
As part of the DFG- and AHRC-funded Fashion’s PLACE project, there will be a workshop on Private International Law, Sustainability and Fashion at the Geneva Graduate Institute on 18 June 2026 (11:00–13:00 CEST), just prior to the EAPIL conference. The event will bring together perspectives from law, sustainability and the fashion industry, with short presentations and space for discussion. If you are in Geneva and interested in the intersection of private international law, circular economy and fashion, consider coming. No sign-up necessary.
This post was written by Hannah Buxbaum, Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. The post is cross-posted from the Transnational Litigation Blog with kind permission.
In 2019, Energy Transfer, the developer of the Dakota Access Pipeline, sued Greenpeace International, a Dutch foundation, in North Dakota state court. Last year, Greenpeace responded with an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) lawsuit against Energy Transfer in Dutch court. In the latest twist in this lengthy dispute, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued an antisuit injunction last week blocking (partially) that anti-SLAPP suit.
The injunction is unusual in two respects. First, it does not actually bar Greenpeace from pursuing the Dutch action; rather, it purports to limit the issues that Greenpeace can raise in that litigation. Second, it was entered after judgment had already been reached in the North Dakota lawsuit.
BackgroundIn 2016, the planned construction of the 1,000-mile Dakota Access oil pipeline engendered significant and sometimes violent protests near the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in North Dakota. Greenpeace International was among the many civil society organizations that advocated against the pipeline project.
The U.S. LitigationIn 2019, Energy Transfer L.P. sued Greenpeace and its two U.S. affiliates, along with other environmental rights groups, in federal court in North Dakota. Energy Transfer alleged that Greenpeace had engaged in criminal activity violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). It also asked the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a range of additional state law claims. This lawsuit was dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a claim—the racketeering claims with prejudice, and the state law claims without prejudice.
A week later, Energy Transfer filed a second lawsuit in North Dakota state court alleging defamation, tortious interference with business, and conspiracy under state law. On March 19, 2025, a jury found Greenpeace liable, concluding that it had supported the protests that delayed construction of the pipeline. It awarded Energy Transfer more than $650 million in compensatory and exemplary damages. In February 2026, the trial court finalized the judgment in Energy Transfer’s favor, though it reduced the total damages to $345 million. Greenpeace is currently seeking a new trial in that case.
The Netherlands LitigationGreenpeace characterizes both the proceedings in North Dakota federal court and the proceedings in North Dakota state court as SLAPP suits. It contends that Energy Transfer filed these claims in order to block Greenpeace from exercising its right to participate in public debate regarding the pipeline. In July 2024, it sent Energy Transfer a notice of liability stating that the U.S. litigation constituted an abuse of its rights under Dutch and EU anti-SLAPP law. It demanded that Energy Transfer withdraw its U.S. claims against Greenpeace and “accept liability and responsibility for payment of all damage (including costs)” that Greenpeace suffered as a result of the proceedings.
Energy Transfer did not agree to these demands, and in February 2025, shortly before trial began in the North Dakota case, Greenpeace filed a summons initiating litigation in the District Court of Amsterdam. It seeks compensation for costs and damages, including reputational damage, and a declaratory judgment that Energy Transfer acted tortiously and abused Greenpeace’s rights by commencing the U.S. lawsuits.
Greenpeace’s suit in the Netherlands invokes the EU’s Anti-SLAPP Directive, which entered into force in May 2024. The goal of the Directive is to protect journalists and civil society actors from “manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings” initiated in order to chill their participation in public debate.
While the Directive’s primary objective was to address SLAPP suits initiated in European courts, it specifically recognizes and seeks to mitigate the threat of SLAPP suits brought in courts outside the EU against EU-based defendants. First, it includes an anti-enforcement provision (Article 16), which provides that a judgment rendered against an EU resident by a non-EU court can be denied recognition and enforcement if the foreign proceedings are deemed “manifestly unfounded or abusive under the law of the Member State in which recognition or enforcement is sought.”
Second, it creates a jurisdictional basis for claims initiated by an EU person targeted by a third-country SLAPP suit (Article 17). In the case of abusive proceedings, such a person “may seek, in the courts or tribunals of the place where that person is domiciled, compensation for the damage and the costs incurred in connection with the proceedings before the court or tribunal of the third country.” Such claims can be initiated before a decision has been rendered or become final in the foreign proceeding.
Although the deadline for EU member states to implement the Directive within their national legal systems has passed, it has not yet been fully transposed across the EU. Nevertheless, the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security has stated that Dutch private international law already permits the exercise of jurisdiction in anti-SLAPP claims involving a third-country proceeding. Greenpeace’s anti-SLAPP claims against Energy Transfer are based on Dutch civil law.
The Antisuit InjunctionFive months after Greenpeace initiated its lawsuit in Amsterdam—and after the North Dakota state lawsuit had resulted in a jury verdict against Greenpeace—Energy Transfer filed a motion in the North Dakota court seeking an antisuit injunction prohibiting Greenpeace from proceeding with the Dutch anti-SLAPP suit.
Whether and under what circumstances a state court may issue an international antisuit injunction was apparently a matter of first impression in North Dakota. Given the lack of precedent, the state district court turned for guidance to federal law on the issuance of such injunctions. (Oddly, it relied not on Eighth Circuit precedent, but on a district court decision from another circuit.) The framework it chose laid out a three-step analysis, requiring the court to consider:
(1) Whether the parties and issues in the U.S. proceeding and the foreign proceeding are the same;
(2) Whether the foreign litigation would (a) frustrate a policy in the enjoining forum; (b) be vexatious; (c) threaten the enjoining court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; or (d) prejudice other equitable considerations; and
(3) Whether principles of comity counsel against an injunction.
Applying this framework, the district court denied Energy Transfer’s motion for an antisuit injunction. Energy Transfer then petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for supervisory review. That court granted review and concluded that the district court had abused its discretion by misapplying the legal framework. Following the same framework, it concluded that an antisuit injunction was justified.
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court grappled with the challenges presented by anti-SLAPP litigation, the court’s analysis did not adhere very closely to the test it purported to adopt.
Threshold Question: Identity of IssuesAs a threshold matter, the party seeking an antisuit injunction must establish that the issues at stake in the foreign proceeding and the U.S. proceeding are substantially the same, such that the outcome of the latter would dispose of the former. That was not the case here. As the district court had recognized, while the two proceedings arose from the same activities, they raised different issues.
The core of the Dutch proceeding was a claim that was not at issue in the U.S. proceeding, since North Dakota law does not have an anti-SLAPP law. Moreover, the Dutch lawsuit involved allegations that Energy Transfer had defamed Greenpeace, based largely on statements the company made in and in connection with the failed RICO litigation. The question of defamatory conduct by Energy Transfer was not at issue in the North Dakota proceeding, since Greenpeace had made no counterclaims there.
The state Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that the issues were “substantially similar,” holding that the threshold requirement had been met. However—presumably recognizing that its judgment would not in fact dispose of the Dutch proceeding—it offered a “narrowly tailored” injunction that left Greenpeace free to pursue claims premised on “matters the North Dakota proceedings did not adjudicate.”
Equitable Factors and the Role of ComityFollowing the district court, the Supreme Court indicated that it was adopting the conservative approach to antisuit injunctions, which views international comity as a significant factor weighing against the issuance of such injunctions. Even under that approach, however, courts are typically willing to enjoin “interdictory” foreign proceedings whose aim is to preclude or interfere with the adjudication of a claim in U.S. court.
In this case, the court characterized the Dutch action as vexatious, stating that it was filed after the North Dakota case had been ongoing for more than six years and “on the eve of trial.” (It is worth pointing out that Greenpeace sent a notice of liability the previous year, after the EU Directive entered into force.) Nevertheless, as the district court noted, it is hard to see how the Dutch action could have actually blocked or interfered with the North Dakota proceeding, which had already proceeded through trial at the time the injunction was sought.
Courts adopting the conservative approach are also willing to enjoin foreign proceedings that violate an important public policy of the forum. Invoking this doctrine, the North Dakota Supreme Court voiced its core objection to the Dutch suit:
North Dakota provides an orderly process for challenging an adverse verdict—post-trial motions and review in this Court… . [Greenpeace]’s Dutch action seeks a declaration that the North Dakota case was “manifestly unfounded and abusive” and demands damages designed to offset the jury’s verdict. If successful, the Dutch action would contradict and offset the verdict, functionally nullifying it. This is not a legitimate parallel action. It is an attack on a fundamental policy of this state.
At this point, however, judgment in Energy Transfer’s favor has already been entered in the North Dakota proceeding, triggering the principle of res judicata. Unless and until a new trial is granted or that judgment is overturned on appeal, one would expect the Dutch court to consider that when assessing Greenpeace’s claims that the North Dakota proceedings were “manifestly unfounded or abusive.” (As recital 29 of the Directive indicates, if the claimant in the foreign proceedings “pursues claims that are founded, such proceedings should not be regarded as abusive.”) Issuing an antisuit injunction that indirectly takes that decision out of the hands of the Dutch court would seem inconsistent with the concept of international comity.
ConclusionThe North Dakota Supreme Court ultimately ordered the district court to enter a “narrowly framed” antisuit injunction. This injunction will bar Greenpeace “from pursuing any claim in the Dutch action whose elements require, as pleaded, a finding that the North Dakota case lacked legal foundation—including any claim premised on the ‘manifestly unfounded’ standard” of the EU Directive.
However, the injunction will not bar Greenpeace from asserting other claims in the Dutch litigation. Specifically, it would not bar claims “premised on Energy Transfer’s dismissed federal RICO suit and on alleged out-of-court defamatory statements—matters the North Dakota proceedings did not adjudicate.”
In a sense, this measure undermines international comity even more than a comprehensive antisuit injunction would. Its effect is to permit the foreign proceeding to continue while attempting to control the set of issues the foreign court can consider.
On 8–10 October 2026, Julian Rapp and Wolfgang Wurmnest will be hosting a conference on European Principles of Transnational Litigation and Their Reception Abroad at the University of Hamburg.
The aim of the conference is described as follows:
As cross-border disputes grow increasingly common in today’s globalized world, reflection on key European procedural principles – and their influence beyond Europe – deserves closer examination. This conference examines how European procedural rules, particularly those shaped by the Court of Justice of the European Union, have evolved into general principles of transnational litigation. It will discuss classic jurisdictional rules (contract and tort jurisdiction, jurisdiction agreements, and lis pendens), the protection of weaker parties, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments – all reflecting the practical challenges that litigants and courts face in cross-border litigation.
Beyond taking stock of European law as it stands, the conference examines how these principles have been received (or rejected) outside the EU – a development that reveals much about their underlying quality. Drawing on comparative perspectives from the United Kingdom, Turkey, Japan, and Korea, the conference aims to foster dialogue between legal cultures and to assess prospects for convergence or divergence in procedural standards. By engaging both doctrinal foundations and practical implications, the conference aims to deepen understanding of how European litigation principles shape, and are in turn shaped by, the evolving global discourse on transnational litigation.
The programme can be found here; registration is possible via this e-mail address: conference-european-principles.rw@uni-hamburg.de.
This is the last chance to register for the third bi-annual conference of the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL) that will take place in Geneva, Switzerland, from 18 to 20 June 2026. To register please use this link.
For more information on the conference see our earlier blog post. The program is available on the conference’s website.
EAPIL is looking forward to seeing you in Geneva!
Reposted from JPIL Conference 2027 | Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät | UZH
The 11th Journal of Private International Law Conference will be held in Zurich, Switzerland. Please save the date: 1–3 April 2027.
The conference organizers Tanja Domej (University of Zurich) and Christiane von Bary (University of Zurich), as well as the editors of the Journal, Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling) and Jonathan Harris (King’s College London), are looking forward to welcoming you in Switzerland!
The call for papers is available here (PDF, 137 KB).
The Zurich organisers can provide a limited number of travel grants for speakers from low- and lower-middle income economies according to the World Bank classification. For eligible countries, see https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/understanding-country-income–world-bank-group-income-classifica or https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.
Travel grants will cover the costs of economy class travel (up to CHF 1500), visa costs, and hotel accommodation (the latter will be booked by the organisers). To qualify for a travel grant, speakers must be at least at the postdoc level, affiliated with an academic institution in an eligible country, and unable to cover their travel expenses otherwise.
If you wish to apply for a travel grant, please submit your CV and list of publications in addition to your abstract. Grant recipients will be selected by the organisers based on the quality of the abstract, the personal qualifications of applicants, and the need for financial assistance.
Please note that, as the travel grants are funded by the University of Zurich, similar funding may not be available for future Journal of Private International Law Conferences.
The German Society of International Law (GSIL) will be hosting a ‘short conference’ dedicated to “Law without Borders? Extraterritorial Regulation and Unilateral Action” in Munich on 11 and 12 June 2026. While its academic events are usually limited to members of the Society, this particular event has been opened up for other academics working on questions of international law, including doctoral candidates. Participation is free of charge.
The programme can be found here; registration is possible here.
On 15 May 2026, the Faculty of Law of the University of Coimbra will host the conference “Dark Spots of the European Succession Regulation: A Decade of Its Application” (“Pontos Negros do Regulamento Europeu das Sucessões: Uma década da sua aplicação”).
The conference aims to discuss some of the most controversial, uncertain and unresolved issues arising from the first decade of application of the European Succession Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 650/2012). The programme brings together scholars and practitioners from different jurisdictions and legal traditions, combining presentations in Portuguese, Spanish and English.
The event will take place at the Legal Institute’s premises of the Faculty of Law of the University of Coimbra.
The full programme and further information are available here.
The following call was kindly shared with us by Aleksandrs Fillers (Riga Graduate School of Law).
This year is marked by growing discussions about revisions of the core EU private international law documents. The 2nd edition of the Riga Private International Law Conference aims to reflect on the possible changes to be encouraged and those to be discouraged. This year the conference will mostly focus on three core ‘general’ EU private international law instruments: Brussels Ibis Regulation, Rome I and Rome II Regulations.
The conference is organized by the Riga Graduate School of Law and will be held online via Zoom on 22 June 2026. Please submit abstracts of no more than 300 words to associate professor Dr. Aleksandrs Fillers (aleksandrs.fillers@rgsl.edu.lv) by 1 June 2026. We will notify you about the acceptance of papers by 5 June 2026.
Selected articles will be published in the Baltic Yearbook of International Law (indexed in Scopus).
The first issue of the Journal of Private International Law for 2026 was published today. It contains the following articles:
Guillaume Laganière, “Foreign law, appellate review and mixed legal traditions in Quebec” This article investigates the appellate review of foreign law findings, with a particular focus on the Canadian province of Quebec, where rules of private law follow the civil law tradition but remain influenced by the common law in relevant areas such as civil procedure and evidence. The first part of the article describes how the procedural treatment of foreign law in Quebec has evolved from a rigid application of English law’s fact doctrine to a more nuanced (and civilian) characterisation in the 1994 Civil Code of Quebec. The second part of the article examines appellate jurisprudence originating in Quebec and suggests that the province’s legal mixity can inform the scope of appellate review, by emphasising the importance of context over the abstract characterisation of foreign law as a whole. Zeno Crespi Reghizzi, “State international responsibility for breach of private international law treaties” As with all treaties, private international law treaties are sources of international obligations, the violation of which forms an internationally wrongful act entailing the international responsibility of the state that has committed it. Despite the scarcity of inter-state disputes on this subject matter, identifying the consequences of the breach of a private international law treaty by a state party could contribute to a better understanding of how these treaties work and whether international state responsibility represents a useful tool to ensure their effectiveness. This study is devoted to these aspects. It explores: (1) the relevant treaty obligations and the state’s conduct potentially qualifying as a breach; (2) the state (or states) entitled to invoke state responsibility for the breach of a PIL treaty and (3) the remedies available. Darius Chan & Sasiy Krishnan, “Charting a path towards harmonisation of privilege rules: a two-stage uniform choice of law rule for privilege in international arbitration“ The lack of certainty in the choice of law rule for privilege in international arbitration has led to a desire to devise uniform guidelines and choice of law rules for legal advice privilege, litigation privilege and settlement privilege. Notwithstanding this, there appears to be no conclusive view on the matter. While issue characterisation generally forms the preliminary backdrop for choice of law questions, the divergent views between the common and civil law traditions on the characterisation of privilege arguably leads to further fragmentation of its choice of law rule, and should be dispensed with. This article proposes a two-stage uniform choice of law rule for the three categories of privilege. At the first stage, the parties’ express choice of law for privilege would be given effect. In the absence of such express choice, the law of the seat governs legal advice privilege and litigation privilege, and the law of the main contract governs settlement privilege. This framework achieves party autonomy, equal treatment to parties and parties’ legitimate expectations, certainty and practicability – all of which are conflict-resolving values. Aleksandrs Fillers, “Extension of consumer protection in EU private international law“ The protection of weaker parties is one of the cornerstones of EU private international law. Consumers are traditionally regarded as typical weaker parties that deserve special protection at the level of private international law. The Brussels Ia Regulation and the Rome I Regulation do not protect all consumers. To be protected, consumers must meet the requirements of Article 17(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation and Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation. These provisions include the requirement for the consumer to be domiciled/reside in the state in which the professional pursues or directs its business activity. This puts different consumers on different footing. In this article, the author argues that this differentiation may be justified for the purposes of applying default jurisdictional and conflictual rules. However, this criterion should not determine the scope of other protective rules, notably those that restrict party autonomy in consumer cases. Likewise, the Brussels Ia Regulation has several other provisions that do not protect consumers who fail to meet all the requirements of Article 17(1). The author argues that all these provisions must be de lege ferenda extended to all consumers. Finally, the author argues that for certain types of consumer contracts, the law of the place of conclusion of the contract (lex loci contractus) should be introduced in the Rome I Regulation as a default rule, to ensure better protection of those consumers who do not reside in a state to which the professional pursues or directs its business activities. Felix Berner, “Choice of law rules under pressure – the growing power of state interests and vested rights in private international law“ This article challenges the notion that choice of law consists merely of rules designating an applicable law. Instead, it argues for a system resting on three pillars: choice of law rules, state interests and vested rights. It demonstrates how state interests and vested rights have become much more powerful in recent years, exerting pressure on choice of law rules and the traditional analysis of choice of law methodology. Integrating both state interests and vested rights into the analysis not only helps to paint a more accurate picture of choice of law, but also provides guidance for deciding difficult cases. To show this, the article offers both theoretical reflections and four case studies addressing particularly pertinent choice of law issues. Andreas Hermann, “Navigating the residence for sole traders and other natural persons under the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention“ The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements partially replaces the Brussels Ia Regulation in UK-EU judicial cooperation post-Brexit, underscoring its growing international significance. Although primarily designed for business to business (B2B) contracts, the Convention also applies to non-legal entities (natural persons) such as sole traders. The determination of the parties’ residence is central to legal certainty, as residence functions as a key connecting factor for the Convention’s scope of application and its coordination with other international instruments. While the Convention provides an autonomous definition of residence for legal entities, it remains silent as regards natural persons. Given the Convention’s nature as an international treaty, “residence” must be interpreted autonomously, rather than by reference to national law. Focusing on the structure and operation of the Convention, its interpretation must observe a de minimis threshold excluding mere temporary presence and, particularly in light of Article 26, recognise parties’ “secondary” residences to coordinate the Convention with other instruments. Autonomous interpretation ensures uniform application across Contracting States and enhances the Convention’s effectiveness, both at the level of jurisdiction and of recognition and enforcement. Ross R-S Pey, “Decoding the oracle: Statutory interpretation in the conflict of laws“ The UK conflict of laws has become increasingly statutory, yet little attention has been paid to how statutory interpretation is used. This omission risks doctrinal inconsistency and unpredictability in international disputes. This article addresses that gap. Using a simple contractual choice-of-law hypothetical, it identifies three interpretative issues: (i) characterising statutes within governing law clauses, (ii) determining when statutes operate as mandatory rules, and (iii) the role of the presumption against extraterritoriality. It provides an account of how purposive interpretation may or may not be used to address issues (i) to (iii). The contribution is twofold. First, it shows that statutory interpretation is fundamental to the conflict of laws. Secondly, it highlights and invites reflection on the role of purposive interpretation in the conflict of laws.
Theme by Danetsoft and Danang Probo Sayekti inspired by Maksimer