof Dr Francesco Tamburini (University of Pisa), Prof Dr Fouzi Rherrousse (University of Oujda), and myself are organising a conference to celebrate the centenary of the Statute of Tangier, signed at Paris. Credit for kicking off the process goes to Willem.

This treaty, signed between France, Spain and the United Kingdom, and later joined by Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy, provided for the creation of a new legal entity: the International Zone of Tangier. Established by 1925, the Tangier Zone was formally an integral part of Morocco, but subject to a special regime that left most of its institutions under the joint administration of several Western powers. This special regime would last until Morocco’s independence in 1956, with some international elements remaining in place under a Royal Charter until 1960.

Thinking about the Zone triggers an extravaganza of thoughts on international commercial courts, conflict of laws, history of law and so much more. The call asks for papers on

The Politics of Individual Powers Towards/Within the Zone
Moroccan Attitudes and Policies Towards/Within the Zone and Its Institutions
The Interzonal and Foreign Relations of the International Zone17
Politics in the International Legislative Assembly
The Veto-Role of the Committee of Control
The Zone’s Legal System/Codes
The Operation, Case Law and Reforms of the Mixed Court
The Bar of the International Zone

Careers of Individual Lawyers/Officials/Businessmen/Intermediaries
The Tangier Banking System
The Ecclesiastical, Jewish and Sharia Courts
The Working and Case Law of the American Consular Court
The Spanish Civil War and its Impact on the Zone
The Architecture of the International Administrative Buildings of the Zone
Smugglers and the Law; and
The Legal System of the Transition Period (1956–1960)

The call and further details are available in Arabic, English, French, Italian and Spanish.

Happy pondering abstracts!

Geert.

EU Legislative Priorities for 2023 and 2024: Joint Declaration of the Presidents of the Union’s Political Institutions

EAPIL blog - ven, 12/16/2022 - 13:00

As reported on this blog by Marco Pasqua, the European Commission adopted on 18 October 2022 its 2023 Work Programme, listing the legislative proposals, including in the area of private international law, that the Commission itself regarded as a priority.

On 15 December 2022, the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission signed a Joint Declaration on EU legislative priorities for 2023 and 2024. The document, as indicated in the official press release, “sets out a shared European vision for a stronger and more resilient Europe in the face of Russia’s unprovoked, brutal aggression against Ukraine and its wide-ranging impact – all the while tackling other serious challenges such as the climate crisis and economic headwinds”.

The joint declaration is accompanied by a working document, which lists 164 “key legislative proposals”, that the three institutions agreed to prioritise.

Some of these proposals either primarily relate to private international law or include provisions that have, or may have, significant private international law implications.

These include the proposal for a Directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence; the proposal for a Directive harmonising certain aspects of insolvency law; the proposal for a Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence; the proposal for a Directive on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (SLAPPs); the proposal for a Regulation on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters; and the proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims.

The recently adopted proposal for a Regulation aimed at harmonising at EU level the rules of private international law relating to parenthood (which Marta Requejo presented here) is not among those listed in the document.

There is also no reference to the expected developments regarding the international protection of adults.

European Commission Proposal for a Regulation on Private International Law Rules Relating to Parenthood

Conflictoflaws - ven, 12/16/2022 - 12:42

This piece was written by Helga Luku, PhD researcher at the University of Antwerp

On 7 December 2022, the European Commission adopted a Proposal for a Regulation which aims to harmonize at the EU level the rules of private international law with regard to parenthood. This proposal aims to provide legal certainty and predictability for families in cross-border situations. They currently face administrative burdens when they travel, move or reside in another Member State (for family or professional reasons), and seek to have parenthood recognised in this other Member State. The proposal follows on a declaration two years ago by the Commission President von der Leyen in her State of the Union address that “If you are a parent in one country, you are a parent in every country”.

How will this proposal change the current situation?  

In line with the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, Member States are required to recognise parenthood for the purpose of the rights that the child derives from Union law, permitting a child who is a Union citizen, to exercise without impediment, with each parent, the right to move and reside freely within the territory of Member States. Thus, parenthood established in one Member State should be recognised in other Member States for some (limited) purposes. There is currently no specific EU legislation that requires Member States to recognise parenthood established in other Member States for all purposes.

Different substantive and conflict-of-law rules of Member States on the establishment and recognition of parenthood can lead to a denial of the rights that children derive from national law, such as their succession or maintenance rights, or their right to have any one of their parents act as their legal representative in another Member State on matters such as medical treatment or schooling. Thus, the proposal aims to protect the fundamental rights of children and as it is claimed by the Commission, to be in full compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Through the proposed Regulation, the Commission intends to enable children, who move within the Union to benefit from the rights that derive from national law, regardless of:

  • the nationality of the children or the parents (on the condition that the document that establishes or proves the parenthood is issued in a Member State);
  • how the child was conceived or born (thus including conception with assisted reproductive technology);
  • the type of family of the child (including e.g. the recognition of same-sex parenthood or parenthood established through adoption).

In principle, the proposal does not interfere with substantive national law in matters related to parenthood, which are and will remain under the competence of Member States. However, by putting the children’s rights and best interests in the spotlight of the proposal, the Commission is requiring Member States to disregard their reluctance toward the recognition of some types of parenthood.

As the Union aspires an area of freedom and justice, in which the free movement of persons, access to justice and full respect of fundamental rights are guaranteed, the Commission proposes the adoption of Union rules on international jurisdiction and applicable law in order to facilitate the recognition of parenthood among the Member States. It covers not only the recognition of judgments but also the recognition and acceptance of authentic instruments. In this sense, the proposal covers the three main pillars of private international law and it will also introduce a European Certificate on Parenthood.

The main aspects of this proposal include:

  • Jurisdiction: jurisdiction shall lie alternatively with the Member State of habitual residence of the child, of the nationality of the child, of the habitual residence of the respondent (e.g. the person in respect of whom the child claims parenthood), of the habitual residence of any one of the parents, of the nationality of any one of the parents, or of the birth of the child. Party autonomy is excluded. (Chapter II, articles 6-15)
  • The applicable law: as a rule, the law applicable to the establishment of parenthood should be the law of the State of the habitual residence of the person giving birth. If the habitual residence of the person giving birth cannot be established, then the law of the State of the birth of the child should apply. Exceptions are foreseen for the situation where the parenthood of a second person cannot be established under the applicable law. (Chapter III, articles 16-23).
  • Recognition: the proposal provides for the recognition of court decisions and authentic instruments with binding legal effects, which establish parenthood, without any special procedure being required. However, if one of the limited grounds for refusal is found to exist, competent authorities of Member States can refuse the recognition of parenthood established by a court decision or an authentic instrument with binding effects. (Chapter IV, articles 24-43)
  • Acceptance: the proposal also provides for the acceptance of authentic instruments with no binding legal effect. These instruments do not have a binding legal effect because they do not establish parenthood, but they refer to its prior establishment by other means or to other facts, thereby having only evidentiary effects. It may be a birth certificate, a parenthood certificate, an extract of birth from the register or any other form. The acceptance of these instruments with evidentiary effects can be refused only on public policy grounds. (Chapter V, articles 44-45)
  • Creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood: children or their legal representatives can request it from the Member State in which the parenthood was established. This Certificate will be issued in a uniform standard form and will be available in all Union languages. It is not mandatory but children or their legal representatives have the right to request it and have it recognised in all Member States (chapter VI, articles 46-57).

What is next?

Since the current proposal concerns family law issues with cross-border implications, under Article 81(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Council shall act unanimously via a special legislative procedure after consulting the European Parliament. Besides the sensitive area the proposal regulates, it also adopts a pro-diversity and non-discrimination policy, including the recognition of same-sex parenthood and surrogacy. Thus, considering the different approaches and national identities of Member States, often associated with their more conservative or liberal convictions, unanimity will not be easy to reach. However, if unanimity cannot be reached, a number of Member States can still adopt the proposal in enhanced cooperation (see: Article 20 Treaty on European Union). This is not an uncommon procedure for Member States when they have to adopt legislation that concerns family law issues, e.g. Regulation 1259/2010 on the law applicable to divorce and legal separation (Rome III) and Regulation 2016/1103 on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes. However, if it happens that the proposal is adopted in enhanced cooperation, it is doubtful whether its objective to provide the same rights for all children is truly achieved. Additionally, the participating Member States will probably include those that did not impose very restrictive requirements with regard to the recognition of parenthood in their national laws, even before the adoption of the Regulation in enhanced cooperation.

Rabels Zeitschrift: Issue 4 of 2022

EAPIL blog - ven, 12/16/2022 - 08:00

The latest issue of the RabelsZ (Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht) has been published. As always, it contains a number of insightful articles. Here are the authors, titles and abstracts:

Moritz Renner and Torsten Kindt, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht und Investitionsschutzrecht (Conflict of Corporate Laws and International Investment Law)

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU has revived the debate on the conflict of corporate laws. Much attention has recently been given to the new generation of EU free trade agreements, such as the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, but their impact on conflicts in the field of corporate law remains unclear. This article proposes that the conflict-of-law effects of these agreements can be fully understood only in the light of their common background in international investment law. Building upon an analysis of the role of treaties in Germany’s conflict-of-law system and of the multiple intersections between the conflict of corporate laws and international investment law in general, the article demonstrates that the newest EU free trade agreements imply in particular the application of a restricted conflict-of-law theory of incorporation on foreign corporations originating from the respective signatory states. While the agreements’ effects on conflicts in the corporate law arena are not as far reaching as those of the EU’s freedom of establishment, they nevertheless further narrow the remaining scope of application of the traditional seat theory underlying Germany’s autonomous rules on conflicts vis-à-vis corporate law.

Tobias Lutzi and Felix M. Wilke, Brüssel Ia extendenda est? – Zur Zukunft der internationalen Zuständigkeit deutscher Gerichte in Zivil- und Handelssachen nach Ausweitung der EuGVVO (Brussels I bis extendenda est? On the Future of the International Jurisdiction of German Courts in Civil and Commercial Matters after an Extension of the Regulation)

With the expiry of the deadline of art. 79 Brussels I bis, the academic debate on a possible further extension of the Regulation to situations involving non-EU defendants is (again) gaining momentum. The present study aims to contribute to this discussion. It compares the relevant German rules on international jurisdiction over non-EU defendants with those of the Brussels I bis Regulation in order to be able to assess the consequences of a possible extension from a German perspective. The study reveals that even replacing the national rules in their entirety would not amount to a radical change. In particular, the addition of typified places of performance under art. 7 no. 1 lit. b Brussels I bis to the forum contractus and the availability of a common forum for joint defendants under art. 8 no. 1 Brussels I bis would constitute welcome improvements of the current framework. The loss of jurisdiction based on the presence of assets under § 23 ZPO would arguably be a disadvantage if not properly compensated for, e.g. through a forum necessitatis provision. The biggest advantage, though, would most likely be the harmonization of the law of international jurisdiction across the EU – which, from a German perspective, would come at a rather reasonable price.

Ulla Liukkunen, Decent Work and Private International Law (Open Access)

This article examines the decent work objective set by the ILO and UN Agenda 2030 from the point of view of private international law. It conceptualizes decent work, arguing that inclusivity of protective safeguards and structures in cross-border situations is essential to achieving the objective, and that the need for inclusivity draws attention to the relationship between labour law and private international law. The analysis offered also introduces a migration law-related perspective on decent work and the private international law of employment contracts and labour relations more generally. It is argued that understanding that the idea of inclusivity is embedded in the decent work objective brings up a global dimension which calls for uniform regulatory solutions at the international level. Decent work could be coupled relatively easily with the need for a revival of the private international law of labour relations and for developing a labour rights-based approach in private international law. It also connects private international law’s protective normative frameworks to the body of international labour standards.

Adrian Hemler, Virtuelle Verfahrensteilnahme aus dem Ausland und Souveränität des fremden Aufenthaltsstaats – Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis des Völkerrechts zum Kollisionsrecht (Virtual Participation in Court Proceedings from Abroad and Its Effects on the Sovereignty of the Foreign State of Residence – With Consideration of the Relationship Between Public International Law and the Conflict of Laws)

Most German-speaking scholars and some German courts consider participation in virtual court proceedings from a foreign state of residence to be a violation of foreign sovereignty. This essay stakes out a contrary position. In reaching this conclusion, it focuses on the distinction between the exercise of state power abroad and the exercise of state power regarding foreign facts. Especially with regards to extraterritorial legislation, it is argued that the law’s scope of sovereign validity remains territorial even if its scope of application covers facts abroad. The discussion also shows how this distinction is equally applicable to court judgments that concern foreign elements. Furthermore, the article discusses the nature of public international law principles regarding extraterritorial legislation and their relationship to national conflict of laws provisions. Also considered is how the sovereignty principle ought to be understood in cyberspace. Having established this theoretical foundation, it is concluded that regardless of the procedural role of the respective party, participation in virtual court proceedings from a foreign state of residence does not amount to a violation of foreign sovereignty.

Corinna Coupette and Dirk Hartung, Rechtsstrukturvergleichung (Structural Comparative Law) (Open Access)

Structural comparative law explores the similarities and differences between the structures of legal systems. Theoretically grounded in systems theory and complexity science, it models legal systems as networks of documents, organizations, and individuals. Using methods from network analysis, structural comparative law measures these networks, assesses how they change over time, and draws quantitative comparisons between multiple legal systems. It differs from other approaches in its assumptions, its methods, and its goals, in that it acknowledges the relevance of dependencies between system entities and borrows more heavily from data science than from econometrics. Structural comparative law constitutes a novel addition to the comparatist’s toolbox, and it opens myriad opportunities for further research at the intersection of comparative law and data science.

Arseny Shevelev and Georgy Shevelev, Proprietary Status of the Whole Body of a Living Person

This article is a reaction to the growing economic significance of the living human body as well as its legal status. In this paper, we argue that ownership in the human body most effectively guarantees the autonomy of the human will as to the use and disposal of one’s own body, but classical ownership theory is unable to fully ensure the autonomy of the human will, since it risks reviving the institution of slavery. We will demonstrate that theories establishing rights to the body other than ownership rights are limited in content and are inherently inconsistent. At the end of the article, we will propose an abstract ownership theory that allows for the exercise of maximum freedom to dispose of the human body while one is alive and which will be devoid of the flaws of the preceding theories.

The table of contents in German is available here.

Fourth Issue of Gravitas Review of Business & Property Law

Conflictoflaws - jeu, 12/15/2022 - 13:40

The fourth issue of Gravitas Review of Business & Property Law was published this week. It contains the following private international law article:

UV Obi (SAN) et al, “The Enforcement of Foreign Jurisdiction Clauses of Contracts in Nigeria”

The inclusion of foreign jurisdiction clauses in contracts has become a common
trend in international commercial transactions. Since most parties are often not
familiar with the laws of their foreign counterparts and are sceptical about getting a
fair trial in the latter’s jurisdiction when a dispute arises from the contract, the
option of a usually neutral foreign jurisdiction clause, therefore, is cardinal when
considering the risks associated with contractual relationships. In this article, the
Authors consider, inter alia, the meaning and nature of contracts, foreign
jurisdiction clause as a term of a contract, its enforcement in both England and
Nigeria, with a particular focus on the attitude of Nigerian Courts to the
enforcement of foreign jurisdiction clause as a term of a contract. The Authors
opine that while the Supreme Court has consistently upheld and enforced foreign
jurisdiction clauses, the lower courts have often refused to do so because they
perceive those clauses to be ouster clauses. The Authors recommend enacting
legislation and practice direction to uphold parties’ freedom of contract, including
parties’ rights to subject their disputes to the laws and country of their choice. This
will no doubt result in a more predictable outcome of international commercial
contracts litigations and related issues in Nigeria, engender trust in our judicial
system, promote party autonomy, strengthen the parties’ existing rights, promote
access to justice, and strengthen our legal system.

UK Supreme Court Rules on Law Applicable to Contribution Claims

EAPIL blog - jeu, 12/15/2022 - 08:00

On 2 November 2022, the UK Supreme Court delivered its judgment in The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association – Forces Help and another (Respondents) v Allgemeines Krankenhaus Viersen GmbH (Appellant).

The issue at stake was whether the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, which regulates whether a person liable from a damage may recover contribution from any other person liable, has overriding effect, and thus applies irrespective of the law governing the claim. The Rome II Regulation did not apply ratione temporis.

Background

Mr Roberts suffered brain damage at birth in the Viersen General Hospital (AKV) in Germany in June 2000. Mr Roberts claims that this occurred as a result of the negligence of the attendant midwife, who was employed by the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association Forces Help (SSAFA). He also sued the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which will indemnify SSAFA against any liability.

SSAFA and MoD have brought a claim against AKV for contribution if Mr Roberts’ claim against them succeeds. The basis for this contribution claim is the 1978 Act. The parties agree that the law governing the contribution claim is German law and under German law, the claim would be time-barred. However, if the 1978 Act has overriding effect and if SSAFA/MoD can show that AKV is liable under it, their contribution claim will be in time.

The High Court considered this issue as a preliminary issue before the rest of Mr Roberts’ claim is decided. The High Court decided that the 1978 Act does have overriding effect and therefore SSAFA/MoD’s contribution claim against AKV is not time-barred. The Court of Appeal agreed. AKV now appeals to the Supreme Court.

Judgment

The Court allowed the appeal on the grounds which were summarised in the Press Summary as follows.

The 1978 Act does not provide expressly that it has overriding effect. It does not provide that the 1978 Act applies irrespective of the foreign law otherwise applicable to the contribution claim. The question is whether such an intention must be implied from the provisions of the statute [38]. Three statutory provisions were identified variously by the Court of Appeal as supporting overriding effect: sections 1(6), 2(3)(c) and 7(3). The Supreme Court, however, considers these provisions equivocal. Their efficacy is not dependent upon overriding effect [39]-[48]. In particular, even in the absence of overriding effect, section 1(6) will be effective in many situations such as where the parties to the contribution claim are in a special relationship governed by the law of England and Wales [43].

Nothing in the admissible Parliamentary materials or the legislative history supports the view that the legislation was intended to have overriding effect [49] – [51]. However, the Bill was a Law Commission Bill and statements by the Commission in other reports suggest it was not intended to have overriding effect [52]-[55]. The weight of academic commentary strongly favours the view that the 1978 Act does not have overriding effect [73]-[79].

A line of authorities supports overriding effect. In a number of these cases overriding effect was assumed, was not directly in point and was not argued [56]-[60]. Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (No 9) provides direct support for overriding effect, but the reasoning is open to the criticism that it is circular [61]-[68].

In coming to the conclusion that the 1978 Act was not intended to have overriding effect, the Supreme Court is influenced in particular by two considerations. First, there will be many situations in which a contribution claim will be governed by the law of England and Wales, notwithstanding the fact that the underlying liabilities are governed by a foreign law [82]. Secondly, it is difficult to see why Parliament should have intended to confer a statutory right of contribution whenever the party from whom contribution is sought can be brought before a court in this jurisdiction, regardless of the law with which the contribution claim has its closest connection. A failure of foreign law to provide for contribution claims is not a defect requiring remedy by legislation in this jurisdiction. Moreover, it would seem contrary to principle for the law of England and Wales to be applied if the contribution claim were most closely connected to a foreign system of law [83].

Assessment

Under the Rome II Regulation, the law governing the claim satisfied by a person liable to the victim also governs the right of that person to seek “compensation” from other persons liable to the victim of the same claim. The Rome II Regulation, however, did not apply in this case.

The judgement eventually concludes that German law should also apply to the contribution claim in a reasoning in three steps.

The first is that, although issues of contribution used to be perceived as issues of procedure, it is now widely considered in the British common law world that it is one of substance.

The second is that the issue should be characterised as closely analogous to a restitutionary or quasi-contractual claim, and that the applicable law should be the law with which this claim is the most closely connected. In the present case, given that the claims of each person liable to the victim was governed by German law, that law would be German law as well. But Lord Lloyd-Jones explains that this could have been otherwise if there had been a special relationship between the two liable persons.

The third is that the statutes with overriding effects should be identified by assessing whether the terms of the relevant legislation cannot be applied or its purpose achieved unless it is overriding, and the legislative policy would be so significant that the statute should override the application of foreign law.

The main difference between the English rule and the Rome II Regulation is now, it seems to me, that the English rule relies on a more flexible test which, in certain cases, could lead to the application of a law other than the law governing the claim of the victim. This was critical in this case, as a particular provision of the 1978 Act somewhat required that there be cases were the law of the claim of the victim would be different from the law governing the contribution claim.

Section 1(6) of the 1978 Act provides:

References in this section to a person’s liability in respect of any damage are references to any such liability which has been or could be established in an action brought against him in England and Wales by or on behalf of the person who suffered the damage; but it is immaterial whether any issue arising in any such action was or would be determined (in accordance with the rules of private international law) by reference to the law of a country outside England and Wales.

The answer of the Court is that, for this provision to make sense, it must be possible that English law sometimes applies where foreign law governs the claim of the victim. The example given is a case where a special relationship existed between the two persons liable.

Quite the song and dance. Dutch TikTok class action passes jurisdictional hurdle at first instance, cutting many a((n) appealable) corner in the process.

GAVC - mer, 12/14/2022 - 10:10

I reported earlier on the ongoing collective claim against TikTok here. Thank you Xandra Kramer and Eduardo Silva de Freitas for signalling and discussing the first instance jurisdictional finding. I note already that the Court [5.28] has refused interim permission to appeal on the jurisdictional finding (as in i.a. the applicable law issue in Airbus). [5.22] it also refused a preliminary reference o the CJEU even though my concise discussion below already shows that more is at play here than the court has made out. TikTok will now first have to argue the case on the merits to then (presumably) appealing both substance and jurisdictional finding.

As I flagged earlier and as Xandra and Eduardo discuss, the issue here is firstly the relationship between GDPR and Brussels Ia at the jurisdictional level: I discuss that in this paper. Against TikTok Ireland, jurisdiction is established on the basis of A80 GDPR, with no further discussion of A79 (even if A80 partially refers to A79 for the action it establishes).

In my view the court quite carelessly muddles the various concepts used in A79-80, all too easily dismisses ia CJEU Schrems, does not clearly distinguish between assignment, subrogation, mandate etc., and certainly does not correctly delineates the authority which the collective organisations might have under the GDPR: for it is not at all clear that this authority, beyond injunctive relief,  includes a (collective) claim for damages.

[5.13] the court already announces that it may not in fact have jurisdiction for all individuals who are no longer habitually resident in The Netherlands, a concession which in my view in fact goes towards undermining its own reasoning.

[5.14] ff the court then reviews A4 and 7(2) BIa, as a supplementary jurisdictional ground for the GDPR related claims and as a stand-alone ground for the non-GDPR related claims. The court’s decision to apply CJEU Wikingerhof as leading to forum delicti and not forum contractus is in my view optimistic, and surely if A7(2) is at play then the CJEU’s authority ia in Schrems is, too. Yet the court [5.17] quite happily assimilates the harmed individuals’ COMI etc. with the collective organisation.

[5.19-20] the court summarily accepts jurisdiction against the other (non-EU) TikTok entities on the basis of Dutch residual rules for related cases.

Jurisdictional issues will most definitely return upon eventual appeal.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.2.5.

 

 

First strike in a Dutch TikTok class action on privacy violation: court accepts international jurisdiction

Conflictoflaws - mer, 12/14/2022 - 00:13

Written by Eduardo Silva de Freitas (Erasmus University Rotterdam) & Xandra Kramer (Erasmus University Rotterdam/Utrecht University), members of the Vici project Affordable Access to Justice, financed by the Dutch Research Council (NWO), www.euciviljustice.eu.  

Introduction

On 9 November 2022 the District Court Amsterdam accepted international jurisdiction in an interim judgment in a collective action brought against TikTok (DC Amsterdam, 9 November 2022, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2022:6488; in Dutch). The claim is brought by three Dutch-based representative organisations; the Foundation for Market Information Research (Stichting Onderzoek Marktinformatie, SOMI), the Foundation Take Back Your Privacy (TBYP) and the Stichting Massaschade en Consument (Foundation on Mass Damage and Consumers). It concerns a collective action brought under the Dutch collective action act (WAMCA) for the infringement of privacy rights of children (all foundations) and adults and children (Foundation on Mass Damage and Consumers). In total, seven TikTok entities are sued, located in Ireland, the United Kingdom, California, Singapore, the Cayman Islands and China. The claims are for the court to order that an effective system is implemented for age registration, parental permission and control, and measures to ensure that commercial communication can be identified and that TikTok complies with the Code of Conduct of the Dutch Media Act and the GDPR.

After an overview of the application of the WAMCA, which has been introduced in a different context on this blog earlier, we will discuss how the Court assessed the question of international jurisdiction.

The class action under the Dutch WAMCA

 Following case law of the Dutch Supreme Court in the 1980s concerning legal standing of representative organisations, the possibility to start a collective action was laid down in Article 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) in 1994. However, this was limited to declaratory and injunctive relief. Redress for compensation in mass damage cases was only introduced in 2005 with the enactment of the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims Act (Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade, WCAM). This collective settlement scheme enables parties to jointly request the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to declare a settlement agreement binding on an opt-out basis. The legislative gap remained as a collective action for compensation was not possible and such mass settlement agreement relies on the willingness of an allegedly liable party to settle.

This gap was closed when in 2019, after a lengthy legislative process, the Act on Redress of Mass Damages in a Collective Action (Wet afwikkeling massaschade in collectieve actie, WAMCA) was adopted. The WAMCA entered into force on 1 January 2020 and applies to mass events that occurred on or after 15 November 2016. The WAMCA expanded the collective action contained in Article 3:305a DCC to include actions for compensation of damage (Tillema, 2022; Tzankova and Kramer, 2021). While the WAMCA Act generally operates on an opt-out basis for beneficiaries represented by the representative organisation(s), there are exemptions, including for parties domiciled or habitually resident outside the Netherlands. In addition, the standing and admissibility requirements are relatively strict, and also include a scope rule requiring a close connection to the Netherlands. Collective actions are registered in a central register (the WAMCA register) and from the time of registration a three-months period starts to run (to be extended to maximum six months), enabling other claim organisations to bring a claim, as only one representative action can be brought for the same event(s). If no settlement is reached, an exclusive representative will be appointed by the court. Since its applicability as of 1 January 2020, 61 collective actions have been registered out of which 8 cases have been concluded to date; only a very few cases have been successful so far. These collective actions involve different cases, including consumer cases, privacy violations, environmental and human rights cases, intellectual property rights, and cases against the government. Over one-third of the cases are cross-border cases and thus raise questions of international jurisdiction and the applicable law.

As mentioned above, in the TikTok case eventually three Dutch representative foundations initiated a collective action against, in total, seven TikTok entities, including parent company Bytedance Ltd. (in the first action, the claim is only brought against the Irish entity; in the other two actions, respectively, six and seven entities are defendants). These are TikTok Technology Limited (Ireland), TikTok Information Technology Limited (UK), TikTok Inc. (California), TikTok PTE Limited (Singapore), Bytedance Ltd. (Cayman Islands), Beijng Bytedance Technology Co. Ltd. (China) and TikTok Ltd. (also Cayman Islands). The claim is, in essence, that these entities are responsible for the violation of fundamental rights of children and adults. The way in which the personal data of TikTok users is processed and shared with third parties violates the GDPR as well as the Dutch Telecommunications Act and Media Act. It is also claimed that TikTok’s terms and conditions violate the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD – 93/13/EEC) and the relevant provisions of the Dutch Civil Code.

International jurisdiction of the Amsterdam District Court

 The first stage of the proceedings, leading up to this interim judgment, deals with the international jurisdiction of the District Court of Amsterdam, as the TikTok entities challenge its international jurisdiction. TikTok requested the Court to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU but the Court refused this request, stating that the questions on (a) how the GDPR and Brussels I-bis Regulation regimes interact and (b) the applicability of Article 79(2) GDPR were deemed resolved.

Relevant jurisdiction rules

Considering the domicile of the defendant(s) and the alleged violation of the GDPR, both EU and Dutch domestic jurisdiction rules come into the picture. TikTok alleges that the Dutch courts do not have jurisdiction over this case under Article 79(2) GDPR. Moreover, TikTok alleges that, since Article 79(2) GDPR is a lex specialis in relation to the Brussels I-bis Regulation, the latter cannot be applied to override the jurisdictional rules set out in the GDPR. The three representative organisations argue that the Dutch courts have jurisdiction under both EU private international law rules and the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (DCCP). Before delving into how the District Court of Amsterdam construed the interaction between the legislations concerned, we will describe the applicable rules on international jurisdiction for privacy violations. The alleged violations occurred, or the claims relate to violations occurring, after 25 May 2018, that is, after the entry into force of the GDPR. TikTok Ireland is a data controller subject to the GDPR. Under Article 79(2) GDPR the “data subjects” (those whose rights are protected by the GDPR) shall bring an action for the violation of their rights in either the courts of the Member State in which the data controller or processor is established or of the Member State in which the data subject has its habitual residence. Furthermore, Article 80(1) GDPR provides for the possibility of data subjects to mandate a representative body which has been properly constituted under the law of that Member State, has statutory objectives which are in the public interest, and is active in the field of the protection of data subjects’ rights and freedoms to file actions on their behalf under Article 79 GDPR.

The case also deals with non-GDPR-related claims, which triggers the application of the Brussels I-bis Regulation, at least as far as the entities domiciled in the EU are concerned. Article 7(1)(a) Brussels I-bis states that, for contractual matters, jurisdiction is vested in the Member State in which the contract is to be performed. More importantly for this case, with regards to torts, Article 7(2) provides jurisdiction for the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur. Finally, in relation to the TikTok entities that are not domiciled in the EU, the international jurisdiction rules of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (Articles 1-14 DCCP) apply. This is the case regarding both GDPR and non-GDPR-related claims. These Dutch rules are largely based on those of the Brussels I-bis Regulation and also include a rule on multiple defendants in Article 7 DCCP.

The claims against TikTok Ireland

The Amsterdam District Court starts its reasoning by addressing whether it has jurisdiction over TikTok Technology Limited, domiciled in Ireland, the entity that is sued by all three representative organisations. The Court states that Article 80(1) GDPR does not distinguish between substantive and procedural rights in granting the possibility for data subjects to mandate a representative body to file actions on their behalf under Article 79 GDPR. Therefore, actions brought under Article 80(1) GDPR can rely on the jurisdictional rule set out in Article 79(2) GDPR which allows for the bringing of actions before the courts of the Member State in which the data subject has its habitual residence. The Court further reasons that the word ‘choice’ enshrined in Recital 145 GDPR, when mentioning actions for redress, allows for the interpretation that it is up to the data subject to decide where she prefers to file her claim.  In the case at hand, since the data subjects concerned reside in the Netherlands, they can mandate a representative body to file claims before the Dutch courts.

As to the non-GDPR-related claims and GDPR violations that also qualify as tortious conduct, the District Court considered first whether the case concerned contractual matters, to decide whether Article 7(1) or Article 7(2) Brussels I-bis Regulation applies. For this purpose, the District Court relied on the rule established by the CJEU in Wikingerhof v. Booking.com (Case C-59/19, ECLI:EU:C:2020:95), according to which a claim comes under Article 7(2) when contractual terms as such and their interpretation are not at stake, but rather the application of legal rules triggered by the commercial practices concerned – or, in other words, contractual “interpretation being necessary, at most, in order to establish that those practices actually occur”. Given that, in this case, the question is whether TikTok’s terms and conditions are abusive under both the UCTD and the DCC, the claim was deemed to fall under Article 7(2) Brussels I-bis Regulation.

Next, the District Court assesses whether the criteria for establishing jurisdiction under Article 7(2) are met. For this purpose it refers to the CJEU ruling in eDate Advertising and Others (Case C-509/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:685). In this case the CJEU ruled that, when it comes to “publication of information on the internet” that triggers an “adverse effect on personality rights”, the habitual residence of the victim being his centre of interests can be regarded as the place in which the damage occurred. The District Court rightfully ruled that since the rights of TikTok users that have their habitual residence in the Netherlands had been violated through online means, the Netherlands can be regarded as the place in which the damage occurred.

The Court confronts TikTok’s argument that, since Article 79(2) GDPR is a lex specialis in relation to the Brussels I-bis Regulation, the latter cannot be applied to override the jurisdictional rules set out in the GDPR. As per the Court, the rules on conflict of jurisdiction established by the Brussels I-bis Regulation are general in nature and, as such, cannot be derogated from other than by explicit rules. Hence, the Court interprets Recital 147 GDPR – which states that the application of the Brussels I-bis Regulation should be without prejudice to the application of the GDPR – as being unable to strip away the applicability of the Brussels I-bis Regulation. In the Court’s understanding, Recital 147 GDPR points to the complementarity of the GDPR in relation to the Brussels I-bis Regulation, and both regimes coexist without hierarchy. Therefore, according to the Court, the GDPR is not a lex specialis in relation to the Brussels I-bis Regulation. Furthermore, the Court notes that, under Article 67 Brussels I-bis Regulation, its regime is without prejudice to specific jurisdictional rules contained in EU legislation on specific matters. While the relationship between the jurisdiction rules of the GDPR and the Brussels I-bis Regulation is not wholly undisputed, in the present case the provisions do not contradict each other, while at the same time in this case also non-GDPR issues are at stake.

The claims against non-EU based TikTok entities

Having established international jurisdiction in the case against TikTok Ireland, the Amsterdam District Court rules on its international jurisdiction in relation to the other TikTok entities sued by two of the foundations. As no EU rules or international convention applies, the Dutch jurisdiction rules laid down in Articles 1-14 DCCP apply. Article 7(1) DCCP contains a rule for multiple defendants and connected claims similar to that in Article 8(1) Brussels I-bis. The Court considers that both legal and factual aspects are closely intertwined in this case. The claims concern several different services, not only the processing of data, and all defendants are involved in the provision of these services. The claims are therefore so closely connected that it is expedient that they are dealt with in the same proceedings.

Outlook

TikTok attempted to appeal this interim judgment on international jurisdiction. Under Article 337(2) DCCP, it is at the court’s discretion to grant leave to appeal interim decisions when the appeal is not filed against the final judgment at the same time. In this case, the Court did not find sufficient reasons to allow for such appeal. The case will now proceed on other preliminary matters, including the admissibility of the claim under the WAMCA, and (if admissible) the appointment of the exclusive representative. For this purpose, at the end of its judgment the Court orders parties to provide security as to the financing of the case, which requires submitting to the Court a finance agreement with the third-party financer. After that, assuming that no settlement will be reached, the case will proceed on the merits. It may well be that either of the parties will appeal the final judgment, and that on that occasion TikTok will raise the jurisdictional question again.

To be continued.

CJEU Rules on Formal Validity of Online Jurisdictional Clauses

EAPIL blog - mar, 12/13/2022 - 08:00

On 24 November 2022, the Court of Justice delivered an interesting judgment on the validity of a digital jurisdictional clause, i.e. the general terms and conditions containing the clause was accessible from a hypertext link mentioned in the written contract (C-358/21, Tilman, already commented here by Krzysztof Pacula and here by Geert Van Calster). In a nutshell, the Court held that such a clause is valid based on the formal requirements laid down in the Lugano II Convention (and, by analogy, in Brussels I bis Regulation) ensuring the parties’ consent to the clause, without the need for a click-wrapping system. Here lies the very point that differentiates the present case from previous ones (in particular C-322/14, Jaouad El Majdoub).

The Facts

A dispute arose between Tilman, a Belgian-based company and one of its clients, Unilever, established in Switzerland, concerning unpaid invoices. Unilever challenged the international jurisdiction of the Belgian courts seized by Tilman, relying on a jurisdiction clause in favour of the English court. This clause appeared in Unilever General Terms and Conditions (GTC) but these were not directly attached to the main contract; instead, they were only accessible on the Internet via a hypertext link mentioned in the contract. Plus, the hypertext link did not directly give access to the GTC but to a website, access to which allows those general terms and conditions to be viewed.

Before the Belgian Court of cassation, Tilman invoked a violation of the formal requirements of the Lugano II Convention – which corresponds to Article 23 of Regulation 44/20021 Brussels I – with regard to the jurisdictional clause and, therefore, the invalidity of the clause for lack of informed consent on its part.

The Issue at Stake

In this context, the Belgian court asked the Court of justice whether, under Article 23, §1, a) and §2, of the Lugano II Convention, consent to a jurisdiction clause can be deduced from a hyperlink inserted in a written contract, without any ‘obligation’ to click on that link.

The Court answered positively, confirming that business life is increasingly digital, including in its ‘legal dimension’, and that the main principles of contract law must thus adapt to it. This is the case of consent which is seen as genuine even in the digital sphere.

 The Court of Justice Reasoning

The decision of the Court of justice provides for a three-steps response.

First, (Non-)Impact of Brexit

Since the jurisdictional clause was stipulated in favour of the English court, the Court could not ignore the question of the geographical and temporal scope of the Lugano II Convention. After Brexit, the United Kingdom was refused access to the Lugano Convention (see also here and here). The applicable instrument for assessing the validity of the clause could be determined either at the date of its conclusion or at the date of the judicial proceedings. Since the issue at stake here was Brexit, i.e. the modification in time of the scope of application of EU law (including the Lugano II Convention), the Court of Justice chose the second option (for a discussion on this question, see here).

The Court rules that the legal action – the jurisdiction clause producing effects only on the date of the judicial proceedings (see Case Sanicentral, 25/79, point 6) – was brought before 31 December 2020, the termination date of the transitional period provided for in Article 126 of the UK withdrawal agreement. The latter text maintains the application of Union law, including the law on judicial cooperation in civil matters and the international agreements such as the Lugano II Convention. Therefore, the convention is applicable in the present case. The issue will be more difficult in the future (cf. here about a Swiss decision refusing the application of the Convention); in particular, the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements should be considered.

Second, Analogy with the Interpretative Framework of the “Brussels Regime”

As regards the interpretation of the Lugano II Convention, the Court recalls, in a very classical way, that it must follow the principles laid down by the previous caselaw concerning the provisions at issue contained in other instruments, including the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I and Ia Regulations, insofar as these provisions are drafted in similar terms.

Third, Condition of Validity of a Jurisdiction Clause in the Digital Ecosystem

In order to be valid, a jurisdiction clause must be concluded, inter alia, “in writing or orally with written confirmation” (Article 23, §1). The objective is to ensure that the parties’ consent to the clause is genuine. In case of a dispute, the assessment is left to the court on the basis of this EU substantive rule. In the context of the information society and e-commerce, proof of consent may also be based on “electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement”. This is an expression of the principle – which is becoming more and more widespread in comparative and EU contract law – of assimilating electronic transmission to written form, with a view to simplifying the conclusion of online contracts. However, according to European caselaw, this does not imply that the clause conferring jurisdiction and the GCT mentioning it are “actually” recorded permanently by the parties (see point 44 of the judgment). This nuance is crucial. In order for electronic transmission to offer the same guarantees as the paper format, in particular as regards evidence, there mere “possibility” to save and print the information before the conclusion of the contract is seen as sufficient.

In the present case, the Court of Justice notes that the jurisdiction clause is stipulated in the GTC explicitly mentioned in the written contract concluded between the parties. This procedure complies with EU law, but it must be ensured that the GTC containing the jurisdiction clause have actually been “communicated” to the contracting party, here Tilman, the Belgian company. This is in principle the case, according to previous case law, “if that information is accessible by means of a screen”. Here, the written contract provided for a hypertext link to an Internet site where the general conditions could be accessed. It is therefore necessary, according to the Court, “that hypertext link functions and can be activated by a party exercising ordinary diligence”. The Court adds that it “equates a fortiori to evidence of communication of that information”.

This analysis is relevant, but it is unclear why it is an a fortiori reasoning. Viewing general conditions on a screen expresses the fact that digital access is effective. This is not the case in the presence of a hypertext link, as long as it has not been clicked on. And then, a key practical issue is how to prove that the link does not function: by taking a photo of the screen (screenshot) which displays an ‘error message’ after the hyperlink has been clicked on?

According to the Court, it is irrelevant that Tilman, the co-contractor, did not have a box to tick on the page of the website to express acceptance of those terms and conditions, nor that the page containing those terms and conditions did not open automatically when the website was accessed. The Court implicitly applies here a proportionality test between the requirement of informed consent and the objective of not hindering commercial exchanges. It is therefore up to the party who is invited to consult the GTC online to do so. A “click” and a reading online, on a screen, are no more demanding in a hyperconnected society than reading a paper document in an annex to a contract.

Finally, the Court allows itself an obiter dictum by referring to points b) and c) of Article 23, §1, in order to clearly situate the case in “international trade”. For the record, these provisions validate jurisdiction clauses concluded in a form consistent with international commercial practice, reinforcing the private autonomy of the economic operators. I am not convinced however that this adds anything to the interpretation and especially that it corresponds (i.e. using a hypertext link to refer to the GTC including a court agreement) to the very concept of usage of international trade. But this is an open question.

General Assessment

This solution must be approved for at least three reasons.

Firstly, outside the digital paradigm, economic operators are supposed to be aware of the GTC of the contract and in particular of the jurisdictional clause they contain. Indeed, the GTC are an important criterion for the financial balance of the commercial agreement.

Secondly, in line with its previous case law, the Court of justice follows a different analysis of contractual consent in B2B contracts than in B2C relationships. The formal requirements laid down in EU secondary law on B2C distance contracts cannot be transposed, by analogy, to the B2B context (see point 37, C-322/14, Jaouad El Majdoub).

Thirdly, the Court’s reading of Article 23(2) is part of a more global European political and legislative context: that of the emerging ‘digital by default principle’. In the e-Government strategy, it means that delivering services digitally is the preferred option through a single contact point (see here). According to the European Commission, the same should progressively apply in the judicial cooperation in civil matters. In its 2020 Communication on Digitalisation of justice in the European Union, the Commission proposed to make “the digital channel the default option in EU cross-border judicial cooperation” (point 3.2 and see here for an update on the topic). Reading this ambition for EU Civil Justice together with the “Brussels/Lugano Regime” (as interpreted in the present case), it shows that the EU legal system is working on providing a coherent framework for international economic exchanges in the digital ecosystem.

PhD/Research Assistant Position at the University of Cologne

Conflictoflaws - lun, 12/12/2022 - 14:08

The Institute for Private International and Comparative Law of the University of Cologne (Professor Mansel) is looking to appoint one Research Assistant (Wissenschaftliche/r Mitarbeiter/in) on fixed-term contracts for 2 years, from March 2023, with contract extension possible, based in Cologne. This is a part-time position (19.92 hrs./week), possibility of PhD is given. In case of a post-doc application, it can be extended to a full-time position (39.83 hrs./week) within short time, provided that the requirements are met. A German state law examination (1. Prüfung) with clearly above-average grades and a command of written and spoken German are required. In addition, knowledge of Dutch, Italian, Spanish or French is an advantage, but not a requirement. Remuneration is based on pay group 13 TV- L.

The University of Cologne promotes equal opportunities and diversity in its employment relationships. Women are expressly invited to apply and will be given preferential treatment in accordance with the LGG NRW. Applications from severely disabled persons are very welcome. They will be given preferential consideration if suitable for the position.

Interested candidates are invited to send their detailed application including the usual documents in a single .pdf file by January 11, 2023 to ipr-institut@uni-koeln.de, for the attention of Professor Mansel.

Heads up – On Public Policy and Hindrances to Access to Justice

EAPIL blog - lun, 12/12/2022 - 08:00

A request for a preliminary ruling from the Areios Pagos (Greece) is pending before the Court of Justice in the case of Charles Taylor Adjusting and FD against Starlight Shipping Company and Overseas Marine Enterprises INC (C-590/21, Charles Taylor Adjusting). The summary of the request in English and other languages can be downloaded here. The questions focus on the interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation:

Is the expression ‘manifestly contrary to public policy’ in the EU and, by extension, to domestic public policy, which constitutes a ground for non-recognition and non-enforcement pursuant to point 1 of Article 34 and Article 45(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, to be understood as meaning that it extends beyond explicit anti-suit injunctions prohibiting the commencement and continuation of proceedings before a court of another Member State to judgments or orders delivered by courts of Member States where: (i) they impede or prevent the claimant in obtaining judicial protection by the court of another Member State or from continuing proceedings already commenced before it; and (ii) is that form of interference in the jurisdiction of a court of another Member State to adjudicate a dispute of which it has already been seised, and which it has admitted, compatible with public policy in the EU? In particular, is it contrary to public policy in the EU within the meaning of point 1 of Article 34 and Article 45(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, to recognise and/or declare enforceable a judgment or order of a court of a Member State awarding provisional damages to claimants seeking recognition and a declaration of enforceability in respect of the costs and expenses incurred by them in bringing an action or continuing proceedings before the court of another Member State, where the reasons given are that: (a) it follows from an examination of that action that the case is covered by a settlement duly established and ratified by the court of the Member State delivering the judgment (or order); and (b) the court of the other Member State seised in a fresh action by the party against which the judgment or order was delivered lacks jurisdiction by virtue of a clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction?

If the first question is answered in the negative, is point 1 of Article 34 of Regulation No 44/2001, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, to be understood as constituting a ground for non-recognition and non-enforcement in Greece of the judgment and orders delivered by a court of another Member State (the United Kingdom), as described under (I) above, where they are directly and manifestly contrary to national public policy in accordance with fundamental social and legal perceptions which prevail in Greece and the fundamental provisions of Greek law that lie at the very heart of the right to judicial protection (Articles 8 and 20 of the Greek Constitution, Article 33 of the Greek Civil Code and the principle of protection of that right that underpins the entire system of Greek procedural law, as laid down in Articles 176, 173(1) to (3), 185, 205 and 191 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure cited in paragraph 6 of the statement of reasons) and Article 6(1) of the [European Convention on Human Rights], such that, in that case, it is permissible to disapply the principle of EU law on the free movement of judgments, and is the non-recognition resulting therefrom compatible with the views that assimilate and promote the European perspective?

The request having been lodged in September 2021, the file seems ripe to be addressed by the Court. More information will follow when available.

Serving Defendants in Ukrainian Territory Occupied by Russia

Conflictoflaws - sam, 12/10/2022 - 17:46
Jeanne Huang University of Sydney Law School

Both Russia and Ukraine are member states of the 1965 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Service Convention (HSC)). After Russia occupied the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and its capital city, Sevastopol, and exercised control over certain areas of Ukraine (the “Occupied Areas”), Ukraine filed a declaration (“Ukraine’s Declaration on Crimea”) under the HSC. It states that, as a result of Russia’s occupation, implementing the HSC in the Occupied Areas is limited, that the procedure for service and relevant communication is determined by the Central Authority of Ukraine, and that documents or requests issued by the Russian and related illegal Authorities in the Occupied Areas are null and void and have no legal effect.

In 2016, Russia declared (“Russia’s Declaration on Crimea”) that Ukraine’s Declaration on Crimea is based on “a bad faith and incorrect presentation and interpretation of facts and law” under the HSC and other Hague Conventions. Thus far, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have each made declarations supporting Ukraine’s and announcing that they will not engage in any direct interaction with the Authorities in the Occupied Areas and will not accept any documents or requests emanating from or through such Authorities. The conflicting Declaration made by Ukraine and Russia, respectively, brings challenges for serving a defendant residing in the Occupied Areas—the scope of which has expanded during the recent military conflict—in civil and commercial cases when the defendant neither appoints an agent in the forum nor waives service. On one hand, neither Ukraine nor Russia permit service by postal channels (mail) under HSC Article 10(a). On the other, service via the Ukrainian Central Authority in the Occupied Areas is unguaranteed as indicated in Ukraine’s Declaration on Crimea; however, Ukraine and its supporting states do not recognize service conducted by the Russian Central Authority. A practical question for litigators is how to conduct service of process in the Occupied Areas?

This post suggests that the legal effects of service conducted by the Russian Central Authority under the HSC on a defendant in the Occupied Areas should be recognized for two reasons. Firstly, the Ukraine and its supporting states’ declarations under the HSC are interpretative declarations rather than reservations (the same is true of the Russian declaration). Secondly, the Namibia Exception can provide certainty and predictability for litigators in international civil and commercial cases and should be applied to service conducted by the Russian Central Authority in the Occupied Areas.

Legal Dilemmas for the HSC
The competing declarations on Crimea do not identify the HSC provision pursuant to which they are made, nor do they specify the provisions whose legal effect they purport to modify. Arguably, no provision of HSC provides a legal basis for either declaration on Crimea.

1. Provisions for the Designation and Function of a Central Authority

Ukraine’s Declaration on Crimea provides that documents or requests made by Russia or a related authority in the Occupied Areas are void. HSC Articles 2–17 do not provide a basis for the declaration, because the purported invalidity of service conducted by the Russian Central Authority does not directly relate to the designation or function of the Ukrainian Central Authority. It is also likely beyond the scope of HSC Article 18, which allows each contracting state to designate other Authorities and determine their competence. A counterargument may be that Russia’s invasion violated Ukraine’s sovereignty, so Ukraine can invoke Article 18 and claim that Russia and relevant local authorities are illegal and that the documents or requests issued by them are void. Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty over the Occupied Areas is, however, an incidental question to the validity of the documents or requests issued by Russia and the relevant local authorities. Importantly, the HSC does not contain a compromissory clause. This distinguishes it from treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea under which, in some circumstances, tribunals can determine incidental questions “when those issues must be determined in order for the . . . tribunal to be able to rule on the relevant claims.”

For the same reasons, Russia’s Declaration on Crimea lacks a clear basis in HSC Articles 2-18.

2. Provision for Dependent Territories

Article 29 allows a state to extend the application of the HSC to territories “for the international relations of which [the declaring state] is responsible.” The meaning of this language is not clear. Article 56(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) includes a similar phase. Article 56(1) is the so-called “colonial clause,” which prevents the automatic application of the ECHR to non-metropolitan territories and empowers a metropolitan state to declare its application. In 1961, the European Commission extended Article 56(1) to “dependent territories irrespective of domestic legal status.” The concept of dependent territories under the ECHR has been defined by almost exclusive deference to a member state’s unilateral Article 56(1) declaration. In Quark Fishing Ltd. v. United Kingdom, for example, Protocol No. 1 was held inapplicable to a fishing vessel under a Falklands flag because the UK declaration only extended the ECHR, not Protocol No. 1, to islands that belonged to Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) Dependencies.

However, the ECHR’s deferential approach should not apply to HSC Article 29. Argentina is not a member state of the ECHR and the court in Quark Fishing relied on the fact that there was no dispute that the islands were a “territory” within the meaning Article 56(1). As an HSC member state, however, Argentina declared its opposition to the UK’s extension of the HSC to the Falkland Islands, relying on a UN resolution noting a dispute between the two states about sovereignty over the islands. Due to the unclear relationship between Article 29 and international law on the occupation or succession of territories, Article 29 may not serve as a legal basis for the Declarations on Crimea.

Legal Effect of the Declarations
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties adopted by the International Law Commission divide declarations formulated by a state under a treaty into reservations and interpretative declarations. A reservation is intended to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty, while an interpretative declaration is purported to specify or clarify their meaning or scope. Putting aside whether they are affirmatively authorized by the HSC, the Declarations on Crimea should be presumptively permissible. This is because reservations are generally permissible unless an exception under the VCLT is triggered, so interpretative declarations should also be presumptively permissible.

The Declarations on Crimea are best understood as interpretative declarations for the following reasons.

First, the question of territorial application is not part of the functioning ratione materiae of the HSC. The subject matter of the Convention is service. HSC Article 29 allows member states to determine the territorial application of the Convention, suggesting that the Convention does not require its application to be extended to the entire territory of a member state.

Second, a declaration purporting to exclude or extend the application of a treaty as a whole to all or part of its territories without modifying its legal effect is not a reservation. The contents of the respective Declaration on Crimea made by Russia and Ukraine show that both countries seek to clarify the application of the HSC as a whole to the Occupied Areas.

Third, none of the declarants explicitly indicates that the Declaration on Crimea is a condition for them to ratify or continue as a member of the HSC. Consequently, they are not conditional interpretative declarations that should be treated as reservations.

Finally, a reservation would modify the legal effect of the HSC, applying between the reserving state and another state if the latter has not objected within twelve months after it was notified, which is not the case here. It is impossible for other state to tacitly accept the conflicting declarations.

Therefore, because the Declaration on Crimea made by Ukraine, its supporting states, and Russia, respectively, are interpretative declarations rather than reservations, they do not exclude or modify the legal effect of the HSC. Neither do they alter the treaty relations between the declarants and the majority of HSC member states that have not expressed a view on these Declarations.

The Namibia Exception
The VCLT does not provide a timeline for a state to accept another state’s interpretative declaration. However, private parties in international litigation require certainty about service of process in Ukraine under the HSC. The courts of HSC member states should not recognize only the Ukrainian Central Authority for service in Occupied Areas just because their governments are politically aligned with Ukraine. Instead, for the reasons set out below, the Namibia Exception protecting the rights and interests of people in a territory controlled by non-recognized government should be extended to service conducted by the Russian Central Authority and local authorities in the Occupied Areas under the HSC.

The “Namibia Exception” comes from the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution case. That decision provides that the non-recognition of a state’s administration of a territory due to its violation of international law should not result in depriving the people of that territory of any advantages derived from international cooperation. The courts of HSC member states should recognize not only the Ukrainian Central Authority for service in the Occupied Areas, but also service conducted by the Russian Central Authority and local authorities in the Occupied Areas under the HSC.

First, service under the HSC concerns private rights. Service of process aims to ensure that a defendant is duly informed of a foreign litigation against it. When the defendant resides in the Occupied Areas, service conducted by the Russian Central Authority under the HSC should belong to the realm of the de facto government. Recognizing the conduct of de facto government does not necessarily lead to de jure recognition (e.g., Luther v. Sagor [1921] 3 KB 532 (Can.)).

Second, service through the Russian Central Authority is the only realistic way to serve a defendant in the Occupied Areas who has no agents in a foreign forum, given that Ukraine made a reservation on service by postal channels under HSC Article 10. Ukraine might be advised to withdraw this reservation during war time.

Third, non-recognition of service conducted by the Russian Central Authority in the Occupied Areas would lead to unjust consequences for Ukrainian people in the Occupied Areas who have to comply with the Russian legal order.

A concern is that applying the Namibia Exception to service of process conducted by the Russian Central Authority may harm Ukrainians in the Occupied Area when they are likely not in a position to defend themselves in a court in the United States, China or other foreign countries. The concern is not a good reason to reject the Namibia Exception because it can be addressed by the foreign courts using legal aids, remote hearing, forum non convenience, temporary stay, or other case management methods.

Recommendations for HSC Member States
The HSC Special Commission is a group of experts designated by member states to discuss issues with the practical operation of the Convention. It has issued recommendations for HSC member states regarding the meaning of “civil or commercial matters”, service by electronic means, and other matters. It should publish a recommendation to assist member states in adopting a consistent response to the conflicting Declarations on Crimea.

The legal nature of Ukraine’s and Russia’s Declarations on Crimea are different. Ukraine’s Declaration on Crimea is an amplifying interpretative declaration, which intends to address new events not covered by a treaty. Russia’s invasion created such an event: the Ukrainian Central Authority can no longer effectuate service in the Occupied Areas. In contrast, Russia’s Declaration on Crimea is an interpretation contra legem. This is because Russia’s occupation of Ukraine violated international law on the prohibition of the unlawful use of force, which is contrary to the principle of good faith. Although states are free to decide whether to acknowledge Russia’s interpretation contra legem, the International Court of Justice has rendered a decision condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although it does not bind all states, it shows that the international community considers the invasion as a violation of international law. The Special Commission should take this opportunity to assist member states in adopting consistent approaches to apply the HSC to serve defendants in Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia.

See Full text here

Reminder – 9th Journal of Private International Law Conference: Deadline for Submission of Abstracts

EAPIL blog - ven, 12/09/2022 - 08:00

As announced on this blog, the 9th Journal of Private International Law conference will be hosted by the Yong Pung School of Law, Singapore Management University from 3 to 5 August 2023.

A reminder that the deadline to submit abstracts is Friday 16 December 2022 at jpil2023@smu.edu.sg. The Call for Papers is available here.

More information on the conference and the related registration can be found here.

IPRax: Issue 6 of 2022

EAPIL blog - jeu, 12/08/2022 - 14:00

The latest issue of the IPRax (Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts) has been published on 1 November 2022. The table of contents is available here. The following abstracts have been kindly provided to us by the editor of the journal.

U. Janzen and R. Wagner, The German implementing rules for the Brussels II ter Regulation

When the original version of the Brussels II Regulation was adopted in 2000, it was not certain whether this regulation would be such a success. In the meantime, the regulation has become one of the most important legal instruments for judicial cooperation in civil matters. The regulation has recently been revised for the second time. The following article presents the German implementing rules for this recast.

R. Magnus, A new Private International Law and new Procedural Rules for Adoptions in Germany

As a result of two recent reforms the German private international and procedural laws applicable to adoptions have changed quite substantively. Article 22 (1) sentence 1 of the Introductory Act to the German Civil Code (EG-BGB) now refers to the lex fori as the law applicable for all domestic procedures, and section 1 (2) of the Adoption effects Act (AdWirkG) introduces an obligatory recognition procedure for many foreign adoptions. The effects of these and other innovations are examined and evaluated in detail in this article.

H.-P. Mansel, Liberalization of the Private International Law of Marriage and Registered Civil Partnership: Remarks on the Place of Marriage and Registration as Connecting Factors

According to the new proposal of the German Council for Private International Law, the law of the “place of marriage” is to govern the establishment of a marriage or registered civil partnership. The article deals with this proposal and explores the question of how this place is to be determined in the case of an online marriage. It argues for the application of the law of the state where the register is kept.

B. Laukemann, Protecting procedural confidence against the insolvency estate?

According to Union law, the effects of insolvency proceedings on a pending lawsuit are governed by the lex fori – and thus not by the law of the opening Member State (s. Art. 18 European Insolvency Regulation [EIR], Art. 292 Directive 2009/138, Art. 32 Directive 2001/24). At first glance, the distinction between the lex fori and the lex concursus raised here does not cause any major problems of interpretation. But can the lex fori and its regulatory purpose, which is to guarantee protection of confidence and legal certainty in civil proceedings, also be brought into position against the liability regime of foreign insolvency proceedings? A look at Art. 7(2)(c) EIR, which, in turn, allocates procedural powers of a debtor and insolvency practitioner to the lex fori concursus, reveals the difficulties of a clear-cut demarcation between the law of the forum and the law governing insolvency proceedings. The present contribution seeks to pursue this classification problem, equally relevant in legal and practical terms, for the relevant pieces of secondary EU legislation. Recently, this legal question was submitted to the CJEU – due to the liquidation of an insurance company within the scope of the Solvency II Directive. The decision gives rise to critically examine the delimitation approach of the CJEU and to ask in general how the protection of procedural confidence, on the one hand, and insolvency-related liability interests of the creditors, on the other, can be brought into an appropriate balance.

J. Kondring, International Service by WhatsApp: Reflections on the Hague Service Convention and the 1928 Anglo-German Convention in Judgement and Recognition Proceedings

In times of electronic communication, the question arises whether cross-border service by means of electronic communication is possible. The Higher Regional Court (OLG) of Frankfurt a.M. had to decide this question in recognition proceedings for a Canadian-German service by WhatsApp. Neither the Hague Service Convention nor bilateral agreements such as the Anglo-German Convention of 1928 allow service by WhatsApp. In this respect, the article also ex-amines the interaction of section 189 German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and Art. 15 of the Hague Service Convention in both judgment and recognition proceedings, including the relationship to the parallel Anglo-German Convention of 1928. In certain cases, Art. 15 of the Hague Service Convention moves aside and “neutralises” section 189 German Code of Civil Procedure and its legal consequences. For the recognition proceedings, Art. 15 of the Hague Service Convention will also have to be taken into account in the context of the examination of the regularity of service of the document instituting the proceedings.

S. Arnold, Applicability of Article 15(1)(c) Lugano II in cases of subsequent relocation of consumers

In its judgment (C-296/20), the ECJ follows the consumer-friendly course already taken in the mBank decision. It interpreted Article 15(1)(c) Lugano II (and by doing so also the corresponding Article 17(1)(c) Brussels Ibis Regulation). The court clarified that the provision governs the jurisdiction of a court also in such cases where a consumer who has contracted with a professional counterparty subsequently relocates to another contracting State. Thus, it is not necessary for the cross-border activities of the professional party to have already existed at the time the contract was concluded. Rather, the subsequent move of the consumer also constitutes the “pursuit” of the professional or commercial activity in the consumer’s member state. Consequently, the court strengthens the position of consumers. Even in the event of a subsequent move, they can rely on the (passive) forum of protection of Article 16(2) Lugano II and the (active) forum of Article 16(1) Lugano II at their place of residence. The burden that this decision places on the professional counterparty – the risk of foreign litigation even if the matter was purely domestic at the time the contract was concluded – seems reasonable, as choice of forum agreements (Art. 17 No. 3 Lugano II) remain possible as a means of protection.

A. Staudinger and F. Scharnetzki, The applicable law for the internal settlement between two liability insurances of a tractor-trailer combination – Karlsruhe locuta, causa non finita

If in a tractor-trailer combination the owners of the tractor unit and the trailer are not the same person and two different liability insurers cover the respective operating risk, the question arises as to the internal settlement between the two liability insurances. Here, first the conflict-of-law issue to be dealt with is the source of law that is to be used to determine the relevant statute for recourse. In its decision of 3 March 2021, the Federal Court of Justice endorsed an alternative approach based on Article 19 of the Rome II Regulation and Article 7 para. 4 lit. b) of the Rome I Regulation in conjunction with Article 46d para. 2 of the Introductory Act to the German Civil Code (EGBGB) for a situation in which a German liability insurer of the tractor seeks half compensation from a Czech trailer insurer. In the opinion of the authors, the IV. Civil Senate had, in light of the European Court of Justice’s decision of 21 January 2016 in the joined cases C-359/14 and C-475/14, an obligation to refer to the Court in Luxembourg under Article 267 para. 1 lit. b), para. 3 TFEU. So, the solution via Art. 19 Rome II Regulation seems hardly convincing, at most a special rule on conflict of laws like Art. 7 para. 4 lit. b) Rome I Regulation. Whether and to what extent Article 7 para. 4 lit. b) Rome I Regulation can be instrumentalized to enforce § 78 para. 2 VVG old version via Article 46d para. 2 EGBGB, however, should have been finally clarified by the European Court of Justice. In particular, it seems doubtful whether Article 46d para. 2 EGBGB as a national rule, which goes back to Art. 7 para. 4 lit. b) Rome I Regulation, allows a provision such as § 78 para. 2 VVG old version to be applied as a mere recourse rule between two insurers. This applies all the more since no special public interests or interests of injured parties worthy of protection are affected here.

C. Mayer, Relevance of the place of marriage for determining the applicable law in relation to the formal requirements of proxy marriage and online marriage

The decisions of the Federal Court of Justice and the Düsseldorf Administrative Court concern a double proxy marriage in Mexico and an online marriage via live video conference with an official from the US state of Utah. In both cases, the spouses were themselves in Germany. Both decisions focus on the conflict of law determination of the applicable law in relation to the formal requirements of marriage. Due to the German conflict of law rules in Art. 11 and Art. 13 Para. 4 EGBGB, the place of marriage is decisive. The Federal Court of Justice concludes that the double proxy marriage took place in Mexico, which is why the marriage was formally valid under the applicable local law. The Dusseldorf Administrative Court rules that the online marriage was concluded in Germany, so that only German law is applicable and the marriage is therefore formally invalid due to the lack of participation of a registrar. Both cases reveal inconsistencies in German conflict of laws.

S. Deuring, The Purchase of Trees Growing in Brazil: Not a Contract Relating to a Right in rem in Immovable Property or a Tenancy of Immovable Property

ShareWood, a company established in Switzerland, and a consumer resident in Austria had entered into a framework agreement and four purchase contracts for the acquisition of teak and balsa trees in Brazil. When the consumer demanded the termination of the purchase contracts, the question arose of whether this demand could be based on Austrian law, even though the parties had agreed that Swiss law should apply. Siding with the consumer, the ECJ ruled that contractual arrangements such as the present one cannot be considered contracts relating to a right in rem in immovable property or tenancy of immovable property pursuant to Art. 6(4)(c) of the Rome I Regulation. The non-applicability of this provision entails the applicability of Art. 6(2) cl. 2 of the Rome I Regulation. According to the latter, a choice of law may not have the result of depriving consumers of the protection afforded to them by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of the country where the consumer has his habitual residence. In consequence, the consumer could, in fact, base his action on Austrian law.

C. Benicke and N. Suchocki, Judicial approval for disclaimer of interests given by parents for their minor children – Polish cases of succession at German courts and the role of the special escape clause in Art. 15 (2) CPC 1996

Polish probate courts demand for judicial approval of any disclaimer of interest given by parents for their minor children, even if such an approval is not required under the law applicable according to Art. 17 of the Child Protection Convention 1996. If German law is applicable due to Art. 17 CPC 1996, in most cases a judicial approval for the disclaimer of interest is not required according to § 1643 (2) p. 2 BGB. As a consequence, German family courts having jurisdiction to issue a judicial approval according to Art. 5 (1) CPC 1996 cannot do so, because under German law, applicable according to Art. 15 (1) CPC 1996 no judicial approval can be issued if not required by the substantive law applicable according to Art. 17 CPC 1996. This leads to the situation that no valid disclaimer of interest can be made, even though both jurisdictions would allow it in a purely domestic case. Therefore, the question arises as to whether in such cases a German family court may issue a judicial approval due to Art. 15 (2) CPC 1996, which exceptionally allows to apply or take into consideration the law of another State with which the situation has a substantial connection. One of the various regulatory purposes of the special escape clause in Art. 15 (2) CPC 1996 consists in allowing the court to adjust the lex fori in order to solve an adaptation problem as it is in this case. The Higher Regional Court Hamm issued such a judicial approval in taking into consideration that the Polish law requires a judicial approval for the disclaimer of interest. We agree with the OLG Hamm in the result, but not in the justification. As Art. 15 (2) CPC 1996 refers only to Art. 15 (1) CPC 1996 the taking into consideration of Polish law cannot overrule that the law applicable according to Art. 17 CPC 1996 does not require a judicial approval. To solve the adaptation problem, it suffices that German law applicable according to Art. 15 (1) CPC 1996 is modified in so far that it allows the formal issuance of a judicial approval even though such an approval is not required by the substantive law applicable according to Art. 17 CPC 1996.

R. Hüßtege, German procedural law for obtaining a decision that the removal or retention of a child was wrongful – present and future

Art. 15 of the Hague Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction requests that the applicant should obtain from the authorities of the State of the habitual residence of the child a decision that the removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. The procedure for obtaining the decision is regulated incomplete in the German implementation law. Most of the problems raised will, however, be remedied by the reform of the German implementing act.

P. Schlosser, Recognition even if service of the document initiating the proceedings had not taken place?

The author is submitting that Art. 22 of the Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance provides only one alternative for refusing recognition to a maintenance Judgment (“may be refused”) and that, therefore, more liberal provisions in national Law are upheld. The German code of civil procedure, § 328, seems not to be more liberal, but must be seen in the light of the overwhelming principle of safeguarding the right to be heard in court. Yet, this principle is well safeguarded, if the proposed victim in the subsequent proceedings of exequatur gets a chance to assert what he would have asserted in the original litigation but, thereby, he had no chance to achieve a different result. Under these circumstances the contrary solution would amount to a refusal of justice to the other party.

B. Heiderhoff, Refugees and the Hague Child Abduction Convention

The ECJ held that the removal of a child cannot be wrong ful in the sense of Article 2(11) of Regulation No 2201/2003 (now Article 2 sec 2(11) of Regulation No 2019/1111), if the parent has complied with a decision to transfer under Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 by leaving the country. This decision makes a valid point, but seems too general and reaches too far. The contribution shows that the integration of family law and migration law is insufficient and urges better coordination between the actors to achieve better protection of the child.

T. Frantzen, Norwegian International Law of Inheritance

Norway adopted a new act on inheritance and the administration of estates in 2019. The act came into force on 1 January 2021. The new act is based on the principles of the act on inheritance from 1972 and the act on administration of estates from 1930. This means that descendants may claim a forced share of 2/3 of the estate, however with a limitation of approximately 150,000 Euro. With the new act the amount has been increased, and it is regulated each year. A surviving spouse may, as before, claim a legal share. The spouse may alternatively choose to take over the so-called undivided estate. This means that the division of the estate is postponed.
Until the new succession act was adopted, Norwegian choice of law rules on succession were based on customary law. The general principle was that succession was governed by the law of the State in which the deceased had her/his last domicile, and that there was no, or a very limited space, for party autonomy.
The new act decides that the administration of estates may take place in Norway if the deceased had her/his last habitual residence in Norway. When it comes to succession, the main rule is that succession is governed by the law of the State where the deceased had her/his last habitual residence. Party autonomy is introduced in the new act, as a person may choose that succession shall be governed by the law of a State of which he or she was a national. The decision on the choice of law is however not valid if the person was a Norwegian citizen by the time of death. The few provisions on choice of law are based on the EuErbVO.

C. Jessel-Holst, Private international law reform in North Macedonia

In 2020, North Macedonia adopted a new Private International Law Act which replaces the 2007 Act of the same name and applies from 18.2.2021. The new Act amounts to a fundamental reform which is mainly inspired by the Acquis communautaire. It also refers to a number of Hague Conventions. The Act contains conflict-of-law rules as well as rules on procedure. Many issues are regulated for the first time. The concept of renvoi is maintained but the scope of application has been significantly reduced. As a requirement for the recognition of foreign judgments the Act introduces the mirror principle. As was previously the case, reciprocity does not constitute a prerequisite for recognition and enforcement.

Pages

Sites de l’Union Européenne

 

Theme by Danetsoft and Danang Probo Sayekti inspired by Maksimer