by Shantanu Kanade, Assistant Professor, Dispute Resolution, Jindal Global Law School, India
The Federal Court of Australia (“Federal Court”), in its recent judgement in the Republic of India v. CCDM Holdings, LLC[1] (“Judgement”), held that the Republic of India (“India”) was entitled to jurisdictional immunity from Australian Courts in proceedings seeking recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards dealing with disputes arising from ‘non-commercial’ legal relationships. The Court’s judgment was rendered with respect to an appeal filed by India against an interlocutory judgement of a primary judge of the same court, rejecting India’s sovereign immunity claim.
Background of the Dispute
Three Mauritian entities of the Devas group (“Original Applicants”) had commenced arbitration proceedings in 2012 under the 1998 India-Mauritius BIT, impugning India’s actions with respect to an agreement for leasing of space spectrum capacity entered between Devas Multimedia Private Limited (an Indian company in which the Original Applicants held shares) and Antrix Corporation Limited (an Indian state-owned entity). In 2011, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security decided to annul the said agreement, citing an increased demand for allocation of spectrum towards meeting various military and public utility needs (“Annulment”). The arbitration proceedings that followed culminated in a jurisdiction and merits award in 2016[2] and a quantum award in 2020 (“Quantum Award”)[3]. The Original Applicants have since sought to enforce the Quantum Award against India in different jurisdictions, discussed here.[4]
Proceedings Before the Primary Judge
The Original Applicants commenced proceedings before a primary judge of the Federal Court (“Primary Judge”) in April 2021 for recognition and enforcement of the Quantum Award. In May 2023, the Original Applicants were substituted with three US entities of the Devas Group which were respectively assignees of each of the Original Applicants (collectively the “Applicants”).
India asserted that it was immune to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court under section 9 of the Foreign State Immunity Act, 1985 (“Act”), which states: “Except as provided by or under this Act, a foreign State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of Australia in a proceeding.” An exception to this general rule of immunity is provided in section 10(1), which states: “A foreign State is not immune in a proceeding in which it has submitted to the jurisdiction in accordance with this section.” Section 10(2) further provides that a State may submit to jurisdiction “by agreement or otherwise”. The Applicants argued that by ratifying the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (“Convention”), India has submitted to the jurisdiction of Australian courts by agreement within the meaning of Section 10(1) and (2) of the Act in relation to proceedings for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
In deciding whether India has waived its immunity, the Primary judge invoked the judgement of the High Court of Australia (“High Court) in Kingdom of Spain v Infrastructure Services (“Spain v. Infrastructure Services”)[5], which dealt with a similar claim of jurisdictional immunity by Spain with respect to enforcement of an ICSID Convention award. Observing that that the “standard of conduct for submission by agreement under Section 10(2) requires either express words or an implication arising clearly and unmistakably by necessity from the express words used”, the Primary Judge held that ratification of the Convention by India amounts to a “clear and unmistakable necessary implication” that it has agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of Australian courts as per Section 10(2).[6] The Primary Judge opined that permitting India to take a sovereign immunity defence would be inconsistent with Article III of the Convention, which requires all Contracting States to “recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them”.[7]
The Primary Judge noted that India had made a commercial reservation to the Convention, per which it would “apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships [. . . ] which are considered as commercial under the Law of India.” (“Commercial Reservation”). However, he did not consider this to be relevant to the instant case as enforcement of the Quantum Award was sought in Australia, which had made no such reservation.[8]
The Primary Judge thus rejected India’s claim to jurisdictional immunity, while granting leave to appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court (“Full Court”).
The Full Court Judgement
India appealed the judgement of the Primary Judge to the Full Court, contending that he erred in rejecting India’s plea on jurisdictional immunity. The Full Court framed two issues for consideration: (1) by ratifying the Convention, did India waive foreign state immunity in respect of enforcement of an award that is generally within the scope of the Convention but excluded by its Commercial Reservation (“Issue 1”), and (2) is the Quantum Award outside the scope of India’s Commercial Reservation? (“Issue 2”).[9]
On Issue 1, India asserted that it had not submitted to the jurisdiction of Australian courts with respect to proceedings for recognition and enforcement of awards that fell outside the scope of its Commercial Reservation. The Applicants submitted that the Commercial Reservation is a unilateral reservation that does not oblige other contracting States to the Convention (“Contracting States”) to limit recognition and enforcement of such awards in the same manner.
In considering these submissions, the Full Court undertook a detailed analysis of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) that deal with the legal effects of reservations made by a State while expressing its consent to bound by a treaty. The Court observed that as the Commercial Reservation is a reservation “expressly authorised” by Article I (3) of the Convention, it falls within the terms of Article 20(1) of the VCLT and does not require any subsequent acceptance by other Contracting States. To determine the legal effects of the Commercial Reservation, the Court turned to Article 21 of the VCLT, read with the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties published by the International Law Commission. Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concluded that “the effect of a reservation is that between the reserving and accepting state (which in the case of the New York Convention is all other states), the reservation modifies the provision of the treaty to the extent of the reservation for each party reciprocally (. . .).”[10] Applying the said understanding, the Full Court opined that obligations under the Convention undertaken towards or by a Contracting State that has made a commercial reservation are limited by such reservation. Both India and Australia thus had no obligation towards each other to enforce awards that do no not pertain to “commercial” relationships under Indian law.[11]
The Full Court then considered whether India’s ratification of the Convention, qualified by its Commercial Reservation, entails a “clear and unmistakable necessary implication” that it has waived its immunity from Australian courts (as per the standard articulated in Spain v. Infrastructure Services). The Court found that no such implication arises as India’s ratification of the Convention subject to the Commercial Reservation is “a sufficiently (un)equivocal expression of India’s intention not to waive foreign State immunity in proceedings enforcing the Convention in respect of non-commercial disputes (. . . ).” [12]
Despite the parties not contesting Issue 2, the Full Court determined the issue for the sake of completeness of legal analysis. Interestingly, given the absence of evidence on what constitutes “commercial” relationships under Indian law, the Full Court approached the question of whether the Quantum Award fell within the scope of the Commercial Reservation from the perspective of Australian law (following case law from the High Court[13]). In doing so, the Court considered Section 11 of the Act, which provides for a “commercial transaction” exception to foreign State immunity. While acknowledging that considerations under Section 11 and those concerning India’s Commercial Reservation are different, the Full Court opined that there is a significant overlap between the two and proceeded to analyse the Quantum Award under Section 11. The Applicants had invoked the exception under Section 11 as a separate ground before the Primary Judge, which he rejected on the ground that the Annulment “was made by the body vested with the highest form of executive policy-making in India, and was stated to be for reasons of public policy” and was not thus not a “commercial transaction”. Reiterating the Primary Judge’s reasoning, the Full Court concluded that the Quantum Award is not an award dealing with differences arising from a “commercial” relationship.[14]
It is interesting to consider if the court’s approach would have been any different if it were answering this question from an Indian law perspective. The position under Indian law on whether awards rendered in investor-State arbitrations (“Investment Awards”) can be considered as pertaining to “commercial” relationships is ambiguous. Of particular relevance are two Delhi High Court judgements, in which the court opined that Investment Awards cannot be considered “commercial” for the purposes of enforcement under Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (which implements the Convention in India).[15] Critics of these judgements, on the other hand, have emphasised that there is enough basis in Indian law and policy to suggest that Investment Awards are commercial in nature. Perhaps the strongest argument in this regard is that India’s 2016 Model BIT expressly states that Investment Awards “shall be considered to arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction for purposes of Article I of the New York Convention.”[16]
Reflections on the Judgement
The Applicants have filed a special leave to appeal the Full Court judgement (“Judgement”) to the High Court. The reflections shared below are thus subject to a potential reconsideration of the Judgement by the High Court.
Firstly, prevailing uncertainty regarding enforceability of Investment Awards in India (as discussed above) is what has prompted investors such as Devas to seek enforcement of such awards in other jurisdictions. In this regard, the Judgement could render Australia an unfavourable enforcement jurisdiction for Investment awards to which India is a party. This is because India could invoke jurisdictional immunity in all future enforcement proceedings until the ambiguity concerning the commercial nature of Investment Awards under Indian law is resolved (either through legislative action or a Supreme Court ruling).
Secondly, this Judgement may have significant implications for enforcement in Australia of all Investment Awards not rendered under the ICSID Convention and thus subject to enforcement under the Convention (“Convention Awards”). Spain v. Infrastructure Services has settled the position that jurisdictional immunity is not available to a foreign State under Australian law with respect to enforcement of ICSID Convention awards. This Judgement, however, casts a shadow of doubt on the enforceability of Convention Awards in Australia by leaving the door open for other Contracting States that have made a commercial reservation to the Convention to invoke jurisdictional immunity in enforcement proceedings for such awards.
Given its likely implications, it is no surprise that the Judgement has come in for criticism by some commentators[17] who have highlighted the following issues: (1) the Full Court’s approach to commerciality of Investment Awards is inconsistent with that of courts in comparable jurisdictions such as the US and Canada, which have enforced Convention Awards despite these States having made a commercial reservation to the Convention, and (2) the characterisation of the Quantum Award as ‘non-commercial’ is contrary to the wide interpretation of term “commercial” envisaged in the UNCITRAL Model Law[18], which has the force of law in Australia.[19]
All stakeholders will now have to wait and watch how the High Court, if and when it takes up the appeal, deals with the Full Court’s findings.
[1] Republic of India v CCDM Holdings, LLC [2025] FCAFC 2 (“Judgement”).
[2] CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited, and Telcom Devas Mauritius Limited v. the Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2013-09, UNCITRAL (“CC/Devas Arbitration”), Award on Jurisdiction and Merits (25 July 2016).
[3] CC/Devas Arbitration, Award on Quantum (13 October 2020).
[4] Jeanne Huang, The Indian Satellite Saga and Retaliation: Recognizing the Supreme Court of India’s Judgment Abroad?, Coonflictoflaws.net, https://conflictoflaws.net/2024/the-indian-satellite-saga-and-retaliation-recognizing-the-supreme-court-of-indias-judgment-abroad/#_edn1.
[5] Kingdom of Spain v Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. [2023] HCA 11.
[6] CCDM Holdings, LLC v Republic of India (No 3) [2023] FCA 1266, ¶ 51 (“Primary Judgement”).
[7] Primary Judgement, ¶43.
[8] Primary Judgement, ¶58.
[9] Judgement, ¶54.
[10] Judgement, ¶67.
[11] Judgement, ¶68.
[12] Judgement, ¶72.
[13] Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd [2005] HCA 54.
[14] Judgement,¶82.
[15] Union of India v. Vodafone Group, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8842, ¶¶ 90-91; Union of India v. Khaitan Holdings (Mauritius) Limited & Ors, SCC OnLine Del 6755, ¶¶ 29-30.
[16]Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty (2016), Article 27.5, https://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/ModelBIT_Annex_0.pdf.
[17] Micheal Lee, Check for NYC Reservations: Federal Court of Australia Affirms India’s Sovereign Immunity Against Recognition and Enforcement of Non-ICSID Arbitral Award, Steptoe Clients Alerts (26 March 2025), https://www.steptoe.com/en/news-publications/check-for-nyc-reservations-federal-court-of-australia-affirms-indias-sovereign-immunity-against-recognition-and-enforcement-of-non-icsid-arbitral-award.html?tab=overview.
[18] UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), Article I(1), footnote 2 states as follows: “The term “commercial” should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. [. . . ].”
[19] International Arbitration Act 1974, Section 16(1).
The author of this report is Meltem Ece Oba (Koç University, Istanbul). The post is being published simultaneously on Conflictoflaws.net and on the EAPIL blog.
On 20-21 March 2025, a conference on “Characterisation in the Conflict of Laws” was convened at St Hilda’s College, Oxford. Under the auspices of the Institute of European and Comparative Law in the Law Faculty of the University of Oxford, the conference was jointly organised by Dr Johannes Ungerer (University of Oxford and Notre Dame University in England), Dr Caterina Benini (Catholic University of Sacred Heart, Milan) and PD Dr Felix Berner (University of Tübingen). The conference brought together scholars and practitioners from several jurisdictions around the world.
The conference’s topic, characterisation, is the process for identifying the nature or category of a particular cause of action (for instance contractual, tortious, proprietary, corporate, matrimonial), so that the correct connecting factor can be employed which then points to the applicable law or to the competent court. Characterisation poses difficulties where the action is domestically unknown or falls in-between two categories and could thus be potentially litigated in different fora or under different laws, leading to different outcomes. Different methods proposed for characterisation make this process even more complex. In this conference, participants explored characterisation from historical, methodological, critical, practical, and further perspectives with the aim to shed light on some of the most pressing and controversial issues of what arguably is the most crucial step for a court when determining its international jurisdiction and the applicable law.
Following the opening remarks by the three organisers, the first presentation addressed the history of characterisation. Professor Martin Gebauer (University of Tübingen) explored three main themes: striking parallels in time and content, strong contrasts, and finally the tensions in characterisation. Gebauer initially touched upon the ‘discovery’ of characterisation as ‘a child of the nineties of the 19th century’ in the works of Franz Kahn and Etienne Bartin. This was followed by the examination of the internationalist approaches. This led him to discuss autonomous characterisation and functional comparative law approaches as the ‘third direction’ through the work of Scipione Gemma and the changed views of Franz Kahn. Gebauer highlighted that the doctrinal views in this decade reflected the ideological battles over the foundations of private international law. He further discussed the developments in characterisation in the 20th century, such as the developments in comparative law and Rabel’s approach to characterisation. Finally, Gebauer considered characterisation in transnational and European law and its contribution to the homogenous understanding of conflict-of-laws rules within the EU. In the discussion following his presentation, the challenges of comparative law methodology and the need to consider a range of perspectives on characterisation (instead of a single one) were debated amongst other aspects.
The following presentations were dedicated to the process and particular problems of characterisation. The paper given by Professor Andrew Dickinson (University of Oxford) raised the question of “Is there any magic in characterisation?” with a focus on the courts of England and Wales. He provided seven steps of dealing with how the courts must engage with characterisation. Using a metaphor, he compared the attempts of describing the characterisation process to an attempt of describing the elephant in the Indian parable of ‘blind men and an elephant’. In this regard, Dickinson underlined that one can only provide an informative tool kit and cannot describe a full process of characterisation. He emphasised that all parts of a given rule and most importantly its purpose must be taken into account when characterising it. In this regard, he explained that ‘substance’ should be valued higher than ‘form’ and that ‘labels’ should not play a major role. Dickinson considered characterisation as being more of a practical issue from the common law perspective, and a process of interpreting a rule or a particular subset of settings; he thus concluded that there is no ‘magic’ in characterisation. Participants used the subsequent discussion for instance to contrast the Common law position with the Civilian approaches and to question the role of the judge and the parties when characterising a claim.
The next presentation was delivered jointly by Associate Professors Brooke Marshall and Roxanna Banu (both University of Oxford) on characterisation’s role in the jurisdictional inquiry in English courts. They began with an overview of the instances where the choice of law questions are raised at the jurisdictional stage in the context of granting permission for service out of the jurisdiction, exploring the relevant gateways in the Practice Direction 6B of the Civil Procedure Rules. Marshall critically examined the UK Supreme Court decision in UniCredit Bank v RusChemAlliance, demonstrating how the choice of law matters affect the international jurisdiction of English courts. Banu, from a more theoretical point of view, then discussed the a priori application of the lex fori to jurisdictional matters and the importance of theorising characterisation to understand the reasons why jurisdiction and substance are to be distinguished. The presentation was followed by a fruitful discussion which, among other issues, highlighted the problematic circular reasoning employed at the intersection of choice of law and jurisdictional characterisation.
The last paper of this session was presented by Professor Pietro Franzina (Catholic University of Sacred Heart, Milan) on ‘renvoi de characterisation’, that is, characterisation for the purposes of renvoi. At the beginning, he set the scene with regard to the meaning of renvoi and characterisation as well as the distinction between primary and secondary characterisation. Franzina explained that where the private international law of the forum contemplates the possibility of renvoi, the conflict of laws conceptions of a foreign applicable law should also be appreciated. In that regard, Franzina demonstrated through examples how the ‘second characterisation’ should reflect the taxonomy of the designated legal system (and, in some instances, the taxonomy of the different system specified under the conflict-of-laws rules of the latter system). He explained that characterisation for the purposes of renvoi is not given as much attention today as it used to receive, especially due to the greater weight that substantive policy considerations have progressively gained in private international law. The subsequent discussion addressed concerns over consistency in the interpretation of connecting factors in jurisdictional and applicable law matters.
The next session of the conference consisted of four presentations on challenges of characterisation in specific areas. The first speaker, Assistant Professor Joanna Langille (University of Western Ontario), focused on the distinction between substance and procedure. In this regard, Langille critically examined the use of the traditional common law distinction of rights and remedies for characterisation purposes. She took a Kantian rights-based approach to explain that the idea of right and remedy essentially merged or ‘shaded into’ one another. Langille argued for an alternative distinction between substance and procedure based on the nature of private rights. The adjudication process through which that determination is made should be subjected to the lex fori as the law of the community. In that sense, she viewed procedural law as being about publicity or the capacity of the courts to make law for the community as a whole and hence operating on a vertical plane. On the other hand, where the court is faced with a question that relates only to the horizontal relationship and, thereby, the reciprocal rights and duties between the two parties, foreign substantive private law should apply. Accordingly, the ‘provisions that are determinative of the rights of both parties’ were considered as substantive, whilst ‘the machinery of the forum court’ as procedural. She exemplified her views by reference to statutes of limitation. Among the issues raised during the subsequent discussion were the role of procedural law and of the lex fori in light of state sovereignty as well as the transcending boundaries of substance and procedure in instances like limitation statutes.
The next paper was delivered by Professor Yip Man (Singapore Management University) on the characterisation of equitable doctrines. While characterisation might have to start from a domestic law understanding, she embraced a functional approach in characterisation and argued for the pursuit of uniformity with an internationalist spirit and therefore against being constrained by domestic law notions. In that regard, she emphasised the importance of understanding the function of equity in arriving at the appropriate category. The conceptual diversity and complexity of equitable doctrines in Common law systems both in conflict of laws and domestic laws were discussed. Yip Man highlighted the objective of identifying the predominant characteristic of a legal institution, which she illustrated by reference to both remedial and institutional features. The relationship between the parties underlying the equitable obligations and remedies were also discussed as possibly being the predominant features to be taken into account. Finally, Yip Man analysed two recent decisions, Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Co v Eton Properties of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and Perry v Esculier of the Singapore Court of Appeal. The discussion addressed the challenge of characterising equitable doctrines in Civilian courts, possible advantages when differentiating between substance and procedure when characterising equitable concepts, and the ‘fusion’ approach.
Moving on to the insightful presentations by two academically distinguished practitioners, Dr Alex Critchley (Westwater Advocates, Edinburgh) spoke about the characterisation of contractual arrangements in the context of family law where some of the most challenging questions arise. Critchley focused on two main issues, namely the way family law agreements differ from other contracts (or as to whether they can be characterised as contracts at all) and the extent to which they relate to other fields of law such as company law. In this context, he explained the international framework for contracts in international family law by exploring the EU and HCCH rules. He then exemplified family law agreements and their different forms such as nuptial agreements, care arrangements for children or agreements addressing corporate or property relationships between family members. This led to a discussion among all participants about choice of law rules for nuptial agreements, the characterisation of maintenance agreements, the 2007 Hague Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, and case law referenced by Critchley, such as F v M 2021 SLT 1121.
Looking at a very different area of law, Dr Thomas Klink (Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart) addressed characterisation in international M&A disputes, where issues arise in judicial practice especially when the purchase agreement did not contain a relevant and valid choice of law clause. In his presentation Klink initially examined the characterisation of purchase agreements both in the form of a ‘share deal’ or – less common – an ‘asset deal’. He hinted at the tricky ramifications if the selling shareholder is a natural person and could be considered to be a consumer for the purposes of Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation. He then moved on to characterisation challenges encountered in the preparation of the transaction and in respect of non-disclosure agreements/letters of intent, access to information, exclusivity, and the issues arising from the termination of negotiations such as break-up fees. Klink also touched upon company law issues such as the transfer of shares. Post-M&A disputes such as fraud cases were also addressed. Looking ahead, he expressed his expectation that the number of M&A disputes in the newly established International Commercial Courts will increase, which was then also discussed further by the conference participants. Other issues in the discussion included the consumer status of investors, the parallels between choice of law and jurisdictional characterisation in M&A disputes, and the latest case-law developments on concurrent claims. This concluded a day full of fruitful debates.
The second day of the conference began with a session on what the organisers had termed rethinking characterisation, exploring novel and more critical approaches to characterisation.
The first speaker in this session was Professor Jeremy Heymann (University of Lyon III Jean Moulin). Heymann’s presentation was entitled ‘characterisation from a unilateralist perspective’. He outlined the approach of unilateralism in contrast to multilateralism. Heymann argued that, from a methodological point of view, it is necessary to first identify a ‘legal order of reference’ and then to determine if the legal issue at hand and the facts of the case fall under the scope of this ‘legal order of reference’. Whilst indicating that the ‘legal order of reference’ of the judge should be the lex fori in most instances, he also highlighted that the law to be taken into account should correspond to the expectation of the parties. Through this conception of unilateralism Heymann argued that the law applicable to characterisation should be ‘much more the lex causae than lex fori’. In the subsequent discussion, the designation of the ‘legal order of reference’ was debated in addition to the challenges of taking into account the expectations of the parties. Heymann further commented on how some EU Regulations might provide for unilateral rules on certain private international law matters, such as the GDPR and the Air Passenger Regulation.
The second presentation in this session was delivered jointly by Philomena Hindermann and Professor Ralf Michaels (both Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg) with the provocative title ‘Against Characterisation?’. Michaels began the paper with a critique of the current approach to characterisation with reference to the English decision in Macmillan v Bishopsgate Investment Trust. He explained how such a methodology in fact conceals the real essence of legal reasoning behind characterisation. He then touched upon the attempts of the American Conflicts Revolution to overcome characterisation through interest analysis. Whilst acknowledging that overcoming characterisation is not possible, he argued for taking account of the policies behind legal rules in the process of characterisation. In this regard, Michaels criticised a process of characterisation through preliminary categories and argued instead that characterisation should be an ‘end result’. Building on this finding, Hindermann continued with the question as to whether there could be such a thing as ‘post-categorical characterisation’. She also criticised characterisation as reflecting certain presumptions and as omitting the policies and various functions of legal rules. Considering characterisation as an epistemological process she then questioned the need for categories and advocated for embracing a non-exhaustive / post-categorical functional approach. Therefore, instead of reducing characterisation to a pre-determined taxonomy, she argued that categories should be built based on each case by way of looking at the functions of the legal institution at hand. Participants to the discussion engaged with the reasons why the American realist thinking approach might or might not be compelling and also deepened the discussion from an EU perspective. The idea of categories under national laws having an open-ended nature as opposed to close-ended categories was further discussed on the one hand, as well as the concerns of legal uncertainty on the other hand.
The last speaker of this session was Professor Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm (University of Edinburgh). Her presentation covered characterisation as a tool to manage diversity and hence she focused on an epistemic change of perspectives in characterisation. Her paper started off with an explanation of the creation of a new delict under Scottish substantive law in relation to domestic violence. Furthermore, Ruiz Abou-Nigm considered a possible interplay with the 1980 Child Abduction Convention where under Article 13(1)(b) domestic abuse might constitute a reason to refuse the return of a child. Recognition and enforcement of civil protection orders were also discussed through this lens. As a conclusion Ruiz Abou-Nigm called for an internationalist approach to characterisation that takes into account feminist perspectives as well as the interplay of cultures. Ruiz Abou-Nigm argued that instead of taking the lex fori as a starting point, one should embrace an epistemological and pluralistic approach. In her view, the ‘order of reference’ of the judge in characterising a matter should be much more complex and international than the categories under the lex fori. Participants asked her how this inter-cultural approach should affect the application of the new Scottish law in a cross-border setting and raised the problem that embracing an inter-cultural approach might not appear to be supportive of a feminist normative approach. Participants also suggested ways that might foster pluralistic thinking with a feminist approach and commented on how the Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence could be used for characterisation or interpretation.
The last session of the conference focused on the interplay of private and public international law. Professor Alex Mills (University College London) spoke about private international law treaty interpretation and characterisation. He started by examining the English common law approach to characterisation in order to draw comparisons between the methodology in the common law regarding the characterisation and the interpretation of international treaties. He explained that, since treaties are implemented through national laws in dualist systems, statutory interpretation is needed in their application whilst principles of international treaty interpretation are also taken into account. Mills argued that international treaty interpretation has commonalities with the common law approaches to characterisation, but that the judge should acknowledge where choice of law rules belong to an international body of law. He used the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention as an example and pointed to its explanatory report which indicates the ‘international spirit’, echoing the English common law approach. In the subsequent discussion, the internationalist interpretation was generally welcomed but its practical implications were questioned. The idea that international treaty interpretation was reflecting the common law approach was challenged by Civilian representatives, though Continental European approaches could also be understood as being too ‘rigid’ from the point of view of the English common law doctrine. Participants also pointed to the process in which the 2005 and 2019 Hague Conventions were drafted and how the consistency in the internationalist approach in both Conventions reflected a common understanding of the drafters.
The final paper of the conference was delivered by Professor Marta Pertegás Sender (Maastricht University and the University of Antwerp) discussed how characterisation questions were addressed at the Hague Conference for the purposes of drafting Conventions. Three main examples were given: first, Pertegás Sender explained that drafters increasingly employ provisions that regulate the scope of a Convention. As a second example of instances where the HCCH takes into account characterisation matters, she demonstrated how rather broad terms are preferred in the drafting of Conventions’ provisions that would establish a common ground for contracting states. Finally, she pointed out the fact that there does not exist a lex fori for the drafters of such international Conventions. Sender also highlighted that especially in the last two decades all of the Conventions emphasise the autonomous interpretation and the promotion of uniformity in their application. The preference for broad terms was challenged in the subsequent discussion as being too vague, especially in the absence of a special court system for the interpretation of HCCH Conventions. Interestingly, the consequences of ‘negative characterisation’ were discussed in relation to the aspects which are kept outside of the scope of the HCCH Conventions, in contrast to a true or ‘positive characterisation’ of what is within the scope of a particular Convention.
Concluding the conference proceedings, the three organisers expressed their gratitude to all speakers for their papers and to all attendees for their fruitful contributions to the discussion.
The news about the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China issuing the Notice on Procedural Matters Related to Civil Cases Involving Foreign State Immunity has been previously reported on this blog.
Following this significant development, Professor Susan Finder, a distinguished Scholar in Residence at Peking University School of Transnational Law, has kindly shared her insights on the matter. Her post was originally published on the Supreme People’s Court Monitor. Given its valuable contribution, we decided to repost it here.
Our sincerest thanks to Professor Susan Finder for her thoughtful analysis and generosity in sharing her thoughts.
At the end of March, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued procedures to implement China’s Foreign State Immunity Law (the Law) in the form of a “Notice on Procedural Matters in Civil Cases Involving Foreign State Immunity” (– Guanyu she waiguo guojia huomian minshi anjian xiangguan chengxu shixiang de tongzhi) (Notice). That law has been in force since the beginning of 2024. Consistent with its practice, the SPC published a press release along with the text of the notice. The press release, in the form of the head of the SPC’s #4 Civil Division’s answers to reporters’ questions, provides useful background. I surmise that the press release is an edited version of materials submitted to SPC leadership for approval (as described in my 2024 article). I had anticipated that the SPC would do so, after additional research and soliciting comments from both inside and outside the court system but had guessed that a notice would be issued in 2024. Although the notice does not so state, I surmise that foreign state immunity cases will be considered “important and difficult” and therefore subject to special internal procedures. See Professor William Dodge’s article for comparisons to US law and comments on the Law. Professor Huo Zhengxin provides another perspective. This post summarizes the major points of the notice, with my comments.
An attachment to the notice lists the authorized courts. The SPC has approved some of these courts to establish international commercial tribunals (courts). It is likely that those tribunals will hear sovereign immunity cases:
Registration is now open for the Summer School ‘Consumer and Market Law in the European Circular Economy’ which will be held from 9 to 18 July 2025: 9-11 July online and 14-18 July in presence at the University of Udine, Italy.
The Summer School is organised by the University of Udine, in cooperation with a consortium of European universities, including University of Essex, De Montfort University of Leicester, University of West Timisoara, East Anglia University, University of Rijeka, University of Belgrade and University of Szeged, within the framework of the Jean Monnet Module CoME CircLE.
The 2025 Summer School will consist of 40 hours of lectures, a workshop and a moot court. Attendees will be offered a comprehensive training on the legal discipline of consumer protection and market regulation in the EU Law, with a particular reference to circular economy, taking into account the following relevant topics: Consumer protection and empowerment issues; Private international law issues; Dispute resolution and redress issues; and Market regulation.
Eligible are undergraduate students, graduatestudents and PhD students, studing Law, Economics, Political Science or International Relations. Application deadline is 31 May 2025, 12.00 pm GMT. Those who are interested in applying, need to fill in the application form and submit it to ip.europeanlaw.uniud@gmail.com.
For details see the programme and the call for application.
HCCH Monthly Update: March 2025
Membership
On 5 March 2025, Rwanda deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Statute, becoming the 92nd Member of the HCCH. On the same day, Guatemala applied to become a Member of the HCCH. More information is available here.
Conventions & Instruments
On 1 March 2025, the 2005 Choice of Court Convention entered into force for North Macedonia. At present, 37 States and the European Union are bound by the Convention. More information is available here.
On 5 March 2025, Costa Rica signed the 2005 Choice of Court Convention. The Convention will enter into force for Costa Rica?only after it deposits an instrument of ratification pursuant to Art. 31(2) of the Convention. On the same day, Colombia signed and ratified the 2007 Child Support Convention, which will enter into force for Colombia on 1 July 2025. More information is available here.
On 11 March 2025, the Republic of Moldova acceded to the 1996 Child Protection Convention. With this accession, the Convention now has 57 Contracting Parties. It will enter into force for the Republic of Moldova on 1 January 2026. More information is available here.
On 13 March 2025, Bahrain acceded to the 1970 Evidence and 2005 Choice of Court Conventions. The 1970 Evidence Convention, which currently has 67 Contracting Parties, will enter into force for Bahrain on 12 May 2025. As for the 2005 Choice of Court Convention, it currently binds 37 States and the European Union and will enter into force for Bahrain on 1 July 2025. More information is available here.
On 23 March 2025, the 2007 Child Support Convention entered into force for the Dominican Republic. At present, 53 States and the European Union are bound by the 2007 Child Support Convention. More information is available here.
Meetings & Events
From 4 to 7 March 2025, the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP) of the HCCH met in The Hague, with over 490 participants joining both in person and online. CGAP mandated the establishment of several new Experts’ Groups (EGs) and Working Groups (WGs) and mandated the continuation of the work of several ongoing EGs and WGs. It also approved the establishment of a Regional Office for Africa, to be hosted by Morocco in Rabat. More information is available here.
From 11 to 13 March 2025, the Regional Workshop on Intercountry Adoption: Sharing Experiences on the Effective Implementation of the 1993 Adoption Convention in Asia was held in Manila (Philippines). More information is available here.
On 19 March 2025, the sixth meeting of the Working Group established to complete the Country Profile and work on the draft Cooperation Request Recommended Model Form for the 1996 Child Protection Convention was held online, hosted by the Permanent Bureau in The Hague. More information is available here.
From 24 to 26 March 2025, the Experts’ Group (EG) on Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) held its third working meeting. Pursuant to its mandate, the EG made further progress on the study of the applicable law and jurisdiction issues raised by the cross-border use and transfers of CBDCs. More information is available here.
Publications
On 4 March 2025, the Permanent Bureau announced the publication of the HCCH 2024 Annual Report. More information is available here.
Vacancies
Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships for the period from July to December 2025. The deadline for the submission of applications is 25 April 2025. More information is available here.
Applications are now open for a part-time, remote Communications and Outreach Internship, preferably starting in July 2025. The deadline for the submission of applications is 27 April 2025. More information is available here.
These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.
(This is written by Xiaoxuan Gu, a PhD student in School of Law, University of Macau)
The Foreign State Immunity Law of the People’s Republic of China (CFSIL) took effect on January 1, 2024.[i] To ensure its proper implementation and guide courts nationwide in lawfully and efficiently adjudicating civil cases involving foreign state immunity, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) formulated supporting procedural rules. On March 26, 2025, the SPC issued the Notice on Procedural Matters Related to Civil Cases Involving Foreign State Immunity (hereinafter the “Notice”), which provides definitive guidance to courts at all levels in handling such novel foreign-related cases.
The Notice stipulates provisions on key procedural matters, including case acceptance criteria, centralized jurisdiction mechanisms, service of process rules, jurisdictional immunity review procedures, and protocols for obtaining evidentiary certifications from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Article 3 of the FSIL explicitly stipulates that foreign states and their property enjoy jurisdictional immunity in Chinese courts unless otherwise provided by the Law.[ii] Therefore, Article 1 of the Notice stipulates that when a plaintiff initiates a civil lawsuit naming a foreign state as a defendant or third party, the plaintiff shall explicitly cite specific provisions of the CFSIL and precisely articulate applicable exceptions to immunity in the petition for judicial review. Petitions that fail to specify the legal basis and remain unclear after judicial clarification by the court shall not be accepted.
At the jurisdictional level, given that civil cases involving foreign state immunity constitute significant new-type foreign-related cases, it is necessary to implement a centralized jurisdiction mechanism to enhance the professional adjudication of such cases. Therefore, Article 2 of the Notice establishes a dual-track system combining centralized jurisdiction and specialized adjudication, which is that the first-instance civil cases involving foreign states as defendants or third parties shall fall under the jurisdiction of intermediate people’s courts with foreign-related civil and commercial jurisdiction at the seats of provincial-level governments (autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central government) while cases statutorily assigned to specialized courts (maritime, financial, or intellectual property courts) shall remain with such courts due to their domain-specific expertise, notwithstanding foreign state involvement. Where multiple intermediate courts exist in municipalities such as Beijing and Shanghai, the Annex to the Notice explicitly enumerates intermediate courts with centralized jurisdiction. Any other court that has accepted such cases shall issue rulings to transfer them to designated centralized jurisdiction courts in accordance with the Notice.
Articles 3 and 4 of the Notice establish special rules for the service of judicial documents in foreign state immunity cases. Courts shall not employ service by public notice when serving summons or other litigation documents to foreign states, but shall use methods prescribed by international treaties concluded or jointly acceded to by China and the relevant state, or other methods accepted by that state and not prohibited under Chinese law (with no prescribed order of application). Where such methods prove ineffective, courts may effectuate service through diplomatic channels via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs upon approval by the SPC through reporting. Documents requiring service shall include copies of translation in languages specified by applicable international treaties between China and the relevant state; in the absence of such treaties, translations shall be provided in the official language of the foreign state. When serving copies of petitions to foreign states, courts shall concurrently deliver notices of response and notices of evidence submission, informing the recipient to file a statement of defense within three months from the date of receipt. If a foreign country applies for an extension, it shall be examined by the court accepting the case.
Articles 5 and 6 of the Notice prescribe the procedures for courts to review whether foreign states are entitled to jurisdictional immunity. Where a foreign state raises a jurisdictional objection asserting immunity during the jurisdictional period, the court shall conduct a comprehensive review of the immunity claim in accordance with the CFSIL. Even if a foreign state fails to raise such objection or appear in proceedings during the defense period, the court shall conduct active review sua sponte under the aforesaid provisions. The Notice further clarifies that a foreign state’s participation in jurisdictional objection proceedings and presentation of arguments shall not constitute acceptance of jurisdiction. This provision aligns with the legislative intent of CFSIL Article 6(1), which stipulates that a foreign state’s response “solely to assert immunity” shall not be deemed jurisdictional acceptance, while establishing institutional safeguards for foreign states to actively participate in inquiries and evidentiary submissions during objection proceedings, thereby ensuring their procedural rights.[iii]
Article 7 of the Notice stipulates that where a people’s court requires the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue evidentiary certifications concerning factual matters related to acts of state in the course of adjudicating civil cases involving foreign state immunity, the court shall, pursuant to Article 19 of the CFSIL submit a request through hierarchical reporting system to the Supreme People’s Court for coordination with the Ministry to obtain such certifications.[iv]
Article 8 of the Notice, as the final provision, specifies that foreign states becoming defendants or third parties through procedural amendments such as party joinder or counterclaims shall be subject to this Notice, while specifically establishing a supplementary mechanism that requires courts at all levels to promptly report issues identified during implementation to the SPC.
[i] See the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign State Immunity at http://en.moj.gov.cn/2023-12/15/c_948359.htm (last visit on March 29, 2025) [hereinafter CFSIL].
[ii] CFSIL Art.3, “Unless otherwise provided by this Law, a foreign State and its property enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the People’s Republic of China.”
[iii] CFSIL Art.6(1),” A foreign State shall not be considered as having submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of the People’s Republic of China if: 1. it makes a defense for the sole purpose of claiming immunity…”
[iv] CFSIL Art.19, “The courts of the People’s Republic of China shall accept the certifying documents issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the following questions of fact concerning acts of State: 1. whether the State involved in a case constitutes a foreign sovereign State as defined in sub-paragraph 1of Article 2 of this Law; 2. whether and when the service of the diplomatic note specified in Article 17 of this Law is effected: and 3. other questions of fact concerning acts of State.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China may provide an opinion to the courts of the People’s Republic of China on issues concerning major national interests such as foreign affairs other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.”
The Annual Conference of the American Association of Private International Law (ASADIP) will take place on 7-9 August 2025 in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). More information will be available soon.
MootASADIP has its own moot! ASADIP’s moot is free of charge and will be held in Spanish and Portuguese. There is a written and an oral part. Only the 4 highest-scoring teams will participate in the oral rounds, which will take place on 6 August 2025. A few deadlines to bear in mind are:
The rules of the Moot are available here (including a declaration on the use of AI). The case “Mejía vs. Larrea” is contained in Annex 4.
New BoardA new ASADIP Board was appointed for the period 2024-2027 and is composed of the following officials:
Other officials who have been appointed are:
Deputy Vice-presidents, Secretary General (María Mercedes Albornoz (México)) and its Deputy, and vocals. The full names are available here. Many congratulations to all.
Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships at the headquarters of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) in The Hague, for the period from July to December 2025!
Interns work with our legal teams in the Family and Child Protection Law Division, the Transnational Litigation and Apostille Division, and the Commercial, Digital and Financial Law Division. Duties may include carrying out research on particular points of private international law and/or comparative law, taking part in the preparation of HCCH meetings and contributing to the promotion of the HCCH and its work.
Applications should be submitted by Friday, 25 April 2025 at 18.00 (CEST). For more information, please visit the Internships Section of the HCCH website.
This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH).
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to MD Sanwar HOSSAIN, LLB (Hons) Wolverhampton University, MSS (Dhaka University), PgDiP (Northumbria University), Barrister at law (Hon’ble Society of Lincoln’s Inn), Advocate (Appellate Division) Supreme Court of Bangladesh and Managing Partner, S Hossain & Associates law office, for bringing the Bangladesh courts’ decisions to my attention.
I. Introduction
The breakdown of an international marriage often leads to complex cross-border disputes, especially when children are involved. Tensions can intensify if one parent decides to take the children to their home country, often without the consent of the other parent.
In such cases, when the countries involved are signatories to the HCCH 1980 Child Abduction Convention, the Convention’s mechanisms are designed to facilitate the prompt return of children to their country of habitual residence. This framework aims to prevent unilateral relocations that could have lasting impacts on the child’s stability. However, when one or both countries are not parties to the Convention, resolving such cases becomes significantly more challenging. In such cases, national courts are compelled to address competing custody claims, assess allegations of wrongful removal, and determine whether they have jurisdiction to hear the case, all while balancing, often quite differently, the best interests of the children involved.
The case presented here is just one of many unreported cases where a romance relationship turns sour, leading to lengthy and contentious legal battles across jurisdictions. This note will focus on the Bangladeshi court’s treatment of the case, as it offers useful insights into the court’s approach to handling such complex cross-border disputes.
II. The Case
1. Underlying Facts
X, a Bangladeshi citizen who also appears to have also a US citizenship, and Y, a Japanese citizen, met each other in Japan where they got married in 2008 according to the forms prescribed under Japanese law. Their marriage resulted in the birth of three daughters. From 2020, tensions between X and Y began to intensify, mainly due to financial disagreements. By late December 2020, a family dispute arose, after which (on 18 January 2021) Y informed X of her intention to divorce and ask him to leave their home.
On 21 January 2021, while the two elder daughters were on their way home from school, X intercepted them and took them to live with him at a separate residence. On 18 February 2021, while Japanese courts were addressing a custody claim brought by Y, X left Japan with the two children, after obtaining new passports for them. Since then, the daughters have been living and studying in Bangladesh.
2. Legal Battle
a) In Japan
On 28 January 2021, Y initiated legal proceedings against X in the Tokyo Family Court, seeking custody of the children and an order to hand over the two daughters. On 31 May 2021, the Tokyo Family Court issued a decree in favor of Y (Hanrei Taimuzu, No. 1496 (2022) p. 247, Hanrei Jiho No. 2519 (2022) p.60). The court reached its conclusion after assuming international jurisdiction on the grounds that the children’s domicile was in Japan (Article 3-15, Article 3-8 of the Domestic Relations Case Procedure Act), and designating Japanese law as the applicable law to the case under the relevant choice of law rules (Article 32 of the Act on General Rules for Application of Laws). The court also refused to take into account an interim custody order issued by Bangladeshi courts, given its non-final and conclusive nature.
b) In Bangladesh
i) Custody dispute before the Family Court
On 28 February 2021, shortly after arrived in Bangladesh, X filed a lawsuit seeking sole custody before the competent family court in Bangladesh. On the same day, X obtained from that an interim order on custody and restrained the taking of the children out of Bangladesh (see previous paragraph).
ii) Habeas Corpus Petition
In July 2021, Y travelled to Bangladesh, leaving her youngest daughter with the custody of her family members. Encountering difficulties in accessing her daughters, Y filed a habeas corpus petition, seeking a determination on whether the children were being unlawfully held in custody. Y argued, inter alia, that Japanese courts have proper jurisdiction over the custody claim and that their decision should be given effect.
The High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (hereafter, ‘the High Court’) considered that, the children welfare and well-being should be paramount and must be assessed independently by Bangladeshi courts, regardless of any foreign judgment. After reviewing the overall circumstances of the case, and hearing the children, the High Court ruled that daughters remain in X’s custody, while granting Y visitation rights (Writ Petition No. 6592 of 2021 of 21 November 2021. A summary of the decision is provided by S Khair and M Ekramul Haque, “State Practice of Asian Countries in International Law – Bangladesh” (2021) 27 Asian Yearbook of International Law 146).
Dissatisfied with the order, Y appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (hereafter ‘The Appellate Division’). After examining relevant international and domestic laws and precedents, The Appellate Division reiterated that the children’s best interest should be given primary consideration. It concluded that the appropriate forum to resolve the custody dispute is the Family Court, where proceedings were already pending. The Appellate Division ultimately decided to overturn the High Court’s decision, placing the children in Y’s custody, while granting X visitation rights until the Family Court issued its final verdict (Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 233 of 2022 of 13 February 2022. A summary of the case is provided by S Khair and M Ekramul Haque, “State Practice of Asian Countries in International Law – Bangladesh” (2022) 28 Asian Yearbook of International Law 195).
iii) Continuation of the Proceedings before the Family Court
The proceedings resumed before the Family Court. On 29 January 2023, the first-instance court dismissed X’s claim on the ground that the Bangladeshi courts lacked jurisdiction since the custody issue had already been decided in Japan, country of the family’s last residence. The court also emphasized that children’s welfare would be better ensured with the mother (Dhaka in Family Suit No. 247 of 2021 dated 29 January 2023). The decision was confirmed in appeal on similar terms (Family Appeal No. 22 of 2023 dated 12 July 2023). Dissatisfied, X appealed to the High Court.
iv) Ruling of the High Court
Before the High Court, X challenged the lower courts’ conclusions. X’s key arguments included the following:
(i) The parties had been litigating in Bangladesh for a long time, thus justifying the jurisdiction of the Bangladeshi courts over the dispute
(ii) The lower courts actively engaged in discussing the merits of the case, including the welfare of the children, and parental suitability, therefore, dismissing the claim on jurisdictional ground was illogical,
(iii) The decision rendered in Japan was not binding on the Bangladeshi courts
(iv) The Japanese decree cannot be given effect as it did not grant X any visitation right
In her response, Y argued that the lower courts correctly dismissed the case. Y’s arguments include – among others – the following point:
(i) The cause of action in casu arose in Japan, where the children were born and raised. In addition, they had never visited Bangladesh before
(ii) All the parties resided in Japan before the dispute arose
(iii) Since Japanese court had already decided the custody issue, Bangladeshi courts lacked jurisdiction.
(iv) The lower courts thoroughly examined the case, placing emphasis on the children’s welfare and well-being. In addition, all questions of welfare and custody should be addressed at the child’s habitual residence
In its decision (Civil Revision No. 3298 of 2023 dated 13 February 2024), the High Court ruled that Bangladeshi courts have jurisdiction over the matter on the ground that:
(i) Although the children were born and primarily raised in Japan, the custody dispute partially arose in Bangladesh where X and the children were residing, at the time when the suit was filed, and continue to reside since then.
(ii) the jurisdiction of the Bangladeshi courts could not be ousted by the decision of Japanese court, given that – as an independent country – the courts are empowered to exercise jurisdiction under domestic law. Such an issue should have been seriously considered with due regard to Bangladesh’s sovereignty, rule of law and the legal aspects of the country.
Regarding the custody determination, the High Court emphasized the importance of carefully considering and balancing various aspects of the case, with a particular focus on the welfare and well-being of the children as the paramount principle. The Court considered that, as a matter of law in Bangladesh, custody should always be granted to the mother, as this is in line with the welfare of the children. The Court also stressed the importance of placing particular emphasis on the opinion of the children and giving precedence to their mental state and intention. Based on such considerations, the Court decided to divide the custody between the parents: custody of the child who wished to stay with the father was granted to X, while custody of the child who wished to return to Japan was granted to Y. The Court also urged the parties to ensure full visitation rights through amicable arrangement based on the principle of reciprocity.
III. Comments
The case, along with the manner in which it was handled by Japanese and Bangladeshi courts raise several important legal and practical questions. Among these, the following can be highlighted.
1. Relevance of the 1980 HCCH Convention
First, the case highlights the significance of the 1980 HCCH Convention in addressing cross-border unlawful relocation of children. Had Bangladesh been a contracting state, the resolution of the case would have been more straightforward, potentially avoiding the prolonged and conflicting litigation that ensued in both jurisdictions. In this respect, one particularly noteworthy aspect deserves to be mentioned. When submitting the writ petition before the High Court, Y argued that, despite the fact Bangladesh not being not a contracting state, the 1980 HCCH Convention could still be applicable. In support of her argument, Y relied on an earlier High Court decision, in which the 1980 HCCH Convention was recognized as being “part of international customary law” (RMMRU v Bangladesh and others (2020) 72 DLR 420). The High Court, however, did not address this issue.
2. Treatment of the Case in Japan and Bangladesh
Second, the contrasting approaches taken by the Japanese courts and the Bangladeshi courts in addressing the custody dispute are striking. In Japan, the courts followed a more classical, structured approach, beginning first by determining whether Japanese courts had international jurisdiction, then determining the applicable law before proceeding to assess the merits of the case. This methodical manner to approach the case was facilitated by the fact that Japan has comprehensively codified its private international law. The existence of a clear applicable legal framework with renders the resolution of such cases a matter of straightforward interpretation and application of the relevant legal provisions (for a brief overview, see my previous post here).
The situation in Bangladesh presents notable differences, as rules of private international law in the country remains fragmented and only partially codified (for an overview, see Mohammed Abdur Razzak, ‘Conflict of Laws – State Practice of Bangladesh’ in S. R. Garimella and S. Jolly (eds.), Private International Law – South Asian States’s Practice (Springer, 2017) 265). An appropriate approach would have been for the High Court to consider whether the Japanese decree could be recognized and enforced in Bangladesh in accordance with the relevant legal provisions (for an overview, see Sanwar Hossain, ‘Cross-Border Divorce Regime in Bangladesh’ in Garimella and Jolly op cit. 102, Abdur Razzak, op. cit., 281). The Court’s approach in the first and second decision appears to conflate the principle of “comity of nations” with the children’s welfare as a paramount consideration that need to be independently assessed by Bangladeshi courts, and the issue of recognition with that of jurisdiction
3. Absence of Islamic law influence
Finally, one of the remarkable aspects of the Bangladeshi court’s decisions is the absence of any discernable influence of Islamic law on the assessment of custody, despite the repeated references in the decisions to the religion of the parties. X, for instance, is described as a ‘religious’ person and ‘a pious Muslim’. The decisions also mention that X and Y’s marriage was celebrated according to Islamic tradition at a local mosque in Japan, following an earlier ceremony at a Shinto Shrine, and only after Y converted to Islam took a Muslim name.
In the High Court 2024 decision, Y is portrayed as an atheist who left Islam and who allegedly threatened X to raise the children in a ‘Japanese culture where drinking alcohol, live together (sic), eating pork are common’. Before Bangladeshi Court, X did raise several Islamic principles related to child custody (notably the fact that, under Islamic law, custody should transfer to the father once the children reach a certain age), and emphasizing on his disagreement with Y who, according to him, ‘refused to follow and respect the Islami life style (sic)’.
Given the significant role of the Islamic principles play in the Bangladeshi legal system, especially in family law matters (for a general overview, see Ahmad Nasir Mohad Yusoff and AHM Shafiqul Islam, ‘The Legal System of Bangladesh: The Duality of Secular and Islamic Laws’ (2024) International Journal of Academic Research in Business & Social Sciences 14(11) 1965), one might expect that the considerations mentioned above would influence the courts’ decisions. For example, as a matter of general principle, the custody of children should not granted to someone who left Islam, particularly, when that person lives in a non-Muslim country (see e.g. the decision of the UAE Federal Supreme court of 10 April 2004 cited in Béligh Elbalti, ‘The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Filiation Judgments in Arab Countries’ in N. Yassari et al. (eds.), Filiation and the Protection of Parentless Children (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2019) 397).
Nonetheless, it is remarkable that none of these considerations were raised or taken into account by the judges, who addressed the case in an entirely objective manner. Even more striking, the High Court not only affirmed Y’s suitability as a custodian, but also reiterated its longstanding principle that child custody should generally be granted to mothers. This principle was applied in the present case without any apparent consideration of Y’s and applied this principle to the case without giving any credits to the significance of Y’s religious background or the fact that she declares herself as a non-Muslim who left Islam.
Published on behalf of the IJI, Den Haag
In the heart of The Hague, a critical institution of international legal knowledge faces an existential threat. The International Juridical Institute (IJI) (translated in English to mean the Hague Institute for Private International Law), a venerable organization with a century-long history of providing essential legal guidance, stands on the brink of liquidation due to declining government support.
Founded in 1918 at the iconic Peace Palace, the IJI emerged as a unique global resource. Born in the aftermath of World War I, the institute was conceived as a “gift to the world” noble vision supported by leading businessmen, ministers, and statesmen. The IJI has been a beacon of legal expertise for over a hundred years, offering free and cost-effective advice in the complex realm of private international law. The institute’s current predicament is a stark testament to the fragility of specialized legal resources. Successive government cuts, culminating in eliminating the social advocacy subsidy scheme in 2019, have systematically undermined the IJI’s financial stability. What makes this situation particularly alarming is not just the potential loss of an institution but the broader implications for access to justice.
The IJI is not merely an archive of legal knowledge; it is a critical resource for individuals navigating complex international legal challenges. Many of these cases involve vulnerable populations, including children, who rely on expert guidance to traverse intricate cross-border legal landscapes.
Ironically, the government’s cost-cutting measures may ultimately prove counterproductive. The reduction in funded legal aid is likely to generate more protracted and expensive legal proceedings, potentially negating any initial savings.
The IJI is making a final, humble appeal: a modest annual subsidy of €260,000 to continue its vital work. This relatively small investment could ensure another century of legal expertise and maintain critical access to justice for countless individuals.
How You Can HelpThe legal community and concerned citizens have a unique opportunity to make a difference:
The potential loss of the IJI represents more than the closure of an institution. It symbolizes a potential erosion of specialized legal knowledge, international cooperation, and accessible justice.
As members of the legal community, we have a responsibility to support institutions that serve the broader public good. The IJI’s century of service is a testament to the power of dedicated legal expertise in bridging complex international legal challenges.
Together, we can help ensure that this invaluable resource continues to serve global legal needs for generations to come.
Thank you very much for your support!
By Adeline Chong, Singapore Management University
In two decisions decided within a fortnight of each other, the Singapore Court of Appeal considered anti-suit injunctions pursued to restrain proceedings allegedly brought in breach of arbitration agreements. The first case, Asiana Airlines, Inc v Gate Gourmet Korea Co, Ltd (‘Asiana Airlines’)[1] dealt with whether A could rely on an arbitration agreement between A and B to restrain B’s proceedings against C, a third party. The second case, COSCO Shipping Specialized Carriers Co, Ltd v PT OKI Pulp & Paper Mills (‘COSCO Shipping’)[2] considered whether an arbitration agreement covered a tortious claim. To put it in another way, Asiana Airlines mainly concerned the ‘party scope’ of an arbitration agreement while COSCO Shipping concerned the ‘subject matter’ scope of an arbitration agreement.[3] Where the anti-suit application is to restrain foreign proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration or choice of court agreement, ordinarily it would be granted unless ‘strong cause’ is shown by the respondent.[4] This provides an easier path for the anti-suit claimant compared to the alternative requirement of establishing that the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive in nature.
In both judgments, the Court emphasised that forum fragmentation was sometimes inevitable and that the crux was to ascertain parties’ intentions as to the ambit of the arbitration agreement. While both decisions canvassed other private international law issues, the primary focus of this comment is the Court’s approach to construing the scope of dispute resolution clauses. Although both decisions involved arbitration agreements, the same reasoning applies to choice of court agreements.[5] Further, the principles apply equally whether the application concerns a stay of proceedings or an anti-suit injunction.[6]
Asiana Airlines (a Korean company) entered into a joint venture agreement with Gate Gourmet Switzerland GmbH (GGS). This joint venture resulted in the establishment of Gate Gourmet Korea (GGK). Asiana entered into a catering agreement with GGK. Both the joint venture and catering agreements contained arbitration agreements. It transpired that the chairman of Asiana had arranged for the two agreements to benefit his own personal interests, in breach of his obligations to Asiana. The chairman was later convicted in Korean proceedings.
Asiana commenced proceedings in Korea against GGK for a declaration that the catering agreement was null and void under Korean law due to its chairman’s breach of trust, and consequently, the arbitration agreement was similarly null and void. It also advanced an argument that the dispute was non-arbitrable due to Korean public policy; all relevant stakeholders were members of the Korean public and the outcome of the proceedings would have an impact in Korea. Subsequently, Asiana also pursued actions against GGS and the directors of the Gate Gourmet Group. It alleged that the directors were actively involved in the chairman’s unlawful conduct and therefore liable in tort under Korean law, and GGS was vicariously liable for their actions. The same points on nullity and public policy were raised.
Gate Gourmet applied for anti-suit injunctions in Singapore to restrain the Korean proceedings. Central to the anti-suit applications was the arbitration agreements in the joint venture and catering agreements. The Court of Appeal, hearing the appeal from a decision of the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), held that it was an abuse of process for Asiana to argue that the arbitration agreements were null and void given that it had not pursued previous opportunities to raise this point. Not surprisingly, Asiana’s public policy argument received short shrift; it was too broadly framed as it was inevitable that proceedings involving big companies would have an impact on their home countries. Thus, the Court held that the Korean proceedings against GGK was in breach of the arbitration agreement in the catering agreement and the anti-suit injunction restraining the Korean proceedings against GGK was upheld.
More interesting was the anti-suit injunction restraining the Korean proceedings against the directors. Asiana argued that the directors were non-parties to the joint venture agreement and the arbitration agreement contained therein and as GGS were sued on the basis of vicarious liability, the proceedings were not related to the agreement. The Court applied Korean law, the proper law of the agreement, to construe the arbitration agreement. It observed that under Korean law, arbitration agreements could cover non-contractual claims and that the tortious claims pursued were closely connected with the joint venture agreement. The anti-suit injunction restraining the Korean proceedings against GGS was affirmed. The question which then arose was whether the anti-suit injunction restraining the proceedings against the directors could be maintained on the same basis of breach of the arbitration agreement or could only be maintained if the Korean proceedings against the directors were shown to be vexatious or oppressive in nature. As the Court observed, an anti-suit injunction based on the first ground meant that ‘GGS as the anti-suit claimant would have to show that if Asiana pursued the claim against the [directors], it would breach GGS’s rights under the JVA Arbitration Agreement.’[7]
This question involved the situation where A and B are parties to the dispute resolution clause and B commences proceedings against C in a different forum from that named in the clause. Can A pursue an anti-suit injunction restraining B’s action against C on the ground that that action is in breach of the clause?[8] Another variant of this situation is where C applies for an anti-suit injunction restraining B’s action against C as being in breach of the jurisdiction clause. In a prior decision VKC v VJZ,[9] the Court of Appeal held that section 2(1)(b) of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 2001 did not cover exclusive jurisdiction clauses.[10] In contrast, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Global Partners Fund v Babcock & Brown[11] took the view that C could rely on the benefit of the jurisdiction clause under the common law provided C was a ‘non-party’ who was intimately involved in the transaction between A and B.[12]
The UK House of Lords in Donohue v Armco Inc[13] held that where an exclusive English choice of court agreement bound some, but not all, of the parties in the foreign proceedings, the avoidance of forum fragmentation amounted to strong reasons not to uphold the choice of court agreement. The requested anti-suit injunction in Donohue, however, involved those who were parties to it: A sought an anti-suit injunction restraining B’s action against A. Nevertheless, Lord Scott of Foscote had commented in obiter that A could in certain circumstances obtain an anti-suit injunction restraining not only proceedings against itself but also proceedings against C if there was a possibility that A and C would be jointly and severally liable. This is provided the wording of the clause was sufficiently wide to cover the proceedings against C and A had a sufficient interest in obtaining the anti-suit injunction, namely, to avoid incurring liability as a joint tortfeasor. The Singapore Court of Appeal rejected Lord Scott’s comments, as it thought that it would be overinclusive and prohibit legitimate claims against third parties.[14] Instead it cited with approval the decision in Team Y&R Holdings Hong Kong v Ghoussoub; Cavendish Square Holding BV v Ghossoub[15] to the effect that the Fiona Trust[16] principle that the intentions of rational businessmen would be to have a ‘one-stop shop’ for litigation cannot apply with the same force when considering claims involving third parties. Clear language is required before an exclusive jurisdiction clause covers claims brought by or against third parties.[17] The risk of forum fragmentation, which underscored Lord Scott’s suggestion in Donohue, should not be ‘overstated’.[18]
This more narrow construction of the party scope of dispute resolution clauses raises the risk of B manipulating the situation and evading the dispute resolution clause by pursuing claims against C. However, as the Court pointed out, it would be open for A to apply for an anti-suit injunction on the basis that B’s proceedings against C rendered the proceedings between A and B vexatious or oppressive. Additionally, C could also independently seek an anti-suit injunction restraining the proceedings against it on the vexation or oppression ground.[19]
On the facts, the Court held that while the directors had signed the joint venture agreement, they had done so in their capacity as representatives of GGS. There was nothing in the wording of the arbitration agreement to indicate that Asiana and GGS intended the clause to apply to claims against the directors. The anti-suit injunction restraining the action against the directors could not succeed on the basis of breach of the arbitration agreement; it could only succeed on the vexation or oppression ground. However, Gate Gourmet failed to show any bad faith on Asiana’s part in suing the directors. Therefore, the anti-suit injunction was upheld in relation to the action against GGS as being in breach of the arbitration agreement while the anti-suit injunction restraining the action against the directors was discharged.
PT OKI (an Indonesian company) had sub-chartered a vessel which belonged to COSCO Shipping (a Chinese company). The head charter and sub-charter contracts each contained a law and arbitration clause for English law and arbitration in Singapore. Further to that, contracts of carriage were entered into between the two companies. These contracts, which were evidenced by or contained in bills of lading, incorporated the law and arbitration clause in the charter contracts. While loading PT OKI’s cargo at the port of Palembang, Indonesia, COSCO Shipping’s vessel allided with the trestle bridge of the jetty, causing damage which allegedly amounted to US$269m. The bridge and port were owned and operated by PT OKI. Various proceedings were pursued by both parties, the most relevant of which were: PT OKI commenced proceedings against COSCO in Indonesia in tort for the damage to the trestle bridge; COSCO applied for an anti-suit injunction in Singapore to restrain PT OKI from continuing with the Indonesian action; and COSCO commenced arbitration against PT OKI before the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) in Singapore seeking declarations of non-liability and various reliefs arising out of the allision. COSCO alleged that PT OKI had breached the safe port warranty under the head charter agreement as incorporated into the bills of lading and raised contractual defences also found in the head charter agreement and incorporated into the bills of lading.
The anti-suit application was based on PT OKI’s alleged breach of the arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeal considered the meaning of the phrase ‘arising out of or in connection with this contract’, used in the arbitration agreement and which is standard language in dispute resolution clauses. At first instance, the judge had referred to various tests-such as the ‘parallel claims test’,[20] ‘causative connection test’ and the ‘closely knitted test’[21] to ascertain if the tort claim fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeal emphasised that the various tests were ‘simply labels and tools developed to assist the courts’[22] and pushed back against any presumption that parties must always have intended for all their claims to be decided in the same forum. The crux was the parties’ intentions as encapsulated by the wording of the agreement; thus ‘[i]f upon examining the text of the agreement and the nature of the competing claims, a claim is not within its ambit, then forum fragmentation is inevitable and the courts should not steer away from that outcome …’[23]
The Court adopted a two-stage test when ascertaining the scope of an agreement: first, the court should identify the matter or dispute which parties have raised or foreseeably will raise in the foreign proceedings; and secondly, the court must then ascertain whether such matter or dispute falls within the scope and ambit of the agreement. At the first stage, the court is trying to identify the substance of the dispute between the parties. It should not consider only the claimant’s pleaded cause of action but should also take into account defences or reasonably foreseeable defences and cross-claims that may arise. The Court held that it was not necessary for the claims or defences to be connected to the contractual relationship. This is significant because the tort action in Indonesia was not based on the contract between the parties.[24] It concluded that the tort action fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The parties must have contemplated that a pure tort claim for damage to the trestle bridge caused during the performance of the contracts of carriage between the parties and where it was foreseeable that defences based on the contract would be raised would fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Thus, the anti-suit injunction could properly be founded on breach of the arbitration agreement. There was no consideration if ‘strong cause’ was shown by PT OKI to justify the breach of the arbitration agreement; it did not appear that arguments had been made on this point.
The decisions in Asiana Airlines and COSCO Shipping should not be read as the Singapore courts resiling from the Fiona Trust principle, which has been cited and applied in a number of other decisions.[25] The core idea that one should adopt a common-sense approach when construing dispute resolution clauses, bearing in mind that the parties are rational businessmen, still underlines the two judgments. The clarification added by the Court of Appeal was the starting point must always be the wording of the dispute resolution clause and the context in which it was entered into.[26] This is in contrast with the prior approach where sometimes the court tended to start with the presumption that parties intended for ‘one-stop shopping’ and to apply the presumption in the absence of any contrary evidence.[27] There is now an important shift in focus. The court should not go to great lengths to achieve a construction which supports ‘one-stop shopping’ where this is not borne out by the wording of the clause and the circumstances of the case. If this means that there would be parallel litigation across a few jurisdictions, the courts should not shy away from that conclusion.[28] In particular, where third parties are concerned, clear language must be used to bring third parties within the scope of a dispute resolution clause. Ultimately, Asiana Airlines and COSCO Shipping underscore the importance of clear and precise drafting of dispute resolution clauses.
[1] [2024] SGCA(I) 8; [2024] 2 SLR 279.
[2] [2024] SGCA 50; [2024] 2 SLR 516.
[3] The phrases ‘party scope’ and ‘subject-matter scope’ was coined by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Global Partners Fund Limited v Babcock & Brown Limited (in liq) [2010] NSWCA 196.
[4] Sun Travels v Hilton [2019] 1 SLR 732 (Singapore CA) [68], [78], [81]-[87].
[5] Asiana [80]-[83].
[6] COSCO [73].
[7] Asiana [58].
[8] See Thomas Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction (2nd edn, OUP 2019) para 7.31.
[9] [2021] 2 SLR 753.
[10] This provision allows C to enforce a term of the contract if the term purports to confer a benefit on C.
[11] [2010] NSWCA 196 (noted A Chong, ‘The “Party Scope” of Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses’ [2011] LMCLQ 470).
[12] Cf Australian Health & Nutrition Association Ltd v Hive Marketing Group Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 61 [90] (President Bell) (in the context of a stay application).
[13] [2002] 1 All ER 749 (HL).
[14] Asiana [85]-[88].
[15] [2017] All ER(D) 81 (Nov) [82].
[16] Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 254 (UKHL).
[17] Asiana [72]-[73].
[18] Asiana [88].
[19] Asiana [84].
[20] Eastern Pacific Chartering Inc v Pola Maritime Ltd [2021] 1 WLR 5475 (“The Pola Devora”) [37].
[21] Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA (The Angelic Grace) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 (English CA) 89. The Court disagreed with the judge that the ‘closely knitted test’ applies only where the non-contractual claim may be recast as a contractual claim: COSCO [78]-[79].
[22] COSCO [3]
[23] COSCO [5].
[24] The court below had been troubled by the fact that the tort claim could not be recast as a contractual claim. It did not grant the anti-suit injunction: [2024] SGHC 92.
[25] Eg, Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 1271 (Singapore CA), Allianz Capital Partners GmbH, Singapore Branch v Goh Andress [2023] 1 SLR 1618 (Singapore HC(A)).
[26] See also Rals International Pte Ltd v Cassa di Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza SpA [2016] 5 SLR 455 [34].
[27] Eg, Vinmar Overseas [79].
[28] See to similar effect, Australian Health [90].
[29] Eg, Vinmar Overseas (Singapore) Pte Ltd v PTT International Trading Pte Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 1271 (Singapore CA), Allianz Capital Partners GmbH, Singapore Branch v Goh Andress [2023] 1 SLR 1618 (Singapore HC(A)).
[30] Eg, Vinmar Overseas [79].
[31] See to similar effect, Australian Health [90].
On Tuesday, April 1, 2025, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST). Professor Carlos Esplugues (University of Valencia) will speak, in English, about the topic
“Take Domestic Law and Run? The Application of Foreign (Private? State?) Law in Times of Uncertainty”
The possible application of foreign law is one of the features of contemporary private international law, a discipline that is particularly sensitive to the social, political and economic environment in which it operates. However, the redefinition of the role of the State in modern societies, technological changes or the growing wave of intolerance and fear towards what comes from abroad in many parts of the world are creating a new environment that affects this question in a pluralistic way. Beyond the classical issue of the nature of the applicable law and its relationship to the process, questions are being raised about the viability of this possible applicability and the conditions under which it can be established.
The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.
If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.
As already mentioned in my previous post, at the end of each year I publish an article (in German) about the Conflict of Laws developments in Germany of the last twelve months, covering more or less the year 2024 and the last months of 2023. This post is the second with an overview over those topics that seem to be most trending.
The two parts focus on the following topics (part 1 contained 1. and 2.):
I will now give attention to the last three topics that focus on the three areas that are not harmonized by EU law (yet) and are mainly questions of family law.
This is not a resumen of the original article as it contains a very detailed analysis of sometimes very specific questions of German PIL. I do not want to bore the readers of this blog with those specificities. Those interested in knowing those details can find the article here (no free access).
I would be really curious to hear whether these or similar cases are also moving courts in other jurisdictions and how courts deal with them. So, please write me via mail or in the comments to the post if you have similar or very different experiences on those cases.
Part 2 – Online Marriages, Gender Afiliation and Name LawOne highly discussed topic of the last few years was the treatment of Online Marriages. Online Marriage refers to a marriage ceremony where the declarations of intent to marry are declared virtually by digital means. In the relevant cases, at least one of the (future) spouses was located in Germany when this intent was declared via Zoom, Whatsapp or similar means, while the rest of the ceremony, esp. the registration or the other acts of a registrar, was located in another State, esp. in Utah or Afghanistan. The case which the BGH (Supreme Court) decided in September 2024 was about two Nigerians that were in Germany while their declaration was registered in Utah, USA.
In German law, the validity of such a marriage is determined in two steps: The substantial law of marriage follows the law of the nationality of each spouse (Article 13 EGBGB). The formal validity, in general, follows the classical alternative connecting factors of either the law of the main question (lex causae) or the law of the place of the relevant (lex locus), Article 11 EGBGB. Nevertheless, regarding marriages, a special rule applies regarding the formal validity: Article 13 para. 4 EGBGB provides that a marriage concluded in Germany necessarily follows German law regarding the form.
As the requirements of each nationality’s laws where fulfilled, main question of the case was: Where does the celebration of a marriage actually take place if it is celebrated online?
Before this question came up, the prevailing opinion and case law referred to the law of the place where the state authority or the religious authority were located (Coester-Waltjen/Coester Liber Amicorum Verschraegen (2023), 1 (6); vgl. auch Gössl NJW 2022, 3751; BGH 19. 12. 1958 – IV ZR 87/58 ), which in my opinion makes sense as these authorities make the crucial difference between a mere contract and a marriage conclusion from the point of view of German law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court (BGH 25.9.2024 – XII ZB 244/22) and other courts (VG Karlsruhe 28.9.2023 – 1 K 3074/23; VG Düsseldorf 5.7.2024 – 7 K 2728/22) decided that the place of the marriage is located at the place where the spouses declare their intents to marry – with the consequence that Art. 13 para. 4 EGBGB applied in all cases where at least one spouse was located in Germany at the moment of the declaration.
I am personally not convinced of the case. The Supreme Court distinguishes the decision from so-called proxy marriages where the declaration is made by the proxy and, therefore, not where the spouses are located but where the proxy is communicating. Nevertheless, this comparison is not convincing: German courts characterize the declaration of a proxy as a (merely) formal requirement in cases where the “proxy” has no power to decide but merely communicates the will of the spouse. Thus, in my opinion, the “proxy” is more a messenger than a real proxy and then the location of the declaration again is where the spouses (not the proxies) are in the moment they send the messenger. Furthermore, I am skeptical because the cases decided yet happened in migration contexts and might have been regarded differently with different parties.
What are your thought? Do you have similar questions in your jurisdictions?
Since November 2024 the German EGBGB has an explicit conflict of laws rule on gender affiliation / gender identity. It was introduced by the Gender Self-Determination Act. According to Art. 7a para. 1 EGBGB (here you find the provision in German), a person’s nationality’s law must be applied. That was more or less the unwritten rule, courts followed in Germany. The second paragraph introduces a very limited form of party autonomy: According to Art. 7a para. 2 EGBGB , a (foreign) person with habitual residence in Germany can choose German law for the change of gender or a related change of name.
While this rule opens non-nationals to change their legal gender in Germany, it does not comply with the case law of the CJEU. In the decision Mirin (ECLI:EU:C:2024:845 – Mirin) the CJEU extended her case law regarding the recognition of names to gender changes that took place in another Member State. It establishes the obligation to recognise the change of gender validly made in another Member State.
If a person changes the gender in another Member State without being a national of that State but (e.g.) living there, in Germany that gender reallocation cannot be accepted by Art. 7a EGBGB. An extension of Art. 7a para. EGBGB, i.e. a choice of law in favour of every habitual residence (not limited to a German one), might help, even though it probably will not include all situations possible where the obligation to recognize a gender afiliation can exist. This development again shows that the classical “recognition via conflict of laws” method is not able to implement the case law of the CJEU.
What are your thoughts to those developments (Mirin and the new rule)?
Finally, there was a general reform of German name law and – in a last minute move my the legislator – in International Name Law as well. The new rules will enter info force in May 2025.
At the moment, the law of the person follows her nationality (Article 10 para. 1 EGBGB – version until the end of April 2025). Furthermore, there is a very limited possibility of a choice of law for spouses regarding a common name (each spouses nationalities and German law if one has the habitual residence in Germany) and for children and their family names (nationality of each parent or other person with parental responsibility or German law, if one parent has the habitual residence in Germany).
The new Article 10 para. 1 EGBGB changes the connecting factor: instead of nationality, habitual residence of the person determines her name, renvoi excluded. According to Art. 10 para. 4 EGBGB, instead, the person can choose the law of the nationality. The futher choice of law for spouses and children family names remains, but allows spouses to choose the law of the habitual residence of one of them, no matter whether it is the German one or not. A child’s name now can be chosen by the parents’ and the child’s nationality (new). In all those cases, persons with double nationality can choose both nationalities.
Finally, Article 48 EGBGB contains a provision that implements the CJEU case law regarding the recognition of names. Until now, it provides that a person can choose to change the name into the name acquired during a habitual residence in another Member State of the European Union and entered in a civil status register there, unless this is manifestly incompatible with fundamental principles of German law.
The new provision is almost identical, but some subtle but important changes were made: First, a person does not have to have their habitual residence in the Member State in which they acquired the name. Nationality is sufficient. This implements “Freitag“. Second, it no longer depends on whether the name was ‘lawfully’ acquired in another Member State, but only on the (possibly incorrect) entry of the name in a foreign register. This last requirement (in my opinion, see Gössl, IPRax 2018, 376) goes further that the CJEU requires, as the name has to be “validly acquired” in another Member State to create the obligation to “recognize” or accept that name. Nevertheless, the CJEU most probably will not object to a Member State that is more recognition/acceptance-friendly than necessary.
I hope you found this overview interesting. Next year, I am planing to provide similar articles, so any feedback is very welcome.
The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on Thursday 27 March 2025 at 14:30 (Mexico City time – CST), 21:30 (CET time). The topic of the webinar is ‘Circular Economy and Private International Law’ and will be presented by Prof. Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm (in Spanish).
The details of the webinar are:
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84118243541?pwd=GoZxHgM7OlZNOCaL1GUpaqsvVTYIK6.1
Meeting ID: 841 1824 3541
Password: AMEDIP
Participation is free of charge.
This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX
Post authored by Lance Huckabee, JD candidate and Global Legal Scholar at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
When a foreign sovereign breaches a commercial contract with a private entity, what recourse does the wronged party have? In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) governs such disputes, providing an exception for commercial activity that causes a “direct effect” in the U.S. Yet, the definition of “direct effect” has remained elusive, leading to decades of judicial inconsistency and a deepening circuit split.
At the heart of this legal uncertainty is the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover (1992), which sought to clarify the issue but instead left room for widely divergent interpretations. Some circuits have adopted a flexible, causation-based approach, analyzing whether a foreign state’s breach had an immediate consequence in the U.S. Others, like the recent D.C. Circuit decision in Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, have imposed rigid bright-line rules—specifically requiring that the contract contemplate the U.S. as a place of performance. This formalistic approach creates a dangerous loophole, allowing foreign states to structure agreements in a way that insulates them from jurisdiction. As a result, a U.S. business may suffer substantial financial harm from a foreign sovereign’s breach but find itself without legal recourse simply because the contract was silent on where payments were to be made.
This restrictive interpretation undermines the FSIA’s core purpose: to hold foreign sovereigns accountable when their commercial activities impact U.S. businesses. By prioritizing contractual language over economic reality, decisions like Wye Oak erode the ability of American companies to seek redress, making sovereign breaches effectively consequence-free. A proper interpretation of the FSIA should align with Weltover’s focus on causation, ensuring that foreign states cannot exploit technicalities to evade liability. If left uncorrected, the current trend risks turning the FSIA into little more than a paper shield—one that protects sovereigns rather than those they harm.
The Wye Oak decision exacerbates both intra- and inter-circuit inconsistencies, further complicating the FSIA’s application and weakening the commercial activity exception in breach-of-contract cases. By imposing a rigid bright-line rule, it unduly narrows the scope of what qualifies as a “direct effect,” creating uncertainty for U.S. businesses engaged in international commerce. With Wye Oak’s attorneys petitioning for certiorari in January 2025, the case presents a critical opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve the longstanding circuit split on the FSIA’s direct effects clause.
The Irwin Law “Essentials Series” is a collection of texts about Canadian law aimed at a broad audience: it includes law students and also lawyers, judges and academics. It has been quite successful over the past twenty years. In 2024 Irwin Law was acquired by University of Toronto Press. It has continued the Essentials Series and the use of the Irwin Law imprint.
It has now published the third edition of Conflict of Laws written by Professor Stephen G.A. Pitel of Western University, Canada. The second edition was published in 2016 and so this edition updates almost a decade of activity, mainly from courts across Canada. The major change is that the chapter on declining jurisdiction has been reorganized and updated in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Douez v Facebook, Inc (2017) and Haaretz.com v Goldhar (2018). All chapters have been updated to reflect new decisions, legislative changes and recent scholarship.
More information is available here. For those outside Canada, the book is a clear and accessible source of comparative conflict of laws analysis.
The 21st century has witnessed a remarkable surge in academic scholarship on private international law in Asia. This is not to say that significant studies on the subject were absent before this period. However, in recent decades, Asian scholars have brought renewed vigour and depth to the field, establishing private international law as a critical area of legal inquiry on the continent.
A testament to this intellectual flourishing is Hart Publishing’s extensive series on private international law in Asia, featuring no fewer than 16 volumes with Professors Anselmo Reyes and Paul Beaumont as Series Editors. These works serve as a rich repository of comparative legal thought, offering valuable insights that extend far beyond Asia’s borders. Scholars and practitioners seeking inspiration from diverse jurisdictions will find these books to be an essential resource. Moreover, other publishers have also contributed to this growing body of literature, further amplifying Asia’s voice in the global discourse on private international law.
Having read and reviewed many of these works on the blog, I am continually struck by the depth of scholarship they offer. Each new book reveals fresh perspectives, reinforcing the notion that private international law is not merely a regional concern but a truly global conversation.
As someone deeply engaged with African private international law, I have found immense value in these Asian publications. The parallels between Asia and Africa—particularly in terms of legal pluralism and cultural diversity—make these studies both relevant and instructive. The cross-pollination of ideas between these regions has the potential to strengthen the development of private international law in both continents.
What is most striking about this surge in Asian scholarship is its outward-looking nature. No longer confined to internal discussions, private international law in Asia is now exporting ideas, influencing legal developments worldwide. This is a phenomenon that deserves both recognition and emulation. The rise of Asian scholarship in private international law is not just an academic trend—it is a pivotal force shaping the future of global legal thought.
This article was written by Prof. William S. Dodge (George Washington University Law School) and first published on Transnational Litigation Blog. The original version can be found at Transnational Litigation Blog. Reposted with permission.
On March 7, 2025, Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr. (Eastern District of Missouri) entered a default judgment for more than $24 billion against the People’s Republic of China and eight other Chinese defendants for hoarding personal protective equipment (PPE) during the early days of the COVID pandemic in violation of federal and state antitrust laws. The Eighth Circuit had previously held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) barred most of Missouri’s claims but that the hoarding claim fell within the act’s commercial activity exception.
Missouri now has the judgment against China that it wanted. But Missouri may find that judgment hard to enforce. As discussed below, there appear to be significant procedural problems with the judgment that at least some defendants might raise. More broadly, the properties of foreign states and their agencies or instrumentalities are entitled to immunity from execution under the FSIA. Immunity from execution is broader than immunity from suit, and it is not clear that any of the defendants have property in the United States that can be used to satisfy the judgment.
The Defendants and the ClaimsOn April 21, 2020, Missouri brought four COVID-related claims against nine Chinese defendants: the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, the National Health Commission, the Ministry of Emergency Management, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the People’s Government of Hubei Province, the People’s Government of Wuhan City, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The original complaint asserted four claims under Missouri tort law: (1) public nuisance, (2) abnormally dangerous activity, (3) breach of duty by allowing the transmission of COVID, and (4) breach of duty by hoarding PPE. The district court initially held that all the claims were barred by the FSIA, but the Eighth Circuit reversed on the hoarding claim.
The FSIA governs the immunity of foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities from suit in federal and state courts, as well as the immunity of their properties from execution to satisfy judgments. Some of the FSIA’s provisions distinguish between foreign states and their political subdivisions on the one hand and their “agencies or instrumentalities” (including “organs” and majority state-owned companies) on the other. Other provisions extend the same immunities to both categories.
Of the nine defendants, the Eighth Circuit held that seven of them were part of the Chinese state. China itself is clearly a foreign state, and its National Health Commission, Ministry of Emergency Management, and Ministry of Civil Affairs are part of the state. The People’s Government of Hubei Province and the People’s Government of Wuhan City fall into the same category because they are political subdivisions. “The Chinese Communist Party may look like a nongovernmental body at first glance,” the court of appeals wrote, but it is “in substance” the same body that governs China and therefore properly considered part of the state. The remaining two defendants, the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, are legally separate from the Chinese government “but still closely enough connected” to qualify as “organs” and thus as “agencies or instrumentalities” of a foreign state covered by the FSIA.
Under the FSIA, all nine defendants are immune from suit in the United States unless an exception to immunity applies. The Eighth Circuit found that only one exception applies—the commercial activity exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)—and that it applies only to Missouri’s claim for hoarding PPE. The court reasoned that hoarding was the kind of activity that private parties can engage in and that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the hoarding had a direct effect in the United States.
After the Eighth Circuit’s decision, I pointed out some of the difficulties that Missouri would face on remand trying to prove its tort claims, including whether Missouri law applied under Missouri choice-of-law rules, whether Missouri law established a duty of care for these defendants, whether the defendants breached any such duty of care, and whether any such breach was the actual and proximate cause of Missouri’s damages. I don’t know whether Missouri’s attorney general reads TLB, but on the eve of trial Missouri changed the legal basis for its hoarding claim from common-law tort to federal and state antitrust law. Antitrust claims are not subject to state choice-of-law rules.
The District Court’s JudgmentThe Chinese defendants decided not to appear and defend against Missouri’s claims. Section 1608(e) of the FSIA provides: “No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United States or of a State against a foreign state, a political subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” This provision is supposed to ensure that the U.S. court does not simply accept the plaintiff’s allegations and instead tests the evidence to make sure that judgment is warranted. Some courts have held, however, that they may accept as true a plaintiff’s “uncontroverted evidence.” That is what Judge Limbaugh did here.
Relying on the plaintiff’s evidence, the district court concluded that “China engaged in a deliberate campaign to suppress information about the COVID-19 pandemic in order to support its campaign to hoard PPE from Missouri and an unsuspecting world.” The court noted that local officials closed schools and quarantined doctors and patients in December 2019, while at the same time other officials were denying that COVID could be spread between human beings. The district court further concluded that “Defendants engaged in monopolistic actions to hoard PPE through both the nationalization of U.S. factories [in China] and the direct hoarding of PPE manufactured or for sale in the United States.” The court pointed to evidence that China stopped exporting PPE and started importing a lot of it.
The court found the evidence sufficient to establish liability for monopolization under federal antitrust law. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15c, Missouri’s attorney general was also permitted to bring a federal antitrust claim parens patriae on behalf of the citizens of Missouri. The court also found the evidence sufficient to establish liability for monopolization under Missouri antitrust law, which the court noted is to be construed “in harmony with” federal antitrust law.
Relying on an expert report on damages submitted by Missouri, the court found that between 2020 and 2051 Missouri either had lost or would lose $8.04 billion in tax revenue because of the impact of China’s hoarding of PPE on economic activity. The court further found that hoarding caused Missouri to spend an additional $122,941,819 on PPE during the pandemic. The court added these amounts and multiplied by three—because federal and state antitrust laws permitted treble damages—for a total damages award of $24,488,825,457.
Problems with the District Court’s AnalysisI see a number of problems with the district court’s analysis. First, the court treated the defendants as an undifferentiated group, seemingly following Missouri’s supplemental brief, which refers simply to the nine defendants collectively as “China.” But the individual defendants in this case knew different things and did different things (and Missouri does not appear to have argued that there was a conspiracy allowing the acts of one defendant to be attributed to the others). The fact that local officials seem to have been aware that COVID could be transmitted from human to human, for example, does not establish that the central government knew this. Indeed, a U.S. intelligence report in 2020 found that local officials hid information about the virus from Beijing. Similarly, the fact that the central government was nationalizing PPE factories, limiting exports, and buying PPE abroad does not show that the Wuhan Institute of Virology or the Chinese Academy of Sciences was doing so.
Second, the damages calculations seem fanciful. The opinion contains no discussion of causation. How can one disentangle the impact of China’s hoarding PPE on Missouri from other factors that contributed to the spread of the pandemic there, for example the fact that Missouri was among the last states to adopt a stay-at-home order? Establishing hoarding’s impact on Missouri’s economy and derivatively its impact on Missouri’s tax revenues is fraught with complications, especially when estimates are projected to the year 2051.
Third, the court failed to consider whether trebling damages is allowed under the FSIA. Section 1606 provides that “a foreign state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages.” In other words, while the FSIA allows the trebling of damages against the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, it may not allow the same against China itself or the other governmental defendants.
But China did not make any of these points, or others that it would undoubtedly have thought of, because it decided not to appear. The China Society of Private International Law did file two amicus briefs, but the district court did not mention them. I can understand China’s reluctance to submit to the authority of a U.S. court (including to the discovery of evidence) in a case that it no doubt feels is politically motivated. But the decision not to appear gave Missouri an enormous advantage.
What Happens Now?So, what happens now? There are probably many possibilities, but I will discuss just three: (1) the possibility that some of the defendants might seek to set the judgment aside for improper service; (2) the possibility of enforcing the judgments against the defendants’ property in the United States; and (3) the possibility of similar suits in other states.
A Rule 60(b) Motion Addressing Service of Process?China could move to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) on the ground that the judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The factors that made China decide not to appear in the first place would likely dissuade it from raising all the issues that it could raise in a 60(b) motion. But it might make sense for some of the defendants to raise service of process in such a motion, particularly the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which, as explained below, are likely to be the most vulnerable to enforcement of the judgment.
The FSIA has rules for serving foreign states and their agencies or instrumentalities. For foreign state and their subdivisions, Section 1608(a) lists four means of service that must be tried in order. In this case, the first three were not available. (China refused to execute a request for service under the Hague Service Convention on the ground that doing so would infringe its sovereignty, as Article 13 of the Convention allows it to do.) So, the district court ordered service through diplomatic channels, which was then made on all the defendants except the Chinese Communist Party, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. I see no defects in service here.
With respect to the remaining three defendants, the district court authorized service by email pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3). There are three problems with this. First, the district court treated the Chinese Communist Party as a non-governmental defendant for purposes of service, but the Eighth Circuit later held that it is instead a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA. After the Eighth Circuit’s decision, Missouri argued that its service on China through diplomatic channels should count as service on the Chinese Communist Party as China’s alter ego. Judge Limbaugh seems to have accepted this assertion without discussion, but the Communist Party could certainly raise the issue in a Rule 60(b) motion.
The second problem is that Rule 4(f)(3) allows a district court to order alternative means of service only if those means are “not prohibited by international agreement.” As Maggie Gardner and I have explained repeatedly, the Hague Service Convention prohibits service by email, at least when the receiving state has objected to service through “postal channels” as China has done. District courts are divided on this, however, and Judge Limbaugh cited a number of district court cases holding (wrongly) that email service is permitted. A Rule 60(b) motion raising this point would be unlikely to convince him, but it might succeed on appeal to the Eighth Circuit.
The third problem is that service by email in this case is inconsistent with the FSIA. For agencies and instrumentalities, like the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Section 1608(b)sets forth the permitted means of service. It appears that the first two were not available and that the district court relied on Section 1608(b)(3)(C), which allows service “as directed by order of the court consistent with the law of the place where service is to be made” (emphasis added). But Chinese law does not permit private parties to serve process by email.
When this issue arose after the Eighth Circuit’s decision, Missouri argued that the language of Section 1608(b)(3)(C) “is nearly identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3), which Missouri previously invoked in its request to serve WIV and CAS by email.” This was misleading. Rule 4(f)(3) refers to means of service that are “not prohibited by international agreement,” whereas Section 1608(b)(3)(C) refers to means of service that are “consistent with the law of the place where service is to be made,” that is Chinese law. Even if service by email were permitted by the Hague Convention—which, as discussed above, it is not—that would not establish that service by email is consistent with Chinese law. Judge Limbaugh did not address this issue in his judgment and might be open to persuasion on a Rule 60(b) motion.
A Rule 60(b) motion limited to service of process issues might have some appeal for China. Although it would require becoming involved in the U.S. litigation, it would not involve arguing the merits of China’s actions during the pandemic or submitting to U.S. discovery. China would be able to make purely legal arguments that the Chinese Community Party was not properly served under Section 1608(a) and that the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Chinese Academy of Sciences were not properly served under Section 1608(b) because email service is prohibited by both the Hague Service Convention and by Chinese law.
Alternatively, defendants could raise the service of process issues, and perhaps other procedural defects, at the enforcement stage if and when Missouri attempts to execute the judgment against any of their properties in the United States. One advantage of waiting for enforcement is that the arguments would be heard by a different judge with no psychological commitment to past decisions. Also, if defendants were to file a Rule 60(b) motion before Judge Limbaugh and lose, they might be precluded from raising the same issues again at the enforcement stage. On the other hand, a successful Rule 60(b) motion could void the judgment once and for all for some of the defendants, whereas saving these arguments for the enforcement stage could require the defendants to raise them anew in multiple enforcement proceedings.
Immunity from ExecutionDefendants also have the option of asserting that any property Missouri attempts to seize is immune from execution. As a general matter, federal court judgments are enforceable against a judgment debtor’s assets anywhere in the United States. But judgments against foreign states and their agencies or instrumentalities are subject to the FSIA’s rules on immunity from execution.
Specifically, Section 1610(a)(2) provides that “[t]he property in the United States of a foreign state … used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune … from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State … if … (2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based.” This means that the properties in the United States of China, its ministries and subdivisions, and the Chinese Communist Party are immune from execution unless those properties were used to hoard PPE. I find it hard to imagine a situation in which that would be true.
The immunity for properties owned by agencies or instrumentalities is not as broad. Section 1610(b)(2) permits execution against “any property in the United States of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States” if the judgment was rendered under the FSIA’s commercial activities exception (as this judgment was) “regardless of whether the property is or was involved in the act upon which the claim is based.” This means that the properties in the United States of the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Chinese Academy of Sciences would be subject to execution if those defendants are engaged in commercial activities in the United States even if the properties themselves were not used to hoard PPE. Thus, these two defendants, unless they can get the judgment set aside for improper service as discussed above, are potentially more exposed to execution than the others.
It is worth emphasizing the district court’s judgment against these nine defendants is enforceable only against properties owned by these nine defendants. Missouri cannot execute its judgment against property in the United States simply because the property is Chinese owned. This is clear from the Second Circuit’s decision in Walters v. Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (2011), another case involving a default judgment against China under the FSIA, in which the court of appeals held that plaintiffs could not use assets belonging to agencies or instrumentalities of China to satisfy a judgment against China itself.
Walters relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec) (1983). As Ingrid Brunk has explained, Bancec stands for the proposition that U.S. courts must generally respect the corporate separateness of foreign states and their agencies or instrumentalities. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Bancec quoted the FSIA’s legislative history, which says specifically that the FSIA “will not permit execution against the property of one agency or instrumentality to satisfy a judgment against another, unrelated agency or instrumentality.”
If a judgment against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state cannot be executed against the property of another agency or instrumentality of that foreign state, it necessarily follows that the judgment cannot be executed against property not belonging to any agency or instrumentality of that foreign state. For example, Smithfield Foods is a major pork producer operating in Missouri. Its property cannot be seized to satisfy this judgment. Smithfield Foods is owned by a private Chinese conglomerate, but Smithfield Foods was not a defendant in this action, and so its property is not subject to execution.
Copycat CasesIn addition to Missouri’s efforts to enforce this judgment, it is likely that the defendants will face copycat cases in other states. Mississippi filed a similar complaint against the same defendants in May 2020. Again, the defendants chose not to appear. On February 10, 2025, Judge Taylor B. McNeel (Southern District of Mississippi) held an evidentiary hearing. It remains to be seen whether Judge McNeel will scrutinize Mississippi’s arguments more carefully than Judge Limbaugh did.
Conclusion$24 billion is a big number. But it seems highly unlikely that Missouri will ever see a penny of it, given the FSIA’s rules on immunity from execution. Missouri may, nevertheless, be able to harass these defendants—and potentially other Chinese parties holding property in the United States—by filing actions to execute the judgment even if those actions ultimately prove unsuccessful.
Last week, friend-of-TLB Ted Folkman had this to say about the Missouri judgment over at Letters Blogatory:
When we think about these cases, we have to think about what it would be like if the shoe were on the other foot. In 2021, the US and other western countries were accused of hoarding the COVID vaccine. Should the United States have been amenable to suit in China or elsewhere because it prioritized the public health needs of its own people? The technical term for taking seriously the question, “what if the shoe were on the other foot?” is comity. We need more of it.
Ugljesa Grusic (UCL) has kindly shared the following invitation with us.
On 24 March 2025, at 6pm UK time, Marta Pertegás (Maastricht University; University of Antwerp; a fulltime member of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law between 2008 and 2017) and Alex Mills (UCL; a Specialist Editor of Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, with particular responsibility for, inter alia, the rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments) will give a seminar on The 2019 Hague Judgments Convention – English and EU Perspectives at the Faculty of Laws, University College London. The event will be delivered in a hybrid format and the readers of the blog are welcome to join either in person or on line.
The seminar is part of the International Law Association (British Branch) Lecture Series and will be chaired by Ugljesa Grusic.
On 1 July 2025, the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters will enter into force in England and Wales. This historic regime establishes a general treaty basis for the recognition and enforcement of civil judgments between Convention States, supplementing the existing national rules and the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005. Perhaps most significantly, it will provide common rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments from England and Wales in EU Member States, and conversely, for EU Member State judgments to be recognised and enforced in England and Wales, to some extent filling a ‘gap’ created by Brexit.
This seminar will address the significance of this development from both an English and EU perspective, examining the main features of the 2019 Convention and considering the opportunities and challenges it presents.
To register, please follow this link.
The following post was kindly provided by Hannah Buxbaum, Vice President for International Affairs, Professor of Law and John E. Schiller Chair, Indiana University, and is cross-posted on tlblog.org
As was widely reported yesterday, the Trump administration permitted two planes carrying Venezuelan deportees to continue on their way to El Salvador after receiving a judicial order to turn the flights back to the United States. A story in Axios quotes an administration official who explains that they were not in fact “actively defying” the judge—the order just came too late, since the planes were already out of U.S. airspace. This seems to be an extraterritoriality argument, suggesting that the judge lacks authority to order an action to take place outside U.S. borders.
The administration has this completely wrong. The judge is ordering the administration to take action inside the United States—that is, to instruct the planes to turn around. That instruction will in turn cause something to happen elsewhere (the pilots will change course), but that doesn’t make the order impermissibly extraterritorial. This is exactly the same the basis on which courts in garden-variety civil disputes order parties subject to their jurisdiction to procure evidence or turn over assets that are located abroad. Moreover, since the planes were reportedly over international waters at the time the order was entered, compliance would not have required any actions by a foreign actor or within the territory of another state—in other words, it wouldn’t have created a conflict of laws.
Now that the deportees are already in El Salvador, that picture is more complicated, since local authorities there might refuse to take action. Even the existence of such a conflict, though, doesn’t mean that Judge Boasberg’s order exceeds his authority. It remains to be seen whether any of the other justifications the White House offered up for ignoring that order are any more compelling, but the argument that it didn’t apply once the planes had left the United States is certainly not.
For further leading expert input on extraterritoriality see one of our previous posts here.
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