Conflictoflaws

On 14 and 15 February 2025, the 5th Conference for Young Researchers in PIL will take place at Heidelberg University. It will be dedicated to the topic of ‘Digital transformation and Private International Law. Local connections in boundless spaces’ and feature a keynote speech by Christiane Wendehorst (University of Vienna).

After statute theory, Savignyan PIL and Europeanisation, digitalisation has the potential to initiate a fourth evolutionary stage in the history of conflict of laws, which is characterised by decentralisation and delocalisation. We may therefore be on the threshold of a PIL 4.0. We would like to discuss how the conflict-of-laws problems arising from the boundless spaces of digitalisation can be solved in European and
autonomous German, Austrian and Swiss private international law. At the same time, we would like to look at the possibilities for legal changes at national, European and international level. In particular, we welcome contributions on comparative aspects of conflict of laws and international procedural law.

More information, including on possible topics and formal requirements can be found in the German and English Call for Papers.
All submissions need to be sent to nachwuchstagung@ipr.uni-heidelberg.de by 23 September 2024.

Further information can also be found on the conference website.

The IBA Litigation Committee is pleased to present this new guide to cross-border enforcement of judgments against states.

Authors from almost fifty jurisdictions have taken part in this project. For each jurisdiction, our aim is to outline the key requirements for enforcing a foreign judgment against a state entity. The guide covers the basic criteria for enforcement of a foreign judgment, the application of sovereign immunity, and due process standards and exceptions (service, representation, etc). It also considers how these principles apply where states are involved in armed conflict, which is sadly relevant to a number of litigants around the world currently seeking to recover for wartime damages against aggressor states.

More information can be found here.

Application of Singapore’s new rules on service out of jurisdiction: Three Arrows Capital and NW Corp

The Rules of Court 2021 (‘ROC 2021’) entered into force on 1 April 2022. Among other things, ROC 2021 reformed the rules on service out of jurisdiction (previously discussed here). Order 8 rule 1 provides:

‘(1) An originating process or other court document may be served out of Singapore with the Court’s approval if it can be shown that the Court has the jurisdiction or is the appropriate court to hear the action.

…

(3) The Court’s approval is not required if service out of Singapore is allowed under a contract between the parties.

…’

A handful of decisions on the application of Order 8 rule 1 have since been delivered; two are discussed in this post. One of them considers the ‘appropriate court’ ground for service out of jurisdiction provided in Order 8 rule 1(1) and touches on the location of cryptoassets; the other is on Order 8 rule 1(3).

Service out under the ‘appropriate court’ ground

Cheong Jun Yoong v Three Arrows Capital[1] involved service out of jurisdiction pursuant to the ‘appropriate court’ ground in Order 8 rule 1(1). As detailed in the accompanying Supreme Court Practice Directions (‘SCPD’), a claimant making an application under this ground has to establish the usual common law requirements that:

‘(a) there is a good arguable case that there is a sufficient nexus to Singapore;

(b) Singapore is forum conveniens; and

(c) there is a serious issue to be tried on the merits of the claim.’[2]

For step (a), the previous Order 11 gateways have been transcribed as a non-exhaustive list of factors.[3] This objective of this reform was to render it ‘unnecessary for a claimant to scrutinise the long list of permissible cases set out in the existing Rules in the hope of fitting into one or more descriptions.’[4] As Three Arrows illustrates though, old habits die hard and the limits of the ‘non-exhaustive’ nature of the jurisdictional gateways remains to be tested by litigants. The wide-reaching effect of a previous Court of Appeal decision on the interpretation of gateway (n) which covers a claim brought under statutes dealing with serious crimes such as corruption and dug trafficking and ‘any other written law’ is also yet to be grasped by litigants.[5]

In Three Arrows, the first defendant (‘defendant’) was a British Virgin Islands incorporated company (BVI) which was an investment fund trading and dealing in cryptocurrency. It was under liquidation proceedings in the BVI; its two liquidators were the second and third defendants in the Singapore proceedings. The BVI liquidation proceedings were recognised as a ‘foreign main proceeding’ in Singapore pursuant to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency as enacted under Singapore law.[6] The claimant managed what he alleged was an independent fund called the ‘DC Fund’ which used the infrastructure and platform of the defendant and its related entities. After the defendant decided to relocate its operations to Dubai, the claimant incorporated Singapore companies to take over the operations and assets of the DC Fund. Not all of the assets had been transferred to these new companies at the time the defendant went into liquidation. The claimant’s case was that the DC Fund assets remaining with the defendant were held on trust by the defendant for the claimant and other investors in the DC Fund and were not subject to the BVI liquidation proceedings. The Liquidators in turn sought orders from the BVI court that those assets were owned by the defendant and subject to the BVI Liquidation proceedings.

The claimant relied on three gateways for service out of jurisdiction: gateway (a) where relief is sought against a defendant who is, inter alia, ordinarily resident or carrying on business in Singapore; gateway (i) where the claim is made to assert, declare or determine proprietary rights in or over movable property situated in Singapore; and gateway (p) where the claim is founded on a cause of action arising in Singapore.

On gateway (a), the defendant was originally based in Singapore before shifting operations to Dubai a few months before the commencement of the BVI Liquidation proceedings. The claimant attempted to argue that residence for the purposes of gateway (a) had to be assessed at the time when the company was ‘alive and flourishing’.[7] This was rightly rejected by the court, which observed that satisfaction of the gateway depended on the situation which existed at the time application for service out of jurisdiction was filed or heard. On gateway (p), it was held that there was a good arguable case that the cause of action arose in Singapore because the trusts arose pursuant to the independent fund arrangement between the parties which was negotiated and concluded in Singapore. All material events pursuant to the arrangement took place when the defendant was still based in Singapore and the defendant’s investment manager was a Singapore company.

It is perhaps the court’s analysis of gateway (i) which is of particular interest as it deals with a nascent area of law. Are cryptocurrencies ‘property’ and if so, where are they located?

The court confirmed earlier Singapore decisions that cryptocurrencies are property.[8] It held:

‘Given the fact that a cryptoasset has no physical presence and exists as a record in a network of computers …. It best manifests itself through the exercise of control over it.’[9]

Between a choice of the identifying the situs as the domicile or residence of the person who controls the private key linked to the cryptoasset, the court preferred residence as being the ‘better indicator of where the control is being exercised.’[10] Seemingly drawing from the position in relation to debts, one of the reasons for preferring residence was that this was where the controller can be sued.[11] The court was also concerned that there may be difficulties in identifying domicile.[12] On the facts, the controller was one of the Singapore incorporated companies set up by the claimant and the claimant was in turn the sole shareholder of that company. Both the company and claimant were resident in Singapore and thus gateway (p) was satisfied.

On the other requirements for service out with permission of the court under the ‘appropriate court’ ground, the court was persuaded that there was a serious issue to be tried on the merits and that connecting factors indicated Singapore was forum conveniens. The defendants’ application to set aside the order granting permission to serve out of jurisdiction and to set aside service of process on them thus failed. The Appellate Division of the Singapore High Court has recently refused permission to appeal against the first instance decision.[13]

It bears pointing out that the same issue of ownership of the assets of the DC Funds was before the BVI court in the insolvency proceedings. The first instance court was unmoved by the existence of parallel proceedings in the BVI, as the BVI proceedings were at a very early stage and hence were not a significant factor in the analysis on forum conveniens.[14] However, as mentioned above, the BVI insolvency proceedings had been recognised as a ‘foreign main proceeding’ by the Singapore court. Under Article 21 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, relief granted pursuant to such recognition can include staying actions concerning the ‘debtor’s property’.[15] While the very issue in the Singapore action is whether the assets of the DC Funds are indeed the ‘debtor’s property’,[16] staying the action will clearly be in line with the kinds of relief envisaged under Article 21. Under the Model Law, the issue of forum conveniens should take a back seat as the emphasis is on cross-border cooperation to achieve an optimal result for all parties involved in an international insolvency.

Service out pursuant to a contractual agreement

In NW Corp Pte Ltd v HK Petroleum Enterprises Cooperation Ltd,[17] the contract between the claimant and defendant, who were Singapore and Hong Kong-incorporated companies respectively, contained this clause:

‘This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the English law [sic]. Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally resolved by Singapore court [sic] without recourse to arbitration and to service of process by registered mail …’

The claimant served process on the defendant in Hong Kong by way of registered post to the defendant’s last known address and purportedly pursuant to Order 8 rule 1(3) ROC 2021. The issue whether the service was validly effected arose when the defendant sought to set aside the default judgment that was subsequently approved by the Singapore High Court Registry. The defendant argued that Order 8 rule 1(3) required that the agreement name not only a method of service but also specify a location out of Singapore where service could take place. The Assistant Registrar (‘AR’) disagreed, holding that this would be too narrow an interpretation of Order 8 rule 1(3). Pointing to the more relaxed modes of service permitted under the ROC 2021[18] in comparison with the predecessor ROC 2014,[19] the AR stated that there was no suggestion in Order 8 rule 1(3) or in the definitions provided elsewhere which suggested that both method and place of service had to be specified in a jurisdiction clause in order for a claimant to avail itself of service out without permission of the court. The AR was of the view that an agreement could come within Order 8 rule 1(3) so long as it provided for service of originating process of the Singapore courts on a foreign defendant.

The reasoning was as follows. First, Order 8 rule 1(3) was a deviation from the orthodox principles that the Singapore court’s jurisdiction was territorial in nature and service on a defendant abroad ordinarily required permission of court. If a foreign defendant agreed that jurisdiction of the court can be founded over them by way of service of originating process, that service necessarily included service out of Singapore. Thus, to come within Order 8 rule1(3), the agreement merely required the foreign defendant to consent to the jurisdiction of the court to be founded over them by way of service of originating process. Secondly, the phrase used in Order 8 rule 1(3) was service ‘out’ of Singapore, rather than service ‘outside’ Singapore. Only the latter phrase, in the AR’s view, connoted that service of process at a location other than Singapore was required.

On the first rationale, the Singapore court’s in personam jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on service of process.[20] This is the case ordinarily, with or without the defendant’s agreement. If the defendant expressly agrees that this can be done, this could be used to counter a subsequent challenge by the defendant to the existence of jurisdiction of the Singapore court, but it is difficult to see how, without more, an agreement to accept service of Singapore process takes the defendant outside the orthodox territorial framework of the Singapore court’s jurisdiction. Surely only the defendant’s agreement to service of Singapore process abroad, rather than merely agreement to service of Singapore process, would provide justification for the deviation from orthodox principles? The AR seemed to be suggesting that it is implicit that a foreign defendant, by agreeing to accept service of Singapore process, also consents to service of process out of Singapore, but the second rationale proffered renders any implicit agreement moot as, on the AR’s view, Order 8 rule 1(3) does not require the defendant to agree to accept service abroad. However, the legal difference between ‘out’ and ‘outside’ is elusive, as ‘service out of jurisdiction’ is uncontroversially understood to refer to service on a defendant who is abroad and thus not within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

A parallel provision to Order 8 rule 1(3) can be found in the Singapore International Commercial Court Rules 2021 (‘SICC Rules’). Permission of the SICC is likewise not required where the defendant is party to a ‘written jurisdiction agreement’ for the SICC or ‘service out of Singapore is allowed under an agreement between the parties.’[21] Order 8 rule 1(3) is missing the first option. However, it would be unlikely for the parties to have agreed on ‘service out of Singapore’ without first having agreed on a Singapore choice of court agreement. Despite this slight oddity, the intention of the drafters is clearly to liberalise the service out(side) of jurisdiction rules. Whether the intention was to liberalise it as much as was held in NW Corp is, however, debatable.

[1] [2024] SGHC 21.

[2] SCPD 2021 para 63(2).

[3] SCPD 2021 para 63(3).

[4] Civil Justice Commission Report, Chapter 6, p 16 (29 December 2017).

[5] Li Shengwu v Attorney-General [2019] 1 SLR 1081 (CA). The point is explained here.

[6] Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 s 252 and Third Schedule.

[7] [2024] SGHC 21 [46].

[8] CLM v CLN [2022] 5 SLR 273; Bybit Fintech Ltd v Ho Kai Xin [2023] 5 SLR 1748.

[9] [2024] SGHC 21 [60]

[10] [2024] SGHC 21 [63].

[11] [2024] SGHC 21 [63].

[12] [2024] SGHC 21 [63].

[13] Three Arrows Capital Ltd v Cheong Jun Yoong [2024] SGHC(A) 10.

[14] [2024] SGHC 21 [82].

[15] Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018, Third Schedule, Art 21(1)(a).

[16] The respondent was clearly the legal owner; the question was whether the assets belonged beneficially to the applicant.

[17] [2023] SGHCR 22.

[18] ROC 2021 O7 r2(1)(d).

[19] ROC 2014 O10 r3.

[20] Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 s16(1)(a). The court also has jurisdiction if the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court (s16(1)(b)), but submission is normally used to counter a jurisdictional objection by the defendant; in the ordinary course of things, service of process must first take place.

[21] SICC Rules 2021 O5 r6(2).

For a workshop on collective actions on ESG toics that will take place in Amsterdam on 21 and 22 November 2024 a call for paper has been posted, deadline 1 July 2024.

As a follow-up from the 4th International Class Action Conference in Amsterdam, 30 June – 1 July 2022, the University of Amsterdam, Tilburg University and Haifa University are jointly organizing a workshop on large scale collective actions on Environmental, Social and Governance topics. The workshop is intended to act as a forum for the sharing of experiences and knowledge. In an increasingly interconnected world, such opportunities for international scholars and practitioners to come together and discuss notes and views on the development of collective redress in their jurisdictions, are more relevant than ever. We choose to organize this as a workshop centered around academic papers in order to both give serious substance to the forum and to convert the exchange of knowledge into lasting contributions in the shape of publications in a special issue journal.

More information is available here: Call for papers for workshop on ESG collective action in Amsterdam – 21 and 22 Nov 2024

On Tuesday 23 April the Pax Moot Court Competition will kick off in Ljubljana. The oral rounds between 29 teams from all over Europe and beyond (including Asia and Australia) will start on Wednesday 24th. Teams will be litigating against each other for two days in front of private international law experts from academia and practice. The semi-finals and finals are scheduled for Friday 26th.

Also on Friday 26 April, there will be a hybrid conference on Dispute Resolution in Private International Law, co-organised by the Pax team and the University of Aberdeen’s Centre for Private International Law. This will include of three panels: Commercial Arbitration, Business and Human Rights, and Decolonial Perspectives on private international law. All welcome to join!

Please see the programme and register.

Australian and New Zealand courts have developed a practice of managing trans-Tasman proceedings in a way that recognises the close relationship between the countries, and that aids in the effective and efficient resolution of cross-border disputes. This has been the case especially since the implementation of the Agreement on Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement, which was entered into for the purposes of setting up an integrated scheme of civil jurisdiction and judgments.  A key feature of the scheme is that it seeks to “streamline the process for resolving civil proceedings with a trans-Tasman element in order to reduce costs and improve efficiency” (Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (TTPA), s 3(1)(a)). There have been many examples of Australian and New Zealand courts working to achieve this goal.

Despite the closeness of the trans-Tasman relationship, one question that had remained uncertain was whether the TTPA regime allows for the grant of an anti-suit injunction to stop or prevent proceedings that have been brought in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. The enforcement of exclusive jurisdiction agreements is explicitly protected in the regime, which adopted the approach of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in anticipation of Australia and New Zealand signing up to the Convention. Section 28 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ) and s 22 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) provide that a court must not restrain a person from commencing or continuing a civil proceeding across the Tasman “on the grounds that [the other court] is not the appropriate forum for the proceeding”. In the secondary literature, different opinions have been expressed whether this provision extends to injunctions on the grounds that the other court is not the appropriate forum due to the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement: see Mary Keyes “Jurisdiction Clauses in New Zealand Law” (2019) 50 VUWLR 631 at 633-4; Maria Hook and Jack Wass The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand (LexisNexis, 2020) at [2.445].

The New Zealand High Court has now decided that, in its view, there is no place for anti-suit injunctions under the TTPA regime: A-Ward Ltd v Raw Metal Corp Pty Ltd [2024] NZHC 736 at [4]. Justice O’Gorman reasoned that the TTPA involves New Zealand and Australian courts applying “mirror provisions to determine forum disputes, based on confidence in each other’s judicial institutions” (at [4]), and that anti-suit injunctions can have “no role to play where countries have agreed on judicial cooperation in the allocation and exercise of jurisdiction” (at [17]).

A-Ward Ltd, a New Zealand company, sought an interim anti-suit injunction to stop proceedings brought against it by Raw Metal Corp Pty Ltd, an Australian company, in the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute related to the supply of shipping container tilters from A-Ward to Raw Metal. A-Ward’s terms and conditions had included an exclusive jurisdiction clause selecting the courts of New Zealand, as well as a New Zealand choice of law clause. In its Australian proceedings, Raw Metal sought damages for misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA). A-Ward brought proceedings in New Zealand seeking damages for breach of its trade terms, including the jurisdiction clause, as well as an anti-suit injunction.

O’Gorman J’s starting point was to identify the different common law tests that courts had applied when determining an application to the court to stay its own proceedings, based on the existence (or not) of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. While Spiliada principles applied in the absence of such a clause, The Eleftheria provided the relevant test to determine the enforceability of an exclusive jurisdiction clause: at [16]. The alternative to a stay was to seek an anti-suit injunction, which, however, was a controversial tool, because of its potential to “interfere unduly with a foreign court controlling its own processes” (at [17]).

Having set out the competing views in the secondary literature, the Court concluded that anti-suit injunctions were not available to enforce jurisdiction agreements otherwise falling within the scope of the TTPA, based on the following reason (at [34]):

1. The term “appropriate forum” in ss 28 (NZ) and s 22 (Aus) of the respective Acts could not, “as a matter of reasonable interpretation”, be restricted to questions of appropriate forum in the absence of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. This was not how the term had been used in the common law (see The Eleftheria).
2. The structure of the TTPA regime reinforced this point, because it is on an application under s 22 (NZ)/ s 17 (Aus), for a stay of proceedings on the basis that the other court is the more appropriate forum, that a court must give effect to an exclusive jurisdiction agreement under s 25 (NZ)/ s 20 (Aus).
3. Sections 25 (NZ) and 20 (Aus) already provided strong protection to exclusive choice of court agreements, and introducing additional protection by way of anti-suit relief “would only create uncertainty, inefficiency, and the risk of inconsistency, all of which the TTPA regime was designed to avoid”.
4. The availability of anti-suit relief would “rest on the assumption that the courts in each jurisdiction might reach a different result, giving a parochial advantage”. This, however, would be “inconsistent with the entire basis for the TTPA regime – that the courts apply the same codified tests and place confidence in each other’s judicial institutions”.
5. Australian case law (Great Southern Loans v Locator Group [2005] NSWSC 438), to the effect that anti-suit injunctions continue to be available domestically as between Australian courts, was distinguishable because there was no express provision for exclusive choice of court agreements, which is what “makes a potentially conflicting common law test unpalatable”.
6. Retaining anti-suit injunctions to enforce exclusive jurisdiction agreements would be inconsistent with the concern underpinning s 28 (NZ)/ s 22 (Aus) about “someone trying to circumvent the trans-Tasman regime as a whole”.
7. The availability of anti-suit relief would defeat the purpose of the scheme to prevent duplication of proceedings.
8. More generally, anti-suit injunctions “have no role to play where countries have agreed on judicial cooperation in the allocation and exercise of jurisdiction”.

The Court further concluded that, even if the TTPA did not exclude the power to order an anti-suit injunction, there was no basis for doing so in this case in relation to Raw Metal’s claim under the CCA (at [35]). There was “nothing invalid or unconscionable about Australia’s policy choice” to prevent parties from contracting out of their obligations under the CCA, even though New Zealand law (in the form of the Fair Trading Act 1986) might now follow a different policy. The TTPA regime included exceptions to the enforcement of exclusive jurisdiction agreements. Here, A-Ward seemed to have anticipated that, from the perspective of the Australian court, enforcement of the New Zealand jurisdiction clause would have fallen within one of these exceptions, and the High Court of Australia’s observations in Karpik v Carnival plc [2023] HCA 39 at [40] seemed to be consistent with this. The “entirely orthodox position” seemed to be that the Federal Court in Australia “would regard itself as having jurisdiction to determine the CCA claim, unconstrained by the choice of law and court” (at [35]).

Time will tell whether Australian courts will agree with the High Court’s emphatic rejection of anti-suit relief under the TTPA as being inconsistent with the cooperative purpose of the scheme. The parallel debate within the context of the Hague Choice of Court Convention – which does not specifically exclude anti-suit injunctions – may be instructive here: Mukarrum Ahmed “Exclusive choice of court agreements: some issues on the Hague Convention on choice of court agreements and its relationship with the Brussels I recast especially anti-suit injunctions, concurrent proceedings and the implications of BREXIT” (2017) 13 Journal of Private International Law 386. Despite O’Gorman J’s powerful reasoning, her judgment may not be the last word on this important issue.

From a New Zealand perspective, the judgment is also of interest because of its restrained approach to the availability of anti-suit relief more generally. Even assuming that the Australian proceedings were, in fact, in breach of the New Zealand jurisdiction clause, O’Gorman J would not have been prepared to grant an injunction as a matter of course. In this respect, the judgment may be seen as a departure from previous case law. In Maritime Mutual Insurance Association (NZ) Ltd v Silica Sandport Inc [2023] NZHC 793, for example, the Court granted an anti-suit injunction to compel compliance with an arbitration agreement, without inquiring into the foreign court’s perspective and its reasons for taking jurisdiction. O’Gorman J’s more nuanced approach is to be welcomed (for criticism of Maritime Mutual, see here on The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand blog).

A more challenging aspect of the judgment is the choice of law analysis, and the Court’s focus on the potential concurrent or cumulative application of foreign and domestic statutes (at [28]-[31], [35]). The Court said that, to determine whether a foreign statute is applicable, the New Zealand court can ask whether the statute applies on its own terms (following Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Fujitsu New Zealand Ltd [2023] NZHC 3598, which I criticised here on The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand blog, also published as [2024] NZLJ 22). It is not entirely clear how this point was relevant to the issue of the anti-suit injunction. The Judge’s reasoning seemed to be that, from the New Zealand court’s perspective, the Australian court’s application of the CCA was appropriate as a matter of statutory interpretation and/or choice of law, which meant that the proceedings were not unconscionable or unjust (at [35]).

On 7 and 8 November, the European Legal Studies Institute (ELSI) at the University of Osnabrück, Germany, is hosting a conference on “Enforcement of Rights in the Digital Space”.

The organizers have kindly shared the following Call for Papers with us:

The European Legal Studies Institute (ELSI) is pleased to announce a Call for Papers for a conference at Osnabrück University on November 7th and 8th, 2024.

We invite submissions on the topic of »Enforcement of Rights in the Digital Space« and in particular on the interplay between the current EU acts on the digital space and national law. The deadline for submissions is May 15th, 2024.

Legal Acts regulating the digital space in the European Union, such as the GDPR, the Data Act and the Digital Services Act, establish manifold new rights and obligations, such as a duty to inform about data use and storage, rights of access to data or requests for interoperability. Yet, with regard to many of these rights and obligations it remains unclear whether and how private actors can enforce them. Often, it is debatable whether their enforcement is left to the member states and whether administrative means of enforcement are intended to complement or exclude private law remedies. The substantial overlap in the scope of these legal acts, which often apply simultaneously in one and the same situation, aggravates the problem that the different legal acts lack a coherent and comprehensive system for their enforcement.

The conference seeks to address the commonalities, gaps and inconsistencies within the present system of enforcement of rights in the digital space, and to explore the different approaches academics throughout Europe take on these issues.

Speakers are invited to either give a short presentation on their current work (15 minutes) or present a paper (30 minutes). Each will be followed by a discussion. In case the speakers choose to publish the paper subsequently, we would kindly ask them to indicate that the paper has been presented at the conference. We welcome submissions both from established scholars and from PhD students, postdocs and junior faculty.

All speakers are invited to a conference dinner which will take place on November 7th, 2024. Further, the European Legal Studies Institute will cover reasonable travel expenses.

Electronic submissions with an abstract in English of no more than 300 words can be submitted to [elsi@uos.de]. Please remove all references to the author(s) in the paper and include in the text of the email a cover note listing your name and the title of your paper. Any questions about the submission procedure should be directed to Mary-Rose McGuire [mmcguire@uos.de]. We will notify applicants as soon as practical after the deadline whether their papers have been selected.

We have kindly been informed that a limited number of places remains available at the conference on Informed Consent to Dispute Resolution Agreements on 20 and 21 June in Bremen, which we advertised a couple of weeks ago.

The full schedule can be found on this flyer, which has meanwhile been released.

A first view article was published online on 12 April 2024 in International and Comparative Law Quarterly.

Raphael Ren, “The Dichotomy between Jurisdiction and Admissibility in International Arbitration”

The dichotomy between jurisdiction and admissibility developed in public international law has drawn much attention from arbitrators and judges in recent years. Inspired by Paulsson’s ‘tribunal versus claim’ lodestar, attempts have been made to transpose the distinction from public international law to investment treaty arbitration, yielding a mixed reception from tribunals. Remarkably, a second leap of transposition has found firmer footing in commercial arbitration, culminating in the prevailing view of the common law courts in England, Singapore and Hong Kong that arbitral decisions on admissibility are non-reviewable. However, this double transposition from international law to commercial arbitration is misguided. First, admissibility is a concept peculiar to international law and not embodied in domestic arbitral statutes. Second, its importation into commercial arbitration risks undermining the fundamental notion of jurisdiction grounded upon the consent of parties. Third, the duality of ‘night and day’ postulated by Paulsson to distinguish between reviewable and non-reviewable arbitral rulings is best reserved to represent the basic dichotomy between jurisdiction and merits.

Béligh Elbalti (Osaka University):
‘Conflict of Laws’ in the Islamic Legal Tradition –
Between the Principles of Personality and Territoriality of the Law

 

Research Group on the Law of Islamic Countries at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law Afternoon Talks on Islamic Law

• DATE: Apr 25, 2024
• TIME: 04:00 PM (Local Time Germany)
• LOCATION: online

more info here.

Registrations are still open for Module n°4, which is taking place on April 18th, 2024. 

The speakers are the following:

• Dr Nicolas Nord, Secretary General, CIEC, “The ICCS Activities and Good Practices in the field of International Child Protection”
• Ms Joëlle Schickel-Küng, Deputy Head of Division, Co-Head of Unit, Swiss OFJ, “Cooperation in the area of international child abduction under the 1980 Hague Convention”
• Mr Jean Ayoub, Secretary General, International Social Service, “ISS – Bridging support to vulnerable children on the move”

Price per module registration fee: 200 CHF. More information is available here.

The author is Dr. Faidon Varesis, Attorney at Law

Teaching Fellow, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

PhD (University of Cambridge); MJur (University of Oxford); LLM, LLB (University of Athens).

 

In an era where the resolution of disputes is increasingly moving away from traditional court systems towards alternative methods, the comprehensive collective work in Greek with Professor Charalampos (Haris) P. Pamboukis as editor emerges as both a timely and seminal contribution to the field of arbitration, both nationally within Greece and on an international scale. This book review seeks to delve into the multifaceted contributions of the book, examining its scope, its pioneering contributors, its evolution within Greek law, and its broader implications for dispute resolution globally.

The book begins by exploring the flourishing landscape of arbitration across various domains such as commercial, investment, construction, maritime, and energy disputes, alongside other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods. The interest in these mechanisms reflects a societal shift towards less adversarial, more cosmopolitan forms of dispute resolution, aimed at alleviating the burdens on state judiciary systems characterized by procedural rigidity and often excessive delays. The prologue set the stage by discussing the significant legislative and jurisprudential developments in domestic and international arbitration within Greece, highlighting the transformative impact of laws passed from 1999 through to the latest reforms in 2023. Such legislative milestones not only signify Greece’s evolving arbitration framework but also illustrate the dynamic interplay between law, scholarly research, and practical application in shaping effective dispute resolution practices. Furthermore, the book weaves through the theoretical underpinnings and the practical aspects of arbitration agreements, the composition of arbitral tribunals, and the procedural norms governing arbitration proceedings, offering a holistic view of the arbitration landscape.

Central to the book’s discourse is the collaborative effort of esteemed scholars, academics, and practitioners who contribute their insights across various themes. This collective approach not only enriches the book’s content with a diversity of perspectives but also underscores the collaborative spirit within the arbitration community. The inclusion of introductory developments on increasingly significant areas such as investment arbitration and mediation, alongside a critical overview of international arbitration consent and the arbitral process, reflects a comprehensive and forward-looking examination of the field.

The book does not shy away from discussing the inherent challenges within arbitration and the diverse methodological approaches adopted by different contributors. However, these aspects are presented as enriching the scientific pluralism and intellectual rigor of the work rather than detracting from its cohesion.

In addition to its substantive chapters, the book is augmented with appendices that include key legislative and regulatory texts relevant to arbitration and mediation. This practical inclusion underlines the book’s aim to serve as a useful tool for both practitioners and scholars.

In conclusion, this collective work stands as a testament to the evolving and vibrant field of arbitration within Greece and its broader implications on the international stage. It encapsulates the intellectual legacy, the legislative advancements, and the practical insights of a diverse group of contributors, offering a comprehensive resource for understanding and navigating the complexities of arbitration. As such, it represents an invaluable contribution to the legal scholarship and practice of arbitration, both within Greece and beyond, fostering a deeper appreciation for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the pursuit of justice and societal harmony.

Written by Shubh Jaiswal, student, Jindal Global Law School, Sonipat (India) and Professor Saloni Khanderia, JGLS. 

In the landmark case of TransAsia Private Capital vs Gaurav Dhawan, the Delhi High Court clarified that Indian Courts are not automatically required to determine and apply the governing law of a dispute unless the involved parties introduce expert evidence to that effect. This clarification came during the court’s examination of an execution petition stemming from a judgment by the High Court of Justice Business and Property Courts of England and Wales Commercial Court. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court invoked the precedent set by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Brownlie v. FS Cairo, shedding light on a contentious issue: the governing law of a dispute when parties do not sufficiently prove the applicability of foreign law.

The Delhi High Court has established that in the absence of evidence proving the applicability of a foreign law identified as the ‘proper law of the contract’, Indian law will be applied as the default jurisdiction. This decision empowers Indian courts to apply Indian law by ‘default’ in adjudicating international civil and commercial disputes, even in instances where an explicit governing law has been selected by the parties, unless there is a clear insistence on applying the law of a specified country. This approach aligns with the adversarial system common to most common law jurisdictions, where courts are not expected to determine the applicable law proactively. Instead, the legal representatives must argue and prove the content of foreign law.

This ruling has significant implications for the handling of foreign-related civil and commercial matters in India, highlighting a critical issue: the lack of private international law expertise among legal practitioners. Without adequate knowledge of the choice of law rules, there’s a risk that international disputes could always lead to the default application of Indian law, exacerbated by the absence of codified private international law norms in India. This situation underscores the need for specialized training in private international law to navigate the complexities of international litigation effectively.

Facts in brief

As such, the dispute in Transasia concerned an execution petition filed under Section 44A of the Indian Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for the enforcement of a foreign judgment passed by the High Court of Justice Business and Property Courts of England and Wales Commercial Court. The execution petitioner had brought a suit against the judgment debtor before the aforementioned court for default under two personal guarantees with respect to two revolving facility loan agreements. While these guarantee deeds contained choice of law clauses and required the disputes to be governed by the ‘Laws of the Dubai International Finance Centre’ and ‘Singapore Law’ respectively, the English Court had applied English law to the dispute and decided the dispute in favour of the execution petitioner. Accordingly, the judgment debtor opposed the execution of the petition before the Delhi HC for the application of incorrect law by the Court in England.

It is in this regard that the Delhi HC invoked the ‘default rule’ and negated the contention of the judgment debtor. The Bench relied on the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Brownlie v. FS Cairo, which postulated that “if a party does not rely on a particular rule of law even though it would be entitled to do so, it is not generally for the court to apply the rule of its own motion.”

The HC confirmed that foreign law is conceived as a question of fact in India. Thus, it was for each party to choose whether to plead a case that a foreign system of law was applicable to the claim, but neither party was obliged to do so, and if neither party did, the court would apply its own law to the issues in dispute. To that effect, the HC also relied on Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV, wherein the English Court had applied English law to a sales contract even when a provision expressly stipulated the application of Dutch law—only because neither party pleaded Dutch law.

Thus, in essence, the HC observed that courts would only be mandated to apply the chosen law if either party had pleaded its application and the case was ‘well-founded’. In the present dispute, the judgment debtor had failed to either plead or establish that English law would not be applicable before the Court in England and had merely challenged jurisdiction, and thus, the Delhi HC held that the judgment could not be challenged at the execution stage.

Choosing the Proper Law

The mechanism employed to ascertain the applicable law under Indian private international law depends on whether the parties have opted to resolve their dispute before a court or an arbitral tribunal. In arbitration matters, the identification of the applicable law similarly depends on the express and implied choice of the parties. Similarly, in matters of litigation, courts rely on the common law doctrine of the ‘proper law of the contract’ to discern the applicable law while adjudicating such disputes on such obligations. Accordingly, the proper law depends on the express and implied choice of the parties. When it comes to the determination of the applicable law through the express choice of the parties, Indian law, despite being uncodified, is coherent and conforms to the practices of several major legal systems, such as the UK, the EU’s 27 Member States, and its BRICS partners, Russia and China – insofar as it similarly empowers the parties to choose the law of any country with which they desire their disputes to be settled. Thus, it is always advised that parties keen on being governed by the law of a particular country must ensure to include a clause to this effect in their agreement if they intend to adjudicate any disputes that might arise by litigation because it is unlikely for the court to regard any other factor, such as previous contractual relationships between them, to identify their implied choice.

Questioning the Assumed: Manoeuvring through the Intricate Terrain of Private International Law and Party Autonomy in the Indian Judicial System

By reiterating the ‘default rule’ in India and presenting Indian courts with another opportunity to apply Indian law, this judgment has demonstrated the general tendency on the part of the courts across India to invariably invoke Indian law – albeit in an implicit manner – without any (actual) examination as to the country with which the contract has its closest and most real connection. Further, the lack of expertise by the members of the Bar in private international law-related matters and choice of law rules implies that most, if not all, foreign-related civil and commercial matters would be governed by Indian law in its capacity as the lex fori. Therefore, legal representatives should actively advocate for disputes to be resolved according to the law specified in their dispute resolution clause rather than assuming that the court will automatically apply the law of the designated country in adjudicating the dispute.

Foreign parties may not want Indian law to apply to their commercial contracts, especially when they have an express provision against the same. Apart from being unclear and uncertain, the present state of India’s practice and policy debilitates justice and fails to meet the commercial expectations of the parties by compelling litigants to be governed by Indian law regardless of the circumstance and the nature of the dispute—merely because they failed to plead the application of their chosen law.

This would inevitably lead to foreign parties opting out of the jurisdiction of the Indian courts by concluding choice of court agreements in favour of other forums so as to avoid the application of the Republic’s ambiguous approach towards the law that would govern their commercial contracts. Consequently, Indian courts may rarely find themselves chosen as the preferred forum through a choice of court agreement for the adjudication of such disputes when they have no connection to the transaction. In circumstances where parties are unable to opt out of the jurisdiction of Indian courts – perhaps because of the lack of agreement to this effect, the inconsistencies would hamper international trade and commerce in India, with parties from other jurisdictions wanting to avoid concluding contracts with Indian businessmen and traders so as to avert plausible disputes being adjudicated before Indian courts (and consequently being governed by Indian law).

Therefore, Indian courts should certainly reconsider the application of the ‘default rule’, and limit the application of the lex fori in order to respect party autonomy.

Parallel proceedings in international commercial litigation between the courts of different countries have long been discussed and explored, for which the Brussels I Regulation in the EU provides a good model for solution although it is still a problem at the global level and an obstacle for the Hague Jurisdiction Project.

 

However, it seems that so far no enough attention has been paid to the problem of parallel proceedings between international commercial litigation and arbitration. Theoretically, parties’ consent to arbitration will exclude the jurisdiction of states’ courts by virtue of the rules set out in Article 2 of the New York Convention altogether. But the Convention fails to successfully eradicate parallel proceedings between arbitral tribunals and state courts, owing to its inherent defects. When a conflict arises between international commercial arbitration and litigation proceedings, a rational balance must be struck between the judiciary and the arbitral tribunal with a reasonable division of competence between the two bodies. Different from parallel proceedings between two courts of different countries where usually both have jurisdiction and the question is only who should decide first, the jurisdiction of a national court and that of an arbitral tribunal excludes each other; similar to them, the problems with the former will also happen to the latter. Shall one always give “priority” to the arbitral tribunal to decide i.e. the issue of validity of the arbitration agreement for the purpose of respecting the doctrine of competence/competence? Can a simple lis pendens rule like that under the Brussels I Regulation work i.e. a national court or arbitral tribunal whoever is seized earlier shall decide when the issue of the validity of arbitration agreement is raised as a preliminary question in the national court? This presentation will try to explore an ideal model for the solution to this problem.

The recording can be found here.

This Friday (12 April) at 3 pm (NZST), Jack Wass and Maria Hook will be giving a seminar at the University of Otago (New Zealand) on their project “Hague Conventions on International Civil Procedure – Pathway to Adoption”. This project, which is funded by the Borrin Foundation, explores a pathway for New Zealand to adopt four key treaties on international civil procedure developed by the Hague Conference on Private International Law – the Service Convention 1965, the Evidence Convention 1970, the Choice of Court Convention 2005, and the Judgments Convention 2019. The purpose of the project is to try and dislodge the inertia within the executive that has resulted in consideration of these Conventions stalling, by producing a briefing paper and draft legislation for the implementation of the treaties. The seminar will focus on the proposed pathway for adoption of the Conventions and discuss its potential effectiveness in encouraging New Zealand’s participation in international treaties.

There is a Zoom link available for anyone who would like to attend the seminar but is unable to do so in person. Please contact me if you would like to attend.

In this post, Yehya Badr (Associate Professor, College of Law, Al-Yamamah University, KSA) presents his recent publication entitled “Religion, Colonialism, and Legal Pluralism: The Story and Legacy of the Egyptian Choice of Law Rules for Personal Status International and Interpersonal Conflicts of Law“, published in the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Issue 1 of Volume 31, 2024. The paper addresses the important issue of Egyptian choice of law rules for international and interpersonal conflicts of law.

The detailed summary, kindly provided by the author, reads as follows:

Personal status in Egypt is an example of legal pluralism, where different laws govern the personal affairs of Egyptian citizens based on their religion and foreigners based on their nationality. This system derives from the rules of Islamic Shariah and the Ottoman millet system, which was modified under pressure from Western powers after the Crimean War. Under this system, Non-Muslim Egyptians historically had the option of resolving personal status disputes through their respective religious courts (known as “Milli Courts”) in application of their religious laws, unless they opted for Sharia courts. In this case, Islamic Sharia would apply. Similarly, foreigners were exempt from Egyptian courts’ jurisdiction by virtue of privileges granted under foreign capitulations during Ottoman rule. This resulted in their personal status disputes being adjudicated by courts established by their consulates, known as “consular courts”. Furthermore, in response to financial difficulties and pressure from colonial powers during the foreign debt crisis of the 1860s, Egypt entered into a multilateral agreement to establish the so-called “Mixed Courts”. These courts had jurisdiction over disputes between foreigners and Egyptians or between foreigners themselves. The Mixed Courts applied the so-called “Mixed Civil Code” which were enacted with the approval of the then colonial powers. Notably, the Mixed Courts were specifically excluded from hearing personal status disputes and operated independently of the Egyptian government under their own charter.

Thus, the Egyptian legal system was an example of true legal pluralism, designed to accommodate the interests of foreigners residing in Egypt and different religious communities through the establishment of five different courts. However, this form of legal pluralism gave rise to various problems, including conflicting decisions and confusion over the applicable law in disputes, particularly in matters of personal status. In particular, there were no established rules of choice of law for personal status disputes, except for the application of non-Muslim law in cases where both parties shared the same sect and rite.

This prompted Egypt to embark on a process of legislative and judicial consolidation. This consolidation used choice-of-law rules to govern personal status conflicts for both Egyptians and foreigners, with lasting consequences. The article examines Egypt’s efforts to reduce legal pluralism by abolishing foreign capitulations through the Montreux Convention of 1937. In addition, it examines the adoption of choice-of-law rules for international personal status disputes included in the Convention, thus rendering Egypt’s choice of law rules for international conflict of laws a product of an international treaty designed to accommodate the demands of Western colonial powers.

Moreover, the article examines the challenges posed by these rules, including the use of nationality as a connecting factor, as well as the unresolved issues related to the application of foreign law resulting from the aforementioned choice-of-law rules. These issues include the characterization and protection of Egyptian public policy.

Finally, the article explains the processes within Egyptian law aimed at limiting legal pluralism within Egyptian personal status law through legislative consolidation. This entailed the enactment of laws applicable to all Egyptians regardless of their faith. Judicial consolidation followed with the abolition of the Shariah courts and the Milli courts. However, religion continues to have a significant influence in determining the laws governing personal status disputes, as not all aspects of personal status have been consolidated. The latter focal point includes a special examination of the challenges associated with the application of Islamic Shariah law to non-Muslims and the reluctance of the Coptic Orthodox Church to recognize divorce decrees issued by Egyptian courts.

As noted above, the Mixed Courts operated independently of the Egyptian government and on numerous occasions adjudicated personal status matters under the pretext of the Mixed Interest Theory. Under this theory, the Mixed Courts had jurisdiction over any dispute involving the interests of a foreigner. In addition, Egypt’s religious courts vied for jurisdiction over personal status disputes involving non-Muslims, further complicating the legal landscape.

On 20 and 21 June 2024, two events on private international law will be taking place in Vienna, both co-hosted by Florian Heindler (Sigmund Freud University, Vienna).

Ehrenzweig Lectures on 20 June 2024

June 2024 marks the fiftieth anniversary since Ehrenzweig passed away. On this occasion, a conference on the Austrian Ministry of Justice will host a conference  to honour Albert Armin Ehrenzweig and his extraordinary jurisprudential legacy. The conference is jointly organised by the Interdisciplinary Association of Comparative and Private International Law (IACPIL), the University of Vienna, and the University of California, Berkeley.

Confirmed speakers are Richard Buxbaum (University of Berkeley), Eric Jayme (University of Heidelberg), Andrew Bradt (University of Berkeley), and Jeremy Heymann (University Lyon III).

More details can be found here. Participation is free of charge. Please register via office@igkk.org.

Third Private International Law Workshop in Austria

On 21 June 2024, Brigitta Lurger, Martina Melcher, Florian Heindler, and Simon Laimer organize the third edition of the Austrian Private International Law Workshop. This year, it is hosted by the Sigmund Freud University Vienna, Austria. The organizers aim to facilitate an open and lively discussion on questions of private international law.

The program can be found here and here. Participation is free of charge. Please register via ipr@sfu.ac.at.

On 20 and 21 June, a conference dedicated to Stratetic Litigation, organized by Christiane von Bary (LMU Munich) and Tobias Lutzi (University of Augsburg), will take place at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Munich, Germany.

The event, which will be held in German and is free of charge for all attendants, aims to tackle a variety of questions raised by a seemingly growing number of lawsuits that pursue aims beyond the dispute between the litigating parties – only some of which appear societally desireable.
The discussants, many of whom have first-hand experience, will address a number of overarching aspects such as the the role of courts in policy-making or the potential of collective-redress mechanisms and legal tech before diving more deeply into two particularly prominent examples: climate-change litigation and SLAPPs.

More information can be found on this flyer.

Please this link to register for the event.

The latest issue of RabelsZ has just been released. In addition to the following articles it contains fantastic news (mentioned in an earlier post today): Starting with this issue RabelsZ will be available open access! Enjoy reading:

 

Symeon C. Symeonides, The Torts Chapter of the Third Conflicts Restatement: An Introduction, pp. 7–59, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2024-0001

This article presents the torts chapter of the Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws, as approved by the American Law Institute in May 2023. That chapter steers a middle ground between the broad, inflexible rules of the First Restatement of 1934 and the exceedingly equivocal directives of the Second Restatement of 1971. It accurately captures the judicial decisional patterns emerging in the more than forty US jurisdictions that have abandoned the old lex loci delicti rule and joined the choice-of-law revolution of the 1960s. It recasts them into new, narrow, and “smart” rules that incorporate the revolution’s methodological advances but without reproducing its excesses. The most noteworthy features of these rules are: (1) the distinction between conduct-regulating and loss-allocating tort rules; (2) the application of the law of the parties’ common domicile in loss-allocation conflicts; (3) a rule giving victims of cross-border torts the option of requesting the application of the law of the state of injury, if the occurrence of the injury there was objectively foreseeable; and (4) the general notion that the choice of the applicable law should depend not only on a state’s territorial contacts, but also on the content of its law.

 

Yves-Junior Manzanza Lumingu, Jules Masuku Ayikaba, Accessibilité des sociétés commerciales de droit étranger à l’espace OHADA – Sur la reconnaissance de leur personnalité juridique selon la jurisprudence de la CCJA, pp. 60–86, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2024-0008

The Access of Foreign Commercial Companies to the OHADA Area – Recognition of Legal Personality under CCJA Case Law. – The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) is striving to make its geographical area more attractive, particularly to foreign investors and foreign commercial companies. This should be achieved by adopting, at a supranational level, uniform and modern legal standards which can be readily embraced by the business community and by ensuring legal certainty through the establishment of the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA). To date, however, OHADA has not yet adopted any provision recognizing the legal personality of companies operating throughout its region. However, the recognition of such entities is essential with regard to their participation – particularly as shareholders or partners – in a commercial company incorporated under OHADA law or in relation to the establishment of branches or subsidiaries within OHADA member states. The CCJA has, however, issued a number of rulings on this issue. This study examines these decisions and recommends the adoption of an OHADA-wide procedure for recognizing the legal personality of foreign commercial companies.

 

Eckart Bueren, Jennifer Crowder. Mehrstimmrechte im Spiegel von Rechtsvergleichung und Ökonomie, pp. 87–150, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2024-0015

Multiple Voting Rights Through the Lenses of Comparative Law and Economics. – Multiple voting rights have been gaining ground internationally with several jurisdictions authorizing them in little more than a decade, including for listed companies. Germany recently followed suit with its “Zukunftsfinanzierungsgesetz”, and the EU Commission intends to do the same as part of the Listing Act. This article explains these developments with a view to contemporary conditions and law and economics conceptions. It then contrasts them with developments in the United States, Asia, and Europe and sheds light on their relationship to other trends in corporate law. Particular attention is paid to findings that may help to properly calibrate mechanisms against abuse, e. g. a possible segment specificity, limitations on resolution items, variations in terms of sunsets or time-phased voting (loyalty shares). The article concludes with considerations on how multiple voting rights and other key legislative objectives of recent years, namely stewardship, sustainability, and corporate purpose, can be coherently developed.

 

Since the beginning of this year, Rabels Zeitschrift is available in open access. For a long time, the journal has published articles in other languages than German in particular English. The new open access model should make even more attractive for authors wishing to reach an international audience. What follows  is a translation of the Editorial in Rabels Zeitschrift, Volume 88 (2024) / Issue 1, pp. 1-4: Open Access – was sich mit diesem Heft ändert by Holger Fleischer, Ralf Michaels, Anne Röthel, Christian Eckl, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Translation by Michael Friedman.

 

Editorial

Open Access – Changes Brought with this Issue

Abstract: Upon perusing this issue, several new features will likely stand out: a new, multi-colour cover, a new layout, which continues inside, and, lastly, the appearance of the logo of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law on the cover, alongside the publisher’s emblem. Additionally, the imprint reflects the new Institute management constellation: Anne Röthel joined the Directorate at the beginning of 2024 and is now an editor of the journal. And above all, the presence of the Creative Commons logo makes clear that the Rabel Journal is now open access. With this and other measures, the publisher and the editors are taking important steps towards “open science”.

“The findings of scientific research should be published open access.” In 2022 the German Science and Humanities Council (Wissenschaftsrat) made this demand –having reference to guidelines of the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) – and identified open access publication as a component of good academic practice. Since that time, research funding has increasingly been linked to open access publication. As part of the Max Planck Society and as the publisher of the Rabel Journal, the Institute considers itself especially committed to the notion of open access given that, consistent with its founding purpose, the Institute is focused on performing basic research. But the task is not limited to meeting the needs of the German-language publication market with its high degree of specialization and its unique, commercially influenced reputation mechanisms. Rather, the Institute, and thus the Rabel Journal, has to stay abreast of the entire world – both in terms of the topics of inquiry as well as the basic research being conducted and funded. This results in concrete expectations in terms of inclusivity: high-quality research should not be absent from global scholarly discourse due to financial limitations. The reception of ideas and findings should not be hemmed in by declining library budgets or continually higher prices on the book and journal market. Similarly, authors should not have to pay prohibitive article processing charges for the publication of articles, as can be the case with so-called hybrid open access. The concern about inequalities or mechanisms which may serve to restrict publication or reception opportunities is also expressed in the May 2023 DFG statement on the EU Council Conclusions on “High-quality, transparent, open, trustworthy and equitable scholarly publishing”. We share the view that open access should serve readers and authors alike.

For these reasons, we welcome the willingness of Mohr Siebeck to publish the Rabel Journal in the subscribe to openmodel (S2O) from now forward. This procedure is not without risk to the publisher. But it allows for a complete open access transformation of academic journals with relatively little additional effort. At the same time, the subscribe to open model enables fair and inclusive open access, as all authors can in principle publish in journals of their choice. However, the success of the model depends on existing subscribers remaining loyal to the journal, thereby not only securing their own access through their subscriptions – as has been the case to date – but also contributing to making the journal available open access to scientists and academics worldwide. We hope that many people will commit to this idea and this effort and make their own contribution to an inclusive academic culture. If our joint idea does not find enough support and over the long term the number of subscriptions falls, we will, however, have to return to closed access and the pertinent volumes would then only be accessible to paying subscribers, as was previously the case.

Since the start of 2024, volumes from 2001 onwards have been freely accessible in the publisher’s e-library, while the volumes from 1927 to 1960 (published under the title “Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht”) and the volumes from 1961 to 2000 (published under the same title but affixed with the name of the founder, Ernst Rabel) can be freely accessed at JSTOR. At all these locations, the content of these volumes will remain open access  and can be reproduced and redistributed in accord with the Creative Commons BY 4.0 licence. The same applies to all new articles published under the S2O model from 2024 forward.

We are convinced in our editorial capacity that the transition to open access is not only a timely and appropriate step that is consistent with the Institute’s ongoing academic mission, but also a measure that will strengthen the journal’s visibility by making its articles readily accessible to readers and researchers at any location, rather than only via libraries in Germany or abroad. We are convinced that this is wholly in the spirit of Ernst Rabel, who created the journal as a forum for international intellectual exchange with the aim of acquiring contributions from all over the world. As he once wrote: “domestic co-operation [cannot] suffice […]; help from foreign countries themselves is indispensable and will always be received with appreciation […] To examine legal material and ascertain the extent to which national legal barriers have become too constricted for it, and to transport scholarship beyond these barriers, this is indeed what commands academic inquiry of Germany’s own initiative, […] but its fulfilment becomes more comprehensive through international cooperation” (Ernst Rabel, Zur Einführung, Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 1 (1927) 1-4, 4).

But the transition to open access will not affect our quality standards. This also means that we have to keep assessing whether our quality measures remain up to date. Open access is an aspect of open science, and it is therefore committed to the guiding principle of disclosing all elements of the scientific process and making them verifiable, as stated in the UNESCO Recommendation on Open Science from 2022. “Open science” does not solely mean free access to publications; rather, it relates also to the responsible handling of research data, to an appropriate and inclusive procedure for the receipt and evaluation of submissions, and to proper efforts in terms of the editorial oversight, preparation and presentation of accepted contributions.

For quality assurance, the journal continues to rely on peer review by academics who are familiar with the subject matter of the submitted articles and who can judge their merit and originality. This procedure has for many years been in the hands of the editorial board, which, together with other reviewers, works on a voluntary basis and with great commitment and a sense of responsibility. We are deeply grateful for the efforts of all the individuals involved. With regard to the thematic and geographical scope of the journal and its aim to follow and participate in worldwide developments, it has become increasingly important to be able to draw on an international network of experts. As an institutional publication, we are mindful of the potential need to adjust the journal’s governance structure, and we wish to consider, for instance, whether and how the establishment of an additional committee could be beneficial. In terms of advisory input, the journal has traditionally been able to rely on the feedback of its co-editors, operating both in- and outside the Institute. They, as well, deserve our explicit gratitude for their co-operation, and we hope that they will continue to support the journal, contributing both valuable suggestions as well as constructive criticism.

Finally, the journal’s layout and design have also been updated. After remaining unchanged for decades, the appearance is now being adapted to match evolving reading habits. Nowadays, articles are increasingly being read on computer screens or mobile reading devices, and the subsequent use and reproduction of texts is now largely carried out by means of electronic devices. Certain formats, fonts, and typographic designs are better suited to these practices than others. Much may still be in flux here and will need to be monitored further, for example in terms of searchability and machine readability or the availability of alternative download formats. These are all important issues that the Institute and the publisher will have to keep in mind in the coming years.

Quality assurance can easily be at odds with speedy publication. We are therefore pleased that an online-first process was agreed with the publisher already in 2023, thereby allowing individual articles to be published promptly – in advance of the entire issue – after peer review and after completion of editorial processing. Through the use of digital object identifiers (DOI), these articles can be cited without ambiguity from the outset.

With these measures, the journal’s publisher and editors are taking significant steps in the direction of open science. We hope that many others will join us on this path and continue to breathe life into the journal, both as readers and as authors contributing from around the world.

Holger Fleischer / Ralf Michaels / Anne Röthel
and from the editorial desk Christian Eckl