Flux européens

130/2025 : 1 octobre 2025 - Arrêts du Tribunal dans les affaires T-600/23, T-612/23

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mer, 10/01/2025 - 09:42
BNetzA / ACER
Énergie
Le Tribunal annule une décision de l’ACER en matière de gestion des marchés de l’électricité

Catégories: Flux européens

129/2025 : 26 septembre 2025 - Ordonnance du Tribunal dans l'affaire T-771/20 RENV

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - ven, 09/26/2025 - 15:32
KS et KD / Conseil e.a.
Mission Eulex Kosovo : le Tribunal rejette le recours en indemnité dirigé contre des institutions et un organe de l’Union européenne

Catégories: Flux européens

Gable Insurance v Dewsall. Succinct pondering on applicable law a good illustration of Rome II’s spaghetti bowl.

GAVC - ven, 09/26/2025 - 09:37

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

In Gable Insurance AG v Dewsall & Ors [2025] EWHC 2280 (Ch) there was succinct pondering whether a claim based on knowing receipt falls within A4 or A10 of Rome II.

Parties do not seem to have pushed the issue and the debate it seems is quickly settled as being covered by English law. In coming to this conclusion Vos DJ does cut a few corners. Firstly despite it not having been intense, there does seem to have been debate and no agreement per A14  Rome II.

Further, the judge and parties discuss the issue of qualification of the claim and whether this should be done using lex fori or (putative) lex causae ([405] in the case at issue, Liechtenstein law would seem to qualify the underlying breach of duty by a director in a similar way to a contractual claim). Under Rome II of course the answer to that question is: neither. Qualification in areas covered by harmonising instruments takes place under an autonomous, EU law concept. Post Brexit of course a relevant question is whether this general principle of EU (PrivInt) law continue to apply when UK Courts apply the ‘assimilated’ Rome I and II instruments. In the case at issue seemingly the answer is ‘not at all’, for with reference to Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v Al Bader (No3) [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271) the conclusion is taken that a relationship which exists under foreign law should be examined to determine whether the duties which are owed would be characterised as fiduciary duties under English law, and that only if they are, a claim in knowing receipt can be brought in England.

[403] the judge holds that the application of A4 and 10 is likely to lead to the same result of English law being lex causae, and [404] that in any event, the circumstances are manifestly more closely connected with England than any other country, hence triggering the escape clause of A4(3) or (10)4. That as I have said before, is a topsy turvy way to go about a Rome II analysis. The ‘proper law of the tort’ exercise is only a narrow escape valve in Rome II (and I): not a general principle.

Geert.

Claim in knowing receipt. Most succinct ponder as to whether covered by A4 or 10 Rome II.Gable Insurance AG v Dewsall & Ors [2025] EWHC 2280 (Ch)www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…

Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-09-09T06:34:10.507Z

(Non) Essential use in chemicals regulation. Our paper on key international, EU, US instruments.

GAVC - ven, 09/26/2025 - 07:07

Now I know I have a blog queue at times but this one is unforgivably late. See here the report by Kathleen Garnett and myself on essential use in key international, US (federal) and EU law.

The concept of essential and non-essential use has been gaining traction in the broader context for chemicals policy. The authors of this report have analysed the concepts of “essential” and “non-essential” use under selected parts of International law, EU law, and US federal law with particular focus given to derogations/exemptions to a general prohibition/restriction which are (i) granted based on essentiality (or equivalent concepts) or (ii) are not granted because of non-essentiality (or equivalent concepts).

In July 2021 we completed a thorough review of essential uses approaches in 9 legal sources: The Montreal Protocol; the US Clean Air Act 1977; the EU Regulation 517/2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases; the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants; the EU POPs Regulation 2019/1021; the EU Regulation 528/2012 on biocidal products; the EU Regulation 1107/2009 on plant protection products; the EU Directive 2011/65 on hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment; and the EU Regulation 1333/2008 on food additives.

The study concludes that deployment of an essential use justification in this complex area of the law is rare. The most common reasons for justifying a derogation and /or exemption, are:

  • the hazard can be controlled through risk management; and/or
  • there are no suitable alternatives; and/or
  • the cost of not allowing a derogations to proceed would be too high; or
  • an emergency situation necessitates a derogation/exemption.

The Montreal Protocol appears to be an outlier in the regulation of hazardous substances with an essential use approach, and our analysis of the 1978 US forerunner to that approach is a most relevant element, we submit, in the current discussions on essential uses.

Kathleen, Geert.

 

Campeau v Gottex. A good example of contractual construction of choice of court under the Hague Convention.

GAVC - jeu, 09/25/2025 - 18:13

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

Campeau v Gottex Real Asset Fund 1 (OE) Waste SARL [2025] EWHC 2322 (Comm) is worth a flag for the discussion of CPR r. 6.33(2B) which allows a claimant not to have to seek permission to serve out of the jurisdiction in the context of choice of court under the 2005 Hague Convention. It reads 

‘(2B) The claimant may serve the claim form on a defendant outside the United Kingdom where, for each claim made against the defendant to be served and included in the claim form—

(a) the court has power to determine that claim under the 2005 Hague Convention and the defendant is a party to an exclusive choice of court agreement conferring jurisdiction on that court within the meaning of Article 3 of the 2005 Hague Convention;

(b) a contract contains a term to the effect that the court shall have jurisdiction to determine that claim; or

(c) the claim is in respect of a contract falling within sub-paragraph (b).’

OE Waste’s argument is that Mr Campeau was not a party to the SPA which contains the clause, and there is no other basis, whether pursuant to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (‘the 1999 Act’) or as a matter of construction of the SPA on which Mr Campeau is to be treated as a party to, or permitted to rely on, the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the SPA. Moreover, there is no alternative basis in CPR 6.33(2B)(b) or (c) that would entitle Mr Campeau to serve the Claim Form out of the jurisdiction without permission.

Butcher J signals [28] that Mr Campeau ought to have submitted a request for permission to serve out as a subsidiary means, for under CPR PD 6B paragraph 3.1(6)(c), contract governed by English law, permission could have been granted on that basis. As it is, he decides on the basis of contractual construction that there is a good arguable case that the contractual scope of the choice of court clause did extend to a dispute over the extent of a third party’s rights under the relevant clause; and that the parties were agreed between themselves that such a dispute should be subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts.

The judgment is not particularly exciting however I decided to post anyway, seeing as it is a good example of contractual construction in the context of choice of court..

Geert.

 

 

Interesting judgment discussing choice of court (Hague 2005) and impact on claims by third parties; privity, contractual constructionCampeau v Gottex Real Asset Fund 1 (OE) Waste SARL [2025] EWHC 2322 (Comm)www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…

Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-09-18T07:12:34.343Z

128/2025 : 25 septembre 2025 - Conclusions de l'avocat général dans l'affaire C-474/24

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 09/25/2025 - 09:59
NADA Austria e.a.
Principes du droit communautaire
Avocat général Spielmann : la publication sur Internet du nom de tout sportif professionnel ayant violé les règles antidopage est contraire au droit de l’Union

Catégories: Flux européens

127/2025 : 22 septembre 2025 - Informations

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - lun, 09/22/2025 - 19:43
Nouvelle composition des chambres du Tribunal de l’Union européenne

Catégories: Flux européens

Federal Court of Australia confirms enforceability of Spanish ECT awards, rejects arguments of foreign sovereign immunity in Blasket Renewable Investments v Spain. A guest blog by Claudia Wortmann.

GAVC - lun, 09/22/2025 - 11:20

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

In Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v Kingdom of Spain [2025] FCA 1028 the Federal Court of Australia has confirmed the enforceability of 4 ETC awards against Spain viz its long-suffering renewable energy support schemes. The judgment has already been leaned upon in support in proceedings before the US Supreme Court and approaches the issues with similar lucidity as Fraser J in Infrastructure Services. 

Current post is by Claudia Wortmann, for which many thanks!! Geert.

 

*****

Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v Kingdom of Spain [2025] FCA 1028

In a single-judge decision in the Federal Court of Australia delivered on 29 August, Justice Stewart held four ICSID awards issued against Spain under the Energy Charter Treaty to be recognisable and enforceable. Each of the awards in 9REN, NextEra, RREEF and Watkins, brought by 9REN and NextEra, and by the assignee to the RREEF and Watkins matters were found to be enforceable pursuant to section 35(4) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), federal legislation in Australia which provides for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.

Spain objected to the proceedings on a number of grounds, being:

  1. Non-waiver of immunity: Spain argued that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction as Spain did not waive its foreign State immunity under section 9 of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth). Readers may recall the Spain HCA case in which the High Court of Australia discussed the ICSID award in Spain v Infrastructure Services This time round, Spain argued that that the High Court’s findings in that matter – that Articles 53-55 of the ICSID Convention amounted to a waiver of foreign state immunity – were incorrect, to allow for the High Court to consider the matter of the ICSID Convention again.
  2. The awards were said to be not ‘binding’ under Art 53 ICSID Convention, either: a. due to the intra-EU nature of the disputes and the primacy of EU law which means Spain owes no public international law obligation to comply with the awards, and if it did that would be an act of prohibited State aid under EU law; or b. because the ICSID dispute settlement provisions have been replaced by the EU court system by virtue of its accession to the Treaty of Lisbon, as either a modification under customary international law (VCLT Art 41) or Art 30 of the VCLT. As the awards are not ‘binding’ under Art 53 of the ICSID Convention, the court lacks jurisdiction to enforce them.
  3. Assignment: Spain argued that it had no binding obligation to pay the assignee, Blasket, under Art 53 ICSID Convention, that Blasket has no standing under Art 54 ICSID Convention to seek recognition or enforcement because it is not a ‘party’, and that in the absence of a binding obligation of Spain to pay Blasket, s 35(4) of the IAA cannot apply, as there is no obligation to enforce an award brought by an assignee.
  4. The Constitutional argument: Spain claimed that even if certification of the awards by the Secretary-General of ICSID were sufficient to prove their ‘binding’ nature, or to prevent the Court from investigating whether it is binding, then section 35(4) of the International Arbitration Act is invalid because it infringes CH III of the Australian Constitution.

 

The Court found that Spain did in fact waive its rights to immunity, the Court had jurisdiction to recognise and enforce the awards pursuant to s 35(4) of the IAA, and dismissed the EC’s application to intervene.

Non-waiver of immunity

As may be recalled, the High Court of Australia in Spain HCA had already found ([150] citing Spain HCA at [29]) that Spain had implicitly waived its foreign State immunity rights. The closed nature of the ICSID system was confirmed in Spain HCA and in Micula v Romania [2020] 1 WLR 1033 at [68]-[69] by the UK domestic courts. There was no reason to find that the award was not binding, as the ICSID system was a closed system, and that apparent conflicts with EU law were not relevant for the enforcement proceedings, as the awards were [174] ‘genuine, certified and authenticated awards’.

Spain’s argument, that ‘waiver of immunity in enforcement proceedings is limited to proceedings to enforce awards that are valid and binding’, had not been raised specifically in Spain HCA, however, the Court found [180] that

On the premise that the awards are binding on Spain, the proceedings are not outside the territory of what the parties accept was decided by the High Court. It follows that Spain’s contention of non-waiver of immunity to jurisdiction must be rejected.

Primacy of EU law

Spain argued that where there is a conflict between Spain’s obligations owed to other EU Member States under the EU foundational treaties, the primacy of EU law must prevail, and therefore, under public international law Spain owed no obligation to comply with the ICSID awards, and Australia owed no obligation to recognise or enforce them. Spain relied on the CJEU’s findings in Achmea and Komstroy in arguing that EU law prevents the application of the ECT between Member States, and it also argued that the public international law obligations would constitute illegal State aid between EU Member States. The Court found [118] that:

European law has undeniable domestic effect including through lower-level instruments of European law sourced in the authority of the foundational treaties… It suffices to say that while international treaties and subordinate EU instruments could be regarded as a form of international law, for the purposes of proof it would not be a form of international law incorporated into or picked up by Australian law in the sense contemplated in the authorities.

On this point, the Court [210] accepted expert evidence supplied by Professor Eeckhout on behalf of the Applicants, in the event of a conflict between international law and EU law,

the Member States must take the appropriate steps under international law to remove the conflicting international law obligation. In the meantime the conflicting clause remains valid and operative’.

Therefore, international law is applicable until withdrawal of the relevant treaty takes effect, which includes the ECT and the ICSID Convention, and [213]

it is no answer for Spain to say that it has some or other defence available to it under EU law, for it is not Australia which is under any supervening requirement of essentially foreign domestic public law to not comply

Spain was allowed to reopen the case for the purpose of submitting the Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States (COM(2024) 257 final) (26 June 2024) (‘EU Inter Se Agreement’); and Declaration on the Legal Consequences of the Judgment of the Court of Justice in Komstroy and Common Understanding on the Non-Applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a Basis for Intra-EU Arbitration Proceedings [2024] OJ L 2024/2121 (26 June 2024) (‘EU Inter Se Declaration’).

The Court found that neither document materially added to Spain’s case, as

a) both came into existence long after the matters in dispute arose;

b) that removal of intra-EU disputes would be subject to future amendment of the ECT in accordance with the VCLT (in line with a separate declaration from Hungary, both an EU and ECT member);

c) neither the Agreement nor Declaration sought to amend the ICSID Convention; and

d) the substance of the Agreement and Declaration were not relevant to the enforcement proceedings as they both went to the interpretation and application of the ECT which is a question for ICSID tribunals, and not the enforcing Court.

The Court acknowledged that although there was a conflict between international law and EU law, it had no bearing on Spain’s public international law obligations or that it meant the ICSID awards were not binding.

Modification argument

Spain argued that the Treaty of Lisbon modified Art 43 ICSID Convention between EU Member States, meaning that tribunals have no jurisdiction over intra-EU disputes, and the Court lacked the power to enforce them, relying on customary international law to support its claim, because the ICSID Convention preceded the VCLT so the VCLT rules on successive treaties would not apply.

Spain argued that there are three requirements for custom to modify a treaty:

a) modification is not expressly prohibited by the treaty;

b) that modification does not affect the enjoyment of, and rights and obligations under the treaty by other parties;

c) the modification does not relate to a derogation provision which is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

The Court held:

    • the argument could only stand if Art 53 could be modified, and if Art 54 cannot give rise to enforceable obligations without a valid and binding award under Art 53, which was dismissed, given that the ICSID regime is a closed one. Further, there was no sufficient express or implied to modify the ICSID Convention between EU Member States or to render Art 53 inapplicable.
    • The modification also failed for lack of notice required under Art 41(2) to inform other parties to the treaty of the intention to modify it.
    • The type of rights that Spain sought to modify are erga omnes partes, owed to all parties to the treaty and not capable of modification under Art 41(1)(b)(i) VCLT. It would be an ‘inexplicable result’ if the enforcing State had an obligation to enforce an award, but the State subject to the award did not owe an obligation to all other State parties to comply with it.
    • The ICSID system and the structure of the Convention support construction of rights as erga omnes partes, supported by authorities including the UK Supreme Court in Micula. The Court also dismissed Spain’s reliance on the US enforcement proceedings for NextEra Energy Global Holdings BV v Kingdom of Spain 112 F4th 1088 (DC Cir 2024) that under Art 53 the obligation to comply was bilateral, and capable of being modified in a way which is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention.
    • Modification by way of Art 30 VCLT on subsequent treaties, that the Treaty of Lisbon displaced the ICSID Convention also failed. Even if such displacement occurred, it was limited to the EU Member States and could not apply to Australia. Further, the principles relied on by Spain per the decision in Achmea and Komstroy were actually based on the EU foundational Treaty of Rome 1957, nearly a decade before the ICSID Convention came into force in 1965, making the ICSID Convention the subsequent treaty for Spain.
    • The EU treaties imposed no obligations which the CJEU had found to be in conflict with those of States under the ICSID Convention, which itself does not require parties to refer disputes to arbitration, hence the incompatibility was not [284] ‘at the level of obligations per se between the EU treaties and the ICSID Convention’.

Assignment

The Court made quick work dismissing Spain’s objection that the assignment of rights from RREEF and Watkins to Blasket was invalid. The Applicant argued successfully that the duty arose under s 35(4) IAA as Australia’s dualist system requires domestic enshrinement of international law obligations to make them enforceable. Under domestic law, in Australia the rights of enforcement for an arbitral award are also capable of being assigned. So in either case, Spain’s argued failed. Justice Stewart was not convinced by Spain’s argument that allowing enforcement by an assignee would allow for double recovery.

EU status of Jersey and Constitutional argument

This argument relating to only the RREEF enforcement proceedings, as an alternative argument by the Applicant in respect of the EU nationality of the investors. Blasket argued that, in the event that Spain’s intra-EU objections were upheld, that the investor in RREEF, being domiciled in the Bailiwick of Jersey, a British Crown Dependency and one of the Channel Islands, should not be prevented from enforcing that award. Justice Stewart agreed, finding the investor in RREEF was not a national of an EU Member State.

Constitutional argument

The Court held that although Art 54 ICSID Convention as implemented by s 35(4) IAA, requires the Court to recognise and enforce any ICSID award as binding within Australia as judgment of that court, this does not ‘impermissibly vest constitutional powers in either the ICSID tribunal or the Secretary-General, nor does it substantially impair the institutional integrity of the Court as a constitutional court by requiring it to find a waiver of foreign state immunity or by recognising or enforcing an award.  

EC application to intervene

The European Commission sought leave to intervene in the proceedings, supported by Spain, which was denied by the Court. The EC application sought to make two submissions: a) Spain’s submissions are an accurate description of EU law, and EU law prevents any payment under the awards as illegal State aid; and b) any payment made by Spain under the ECT awards would being subject to significant ongoing fines until such payment were recovered. The Court accepted that Spain’s submission on EU law may indeed be accurate, but as the ‘crux’ of the proceedings were on (at [361]) ’ the effect of EU law on public international law binding Australia’, such accuracy had no impact on the Court’s findings. On the second point Stewart J stated at [362]:

while the questions raised are no doubt interesting, as explained above, they are irrelevant on an application for recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award in circumstances where I have concluded, notwithstanding the identified consequences extant in and arising from EU public law, the Court is bound to give effect to the award in accordance with public international law and Australian domestic law.

 

In sum, Stewart J dismissed Spain’s arguments from the outset, finding that most of them were similar enough to those put forward in Spain HCA to warrant the application of precedence. Even so, His Honour considered and dismissed each of Spain’s alternative arguments in succession, reaffirming that ICSID awards can and will be enforced in Australia, and that the influence of EU law principles remains minimal in this context.

Claudia.

 

126/2025 : 18 septembre 2025 - Conclusions de l'avocat général dans les affaires jointes C-188/24, C-190/24

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 09/18/2025 - 09:52
WebGroup Czech Republic et NKL Associates
Avocat général Szpunar : une mesure constituant un corollaire des dispositions du droit pénal ou nécessaire afin d’assurer l’efficacité des contrôles routiers relève du principe du pays d’origine prévu par la directive sur le commerce électronique

Catégories: Flux européens

125/2025 : 17 septembre 2025 - Informations

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mer, 09/17/2025 - 16:09

Élection des juges appelés à exercer les fonctions d’avocat général au sein du Tribunal pour le traitement des demandes de décisions préjudicielles

Catégories: Flux européens

124/2025 : 17 septembre 2025 - Informations

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mer, 09/17/2025 - 10:36

Élection des présidents de chambre du Tribunal de l’Union européenne

Catégories: Flux européens

123/2025 : 16 septembre 2025 - Informations

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mar, 09/16/2025 - 13:34
M. Savvas Papasavvas est réélu vice-président du Tribunal de l’Union européenne

Catégories: Flux européens

122/2025 : 16 septembre 2025 - Informations

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mar, 09/16/2025 - 13:23
M. Marc van der Woude est réélu président du Tribunal de l’Union européenne

Catégories: Flux européens

121/2025 : 15 septembre 2025 - Audience solennelle.

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - lun, 09/15/2025 - 14:46
Entrée en fonctions de nouveaux membres à la Cour de justice et au Tribunal de l’Union européenne et renouvellement partiel du Tribunal

Catégories: Flux européens

120/2025 : 11 septembre 2025 - Conclusions de l'avocat général dans l'affaire C-196/24

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 09/11/2025 - 10:01
Aucrinde
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Avocate générale Ćapeta : la Charte n’interdit pas d’établir la paternité par prélèvement génétique post mortem

Catégories: Flux européens

119/2025 : 11 septembre 2025 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-38/24

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 09/11/2025 - 09:51
Bervidi
Politique sociale
Discrimination au travail : la protection des droits des personnes handicapées contre les discriminations indirectes s’étend aux parents d’enfants handicapés

Catégories: Flux européens

118/2025 : 11 septembre 2025 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-802/23

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 09/11/2025 - 09:50
MSIG
Principe ne bis in idem : une personne ne peut être poursuivie dans un État membre pour un acte de terrorisme lui ayant déjà valu une condamnation dans un autre État membre, bien que la qualification de l’infraction y soit différente

Catégories: Flux européens

117/2025 : 11 septembre 2025 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-687/23

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 09/11/2025 - 09:39
Banco Santander (Résolution bancaire Banco Popular III)
Libre circulation des personnes
Banco Popular : les droits découlant des actions en nullité et en responsabilité introduites avant la résolution de cette banque sont opposables à Banco Santander

Catégories: Flux européens

116/2025 : 11 septembre 2025 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-59/23 P

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - jeu, 09/11/2025 - 09:38
Autriche / Commission (Centrale nucléaire Paks II)
Aide d'État
La Cour de justice annule la décision de la Commission approuvant l’aide de la Hongrie pour la centrale nucléaire Paks II

Catégories: Flux européens

115/2025 : 10 septembre 2025 - Arrêt du Tribunal dans l'affaire T-573/23

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - mer, 09/10/2025 - 09:55
Positive Group / Conseil
Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune
Guerre en Ukraine : le Tribunal confirme les mesures restrictives contre Positive Group PAO, une entité active dans le secteur russe des technologies de l’information et titulaire d’une licence délivrée par les services de renseignement intérieurs russes

Catégories: Flux européens

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