Flux européens

In my August conflict of laws exams I asked the students the following question:

In Case C-494/23 Maha, facts are as follows. On 19 August 2017, applicants purchased a motor vehicle in Germany. On 12 September 2017, the vehicle was seized by the Police of the Czech Republic on the ground that it is the subject of suspicion of the criminal offence of theft committed in France. Subsequently, the Police placed the vehicle in custody. Applicants then filed an application with the Czech court for the release of the vehicle from custody.

Given that, in previous proceedings, other persons had claimed a right to the vehicle, according to Czech law consent of all of the persons concerned is required for the release of the subject of custody, or the substitution of their consent by a court ruling. Consequently, applicants filed an application with the same court against defendants resident in France, for the substitution of their consent to the release of the item from custody. The defendants did not attend the proceedings

The CJEU is asked to determine

1. 1. 1. 1. whether proceedings concerning the substitution of the defendant’s consent to the release of an item from judicial custody in which the item was placed by a law enforcement authority in criminal proceedings, falls within the autonomous term of EU law of a ‘civil and commercial matter’ as defined in Brussels Ia.; and
         2. if it indeed does fall within that term, whether an application initiating such proceedings may be deemed to constitute an application in ‘any other third-party proceedings’ within the meaning of A8(2) Brussels Ia.

How in your view should the CJEU respond? Answer both questions, even if you argue that the answer to question 1 should be in the negative.

I was of course expecting students to review the core ‘civil and commercial’ cases as reviewed extensively on the blog -and in class; I don’t just ask students to read the blog ;-¬ , to highlight the continuing confusion /uncertainty, and to make a determination either way.

My two cents was on the claim indeed being civil and commercial. It is a claim in the periphery of a criminal investigation yet the claim itself is one in pure restitution /confirmation of ownership, between parties neither of whom are public authorities, where no extraordinary powers are being used by any of the parties involved.

The CJEU held differently two weeks ago. It is imo indicative of the state of confusion over this core trigger for Brussels Ia that another commentator, perfectly legitimately, finds the judgment ‘not surprising’.

Consider the reasons for the referring court to suggest the case might be civil and commercial, [19]:

The referring court is of the opinion that certain considerations lead to the conclusion that the proceedings for substituting consent to the release from court custody come within the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 and, consequently, within the material scope of that regulation. Accordingly, the purpose of court custody is to dispel, in the context of a civil action, any doubt as to which of the persons concerned may have the item returned to them by reason of a right to property or another right. Furthermore, those proceedings, which are inter partes, are governed by rules of civil procedure, more specifically by those relating to special court proceedings.

I won’t repeat all the references included by the CJEU seeing as they are the classic ones (all reviewed on the blog); this time the core port of call would seem to have been Lechouritou where the Court had summarised its position (in 2007) and with reference to other classics [Eurocontrol, Rüffer [7]; Gemeente Steenbergen [28]; Préservatrice foncière TIARD SA v Staat der Nederlanden [20]; Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ [22]] as follows:

It is to be remembered that, in order to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obligations which derive from the Brussels Convention for the Contracting States and the persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform, the terms of that provision should not be interpreted as a mere reference to the internal law of one or other of the States concerned. It is thus clear from the Court’s settled case-law that ‘civil and commercial matters’ must be regarded as an independent concept to be interpreted by referring, first, to the objectives and scheme of the Brussels Convention and, second, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national legal systems …

According to the Court, that interpretation results in the exclusion of certain legal actions and judicial decisions from the scope of the Brussels Convention, by reason either of the legal relationships between the parties to the action or of the subject matter of the action …

Thus, the Court has held that, although certain actions between a public authority and a person governed by private law may come within the scope of the Brussels Convention, it is otherwise where the public authority is acting in the exercise of its public power.

Core of the CJEU’s Lechoritou reference in current case is in [44]. The referring court and the claimants had argued that the preliminary proceedings take place between individuals not involving law enforcement authorities, that the procedure is inter partes and that the detailed rules for its exercise are governed by rules of civil procedure (the kind of arguments which in other cases assisted in coming to a finding of ‘civil and commercial’). In Mahá the CJEU answers [44] with reference to Lechoritou ([41)}

the fact that the plaintiff acts on the basis of a claim which arises from an act in the exercise of public powers is sufficient for his action, whatever the nature of the proceedings afforded by national law for that purpose, to be treated as being outside the scope of the Brussels Convention

Pro memoria: Lechoritou involved a claim by Greek nationals against the German State, on the basis of a nazi massacre in 1943. A money claim by private individuals against a foreign state (unlike current case between private parties) directly ‘arising from’ the ultimate act of sovereign power namely warfare.

The situation in current case is very very different.

[36] the CJEU insists that the current action is “based on”  –I do not think it is: it follows from it, it is not based on it– “the seizure proceedings ordered by the law enforcement authorities and the placing of the property in question in the custody of the court.” This, it says [36] “is an essential prerequisite for the release of the property from the custody of the court and the restoration of the property” and [37] “It follows that, in the light of both its subject matter and its basis, since proceedings to substitute consent are inextricably linked to the seizure of the property at issue by the law enforcement authorities and to the subsequent placing of the property in the custody of the court, they cannot be examined without having regard to those proceedings.” (emphasis added)

This focus on ‘inextricably linked’, the ‘prerequisite’ of the property claim and the vicinity of the criminal proceedings brings us close in my view to the context criterion adopted by the Court in Kuhn and  in my view is likely to lead to yet further confusion, as well as forum shopping possibilities. There is an infinite amount of civil claims which are inextricably linked to criminal proceedings which are the prerequisite of the civil claim at issue or arise form such a claim. Take libel actions which in many States are a criminal offence, or take follow-on damages claims in competition law or unfair competition: both are criminally sanctioned in all EU Member States. Leaving it up to national courts to decide whether the link is intimate enough to warrant exclusion from Brussels Ia is likely to endanger Brussels Ia’s number one DNA, which last time I looked, continues to be predictability.

Geert.

EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, Heading 2.2.2.2.

 

In C-425/22 MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt. v Mercedes-Benz Group AG Emiliou AG had opined in that a parent company cannot rely on the competition law concept of economic unit to establish jurisdiction where it has its registered seat, re a claim for damages for the harm suffered by its subsidiaries. I referred in my review of the Opinion to my colleague Joeri Vananroye summarising it as :

“In corporate law terms: yes to outsider veil piercing, no to insider reverse veil piercing. Outsiders may disregard legal structure and go for economic reality; but not those who set up that structure. See also: rules on derivate damages.”

The CJEU confirmed early July (yes, I have a blog queue to tackle…): [44]

the objectives of proximity and predictability of the rules governing jurisdiction and consistency between the forum and the applicable law, and the unhindered possibility of claiming damages for the harm arising from an infringement of competition law affecting a member of the economic unit, preclude a reverse application of the concept of ‘economic unit’ for the determination of the place where the damage occurred, for the purposes of Article 7(2) of Regulation 1215/2012.

The CJEU further explains these principles in current context with reference to the same case-law as the AG and as reviewed in my post.

Geert.

EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.438 ff.

https://x.com/GAVClaw/status/1809233522462183689

The CJEU in Grand Chamber held 10 days back in C‑633/22 Real Madrid Club  de Fútbol, AE v EE, Société Éditrice du Monde SA. No English version was yet available at the time of writing.

The Court in essence confirms Spzunar AG’s Opinion which I reviewed here.

Its findings echo the language and sentiment of Article 16 of the EU’s anti-SLAPP Directive 2024/1069 (that Article addressing non-recognition of third country judgments).

The Grand Chamber emphasises mutual trust and the consequential very narrow room for refusal of recognition on ordre public grounds, even in the context of the application of the Charter’s Article 11 freedom of expression grounds: refusal must be exceptional, case-based, and not based on an entirely new balancing act.

However the court of enforcement must refuse to recognise if the Article 11 rights are fundamentally impacted. In exercising that assessment, it must i.a. take account of the distinction between the reputation of a legal cq natural person (the former lacking the ‘moral’ element of impacting on the ‘dignity’ of the person: [58]), the financial capacity of the defendant (accused to have libeled) [68], and the stiffing impact caused by a disproportionate difference between the actual damage suffered, and the libel award [62 ff].

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed, 2024, 2.619 ff.

 

Transfert partiel de compétence de la Cour de justice au Tribunal : création au sein du Tribunal d’une chambre spécialisée en matière préjudicielle et élection d’avocats généraux

Élection de deux présidents de chambre du Tribunal de l’Union européenne

M. Maciej Szpunar est réélu premier avocat général de la Cour de justice

Élection des présidents des chambres à cinq juges de la Cour de justice

M. Thomas von Danwitz est élu vice-président de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne

M. Koen Lenaerts est réélu président de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne

Renouvellement partiel de la Cour de justice et entrée en fonctions de nouveaux membres du Tribunal

Commission / Malte (Citoyenneté par investissement)
Citoyenneté européenne
Avocat général Collins : la Commission n’a pas prouvé que les règles de l’Union en matière de citoyenneté (article 20 TFUE) requièrent l’existence d’un « véritable lien » ou d’un « véritable lien antérieur » entre un État membre et un particulier pour que cet État puisse accorder à ce dernier sa nationalité

Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl e.a. (Femmes afghanes)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Les mesures discriminatoires adoptées à l’égard des femmes par le régime des talibans constituent des actes de persécution

Schrems (Communication de données au grand public)
Principes du droit communautaire
Un réseau social en ligne tel que Facebook ne peut utiliser l’ensemble des données à caractère personnel obtenues à des fins de publicité ciblée, sans limitation dans le temps et sans distinction en fonction de leur nature

Protéines France e.a.
Principes du droit communautaire
Étiquetage des denrées alimentaires : à défaut d’adopter une dénomination légale, un État membre ne peut interdire l’utilisation de termes traditionnellement associés aux produits d’origine animale pour désigner un produit contenant des protéines végétales

FIFA
Libre circulation des personnes

Football : certaines des règles de la FIFA relatives aux transferts internationaux de footballeurs professionnels sont contraires au droit de l’Union 

Real Madrid Club de Fútbol
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Liberté d’expression : l’exécution d’un jugement condamnant un journaliste et un éditeur de presse au paiement de dommages-intérêts doit être refusée pour autant qu’elle viole la liberté de la presse

Commission / Front Polisario
Relations extérieures
Sahara occidental : les accords commerciaux UE-Maroc de 2019 en matière de pêche et de produits agricoles, auxquels le peuple du Sahara occidental n’a pas consenti, ont été conclus en méconnaissance des principes de l’autodétermination et de l’effet relatif des traités

Confédération paysanne (Melons et tomates du Sahara occidental)
Rapprochement des législations
Information des consommateurs : l’étiquetage des melons et des tomates récoltés au Sahara occidental doit mentionner ce territoire, et non le Maroc, en tant que pays d’origine

Bezirkshauptmannschaft Landeck (Tentative d’accès aux données personnelles stockées sur un téléphone portable)
L’accès de la police aux données contenues dans un téléphone portable n’est pas nécessairement limité à la lutte contre la criminalité grave

Lituanie / Parlement et Conseil (Paquet mobilité - Détachement et temps de travail)
Transport

La Cour confirme largement la validité du Paquet mobilité