Droit international général

Written by Hadrien Pauchard (assistant researcher and doctoral student at Sciences Po Law School)

The first issue of the Revue Critique de droit international privé of 2025 has just been released. It gathers six contributions honouring Albert Armin Ehrenzweig and his legacy, as well as seven case notes and numerous book reviews.

The doctrinal part of the volume is devoted to the proceedings of the Albert Armin Ehrenzweig Conference organized in June 2024 at the University of Vienna, fifty years after the passing away of the great author. The contributions commemorate both the man and the scientist, testifying to the relevance of Albert A. Ehrenzweig’s scholarship to contemporary private international law. They are published in French in the printed version of the Revue (also available online here), and will be available shortly in English (here).

The conference opens with Prof. Matthias Lehmann (University of Vienna) personal tribute to Albert A Ehrenzweig – A Giant of the Conflict of Laws. It recalls the dramatic journey through which Professor Ehrenzweig built his legacy as a “communicator between different cultures”:

With Albert Ehrenzweig, Austria lost one of its undoubtably greatest legal talents. But one’s loss was another’s gain, that of the US. This simple zero sum is worth emphasising at a time when the hatred against migrants is rising yet again on both sides of the Atlantic. Ehrenzweig brought to the US plenty of ideas from his native Austria. Among them is the abstract consideration of legal problems and the strictly logical approach to their solution, which is particularly helpful in areas such as conflicts of jurisdiction or conflicts of laws. He also brought with him a great deal of interest and knowledge in the area of psychology, which was en vogue in his days in Vienna.

In the following contribution, Prof. Florian Heindler (Sigmund Freud Privat University, Vienna) reflects on two major lines of the dedicatee’s scholarship, namely the Comparative Method and the Integration of Conflict of Law’s with Jurisdiction. The article is introduced as follows:

Ehrenzweig’s work deserves attention –primarily because of its topicality– beyond its historical-bibliographical interest and its link the question of remedy for past injustices. Two methodological cornerstones of his work on the conflict of law must be emphasised. Firstly, transatlantic dialogue: Ehrenzweig frequently sought to align “European learning and experience” with the “pragmatic approach” and “technique of recording daily experiences”. He was endowed with the particular ability to address discussions in the US and in Europe so as to bridge the gaps between European and US private international law, thus bringing the highly divided US and European legal systems closer together. The second theme is linked to the integrated thinking of Ehrenzweig which shaped his theories in the area of conflict of laws. Indeed, Ehrenzweig was also famous tort lawyer, where he demonstrated out-of-the-box thinking, also characteristic of his way of conducting legal research. Illustrating this talent, most prominently, is his publication on “a proper law in a proper forum” (“jurisdictional approach”).

In the third contribution on Albert Ehrenzweig, Berkeley, and Un-stating Choice of Law, Prof. Andrew D. Bradt (University of California, Berkeley School of Law) pays tribute to Professor Ehrenzweig’s influence on Conflict of Laws in the United States. The abstract reads as follows:

Like his fellow realists, Ehrenzweig eschewed metaphysical dogma, viewing choice of law in a more “pluralistic” way, as a matter for the law of the forum, so that applying a different state’s law to a case is less a choice of foreign law than an expression of forum law and policy. In this respect, his campaign against Restatements of choice of law voices concerns that remain pertinent as the American Law Institute enters its second decade of its efforts to create a Third Restatement.

In the fourth article, Prof. Chris Tomale (University of Vienna) calls for a contemporary reappropriation of the dedicatee’s writings on Datum and Substance – Albert Ehrenzweig’s moral data approach. The contribution is presented as follows:

The changing, almost fluid nature of Ehrenzweig’s legal scholarship between three modalities of claims about the law has opened up his work to much undeserved criticism, which calls for a new and instructive look at the very epistemological substance of his findings. Moreover, the contemporary re-politization of private law could also be a call for its re-moralization, raising exactly the same moral data questions that were on Ehrenzweig’s mind. In this respect, too, Ehrenzweig’s moral data approach offers a helpful heuristic to describe and understand these developments.

Then, bridging the gaps between two continents and two intellectual traditions, Prof. Jeremy Heymann (Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3) delivers though-provoking reflections on Ehrenzweig’s Legacy in European Private International Law. The abstract read as follows:

All too often reduced by his detractors, at least over the European side of the Atlantic, to his plea for the « proper law of the forum » – and all too often misread –, Ehrenzweig’s thinking calls to be reconsidered. His very distinctive unilateralist approach to the conflict of laws is well in tune with the method posited, in numerous judgments, by the Court of Justice of the European Union and more generally by the EU legislator.

The tribute concludes with Dr. David Messner-Kreuzbauer’s (University of Graz) last thinkings on The Argument from “Substantive Evolution” as a Legacy of Albert Armin Ehrenzweig’s Private International Law. Continuities From Vienna to Berkeley. The article’s abstract reads as follows:

Albert Armin Ehrenzweig has been portrayed as a “European Legal Realist”, and is remembered for the fact-oriented data approach as well as a preference for the lex fori. This article presents a slightly different Ehrenzweig: a Viennese judge and academic who went to the United States formed by strong ideas about substantive (tort) law, by the jurisprudence of interests and with a keen sense for moral psychology. His thoughts may have great value in navigating a contemporary task: bringing together contemporary private international law with the evolution of substantive (tort) law in recent decades.

The full table of contents is available here.

Previous issues of the Revue Critique (from 2010) are available on Cairn.

According to Article 4(1) of the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (the ‘Agreement’), Denmark shall not take part in the adoption of opinions by the Committee referred to in Article 26 of Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 on the […]

On 11 and 12 June 2025, the Nordic Group on Private International Law (NGPIL) held a conference in Stockholm. NGPIL is an informal group consisting of lawyers interested in the field of private international law. Founded in Uppsala in 2002, the group enhances the intelligibility of the Scandinavian languages as well as the common legal […]

Last summer, Andrew Dickinson (Professor of the Conflict of Laws, University of Oxford, and former editor of ConflictofLaws.net) delivered a special course at the summer course of the Hague Academy of International Law entitled ‘Natural Justice in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’. It has now been published as Volume 446 of the Recueil des cours / Collected Courses.

The blurb reads as follows:

This special course assesses the utility of ideas of ‘natural law’ and ‘natural justice’ as tools to explain, rationalise and develop the rules governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments currently applied by the world’s legal orders.

After introducing the topic, the first part of the course consider how influential 17th and 18th century accounts of the law of nature sought to account for the relations existing between all human beings, as well as the creation of political societies with law-making powers, the global ordering of those societies and the role of adjudication as a means of resolving disputes within and among them. This provides the historical and intellectual background for what follows.

The principal part of the course considers how writers on the conflict of laws in this period drew upon and utilised these ideas, as the rules that we apply today to regulate foreign judgments began to take shape. This leads to a study of the further evolution of the legal landscape in the 19th century, highlighting the use of natural law reasoning by judges and commentators to explain and justify the effectiveness of individual exercises of adjudicatory authority beyond their original domains, as well as the later rejection of natural law thinking in favour of models centred on ideas of sovereignty and territoriality, which continue to dominate today.

Having completed this historical survey, the course examines the specific legacy of natural law reasoning in the common law world, involving the use of principles of ‘natural justice’ to deny recognition of unjust foreign judgments, as well as the counterparts of these principles in other legal systems and international treaties.

Drawing on the preceding material, the concluding chapter considers the case for renaturalising the law in this area, and the implications of following this path.

More information on the book can be found here.

It is available to subscribers to the Recueil des cours here.

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) will be holding its XLVIII Seminar entitled “Reflections regarding the Inter-American system in the 50th Anniversary of the CIDIP-I and the latest developments of Private International Law in Mexico” (Reflexiones en torno al sistema interamericano en el 50 Aniversario de la CIDIP-I y la actualidad del Derecho Internacional Privado en México) from 22 to 24 October 2025. The venue of the seminar will be the Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro (Querétaro, Mexico).

Potential speakers are invited to submit a paper in Spanish, English or Portuguese by 22 August 2025. Papers must comply with the criteria established by AMEDIP and will be evaluated accordingly. Selected speakers will be required to give their presentations preferably in Spanish as there will be no interpretation services, but some exceptions may be made by the organisers upon request for presentations in English and Portuguese. For more information on the requirements, click here.

 

The XVIII conference of ASADIP, the American Association of Private International Law, will take place from 7 to 9 August 2025 in Rio de Janeiro, under the titled Regional imaginaries, global resonance: Inter-American Private International Law and the world stage. It will bring together 78 panelists from 20 countries. The conference features, among other things, an […]

All episodes of Series 3 of the University of East Anglia Law School Podcast are now out. Hosted by Rishi Gulati, they cover the following topics:

• The Future of International Investment Law (Muthucumarasamy Sornarajah)
• Double Standards in International Law (Patryk Labuda)
• The launch of the Elgar Companion to UNIDROIT (Edward Elgar, 2024)
• The Rise of International Commercial Courts (Giesela Rühl)
• The exercise of self-defence in outer space (Chris O’Meara)
• Greenland, Self-Determination, and the Geopolitical Contest (Maria Ackrén).

All  episodes are available at SoundCloud, Apple Podcasts, and Spotify

The Supreme Court of Canada has released its reasons for dismissing the appeal (which it did orally on December 9, 2024) in Dunmore v Mehralian, 2025 SCC 20.  The narrow issue was the meaning of “habitual residence” for a child in the statutory context of the Children’s Law Reform Act (Ontario).  The SCC had earlier explained that a hybrid approach to the meaning of habitual residence is to be used under the Hague Convention: Office of the Children’s Lawyer v Balev, 2018 SCC 16.  In the convention, there is no definition of habitual residence.  In contrast, the CLRA does provide elements of a definition of habitual residence (in s 22) though it leaves “resides” undefined.  This generated the issue: under the statute, does the same hybrid approach apply or is the definition different because of the statute?

This mattered because under an approach that used only or mainly the shared intention of the parents to determine the child’s habitual residence, the child was resident in Oman. [170]  In contrast, under the hybrid approach that gave greater weight to objective factual connections to a place and less weight to the parents’ joint intent, the child was resident in Ontario. [88] The father urged the court to apply the former approach; the mother the latter.

The court by 8-1 decision agreed with the mother.  Key statements in the judgment written by Justice Martin include “residence is a contextual and factual concept that should not be encumbered by unnecessary rigidity”; the court should consider “all factors”; “the guiding principle is not whether the parents had a settled intention to reside in the place but whether the child was at home there”. [6]  The court found that the statutory language defining aspects of habitual residence did not adopt or mandate the parental intention approach [54] but rather left open how to define “resides”.  Balev, while not directly applicable, “serves to underline the inappropriateness of a shared intention approach”. [55]  The court offered several observations about principles to be used in determining a child’s residence. [64]-[67]

Justice Cote dissented, as she had in Balev.  It might be interesting to note that Justice Rowe also dissented in Balev but did not do so here.  Both had preferred the parental intention approach in the Hague Convention context.  Here Justice Cote held that in the CLRA context, s 22 had expressly adopted a parental intention approach [99] and that the court accordingly could not read the provisions to use the more flexible hybrid approach instead.  She also continued the argument, from the dissent in Balev, as to why that approach was superior for protecting children. [130]

My own sense is that the majority has the better of the argument, both on the statutory wording and on the ultimate choice of what test to use.  On the  latter, the tide seems strongly to support broader tests of residence, especially for children, rather than narrower ones.  The court wants this concept to be flexible.  So where there is latitude to choose a meaning, the court will choose the hybrid approach.  On the former, I think that s 22 leaves this latitude open.  It is true, as Justice Cote points out [118]-[119], that elements of parental intent feature prominently in parts of s 22 (see s 22(2)2 and s 22(3)).  But that does not mean that s 22(2)1 – resides with both parents – requires using the parental intention approach to determine what that means.  There is enough room, as a matter of statutory interpretation, for the majority to get to its result.

The decision is useful for its clarification of the approach to be used.  But I am not clear as to how it actually matters in the specific context of this case.  The mother had commenced proceedings in Ontario seeking a parenting order, under s 22.  The father argued s 22 did not apply, in part because the child was not habitually resident in Ontario.  The father also sought an order under s 40 for the child to be returned to Oman, which could only be made if the court lacked jurisdiction under s 22.  So far so good.  If the court lacks s 22 jurisdiction, the mother cannot get the parenting order she wants and risks an order of return.

But the father had also started a divorce proceeding in Oman and got a divorce from that court, and part of that order was an award of “primary custody” to the mother. [110]  The Court of Appeal for Ontario recognized that order: 2023 ONCA 806.  So even if s 22 does not apply to give the Ontario court jurisdiction to make a parenting order, is there any likelihood the court would make an order under s 40 for return?  She was awarded primary custody by an Omani court and she lives in Ontario.  And in the absence of an Ontario parenting order, she still has primary custody under the order of the Omani court.

The SCC does not offer any thoughts, in its decision, on the impact of the recognition of the Omani custody order.  And in fairness it did not need to do so to settle the legal question of how to interpret habitual residence in the context of s 22 of the CLRA. But at least I am left to wonder about this.

As a general point, the majority stresses the need for deference to first-instance determinations of a child’s residence [82] and, relatedly, the need for these sort of proceedings to be resolved expeditiously, [75] something that did not happen in this case. [77]  Justice Cote does not disagree and argues that the majority’s hybrid approach will contribute to such drawn-out litigation. [158]-[159]

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on Thursday 26 June 2025 at 14:30 (Mexico City time – CST), 22:30 (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is WIPO expedited arbitration: ADR and ODR in the era of technology disputes, videogames and e-sports and will be presented by Kiyoshi Tsuru and Óscar Suárez (WIPO) (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link:

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87282981913?pwd=Yd9anbHRaF74qf7aq52g6L8cAMKFXv.1

Meeting ID: 872 8298 1913

Password: AMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

Many thanks to Karim Hammami for the tip-off

 

I. Introduction

Once in the 20th century, the so-called “Nevada Divorces” captured the attention of private international law scholars around the world, particularly regarding their recognition abroad. Today, a similar phenomenon is emerging with the so-called “Utah Zoom Wedding.” So, what exactly is this phenomenon?

This term refers to a legal and innovative practice, which gained prominence during the COVID-19 pandemic, whereby couples — even if physically located outside the United States — can legally marry under Utah law through a fully online ceremony, typically conducted via Zoom.

This type of marriage has become increasingly popular in countries like Israel and Lebanon (see infra), where only religious marriages governed by recognized personal status laws are permitted. In such systems, interfaith marriages are often not allowed or are significantly restricted, depending on the religious communities involved. Traditionally, couples seeking a civil marriage had to travel abroad in order to conclude one that could later be recognized upon their return. The Utah Zoom Wedding offers a more accessible and convenient alternative, allowing couples to contract a civil marriage remotely without leaving their home country.

The inevitable question then becomes the validity of such a marriage abroad, particularly in the couple’s home country. It is in this respect that the decision of the Beirut Civil Court dated 22 May 2025, commented below, provides a valuable case study from a comparative law perspective. It sheds light on the legal reasoning adopted by Lebanese courts when dealing with marriages concluded online under foreign law, and illustrates the broader challenges of transnational recognition of non-traditional marriage forms in plural legal systems.

 

II. The Case: X v. The State of Lebanon

1. Facts

The case concerns the registration in Lebanon of a marriage concluded online via Zoom in the State of Utah, United States. The concerned parties, X (the plaintiff) and A (his wife) appear to be Lebanese nationals domiciled in Lebanon (while parts of the factual background in the decision refer to X alone as being domiciled in Lebanon, the court’s reasoning suggests that both X and A were domiciled there. Accordingly, the analysis that follows adopts the court’s understanding). In March 2022, while both parties were physically present in Lebanon, they entered into a marriage remotely via videoconference, officiated by a legally authorized officiant under the laws of the State of Utah. The ceremony was conducted in the presence of two witnesses (X’s brother and sister).

Following the marriage, X submitted an authenticated copy of a Utah-issued marriage certificate, along with other required documents, to the Lebanese Consulate General in Los Angeles. The Consulate registered the certificate and transmitted it through official channels to Lebanon for registration in the civil registry. However, the Lebanese authorities ultimately refused to register the marriage. The refusal was based on several grounds, including, inter alia, the fact that the spouses were physically present in Lebanon at the time of the ceremony, thus requiring the application of Lebanese law.

After unsuccessful attempts to have the decision reconsidered, X filed a claim before the Beirut Civil Court against the State of Lebanon, challenging the authorities’ refusal to register his marriage.

 

2. Parties’ Arguments

Before the Court, the main issue concerned the validity of the marriage. According to X, Article 25 of Legislative Decree No. 60 of 13 March 1936 provides that a civil marriage contracted abroad is valid in form if it is conducted in accordance with the legal procedures of the country in which it was concluded. X argued that the validity of a marriage concluded abroad in conformity with the formal requirements of the law of the place of celebration should be upheld, even if the spouses were residing in and physically present in Lebanon at the time of the marriage.

On the Lebanese State’s side, it was argued, inter alia, that although, under the Lebanese law, the recognition of validity of marriages concluded abroad is permitted, such recognition remains subject to the essential formal and substantive requirements of marriage under Lebanese law. It was also contended that the principles of private international law cannot be invoked to bypass the formal requirements imposed by Lebanese law on marriage contracts, particularly when the purpose is to have the marriage registered in the Lebanese civil registry. Accordingly, since the parties were physically present in Lebanon at the time the marriage was concluded, Lebanon should be considered the place of celebration, and the marriage must therefore be governed exclusively by Lebanese law.

 

3. The Ruling (relevant parts only)

After giving a constitutional dimension to the issue and recalling the applicable legal texts, notably Legislative Decree No. 60 of 13 March 1936, the court ruled as follows:

“The Legislative Decree No. 60 mentioned above [……] recognizes the validity of marriages contracted abroad in any form, as Article 25 thereof provides that “a marriage contracted abroad is deemed valid in terms of form if it complies with the formal legal requirements in force in the country where it was concluded.” This made it possible for Lebanese citizens to contract civil marriages abroad and to have all their legal effects recognized, provided that the marriage was celebrated in accordance with the legal formalities of the country where it was contracted and therefore subjected to civil law [……].

Based on the foregoing, it is necessary to examine the conditions set out in Article 25 and what it intended by “a marriage contracted abroad,” particularly in light of the Lebanese State’s claim that the Lebanese national must travel abroad and be physically present outside Lebanon and that the marriage must be celebrated in a foreign country [……].

In order to answer this question, several preliminary considerations must be addressed, which form the basis for determining the appropriate legal response in this context. These include:

• The principle of party autonomy in contracts and the freedom to choose the applicable law is a cornerstone of international contracts. This principle stems from the right of individuals to govern their legal relationships under a law they freely and expressly choose. This equally applies to the possibility for the couple to choose the most appropriate law governing their marital relationship, when they choose to marry civilly under the laws of a country that recognizes civil marriage.
• Lebanese case law has consistently recognized the validity of civil marriages contracted abroad, subjecting such marriages, both as to form and substance, to the civil law of the country of celebration, regardless of the spouses’ other connections to that country [……]. This implies an implicit recognition that Lebanese law leaves room for the spouses’ autonomy in choosing the form of their marriage and the law governing their marriage.
• Legal provisions are general and abstract, and cannot be interpreted in a way that creates discrimination or inequality among citizens [……]. Therefore, adopting a literal interpretation of the term “abroad” to require the physical presence of the spouses outside Lebanese territory at the time of the marriage, as advocated by the State of Lebanon, would result in unequal treatment among Lebanese citizens. This is because, under such an interpretation, civil marriage would only be practically available to those with the financial means to travel abroad. Such a result would fail to provide a genuine solution to the issue of denying certain citizens the right to civil marriage.
• Subjecting a civil marriage contract to a law chosen by the parties does not contravene Lebanese public policy in personal status matters. This is because, once the marriage is celebrated in accordance with the formalities admitted in the chosen country, it does not affect the laws and rights of Lebanon’s religious communities or alter them. On the contrary, it constitutes recognition of a constitutionally protected right [right to marriage] that deserves safeguarding, and that the recognition of this right serves public policy. Furthermore, the multiplicity of personal status regimes in Lebanon due to the existence of various religious communities practically broadens the scope for accepting foreign laws chosen by the parties. However, Lebanese courts retain the power to review the chosen law to ensure that it does not contain provisions that violate Lebanese public policy, and this without considering the principle of party autonomy, in and of itself, to be contrary to public policy.[…]

Based on the foregoing [……], the key issue is whether the marriage contract between X and A, which was entered into in accordance with the law of the State of Utah via online videoconference while both were actually and physically present in Lebanon, can be executed in Lebanon.

[……]

Utah law [……] expressly allows the celebration of marriage between two persons not physically present in the state. [……]

[U.S. law] clearly provides that the marriage is deemed to have taken place in Utah, even if both parties are physically located abroad, as long as the officiant is in Utah and the permission to conclude the marriage was issued there. Accordingly, under [Utah State’s] law, de jure, the locus celebrationis of marriage is Utah. This means that the marriage’s formal validity shall be governed by Utah law, not Lebanese law, in accordance with the principle locus regit actum. [……]

Therefore, based on all of the above, X and A concluded a civil marriage abroad pursuant to Article 25 of the Legislative Decree No. 60. The fact that they were physically located in Lebanon at the time of celebration does not alter the fact that the locus celebrationis of the marriage was de jure the State of Utah, based on the spouses’ clear, explicit and informed choice of the law of marriage in the State of Utah. Accordingly, the marriage contract at issue in this dispute satisfies the formal requirements of the jurisdiction in which it was concluded (Utah), and must therefore be deemed valid under Article 25 of the Legislative Decree No. 60. […..]

Consequently, the administration’s refusal to register the marriage contract at issue is legally unfounded, as the contract satisfies both the formal and substantive requirements of the law of the state in which it was concluded.

 

III. Comments

 

1. Implication of the Marriage Legal Framework on the Law applicable to marriage in Lebanon

In Lebanon, the only form of marriage currently available for couples is a religious marriage conducted before one of the officially recognized religious communities. However, couples who wish to avoid a religious marriage are allowed to travel abroad—typically to countries like Cyprus or Turkey—to have a civil marriage, and the later have it recognized in Lebanon. This is a consequence of the judicial and administrative interpretation of the law applicable to marriage in Lebanon, according to which, a marriage concluded abroad is recognized in Lebanon if it had been concluded in any of the forms recognized by the foreign legal system (Art. 25 of the Legislative Decree No. 60 of 13 March 1936. See Marie-Claude Najm Kobeh, “Lebanon” in J Basedow et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Private International Law – Vol. III (Edward Elgar, 2017) 2271). The marriage thus concluded will be governed by the foreign civil law of the country of celebration, irrespective of any connection between the spouses and the foreign country in question, such as domicile or residence. In this sense, Lebanese citizens enjoy a real freedom to opt for a civil marriage recognized under foreign law. The only exception, however, is when both parties are Muslims, in which the relevant rules of Islamic law apply (Najm, op. cit., 2271-72).

 

2. “Remote Marriage” in Lebanon

According to one commentator (Nizar Saghia, “Hukm qada’i yuqirr bi-sihhat al-zawaj al-madani “‘an bu‘d” [A Judicial Ruling Recognizes the Validity of a “Remote” Civil Marriage]), the “remote marriage” issue began in 2021 when a couple took advantage of a provision in Utah law allowing online marriages—an option made attractive by COVID-19 travel restrictions, financial hardship, and passport renewal delays. Their success in registering the marriage in Lebanon inspired others, with around 70 such marriages recorded in 2022. In response, the Directorate General of Personal Status began refusing to register these marriages, citing public policy concerns. Faced with this, many couples opted for a second marriage, either abroad (e.g., Cyprus or Turkey) or through a religious ceremony before a recognized sect in Lebanon. Some couples, however, – like in the present case – decided to challenge the refusal of the Lebanese authorities in court, seeking recognition of their marriage.

 

3. Significance of the Decision

The significance of this decision lies in the court’s readiness to broaden the already wide freedom couples have to choose the law governing their marriage. Already under the established legal practice in Lebanon, it was admitted that Lebanese private international law adopts a broad subjectivist view of party autonomy in civil marriage, allowing spouses to choose a foreign law without any requirement of connection to it (Pierre Gannagé, “La pénétration de l’autonomie de la volonté dans le droit international privé de la famille” Rev. crit. 1992, 439). The decision commented on here pushes that principle further: the court goes beyond the literal reading of Article 25 and applies it to remote marriages conducted under foreign law before foreign officials, even when the spouses remain physically in Lebanon.

This extension is striking. First, it should be noted that, under Lebanese private international law, it is generally admitted that “[t]he locus regis actum rule governing the formal conditions of marriage is ……extended to cover the consequences of marriage”, including filiation, parental authority, maintenance, custody and even divorce and separation (Najm, op. cit., 2272). Now, it suffices for a simple click online, and the payment of minimal fees to have the marital relationship of the spouses governed by the law of foreign State, despite the absence of any connection, whatsoever, with the foreign legal system in question (except for internet connection).

Second, and more interesting, such an excessively broad view of party autonomy does not seem to be always accepted, particularly, in the field of contracts (Gannagé, op. cit.). For instance, it is not clear whether a genuine choice of law in purely domestic civil or commercial contracts would be permitted at all (see, however, Marie-Claude Najm Kobeh, “Lebanon”, in D. Girsberger et al. (eds.), Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (OUP 2021) 579, referring to the possibility of incorporation by way of reference).

The classical justification of such a “liberalism” is often explained by the Lebanese state’s failure to introduce even an optional civil marriage law. As a result, Lebanese citizens are effectively granted a genuine right to choose a foreign civil status of their choice (Gannagé, op. cit., 438), and, now this choice can be exercised without ever leaving the comfort of their own homes.

Finally, it worth indicating that the court’s decision has been widely welcomed by proponents of civil marriage in Lebanon, as well as by human rights and individual freedom advocates (see e.g., the position of EuroMed Rights, describing the decision as opening up “an unprecedented space for individuals not affiliated with any religion”). However, it remains to be seen how this decision will affect the general principles of private international law, both in Lebanon and beyond, particularly when the validity of such Zoom Weddings, concluded without any connection to the place of celebration, is challenged abroad.

Legal fragmentation slows down the scaling up of the Critical Raw Materials-battery value chains to meet the demands of the green transition. Digital Product Passports (DPPs) should serve as an effective digital traceability tool for business compliance, rather than creating a green barrier.

UNECE and UN/CEFACT are proud to release our White Paper for public review, offering a deep dive into:

1. Legal conflicts across the Critical Raw Materials-battery international and cross-sector value chains (jurisdiction, applicable law, and enforcement)
2.  Traceability across critical raw materials like cobalt, copper, lithium & nickel
3. Gaps in international cooperation, especially between the EU, China, the U.S., and Australia
4.  Practical principles to bridge legal divides and support SMEs and the Global South

The paper proposes five key principles for improving legal interoperability:

1. Leverage existing legal and trade frameworks
2. Respect mandatory laws and public policy exceptions
3. Maintain certainty and predictability
4. Ensure inclusivity for SMEs and developing countries
5. Achieve mutual recognition across jurisdictions

The white paper is subject to a 14-day public review until Monday, 30 June 2025. Please use the Public Comment Log provided to facilitate the preparation of a Disposition Log by the Project Team. Download the full paper and provide your comments here:
https://uncefact.unece.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=24933171

For the works leading to this white paper, see here and here. 

 

The Faculty of Law at Humboldt University of Berlin (Germany) invites applications for a Junior Professorship (W1 Tenure Track to W2) in Private Law and Private International Law, to be filled as of 1 October 2026.

Candidates are expected to conduct research and teaching in Private Law and Private International Law broadly understood (including in particular International Family and Succession Law, International Civil Procedure, International Dispute Resolution, International Commercial Arbitration).

This position is part of the Faculty’s strategic effort to further strengthen its international profile as well as its commitment to foundational legal research. Applicants should demonstrate academic excellence, international visibility and have teaching experience at university level.

Candidates must hold a first law degree (ideally from Germany) and a PhD in (private international) law from either Germany or abroad. In addition, proficiency in German (native speaker level) is required as the position requires teaching and participation in academic self-governance in German.

Applications (letter of motivation, CV, list of publications and presentations, relevant academic transcripts and certificates, teaching evaluations) should be submitted to the Dean of Humboldt Law both by postal and by electronic mail (in one pdf) by 11 July 2025 under the reference number JP/003/25:

Dean of the Faculty of Law
Prof. Dr. Philipp Dann
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Unter den Linden 6
10099 Berlin
Germany

Email: dekan.rewi@hu-berlin.de

Further information on the tenure track framework at Humboldt University is available here at https://hu.berlin/tenuretrack-katalog.

The following post is reproduced from a recent update by the Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI). 
Many thanks to Catherine Shen for sharing the information.

 

In a judgment (2023) Hu 01 Xie Wai Ren No. 28 dated January 8, 2025, the Shanghai International Commercial Court (Shanghai Court) recognized and enforced an order given by the General Division of the Singapore High Court after finding reciprocity between China and Singapore in the recognition and enforcement of each other’s civil and commercial judgments.

The Singapore order

Zhao, the applicant in the enforcement proceeding before the Shanghai Court, and Ye, the respondent, entered into a loan agreement in December 2013 where Zhao agreed to lend Ye HKD 10 million. The money was transferred to Ye in April 2014. As Ye failed to repay the money as agreed on time, Zhao filed a lawsuit in the Singapore High Court.

On August 23, 2022, the General Division of the Singapore High Court (General Division) gave Oder HC/ORC5055/2022 which states, among others, that all subsequent proceedings of the matter will be stayed, except that the parties have the right to apply for enforcement without the need for any new proceeding to be issued and that Ye must repay Zhao an outstanding amount of close to HKD 9.5 million over three tranches.

Subsequently on June 16, 2023, the General Division gave Order HC/ORC2766/2023 which, among others, orders Ye to repay Zhao an amount of approximately HKD 9.3 million that was still outstanding, pay Zhao interest on judgment debt at the annual rate of 5.33% and bear SGD 2,500 in costs. Order HC/ORC2766/2023 states that it is the final order from the General Division with regard to the Tomlin order in HC/ORC5055/2022.

The China ruling

As Ye still failed to make repayment pursuant to Order HC/ORC2766/2023, Zhao applied to the Shanghai Court for recognition and enforcement of Order HC/ORC2776/2023. Ye is found to own real estate in Shanghai.

China and Singapore have not entered into any bilateral agreement on the recognition and enforcement of each other’s civil and commercial judgments. Nor have they joined any international treaty on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Accordingly this application needs to be reviewed based on whether reciprocity exists between Chinese and Singaporean courts. The Shanghai Court found that reciprocity exists on the basis of the Memorandum of Guidance between the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China and the Supreme Court of Singapore on Recognition and Enforcement of Money Judgments in Commercial Cases as well as past precedents where the courts of the two countries have recognized and enforced each other’s civil and commercial judgments. Zhao cited as support in her application [2014] SGHC 16 where the Singapore High Court recognized a judgment from the Suzhou Intermediate People’s Court as well as (2017) Zhe 03 Xie Wai Ren No. 7 where the Wenzhou Intermediate People’s Court recognized a Singapore civil judgment.

The Shanghai Court accordingly rendered a ruling to recognize and enforce Order HC/ORC2776/2023.

The original Chinese judgment can be read here. We thank Dr Yu Meng for alerting us to this judgment.

More about ABLI’s work on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Asia can be found here and here.

 

The special course given by Andrés Rodríguez Benot (Pablo de Olavide University Sevilla) at the Hague Academy of International Law on Le régime économique des mariages et des partenariats enregistrés en droit international privé (The Property Regime of Marriages and Registered Partnerships in Private International Law) has been published in Volume 445 of the Collected […]

On 18 June 2025 the European Commission opened an infringement procedure under Article 258 of the TFEU against Malta (INFR(2025)2100), alleging that Malta is failing to comply with its obligations under the Brussels I bis Regulation with respect to litigation in matters related to gambling. Following the formal notice sent by the Commission, the Maltese […]

The French Cour de Cassation will host a conference on the recast of the Brussels I bis Regulation on Monday, 23 June 2025, from 3.30 pm to 6.30 pm. The conference is organised by Marie-Elodie Ancel (University of Paris-Panthéon-Assas) and Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières (University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne), following the 2023-2024 seminar series on the recast of […]

It is a real pleasure to share a new essay by Professor Symeon C. Symeonides, written on the occasion of his retirement after fifty remarkable years in the field of conflict of laws. The essay, eloquently titled Reflections from Fifty Years in the Conflicts Vineyard, was presented as part of a symposium held in his honor in May 2024 at Willamette University College of Law, and sponsored by the AALS Section on Conflict of Laws.

The abstract of the essay reads:

This essay was written on the occasion of a Symposium titled “50 Years in the Conflicts Vineyard,” which was held in the author’s honor in May 2024 at Willamette University Law School and sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws. For this reason, the essay is inevitably autobiographical. The author reflects on some transformative events that occurred during his fifty-year labor in teaching, writing, and legislating in the field of conflict of laws, the teachers, mentors, and authors who have influenced him, and the lessons he has learned.

The essay is inevitably personal — and all the more moving for it. Professor Symeonides takes the reader not only through some of the transformative moments in his five-decade career, as described in the abstract, but also through the challenges, passions, joys, and moments of sorrow that have marked both his personal and professional life.

As he writes:

“Fifty years of anything is a long time. Fifty years in conflicts law, if you love this field as much as I do, feels like a walk in the park. That is how I feel about my fifty years of laboring in this vineyard. It’s been a great ride.”

Reading this piece felt like yet another walk in the park with him, a chance to discover meaningful moments from his life and his extraordinary career as a giant in the field. Readers will undoubtedly find many passages that catch their attention or resonate with their own experiences.

On a personal note, I first discovered Professor Symeonides’ work as a master’s student in Tunisia. I remember copying Part II on jurisdiction and foreign judgments of his book Conflict of Laws: American, Comparative, International – Cases and Materials (St. Paul, Minn., 1998), co-authored with Wendy Collins Perdue and Arthur von Mehren, and trying hard to learn from it. It was difficult, since – as a Tunisian student – I was not used to the casebook style. But from that moment on, I began following Professor Symeonides’ scholarship. His writings have long served as a source of insight and inspiration (see on this blog, Ralf Michaels, Symeonides’ 30th (and last) Annual Survey of Choice of Law).

The essay offers much to reflect on, but one detail stood out to me in particular: Professor Symeonides – together with another Conflict “Gentile Giant”, the late Professor von Mehren – once commented on a draft of the 1998 Tunisian Code of Private International Law (see p. 17, fn. 66). This is something I could not have imagined even in my wildest dreams. As someone with a deep interest in this area, that historical note meant a great deal to me.

My warmest thanks to Symeon for sharing this piece, and – more broadly – for the inspiration, kindness, and intellectual generosity he has shown throughout his extraordinary career.

 

Béligh Elbalti

The author of this post is Rob Rooman, PhD Researcher at KULeuven. Ever since its adoption, the future of Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence (hereinafter, the CS3D) has been unsure. The Directive in general is facing significant political resistance, and […]

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

X v Y ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2025:1020 at the court of Den Haag, acting upon appeal is an interesting ‘residual’ application of the Rome I Regulation 593/2008 and an excellent case to appreciate ordre public.

The parties had married in Iran in 2009. The divorce was established by the courts at The Hague in 2022. Jurisdiction is established under Regulation 2016/1103 (‘Rome IVa) and [5.1], with respect to the dower, under residual Dutch law.

The first instance court held that no lis pendens could be accepted with concurrent divorce proceedings in Iran, due to there not being a recognition Treaty with Iran under which any Iranian finding can be recognised and enforced in The Netherlands. This part of the ruling had not been appealed.

The court also held that the parties’ prenuptial arrangements must be enforced, and that ordre public considerations do not prevent that.

The prenup gave the wife a 50% share in the husband’s estate, unless it was the wife who initiated divorce proceedings; and it included the husband’s dower arrangements, consisting of a (modest) cash payment and additionally 150 Bahar-Azadi gold coins. Payment is indeed by way of dower and not dowry as I had first erroneously reported on X, Bluesky and Linkedin. Thank you Béligh Elbalti for pointing out that a dowry is property or money brought by a bride to her husband or his family at the time of marriage. Islamic law seemingly does not recognise dowry. But it does recognise a dower: property or money provided by a husband for his wife.

The first instance court argued that ordre public must be applied in ad hoc fashion rather than across the board; that the wife had negotiated a pre-nup which canceled out the ordinarily applicable rule that spouses do not share their property, instead each keeping their separate property, both that brought into the marriage and that acquired before it; that therefore if the wife initiated the divorce, she was brought back to the situation as exists had there not been a prenup (and the same situation which applied to the man at any rate); and that the Dutch legal order’s objection to the pressure the man may therefore put on the wife to initiate the divorce, is not of such an intense nature as to offend ordre public. 

As for the dower, the first instance court held that 110 coins be paid immediately and a further 40 when the ex-husband’s financial arrangements so allow: this followed from the application of Iranian law, as clarified by expert report,  that any dower above 110 coins may be postponed to take account of the husband’s financial situation. 

The appeal court looked at the applicable law issue from a more explicit international /European angle than the first instance court.

For the matrimonial property issue (the 50% issue), the court, like the parties, applies the 1978 Hague Convention. Consequently Iranian law applies. Rather than the first instance court’s assessment of ordre public viz the Dutch provisions on same, the appeal court tests it against Article 14 of the Hague Convention, yet it comes to the same conclusion. Like the first instance court it does so with much reference to the standard Iranian practice. [5.10] ff it holds obiter that even if the provision were to offend Dutch ordre public, the impact of that finding would give the wife an inalienable right to 50% of the husband’s share (not reciprocated for the husband) which in turn would offend ordre public for it would go directly against Iranian law’s intention both party autonomy and protection for the wife: viz that latter element the court points out that in accordance with the applicable Dutch law provisions for maintenance, the wife will be looked after, on top of the dower entitlement which the court addresses next, [5.13] ff:

Rome I A1(2)b excludes “obligations arising out of family relationships and relationships deemed by the law applicable to such relationships to have comparable effects, including maintenance obligations” and in (c) it excludes “obligations arising out of matrimonial property regimes, property regimes of relationships deemed by the law applicable to such relationships to have comparable effects to marriage, and wills and succession”.

The dower element of the claim in the case clearly is not covered by Rome I itself. However The Netherlands, like for instance Belgium, applies Rome I ‘even when it does not apply’ – as long the dower can be considered a contract under the relevant Dutch PrivIntLaw provision (not: the Rome I autonomous interpretation) which the court [5.14] holds it is. [5.17] That the cash payments have been made, is not contested.

The husband claims that the wife divorced him by khul, or khula, with relinquishment of the dower. The court [5.21] disagrees. The divorce is subject to Dutch law, which does not have a khul-type procedure. As for the ordre public arguments under Dutch law (which apply here; contrary to the matriomonial property issues where as noted above, the Hague Convention applies) the appeal court confirms the lower court’s findings. A dower is part and parcel of Iranian law. The case at hand does not offend Dutch ordre public with such intensity that payment of the dower must be dismissed.

[5.21] finally the court holds that parties do not consider that the dower payments of the gold coins are covered by Iranian export sanctions.

An interesting case.

Geert.

1/2 Interesting application of Rome I to dowry per Iranian marriageRome applies residually despite exclusion of family property law: Dutch PrivIntLaw revives itNo ordre public objection to payment in fullNo relinquishment by wife seeing as Dutch law, applicable to the divorce,

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-06-14T07:46:05.099Z

In light of the Commission’s report on the Brussels Ia Regulation (first discussed here by Xandra Kramer), ConflictofLaws.net will be hosting an ad-hoc virtual roundtable

on Tuesday, 8 July 2025, 12pm–1.30pm (CEST).

The conversation will focus on the report published by the Commission on 2 June and its implications for a possible future reform of the Regulation.

The event will feature the following panellists:

Andrew Dickinson
University of Oxford

Stefano Dominelli
University of Genoa

Pietro Franzina
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan

Thalia Kruger
University of Antwerp

Tobias Lutzi
University of Augsburg

Everyone interested is warmly invited to join via this Zoom link.