
If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.
Like all my posts, this post is entirely AI free.
CJEU Judgment in C-232/25 [Idziski] has already been commented on eloquently by others, whom I shall refers to below. My review of the Opinion of Rantos AG is here.
I have mentioned elsewhere that the current review of the Brussels Ia Regulation ought to consider the nuclear option: that statute itselfs corrects the CJEU injection of locus damni jurisdiction viz Article 7(2) BIa in CJEU Bier, and bring it back to locus delicti commissi jurisdiction only. Judgment in Idziski will add fuel to the argument that such a move would most certainly assist with clarity (is is unlikely though to get much traction).
The CJEU held first of all that e-Date centre of interests full jurisdiction does not extend to terrestrial broadcasting. Claimants in these kinds of cases continue to depend on Shevill locus damni, mozaik jurisdiction. (I for one am waiting for the next case where someone claims for libel following from the YouTube airing of an initially terrestrial broadcast. Giacomo Marola predicts this complication, too).
As for the online airing, the CJEU applies Mittelbayerischer Verlag to deny centre-of-interests jurisdiction for the individual who claimed (Z.R.), however then confirms it for the representative association (‘Ś’): [55] ff
In the light of the objective of predictability of the rules of jurisdiction and the objective of legal certainty […] the criterion relating to the indirect identification of persons claiming that their personality rights have been breached by content published on the internet requires that it be possible to identify those persons with certainty by reason of attributes which are specific to them and which distinguish them from all other individuals.
By contrast, as a limited group whose members constitute a closed category of persons, unit X is, unequivocally, directly identified by the series at issue broadcast on the internet. Thus, the content of that series contains objective and verifiable elements making it possible to identify that group directly by distinguishing it from any other. (emphasis added)
[58] the court summarises
the court of the place of the centre of interests of a legal person, whose principal purpose is to defend the interests of a limited group whose members constitute a closed category of persons, has jurisdiction to hear, in respect of the entirety of the alleged damage, an action for damages brought by that legal person, where the audiovisual content broadcast on the internet contains objective and verifiable elements making it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, that group by distinguishing it from any other.
Giacomo Marole notes that the Idziski requirement of identification of individuals “with certainty”, would seem a tightening of the rule in Mittelbayerischer, where the Court held [46]
Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the place in which the centre of interests of a person claiming that his or her personality rights have been infringed by content published online on a website is situated have jurisdiction to hear, in respect of the entirety of the alleged damage, an action for damages brought by that person only if that content contains objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, that person as an individual. (emphasis added)
‘Directly or indirectly’ is confirmed however only for legal persons /a group of individuals.
This leaves the issue of the scope of the Polish court’s jurisdiction viz Z.R.’s claims. Giacomo Marola summarises this part of the judgment as follows
For television broadcasting, the Polish courts may hear both the claim for compensation for the damage allegedly suffered in Poland and the non-pecuniary remedies sought by the claimants, provided that those remedies are limited, in their effects, to Polish territory.
The position is different for online dissemination. In line with its previous case law treating the rectification of online content as a single and indivisible remedy, the Court holds that the Polish courts’ “mosaic” jurisdiction is limited to compensation for the non-material damage allegedly suffered in Poland. It does not extend to a non-pecuniary remedy aimed at securing the rectification of information placed online.
Generally, Giacomo flags the potential that geoblocking and geolocation may have to vary the CJEU’s eDate’s premise. Seeing as eDate is based on a presumption of ubiquitous internet, technologies which make the internet less ubiquitous, might impact the findings of eDate (held in October 2011).
Tobias Lutzi called the ruling ‘underwhelming, yet not surprising’. I agree. The judgment continues a long line of authorities presenting the CJEU’s Article 7(2)’s jurisdiction as somehow coherent and logical. It is not, it is a muddle and unless the radical option of statutory dismissal of locus damni be adopted, I suppose we somehow just work our way through it.
Geert.
If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.
Like all my posts, this post is entirely AI free.
A quick note on CJEU Case C‑346/25, Fibo Markets (Fido Markets LTd v JP) which was held mid June. The judgment concerns Article 6(4)d Rome I. This Article in short carves out financial instruments from Rome I’s protective provisions for consumer contracts (essentially resurrecting therefore lex voluntatis under Article 3, and the cascade of Article 4 should parties not chose an applicable law . However the formulation of the provision, to use the words of Michael Wilderspin in the late professor Mankowski’s commentary (Rome I, Sellier, 2017, p.471) leads to a provision that is “utterly bewildering and in its meaning opaque” to the uninitiated (and I wonder how many of those initiated there truly are).
The provision reads in full
Article 6(4). Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to:…
(d) rights and obligations which constitute a financial instrument and rights and obligations constituting the terms and conditions governing the issuance or offer to the public and public take-over bids of transferable securities, and the subscription and redemption of units in collective investment undertakings in so far as these activities do not constitute provision of a financial service;
One learns from the wording that B2C ‘financial services’ are fully included in the protective provisions, and that ‘financial instruments’ might not be. The recitals (but not the actual statutory provisions) link this to a number of EU secondary laws, in particular Directive 2004/39 (see also the CJEU judgment for detail). Michael summarises the provisions by referring to financial derivatives, which do not consist of tangible money but rather are a set of promised that can be executed at a later stage (my late father in law would have called that ‘Fairy Money’). They tend to be transactioned (is that a verb?) with investors in many different countries, and applying different sets of consumer rules to them, Michael Wilderspin explains, would be inappropriate.
The instrument at issue in current case is a financial contract for differences (‘CFD’), which FSMA tell me is a is a “derivative financial product that allows investors to take a long or a short position in an underlying asset.” They are highly speculative.
[34] the CJEU refers to the EC explanation to specify that CFS
are contractual in nature. They are cash settled derivative contracts, the purpose of which is to transfer to the investor the exposure to fluctuations in the value of an underlying asset. The transaction between the parties is based on the difference between the prevailing value of the underlying asset at the time of the conclusion of the contract and its value at the time of sale.
Referring to the use, in Article 6(4)d of the expression “rights and obligations which constitute a financial instrument” (emphasis added) in 22 of the 23 official language forms of the Regulation, in contrast with 1, the German one, which uses “in relation to” (im Zusammenhang mit einem Finanzinstrument), the Court notes [44] that that provision does not cover all the rights and obligations connected to a financial instrument, but only those which form that instrument strictly speaking.
[46] by contrast
terms which stipulate how the professional is to receive, process, execute or modify the order placed by the consumer do not, in the light of the wording of Article 6(4)(d) of the Rome I Regulation alone, come within the scope of the rights and obligations constituting the financial instrument itself.
[51] limiting the expression “‘rights and obligations which constitute a financial instrument” to the rights and obligations that define the CFD strictly speaking is held to be consistent with the objective of consumer protection pursued by A6(4) Rome I.
In the case at issue this means that Clause 8.10 of the framework contract, which provided that FIBO reserved the right, in the event of a technical failure on that platform, not to execute the transaction as instructed by J.P, that is to say, not to conclude the corresponding CFD or, as the case may be, to execute it on different terms, in particular at a price other than that indicated in J.P.’s order, is NOT caught by the carve-out and fully subject to the protection of the laws of the consumer’s habitual residence.
In conclusion, only financial instruments strictly speaking are excluded from the consumer carve-out, and not contracts which govern their acquisition and related transactions.
Geert.
The publisher’s blurb, including a discount code, is as follows:
Private International Law and Children’s Rights Law
Conflicts in International Child Abduction Cases
Tine Van Hof
This book examines the relationship between two legal fields when courts decide on cross-border child abduction. While private international law prioritises the child’s prompt return and applies the best interests principle in abstracto, children’s rights law demands an in concreto, individualised assessment of the child’s best interests. These differing approaches can lead to legal friction in practice.
Through a detailed analysis of legal instruments and supranational case law, the book explores how these conflicts arise and how they might be resolved.
Offering clear recommendations for lawmakers, international organisations, and courts, the book provides a roadmap for fostering constructive relationships between legal fields. It is an essential resource for scholars of private international law, judges and practitioners in cross-border family law, and policymakers working at the intersection of international law and children’s rights.
Tine Van Hof is a legal researcher at the University of Antwerp, Belgium.
Jun 2026 | 9781509977055 | 288pp | Hbk | RRP: £90
Discount Price: £72
Order online at www.hartpublishing.co.uk – use the code GLR BD8 to get 20% off!
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This post has kindly been provided by Markus Lieberknecht (University of Osnabrück).
It is our great pleasure to bring to readers’ attention the publication of the article “The Reasons Highest Courts Give: England, France, Germany; 1880–89 and 2007–16”, co-authored by Holger Spamann (Harvard Law School), Stefan Vogenauer and Jasper Kunstreich (MPI Hamburg), Heinrich Nemeczek (Scalable Capital) and Markus Lieberknecht (Osnabrück University), in The Journal of Legal Studies.
One of the core debates in comparative law concerns the characteristics, extent, and development of the common/civil law divide. In this context, it is a familiar trope that common and civil lawyers reason differently, but that the systems are converging. However, the empirical basis for such claims is thin to nonexistent. To address this paucity of data-backed research, we present the first systematic quantitative comparison of three paragon jurisdictions of common law (England) and civil law (France and Germany), and across two centuries (1880–89 vs. 2007–16). Specifically, we analyze the use of legal authorities (cases, statutes, and literature) in 40 representative opinions of each apex court in each of the two decades we surveyed.
Our findings challenge some conventional wisdoms. Take the claim of fundamental differences: Our findings suggest that England and Germany differ only in degree, not in kind. For instance, most German opinions were already citing and distinguishing precedent in the 1880s. There is nothing that one court does, that the other does not do at all. Nonetheless, English courts engage with prior cases more closely than the German courts. Overall, the odd one out in this trio is France, not England. The convergence thesis does not fare well in light of our data either: We observed no such development but instead noted the opening of a new chasm with regard to legal literature, which only the modern German court engages extensively.
Naturally, our study can only pose a challenge, not a refutation, of engrained beliefs that common and civil law systems are fundamentally different but that they have been converging. It is, however, a rather strong challenge, relying on data from the three arguably central jurisdictions on the bread-and-butter object of legal studies (opinions of apex courts). We invite further research based on our sampling and coding scheme, which is scalable and can be applied to other jurisdictions and time periods.
The article – Spamann/Kunstreich/Lieberknecht/Nemeczek/Vogenauer, 55 J. Leg. Stud. 365 (2026) – can be accessed here or obtained from the author of this post.
The following announcement was kindly shared with us by Fabienne Jault-Seseke.
The 6th issue of Perspectives contentieuses internationales has been released and is online.
It contains seven articles related to the consolidation of cross-border litigation. These articles form the first part of the proceedings of a conference held in Toulouse in November 2025. The second part will be published in Volume 7. Volume 6 also includes two further articles, one on the law applicable to air transport and one of theclassification, and three short notes (focus).
Here is the list of papers, along with their abstracts.
Fabienne Jault-Seseke, The consolidation of cross-border litigation in the interests of consistency
The consolidation of cross-border litigation makes it possible to satisfy the requirement of consistency. It is mainly understood as the ability to bring claims and defendants before a single judge,but it also arises in the context of res judicata. Consolidation serves the proper administration of justice by avoiding fragmented decisions in the same case, and it must be seen together with the right of access to a court. Finding the right balance is difficult. It depends on the nature and subject matter of the dispute. The rules that make such concentration possible are varied (related actions, the most appropriate forum, lis pendens, transfer of jurisdiction, specialization of courts, and cooperation between judges).
Sandrine Clavel, Global litigation strategy and consolidation
An analysis of the procedural strategies likely to be employed by the main parties involved in civil and commercial litigation—particularly businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—reveals that they hold an ambivalent stance toward the goal of consolidating litigation. These strategies are, in fact, primarily driven by the desire to achieve the most favorable outcome for the party concerned; however, this fundamental objective is sometimes best served by consolidating the litigation and at other times by splitting it up. This analysis also highlights that the fragmentation of litigation is a natural tendency in transnational disputes, due to the multiplicity of parties and the dispersion of the elements of the dispute across multiple legal systems, but also, at times, due to the nature of the applicable legal rules. It is therefore relatively easy for the parties to capitalise on this trend by devising procedural strategies based on multiple proceedings, whereas it may prove more complex for those who, for very legitimate reasons, wish to effectively consolidate their litigation. The overview of litigation strategies presented in this article therefore leads to the conclusion that what matters is not so much deciding, in abstracto, on the respective merits of consolidating or fragmenting international litigation — this must be decided on a case-by-case basis by the parties involved, depending on the nature of the dispute and the applicable rules — but rather to provide litigants with effective tools to achieve the objective of consolidating litigation when they deem it desirable, and to provide judges with effective tools to sanction any abuses that might be committed by those litigants in defining their litigation strategies.
Estelle Gallant (dir.), The consolidation of litigation in family matters
Although the concentration of litigation in international family matters could undoubtedly be favored, it nevertheless appears that the European regulation of international family conflicts offers litigants a broad range of rules on judicial jurisdiction and thus establishes a deliberate form of forum shopping. This notably enables the better-informed parties to bring proceedings before the court whose applicable law will provide them with the greatest advantages. Mechanisms for consolidating proceedings do exist, but they clearly do not reflect any general objective pursued by the legislature. The autonomy of the will, increasingly valued in private international family law, may therefore prove valuable for parties wishing to anticipate outcomes in the event of a dispute; however, it may also appear as a discriminatory tool serving only a certain category of litigants and thus fail to satisfy all the objectives of justice in private international law. Finally, the fragmentation of international litigation sometimes comes into conflict with national rules requiring the indivisibility of certain proceedings, raising the question of how such rules should be reconciled with European regulations.
Marie Nioche, Provisional justice and consolidation of cross-border disputes
Provisional justice tends to fragment proceedings in cross-border disputes. The analysis is based on the Brussels I bis Regulation. The author first addresses the causes of this fragmentation. She then considers possible solutions for improving the concentration of cross-border provisional litigation. Under current law, the options are limited, as traditional tools are ill-suited to provisional litigation. De lege ferenda, however, it is possible to effectively tackle fragmentation by recognizing the central role of the judge who has jurisdiction on the merits, both ex ante – to prevent coordination difficulties and conflicts of provisional proceedings or decisions – and ex post – to resolve them.
Philippine Blajan, Consolidation of cross-border disputes litigation through the optimal use of choice-of-court agreements
Choice-of-court agreements have become key instruments for managing cross-border disputes in an increasingly complex international commercial environment. Beyond ensuring predictability, they enable parties to concentrate litigation before a single forum and reduce the risks of parallel proceedings and inconsistent judgments. Their effectiveness, however, depends on their ability to bind third parties involved in complex contractual networks and to withstand competing jurisdictional claims. At the same time, excessive concentration may undermine procedural fairness where vulnerable or weaker parties are compelled to litigate before a distant or burdensome forum. The article analyses the tensions between party autonomy, procedural efficiency, and access to justice under European and French private international law. It concludes by suggesting a new “jurisdictional concentration clause” designed to centralize disputes arising from interconnected contractual relationships while preserving fairness and legal certainty, and binding force of contracts.
Julie Esquenazi, Hélène Georgelin, Choice-of-court agreements, primacy at any cost comes at a price
In the last few months, case law has been particularly notable in relation to jurisdiction clauses. Notably, the scope of such clauses is becoming increasingly broader, particularly with regard to their primacy over other jurisdictional rules as well as their enforceability against interested third parties. This approach in case law, justified by the objective of predictability, may conflict with other principles, such as the proper administration of justice or the relative effect of agreements.
Laurence Idot Consolidation of litigation: the contributions of public enforcement to private enforcement
Public enforcement in cross-border matters has developed considerably. Competition law is a prime testing ground. But financial and digital matters, among others, are also concerned. The mechanisms for concentrating litigation found there cannot simply be transposed to private enforcement. They are nevertheless a source of inspiration, whether in identifying the most suitable authority, putting in place cross-border information mechanisms, or identifying rules that help ensure coherence.
Caroline Derache, Constance Plouchart, The law applicable to disputes relating to air transport
Although international air transport is governed by uniform substantive rules laid down among others in long-standing international treaties, there are still many situations where, in case of litigation, the court may have to determine the law applicable to the claims brought before it. This is the case, for example, when parties other than the carrier are involved. Determining the relevant text and subsequently applying the appropriate conflict of laws rule can, then, give rise to debates that have led to decisions that are worth examining. However, some issues have not yet been resolved.
Sophie Duparc, Elie Lenglard, Maud Minois, Noela Picari, What role does the ‘lege fori’ classification play in the age of independent classification ?
What role remains for lege fori characterization in a private international law increasingly shaped by the European Union and by autonomous concepts developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union ? Using the landmark Caraslanis decision as its starting point, the article argues that the opposition between domestic and autonomous characterization is less radical than commonly assumed. Although European harmonization has shifted the interpretation of connecting-factor categories to the legal order of the Union, it has neither eliminated the relevance of national legal concepts nor resolved the difficulties surrounding the identification of the object of characterization. The article highlights the continuing methodological value of lege fori characterization through three contemporary case studies: the fiducie and the trust, the direct action mechanism, and claims based on the abrupt termination of established commercial relationships. These examples reveal the persistent tension between European uniformity and the diversity of national private law systems. The authors contend that autonomous characterization can operate coherently only through renewed reliance on comparative analysis and a careful understanding of national legal institutions. The challenge today is therefore not to replace lege fori characterization with autonomous concepts, but to articulate both approaches in a manner that safeguards the unity of EU private international law while preserving the coherence of domestic legal systems.
The focus are the following :
Summary report on the inaugural conference of the GLAS Forum, by Daniela de Avilez Demoro and Yannick Vincent
A first step towards a revision of the Brussels I bis Regulation, by Sandrine Clavel
The transposition of the anti-SLAPP Directive, by Fabienne Jault-Seseke
This post was kindly prepared by Véronique Carole Ngono, Professor of Private Law (agrégée), University of Douala, Cameroon.
I. Introduction
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa has not been the subject of many studies. Although a few such studies do exist, this is in contrast to the field of conflict of laws and personal status law in particular. Consequently, the two rulings issued by the Supreme Court of Senegal on August 12, 2020, in connected disputes went practically unnoticed, even though they offer valuable insights into determining the jurisdiction of Senegalese courts in international disputes and the enforcement of foreign judgments.
The purpose of this note is therefore to shed light on the law and practice of conflict jurisdictions in Senegal.
II. Facts and proceedings
The dispute involves a Senegalese couple, X (the husband) and Y (the wife), who married in Senegal in 1996. They lived there for some time before Y moved to Montreal, Canada, where she settled in 2015.
In 2017, X filed a petition for divorce in Senegal. Y challenged the jurisdiction of the Senegalese courts. The lower court rejected Y’s objection and assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Dissatisfied with the decision, Y appealed to the Supreme Court [Case 1].
Meanwhile, in 2019, Y successfully obtained an interim order from a court in Montreal, Quebec, in the divorce proceedings between the parties. The order, among other things, granted Y the exclusive right to occupy a residence located in Senegal, to the exclusion of X.
The lower court declared the Canadian judgment enforceable in Senegal. Dissatisfied with that decision, X appealed to the Supreme Court [Case 2].
III. Rulings
Case 1 (Ruling No 73 of 12 August 2020)
In the first case, the Supreme Court ruled that when disputes involve spouses of Senegalese nationality, the wife resides abroad, the rule governing the international jurisdiction of Senegalese courts set forth in Article 853 of the Family Code (CF) apply to the exclusion of domestic provisions contained in Article 167 of the same Code, which are confined to matters of territorial jurisdiction. Second, the Court held that, by virtue of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 853, the Senegalese Court are not required, in the event of international lis pendens, to decline jurisdiction in favor of a foreign court hearing the same dispute between the same parties. Consequently, the lower court dismissed the lis pendens noting that the – both Senegalese national married in Senegal – had lived there before Y moved to Canada in 2015, properly justified its decision.
Case 2 (Ruling No 74 of 12 August 2020)
In the second case, the supreme Court ruled as follows:
First, the Supreme Court recalled the applicable legal framework for granting exequatur, notably Articles 787-790 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) dealing with the exequatur requirements, and Articles 853 [op. cit.] as well as 843 and 846 of the FC dealing with the law applicable to the extra-patrimonial effects of marriage and divorce or legal separation, as well as matrimonial property regimes. The Court then observed that the lower court had declared the Canadian judgment enforceable in Senegal on the ground that it satisfied the requirements for recognition and enforcement.
However, the Supreme Court disagreed and held that, by declaring the Canadian judgment enforceable, the lower court had misapplied the law. First, the Canadian court lacked jurisdiction to order provisional measures in divorce proceedings between Senegalese spouses, since some of those measures were to be enforced in Senegal and the Canadian court had failed to apply Senegalese law, which was designated as the applicable law under the Senegalese conflict-of-laws rules. Second, nothing in the order established that the judgment had been rendered in proceedings in which the parties had been duly served, properly represented, or declared in default.
IV. Comments
An analysis of the two rulings sheds light on how Senegalese Courts deal with parallel proceedings in international disputes (1) and the requirements of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (2).
1. The treatment of parallel proceedings by Senegalese Court
The first ruling in case 1 by the Supreme Court of Senegal provides some useful insights. First according to the supreme court, where one of the defendants is resident abroad, rules on international jurisdiction should apply even when the dispute is between two Senegalese nationals. Second, rules on international jurisdiction do not recognize international lis pendens. This is because according to the Court, Article 853 of the FC confers exclusive jurisdiction to Senegalese court whenever either plaintiff or the defendant is Senegalese national.
Accordingly, while Article 853 of the FC does not explicitly refer to the exclusive nature of the ground of jurisdiction based on the Senegalese nationality, the Court interpreted the “privilege of jurisdiction” referred to in the provision as conferring Senegalese courts exclusive jurisdiction. This exclusive nature of the jurisdiction of Senegalese courts precludes the recognition of international lis pendens, unless the parties have waived the jurisdictional privilege conferred to them or the judgment resulting from proceedings initiated in Senegal is intended to be enforced abroad.
Consequently, a judgment rendered abroad in a dispute between Senegalese nationals or between a Senegalese national and a foreign national in violation of this exclusive jurisdiction may not be enforced in Senegal. Paragraph 2 of this article further provides that Senegalese courts also have jurisdiction over disputes between foreign nationals when the defendant is domiciled in Senegal or when one of the jurisdictional grounds referred to in article 34 through 36 o the CPC dealing with territorial jurisdiction is located in Senegal.
2. The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment
a) Applicable legal framework
Under Article 787 of the CCP, in civil, commercial and administrative matters, contentious and non-contentious decisions rendered by foreign courts have de plano the force of res judicata in Senegal territory if they meet the following conditions:
a) The decision was rendered by a court having jurisdiction in accordance with the rules on conflicts of jurisdiction recognized in Senegal;
b) The decision applied the law governing the dispute in accordance with the conflict-of-laws rules recognized in Senegal
c) The decision is, under the law of the State in which it was made, final, binding and enforceable under the law of the rendering State;
d) The parties were duly summoned, represented or declared in default;
e) The judgment is not contrary to Senegalese public policy and does not conflict with a Senegalese court judgment having the force of res judicata.
The application of Article 787 must also be read in conjunction with Article 790 of the CCP, and Articles 843, 846 et 853 of the FC. Article 790 of the CCP determines the scope of the exequatur court’s review by providing that, the President of the Regional Court of the place where enforcement is limited to verifying whether the decision for which a declaration of enforceability is sought meets the conditions laid down in Article 787.
Articles 843 and 846 of the FC lay down the rules on conflicts of law relating to personal status in Senegal, particularly in matters of marriage and divorce. These provisions are relevant for determining whether the foreign court had applied the law governing the dispute according to the Senegalese choice of law rules, as required by Article 787(b). Finally, as noted above, Article 853 establishes the rules governing international direct jurisdiction o the Senegalese courts and is relevant to determining whether the foreign court exercised jurisdiction in accordance with the jurisdictional rules recognized in Senegal, as required by Article 787(a).
b) The practice of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements in Senegal
According to the Supreme Court the conditions laid down in Article 787 were not satisfied. First the Canadian court lacked jurisdiction to order provisional measures to be enforced in Senegal. Second, the Canadian court failed to apply Senegalese law, which was applicable in accordance with the conflict-of-laws rules Articles 843 and 846 of the FC. Those provisions provide that the extra patrimonial effects of marriage as well as divorce and legal separation, are governed by the spouses’ common national law where they share same nationality or where they are of different nationalities, by the law of the country where they have their common domicile at the time the proceedings are instituted. In the absence of proof of the existence of a common domicile the lex fori applies. Furthermore, the Court noted that nothing in the finding of the appealed order that the foreign judgment was rendered in proceedings which the parties had been duly summoned, represented or declared in default.
A new volume coming out of the Programme in European Private Law for Postgraduates (PEPP) has just been published as part of the Scritti di diritto privato europeo ed internazionale series.
The book, available in open access here, focuses on the emergence of new legal personality for environmental features; protection of children; alternative dispute resolution; protection of the internal market and access to justice; SLAPPs; onlice activities and private international law; jurisdiction and choice of court agreements, and tax arbitrability.
Contributions include:
Michał Kućka: Rivers and Other Elements of Nature as Legal Persons: On the Use of Private Law Instruments in Environmental Protection (Polish Perspective)
María González Marimón: Mediation in International Child Abduction Cases in the Brussels II ter Regulation
Francesca Maoli: The EU Legislation on SLAPPs and its First “Stress-Tests” in Lawsuits Between Environmental NGOs and Corporations
Simone Carrea: Arbitrability of Tax Matters in the Context of Inter-private Dis-putes
Stefano Dominelli: Lex fori prorogati and Brussels I bis
Luana Matoso: Choice of Court Agreements and Service Out of the Jurisdiction: The Influence of the Brussels I bis Regulation on English Law After Brexit
Rosa Pla Almendros: The Relevant and Complex Role of Private International Law in the Private Enforcement of the DSA
Felix D. Pollmann, Jonathan L. T. Chu: Standard Terms in Business-to-Business Contracts under English and German Law: Comparative Assessment and Strategies for Avoiding the Application of §§ 305-310 BGB
Kai Hüning: The Hearing of the Child in Child Abduction Cases under the 1980 Hague Convention
Amber Boes: Judicial Powers in Promoting Mediation: A Paper Tiger or a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?
Lise Van den Eynde, Ruth Sander: Conflict of Interest in Representation: Belgian ‘Novelty’ versus German Tradition
Jonathan L. T. Chu, Felix D. Pollmann: Debt, Judgment, and Security: English and German Approaches to Preclusion
Sofia Caruso: Access to Justice for Consumers and SMEs: A Competition Law Problem?
Eden Smith: Origins and Aspects of Mitigation in the Law of Damages in England and Germany
Paula Granell: Transfer Pricing and the Role of Contractual Terms in the Post-BEPS Era
Monika Chmielowiec: Towards a Framework of Tort Liability for AI: Insights from Legal Scholarship
Monika Naumovski: Consumer Safety in the Internal Market: The Harmonisation of EU Product Liability
Written by Hadrien Pauchard (assistant researcher and doctoral student at Sciences Po Law School)
The second issue of the Revue Critique de droit international privé of 2026 was just released and is accessible online. It contains two articles, eight case notes, as well as five book reviews. In line with the Revue Critique’s recent policy, the doctrinal part will soon be made available in English on the editor’s website (for registered users and institutions).
The first article by Prof. Étienne Farnoux (Université de Strasbourg/Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth) scrutinizes the French Supreme Court’s recent case law pertaining to the Localisation du préjudice financier sur le compte bancaire de l’investisseur en France, une nouvelle doctrine de la Cour de cassation pour la compétence juridictionnelle et la loi applicable ? (The Localisation of Financial Losses on the Investor’s Bank Account in France: A New Doctrine from the Cour de Cassation Regarding Jurisdiction and Applicable Law?). Beyond the innovative solution in the particular cases (outlining a unitary connection of the financial loss centred on the investor’s bank account), this series of six rulings tackles some fundamental questions raised by the localisation of purely immaterial damages, which materialize broader concerns in contemporary private international law scholarship and judicial practice. The author identifies these trends as follows:
In four judgments delivered on October 1st and two further judgments on 26 November 2025, the Cour de cassation located the financial loss suffered by an investor at that investor’s domicile, within the framework of a unitary approach common to both the determination of jurisdiction and the identification of the applicable law. Beyond the outcome – favourable to the investor – the methodology adopted is noteworthy: the Cour de cassation applies a sophisticated connecting-factor, based on a multifactorial and case-by-case analysis, thereby rationalising the complex case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning financial loss in the context of the European forum delicti. This article analyses these rulings, emphasising three significant methodological developments: the alignment of forum and jus, the disaggregation of the connecting rule, and the personalization of the connecting factor.
In the second article, Prof. Véronique Carole Ngono (Université de Douala) ponders over Les Principes africains sur la loi applicable aux contrats commerciaux internationaux : un modèle pour l’Afrique ? (The African Principles on the Law Applicable to International Commercial Contracts: A Model for Africa?). Informed by a large survey of legislative practices in numerous African jurisdictions and regional bodies, the author’s critical appraisal of the 2024 African Principles provides an informed glimpse into the main issues and challenges of modern codification within the field. Her inquiry is summarized as follows:
African private international law has been enriched by a flexible legal text: the African Principles on the Law Applicable to International Commercial Contracts, which were officially launched in 2024. While the objective of harmonising solutions for the choice of law in international commercial contracts in Africa is commendable, despite the fact that they are, in principle, an extension of the 2008 Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations and the Hague Principles on the choice of law applicable to international commercial contracts, the question of their impact arises. The answer is nuanced: while these principles constitute a necessary model given the unsatisfactory state of African legislation on the issue, their impact could be hampered by certain shortcomings.
The full table of contents is available here.
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