Conflictoflaws

I. Introduction

This is certainly a genuinely interesting case from Bahrain, involving the application of “foreign” Jewish customs in a succession dispute that appears to be between Jewish Bahraini nationals. Although the case seems to lack any foreign element, its relevance to conflict of laws is nonetheless clear, since – to my knowledge – this is the first case in which the applicability of “foreign” religious customs in matters of personal status has been explicitly admitted in what appears a purely domestic case. The case also provides a broader analytical framework, raising questions about the place and applicability of non-state law in private international law (this contrasts of the recent decision of the French Supreme Court denying the applicability of Jewish law, albeit in a different context) and, more generally, about the compatibility of non-Islamic religious norms with domestic public policy frameworks in Muslim-majority legal systems.

 

II. Facts

The case concerns a domestic succession dispute involving Jews in Bahrain. Although the ruling does not expressly state this, the absence of any reference to choice-of-law rules strongly suggests that the parties involved were Bahraini Jews and that the case contained no foreign elements.

Following their brother’s death, Y1 (the deceased’s brother) brought proceedings in 2024 before the High Civil Court against Y2 (the deceased’s nephew) and Y3 (the deceased’s sister), seeking the opening of the estate, the identification of the heirs, an inventory of the assets, and the devolution of the estate. The court ordered the opening of the estate and held that Y1 and Y2 were entitled to equal shares.

X et al. (the deceased’s sisters), who were not parties to the original proceedings, filed a third-party objection seeking annulment of the judgment and a redistribution of the estate among all heirs, including themselves, in equal shares, based on Jewish inheritance customs or, subsidiarily, Islamic law. The objection was dismissed on the merits, and this outcome was upheld on appeal. X et al. then appealed to the Supreme Court of Bahrain, challenging their exclusion from the inheritance.

Before the Supreme Court, X et al. argued that the lower courts had relied on Chapter 27 of the Torah (the Old Testament), a text which, they contended, no longer reflects contemporary Jewish social or religious practice. They maintained that Jewish inheritance rules have evolved over time and that current customs within Jewish communities grant women equal inheritance rights in the absence of a will, an approach adopted by many rabbinical courts worldwide. In the absence of established Jewish inheritance rules or locally recognised custom in Bahrain, they argued that prevailing foreign custom should apply, since it does not conflict with Bahraini public policy.

 

III. Ruling

In its decision of 1 December 2025, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of X et al. holding as follows (detailed summary):

Under Bahraini law, the High Civil Courts have jurisdiction over all personal status matters concerning non-Muslims. Where no statutory rule applies, Article 1 of the Civil Code requires courts to apply the customs of the religious community concerned.

Such customs are not limited to those established locally in Bahrain. If no local custom is proven, courts may apply general or foreign customs, provided that they are genuinely observed by the members of the religion concerned. The application of foreign custom is subject to two conditions: first, that it is actually and consistently followed and regarded as binding within the community, that is, it has not fallen into disuse; and second, that it does not conflict with public policy in Bahrain. Where these conditions are met, the relevant foreign custom governs matters of personal status concerning members of the religion in question.

In this case, the lower court applied Chapter 27 of the Torah on the ground that no local Jewish custom governing the distribution of inheritance existed in Bahrain, thereby excluding any consideration of customs prevailing outside the Kingdom. However, once its existence is established, foreign custom may be disregarded only where it conflicts with a statutory provision or with public policy. The failure to examine whether relevant foreign Jewish inheritance customs existed and satisfied the required conditions—namely, that they are applied in a consistent, continuous, and well-known manner among members of the Jewish faith, that they are regarded by them as binding, and that they do not violate public policy—justifies the quashing of the decision and the remittal of the case.

 

III. Comments

Generally speaking, the application of foreign law in the MENA region has long been a challenging issue question marked by uncertainty and resistance in practice (for a general comparative overview, with a special focus on civil and commercial matters, see Béligh Elbalti, “Choice of Law in International Contract and Foreign Law before MENA Arab Courts from the Perspective of Belt and Road Initiative”, in Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit, Sai Ramani Garimella (eds.), Legal Challenges of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative – Private International Law Considerations (Routledge, 2025), pp. 145-150). Against this background, the acceptance by the Bahraini Supreme Court of the application of foreign customs in matters of personal status in a purely domestic case is all the more noteworthy, insofar as certain conditions are met.

The case raises in particular two fundamental questions: (1) the applicability of non-Muslim legal norms in Bahrain; and (2) the relevance of public policy in this context.

 

1. The applicability of non-Muslim legal norms in Bahrain

a) General Applicable framework

Unlike some non-neighboring countries in the region, where matters of personal status of non-Muslims—whether foreigners or nationals—may be governed by special legislation (see, for example, UAE federal legislation on Civil Personal Status), Bahrain has not adopted any specific legal framework applicable to non-Muslims.

There are, however, a few notable exceptions.

First, the 1971 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (CCCP) sets out conflict-of-laws rules that are expressly applicable to personal status matters involving non-Muslims (Article 21 of the Bahraini CCCP).

Second, Legislative Decree No. 11 of 1971 regulates inheritance and the devolution of estates of foreign non-Muslims.

Third, Legislative Decree No. 42 of 2002 on Judicial Jurisdiction provides, in Article 6, that disputes relating to the personal status of non-Muslims fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, as opposed to the Muslim Sharia courts, which, by contrast, have subject-matter jurisdiction over all disputes relating to the personal status of Muslims, with the exception of certain disputes relating to succession, which fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts (Article 13). In this context, the Muslim Sharia courts are required to apply Bahrain’s Family Law of 2017 (Law No. 17 of 2017), which to date constitutes the only legislative framework governing family law matters in Bahrain. This law, however, applies exclusively before the Muslim Sharia courts, which lack jurisdiction over disputes involving non-Muslims.

Accordingly, while the civil courts have jurisdiction ratione materiae to hear personal status disputes involving non-Muslims, Bahraini law does not specify the substantive law to be applied by those courts in such matters—except where the parties are foreigners and foreign law is applicable pursuant to Bahraini choice-of-law rules, or where the dispute concerns the succession of foreign non-Muslims, in which case Legislative Decree No. 11 of 1971 applies.

 

b) Customs as a source of law

It is in this context that the Bahraini Supreme Court relied on Article 1 of the Bahraini Civil Code of 2001, which authorizes courts to apply customs (‘urf) in the absence of legislative provisions. The reference to customs is significant, given that Bahraini family law does not contain any provision allowing non-Muslims to invoke the application of their own religious law, unlike several neighbouring jurisdictions in the region (see Article 1(2) of the UAE Personal Status Law of 2024; Article 364 of the Kuwaiti Personal Status Law of 2007; Article 4 of the Qatari Family Law of 2006; and Article 282 of the Omani Personal Status Law of 1997).

The Bahraini Supreme Court’s case law is consistent on this point. In a previous decision of 4 April 2023, the Supreme Court quashed a lower court judgment that had applied the 2017 Bahraini Family Law to a dispute involving spouses of the Bahá’í faith, without examining whether there existed any laws or regulations among members of the Bahá’í faith in Bahrain governing their personal status matters, or whether any customs regulated such matters. Unlike the case discussed here, the 2023 decision did involve a conflict-of-laws issue in the sense of private international law, which was resolved by applying Bahraini law as the lex patriae of the husband (Article 21(3) of the CCCP). It was at then that the Supreme Court emphasized the absence of Bahraini legislation governing personal status matters for non-Muslims and justified recourse to Article 1 of the Civil Code, thereby overruling the lower court’s decision for failing to consider the applicability of Bahá’í law or custom.

However, what is remarkable in the present case is that the court extended the scope of the “customs” referred to in Article 1 of the Civil Code to include “general and foreign (external) customs”, in the absence of a local one (‘urf mahalli). Reference to foreign (external) customs is, however, subject to two cumulative conditions: (1) the foreign customs must be generally observed by members of the relevant religious community, in the sense that they must not have fallen into disuse; and (2) they must not be inconsistent with public policy in Bahrain. With respect to the first condition, the appellants argued that the classical Jewish rule prioritizing male heirs and allowing women to inherit only in the absence of sons has become obsolete in contemporary Jewish social and religious communities. They contended that it has become common practice across Jewish communities worldwide to allow women to inherit on an equal basis, a practice consistently endorsed by rabbinic courts in various legal systems worldwide.

 

2. Consistency with public policy

Another key question concerns whether succession rules that depart from Islamic Sharia should be regarded as contrary to public policy. Given the centrality of Islamic Sharia in the legal systems of many MENA countries, succession rules raise a particularly sensitive issue when they diverge from its principles. This is more so, knowing that, in some jurisdictions, such as Egypt, where non-Muslims are permitted to apply their own religious rules in matters of family law, succession remains governed by a unified regime based on Islamic Sharia, which applies equally to Muslims and non-Muslims.

In the present case before the Bahraini courts, the applicable Islamic Sharia rules would have entitled the deceased’s sisters to inherit, but only on the basis of the principle that a male heir receives a share equal to that of two female heirs (Quran 4:176). In addition, remote male agnates, such as nephews, will be excluded. It is therefore understandable that X et al. invoked Islamic Sharia in the alternative, since, unlike the classical Jewish rule at issue, it would at least secure them a share in the estate, albeit an unequal one (on the reliance of Jewish community on Islamic Sharia courts, see Jessica M. Marglin, “Jews in Shari‘a Courts: A Family Dispute From the Cairo Geniza”, in A. E. Franklin et al. (eds.), Jews, Christians and Muslims in Medieval and Early Modern Times – A Festschrift in Honor of Mark Cohen (Brill, 2014), pp. 207-25).

The central issue, however, is whether an equal division of the estate among all potential heirs, without gender distinction, would raise concerns of Islamic public policy. On this point, comparative practice in the region shows a consistent reluctance to treat divergence from Islamic Sharia rules as such a violation. Courts across the Middle East have generally held that, in disputes involving non-Muslims, the application of foreign or religious rules differing from Islamic inheritance principles does not, in itself, offend public policy (for a detailed analysis from a private international law perspective, see Béligh Elbalti, “Applicable Law in Succession Matters in the MENA Arab Jurisdictions – Special Focus on Interfaith Successions and Difference of Religion as Impediment to Inheritance”, RabelsZ, Vol. 88(4), 2024, pp. 734). Against this background, it is unlikely that the Bahraini courts would consider an equal distribution of the estate among heirs to be contrary to public policy, particularly where the applicable framework already permits recourse to religious or customary norms in the absence of specific legislation.

by Arvid Kerschnitzki, University of Augsburg

On 23 April 2026, Advocate General Emiliou published his opinion on Case C-799/24 – Babcock Montajes S.A. v Kanadevia Inova Steinmüller GmbH. It adds another piece to the puzzle that is the CJEU’s broad interpretation of the term ‘judgment’ in the Brussels Ia Regulation. At the same time, the case highlights the persisting problems with procedural coordination under the regulation.

I. Facts of the case

The facts of the case as well as the procedural history have already been summarised in detail by Lino Bernard and Marta Requejo Isidro respectively, here and here.

To summarize:

A German and a Spanish company concluded a contract with an exclusive choice-of-court agreement in favour of a German court. Despite this agreement, the Spanish company initiated proceedings before a Spanish court in Madrid, seeking payment allegedly owed under the contract in connection with a bank guarantee invoked by the German company. Shortly thereafter, the German company brought proceedings before the designated German court in Cologne, seeking a declaration that the Spanish company was under an obligation to reimburse the German company and/or to pay damages.

The Madrid court affirmed its international jurisdiction without addressing the choice-of-court agreement, but declined territorial competence and referred the case to the court in San Sebastián (Spain). Although the German company did not challenge the Madrid court’s decision, it subsequently contested the international jurisdiction before the San Sebastián court. This objection was rejected in an interim decision, with the court relying on the prior determination of the Madrid court.

In parallel, the German court seized by the German company dismissed the action as inadmissible, holding that it was bound, pursuant to Art. 36(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, to recognise the decision of the San Sebastián court, even though the choice-of-court agreement had been disregarded. On appeal, however, the German appellate court overturned this decision, finding that it retained international jurisdiction despite the Spanish court’s ruling. This was due to the appellate court’s assertion that the interim decision did not constitute a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the Brussels Ia Regulation. The Spanish company appealed to the German Federal Court of Justice, which referred the following questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union:

1. Is the term ‘judgment’ in Article 36(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘the Brussels I Regulation’) to be interpreted to the effect that the court of a Member State on which an agreement as referred to in Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation confers exclusive jurisdiction (Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Regulation) must recognise a judgment by which a non-designated court of a Member State finds that the courts of that Member State have international jurisdiction if the judgment in question is an interim judgment, in other words, is not a decision which terminates a dispute?
2. If the answer to Question 1 is, in principle, in the affirmative: Does recognition of the interim judgment also depend on whether the interim judgment affirming the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State is binding on the non-designated court itself and/or whether the affirmation of international jurisdiction may be varied in the context of an appeal?

II. Opinion of Advocate General Emiliou

AG Emiliou addressed the questions jointly, understanding them as asking ‘whether an interim decision adopted by a court of a Member State, in which that court (only) declares itself to have international jurisdiction, but which does not yet make any determination on the merits of the claim, is covered by the concept of “judgment” within the meaning of Art. 36(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 and must therefore be recognised in accordance with that provision, even if that decision allegedly contradicts an exclusive choice-of-court agreement designating the courts of another Member State.’ (para 27).

He begins by emphasising that an infringement of a choice-of-court agreement cannot justify refusal of recognition (paras 38–56). This is based on the prohibition of a révision au fond (para 39), as also confirmed by the Gjensidige judgement (C?90/22) (para 42).

Turning to the central issue – whether an interim decision by which a court of a Member State declares itself to have jurisdiction, allegedly in breach of a choice-of-court agreement, constitutes a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Art. 2(a) of the Brussels Ia Regulation – AG Emiliou relies on the Court’s case law, in particular Maersk (Joined Cases C-345/22 to C-347/22) and Gothaer (C-456/11), to show that procedural decisions are not excluded from the concept of a ‘judgment’ (para 67–73). While acknowledging that these cases do not directly address the present issue (para 69), he argues that there is no convincing reason to distinguish between a decision declining jurisdiction (as in Gothaer) and one confirming jurisdiction (as in the present case) (para 79).

The AG then highlights the importance of the concept of ‘judgment’ in the context of lis pendens (para 74). He notes that the proper functioning of the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) would be uncertain if a purely jurisdictional decision were not regarded as a ‘judgment’ capable of recognition (para 76).

AG Emiliou emphasises that, although safeguarding the practical effectiveness of choice-of-court agreements is a legitimate concern, the protection afforded by Art. 31(2) does not justify excluding decisions containing only jurisdictional findings from the concept of a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the Regulation (paras 86–88). Refusing recognition of such an interim decision would effectively permit parallel proceedings and thereby create a risk of conflicting judgments – undermining the very objectives of the lis pendens rules (para 89). In such circumstances, Art. 29(3) should take precedence over Art. 31(2) once it becomes clear that parallel proceedings cannot be avoided through the mechanisms of Art. 31(2) (para 90).

Finally, AG Emiliou argues that the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) may arise at different stages of the proceedings, depending on whether the defendant is still able to contest jurisdiction. The court second seised should only decline jurisdiction once it can be safely assumed that the court first seised will proceed to examine the case on the merits (para 96). Referring to the wording of Art. 38(a), he concludes that the obligation to recognise a judgment containing only a jurisdictional determination may arise irrespective of whether that judgment is final. By contrast, the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) arises only once the jurisdiction of the court first seised has been established in such a way that it can no longer be contested (para 98).

In response to the second question referred, Emiliou further suggests that a jurisdictional determination may produce res judicata effects which cannot subsequently be set aside by the courts with priority (paras 99–101).

To summarise the Opinion of AG Emiliou: an interim decision, even if given in breach of a choice-of-court agreement, constitutes a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Art. 2(a) of the Regulation and must be recognised. While the obligation of recognition arises irrespective of whether the decision is final, the obligation of the court designated in the choice-of-court agreement to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) arises only once the jurisdiction of the court first seised can no longer be contested in the ongoing proceedings.

III. Comment

The present proceedings will likely make a further contribution to the CJEU’s emerging, controversial line of case law on what constitutes a ‘judgment’ capable of recognition within the meaning of Art. 36 of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Prominent examples include H Limited (C-568/20), London Steam-Ship (C-700/20) and Gothaer (C-456/11), all of which are referenced in the Opinion (Fn. 32, 34, 39).

To date, the Court has consistently adopted a broad interpretation of this concept, notwithstanding substantial criticism from scholars. The Opinion of AG Emiliou continues this approach by interpreting ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the Regulation as encompassing interim decisions, even where they are given in breach of Art. 31(2).

Even though (German) scholarship remains cautious with regard to the recognition of such decisions, the reasoning of AG Emiliou is largely convincing, albeit with some caveats.

The main reservation concerns his argument that the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3) needs to be reinforced by treating jurisdictional decisions as recognisable judgments (paras 76–78). This step does not appear necessary. As he himself acknowledges (para 78), the same line of reasoning could lead to the opposite conclusion, namely that Art. 29(3) already provides a sufficient mechanism, making the recognition of an interim judgment in such circumstances superfluous.

However, the Opinion remains firmly in line with the Court’s existing case law, with the judgment in Gothaer (see especially Nr. 79). It is convincing in emphasising that, while the Regulation seeks to protect choice-of-court agreements, the prevention of parallel proceedings – and thus of conflicting judgments – carries greater weight (paras 89–90). This is further underpinned by the emphasis on mutual trust and the free circulation of judgments (paras 38–40, 82, 85, 87).

It is, however, somewhat surprising that AG Emiliou initially relies on Art. 29(3) as a key argument in favour of recognising the interim judgment, yet ultimately maintains a substantive distinction between the obligation to recognise such a judgment under Art. 36(1) and the obligation to decline jurisdiction under Art. 29(3). In the present case, this distinction does not appear to affect the outcome. It remains to be seen in which situations it might lead to different results.

Ultimately, however, the case reveals a more fundamental issue. As Lino Bernard has aptly observed, it is, in essence, concerned with procedural coordination under the Brussels Ia Regulation. Since a violation of the lis pendens rules does not constitute a ground for refusal of recognition (Liberato – C-386/17; see also AG Emiliou’s Opinion, Nr. 53), the question whether an interim decision is capable of recognition becomes particularly significant in this context. By contrast, if the lis pendens rules were enforced at the level of Art. 45(1), the issue of recognisability would be far less consequential, as recognition could be refused on that basis.

In this regard, it is remarkable that AG Emiliou’s decision prima facie strengthens (see para 76) the lis pendens rules at the stage of recognition. It may provide a workable interim solution for the principle of priority under Art. 29(1) and (3). But at the same time, as the present case illustrates, it sacrifices the protection of choice-of-court agreements under Art. 31(2). This could conceivably create new opportunities to misuse the lis pendens rules and encourage a race to the courts, particularly for claimants  with the ability to convince the court to issue an early interim decision.

Accordingly, the case once again highlights the need to elevate the entire lis pendens regime to a ground for refusal of recognition. Encouragingly, the Commission’s Report on the application of the Brussels Ia Regulation suggests that the recast may address this issue.

Independent of any reform of the Regulation, it remains to be seen whether the Court will follow AG Emiliou’s broad understanding of ‘judgment’ and continue its line of extending the interpretation of that concept within the meaning of the Regulation.

 

The announcement below is kindly provided by Agatha Brandão de Oliveira (University of Lucerne, Switzerland)

 

After several years of intensive work, the Choice of Law Dataverse (CoLD) is ready to be shared with the wider community. The platform is an open-access resource gathering more than 17,000 data points — including legislation, court decisions, and other materials from 100 jurisdictions around the world. After collecting and processing this information, we have analyzed and systematized these choice-of-law rules into pedagogical country reports, now freely available for research, teaching, and practice. The project was recently awarded the Swiss National ORD Prize 2025.

We would be delighted to share this milestone with colleagues whose work continues to shape the field.

 

Date and Venue

28.04.2026 | Tuesday, 11.30 a.m. CEST, Online via Zoom

No registration required, calendar invitation with connection link attached

Participants are welcome to join the full programme or drop in for individual sessions — the Zoom link remains open throughout the day, and no registration is required.

 

Programme

11:30 – Understanding the Choice of Law Dataverse

Agatha Brandão (University of Lucerne, Switzerland) will demonstrate the platform’s main features.

12h – Party Autonomy: Sacred Principle or Legal Fiction?
A debate not to be missed between Professor Horatia Muir Watt (Sciences Po, France), Professor Béligh Elbalti (University of Osaka, Japan), and Professor Gérald Goldstein (Université de Montréal), moderated by Professor Daniel Girsberger (University of Lucerne, Switzerland), on the myths and enduring significance of party autonomy in international contract law.

13h – Permanent Bureau Remarks on Ten Years of the HCCH Principles

Raquel Peixoto offers a retrospective on a decade of the HCCH Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts — what has been achieved, what lies ahead, and how this work intersects with CoLD.

14h – Bilateral Q&A

Participants may also request a 15-minute private session to explore the Dataverse for their own research purposes, ask questions about the project, or sign up as a specialist for their jurisdiction.

17h – Using the Dataverse for Advancing PIL Research

A session we particularly recommend for doctoral candidates and young researchers: Rorick Tovar (University of Lucerne, Switzerland), Solomon Okorley (University of Johannesburg, South Africa), and Ying Wang (Université de Montréal, Canada) discuss how CoLD supports comparative law and case law analysis in their own research.

Further information: cold.global/event/launch
For any questions, please contact agatha.brandao@unilu.ch.

We hope you can join us online for our launch event!

CoLD

Choice of Law Dataverse

University of Lucerne

 

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The following call for papers has kindly been shared with us by the editors of The Journal of Law, Market & Innovation (JLMI)

This Call for Papers of the Journal of Law, Market & Innovation (JLMI) concerns the first issue to be published at the end of March 2027 and is devoted to the Securitisation of Supply Chains: Critical Raw Materials Between Energy Security and the Green Transition. This issue will be edited by the Editors-in-Chief of the JLMI (Lorenza Mola, Cristina Poncibò and Riccardo de Caria), along with Pritam Banerjee and Vishakha Srivastava as guest co-editor. You can find the call with all the details at the following link:

SECURITISATION OF SUPPLY CHAINS: CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS BETWEEN ENERGY SECURITY AND THE GREEN TRANSITION

The Call invites contributions on the subject of Securitisation of Supply Chains: Critical Raw Materials Between Energy Security and the Green Transition. The growing use of trade policy to advance national and economic security objectives is blurring the boundary between legitimate security measures and disguised restrictions on trade. Countries are increasingly giving new dimensions to traditional instruments such as trade defence instruments, import restrictions, export controls, local content requirements, subsidies tied to trusted supply chains, traceability and transparency requirements, among others, to serve strategic purposes. Moreover, concerns around energy security are translating into the securitisation of trade through control over critical raw materials, with security and resilience of supply chains emerging as the legal and political vocabulary for legitimising discriminatory trade measures.

The authors are called to explore the link between energy security and the green transition with regard to the regulation of trade in critical raw materials, particularly the tension between dependence on critical raw materials and decarbonisation commitments. In this context, the submissions examine the governance of critical raw materials, with a particular focus on their treatment as strategic assets rather than ordinary tradable goods.

The issue will also address the risk factors for security and resilience of supply chains, such as vulnerabilities arising from technological dependencies and asymmetries in access to key technologies.

We invite submissions that analyse state priorities, primarily driven by critical raw materials availability divide, and firm priorities, primarily driven by resilience of supply chains. Submissions may explore treatification, unilateral measures, contract clauses on critical raw materials, as well as their broader implications for global trade.

The Editorial Board will select articles based on the quality of research and writing, diversity, and relevance of the topic. The novelty of the academic contribution is also an essential requirement.

Prospective articles should be submitted in the form of full papers to submissions.jlmi@iuse.it by 20 July 2026. Submissions will undergo a preliminary selection process by the editorial board: authors will be notified of the outcome of this preliminary selection by 10 September 2026.  Selected articles will then undergo a rigorous double- blind peer-review process. Typically, the JLMI accepts contributions within the range of 10.000-15.000 words, including footnotes, but both shorter and longer articles will be considered. We ask prospective authors to kindly make sure that their submission conforms to the JLMI Code of Ethics and Authors’ guidelines (also with regard to disclosure of simultaneous submission to other journals: authors are required to disclose if they have submitted their article elsewhere, both in case of negative and pending reviews, and promptly update the editorial board of any changes in this regard, throughout the whole editorial process with the JLMI). Perspective authors are kindly required to follow the JLMI style guide, and abide by the OSCOLA citation standard. For further information, or for consultation on a potential submission, please email us at editors.jlmi@iuse.it.

The University of Edinburgh is recruiting a postdoctoral research fellow in private international law to work on an exciting new research project funded by the UKRI Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and the German Research Foundation (DFG) entitled “Fashion’s PLACE – Private (International) Law and Circular Economy”. The project explores the private law and private international law components of legal design for a just circular economy transition in global value chains. It takes the fashion industry as a case study, examining the journey of textiles from the places of production, via the marketplaces of consumption, to the places of disposal.

The post-holder will be line managed by Professor Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm and will be based in the School of Law at the University of Edinburgh. The post-holder will work closely with other investigators at the University of Edinburgh and Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, namely Dr Antonia Sommerfeld, Dr Michael Picard and Professor Ralf Michaels.

The post is full-time (35 hours per week).

The deadline for application is May 4th 2026.

More information on the project here, on the call here.

The next webinar in the Crossroads in Private International Law webinar series will be given by Prof. Csongor Nagy (University of Galway) on the topic “EU Law and Sports Arbitration: When Global and Regional Regimes Meet“.

The webinar is scheduled for 22 April 2026, 14:00 – 15:00 UTC.

More information about the event and registration is available here, at the webpage of the organiser – the Centre for Private International Law & Transnational Governance of the University of Aberdeen.

This post has previously been published by PAX Moot (with minor changes). Photo: University of Ljubljana Team. 

The PAX Moot 2026 — Vladimir Koutikov Round has come to an end, and what an incredible edition it has been. We hope it was an unforgettable experience for all participants — a unique opportunity to engage in high-level argumentation on Private International Law, grow advocacy skills, and forge lasting friendships along the way.

Without further ado, we are proud to announce the results of this year’s competition:

• Winner — University of Ljubljana
• Runner-up — Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski

Best Written Submission (shared 1st place) University of Warsaw & University of Ljubljana
Honourable Mention for Written Submission: Singapore Management University | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid | University of Antwerp

Best Oralist Awards:

• 1st place — Chloe Xin Ying Chia (Singapore Management University)
• 2nd place — Lara Vangoethem (Maastricht University)
• 3rd place — Benedetta Gargiulo (Maastricht University)

We extend our deepest gratitude to our hosts from Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, and to the European Commission for their generous funding, which makes this incredible event possible.

To every team, coach, judge, and volunteer who contributed to making PAX Moot 2026 a success: thank you.

Photo credit: Mayela Celis

The following Call for Contributions has been kindly shared with us by Sandrine Brachotte (UAntwerpen):

The organizers are pleased to invite you to contribute to a book and conference on the theme of decoloniality and legal methodology in Europe, given the political importance of methodology. This subject requires Europeans to draw inspiration from the knowledge and experience of the regions they colonised. Legal scholars must also learn from civil society and studies carried out in the social sciences.

Editors/Organisers:

Sandrine Brachotte, UAntwerpen

Christine Frison, ULiège

Lina Álvarez-Villarreal, Universidad de los Andes

Project Description

This book aims to connect European legal methodology to decoloniality. It examines the compatibility of European legal methodologies for teaching, studying, writing about, elaborating on and applying law with the demands of decoloniality. It will also suggest ways to address areas of conflict, inadequacy and structural misalignment between the two. The book’s focus on legal methodology rather than law reflects the assumption that methods are not apolitical and constitute ways of viewing the world (Gordon, Escobar).

The decolonial perspective exposes how the dominant worldview at the global level continues to marginalise the sensitivities to the world (Mignolo) of people from former colonies and their identities, using not only race and ethnicity, but also gender and sexual orientation (Lugones, Segato). It includes the argument that coloniality has built on the “world-of-One”: one hegemonic – capitalist, anthropocentric, modern, patriarchal, etc. – way of being human (Escobar), shaped primarily by Europe in a history of continuous dispossession of non-European peoples, territories, and nature, and the imposition of modern European values, norms and conceptions of knowledge. Decoloniality further highlights the need to redress this power imbalance as a matter of justice and equality by compensating for the structural peripherality of these sensitivities and identities. To do so, the voices of the people concerned must be listened to in the first place.

In this respect, the law must be reconsidered, as it is one of the main instruments of the modernity/coloniality tandem (Quijano). Its association with state law in legal theory is a product of modernity (Liotta and Szpiga). State law was used by European colonial powers to legitimise the colonial enterprise (García-López and Winter-Pereira), and it remains in place in formerly colonised states. This means that European epistemologies and values, both past and present, continue to govern the lives of formerly colonised communities to some extent (Bazán Seminario). Because coloniality operates on a global scale (Quijano), the decolonial project speaks to the entire world, including Europe. Moreover, as former colonial powers, European states have a special responsibility to address decolonial demands, which requires them to acknowledge a darker truth about themselves and thus the negative impact of coloniality on Europe (du Bois, Césaire, Àlvarez-Villarreal). Furthermore, Europe has much to learn from the epistemologies and struggles of colonised peoples (Comaroff and Comaroff) in order to address the contemporary crises of our time, such as reorganising knowledge (Lander), politics (Walsh, Gutiérrez-Aguilar, Tzul-Tzul), economics (Àlvarez-Villarreal), and dealing with climate and ecological crises (Millán, Escobar).

Decolonial approaches are gaining traction, including within legal studies (eg Achiume, Al Attar & Abdelkarim, Barreto, Kapur, Moreno, Nesiah). In this context, a few scholars have highlighted the need to rethink legal education and research in European universities (Adébísí), as well as the foundations of law and the content of legal rules in European states and at the EU level (eg Ashiagbor, Solanke, Zenouvou, Salaymeh & Michaels, Eklund, Brachotte). International law must of course also be rethought from a decolonial perspective, including in European universities. Yet, the concrete methodological implications of decoloniality for law in Europe remain poorly defined. In this regard, the rich work of several decolonial social scientists (eg Bhambra, Diagne, Carneiro, Galcerán Huguet, Moosavi, Mbembe, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Omodan, Ribeiro, Udah), scholars working in Indigenous studies (eg Borrows, Datta, Denscombe, Ewing, Krenak, Monchalin, Napoleon, Thambinathan & Kinsella, Smith, Tuhiwai Smith) and decolonial legal scholars from formerly colonised states (eg de Almeida, Diouf, Mosaka) must be built upon.

Audience

The book is intended for legal students, researchers and practitioners, as well as for civil society organisations.

Scope and Themes

The volume seeks contributions addressing, inter alia, the following questions:

• What does decoloniality require from legal research and writing, especially in view of the empirical turn, the historicisation of law, and the decolonial demand to go for “undisciplinarity”?
• How compatible are European universities’ legal and ethical standards, as well as the acquisition policies of their libraries, with these requirements?
• What does decoloniality require of legal education, both in terms of subject matter and pedagogical techniques?
• What does decoloniality require from the legal methods and techniques that are used in legal practice, to draft legislation or to take judicial or administrative decisions considering (i) law in general and (ii) the specificities of each branch of law, such as comparative law, public international law, private international law, European Union law, civil law, criminal law, and migration law?
• Regarding legal research, legal education and legal practice, to what extent can decolonial methods developed in formerly colonised states be implemented in Europe to enhance methodological compatibility, and what are alternative methods to reach that goal?

Type of Contributions and Selection Process

We invite original and unpublished chapter proposals of approximately 8,000–10,000 words (including footnotes and references).

We welcome authors who have a social sciences or legal background or who claim undisciplinarity, and who are in academia, in legal practice, or in civil society organisations.

We strongly encourage authors who do not feel comfortable in English to submit an abstract in their own language.

Abstracts will be selected on the basis of academic quality, with due regard to representativity and inclusiveness, including diversity in geographical backgrounds, gender, and career stages, in order to ensure a pluralistic discussion.

Conference

The conference will take place at UAntwerp (Belgium) on 25, 26 and 27 January 2027, starting after lunchtime on the first day and finishing before lunchtime on the last day. We are delighted to be able to already announce that Dr. Leon Moosavi will act as a keynote speaker.

 

Participants will be expected to cover their own travel and accommodation expenses. However, the organisers are firmly committed to ensuring that financial constraints do not constitute an obstacle to participation. Scholars who may face difficulties in covering travel or accommodation costs are warmly encouraged to contact the organisers in confidence to discuss possible arrangements.

In addition, where travel is not possible (for example, due to visa restrictions, institutional limitations, or personal circumstances), remote participation will be facilitated, including participation in the conference discussions via online means.

The organisers aim to ensure an inclusive and accessible academic exchange, irrespective of geographic or financial constraints.

Submission Guidelines

Interested contributors are invited to submit:

• An abstract (300–500 words)
• A short biographical note (100–150 words)

Deadline: 30 April 2026

Timeline

• Notification of acceptance: 30 May 2026
• Draft chapter submission: 30 July 2026

• Feedback to authors from external peer reviewers and editors: 30 September 2026

• Final chapter submission (subject to modifications following the conference): 20 December 2026

Contact

Proposals should be sent to: dlmsineurope@gmail.com

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts“ (IPRax) features the following articles:

 

B. Heiderhoff/C. Rüsing: Dealing with parallel proceedings in Third Countries – from Germany via Brussels to The Hague? [German]

The extent to which civil proceedings pending in a third country preclude proceedings before domestic courts varies considerably across jurisdictions. Autonomous German law with its quite strict first-seized rule accords substantial deference to proceedings initiated earlier in third countries. Other legal systems have adopted a more cautious approach, most notably common law jurisdictions, which rely on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation reacts to these differences. At least for some grounds of jurisdiction, it allows the Member State courts to exercise discretion and suspend proceedings if a foreign court has been seized earlier. Ultimately, both autonomous German law and European law attach great importance to priority and to international jurisdiction.

Against this background, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has published a draft convention on parallel proceedings. It seeks to combine jurisdiction- and priority-based approaches with elements of the forum non conveniens doctrine. This article therefore reconsiders, at a more fundamental level, the appropriate response to parallel proceedings. It first compares the German and European approaches and demonstrates why, de lege lata, Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation cannot be applied by analogy under autonomous German law. On this basis, the article evaluates the draft Hague Convention and critically assesses its underlying orientation.

 

L. d´Avout: Trojan following Coman, Pancharevo and Mirin: Another step forward or an editorial misstep? [German]

According to Trojan, under EU law and despite constitutional prohibitions, a Member State is obliged to directly recognise a same-sex marriage validly concluded in another Member State, without any restrictions on the purposes and scope of direct recognition (free enjoyment of EU citizens’ rights). Here, the CJEU appears to be going one step further. The motivation behind the recognition order is innovative; however, in reality, the court ruling acts as a mere echo of the ECtHR’s case law on defective national personal and family law. Omnis interpretatio sub lege europae periculosa est.

 

K. A. Prinz von Sachsen Gessaphe: No jurisdiction of German courts to determine the heirs of Pope Benedict XVI. [German]

In this decision, the Munich Court of Appeal (“OLG München”) deals with the international jurisdiction for the appointment of a curator of the estate for the purpose of determining unknown heirs of Pope Emeritus Benedict XIV, who died in 2022. Since he had his habitual residence in the Vatican City State, where he also died, at least since his election as Pope in 2005, the jurisdiction of German courts under Art. 4 EU Succession Regulation was ruled out. The OLG also denied subsidiary jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 10 EU Succession Regulation, as none of the deceased’s estate assets were located in Germany. It also considered that the requirements for emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 11 EU Succession Regulation were not met, as neither the impossibility nor the unreasonableness of initiating or conducting proceedings before the courts of the Vatican City State could be assumed. The court did not, however, address the obvious question of whether the measure could be based on Art. 19 EU Succession Regulation. Ultimately, the OLG can be agreed with, even though the reasoning should have been more detailed in some respects; in particular, it should have addressed the jurisdiction under Art. 19 EU Succession Regulation, which was, however, also to be rejected here because there is no genuine link between the requested measure and the territorial jurisdiction of German courts.

 

M. Gebauer: Renvoi under the European Succession Regulation and its consequences: characterisation in foreign choice-of-law rules; substitution; preliminary questions; adaptation; parallel proceedings [German]

The underlying constellation of the decision proves to be a prototype for the more complex follow-up questions that arise after a renvoi under the European Succession Regulation. These include the characterisation of the third state’s choice-of-law rules according to its own criteria; partial renvoi; the secondary characterisation of the substantive rules of the lex fori, to which the third state’s choice-of-law rules refer; preliminary questions of matrimonial property law within the substantive succession rules; substitution and adaptation. A typical procedural challenge arises when the deceased had the last habitual residence in a third state because the extensive subsidiary jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States according to the European Succession Regulation often leads to parallel proceedings in the respective third states.

 

B. Heiderhoff: Change of applicable law and adjustment of an Islamic mahr to German post-marital claims [German]

The OLG Düsseldorf decided that the agreed amount of an Islamic mahr (dower) may be reduced if the basis of the transaction ceases to exist as a consequence of a change of the applicable law. While the contract was originally concluded under Iranian Law, the court held that due to the acquisition of German citizenship German law became applicable. The court applied section 313 of the German Civil Code (BGB) (“Interference with the basis of the transaction”) because – unlike under Iranian law – the wife can claim division of pension rights under German law. The author first shows that under the Matrimonial Property Regulation (Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103) the law applicable to the mahr will no longer change when Iranian citizens are naturalised in Germany. However, even if one followed the court in assuming a change of the applicable law, section 313 of the BGB cannot be applied as easily as the OLG Düsseldorf held.

 

F. Berner: Cross-border favours [German]

The decision of the Munich Court of Appeal (OLG München) deals with a cross-border favour. Although the OLG correctly concludes that German substantive law applies in the individual case, the decision raises the question of how claims arising from the breach of a duty of care in the context of favours should actually be characterised. For example, it is not entirely clear whether substantive tortious claims in this context always fall under the Rome II Regulation or whether they do not fall – at least partially – under the Rome I Regulation. Equally problematic is the characterisation of the “relationship of favour” (“Gefälligkeitsverhältnis”) – a category between contract and tort. Finally, the decision is also of interest because of its treatment of a comparative law argument within substantive law.

 

M. Stürner: Between lex fori and lex causae: The claim for reduction in price in the event of defective work under Italian law [German]

The Court of Appeal Dresden had to deal with a warranty claim to which Italian law applied as the defendant contractor had its seat in Italy. The claimant’s request was interpreted by the Senate as a declaration of a reduction in price by applying the lex fori, although, pursuant to Article 12 (1) lit. c) Rome I Regulation, the law applicable to the contractual obligation (i.e. Italian law) also determines the consequences of the (partial) non-fulfilment of the contractual obligation. Even if the diverging approaches did not produce different results in the end, it once again shows the difficulties in distinguishing between the fundamental categories of lex fori and lex causae.

 

C. Thole: Judicial Review of fair trial and public policy in exequatur proceedings regarding foreign arbitral awards [German]

The Bavarian Court of Appeal (BayObLG) had to decide upon the enforceability of a Danish arbitral award, against which the respondent, among other things, objected on the grounds of a violation of the right to be heard. The judgment is largely based on the specific circumstances of the individual case and the respondent’s failure to sufficiently substantiate his objections. However, the court decision also points to still unresolved legal questions reaching beyond the case at hand.

 

G. Freise/L. Vollert: Choice of court agreements and overriding mandatory provisions: Does Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation allow for lois de police? [German]

Several EU regulations allow for overriding mandatory provisions. The French Cour de cassation had to decide whether Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation likewise allows for such a reservation in favour of lois de police. The Cour de cassation, however, held that Article 25 Brussels I bis Regulation does not allow the application of overriding mandatory provisions. According to the view taken here, the ruling should be seen in connection with the recent case law of the CJEU. The CJEU has, in its more recent decisions, significantly limited the scope for review of jurisdiction agreements falling under Article 25 Brussels I bis Regulation. From this perspective, the Cour de cassation’s decision is convincing. Nevertheless, some concerns regarding the right to a fair trial remain.

 

A. Spickhoff: Medical device liability in international jurisdiction and conflict of laws [German]

Medical device liability in international jurisdiction and conflict of laws exhibits certain peculiarities due to various actors being involved on the production side. This necessitates a closer examination, particularly in private international law, of the group of parties entitled to be sued under Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation. Before this examination, however, the place of the tort establishing jurisdiction, meaning the place of injury or the place at which the tortious act occurred, must be specified in a ubiquitous manner. From the Austrian perspective, in case of a remote tort, only the place of conduct is relevant.

 

S. Vuattoux-Bock: The law applicable to the last purchaser’s direct action [German]

In cross-border supply chains, defects may only become apparent after goods have been resold, giving rise to complex liability issues across multiple links in the chain. Under French law, subsequent purchasers have a direct contractual claim (“action directe”) against all prior sellers, including the manufacturer. However, the applicable law for such claims in international chains has been uncertain. In two landmark rulings on 28 May 2025, the French Cour de Cassation ruled that the “action directe” is governed by the Rome II Regulation. This rejected its previous contractual classification in favour of a tort-based approach for private international law purposes. These decisions have significant implications, particularly for German manufacturers, as they greatly reduce the predictability of liability exposure in the supply chain. Ultimately, the rulings strengthen the position of French, Belgian or Luxembourgish end buyers in international supply chains, but raise substantial concerns regarding legal certainty and risk assessment for manufacturers and intermediaries. This article critically examines these rulings, highlighting the tension between EU-wide coherence and legal certainty. It also discusses possible alternative approaches, including the application of Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation, to better balance the foreseeability of liability for suppliers with the protection of end buyers.

 

M. Weller: Governmental interest analysis and Nazi-looted art [German]

The judgment to be discussed here implements the previous decision of the U.S. Supreme Court: In actions against states and their instrumentalities, e.g. for the restitution of Nazi-looted art based on the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in which the federal court seised with the matter is located (here California) are to be applied, rather than federal choice of law rules. However, in accordance with this requirement, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit again applied Spanish law on acquisitive prescription under the governmental interest analysis as practiced in California and thus dismissed the action in favor of the state-owned Museo Thyssen-Bornemisza in Madrid, as it had done before under federal choice of law. California took this as an opportunity to enact legislation in direct response to the ruling in cases like the present one, ordering the application of California substantive law. This prompted the plaintiff to pursue his claim with further legal remedies aimed at rehearing the case, currently with a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The decision on this petition is still pending. The judgment presented here illustrates the functioning and weaknesses of governmental interest analysis in an exemplary manner. At the same time, the decision is equally exemplary in revealing that – after more than 20 years of proceedings – the processing of historical injustice before state courts under applicable law has its limits. The U.S. should follow its own international plea for “just and fair solutions” and provide alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, as Germany, for example, has been doing since 2003.

 

GEDIP: The law applicable to rights in rem in corporeal assets [English]

GEDIP: Guidelines on the Influence of European Union Law on Member States Law on Nationality [English]

GEDIP: Guidelines on the treatment of renvoi in European Union instruments on applicable law in civil matters [English]

C. Kohler: The renvoi in European conflict of laws – Meeting of the European Group of Private International Law 2025 [German]

Issue 1 of RabelsZ 90 (2026) has just been released. It contains the following articles which are all available Open Access: CC BY 4.0:

 

Holger Fleischer, Felix Bassier, Samuel Insull und Ivar Kreuger: Finanzskandale als Katalysatoren der US-amerikanischen Wertpapiergesetze von 1933/34 [Samuel Insull and Ivar Kreuger: Financial Scandals as Catalysts of US Securities Law from 1933 and 1934], pp. 1–57, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2026-0008

The US securities laws from 1933 and 1934 remain to this day the international benchmark for modern capital market regulation. Like many other regulations in this area, the legislation was preceded by major scandals. This article reconstructs the two leading scandals surrounding electricity magnate Samuel Insull and »Match King« Ivar Kreuger. After situating them within the spectrum of scandals occurring in the Roaring Twenties, the article considers these incidents in the larger context of research on corporate law scandals.

 

Bero Gebhard, Julian Greth, Dispositive Organhaftung: Perspektiven aus Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsökonomik [Contracting Around Director Liability: Perspectives from Comparative Law and Law & Economics], pp. 58–91, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2025-0070

The business judgment rule is intended to protect managers and board members from personal liability in connection with business decisions, thereby enabling risk-optimized decision-making. However, the requirements of an adequate information base and reasonableness preserve incentives for risk-averse behaviour, and the possibility of erroneous evaluations of business decisions by courts creates further incentives for board members to shy away from risk, yet such risk aversity is inefficient in a diversified shareholder structure. This article examines mechanisms for excluding the personal liability of board members in Delaware (USA) and Switzerland. The policy reference point is the ex ante dispositive liability regime under § 102(b)(7) Delaware General Corporation Law, whereas Swiss corporate law relies on less effective ex post mechanisms. The authors call for the implementation of an opt-out model for liability due to breaches of duty of care, similar – but not identical – to the legal framework in Delaware; such a model could be especially beneficial to high-growth companies. To this end, a policy proposal is developed that should also allow for exemption from liability for gross negligence.

 

Julia Kraft, Pflichtprüfung und Anschlusszwang im Kontext grenzüberschreitender Genossenschaftsmobilität. Wie viel Zwang verträgt die Freiheit? [Mandatory Audits, Membership in Umbrella Organizations, and the Cross-border Mobility of Cooperatives.
How Much Constraint Is Still Freedom?], pp. 92–119, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2026-0003

The cross-border mobility of companies is an expression of the freedom of establishment, which also applies to cooperatives, as emphasized in Art. 54(2) of the TFEU. But German cooperative law doubly constrains the freedom of establishment. First, every registered cooperative (eingetragene Genossenschaft, eG) under German law is subject to mandatory periodic audits. Second, cooperatives must belong to an umbrella organization that the state has authorized to perform the audits. Both obligations – core elements of the German act on cooperatives – may conflict with the freedom of establishment. Considering the German government’s 25 June 2025 draft of an act to »Strengthen the Legal Form of the Cooperative«, this article explores the tension between regulatory constraints and the freedom of establishment and assesses whether the requirements imposed by German cooperative law are compatible with it.

 

Christian Rüsing, Zum Verhältnis von Internationalem Privat- und Verwaltungsrecht.
Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel von Eingriffsnormen im Europäischen Kollisionsrecht [The Relationship between Private International Law and Administrative International Law.  The Example of Overriding Mandatory Provisions in EU Conflict of Laws]m pp. 120–156, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2026-0005

The relationship between private international law and administrative international law is rarely examined in detail. Yet both areas would benefit from considering the other. In the context of private international law, this is particularly pertinent in relation to overriding mandatory provisions. In the HUK-Coburg II case, the CJEU recently established two unwritten requirements for the enforcement of these provisions: Courts may enforce such provisions only if, first, the legal situation in question has sufficiently close links with the Member State of the forum and, second, the public interest cannot be achieved through the application of the lex causae. This article demonstrates that the criterion of a sufficiently close link with the Member State of the forum is viewed differently when considered alongside the principles of administrative international law. The second requirement, the necessity test, has – among other things – a significant influence on approaches to coordinating administrative and private international law through the instrument of overriding mandatory provisions. The article therefore examines how both areas can be better coordinated, at least within the internal market.

 

Mary-Rose McGuire, Das auf Datennutzungsverträge anwendbare Recht.
Eine kritische Analyse der Einordnung von Art. 3 DSGVO und Art. 1 Abs. 3 Data Act als international-privatrechtliche Kollisionsnormen [The Law Applicable to Data Sharing Agreements.  A Critical Analysis of the Classification of Article 3 GDPR and Article 1(3) Data Act as Conflict-of-law Rules under Private International Law], pp. 157–190, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2026-0007

The European legislature has issued a series of legal acts aimed at creating a European data space. Common to these instruments is that they establish a regulatory framework for this data space but leave it to be filled by the relevant actors through a network of contracts. The acts include only isolated requirements for these contracts, and their conclusion, validity, and termination is otherwise governed by national law. With regard to such data use contracts, harmonized private international law does not yet provide any specific rules. The two central legal acts – the GDPR and the Data Act – contain provisions only on the territorial scope of application. Against this background, it is subject to debate whether the general conflict-of-law rules of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations apply or are superseded by conflict-of-law rules “hidden” in the rule on the scope of application. Practical differences arise particularly with regard to the admissibility of choice of law and the applicability of European data law in relation to third countries. The analysis shows that a reliable determination of the applicable law requires distinguishing between the existence of rights to data, contracts relating to data, and breaches of obligations relating to data. The article advocates application of the Rome Regulations on determining the law applicable to contracts and torts with adaptation to the specific characteristics of the digital space.

 

BOOK REVIEWS

This issue also contains several reviews of literature in the fields of comparative private and private international law and on related topics (pp. 191–221).

You are invited to the next Migration Talk organized by the Jean Monnet Chair in Legal Aspects of Migration Management in the European Union and in Türkiye.

Speaker: Prof. Dr. Diego Acosta, University of Bristol

Title: An Analysis of Free Movement Regimes Globally

Date and Time: Monday, April 20, 2026 – 12:30 PM – 1:20 PM (Turkish Time)

Event Location: via Zoom (The Zoom link shall be provided upon request: migration@bilkent.edu.tr)

GE 250/251 will be given for full attendance.

The event will be held in English.

About Guest

Dr. Diego Acosta is a Law Professor at the University of Bristol in the UK. He has authored over 80 academic works and has consulted for various governments and international organisations worldwide. As a prominent speaker, he has presented his research at academic conferences and workshops in more than 40 countries. He has been interviewed by several media outlets, most recently by The New York Times. You can visit his professional website at: www.diegoacosta.eu

Abstract

Governments worldwide engage in a variety of treaties to regulate the movement of people, which either impose restrictions or make mobility easier. However, the treaties facilitating movement are not properly categorized. Instead, scholars and policymakers often pile them up under the wider umbrella of free movement. The Freemove project, supported in part through a grant from the Open Society Foundations, is the first one ever to comprehensively map, analyze, and compare all bilateral and multilateral free movement of people regimes at the global level. Users can access information about each regime, see how they have evolved over the last 30 years, compare them with others, and assess trends in this crucial area which affects the rights of millions of people in situations of human mobility. The website is available here: www.freemovehub.com

 

 

I. Introduction

Finally out: the new Moroccan Code of Civil Procedure (Law No. 58.25), the preparation of which was previously announced on this blog, has been promulgated by Dahir (Royal Decree) No. 1.26.07 of 11 February 2026 and published in the Official Journal (Al-Jarida Ar-Rasmiyya) No. 7485 of 23 February 2026. The legislative process was fraught with difficulties, and the draft went back and forth several times before its final adoption earlier this year. The Code will enter into force six months after its publication, i.e. on 24 August 2026.

As previously introduced on this blog, the preparatory work for the new Code dates back to 2023, when a first draft was submitted to the Moroccan House of Representatives (Draft No. 02.23). One of the main innovations of the new Code is the introduction, for the first time in Moroccan history, of a catalogue of rules on international jurisdiction. The Code also amends the existing rules governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Apart from a few minor exceptions, the provisions contained in the new Code, both on international jurisdiction and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, remain largely unchanged compared with those previously presented, save for limited linguistic and stylistic adjustments that do not entail any substantive legal implications.

What follows is a brief outline of the main solutions adopted in the Code, followed by a short assessment.

 

II. International Judicial Jurisdiction

The rules governing international jurisdiction are now expressly set out in Articles 72 to 75 of the new Code, contained in Chapter IV, entitled “International Judicial Jurisdiction” (al-Ikhtisas al-Qada’i ad-Duwali). The new rules may be summarized as follows:

 

1. General jurisdiction based on the defendant’s Moroccan nationality and the domicile or residence of a foreign defendant in Morocco (Articles 72 and 73)

Article 72 confers general jurisdiction on Moroccan courts on the basis of the Moroccan nationality of the defendant, even where the latter has neither domicile nor residence in Morocco. Article 73, by contrast, adopts the classical principle of actor sequitur forum rei when proceedings are brought against a foreign defendant. In both cases, jurisdiction is excluded where the action concerns an immovable property located abroad (last sentence of Articles 72 and 73).

 

2. Special jurisdiction in cases where the action is brought against foreign defendants with no domicile or residence in Morocco (Article 74)

Article 74 lays down an additional set of rules on special international jurisdiction applicable where proceedings are brought against foreign defendants who have neither domicile nor residence in Morocco. In such cases, Moroccan courts may assume jurisdiction when the action concerns:

1) assets located in Morocco, or obligations formed, performed, or to be performed in Morocco (Article 74(1));

2) tortious liability where the act giving rise to liability or the damage occurred in Morocco (Article 74(2));

3) the protection of intellectual property rights in Morocco (Article 74(3));

4) proceedings relating to businesses in difficulty instituted in Morocco (Article 74(4));

5) cases involving multiple defendants, provided that at least one of them is domiciled in Morocco (Article 74(5));

6) maintenance obligations where the maintenance beneficiary resides in Morocco (Article 74(6));

7) matters relating to the filiation of a minor residing in Morocco, or to guardianship over a person or property (Article 74(7));

8) matters of personal status where

• (i) the plaintiff is Moroccan, or
• (ii) the plaintiff is a foreigner residing in Morocco and the defendant has no known domicile abroad (Article 74(8))

9) dissolution of the marital bond where

• (i) the marriage contract was concluded in Morocco;
• (ii) the action is brought by a spouse who is a Moroccan national; or
• (iii) one spouse has abandoned the other and established domicile abroad or has been deported from Morocco (Article 74(9)).

In addition, article 74 in fine further clarifies the ancillary heads of international jurisdiction. In particular, Moroccan courts to hear an original action are also empowered can assume jurisdiction to adjudicate any counterclaims and related claims arising from the same legal relationship. Finally, Moroccan courts are granted jurisdiction to order conservative and provisional measures intended to be executed in Morocco, even where they lack jurisdiction over the merits of the principal dispute.

 

3. Jurisdiction based on the agreement of the parties (Art. 75)

The new Code also recognises party autonomy as an independent basis of international jurisdiction. Under Article 75 para. 1, even where a dispute would not otherwise fall within the ordinary heads of jurisdiction set out above, Moroccan courts may assume jurisdiction where the defendant expressly or implicitly consents to, or submits to, their jurisdiction. This jurisdiction by consent is, however, excluded where the action concerns immovable property situated abroad.

 

4. Ex officio declining jurisdiction in the event of non-appearance

The Code further introduces a rule aimed at preventing the exercise of jurisdiction by default (Article 75 in fine). Where the defendant fails to enter an appearance, the court is required, ex officio, to decline jurisdiction and to declare itself incompetent.

 

III. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

The new rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are now set out in Articles 451 to 456 of the new Code. While they largely reproduce existing solutions, they nonetheless introduce several important innovations.

 

1. Necessity of exequatur

Article 451 establishes the principle that foreign judgments cannot be enforced in Morocco as such. Their enforcement is subject to a prior declaration of enforceability (exequatur) by the competent Moroccan court, granted in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Code. Article 452 sets out the procedural framework governing applications for exequatur, while article 454 specifies the documentary requirements and the avenues of appeal applicable to exequatur proceedings.

 

2. Enforcement requirements

Article 453 sets out the substantive conditions that must be satisfied before a foreign judgment may be declared enforceable in Morocco. These requirements may be grouped as follows.

a) Requirements relating to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. First, the foreign court must not have ruled on a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of Moroccan courts (Article 453(i)). In addition, the choice of the foreign forum must not have been tainted by fraud (Article 453(ii)).

 b) Requirement relating to due process. Due process guarantees must have been respected, in particular insofar as the parties were duly summoned and properly represented in the proceedings before the foreign court (Article 453(iii)).

 c) Requirements relating to finality and the absence of conflicting judgments. The judgment must be final and conclusive under the law of the court of origin (Article 453(iv)). Moreover, it must not be incompatible with a judgment previously rendered by Moroccan courts (Article 453(v)).

 d) Requirement relating to public policy. The foreign judgment must not violate Moroccan public policy (Article 453(vi)).

 e) Requirement relating to the contravention of international conventions ratified by Morocco. Finally, the content of the enforcement judgment must not contravene the provisions of any international convention ratified by Morocco and published in the Official Gazette (Article 453(vii)).

 

3. The reciprocity requirement

In addition to the foregoing conditions, Article 456 introduces the requirement of reciprocity as a condition for the enforcement of foreign judgments. While the application of the above requirements remains subject to international conventions binding on Morocco, the new Code now expressly requires that the existence of reciprocal treatment between Morocco and the State of origin be taken into account when ruling on an application for exequatur.

 

4. Instruments eligible to enforcement

Article 455 extends the exequatur mechanism beyond foreign judgments to cover titles and authentic instruments drawn up abroad. Such instruments may be enforced in Morocco provided that they were established by competent public officers or public servants and that they qualify as enforceable titles under the law of the State of origin. Their enforcement in Morocco is subject to a prior declaration of enforceability and is conditional upon the instrument being enforceable in its State of origin and not being contrary to Moroccan public policy.

 

IV. Comments

The introduction of new rules on international jurisdiction and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is, in itself, a welcome development. It reflects a growing awareness among the Moroccan authorities of the practical importance of private international law and an intention to provide legal practitioners and courts with a clearer and more structured framework. This development is consistent with Morocco’s increasing engagement at the international level, notably through the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), an engagement that has recently culminated in the establishment of an HCCH Regional Office for Africa in Morocco.

However, from a substantive point of view, the newly adopted rules may leave a certain sense of dissatisfaction. This is due to a number of issues, most of which were already pointed out in a previous post on this blog.

 

1. International jurisdiction

First, as regards the legal framework governing international jurisdiction, a reading of the adopted provisions gives the impression that the legislature has remained attached to an outdated conception of private international law, and has failed to take account of more recent developments, even with respect to some fundamental issues. In particular, the new rules do not distinguish between exclusive and concurrent heads of jurisdiction, despite the practical importance of such a distinction for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Nor do they introduce specific regimes for situations requiring enhanced protection, such as disputes involving weaker parties (notably consumers and employees), or provide more detailed rules for parallel proceedings, including lis pendens and connexity.

More importantly, the new Code introduces a number of questionable grounds of jurisdiction. These include, in particular, the nationality of the defendant, the place of conclusion of the contract, and the mere location of property in Morocco, irrespective of its value. Finally, although the Code introduces a new rule based on party autonomy in matters of jurisdiction, it fails to provide a clear and coherent regime governing choice-of-court agreements, in particular as regards whether the parties may oust the jurisdiction of Moroccan courts that would otherwise be competent under the newly adopted rules.

 

2. Enforcement of foreign judgments

While the new provisions clarify the formal requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments, they fail to take sufficient account of existing judicial practice and introduce rules that lack precision and are open to divergent interpretations.

For instance, Moroccan law does not, as a general rule, clearly distinguish between recognition and enforcement, as foreign judgments are in principle subject to a prior declaration of exequatur. Nevertheless, the case law of the Moroccan Supreme Court has, to some extent, developed a pragmatic approach that de facto allows the recognition of certain effects of foreign judgments even in the absence of a prior exequatur declaration. However, the new Code does not take these developments into account and instead adopts rules focusing exclusively on the enforcement of foreign judgments, thereby leaving the status quo on this issue largely unchanged.

In addition, the new rules clarify the control exercised over the jurisdiction of the foreign court by introducing a twofold examination. First, the matter decided by the foreign court must not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Moroccan courts. However, as noted above, the new provisions on international jurisdiction fail to identify or define the matters that are to be regarded as falling within such exclusive jurisdiction. Secondly, the rules require that the choice of the court of origin must not have been fraudulent. In this respect, it should be noted that an additional requirement concerning the existence of a characteristic connection between the dispute and the State of the rendering court had initially been envisaged. This requirement, which echoed the approach adopted by the French Cour de cassation in the well-known Simitch case, was ultimately removed from the final version of the Code, arguably because of the practical difficulties it would have entailed for judges in assessing the existence of such a connection.

Furthermore, the version finally adopted introduces a new requirement that was absent from earlier drafts and appears to have been added during the legislative process. This concerns the condition that the content of the enforcement judgment must not contravene an international convention duly ratified by Morocco. The rationale for the introduction of this requirement is not only unclear, but the provision itself is largely redundant. Indeed, Articles 454 and 456 of the new Code already give priority to the application of international conventions ratified by Morocco. The provision appears also to be difficult to apply in practice, given that the manner in which this provision is formulated, particularly in the Arabic version of the text, is awkward and makes its precise scope and operation difficult to ascertain.

Finally, the introduction of reciprocity as a condition for the enforcement of foreign judgments comes as something of a surprise and is arguably problematic. The former Code of Civil Procedure contained no reference to reciprocity, and Moroccan practice had long evolved without treating it as a relevant requirement. It is true that Article 19 of the Dahir (Royal Decree) of 12 August 1913 on the civil status of French nationals and foreigners in Morocco refers to reciprocity. However, although that provision has never been formally repealed, the prevailing view among Moroccan scholars is that it is no longer applicable, a position reflected in judicial practice, as Moroccan courts do not rely on it in their decisions. More importantly, the inclusion of reciprocity appears at odds with the general tendency in comparative law, which is either to abandon this requirement or to significantly limit its effect. Its (re?)introduction sends a negative signal to jurisdictions where reciprocity remains a condition for recognition and enforcement and is likely to unnecessarily complicate both the recognition of foreign judgments in Morocco and, consequently, the circulation of Moroccan judgments abroad.

 

V. Concluding Remarks

The general impression that emerges from a reading of the new rules is, on the whole, one of disappointment. The newly adopted provisions appear to be based on an outdated model and fail to take account of recent developments, including those observed in neighbouring jurisdictions. The content of a number of provisions gives the impression of a step backwards in time. For instance, some of the newly adopted rules, notably in matters of international jurisdiction, are comparable to those formerly found, for example, in Tunisia under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1959, which were later repealed and replaced by more modern provisions now contained in the Code of Private International Law of 1998. The new rules also do not fully reflect existing Moroccan practice, whether at the diplomatic level, where Morocco has been actively engaged with the work of the HCCH – an engagement that contributed to the establishment of its Regional Office for Africa in Morocco – or at the judicial level, particularly in the field of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Available records relating to the drafting process suggest that these issues did not receive the level of attention they deserved, nor did they benefit from sufficient expert consultation or discussion that might have allowed the legislature to draw on both recent international developments and established domestic practice. One hope nevertheless remains: that the Code will already be subject to early reform.

A new extensive handbook on European Civil Procedure (eds. Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet and Adriani Dori) was just published by De Gruyter Brill. This book offers a comprehensive overview of the overarching themes shaping civil justice in Europe, an overview of key instruments and a broader outlook on the future of European civil procedure.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the general themes regarding the development of European civil procedure, including the EU competence, historical perspectives, the principles of mutual trust and access to justice as foundational principles, the interaction between European and national civil procedure and innovation and the role of digitalisation in civil procedure. Part II deals with key topics of litigation and other means of dispute resolution. It starts with the service of documents as this is usually the first step in initiating litigation, and following the sequence of the procedure discusses the international jurisdiction, taking of evidence and the recognition and enforcement based on the general EU instruments. Two chapters address international jurisdiction and enforcement in family matters, maintenance, matrimonial property and succession. Uniform debt collection procedures, asset preservation, insolvency proceedings and specialised courts are discussed in separate chapters. The last three chapters focus on ADR and ODR as alternative pathways, collective redress and legal aid, costs and funding of civil litigation. Part III is dedicated to general and future outlooks on European civil procedure, including harmonisation through soft law, the EU enlargement process (Albania, Serbia and Ukraine) and perspectives from non-European jurisdictions (China, South Africa, the United States and Brazil) and wider challenges of European civil procedure. A hybrid launch event, organised by the European Civil Justice Centre, will be held at Leuven University on 25-26 June (information to follow). More information available at the publisher’s website here.

Part I: Introduction and General Perspectives on European Civil Procedure
Chapter 1  Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet, and Adriani Dori  – Introduction to European Civil Procedure
Chapter 2  Eva Storskrubb – Civil Justice and EU Competence
Chapter 3  Cornelis Hendrik van Rhee – The History of Civil Procedure in Europe
Chapter 4  Matthias Weller – Mutual Trust
Chapter 5  Burkhard Hess – Access to Justice as a Fundamental Principle of European Union Procedural Law
Chapter 6  Alain Ancery and Bart Krans – EU Law and National Civil Procedural Law: A Much Greater Area than at First Glance
Chapter 7  Anna Nylund – Innovation and Digitalisation

Part II: Litigating and Other Means of Dispute Resolution in Europe 
Chapter 8  Wendy Kennett – Getting Started: Service of Documents
Chapter 9  Geert van Calster – International Jurisdiction: Fundamental Issues and ‘Principles’ of EU Private International Law
Chapter 10  Pietro Franzina – International Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters

Chapter 11  Jachin Van Doninck and Wannes Vandenbussche – Taking of Evidence
Chapter 12  Fernando Gascón Inchausti – Recognition and Enforcement: Fundamental Issues
Chapter 13  Wolfgang Hau – Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments
Chapter 14  Apostolos Anthimos – International Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement in Family Matters and Maintenance
Chapter  15  Anna Wysocka-Bar – International Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement in Matters of Property Regimes and Succession
Chapter 16  Elena D’Alessandro – Debt Collection and Special Procedures: Small Claims and Orders for Payment
Chapter 17  Carlos Santaló Goris – Asset Preservation and Provisional Measures
Chapter 18  Vesna Lazic – Insolvency Proceedings
Chapter 19  Georgia Antonopoulou – Specialised Courts: The Unified Patent Court and International Commercial Courts
Chapter 20  Emma van Gelder – Alternative Pathways: ADR/ODR
Chapter 21  Eva Lein – Collective Redress
Chapter 22  John Sorabji – Legal Aid, Costs and Funding

Part III: Outlooks on European Harmonisation and Beyond
Chapter 23  Emmanuel Jeuland – Harmonisation Through Soft Law, Common Standards, and Best Practices
Chapter 24  Monika Canco, Ana Harvey, and Iryna Izarova – European Civil Procedure and the EU Enlargement Process
Chapter 25  Magdalena Tulibacka, Peter C.H. Chan, Mohamed Paleker and Eduardo Silva de Freitas – European Civil Procedure From a Non-European Perspective
Chapter 26  Alan Uzelac – Wider Challenges: The EU, Europe, and the World

 

The following call was kindly shared with us by the editors of TDM.

We are pleased to announce a forthcoming Transnational Dispute Management (TDM, ISSN 1875-4120, www.transnational-dispute-management.com) special issue on “Project Finance in International Arbitration” This Special Issue will be edited by Seabron Adamson and Tiago Duarte-Silva, both of Charles River Associates.

This call for papers can also be found on the TDM website:
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=2118

 

Background

Project finance is used in many of the world’s largest energy, mining, infrastructure, telecommunications, and digital infrastructure projects. Many of the most complex commercial and investor-State arbitrations involve project financed businesses. However, the financial logic of special-purpose vehicle (SPV) structures, lender controls, cashflow waterfalls, and project financeability remains under-examined in arbitration writing. This special issue invites contributions on how project finance shapes jurisdiction, liability, causation, valuation, and remedies across both commercial and treaty disputes.

The sectors in which project finance is predominantly used — energy, mining, infrastructure, and telecommunications — are also the sectors that generate the greatest volume of international arbitration disputes. According to 2024 statistics, energy and construction matters collectively account for a substantial majority of ICC commercial arbitration cases, while energy and mining-related disputes represent nearly half of all ICSID cases. Project finance structures are therefore routinely at the heart of some of the most complex and high-value arbitrations in the world.

Despite this convergence, the specific financial mechanics of project finance remain under-explored in the international arbitration literature. The structural features of project-financed transactions (the SPV architecture, cashflow waterfalls, lender step-in rights, covenant frameworks, and heavily negotiated risk allocations) create a distinct legal and economic context that shapes how disputes arise, how liability is assessed, and how damages are quantified. Even modest disruptions to revenues or operations can trigger cascading contractual consequences that may wipe out equity value entirely, even when the underlying asset continues to function. Quantifying the full extent of such losses increasingly requires a sophisticated understanding of project finance mechanics by arbitration tribunals and practitioners.

Disputes in project-financed transactions frequently arise from governmental actions that may impair project economics or bankability (including permit delays, regulatory changes, and expropriation), counterparty failures (whether by offtakers, EPC or O&M contractors, or co-investors), or unforeseen operational disruptions. In the investor-State context, the interplay between treaty protections and the rights of lenders raises fundamental questions about who has standing to claim, what losses are recoverable, and how reparations should be structured. In commercial arbitration, multi-party, multi-contract disputes are common, involving intricate questions of risk allocation under construction contracts, power purchase agreements (PPAs), concession agreements, and financing documentation.

This special issue seeks to bring together leading practitioners, academics, and experts to examine the intersection of project finance and international arbitration in depth. Contributions from practitioners with experience in the field (whether as counsel, arbitrators, damages experts, or other specialists) are particularly welcome.

Topics

We invite submissions addressing one or more of the following topics, or any other relevant issues at the intersection of project finance and international arbitration:

Project Finance Structure and Arbitration

• The SPV structure and its implications for jurisdiction, standing, and enforcement in arbitration
• Lender rights in arbitration: step-in rights, direct agreements, and the role of lenders as parties or third parties to disputes
• Multi-party arbitration in project finance: aligning disputes across the contractual matrix (EPC, O&M, offtake, financing)
• Confidentiality and disclosure of financing documents in arbitral proceedings
• Arbitration clauses in project finance agreements: drafting considerations, potentially problematic clauses, and interaction between dispute resolution tiers
• The impact of political risk insurance
• Corruption and cronyism in project development

Investor-State Disputes Involving Project Finance

• Bankability and the fair and equitable treatment standard: when do regulatory changes cross the line?
• Stabilization clauses in concession agreements and their interaction with treaty protections
• Standing, nationality and attribution issues in investor-State claims involving SPVs, HoldCos, lending and sponsor syndicates and lender-controlled structures
• Force majeure, necessity, and hardship in project-financed infrastructure and energy disputes
• Government actions affecting project bankability: permit delays, regulatory creep, and currency restrictions
• The role of export credit agencies (ECAs), political risk insurers and multilateral development banks (MDBs) in shaping dispute outcomes
• Managing the risk of conflicting decisions across arbitral and judicial disputes involving separate claimants
• Political risk in project development and operation

Damages and Financial Analysis

• Quantifying losses in project-financed disputes: the role of the cashflow waterfall and financial model
• The “binary” nature of project finance equity losses: implications for damages methodology
• DCF and comparables-based valuation in early-stage, construction-phase, and operational project finance disputes
• Financeability as a damages issue: was the project realistically bankable, and how should that be assessed?
• Mitigation obligations and lender enforcement tools (waivers, cure periods, restructuring) in the damages analysis
• Loss of chance and causation in complex, multi-causal project finance disputes
• The impact of liability limits in project contracts

Sector-Specific Issues

• Renewable energy project finance disputes: PPAs, curtailment, and the energy transition
• Mining and natural resources: concession agreements, offtake disputes, and royalty financing in arbitration
• Infrastructure projects: PPP structures, availability-based payments, and government termination rights
• Oil and Gas project finance: production sharing agreements, joint operating agreements, and contractor disputes
• Digital infrastructure and data centres: emerging project finance disputes in a rapidly growing sector
• Disputes involving Islamic finance structures used in project financing

Procedural and Practical Considerations

• Interim measures and the protection of project assets and revenues pending arbitral proceedings
• Expert evidence in project finance disputes: financial modelling, engineering, and sector expertise
• Enforcement of project finance arbitral awards against States and SPVs
• Third-party funding in project finance arbitrations
• Insolvency, restructuring, and arbitration: managing distressed project finance disputes
• Dispute avoidance and management clauses in project finance documentation

Submissions

We invite all those with an interest in the subject to contribute articles or notes on one of the above topics or any other relevant issue. Proposals for papers (150–200 words) should be submitted to the editors by June 30th publication is expected final quarter 2026/first quarter 2027.

Please address all questions and proposals to the editors at sadamson@crai.com and tduarte@crai.com and CC info@transnational-dispute-management.com when submitting your materials.

Articles accepted for publication before this deadline will also go through TDM’s on-line advance publication process, allowing your work to reach its target audience as soon as the paper completes peer review and the editing process.

Guest Editors Seabron Adamson
Charles River Associates
View profile

* sadamson@crai.com Tiago Duarte-Silva
Charles River Associates
View profile

* tduarte@crai.com Submission Guidelines

The minimum word count for articles is 5,000 words (excluding footnotes, endnotes, appendices, tables, summary etc.). Articles must include a short summary of the key points addressed and any conclusions drawn (150–200 words).

The layout of the articles should conform to TDM’s submission guidelines, available at: www.transnational-dispute-management.com/contribute.asp (more information available upon request).

For citations, please follow OSCOLA (4th Edition): www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/publications/oscola

This call for papers can also be found on the TDM website:
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=2118

Bilkent University Faculty of Law is pleased to invite you to an upcoming conference titled “Private International Law and Sustainable Development.”

We are honored to host a panel of world-renowned experts to discuss the evolving role of Private International Law in achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Date: 13th April 2026, Monday
Time: 13:30 – 15:30
Venue: FFB 2

Moderator: Prof. Dr. Bilgin Tiryakio?lu

Distinguished Speakers:
Prof. Dr. Ralf Michaels (Max Planck Institute) – The Place of Private International Law in Sustainable Development
Prof. Dr. Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm (University of Edinburgh) – Sustainable Consumption and Production (SDG 12): Circularity in Fashion
Prof. Van Loon Hans (Former Secretary General of the HCCH) – The Role of the Judge in Climate Cases (SDG 13)
Assoc. Prof. Dr.Gulum Özçelik (Bilkent University) – Recognition of Personal Status Acquired Abroad (SDGs 5, 10, 16)

The conference will be live-streamed on our official YouTube channel: @bilkentuniversitesihukuk.

The event will be held in English.
All interested participants are welcome.

Students who attend the event will be awarded GE 250/251 points.

The following announcement was shared with us by the conference organizers, Aleksandrs Fillers (Riga Graduate School of Law, Latvia), Adrian Rycerski (SWPS University in Poznan, Poland).

Please save the date: 19 November 2026

We are pleased to invite you to an international scientific conference devoted to modern problems of Private International Law, with particular attention to the impact of new technologies.

We hope the event will provide an excellent opportunity for the exchange of views, experiences, and in-depth discussion.

The conference will be held online and will bring together students, PhD candidates, and experienced experts.

The organizers plan a post-conference publication.

We welcome abstracts addressing any aspect of Private International Law, especially those focusing on modern issues and emerging challenges.

Abstracts (in English, max. 1500 characters) should be submitted to:
Aleksandrs.Fillers@rgsl.edu.lv and arycerski@swps.edu.pl

Submission deadline: 31 May 2026

Notification of acceptance: by 30 June 2026

Participation in the conference is free of charge.

We look forward to your contributions!

Aleksandrs Fillers, PhD
Associate Professor at Riga Graduate School of Law

Adrian Rycerski, PhD
Assistant Professor at SWPS University in Poznan

The University of Udine, together with its partners, has announced two exciting opportunities for students, researchers and practitioners interested in European consumer and market law, with a particular focus on sustainability and the circular economy.

The first call invites participants to register for the Summer School “Consumer and Market Law in the European Circular Economy” to be held at the University of Udine, from 8 to 17 July 2026. This programme offers a unique chance to engage with leading scholars and experts, explore the evolving legal framework surrounding sustainable markets and deepen understanding of how EU law is adapting to support the transition toward a circular economy. The Summer School promises an interdisciplinary and international learning environment, making it especially valuable for those looking to expand both their academic knowledge and professional networks. The organisers have provided the Call for applications – Udine Summer School 2026 and the Brochure – Udine Summer School 2026.

In parallel, a second call has been launched for abstracts for the Workshop “Judicial Protection and Enforcement of ‘Green’ Rights in the EU”. This workshop aims to bring together researchers and practitioners to discuss critical issues related to environmental rights enforcement, judicial protection mechanisms and the role of courts in advancing the EU’s green transition. Contributors are encouraged to submit abstracts that engage with current challenges and emerging developments in this rapidly evolving field. The workshop will be held at the University of Udine, on 14 July 2026. The organisers have provided the Call for Abstracts – Workshop Udine Summer School 2026.

Registration is now open for the Summer School, and interested participants are encouraged to apply promptly. At the same time, those wishing to present at the workshop can submit their abstracts for consideration.

Both initiatives reflect a growing commitment within the European academic and legal community to address sustainability challenges through legal innovation and collaboration. For more information on the programmes, application procedures and deadlines, please visit the official project website.

Activities are co-funded by the EU Erasmus+ Programme.

Introduction

Hilton v Guyot, is the most influential case in the United States—and perhaps globally—on the use of comity as a basis for recognising and enforcing foreign judgments. In that case, Justice Gray of the United States Supreme Court defined comity as follows:

“No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent of which the law of one nation… shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon… the “comity of nations”…”

Comity in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on one hand, nor a mere courtesy and goodwill, on the other; it is the recognition which one allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial act of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under protection of its laws…”

By contrast, under English common law, the dominant basis for recognising and enforcing foreign judgments is the theory of obligation. Blackburn, J in the English case of Schibsy v Westenholz  stated that the true principle is that,

“…the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction over the defendant, imposes a duty or obligation on him to pay the sum for which the judgment is given, which the courts in this country are bound to enforce…”

And further on in his judgment, Blackburn J. makes it plain that the doctrine of “comity” is incorrect. Thus, no question of reciprocity could arise in an action brought upon a foreign judgment.”

The theory of obligation is applied in many Commonwealth and Anglophone African countries. Interestingly, an emerging but underexplored trend is the growing consideration—and in some instances, application—of the principle of comity by courts in these jurisdictions, with several African judges expressly citing Hilton v Guyot.

This blog highlights selected cases illustrating this development, focusing on Liberia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa, and Nigeria. The discussion is limited to the common law framework and does not address statutory regimes or international conventions.

 

Liberia

Liberia is a former colony of the United States located in West Africa. In  Turner v Burnette, the Liberian Supreme Court firmly established the principle of comity in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, drawing particular support from Hilton v Guyot. The Court further explained—by reference to another U.S. authority—that:

“The application of comity does not rise [sic] to the effect of establishing an imperative rule of law; it has the power to persuade but not command. Comity being voluntary, and not obligatory, rests in the discretion of the tribunal of the forum and is governed by certain more or widely recognized rules.” Generally, greater force and dignity will be given to judgments of foreign courts when parties have had their day in a court of competent jurisdiction, after due service of process or after an entry of appearance, and have had a full and impartial hearing upon the merits of their case; unless it can be shown that the proceedings were tainted with fraud.”

Andrew Moran and Anthony Kennedy, conclude on the basis of the above Liberian Supreme Court decision that, “It seems, therefore, that any foreign judgment may be enforceable in Liberia at common law as a matter of comity between nations. The procedure appears to be that a suit commenced on the foreign judgment, in the same way as an action is commenced at common law in other jurisdictions.”

Kenya

Kenya is a former colony of the United Kingdom located in East Africa. Nevertheless, Kenyan courts apply both the theory of obligation and the principle of comity in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments at common law.

In ABSA Bank Uganda Limited (Formerly Known as Barclays Bank of Uganda Limited) v Uchumi Supermarkets PLC, the Kenyan High Court held at paragraph 5 that,

In the absence of a reciprocal enforcement arrangement, a foreign judgment was enforceable in Kenya as a claim in common law. Where a foreign court of competent jurisdiction had adjudicated a certain sum to be due to another, a legal obligation arose to pay that sum, on which an action of debt to enforce the judgment could be maintained. In deciding whether a foreign court was one of competent jurisdiction, the courts would apply not the law of the foreign court itself but English rules of private international law. The competence of the foreign court was the competence of the court in an international sense, that was, its territorial competence over the subject matter and the defendant. Its competence or jurisdiction in any other sense was not material.”

However, in a more recent case, the Kenyan Supreme Court, relying on Hilton v Guyot, applied the principle of comity in determining whether to recognise and enforce a locus inspection order from Scotland (see Anam Abdul Majid and Chukwuma Okoli). After quoting the key passage from Hilton v Guyot with approval, the Court stated at paragraph 60 that:

“This approach prioritizes citizen protection while taking into account the legitimate interests of foreign claimants. This approach is consistent with the adaptability of international comity as a principle of informed prioritizing national interests rather than absolute obligation, as well as the practical differences between the international and national contexts.”

Uganda

Uganda is a former colony of the United Kingdom located in East Africa. Nevertheless, Ugandan judges apply both the theory of obligation and the principle of comity in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments at common law. More recently, Ugandan courts have justified the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments by reference to the theories of obligation, comity, and reciprocity. In the very recent case of Brianna v Mugisha, Justice Nagawa, after a careful consideration of Ugandan case law authorities and Hilton v Guyot, stated that:

 

“5.4 However, I have observed that despite the absence of a statutory
reciprocal arrangement, Ugandan courts have recognized and
enforced foreign judgments under the common law principles of
obligation, reciprocity, and comity.

5.5. These doctrines provide a legal foundation for cross-border judicial
cooperation, particularly in the absence of a formal treaty or statutory
framework, such as in the case of Uganda and the United States.

 

5.6. The doctrine of comity is based on mutual respect between sovereign
states. It allows a court to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment
not as a matter of strict legal obligation, but out of respect to the
foreign court’s authority and fairness in its proceedings. Courts apply
comity where: the foreign court had competent jurisdiction over the matter and the parties, the proceedings were conducted fairly, with
due process observed and enforcing the judgment would not be
contrary to public policy in the recognizing jurisdiction.

 

5.7. The obligation theory treats a valid foreign judgment as creating a legal
duty on the judgment debtor to comply, similar to a contractual
obligation. This approach holds that once a court of competent
jurisdiction has determined a party’s liability, that decision should be
respected and enforced in other jurisdictions unless there is a
compelling reason not to do so, such as: Fraud in obtaining the
judgment, Violation of natural justice, or a fundamental defect in
jurisdiction.

 

5.8. Under reciprocity, a foreign judgment will only be enforced if courts in
the originating country would likewise enforce judgments from the
enforcing country. This principle ensures mutual legal cooperation
between jurisdictions.”

It must, however, be noted that the acceptance of reciprocity as a basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments at common law marks a significant departure from the position in other Anglophone and Commonwealth African countries, as well as Commonwealth jurisdictions more broadly.

Tanzania

In Tanzania, a significant number of recent cases have used foreign judgments to preclude new actions on grounds of res judicata, obligation, and comity (Exim Bank (COMORES) SA vs Costa Sari;  Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited & Another vs Independent Power Tanzania Limited & Others)

South Africa

South Africa, located in Southern Africa and formerly colonised by both Britain and the Netherlands, is a mixed legal system drawing from Roman Dutch law and the common law. The theory of obligation remains the dominant basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This position was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Jones v Krok, where the Court endorsed the English authority of  Nouvion v Freeman as support for applying the obligation theory in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments

However, in Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick,, the Constitutional Court referred to the principle of comity to justify the development of the common law framework for recognising and enforcing judgments from international courts, signalling a limited but notable openness to comity based reasoning.

Nigeria  

Nigeria is a former colony of the United Kingdom and is located in West Africa. Under the common law regime, it applies the theory of obligation in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Alfred C Toepfer Inc v Edokpolor).

However, some Nigerian judges at the Supreme Court have proposed comity, jurisdictional reciprocity, and the facilitation of international trade and commerce as additional bases for enforcing foreign judgments (Grosvenor Casinos Ltd v Ghassan Halaoui (2009) 10 NWLR 309, 338–39 (Oguntade JSC)), but there has been no reported case where these proposals have been implemented in practice.

 

Conclusion

The purpose of this post is to highlight how selected Commonwealth and Anglophone African courts have received and applied the principle of comity in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the common law, particularly as articulated in Hilton v Guyot.

At present, Liberia is the only jurisdiction that fully applies the principle of comity as advanced in Hilton v Guyot, arguably influenced by its historical ties to the United States.

Kenya applies the doctrine of obligation alongside the principle of comity, while Uganda adopts a similar approach and has recently gone further by recognising reciprocity as an additional basis for enforcement.

South Africa primarily follows the doctrine of obligation, although a few cases have considered comity in the context of recognising and enforcing foreign judgments, albeit without concrete application.

In Nigeria, courts continue to rely principally on the doctrine of obligation at common law. Although some Supreme Court justices have proposed comity as a possible basis for enforcement, this has not been implemented in practice.

Overall, the doctrine of obligation remains the dominant common law basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments across Anglophone and Commonwealth Africa. Nonetheless, the principle of comity, as developed in Hilton v Guyot, continues to play an important role in shaping the jurisprudence of a limited number of African jurisdictions.

 

 

Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships at the headquarters of the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH in The Hague, for the period from September 2026 to February 2027!

Interns work with our legal teams in the Family and Child Protection Law Division, the Transnational Litigation and Apostille Division, and the Commercial, Digital and Financial Law Division.

Duties may include carrying out research on particular points of private international law and/or comparative law, taking part in the preparation of HCCH meetings, and contributing to the promotion of the HCCH and its work.

Applications should be submitted by Monday, 20 April 2026 at 18.00 (CEST). For more information, please visit the Internships Section of the HCCH website.

This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH).

 

INTRODUCTION

Following a significant hiatus, the public policy defense has re-emerged prominently in discussions surrounding the enforcement of foreign judgments, particularly in the context of a judgment issued by the Panama Maritime Court in 2024. The primary issue addressed by the Greek court was whether a foreign judgment could be recognized and enforced when the foreign court denied appellate proceedings due to the failure to post a security deposit that was both substantial and necessary for the appeal process.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The case involved a claim for damages between a company based in Hong Kong and another company registered in the Marshall Islands. This dispute was adjudicated under Panama’s maritime law, established by Law 8 of 1982 and updated by Law 55 of 2008, which governs maritime-related disputes through a specialized and efficient legal framework. The Panamanian maritime courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over in rem actions, enabling prompt vessel arrests and maritime liens within both Panamanian territorial waters and the Panama Canal for claims related to damages, cargo issues, and collisions.

The Panamanian court ruled in favor of the claimant, mandating the defendant to either return the vessel or pay approximately 45 million USD, i.e., the valuation of the vessel along with associated legal costs, as ordered by the court.

Subsequently, the judgment creditor sought recognition and enforcement of the Panamanian judgment in Greece, as the vessel was docked within Greek territorial waters.

The opposing party contended that the ruling from the Panamanian Naval Court of First Instance contravened Greek public policy and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), primarily because the appellate process was effectively obstructed. According to Article 490 of Panama’s Maritime Courts and Disputes Law, the appellant was required to deposit a security of nearly 45 million USD (equivalent to the judgment amount and associated legal fees) within ten days to have its appeal considered.

The original text from Article 490 reads:

“Artículo 490. Para cursar la apelación se requerirá la consignación, ante la secretaría del Tribunal Marítimo de primera instancia, de una caución que garantice el pago del monto de la condena más las costas. Para determinar el monto de la caución se considerará la caución consignada para levantar el secuestro o el valor del bien secuestrado. Dicha caución será consignada dentro de los diez días siguientes a la notificación de la providencia que admita el recurso. Si el apelante no consigna la caución de que trata este artículo, el juez declarará desierto el recurso.”

In light of the above, the excessive requirement for a security deposit resulted in the judgment debtor’s appeal being dismissed, thereby forfeiting its right to be heard.

 

FINDINGS OF THE GREEK COURT.

The Greek court recognized that while imposing a financial guarantee as a prerequisite for appeal can have legitimate justifications, such as discouraging vexatious litigation and promoting judicial efficacy, the circumstances in this case revealed that the requirement was manifestly disproportionate and unduly burdensome. The court articulated the following concerns:

– The required guarantee matched the total amount of the initial judgment plus costs.

– There was no cap, no exceptions, and no discretion for reduction based on the specifics of the case.

– It effectively forced the appellant to comply with the first-instance judgment in full just to access the appeal process.

The court referenced Article 323(5) of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, which encompasses the public policy clause, confirming that the security requirement violated the principle of proportionality. Furthermore, limiting access to the court and undermining judicial protection directly contravened Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 20, paragraph 1 of the Greek Constitution.

Consequently, the obligation to deposit an amount of USD 44,397,715.97, which constitutes the awarded sum of the initial judgment (USD 41,248,107.88) plus legal costs (USD 3,149,608.09), was viewed as an untenable financial burden that contradicts the right to judicial protection.

More specifically, the imposition of a security deposit that equaled the judgment amount plus legal fees, with no statutory limits, exceptions, or discretionary reduction possibilities, violated public policy. This requirement substantially infringed upon the appellant’s right to access judicial remedies against an enforceable ruling.

Finally, the court noted that while Greek law allows for provisional enforceability of first-instance judgments under certain conditions, including the possibility of appeal suspension without a guarantee if there is a likelihood of success, such provisions were absent in Panamanian law.