Conflictoflaws

I. Introduction:

In a previous post on this blog, I reported a decision rendered by the Bahrain High Court in which the court refused to enforce a choice of court agreement in favour of English courts. The refusal was based on the grounds that the case was brought against a Bahraini defendant and that rules of international jurisdiction are mandatory. The Bahraini Supreme Court’s decision reported here is a subsequent development on the same case. The ruling is significant for many reasons. In a methodical manner, the Supreme Court identified the foundational justifications for the jurisdictional rules applied in Bahrain. Moreover, it clarified the role and effect of choice of court agreements, particular their derogative effect. Finally, and somehow surprisingly, the Court supported its position by invoking to “the doctrine of forum non conveniens”, explicitly mentioned to in its decision.

The decision is particularly noteworthy, as it positively highlights the openness of Bahraini judges to adopting new legal doctrines previously unfamiliar within the country’s legal framework. This openness likely signals an increasing acceptance of such jurisdictional adjustment mechanisms in legal systems outside the traditional common law or mixed jurisdictions. However, the decision also negatively highlights the challenges of importing foreign doctrines, particularly when such doctrines are applied in contexts where they are not fully integrated or properly understood. These challenges are further exacerbated when the reliance on the foreign legal doctrine appears to be driven by judicial convenience rather than a genuine commitment to the principles underlying the imported legal doctrine.

II. Facts

The facts of the case have been previously reported (see here) and need not to be repeated. It suffices to recall that the dispute involved a breach of a pharmaceutical distribution sales agreements between an English company (the plaintiff) and a Bahraini company (the defendant). Relying on the choice of court agreement included in the contract, the defendant challenged the jurisdiction of Bahraini court.

The court of first instance rejected the challenge on the ground that the jurisdiction of Bahraini courts was justified by the “Bahraini nationality” of the defendant, and the mandatory nature of the Bahraini rules of international jurisdiction (see the summary of the case here).

On appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the initial ruling on the grounds that Bahraini courts lacked jurisdiction.

Dissatisfied, the English company appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that, as the defendant was a Bahraini company registered in Bahrain, jurisdiction could not be derogated by agreement due to the public policy nature of the Bahraini jurisdictional rules.

III.  The Ruling

In its decision rendered in the Appeal No. 5/00071/2024/27 of 19 August 2024, the Bahraini Supreme Court admitted the appeal and overturned the appealed decision holding as follows:

“International jurisdiction of Bahraini courts, as regulated in the Civil and Commercial Procedure Act [CCCA] (The Legislative Decree No. 12/1971, Articles 14 to 20) and its amendments, is based on two fundamental principles: the principle of convenience (al-mula’amah) and the principle of party autonomy (‘iradat al-khusum).

Concerning the principle of convenience, Article 14 of the CCCA states that Bahraini courts have jurisdiction over cases filed against non-Bahraini [defendants] who have domicile or residence in Bahrain, except for in rem actions concerning immovable properties located abroad. This is because it is more appropriate (li-mula’amati) for the courts where the immovable is located to hear the case. Similarly, Article 15(2) of the CCCA stipulates that Bahraini courts have jurisdiction over actions involving property located in Bahrain, obligations originated, performed or should have been performed in Bahrain, or bankruptcies opened in Bahrain. This means a contrario that, under the principle of convenience (mabda’ al-mula’amah), the [said] provision excludes [from the jurisdiction of the Bahraini courts] cases where the property is located outside Bahrain, or where the obligations originated in and performed abroad, or was originated and should have been performed abroad, or concerns a bankruptcy opened abroad unless the case involves a cross-border bankruptcy as governed by Law No. 22 of 2018 on Restructuring and Bankruptcy.

Regarding the principle of party autonomy (mabda’ ‘iradat al-khusum), Article 17 of CCCA allows Bahraini courts to adjudicate cases, even when they do not fall within their jurisdiction, if the parties explicitly or implicitly accept their authority. While the law recognizes the parties’ freedom (iradat) to submit (qubul) the jurisdiction of Bahraini courts to hear cases that otherwise do not fall under their jurisdiction, the legislator did not clarify the derogative effect of choice-of-court agreements when the parties agree to exclude the jurisdiction of Bahraini in favor of a foreign court, despite the Bahraini courts having jurisdiction over the case. In addition, the legislator remains silent on the rules for international jurisdiction in cases brought against Bahraini nationals. However, this cannot be interpreted as a refusal by the legislator [of the said rules] nor as an insistence on the jurisdiction of Bahraini court. In fact, the legislature has previously embraced the principle according to which Bahraini courts would decline jurisdiction over cases that otherwise fall under their jurisdiction when parties agree to arbitration, whether in Bahrain or abroad.

Based on the foregoing, nothing in principle prevents the parties from agreeing on the jurisdiction of a [foreign court]. However, if, one of the parties still brings the case before Bahraini courts despite such an agreement, the issue extends beyond merely honoring the agreement to a broader issue dependent solely on how Bahraini courts assess their own jurisdiction. In this case, the parties’ agreement [relied upon] before the Bahraini courts becomes just one factor that the court shall consider when deciding whether or not to decline jurisdiction. The court, in this context, must examine whether there are grounds to decline jurisdiction in favor of a more appropriate foreign [court] in the interest of justice, and the court shall decide accordingly when the said grounds are verified. This principle is known as “The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens” (al-mahkamat al-mula’amat).[1] Therefore, if all the conditions necessary for considering the taking of jurisdiction by a foreign court and the rendering justice is more appropriate (al-‘akthar mula’amah) are met, Bahraini courts should decline jurisdiction. Otherwise, the general principles shall apply, i.e. that the taking of jurisdiction shall be upheld, and the courts will proceed with hearing the case.

Accordingly, the Bahraini courts’ acceptance to decline jurisdiction in favor of a foreign court, based on the parties’ agreement and in line with the principle of party autonomy, presupposes that [doing so] would lead to the realization of the principle of convenience (mabda’ al-mula’amah). [This would be the case when] (1) the dispute shall have an international character; (2) there is a more appropriate forum to deal with the dispute [in the sense that] (a) the validity of the choice of court agreement conferring jurisdiction is recognized under the foreign law of the chosen forum; (b) evidence can be collected easily; (c) a genuine connection exists with the state of the chosen forum; and (d) the judgments rendered by the courts of the chosen forum can be enforced therein with ease.[2]

Furthermore, since the jurisdiction of Bahraini courts is based on the consideration that the adjudicatory jurisdiction (al-qadha’) is one of the manifestations of the State’s sovereignty over its territory and that the exercise of this jurisdiction extends to the farthest reach of this sovereignty, it is incumbent [upon the courts] to ensure that declining jurisdiction by Bahraini courts does not infringe upon national sovereignty or public policy in Bahrain. The Assessment of whether all the abovementioned conditions are satisfied falls within the discretion of the courts of merits (mahkamat al-mawdhu’), subject to the control of the Supreme Court.

Given the above, and based on the facts of the case […..], the appellant—an English company—entered into an agreement of distribution and sale in Bahrain for pharmaceutical products [……], supplying the appellee—a Bahraini company—with said products. Seven invoices were issued for the total amount claimed; yet the appellee refused to make payment. [Considering that] Bahrain is the most appropriate forum for the administration of justice in this case – given the facts that appellee’s domicile and its place of business, as well as the place of performance of the obligation are located in Bahrain – the parties’ agreement to submit disputes arising from the contract in question to the jurisdiction of the English courts and to apply English law does not alter this conclusion. It is [therefore] not permissible to argue here in favor of prioritizing party autonomy to justify declining jurisdiction, as party autonomy alone is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction without the fulfillment of the other conditions required by the principle of forum non conveniens (mabda’ mahkamat al-mula’amah).

Considering that the court of the appealed decision [unjustifiably] declined to hear the case on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction, it violated the law and erred in its application. Therefore, its decision shall be overturned.

IV. Comments

Although the outcome of the case (i.e. the non-enforcement of a derogative choice-of-court agreement) might be somehow predictable given the practice of Bahraini courts as noted in the previous comment on the same case, the reasoning and justifications provided by the Supreme Court are – in many respects – surprising, or even … puzzling.

A comprehensive review of the court’s ruling and its broader theoretical and practical context requires detailed (and lengthy) analyses, which may not be suitable for a blog note format. For this reason, only a brief comment will be provided here without delving too much into details.

1. International Jurisdiction and its Foundation in Bahrain

According to the Supreme Court, the international jurisdiction of Bahraini courts is grounded in two fundamental principles: convenience (al-mula’amah) and party autonomy (‘iradat al-khusum).

Convenience (al-mula’amah), as indicated in the decision, is understood in terms of “proximity”, i.e. the connection between the dispute and Bahrain. This connection is essential for proper administration of justice, and efficiency of enforcing judgments. Considerations of “convenience” are reflected in the Bahraini rules of international jurisdiction as set out in the CCCA. Therefore, when the jurisdiction of Bahraini courts is justified based on these rules, the dispute can be heard in Bahrain; otherwise, the courts should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

However, Bahraini courts, although originally incompetent, can still assume jurisdiction based on party autonomy (‘iradat al-khusum). Here, the parties’ agreement – whether explicit or tacit – to submit to the authority of Bahraini courts establishes their jurisdiction.

At this level of the decision, it is surprising that the Court did not include the Bahraini nationality of the parties as an additional ground for the jurisdiction of Bahraini Court. While the Supreme Court rightly pointed out that the Bahraini regulation of international jurisdiction does not regulate dispute brought against Bahraini national, and that, unlike many codifications in the MENA region, nationality of the defendant is not explicitly used as a general ground for international jurisdiction, this does not imply that nationality has no role to play in Bahrain. In fact, as explained in the previous post on the same case, Bahraini courts have regularly assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the Bahraini nationality of the parties and have consistently affirmed that “persons holding Bahraini nationality are subject to the jurisdiction of Bahraini courts as a manifestation of the state’s sovereignty over its citizens”. Moreover, Article 16(6) of the CCCA allows for jurisdiction to be taken based on the nationality of the plaintiff in personal status matters, particularly when Bahraini law is applicable to the dispute.

Furthermore, one might question the inclusion of various aspects, such as the connection with Bahrain, administration of justice and efficiency, under the broad and somewhat vague label of “convenience”. In a (more abstract) sense, any rule of international jurisdiction can be justified by considerations of “convenience”. In any event, it worth mentioning here that modern literature offers a multitude of justifications for different rules of international jurisdiction, taking into account various interests at stake, theories of jurisdictions, paradigms, and approaches (for a detailed account, see Ralf Michaels, “Jurisdiction, Foundations” in J. Basedow et al. (eds.) Elgar Encyclopaedia of Private international Law – Vol. 1 (Edward Elgar, 2017) 1042).

2. The Unexpected Reference to Forum Non Conveniens

Once the Court identified the foundational bases of the Bahraini courts’ jurisdiction, it engaged in a somewhat confusing discussion regarding the circumstances under which it might decline jurisdiction.

It is important to recall that the legal question before the court pertains to the effect of a choice-of-court agreement in favor of a foreign court. In other words, the issue at hand is whether such agreement can exert its derogative effect, allowing Bahraini courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction.

Traditionally, Bahraini courts have addressed similar issues by asserting that the rules of international jurisdiction in Bahrain are mandatory and cannot be derogated from by agreement (as noted in the previous comment on the same case here). However, in this instance, the Court veered off in its analysis. Indeed, the Court (unexpectedly) shifted from the straightforward issue of admissibility of the derogative effect of choice-of-court agreements to the broader question of whether to decline jurisdiction, ultimately leading to a discussion of……forum non conveniens!

The Court’s approach leaves an unsettling impression. This is because the ground of appeal was not framed in terms of forum non conveniens. Indeed, the appellant did not argue that the choice-of-court agreement should not be enforced because the chosen court was inappropriate or because Bahraini courts were forum conveniens. Instead, the appellant merely referred to the mandatory nature of the jurisdictional rules in Bahrain, which cannot be derogated from by agreement, irrespective of any consideration regarding which court is clearly more appropriate to hear the case.

This impression is further strengthened by the manner with which the Court addressed the issue it raised itself. Indeed, after setting out the test for declining jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens (but, in fact, primarily concern more the conditions for the validity of a choice-of-court agreement), the Court failed to examine and apply the very same tests it established. Instead, the Court concluded that Bahraini courts were forum conveniens simply because they had jurisdiction on the grounds that the defendant was a Bahraini company registered in Bahrain, had its domicile (principal place of business) there, and that Bahrain was the place of performance of the sale and distribution obligations.

However, upon a closer examination at the fact of the case, one can hardly agree with the Court’s approach. On the contrary, all the reported facts indicate that the requirements set forth by the Court were met: (1) the international nature of the dispute is beyond any doubt; (2) English courts are clearly appropriate to hear the case as (a) the choice-of-court agreement in favor to English court is undoubtedly valid under English law; (b) it is unlikely that the case would raise any concerns regarding the collection of evidence (since one of the parties is an English company, one can expect that parts of the evidence regarding the transaction, payment, invoices etc. would be in English, and to be found in England); (c) there is no doubt about the genuine connection with England, as one of the plaintiff is an English company established in England, and parts of the transactions are connected with England. Also, it is unclear how a choice-of-court agreement in this case would violate the sovereignty of Bahrain, as there is nothing in the case to suggest any public policy concerns.

The only potential issue might pertain to the enforceability of the future judgment in England (point (d) above) as there is a possibility that the appellee may have no assets to satisfy the future judgment in England. This might explain why the appellant decided to bring in Bahrain in violation of the choice-of-court. However, such concern can be mitigated by considering the likelihood of enforcing the English judgment in Bahrain, as it would meet the Bahraini enforcement requirements (articles 16-18 of Law on Execution in Civil and Commercial Matters [Legislative Decree No22/2021]).

V. Concluding Remarks

This is not the only case in which challenges to choice-of-court agreements in favor of a foreign court are framed in terms of forum non conveniens in Bahrain (see e.g., the Bahrain Chamber of Dispute Resolution, Case No. 09/2022 of 17 October 2022). However, to my knowledge, this is the first Supreme Court decision where explicit reference is made to “the doctrine of forum non conveniens” (with the terms cited in English).

In the case under discussion, there is a concern that the Court seems to have conflated two related yet distinct matters: the power of the court to decline jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens, and the court’s authority to decline jurisdiction on the basis of the parties’ agreement to confer jurisdiction to a particular court (cf., R. Fentiman, “Forum non conveniens” in Basedaw et al., op. cit. 799). In this regard, it is true that in common law jurisdictions the doctrine of forum non conveniens is generally recognized as a valid defense against the enforcement of choice-of-court agreements (see J.J. Fawcett, “General Report” in J.J. Fawcett (ed.), Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 1995) 54). However, it also generally admitted that the respect of the parties’ choice should not be easily disregarded, and courts should only intervene in exceptional circumstances where there is a clear and compelling reasons to do so (see, Fentiman, op. cit., 799). Such compelling reasons, however, are clearly absent in the present case.

Moreover, the way with which the Supreme Court framed the issues of foreign non conveniens inevitably raises several intricate questions: would the doctrine apply with respect to the agreement’s prorogative effect conferring jurisdiction to Bahraini courts? Would it operate in the absence of any choice-of-court agreement? Can it be raised in the context of parallel proceeding (lis pendens)? Would it operate in family law disputes, etc.?

In my opinion, the answers to such question are very likely to be in the negative. This is primarily because Bahraini courts, including the Supreme Court, have traditionally and consistently regarded their jurisdiction as a matter of public policy, given the emphasis they usually place on judicial jurisdiction as a manifestation of the sovereignty of the State which, when established, cannot be set aside or diminished. Such conception of international jurisdiction leaves little room to discretionary assessment by the court to evaluate elements of forum non conveniens, ultimately leading them to decline jurisdiction even when their jurisdiction is justified.

——————————————-

[1] English terms in the original text. The Arabic equivalent can be better translated as “forum conveniens” rather than “forum non conveniens”.

[2] Numbers and letters added.

The following information has been kindly provided by Zlaty Mihailova, Center for International Legal Cooperation (CILC).

The EU-funded project PACE “Creating Privacy Awareness in Civil Enforcement” examines the intersection of civil enforcement and data protection and aims to contribute to the effective and coherent application of EU data protection law in civil enforcement procedures.

 The PACE Project is launching  free-of-charge on-line training seminars  for enforcement agents and/or their staff on a national and transnational level for the EU member states and EU candidate countries.

Objective:

• to offer practical and applied skills to enforcement agents or professionals exercising enforcement duties on data protection issues in civil enforcement.

Who is it for?

• Enforcement Agents,
• deputy enforcement agents,
• data officers working at the office of an enforcement agent,
• civil servants exercising enforcement duties,
• supervisory bodies of enforcement agents,
• other authorities involved in GDPR directly or indirectly related to enforcement,
• Ministry of Justice officials

Format of seminars:

• Transnational: each seminar will bring together enforcement officers from at least two to three EU member states to allow exchange of experience and best practice
• Practical: the seminars will focus on practical and applied skills which are relevant to the everyday work of enforcement agents
• Interactive: the seminars will include practical exercises and work in groups
• Linguistically accessible: Simultaneous interpretation into national languages will be available
• A minimum of 10 participants per EU member state
• No maximum number

Content of seminars:

• What is personal data in civil enforcement context
• When enforcement agents deal with personal data
• Common breaches of data protection
• Limitations in the use of data
• Case studies

Presenters/facilitators:

• Experts from the UIHJ and UEHJ
• Members of the PACE Training Committee
• PACE trainers

Certification:

• Participants who attend all sessions will receive a signed certificate of attendance.
  The training might also count for professional development points and/ or annual training obligation, please liaise with your national chamber on this issue.

Proposed seminar dates: 25-26/10; 31/10-01/11; 07-08/11; 14-15/11/2024 for Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia

Final Seminar: Date TBD, open for all EU Member states

Upcoming seminar dates:

10-11/10 – BE, FR, LUX, NL PACE_Transnational trainings: Expression of interest form (10-11.10.2024)

18/11 – AU, DE, FI, SE PACE_Transnational trainings: Expression of interest form (18.11.2024)

Duration: 2 days (11 training hours), online.

Application deadline and procedure:

• 5 working days before the seminar date
• Please apply through your Court/ MoJ/National Chamber or complete the application through the link here

Contact persons for additional information:

Jos Uitdehaag                                            Maria Mousmouti

First vice-president of UIHJ                  Director Center for European Constitutional law

Email : j.uitdehaag@uihj.com               Email : projects@cecl.gr

This month the US Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., et al. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico). For more information, click here. For some Private International Law implications, click here.

The petitioners are: Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc.; Barrett Firearms Manufacturing, Inc.; Beretta U.S.A. Corp; Glock, Inc.; Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc.; Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc., d/b/a Interstate Arms; Century International Arms, Inc.; and Colt’s Manufacturing Company, LLC.

As previously reported, this is a much-politicized case initiated by Mexico against US gun manufacturers. Mexico alleges inter alia that defendants actively assist and facilitate trafficking of their guns to drug cartels in Mexico. Among the claims for relief are: Negligence, public nuisance, defective condition – unreasonably dangerous, negligence per se, gross negligence, unjust enrichment and restitution, violation of CUTPA [Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act], Violation of Mass. G.L. c. 93A [Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act], punitive damages.

At first, a US District Court dismissed the case, which we reported here. However, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. See a recent official statement from the Mexican government here (in Spanish).

Some of the arguments of the Court of Appeals are (for the full judgment, click here):

[…] p. 38 et seq.

• “Instead, defendants contend that even for pleading purposes the complaint fails to allege facts plausibly supporting the theory that defendants have aided and abetted such unlawful sales.
• “We disagree, finding instead that Mexico’s complaint adequately alleges that defendants have been aiding and abetting the sale of firearms by dealers in knowing violation of relevant state and federal laws. “[T]he essence of aiding and abetting” is “participation in another’s wrongdoing that is both significant and culpable enough to justify attributing the principal wrongdoing to the aider and abettor.” Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. 471, 504 (2023).

[…]

• “It is therefore not implausible that, as the complaint alleges, defendants engage in all this conduct in order to maintain the unlawful market in Mexico, and not merely in spite of it.

[…]

• “We think it clear that by passing along guns knowing that the purchasers include unlawful buyers, and making design and marketing decisions targeted towards those exact individuals, the manufacturer is aiding and abetting illegal sales. And this scenario, in substance, is fairly analogous to what Mexico alleges.”

The Court of Appeals concludes:

• In sum, we conclude that the complaint adequately alleges that defendants aided and abetted the knowingly unlawful downstream trafficking of their guns into Mexico. Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are premised either on an inaccurate reading of the complaint or on a misapplication of the standard of review on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Whether plaintiffs will be able to support those allegations with evidence at summary judgment or at trial remains to be seen. At this stage, though, we must “accept all well-pleaded allegations of [Mexico] as true and afford all inferences in [Mexico’s] favor.” […]

As expected, Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. et al. were unsatisfied with the judgment and filed for certiorari before the US Supreme Court. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the “proximate cause” of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico.
2. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to “aiding and abetting” illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.

In particular, and among other allegations, Smith & Wesson argues that: “Mexico’s theory of liability reduces to this: ‘A manufacturer of a dangerous product is an accessory or co-conspirator to illicit conduct by downstream actors where it continues to supply, support, or assist the downstream parties and has knowledge—actual or constructive—of the illicit conduct.’” However, Smith & Wesson contends that that theory of aiding and abetting has been rejected in case law and emphasizes the distinction between active complicity and passive conduct. It alleges that even if a company has extensive commercial activity, it is a not an active participant in downstream criminal acts unless the company engages in some other “affirmative misconduct” in promoting those acts (p. 29 et seq. of the petition).

Amicus briefs have been filed by:

• Washington Legal Foundation
• Atlantic Legal Foundation
• Landmark Legal Foundation
• Montana
• National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc.
• National Association of Manufacturers et al.
• The American Constitutional Rights Union et al.
• National Rifle Association of America and Independence Institute
• Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc. and FPC Action Foundation
• The Buckeye Institute and Mountain States Legal Foundation’s Center to Keep and Bear Arms
• Michigan Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners
• National Association for Gun Rights and the National Foundation for Gun Rights
• S. Senator Ted Cruz, U.S. Representative Darrell Issa, and 25 Other Members of Congress
• The Second Amendment Foundation

If the Supreme Court affirms the Court of Appeals’ judgment,  this is only the beginning of a long and complex litigation. As stated by the Court of Appeals, it remains to be seen whether Mexico’s allegations can be proven at summary judgment or at trial. Any updates will be reported here.

We are pleased to announce the publication of the latest issue of the Chinese Journal of Transnational Law (Volume 1, Issue 2, September 2024). The special issue titled “Legalization of Foreign Relations in China” was guest-edited by Professor Congyan Cai.

The full issue is now available with free access for a limited time. You can explore the table of contents and access the articles at this link: Chinese Journal of Transnational Law – Volume 1, Issue 2.

Table of Contents

Special Issue Articles

Legalization of Foreign Relations in China
Zheng Tang and Congyan Cai
pp. 89

Milestone of China’s Foreign-Related Legislation – A Review of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign Relations
Huang Huikang
pp. 95

Political Framing in China’s Foreign Relations Law: International Law and ‘Fundamental Norms Governing International Relations’
Malcolm Jorgensen
pp. 117

China’s Foreign State Immunity Law: A View from the United States
William S. Dodge
pp. 137

A Critical Appraisal on China’s Blocking Statutes from a Private Actor’s Perspective
Guiqiang Liu
pp. 154

Original Research Article

A Future Uniform Regime of International Commercial Mediator Immunity: Limited, Party-Agreed and Statute-Required
Meng Lin
pp. 176

Short Article and Recent Development

Reading China’s Global Security Initiative Through an International Legal Lens
Ka Lok Yip
pp. 198

Book Review

Liang Xi, Updated and Augmented by Yang Zewei, Liangxi Guojizuzhifa
Gang Tang
pp. 211

The following information on the Journal of Private International Law 20th Anniversary Conference, to be held at the Faculty of Laws, University College London, Thursday 11 – Saturday 13 September 2025, has kindly been provided by Ugljesa Grusic.

We are pleased to invite the submission of paper proposals for the conference. Submission is open to anyone regardless of seniority or academic affiliation, including postgraduate students and practitioners, with an expectation that you will produce a paper for submission to the Journal of Private International Law by the end of the 2025 calendar year (with publication subject to the usual peer review process). Proposals are welcome on any topic within the scope of the Journal. A proposal should include an abstract of no more than 500 words, as well as details of the name and affiliation(s) of the author(s).

The conference will include, in the customary manner, a mixture of parallel panel sessions (on Thursday afternoon and Saturday morning) and plenary sessions (on Friday). Please indicate in your proposal whether you are willing to present in either format, or only in one or the other – a willingness to be flexible will increase your chance of being selected. Selection will be made by the conference organisers (Professor Ugljesa Grusic and Professor Alex Mills) and the Editors of the Journal (Professor Jonathan Harris and Professor Paul Beaumont).

The conference will be held in Bentham House, the home of UCL Faculty of Laws, in Bloomsbury, London. Speakers will not be expected to pay a conference fee, but will need to pay for their own expenses, including travel and accommodation. Non-speakers will be expected to pay a conference fee.  A conference dinner will be held on Friday (12 September 2025), at additional cost and with limited places – details will be provided in due course on the conference web page at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/events/2025/sep/person-journal-private-international-law-20th-anniversary-conference. There are a wide variety of hotels available nearby – further information about accommodation options and other practicalities will also be provided on the conference web page in due course.

Please send your paper proposal by email to  JPrivIL25@ucl.ac.uk by 17 January 2025.

We look forward to receiving your proposals, and to welcoming you to London in September 2025!

Professor Ugljesa Grusic, Professor of Private International Law (UCL)
Professor Alex Mills, Professor of Public and Private International Law (UCL)
Professor Paul Beaumont, Professor of Private International Law (University of Stirling)
Professor Jonathan Harris, Professor of International Commercial Law (King’s College London)

Prof. Zheng Sophia Tang will be hosting a hybrid conference on Private International Law and Sustainable Development in Asia at Wuhan University on 23rd November 2024. This conference will be held both in person and online.

We invite those interested in this important discussion to mark their calendars. More information will be provided soon.

The tentative program is as follows:

Conference on Private International Law and Sustainable Development in Asia

Date: 23 November 2024 Venue: Wuhan University School of Law Zoom link: To be announced

22 November 2024

06:00 PM: Conference Dinner

23 November 2024

08:30 – 09:00 AM: Registration and Welcome Coffee

09:00 – 09:05 AM: Opening Remarks

• Prof Zheng Tang, Associate Dean, Wuhan University Academy of International Law and Global Governance

09:05 – 9.20 AM: Welcome Remarks

• Prof Yongping Xiao, Director of Wuhan University Institute of International Law, Dean of Wuhan University Academy of International Law and Global Governance

9:20- 9:40 AM: Keynote Address (Private International Law and Sustainable Development)

• Prof Ralf Michaels, Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm and Hans Van Loon

9:40–10:00 AM: Conference Photo and Coffee Break

10:00 – 11:00 AM: Panel 1: Family/Equality

• Chair: Ralf Michaels
• Panelists
  • CHEN, Rong-Chwan: Taiwan’s Path toward SDG 5 in Private International Law
  • JOLLY, Stellina; MALLA, Prakriti: International Child Abduction Jurisprudence in India and Nepal: an Evaluation of Gender Consideration in the Attainment of SDG 5
• Discussant: N.N.
• Q & A

11:00 – 11:15 AM: Coffee Break

11:15-12:15 Panel 2: Migration

• Chair: Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm
• Panelists

• NISHITANI, Yuko: Migration and SDGs in Family Relationships

• • YANG, Zixuan: Sustain the Legal Identity for Intra-Regional Circular Migrants in Asia: From Private International Law towards Openness, Inclusiveness and Equity in the Greater Bay Area
• Discussant: Rong-Chwan Chen
• Q & A

12:15 – 01:15 PM: Lunch Break

01:15 – 02:45 PM: Panel 3: Environment/Climate Change

• Chair: Hans van Loon
• Panelists:
  • CHONG, Adeline; SCHACHERER, Stefanie: Extra-territorial Liability and Enforcement: Finding Ways to Tackle Haze Pollution in Southeast Asia
  • BUI, Thi Quynh Trang; NGUYEN, Thi Hong Trinh: Exploring the Potential for Climate Change Litigation in Vietnam: A Forward-Looking Assessment
  • REYES, Anselmo: The Impartial Judge, Climate Change and the Conflict of Laws
• Discussant: Yuko Nishitani
• Q & A

2:45 – 3:00 PM: Coffee Break

3:00-4:30 Panel 4: The Role of the State

• Chair: Sophia Tang
• Panelists:
  • MU, Ke: State-owned Enterprises’ Role in Marching towards the Sustainable Development Goals
  • FAN, Zihao: Cities’ Roles in Transnational Access to Justice and the Sustainable Value therein: An Observation on Jurisdictional Rules of Mainland China
  • ZHOU, Jiabao: Private International Law as Foreign Relations Law? Reorienting Chinese Private International Law towards Sustainable Development
• Discussant:
• Q & A

4:30-5:15 Presentations: The International Framework

• Chair: To be announced
• Panelists:
  • GOH ESCOLAR, Gérardine: Private International Law Frameworks for the Digital and Green Economies: Crucial Tools for the Realisation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
  • ZHAO, Ning: Navigating Transnational Litigation in Asia: The HCCH’s Contribution to Achieving SDGs through Effective Legal Frameworks
• Discussant:
• Q & A

5:15-5:30 Closing Remarks

• Prof Jin Huang, President of China Society of Private International Law

06:00 PM: Conference Dinner

Information kindly provided by Johannes Ungerer

At the University of Oxford, a conference on ‘Characterisation in the Conflict of Laws’ will be held on 20 and 21 March 2025. It is jointly organised by Dr Johannes Ungerer (University of Oxford and University of Notre Dame in England), Dr Caterina Benini (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan), and PD Dr Felix Berner (University of Tübingen), and is funded by the Institute of European and Comparative Law and the Faculty of Law.

For more than a century, characterisation has been discussed in the conflict of laws without reaching a consensus on a generally accepted theory. However, it is arguably the most crucial step for a court when determining its international jurisdiction and the applicable law. Characterisation identifies in cross-border litigation the nature or category of a particular cause of action (for instance contractual, tortious, proprietary, corporate, matrimonial), so that the correct connecting factor can be employed. This is difficult where the action is unknown domestically or potentially falls in-between two categories and could thus be litigated in different fora or under different laws, leading to different outcomes. What makes it even more complex are the different techniques proposed for characterisation, depending on the origin of the conflicts rules in question (national, EU, or international rules).

The conference, taking place at St Hilda’s College, will be organised as a round-table discussion, bringing together legal scholars and practitioners from a range of jurisdictions, covering both Common Law and Civil Law traditions, in order to establish a common understanding of the practices and challenges regarding characterisation. It will feature contributions from 15 speakers in three sessions: the programme can be accessed here.

The conference room can accommodate a small number of attendees. Interested scholars and practitioners are invited to express their interest in attending the conference by sending an email to Dr Ungerer by 17 November 2024.

Written by Jidong Lin, Wuhan University Institute of International Law

1. Background

China’s newly amended Civil Procedure Law (“CPL 2024”), which came into effect on 1 January 2024, introduces several distinct and innovative changes. Among the most notable is the incorporation of “other appropriate connections” as a jurisdiction ground. Article 276 of the CPL 2024 addresses the jurisdiction of Chinese courts over foreign-related disputes where the defendant lacks domicile in China. Paragraph 1 of Article 276 lists six jurisdiction grounds, including the place of contract formation, place of contract performance, place of the subject matter, place of distrainable property, place of tort, and place of representative offices. As a supplement, Paragraph 2 provides that “notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, foreign-related civil disputes that have other appropriate connections with the People’s Republic of China may fall under the jurisdiction of the People’s Courts.” The term “other appropriate connections” represents a legal innovation not only within Chinese legislation but also on a global scale. Currently, there is no official interpretation or guidance on its precise meaning, making it essential to analyze and evaluate this jurisdiction ground and its potential implications for jurisdictional practices.

2. Legislative Purposes

Regarding the legislative purposes behind the incorporation of “other appropriate connections”, the then President of the Supreme People’s Court explained at the 38th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress that the purpose is to “increase the types of foreign-related cases under China’s jurisdiction, expand jurisdiction grounds, better protect the rights of both Chinese and foreign parties, and effectively safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests.”[1] Additionally, the head of the Civil Law Office of the Legal Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, one of the principal figures involved in drafting the amendment, emphasized that the incorporation of “other appropriate connections” is intended to “expand the jurisdiction of Chinese courts over foreign-related cases.”[2] From these official explanations, it can be concluded that the legislative purposes of incorporating “other appropriate connections” as a jurisdictional ground are threefold: (a) expanding jurisdiction over foreign-related cases, (b) protecting the rights of parties, and (c) safeguarding national and public interests.

3. Potential Function

The legislative purposes outlined in official statements are somewhat broad and indirect. However, scholarly works offer insights into the potential functions of this jurisdiction ground, which help achieve legislative purposes. These functions can be summarized as follows:

a) Filling Jurisdiction Gaps

First, “other appropriate connections” can help fill jurisdiction gaps. This is particularly relevant when the interests of Chinese individuals or companies are infringed upon in a cross-border context while none of the listed jurisdiction grounds apply.[3] Such situations are increasingly common due to rapid social developments that give rise to new types of disputes. In such cases, “other appropriate connections” can serve as a supplementary jurisdiction ground to fill the jurisdiction gaps and protect their interests.

b) Articulating Extraterritoriality Provisions

Second, “other appropriate connections” can strengthen the enforcement of extraterritoriality provisions in Chinese laws. China has introduced extraterritoriality provisions in several regulatory laws, including the Personal Information Protection Law, Anti-Trust Law, and Security Law. However, the previous Civil Procedure Law lacked corresponding provisions that granted Chinese courts adjudicative jurisdiction over related disputes. The incorporation of “other appropriate connections” addresses this gap, allowing courts to assert jurisdiction in such cases.

c) Substituting Necessity Jurisdiction

Third, “other appropriate connections” may act as a substitute for necessity jurisdiction. The CPL 2024 does not formally establish the necessity jurisdiction, despite scholarly calls for its establishment.[4] Although the adoption of necessity jurisdiction in China remains a topic for further discussion, “other appropriate connections” may provide a mechanism for courts to exercise this type of jurisdiction when required.[5]

4. Interpretation

It is necessary to first establish the methodology for the interpretation of “other appropriate connections”. Some scholars argue that future judicial interpretations should continue to follow the enumerative approach—listing several typical jurisdiction grounds to provide a degree of legal certainty. In terms of content, it has been suggested that indirect jurisdiction grounds, as outlined in the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters 2019, should be considered.[6] However, this approach may result in rigidity and a lack of flexibility, which have been the main criticisms of the earlier legislation. As a result, a more flexible and open approach should be adopted instead, one that provides general guidelines while allowing judges to conduct case-by-case analyses.[7]

This method is further illustrated by judicial practices involving “other appropriate connections”. In the first case to adopt “other appropriate connections” as the jurisdiction ground, the Supreme People’s Court addressed a jurisdictional issue arising from a dispute related to FRAND (Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) licensing.[8] The Court stated that whether the dispute has “appropriate connections” with China should be assessed by examining the characteristics of the case. Based on this analysis, the Supreme People’s Court identified several connecting factors that serve as additions to the jurisdiction grounds listed in the previous Civil Procedure Law. The Court concluded that if any of these connecting factors are situated within Chinese borders, the dispute will have “appropriate connections” with China.[9] This practice indicates that the primary method for interpreting “appropriate connections” involves analyzing specific cases to define additional relevant connecting factors or jurisdictional grounds.

The next question regarding interpretation is the extent of connection required by “other appropriate connections”. To clarify this, the wording used must be considered. During the legislative process, the term “appropriate connections” was specifically chosen to distinguish it from terms like “real and substantial connections” and “minimum contacts”, which are commonly used in comparative law and academic literature. This suggests that “appropriate connections” do not necessitate a close connection to “substantial connection”, yet should not be overly broad like “minimum contacts”.[10] However, the precise extent required remains to be determined. It appears that the necessary extent may depend on the interests at stake since the primary purpose of incorporating “other appropriate connections” is to protect China’s private and public interests. Thus, a more vital interest may necessitate a lower threshold for connection, while less vital interests may demand higher.

5. Concluding Remarks

The incorporation of “other appropriate connections” as a jurisdiction ground reflects China’s determination and ongoing efforts to enhance its foreign-related legal framework. It also provides a solid foundation for Chinese courts to actively participate in transnational governance. From the perspective of international law, Chinese practices concerning “other appropriate connections” deserve further examination, since it also serves as a supplementary rule for indirect jurisdiction (Article 301, CPL 2024) and for the allocation of enforcement jurisdiction within borders (Article 304, CPL 2024). It is fair to submit that “appropriate connections” constitutes a fundamental jurisdiction rule of China, potentially contributing to the development of international laws in corresponding fields. However, current practices and guidelines regarding “other appropriate connections” remain insufficient, highlighting the need for continual and further observation.

[1] See Zhou Qiang, ‘Explanation on the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft Amendment)’ (National People’s Congress of the PRC Website, (27 February 2021) <www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c30834/202112/t20211227_315637.html> accessed 13 October 2024.

[2] See Wang Qiao, ‘China’s Civil Procedure Law Completes Revision, Will Better Safeguard Parties’ Litigation Rights and Legitimate Interests – Interpretation of the Newly Revised Civil Procedure Law People’s Court Daily (Beijing, 2 September 2023) 4.

[3] See Shen Hongyu & Guo Zaiyu, ‘Commentary on and Interpretation of the Revised Provisions of the Foreign-Related Part of the Civil Procedure Law’  (2023) 54 China Law Review 70, 73.

[4] See Huang Zhihui, ‘System Positioning and Normative Explanation of Necessary Jurisdiction System of Foreign-related Civil Litigation in China’  (2022) 39 Studies in Law and Business 48, 60-61.

[5] See Huang Zhihui, ‘Study on the International Civil Jurisdiction of Appropriate Connections in the Context of the Foreign-Related Rule of Law’  (2023) 505 Law Science 176, 185-186.

[6] See Liu Guiqiang, The Challenges and Responses Faced by China’s Counter-Sanctions Litigation Recovery System  (2023) 45 Global Law Review 211, 219.

[7] See Guo Zhenyuan, Appropriate Connections Principle in Foreign-Related Civil Litigation Jurisdiction: Theoretical Explanation and Path of Application  (2024) 127 Chinese Review of International Law 127, 137.

[8] Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. ZTE Corporation Ltd., (2019) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Xia Zhong No. 157 (Supreme People’s Court).

[9] Similar reasoning can be seen in Guang Dong Oppo Mobile Telecommunications Corp., Ltd., et al. v. Sharp Corporation., et al., in Supreme People’s Court Gazette, Issue 2, 2022 (Total No. 306) p. 23-30.

[10] See Shen Hongyu & Guo Zaiyu, ‘Commentary on and Interpretation of the Revised Provisions of the Foreign-Related Part of the Civil Procedure Law’  (2023) 54 China Law Review 70, 73.

Editors:

Dr Chukwuma Okoli, Dr Eghosa O. Ekhator, Professor Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Professor Ralf Michaels, Hans van Loon

We are excited to invite contributions to The Journal of Sustainable Development and Policy for a special issue focusing on “Private International Law and Sustainable Development in Africa.” This is an area with limited scholarship in Africa, as most research has traditionally emphasized substantive laws, often neglecting the critical role of private international law in sustainable development. Interested researchers should consider themes such as the ones explored in Michaels/Ruiz Abou-Nigm/Van Loon (eds.) (2021): The Private Side of Transforming our World – UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030 and the Role of Private International Law. Proposals should emphasise private international law and sustainable development issues that are of particular relevance to the African context.

We encourage researchers to explore the intersection of private international law and sustainable development in relation to issues such as environmental protection, corporate social responsibility, and the protection of vulnerable groups (for example, employees, consumers, migrants, and indigenous peoples). Interesting topics in private international law could include how multinational companies are held accountable to host communities in Africa regarding cross-border environmental issues including climate change, as well as social and economic sustainability. Researchers could engage with the regulatory framework for multinational companies in cross-border transactions affecting corporate social responsibility in Africa, and the enhancement of human rights standards and social justice in cross-border employment matters in Africa .They might also wish to reflect on the implications for Africa of the new EU Directive 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence, and of similar due diligence legislative initiatives deployed at the national level in different countries. Other relevant topics include the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and its relationship with private international law and sustainable development, as well as the harmonization of private international law in Africa and its relation with sustainability goals, regional economic integration, abuses of party autonomy in international commercial contracts, and the appeal of international commercial adjudication in Africa. These are all themes that can be explored from a sustainability perspective.

We are particularly interested in innovative academic approaches that address these themes within the African context. We welcome proposals from all approaches, including critical, doctrinal, analytical, conceptual, reflexive, interdisciplinary, post-critical and speculative traditions of law, that enable a serious scholarly reflection on private international law and sustainable development. Contributions will start filling a significant gap in the literature and promote a deeper understanding the relationships, the impact and the potential of private international law in sustainable development in Africa.

Guidelines

Applicants are invited to submit a research proposal of up to 500 words, together with a short CV in the same document. Submissions should be sent to c.okoli@bham.ac.uk, and copy E.Ekhator@derby.ac.uk, and info@ogeesinstitute.edu.ng by 16 December 2024 with the email subject clearly marked “Submission Proposal – Special Issue JSDP – PIL and Sustainable Development in Africa”.

Proposals will be reviewed by the editors and selected participants will be informed by the end of January 2025.

Full draft of selected papers of up to 8,000 words inclusive of footnotes should be submitted by 30 June 2025 following the ‘submission guidelines’ section of The Journal of Sustainable Development and Policy: https://www.ogeesinstitute.edu.ng/submissions.

The editors are seeking opportunities for funding to support a conference in late 2025 to discuss draft papers in advance of publication of the special issue in early 2026.

About the project The Private Side of Transforming our World – UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030 and the Role of Private International Law

“Droit international privé – Immunités de juridiction et competence internationales des tribunaux tunisiens” (Private International Law – Jurisdictional Immunity and International Jurisdiction of Tunisian Courts) is the title of the long-awaited book recently published by Prof. Sami Bostanji, a distinguished Professor at the Faculté de droit et des sciences politiques de Tunis, Director of the DRIMAN research center, and one of the leading private international law scholars in Tunisia.

The book represents the first detailed and in-depth analysis of the rules and practices governing the judicial function in Tunisian private international Tunisian, viewed through the lenses of jurisdictional immunities and international adjudicative jurisdiction. It offers a systematic approach to the subject drawing on the most recent – and often unpublished – decisions of Tunisian courts. The author justifies his focus on these two aspects of the judicial function by highlighting “the importance of these issues, both on a theoretical and practical level,” which—according to him—demonstrates a “shift in the center of gravity” (déplacement du centre de gravité) in private international law, moving from conflicts of laws to conflicts of jurisdictions (p. 29, para. 16).

The book, which follows the classical French two-parts plan, begins first with a general introduction in which the author discusses some key concepts, briefly introduces some aspects of the legal the history of judicial jurisdiction in Tunisian private international law, and examines the notion of internationality as a prerequisite for the operation of the private international law system in Tunisia, as well as the relevance of the subject.

The book is then divided into two main parts.

Part One focuses on the study of jurisdictional immunities, approached from the perspective of “restrictions on the power to adjudicate” (Les restrictions au pouvoir de juger). In this first part, the author thoroughly examines how immunities are regulated, starting with the broader international rules governing these issues (Title I) before delving into the solutions provided by Tunisian law, particularly the Code of Private International Law (Title II). The author highlights both legal developments and practical applications of these rules in Tunisian court decisions.

Part Two explores the system of international jurisdiction of Tunisian courts through the perspective of “the capacity to adjudicate” (l’aptitude à statuer). Here, the author analyzes the various forms in which this capacity manifests (Les déclinaisons de l’aptitude à statuer), emphasizing their specific characteristics. This part is divided into three titles.

Title I offers a theoretical analysis of international jurisdiction, examining its nature and guiding principles.

Title II, which serves as the core of the book, is dedicated to the grounds of international jurisdiction for Tunisian courts. These grounds can be derived from (limited) international or (primarily) domestic sources, either through statutory provisions or case law and cover a range of issues. These include exclusive jurisdiction; general jurisdiction based – according to the author – on the domicile of the defendant, the agreement of the parties and connexity; special jurisdiction justified by various concerns such as the protection of children, proximity and administration of justice, location of property etc.; the intricate issue of nationality as ground of international jurisdiction and forum necessitatis.

Title III addresses the challenges to the jurisdiction of Tunisian courts, including cases where the defendant contests jurisdiction, either by appearing before the court and raising the issue or when the judge raises it ex officio. It also examines the implications of foreign proceedings (lis pendens) and foreign judgments (res judicata) on the jurisdiction of Tunisian courts.

In a nutshell, this book provides a comprehensive and detailed account of the theory and practice of jurisdiction in Tunisia, making a significant contribution to the field of private international law in the country and abroad. Written in French, it offers French-speaking scholars and practitioners a valuable opportunity to gain insights into Tunisian jurisdictional rules. The publication of the book is particularly timely, considering the ongoing discussions on jurisdiction within the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH). It indeed offers a new perspective that may prove invaluable to those involved in drafting future international frameworks on jurisdiction to take into account different views and approaches from various parts of the world, especially from the standpoint of a North African and an Arab jurisdiction (although the author highlights from time to time along the pages the “exceptional” aspect of the Tunisian regulation of the issue of jurisdiction as compared to other MENA Arab countries).

Lastly, given the expertise of the author and his long experience as a dedicated scholar and law professor, it is hoped that this work will be followed by further volumes addressing other aspects of Tunisian private international law, particularly the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and choice of law.

Probably some of these aspects will be addressed in Prof. Bostanji’s forthcoming stimulating course titled “Secularization and Private International Law in the Arab Countries” which will be delivered during next year’s Summer Courses at the Hague Academy of International Law, as recently announced. For more details, see here.

Much remains to be seen and unveiled!!

The blurb of the book reads as follows:

L’étendue de la fonction juridictionnelle est une question centrale du droit international privé contemporain. Le pouvoir de juger, en matière internationale, connaît des restrictions qu’illustrent les immunités de juridictions. Par ailleurs, le périmètre de ce pouvoir, qui se déploie sous le rapport de la compétence internationale, présente des singularités sur le plan des critères qui la fondent et des incident affectant sa mise en œuvre. L’intérêt doctrinal porté, au cours de ces dernières années, à ces questions ainsi que la pléthore des décisions rendues, dans domaines, attentent incontestablement de leur importance aussi bien d’un point de vue théorique que pratique.C’est sous ces différents prismes que le présent ouvrage cherche à éclairer l’évolution de la matière en droit international privé tunisien. (The scope of the judicial function is a central issue in contemporary private international law. The power to adjudicate, in the international context, faces some limits, as illustrated by jurisdictional immunities. Moreover, the reach of this power, which is exercised in relation to international jurisdiction, displays certain unique features regarding the criteria that define it and the issues that affect its operation. The scholarly interest in these issues in recent years, along with the abundance of rulings in this area, undeniably attests to their significance from both theoretical and practical perspectives. It is through these various lenses that the present book seeks to shed light on the evolution of this field in Tunisian private international law.)

The book’s Table of content (in French) can be viewed here.

The Japan Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA), one of the oldest international arbitration institutions in the world, founded in 1950, has published the 5th Volume of its annual journal on commercial arbitration – the Japan Commercial Arbitration Journal.

The journal features articles on international commercial arbitration, mediation, and litigation related to Japan. These articles are authored by prominent scholars and experienced practitioners who are well-versed in the resolution and prevention of international commercial disputes.

The Japan Commercial Arbitration Journal is particularly valuable for non-Japanese readers, including foreign researchers and practitioners, as it provides insights into Japan’s approach to international dispute resolution. By offering comprehensive analysis and updates on arbitration, mediation and litigation practices in Japan, the journal helps bridge the knowledge gap for those working in international commercial law. Access to this information is essential for professionals seeking to understand the nuances of Japanese legal procedures and effectively engage with Japan in cross-border commercial matters.

The new volume features the following articles:

Miriam Rose Ivan L. Pereira

Emergency Arbitration at the JCAA: A Review of the Rules and the Changing Landscape

Fumiyasu Miyazaki

Overview of the amendment to Japan’s Arbitration Act

Atsushi FUKUDA, Takahito KAWAHARA

Overview of the Development of International Mediation Legislation in Japan with the Singapore Convention on Mediation

Takanori Kawashima

Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses: Effects of Non-Compliance with Pre-Action/Pre-Arbitration ADR Clauses  

Miyuki Watanabe

Due Process in Arbitration – How to Mitigate Due Process Paranoia?

Takanori Abe

Patent royalty claim dismissed due to a demurrer, admitting the reach of an arbitration agreement ?Defendants’ measures and plaintiffs? risk reduction ?

Kazuhiro Kobayashi

Practical Issues in Enforcing International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation

Michael Martinez

Too far, or not enough? Considerations for discovery in the United States and improving efficiency in international arbitration through an analysis thereof

Shuhei Kubota

Arbitration as a Means of Resolving ESG Disputes

Shin-Ichiro Abe

The Development of Sports Arbitration in Japan and Challenges for the Future

Yoshihisa Hayakawa

Advanced Technologies in Tokyo Facilities for Arbitration Hearings

Tony Andriotis, Shingo Okada, Eric Yao

Serving a Party in Japan by Hague Service Convention

Atsushi Shiraki

Asymmetrical Approaches of Extraterritorial Evidence Legislation between the U.S. and Japan

All volumes can also be freely consulted and downloaded here.

I. Introduction

As mentioned in a previous post, Morocco is not only the MENA Arab jurisdiction that has ratified the largest number of the HCCH Conventions (7 in total), but also a country where the HCCH conventions have been actively applied (see here on the application of the HCCH 1980 Child Abduction Convention, and here for a case involving the application of the HCCH 1996 Child Protection Convention). The application of the HCCH Conventions in Morocco offers valuable insights into how these HCCH instruments operate within an Islamic context, challenging the widely held assumption of the existence of an Islamic exceptionalism (though such exceptionalism does exist, but to a varying degree across the Muslim-majority countries. See e.g. Béligh Elbalti, “The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Filiation Judgments in Arab Countries” in Nadjma Yassari et al. (ed.), Filiation and the Protection of Parentless Children (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2019), 373-402).

In the case reported here, the authenticity certificate of conversion to Islam issued in Spain and to which an Apostille was attached was the crucial issue that the Supreme Court had to address. It must be admitted however from the outset that the case did not directly involve the interpretation and the application of the HCCH 1961 Apostille Convention – officially known as Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents. Nonetheless, the case does raise some interesting issues regarding the admissibility of apostillised documents (i.e. document for which an Apostille has been issued). The case also brings to light a significant concern regarding interfaith successions from a private international law perspective in the MENA Arab region, particularly in Morocco. However, while the latter issue is particularly important, for the sake of brevity, the focus here will be placed d on the implication of the Apostille Convention in this case.

II. Facts

The case involves a dispute over inheritance of A (apparently a Moroccan national). After A’s death, his heirs (collectively here referred to as “Y”) issued a certificate of inheritance that excluded his wife, a Spanish national (here referred to as “X”) from A’s inheritance. X contested this in the Family Court, claiming her legal rights as A’s widow. Shae argued that Y had unfairly excluded here on the grounds that she was not Muslim, despite having converted to Islam by declaring her faith in the presence of an imam in a mosque in Spain before A’s death, and that she was handed over a certificate confirming her conversion. However, due to the emotional toll of A’s sudden death she forgot to bring the certificate with her at the time of A’s death, and to rectify this, she obtained an official notary document confirming her conversion. In support of her request to be included in the list of A’s heirs, X submitted various legal documents as evidence, including the certificate of her conversion to Islam she obtained in Spain with an Apostille attached to it.

Y, however, requested to dismiss the claim arguing, inter alia, that X was still Christian at the time of A’s death, that the conversion declaration that she made after A’s death had no effect and could not make from a legal heir, therefore, she was not entitled to inheritance since there can be no inheritance between a Muslim and a non-Muslim. Y also argued that her certificate of conversion obtained in Spain was void and had no legal validity even if an Apostille is attached to it.

The Family Court, as the first instance court, ruled in X’s favor and recognized her right to inherit. The decision was later appealed on the grounds, among others, X’s conversion to Islam was fabricated as she was seen performing Christian rituals at the funeral. Y also filed a separate challenge to the authenticity of her foreign certificate of conversion to Islam on the grounds that the certificate was forged. The Court of Appeal, however, dismissed the appeal and upheld the Family Court’s ruling in X’s favor.

Dissatisfied, Y filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Before the Supreme Court Y argued, inter alia, that the Spanish conversion certificate was a mere piece of paper without any official administrative references with a signature attributed to a Mosque in Spain. Nonetheless, the court accepted this certificate without verifying its authenticity or the context in which it was issued, such as by consulting relevant records or conducting a judicial investigation with Spanish authorities under the judicial cooperation agreement between Morocco and Spain, and also failed to verify whether the widow was even in Spain on the date the certificate was issued.

III. The Ruling

In its ruling No. 167 of 5 April 2022, the Moroccan Supreme Court admitted the appeal and overturned the appealed decision with remand stating as following:

“[…] according to the last paragraph of Article 40 of the convention signed between Morocco and Spain on judicial cooperation in civil, commercial, and administrative matters of 30 May 1997, if there is a serious doubt regarding the authenticity of a document issued by the judicial authorities or other authorities of either country, this should be verified through the central authority of both countries.

[Although] the court of the appealed decision ordered an investigation as part of activating the procedure for alleged forgery against the certificate of conversion to Islam [……] issued by the head of the Islamic Center in Spain, and registered under number (…..) in the registry of Islamic associations at the Ministry of Justice there, [it] failed to observe the procedures stipulated in Article 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, particularly, by hearing the testimony of the person who issued the certificate and examining its authenticity, regularity, the accuracy of the information it contained and its date; and that by way of a rogatory mission to the competent Spanish authorities in accordance with Article 12 of abovementioned Convention [of 1997], in order to base its decision on verified facts.

As a result, the court’s decision lacked a legal basis and was deficient in its reasoning [……], and therefore, it must be overturned.”

IV. Comments

1. About the HCCH 1961 Apostille Convention

 The HCCH 1961 Apostille Convention is undoubtedly one of the most successful HCCH conventions, with its 127 contracting parties (as of the date of the writing). The Convention’s status table shows that more than 15 countries are Muslim-majority jurisdictions or have legal systems influenced by or based on Islamic law. Among them are five Arab jurisdictions from the MENA region: Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Bahrain and Oman. Marocco ratified the Convention on 27 September 2015, and it entered into force on 14 August 2016.

As is widely known, the Convention aims at simplifying the process of authenticating public documents for use abroad. The Apostille Convention eliminates the need for a complex and time-consuming legalization process by introducing a standardized certificate called an Apostille. As such, the Apostille, issued by a designated authority in the State of origin, is a simplified certificate that confirms the authenticity of the document’s origin by certifying the signature on the document is genuine, thus allowing it to be recognized in another Contracting States, the State of destination. (For details, see the HCCH Permanent Bureau, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Apostille Convention (2nd ed. 2023) pp. 25-34 hereafter the “Apostille Handbook”)

Several key principles that underpin the Apostille Convention. These include the following: First, the Convention applies mainly to “public documents” (the Apostille Handbook, p. 51, para. 102). Second, the Convention is based on the premise that the Apostille only verifies the authenticity of a public document’s origin (and not the content) by certifying the signature, the signer’s capacity, and, where applicable, the seal or stamp (see the Apostille Handbook, p. 31, para. 22-23).

The case commented here provides valuable insights concerning these two points. The first issue is whether a certificate of conversion to Islam, issued by a mosque or an Islamic center in Spain, qualifies as a “public document” under the Convention. Even if it does qualify, the second issue concerns the probative value of an apostillised document, particularly when the authenticity of the document itself is contested for forgery or fabrication.

As the ruling of the Supreme Court above indicates, the Court did not address the first question, arguably assuming the validity of the Apostille without further examination. However, a closer review of the first principle mentioned above suggests that this issue may not be as straightforward as the Court seemed to have presumed. This can be supported by the fact that the Court focused more on the allegation of forgery of the apostillised certificate, implying that the validity of the Apostille itself was not in question.

2. Certificate of Conversion to Islam as a “public document”

Can a certificate of conversion to Islam issued in Spain be qualified as a “public document” under the Apostille Convention? Answering this question first requires an understanding of what constitutes a “public document” under the Convention.

a) What is a public document under the Convention?

Although the Convention enumerates in a non-exhaustive list the documents deemed to be “public documents” (art.1(2)), and mainly relies on the national law of the State of origin (i.e. where the document was executed) to determine whether the document qualities as “public document” (the Apostille Handbook, p. 52, para. 105), it provides for a useful criterion to determine whether a document is a “public document”. According to the Apostille Handbook, “the term “public document” extends to all documents other than those issued by persons in their private capacity. Therefore, any document executed by an authority or person in an official capacity (i.e. acting in the capacity of an officer authorized to execute the document) is a public document” (p. 51-52, para. 103). Documents that do not meet this criterion are generally not considered “public documents” under the Convention (the Apostille Handbook, p. 64, para. 182).

There are, however, exceptions. A document may still be apostollised if it is notarized or officially certified (art. 1(2)(c) and (d). See the Apostille Handbook, p. 54, paras. 116-122. On the example of educational documents, including diplomas, see p. 59, paras. 150-153). In addition, “[t]he law of the State of origin may consider religious documents, as well as documents executed by official religious courts, to be of public nature and therefore a public document under the Convention” (See the Apostille Handbook, p. 65, para. 185).

b) The Public nature of Certificates of Conversion to Islam

In certain countries, certificates of conversion to Islam are clearly recognized as public documents. For example, in many Muslim-majority jurisdictions such certificates are issued by public organs or institutions affiliated with the state, such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, or the Ministry of Justice (e.g., in the UAE) or by authorized persons (such as the Adouls in Morocco). In such cases, the conversion certificate possesses the requisite “public” nature under the Apostille Convention.

However, in many non-Muslim countries, no specific public administrative authority is responsible for overseeing religious conversions or issuing certificates to that effect. Instead, individuals wishing to convert to Islam typically approach a local mosque or Islamic center. There, the person publicly professes their declaration of faith in front of an imam and witnesses. While a certificate is often provided for various purposes (e.g., marriage or pilgrimage), these documents lack the “public” character necessary for apostillasation under the Apostille Convention.

In the case commented here, the summary of facts indicates that the Spanish widow had embraced Islam before an imam at a mosque. The Supreme Court’s ruling, however, refers to her conversion in front of the head of an Islamic Center in Spain registered with the Spanish Ministry of Justice (although it is possible that the mosque was part of the Islamic center, and the head of the Islamic center serves also served as the imam). In any event, it doubtful that either the Imam or the head of the Islamic center acted “in the capacity of an officer” to issue the conversion-to-Islam certificate. Indeed, even when registered as non-profit or religious organization or association, mosques and Islamic centers generally do not possess the authority to issue “public documents” within the meaning of the Apostille Convention. This applies to other types of certificates these centers or mosques may issue such as marriage or divorce certificates. Such certificates are generally not recognized by the states unless duly registered with civil authorities. Where registration is not possible, these documents primarily serve religious purposes within the community.

There is also no indication in the Supreme Court’s decision that the certificate in question falls under the exceptions outlined above (see IV(2)(a)). Therefore, it remains unclear on which grounds the certificate of conversion was apostillised, as “[t]he Convention does not authorize the issuance of an Apostille for a document that is not a public document under the law of the State of origin [Spain in casu], even if the document is a public document in the State of destination [Morocco in casu]” (the Apostille Handbook, p. 52, para. 107).

3. Contestation for forgery of an apostillised document

It is worth recalling here that the case reported here concerned the invalidation of a certificate of inheritance that excluded a Spanish widow, who claimed to have converted to Islam, from her deceased husband’s estate. To support her claim, the widow submitted, among other documents, an apostillised certificate of conversion to Islam issued in Spain. Before the Supreme Court, the appellants argued that the certificate of conversion had no legal value because it was forged and lacked sufficient elements to establish its authenticity. The Supreme Court admitted the appeal on the grounds that the authenticity of the certificate had to be examine pursuant to the relevant provisions of the 1997 Moroccan-Spanish Convention on Legal Assistance in Civil, Commercial and Administrative Matters.

The position of the court should be approved on this particular point. the Apostille Handbook makes it clear that the Apostille has no effect on the admissibility or probative value of a foreign public document (the Apostille Handbook, p. 32, para. 25). Indeed, since the Apostille does not relate to or certify the content of the underlying public document, issues concerning the authenticity of the foreign public document and the extent to which it may be used to establish the existence of a fact are left to be dealt with under the law of the State of destination. In this case, the applicable provisions are found the Moroccan code of civil procedure and the Hispano-Moroccan bilateral convention on judicial assistance, as indicated in the Court’s decision.

By Reef Alfahad,  PhD Candidate at Kings College London

On 17 October 2024, a conference on ‘The Anglo-French Approaches in Arbitration’ will take place at King’s College London (UK). This conference will discuss how the French and English approaches differ when dealing with corruption in arbitration and antisuit injunctions, particularly in light of the recent UK Supreme Court decision in UniCredit v RusChemAlliance.

The event will bring together renowned experts in international arbitration and international commercial litigation.

Welcome remarks: Dr Manuel Penades (King’s College London)

The first panel will address corruption in arbitration and the review by national courts. The speakers will be:

• Jason Fry (KC): Global Head of International Arbitration at Clifford Chance,
• Dr. Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Arbitrator, JK ADR, and Visiting Professor at LSE,
• Karolina Latasz, Senior Associate, Squire Patton Boggs
• Chair: Reef Alfahad, PhD Candidate at KCL, organiser

The second panel will be dedicated to anti-suit injunctions concerning foreign seated arbitrations. The panellists will be:

• The leading counsels for both parties in UniCredit v RusChemAlliance, Alexander Gunning (KC) and Professor Jonathan Harris (KC)
• Raphaël Kaminsky, French law expert and Partner, Teynier Pic,
• Professor Dr. Maxi Scherer, Professor, Queen Mary School of Law and Arbitrator, ArbBoutique.
• Chair: Marie Berard, Head of UK Arbitration, Clifford Chance (London).

The conference will be held in English. The program is available here https://www.kcl.ac.uk/events/the-anglo-french-approaches-to-arbitration.

Registration is required at https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/the-anglo-french-approaches-to-arbitration-tickets-1024955999987?aff=oddtdtcreator

By Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit, Lecturer in Maritime Law, Australian Maritime College, College of Sciences and Engineering, University of Tasmania

On 24th September 2024, Mimmie Chan J handed down the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Bank A v Bank B [2024] HKCFI 2529. In this case, the Plaintiff (Bank A) with its base of operation in Germany was under the supervision of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). Its majority shareholder was the Defendant (Bank B) who held 99.39% shares. In turn, the Defendant was a Russian bank whose majority shareholder was the Government of the Russian Federation.

Between the predecessor of Plaintiff (as, at the time before the court in Hong Kong, the Plaintiff bank was already in voluntary liquidation) and Defendant, there existed an ISDA agreement dated 23 July 2023. Following the war between Russia and Ukraine which broke out in February 2022, Germany followed the “Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine” which Article 2 provides:

“1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by any natural persons or natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them as listed in Annex I shall be frozen.

2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural persons or natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them listed in Annex I.”

As a result, BaFin barred Plaintiff from making payments or other transfers of assets to companies, including Defendant. Moreover, it also barred Plaintiff from accepting new deposits, granting loans, or making payments to Russian borrowers. The defendant was subsequently listed in the Annex I of the EU Regulation. On that same day, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Termination and Settlement Agreement (TSA) under which Plaintiff was to pay Defendant EUR 112, 634, 610. The TSA contained a choice of the English law clause and an arbitration clause for any dispute to be resolved by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) arbitration.

After the defendant was added to Annex I, BaFin denied the defendant’s right to vote in the plaintiff’s meetings and also barred the plaintiff from taking any instructions from the defendant. Defendant tried to demand payment from Plaintiff according to the TSA but Plaintiff denied that, citing the infeasibility due to the EU Regulation.

The defendant hence commenced proceedings before the courts in Russia. Among other things, the Russian Court granted a ‘Freezing Order’ prohibiting any transfer of securities that Plaintiff had in its account with Defendant’s bank. The plaintiff’s attempt to challenge the jurisdiction of the Russian Court based on the arbitration clause contained in the TSA was unsuccessful. Hence, on 27 October 2023, the plaintiff sought an interim anti-suit junction from the court in Hong Kong.

Regardless of the interim anti-suit injunction, the defendant commenced again the proceedings in Russia where the Russian Court issued an anti-suit injunction prohibiting the plaintiff from continuing any proceedings in Hong Kong, and subsequently the defendant obtained another injunction prohibiting the plaintiff from initiating arbitration proceedings at the HKIAC.

In late 2023, the Russian Court gave judgment in favor of the defendant to seek the settlement payment under the TSA and granted the final injunction restraining the plaintiff from pursuing the HKIAC arbitration.

The plaintiff hence came to the court in Hong Kong seeking a final injunction to restrain the defendant from pursuing or continuing any proceedings in Russia. The defendant resisted that by raising the arguments based on Article 19 and Article 13 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 4 April 1990 Promulgated by Order No. 26 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on 4 April 1990 Effective as of 1 July 1997) (hereinafter the “Basic Law”) (which is effectively a mini-constitution for Hong Kong) SAR):

“Article 13

*The Central People’s Government shall be responsible for the foreign affairs relating to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China shall establish an office in Hong Kong to deal with foreign affairs.

The Central People’s Government authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to conduct relevant external affairs on its own in accordance with this Law.

Article 19

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication.

The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have jurisdiction over all cases in the Region, except that the restrictions on their jurisdiction imposed by the legal system and principles previously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained.

*The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs. The courts of the Region shall obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive on questions of fact concerning acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs whenever such questions arise in the adjudication of cases. The certificate shall be binding on the courts. Before issuing such a certificate, the Chief Executive shall obtain a certifying document from the Central People’s Government.”

Mimmie Chan J summarised the rule concerning the anti-suit injunction which has been established through authorities in Hong Kong at [34]:

“Foreign proceedings initiatied in breach of an arbitration agreement will ultimately be restrained by the grant of an injunction, unless there are strong reasons shown to the contrary … For contractual anti-suit injunctions, the courts have emphasized that there is no need to prove that the arbitral tribunal is the most convenient forum … Nor is there need for the Court to feel diffidence in granting the injunction, or to exercise the jurisdiction sparingly and with great caution,  for fear of giving an appearance of undue interference with proceedings of a foreign court. The restraint is directed against the party which has promised not to bring the proceedings otherwise than in accordance with the arbitration agreement, and effect should ordinarily be given to the agreement in the absence of strong reasons for departing from it…”

So far as the argument based on the act of state in Article 19 of the Basic Law is concerned, the judge found there was no proof that the defendant was a state entity despite its majority shareholder being the Government of the Russian Federation. Neither the defendant’s argument that Germany was somehow involved in the plaintiff convinced the judge because, as she found in [50], Bafin was a regulatory authority. Its act was not that of the state. Since there is no doubt about neither party in the case, there is no basis to obtain the certificate from the Chief Executive according to the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Basic Law (citing the Court of Final Appeal in Democratic Republic of Congo v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC (No 1) (2011) 14 HKCFAR 95).

The judge then came to conclude in her ratio decidendi at [59] and [60]:

“In my judgment, what is pertinent is that the question for determination by the Court in this case is simply whether there is a valid and binding arbitration agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, which covers the scope of the dispute between the two parties and the claims made by them in these proceedings and in the two sets of Russian proceedings, and whether to grant the injunctions on the Plaintiff’s application. It is trite, that the arbitration agreement contained in the Arbitration Clause is severable from and separate to the underlying TSA between the parties. Any illegality of the TSA, and any alleged impossbility to perform the TSA, cannot affect the validity and operation of the arbitration agreement. Nor does the impossibility of performance of any award obtained in the HK Arbitration affect the validity and enforceability of either the arbitration agreement, the HK Arbitration itself, or the award obtained …

… It is simply not necessary for the Court to decide whether the issue and application of the EU Sanction confers a good answer to the Defendant’s claim for payment under the TSA, whether the Plaintiff can be excused from payment, and the effect of the EU Sanction on the TSA are all matters which go to the merits of the claim in the HK Arbitration, and it should not be forgotten that the Court does not consider the merits of the underlying dispute when it decides the Plaintiff’s claim for the injunctions – which are made solely on the basis of a valid arbitration agreement. This is also a reason to reject the Defendant’s assertion that by granting the injunctions to the Plaintiff, the Court is implementing or facilitating the EU Sanction. Any injunction which the Court grants in this case is to facilitate the arbitration agreement between the parties, and nothing else”.

The judge also denied that the EU Regulation is in any way contradictory to the public policy of Hong Kong or that of the People’s Republic of China since it does not affect the rights or property of any Chinese entity or Hong Kong entity.

Overall, this is a fair case that the judge chose to uphold the effect of the arbitration agreement. It was somewhat curious that the parties agreed to the English law in the TSA agreement, knowing that, under the English law, the EU Regulation is likely to be effective. It is not known for what reason the Court in Russia found for the defendant regarding its entitlement to the payment under the TSA. For sure, a hard burden falls on arbitrators at the HKIAC (as per the TSA, the tribunal should consist of 3 arbitrators). There has been much discussion on the impact of any unilateral sanction upon arbitrators in recent years. Arbitrators will continue facing this challenge so long as the conflict remains, being that between Russia and Ukraine or that in the Middle East.

On 26 and 27 June 2025, Brigitta Lurger, Martina Melcher, Florian Heindler, and Simon Laimer organize the forth edition of the Austrian Private International Law Workshop. This year, it is hosted by the University of Graz, Austria. The organizers aim to facilitate an open and lively discussion on questions of private international law. Presentations will be delivered in German.

Confirmed speakers are Barbara Egglmeier-Schmolke, Burkhard Hess, Martin Lutschounig, Sören Segger-Piening and Bea Verschraegen.

Details can be found on the flyer and here. Participation is free of charge. Please register via ipr-workshop@uni-graz.at.

Just two days after losing to LOSC Lille in the Champions League, Real Madrid suffered another defeat against a French opponent. Among the 44 (!) judgments published this Friday by the CJEU – a flurry of decisions reminiscent of the madness that is the current Champions League format –, the Court decided a true ‘clásico’ of European private international law in Case C-633/22 Real Madrid Club de Fútbol.

The decision has long been awaited: eigth months after the Opinion by AG Szpunar (discussed here) has been published and almost 18 years since the facts of the case. It concerns an article published by leading French newspaper Le Monde in 2006, which claimed that both FC Barcelona and Real Madrid had retained the services of Eufemiano Fuentes, a sports doctor heavily implicated in numerous doping scandals. Real Madrid and a member of their medical team sought damages for the harm to their reputation and were eventually awarded payment of € 390,000 to the former and of € 30,000 to the latter by a Spanish court in 2014. Their attempts to enforce those awards in France were thwarted, though, with the Paris Court of Appeal holding that they were violating French public policy by deterring the media’s freedom of expression as guaranteed by Art 11. of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The French Cour de cassation finally referred the case to the CJEU in 2022, raising questions as to whether such a deterrent effect on freedom of expression would be a valid ground of public policy to refuse enforcement based on (what is now) Art. 45(1)(a) Brussels Ia and, if so, how it could be established.

In its decision (not yet available in English), the Court largely follows the Opinion of its Advocate General. After reiterating the importance of striking the right balance between swift recognition and enforcement of judgments between Member States and the defendant’s right of defence (paras. 29–31), the Court emphasises that – except in exceptional circumstances – the courts of the Member State of enforcement must not review the substance of the foreign decision (paras. 36–39) and may even have to presume that the fundamental rights of the defendant, including those derived from EU law, have been respected (paras. 42–43). Yet, a violation of the freedom of expression enshrined in Art. 11 of the Charter (and Art. 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights) may constitute such exceptional circumstances (paras. 45–53).

Focusing on the present case, the Court then goes on to emphasise the role of the press as a ‘public watchdog’ (using the English term even in the French original), not least with regard to reporting on doping in professional sports, and the risks of a deterring effect, relying extensively on jurisprudence by the European Court of Human Rights (paras. 54–56). According to the Court, it follows that in this context,

‘toute décision accordant des dommages-intérêts pour une atteinte causée à la réputation doit présenter un rapport raisonnable de proportionnalité entre la somme allouée et l’atteinte en cause.’ (para. 57)

In order to establish the existence of such a reasonable proportion, the courts of the Member State of enforcement may indeed consider, in particular, the amount awarded: if it exceeds the material and immaterial damage, or if it is significant in comparison to the ressources of the defendant, a deterrent effect may be found (paras. 62–64). What is more, the courts may also take into the account ‘la gravité de la faute [des personnes condamnées]’ (para. 68).

While it remains for the French courts to apply these criteria to the Spanish decision – and to potentially refuse enforcement to the extent (!) that it has a deterrent effect on freedom of expression (i.e. not entirely; see para. 72) on this basis –, the Court of Justice certainly appears open towards the possibility of such a deterring effect being found to exist in the present case.

I. Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments depend, first and foremost, on whether the foreign court issuing the judgment was competent to hear the dispute (see Béligh Elbalti, “The Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts and the Enforcement of Their Judgments in Tunisia: A Need for Reconsideration”, 8 Journal of Private International Law 2 (2012) 199). This is often referred to as “indirect jurisdiction,” a term generally attributed to the renowned French scholar Bartin. (For more on the life and work of this influential figure, see Samuel Fulli-Lemaire, “Bartin, Etienne”, in J. Basedow et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Private International Law – Vol. I (2017) 151.)

Broadly speaking, indirect jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction of the foreign court in the context of recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. Concretely, the court being asked to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment evaluates whether the foreign court had proper jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The term “indirect” distinguishes this concept from its legal opposite: direct jurisdiction. Unlike indirect jurisdiction, direct jurisdiction refers to the authority (international jurisdiction) of a domestic court to hear and adjudicate a dispute involving a foreign element (see Ralf Michaels, “Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgment Conventions,” in E. Gottschalk et al. (eds.), Conflict of Laws in a Globalized World (2007) 35).

While indirect jurisdiction is universally admitted in national legislation and international conventions on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the standard based on which this requirement is examined vary at best running the gamut from a quite loose standard (usually limited only to the examination of whether the dispute fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the requested court as legally determined in a limitative manner), to a very restrictive one (excluding the indirect jurisdiction of the rendering court every time the jurisdiction of the requested court – usually determined in a very broad manner – is verified). The UAE traditionally belonged to this latter group (for a comparative overview in MENA Arab Jurisdictions, see Béligh Elbalti, “Perspective of Arab Countries,” in M. Weller et al. (eds.), The 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention – Cornerstones, Prospects, Outlook (2023) 187-188; Idem “The Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Tool of Economic Integration – Views from Middle Eastern and Arab Gulf Countries, in P Sooksripaisarnkit and S R Garimella, China’s One Belt One Road Initiative and Private International Law (2018) 226-229). Indeed, despite the legal reform introduced in 2018 (see infra), UAE courts have continued to adhere to their stringent approach to indirect jurisdiction. However, as the case reported here shows this might no longer be the case. The recent Dubai Supreme Court’s decision in the Appeal No. 339/2023 of 15 August 2024 confirms a latent trend observed in the UAE, particularly in Dubai, thus introducing a significant shift towards the liberalization of the recognition and enforcement requirements. Although some questions remain as to the reach of this case and its consequences, it remains a very important decision and therefore warrants attention.

II. Facts

The summaries of facts in UAE courts’ decisions are sometimes sparse in details. This one particularly lacks the information necessary to fully understand the case.

What can be inferred from the description of facts in the decision is that the dispute involved two Polish parties, a company as a plaintiff (hereafter referred to as “X”) and a seemingly a natural person as a defendant (hereafter referred to as “Y”) who has his “residence [iqamah]” in Dubai.

X was successful in the action it brought against Y in Poland and obtained a judgment ordering the latter to pay a certain amount of money. Later, X sought to enforce the Polish judgment in Dubai.

X’s enforcement petition was first admitted by the Execution Court of Dubai. On appeal, the Dubai Court of Appeal overturned the enforcement order on the ground that the international jurisdiction over the dispute lied with Dubai courts since Y had his “residence” in Dubai. Dissatisfied, X filed an appeal before the Dubai Supreme Court.

Before the Supreme Court, X argued that Y’s residence in the UAE does not prevent actions from being brought against him in his home country, where the “event [waqi’a]” giving rise to the dispute occurred, particularly since both parties hold the same nationality. In addition, X claimed that it was not aware that Y’s residence was in the UAE.

III. The Ruling

The Supreme Court admitted the appeal and overturned the appealed decision with remand.

In its ruling, and after recalling the basic rules on statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court held as follows:

“According to Article 85 paragraph [……] of the Executive Regulation of the Civil Procedure Act (issued by Cabinet Decision No. 57/2018,[i] applicable to the case in question), [……], “enforcement shall not be ordered unless the following is verified: “UAE courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute [……], and that the foreign rendering court had jurisdiction according to its own laws.”

“This clearly indicates that the legislator did not allow enforcement orders to be granted [……] unless UAE courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute in which the foreign judgment to be declared enforceable was rendered. Therefore, in case of concurrent jurisdiction between UAE courts and the foreign rendering court, and both courts are competent to hear the dispute, this does not, by itself, prevent the granting of the enforcement order. This marks a departure from the previous approach prior to the aforementioned Executive Regulation, where, under the provisions of Article 235 of Federal Act on Civil Procedure No. 11/1992,[ii] it was sufficient to refuse the enforcement of a foreign judgment if the UAE courts were found to have jurisdiction over the dispute—even if their jurisdiction was not exclusive. [This continued to be the case until] the legislator intervened to address the issue of the jurisdiction that is exclusive to UAE courts [as the requested State] and concurrent jurisdiction that shared the foreign rendering court whose judgment is sought to be enforced [in UAE]. [Indeed,] the abovementioned 2018 Executive Regulation resolved this issue by clarifying that what prevents from declaring a foreign judgment enforceable is [the fact that] UAE courts are conferred exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute in which the foreign judgment was rendered. This was reaffirmed in [……] in [the new] Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Law issued by Federal Decree-Law No. 42 of 2022,[iii] which maintained this requirement [without modification].

[…] the appealed decision departed from this point view, and overturned the order declaring the foreign judgment in question enforceable on the ground that Y resides UAE, which grants jurisdiction to Dubai courts over the dispute […], despite the fact that [this] basis [of jurisdiction] referred to by the appealed decision [i.e. – the defendant’s residence in the UAE] does not grant exclusive jurisdiction to UAE courts to the exclusion of the foreign rendering court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the ruling misapplied the law and should be overturned.” (underline added)

IV. Analyses

 The conclusion of the Dubai Supreme Court must be approved. The decision provides indeed a welcomed, and a much-awaited clarification regarding what can be considered one of the most controversial requirements in the UAE enforcement system. In a previous post, I mentioned indirect jurisdiction as one of the common grounds based on which UAE courts have often refused to recognize an enforce foreign judgments in addition to reciprocity and public policy.[iv] This is because, as explained elsewhere (Elbalti, op. cit), the UAE has probably one of the most stringent standard to review a foreign court’s indirect jurisdiction.

1. Indirect jurisdiction – Standard of control

The standard for recognizing foreign judgments under UAE law involves three layers of control (former article 235 of the 1992 FACP). First, UAE courts must not have jurisdiction over the case in which the foreign judgment was issued(former article 235(2)(a) first half of the 1992 FACP). Second, the foreign court must have exercised jurisdiction in accordance with its rules of international jurisdiction (former article 235(2)(a) second half of the 1992 FACP). Third, the foreign court’s jurisdiction must align with its domestic law, which includes both subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction, as interpreted by the court (former Article 235(2)(b) of the 1992 FACP).

a) Traditional (stringent) position under the then applicable provisions

 The interpretation and application of the first rule have been particularly problematic as UAE courts. The courts have, indeed, often rejected foreign courts’ indirect jurisdiction when UAE jurisdiction can be justified under the expansive UAE rules of direct jurisdiction (former articles 20 to 23 of the 1992 FACP), even when the foreign court is validly competent by its own standards (Dubai Supreme Court, Appeal No. 114/1993 of 26 September 1993 [Hong Kong judgment in a contractual dispute – defendant’s domicile in Dubai]). Further complicating the issue, UAE courts tend to view their jurisdiction as mandatory and routinely nullify agreements that attempt to derogate from it (article 24 of the 1992 FACP, current article 23 of the 2022 FACP. See e.g., Federal Supreme Court, Appeals No. 311 & 325/14 of 20 March 1994; Dubai Supreme Court, Appeals No. 244 & 265/2010 of 9 November 2010; Abu Dhabi Supreme Court, Appeal No. 733/2019 of 20 August 2019).

b) Case law application

While there are rare cases where UAE courts have accepted the indirect jurisdiction of a foreign court, either based on the law of the rendering state (see e.g., Abu Dhabi Supreme Court, Appeal No. 1366/2009 of 13 January 2010) or by determining that their own jurisdiction does not exclude foreign jurisdiction unless the dispute falls under their exclusive authority (see e.g., Abu Dhabi Supreme Court, Appeal No. 36/2007 of 28 November 2007), the majority of cases have adhered to the traditional restrictive view (see e.g., Federal Supreme Court, Appeal No. 60/25 of 11 December 2004; Dubai Supreme Court, Appeal No. 240/2017 of 27 July 2017 ; Abu Dhabi Supreme Court, Appeal No. 106/2016 of 11 May 2016). This holds true even when the foreign court’s jurisdiction is based on a choice of court agreement (see e.g., Dubai Supreme Court, Appeal No. 52/2019 of 18 April 2019). Notably, UAE courts have sometimes favored local interpretations over international conventions governing indirect jurisdiction, even when such conventions were applicable (see e.g., Dubai Supreme Court, Appeal No. 468/2017 of 14 December 2017; Abu Dhabi Supreme Court, Appeal No. 238/2017 of 11 October 2017. But contra, see e.g., Dubai Supreme Court, Appeal No. 87/2009 of 22 December 2009; Federal Supreme Court, Appeal 5/2004 of 26 June 2006).

2. The 2018 Reform and its confirmation in 2022

The 2018 reform of the FACP introduced significant changes to the enforcement of foreign judgments, now outlined in the 2018 Executive Regulation (articles 85–88) and later confirmed in the new 2022 FACP (articles 222~225). One of the key modifications was the clarification that UAE courts’ exclusive jurisdiction should only be a factor when the dispute falls under their exclusive authority (Art. 85(2)(a) of the 2018 Executive Regulation; article 222(2)(a) of the new 2022 FACP). While courts initially continued adhering to older interpretations, a shift toward the new rule emerged, as evidenced by a case involving the enforcement of a Singaporean judgment (which I previously reported here in the comments). In this case, Dubai courts upheld the foreign judgment, acknowledging that their jurisdiction, though applicable, was not exclusive (Dubai Court of First Instance, Case No. 968/2020 of 7 April 2021). The Dubai Supreme Court further confirmed this approach by dismissing an appeal that sought to challenge the judgment’s enforcement (Appeal No. 415/2021 of 30 December 2021). This case is among the first to reflect a new, more expansive interpretation of UAE courts’ recognition of foreign judgments, aligning with the intent behind the 2018 reform.

3. Legal implications of the new decision and the way forward

The Dubai Supreme Court’s decision in the case reported here signifies a clear shift in the UAE’s policy toward recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. This ruling addresses a critical issue within the UAE’s enforcement regime and aligns with broader trends in global legal systems (see Béligh Elbalti, “Spontaneous Harmonization and the Liberalization of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments” 16 Japanese Yearbook of Private International Law (2014) 273). As such, the significance of this development cannot be underestimated.

However, there is a notable caveat: while the ruling establishes that enforcement will be granted if UAE courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction, the question remains as to which cases fall under the UAE courts’ exclusive jurisdiction. The 2022 FACP does not provide clarity on this matter. One possible exception can be inferred from the 2022 FACP’s regulation of direct jurisdiction which confers broad jurisdiction to UAE courts, “except for actions relating to immovable located abroad” (article 19 of the 2022 FACP). Another exception is provided for in Article 5(2) of the Federal Act on Commercial Agencies,[v] which subjects all disputes regarding commercial agencies in UAE to the jurisdiction of the UAE courts (see e.g., Federal Supreme Appeal No. 318/18 of 12 November 1996).

Finally, one can question the relevance of the three-layer control of the indirect jurisdiction of foreign courts, particularly regarding the assessment of whether the foreign court had jurisdiction based on its own rules of both domestic and international jurisdiction. It seems rather peculiar that a UAE judge would be considered more knowledgeable or better equipped to determine that these rules were misapplied by a foreign judge, who is presumably well-versed in the legal framework of their own jurisdiction. This raises concerns about the efficiency and fairness of such a control mechanism, as it could lead to inconsistent or overly stringent standards in evaluating foreign judgments. These requirements are thus called to be abolished.

———————————————

[i] The 2018 Executive Regulation Implementing the 1992 Federal Act on Civil Procedure (Cabinet decision No. 57/2018 of 9 December 2018, as subsequently amended notably by the Cabinet Decision No.75/2021 of 30 August 2021; hereafter referred to as “2018 Executive Regulation”.)

[ii] The 1992 Federal Act on Civil Procedure (Federal Law No. 11/1992 of 24 February 1992, hereafter “1992 FACP”).

[iii] The 2022 Federal Act on Civil Procedure (Federal Legislative Decree No. 42/2022 of 30 October 2022). The Act abolished and replaced the 2018 Executive Regulation and the 1992 FACP (hereafter “2022 FACP”).

[iv] However, since then, there have been subsequent developments regarding reciprocity that warrant attention as reported here.

[v] Federal Law No. 3/2022 of 13 December 2022 regulating Commercial Agencies, which repealed and replaced the former Federal Law No. 18/1982 of 11 August 1981.

(This post was drafted by Zhang Yong, a PhD student in the University of Macau and revised by Guangjian Tu)

The Annual Inter-regional and International Family Law Forum of Chinese Society of Private International Law was held on September 21, 2024 in Everwin Law Office, Guangzhou. Scholars, practitioners and notaries from all over the country working in the field came together to discuss the relevant issues. After the opening ceremony chaired by Prof. Guangjian Tu from the University of Macau, keynote speeches were delivered: 1, Prof. Yong Gan, School of Law of Wuhan University, who is a member of the Expert Group, introduced the progress of the Expert Group’s work on the Parentage/Surrogacy Project in the Hague Conference on Private International Law; 2, Prof. Faqiang Yuan, School of International Law of East China University of Political Science and Law, shared his research article titled “Annual Report on the Development of Rule of Law in the Field of Family Affairs: Domestic and Abroad in 2022-2023″.

In the parallel sessions, participants had heated debates and discussions on new developments in foreign-related family law in the Mainland China, foreign-related and Hong Kong and/or Macao-related marital property relations and agreements, parentage and maintenance support, recognition and enforcement of inter-regional marriage and family judgments, foreign-related and Hong Kong and/or Macao-related inheritance, and jurisdiction over inter-regional family issues etc.

Of course, the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments in Matrimonial and Family Cases by the Courts of the Mainland China and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the Arrangement) was the focus of this forum. The Arrangement was adopted on 20 June 2017 and came into effect on 15 February 2022. In order to achieve closer and more extensive judicial assistance in the area of marriage and family law between Mainland China and Hong Kong, except for inheritance-related issues, the Arrangement covers a broad range of matters, almost everything in marriage and family laws such as validity of marriage, marital property relationships, parentage, maintenance, adoption etc. This is very different from the Regulations enacted in the European Union, which regulated those issues one by one in a piece-meal approach.

Written by Hadrien Pauchard (assistant researcher and doctoral student at Sciences Po Law School)

The third issue of the Revue Critique de droit international privé of 2024 was released on October 1st. It contains four articles and several case notes. In line with the Revue Critique’s recent policy, the doctrinal part will shortly be made available in English on the editor’s website (for registered users and institutions).

The volume features a first article on L’ambiguïté de la notion de « reconnaissance » confrontée à la proposition de règlement de l’Union européenne relative à la filiation (The ambiguity of the concept of “recognition” in the light of the EU draft regulation on parenthood) authored by Prof. Christine Bideau (Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3), who provided the following abstract :

The term “recognition” is often used in private international law, but it has very different meanings. So when the European Commission draws up a proposal for a regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of decisions and acceptance of authentic instruments in matters of parenthood and on the creation of a European Certificate of Parenthood, insisting on the permanence of the parenthood link regardless of the Member State in which the persons concerned are located, we can only wonder what meaning it intended to give to this “recognition” of parenthood that it advocates in its explanatory memorandum.

In the second article, Prof. Étienne Pataut (Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne) discusses the Perte de nationalité en Europe : la consolidation du contrôle de proportionnalité (Loss of nationality in Europe : the strengthening of proportionnality review). Its abstract reads as follows :

By two new decisions, the Court of Justice clarifies the content, in particular procedural, of the proportionality control in matters of loss of nationality. These solutions could have a significant impact on French litigation in this area.

In the third article, Prof. Gilles Cuniberti (Université du Luxembourg) embarks À la recherche d’une justification sérieuse à l’application de la Convention de 2004 sur l’immunité des États par le juge français (In search of a serious justification for the application of the 2004 Convention on State Immunity by the French judge). The abstract reads as follows :

Since 2011, the French supreme court for private and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) has ruled that the French law of sovereign immunities is based on customary international law, and that it would be reflected in the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. This Article surveys the case law of several European supreme courts and argues that it is doubtful that the Convention reflects customary international law. It concludes by proposing that French courts apply the Convention as such, instead of pretending to apply customary international law.

Lastly, Prof. Thibaut Fleury Graff (Université Paris II Panthéon Assas) conducts a review of recent French and European case law on droit des étrangers (aliens’ law). Entitled Du politique au juridique : qui est l’étranger ? Retours choisis sur la jurisprudence 2023 en matière de migrations (From the political to the legal: who is the alien? Selected case law on migration in 2023), the contribution offers a critical look at the boundary work constantly at play in the definition of the status of aliens.

The full table of contents is available here.

Previous issues of the Revue Critique (from 2010 to 2022) are available on Cairn.

By Ananya Bhargava, Jindal Global Law School, OP Jindal Global University, India.

Recently, the Delhi High Court in the case of Honasa Consumer Limited v RSM General Trading LLC granted an anti-enforcement injunction against the execution proceedings instituted in the Dubai Court on the ground that it threatened the arbitral process in India. The Court deemed the proceedings before the Dubai Court as an attempt to frustrate a possible arbitration envisaged by the contract between the parties.  The injunction was granted under S.9 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 as an “interim measure.”  This is a significant turning point in the intersection of arbitration and cross-border litigation in India since the remedy of anti-enforcement injunction is rarely granted by judicial authorities across jurisdictions.

Interestingly, in 2021, the same bench of the Delhi High Court granted the first-ever anti-enforcement injunction in India in Interdigital Technology Corporation v. Xiaomi Corporation. Here, the court defined anti-enforcement injunctions as injunctions where a court injuncts one of the parties before it from enforcing against the other a decree or order passed by a foreign court. Thus, the remedy of anti-enforcement injunctions is triggered when a foreign proceeding has already run its course and resulted in an unfavourable judgment. It is a remedy restraining the enforcement of a decree that is in an inconvenient forum or is in breach of the parties’ contractual agreement.

By its very definition, an anti-enforcement injunction appears to be a more aggressive and exceptional form of relief. Thus, courts have traditionally been cautious in granting such injunctions, given the potential implications on international comity and judicial restraint. However, the Delhi High Court’s decision to grant one in this case marks an interesting departure from this reluctance. This article delves into the rationale behind Delhi High Court’s judgment in this case and explores its implications on cross-border litigation in India.

Brief facts:

The fulcrum of the dispute concerned an Authorized Distributorship Agreement (ADA) between Honasa Consumer Limited (petitioners) and RSM General Trading LLC (respondents). The ADA included an Arbitration clause with New Delhi as the venue of arbitration and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 declared as the governing law.  The ADA also conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of New Delhi for matters arising from the contract. Despite these provisions, the respondents filed a suit in the Court of First Instance in Dubai, which ruled against the petitioners and imposed damages. The petitioners challenged this decree in the Dubai Courts of Appeal.

While the appeal was pending, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court under S.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and sought an injunction against the respondents from enforcing the Dubai Court’s decree. The petitioners argued that the respondent’s actions in filing the Dubai Suit was oppressive and vexatious in nature and it attempted to subvert the contractual clauses agreed upon by both the parties. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the court’s power to grant interim reliefs under S.9 of ACA does not encompass the power to grant an anti-enforcement injunction against a foreign court’s decree.

Delhi High Court’s Ruling:

Based on the following contentions, the Court held that the power to grant “anti-enforcement” or anti-suit injunction would also be encompassed in the power to grant interim measures. The judgment was predicated on a liberal understanding of S.9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, where the court owing to the legally abusive nature of the foreign proceedings, deemed it to be “just and convenient” to pass an injunction against the respondents from enforcing the Dubai Court’s decree against the petitioners.

The court arrived at this conclusion through a comprehensive analysis of three broad legal principles. First, the court analyzed the threshold of granting anti-enforcement injunctions in other jurisdictions. Second, the court considered the scope of S.9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, that provides for interim reliefs. Finally, the principle of international comity was discussed in detail by the court. These are discussed briefly below.

• Court’s analysis of international jurisprudence:

In the absence of established precedent on anti-enforcement injunctions in India, the Delhi High Court analysed cases from various jurisdictions to shape its approach. The principles outlined in these cases manifest the overall outlook of courts across jurisdictions on anti-enforcement injunctions. While some courts have taken a liberal approach, other jurisdictions are wary of the sheer magnitude of the injunction in rendering the foreign judgment almost redundant.

In England, the Court of Appeal in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd adopted a more liberal view, focusing on the principles of justice and comity rather than imposing a high threshold of “exceptionality in granting such injunctions.” The court held that an anti-enforcement injunction has developed incrementally from the same underlying principles as the anti-suit injunction. Thus, the court did not distinguish between anti-suit and anti-enforcement injunctions based on the degree of exceptionality. Instead, it lowered the threshold for the latter, placing both on the same level.

Conversely, the Singapore Court of Appeals (SCA) in Sun Travels & Tours Pvt Ltd v. Hilton International Manage (Maldives) Pvt Ltd., emphasized on the difference between anti-suit and anti-enforcement injunctions and held that a “greater degree of caution” should be exercised by courts while considering an anti-enforcement application.  The court reasoned this on the ground that, “an AEI proscribes the enforcement of foreign, granting an anti-enforcement injunction is comparable to nullifying the foreign judgment or stripping the judgment of any legal effect when only the foreign court can set aside or vary its own judgment.” The SCA was cognizant of the legally aggressive nature of anti-enforcement injunctions and therefore incorporated the threshold of “exceptionality” while dealing with such applications.

The Delhi High court on the other hand, deviated from the approach taken by SCA in Sun Travels and subscribed to a more liberal understanding similar to the English Courts. The court while endorsing its holding in Interdigital Technology Corporation v. Xiaomi Corporation held that “where a court in rendering of “justice” requires an anti-enforcement injunction to be issued, then it should not hold back its hands on some perceived notion of lack of “exceptionality” in the case.” By doing so, the court significantly lowered the threshold for granting anti-enforcement injunctions in India and held that rarity and exceptionality need not necessarily be a deciding factor for granting such injunctions.

• On the scope of S.9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act:

On the scope of S.9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the court held that that the scope of S.9 is wide and compendious. It stated that although the section appears exhaustive in nature as it enumerates the matters in which interim relief can be granted, clause (e) of S.9(1)(ii) provided the courts with the discretionary power to grant any such interim measure that is “just and convenient.”. The court while reiterating established principles on interim measures held that while granting an injunction under S.9 of ACA, all the court has to see is whether  the applicant for interim measure has a good prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience is in favour of  interim relief as prayed for being granted and whether the applicant  has approached the court with reasonable expedition.  If these requirements are fulfilled, the court stated that it is within its power to grant the requisite interim relief in the form of an injunction. In this case, the Dubai court decree was held to be oppressive and vexatious, as a result, the court granted the anti-enforcement injunction as an interim relief.

Further, the court made an interesting observation with regards to S.9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act. In response to the respondents citing S.44 of UK Arbitration Act as a defence, the court held that S.9 of ACA combines S.44 of UK Arbitration Act and S.37 of the Senior Courts Act. S.44 of the UK Act empowers the court to pass orders in support of the Arbitral Proceedings. The court noted that the section did not contain any “just and convenient” clause similar to S.9(1)(ii)(e) of Indian ACA. Whereas S.37 of the Senior Courts Act did contain a provision that allows the courts to pass interlocutory orders as is “just and convenient.” Ultimately the court concluded that S.9 of ACA does give powers to the courts to intervene in foreign proceedings where it is in the interest of justice.

• On the issue of international comity:

Lastly, on the issue of comity of Courts, the court held that “the principle of comity of courts can have no application where a foreign Court is manifestly acting in excess of jurisdiction.” Here, the respondent in manifest disregard of  the arbitration agreement contractually agreed upon by the parties, instituted a suit in the Dubai Court against the exclusive choice of Delhi High Court as the seat court. In this regard, the court held that the principle of comity of courts is not, jurisprudentially, a bar to grant of anti-suit or anti-enforcement injunction, where the facts of the case justify such grant.

Further, while disregarding the principle of comity in this case, the court buttressed on the principle of contractual supremacy and the need to hold parties accountable to their contractual commitments. It stated that adherence to contractual  covenants, voluntarily executed ad idem, is the very life breath of commerce. Ultimately it concluded that the defence of comity cannot be pleaded by the respondents in this case since the decree of the Dubai court was coram non judice as per the contractual covenants.

Implications of the court’s analysis :

The protection of contractual rights stands out as one of the most important themes in the Court’s approach to grant anti-enforcement injunction in the present case. In this regard, the judgment has some positive implications.

For instance, while disregarding the application of international comity in this case, the court upheld the exclusive jurisdiction clause between the parties and equated it to the negative covenant in the agreement. This effectively means that judgments from non-chosen jurisdictions would be in prima facie breach of such contractual clauses and would not be enforced ideally. This is in line with the common law approach to private international law that thrives on such contractual agreements.

This is a refreshing approach considering the fact that Indian courts have in the past disregarded the choice of law agreements to impute the law of the lex fori. Just a year ago in TransAsia Private Capital vs Gaurav Dhawan, the Delhi High Court had recorded that Indian courts are not required to automatically apply the chosen governing law to the dispute unless the parties introduce expert evidence to that effect. The present judgment in this regard is a positive deviation from the standard “default rule” applied by Indian Courts. A logical corollary to the court’s emphasis on contractual supremacy and protection of the exclusive jurisdiction clause is also the respect for parties choice of governing law. In the present case Dubai Court’s application of Dubai Law was seen as a violation of the contract which stipulated Arbitration and Conciliation Act as the governing statute. The precedential implication of this is that Indian courts can now move away from the default rule and respect the principles of party autonomy which is grounded on the principle of contractual supremacy. Thus, the court rightfully asserted the principle of contractual supremacy while granting an anti-enforcement injunction.

That said, the court’s attempt in lowering the threshold for anti-enforcement injunction to the same level as anti-suit injunctions may lead to uncertainty regarding its precedential value for other jurisdictions. In this regard, the judgment does suffer from certain deficiencies. First, setting a low standard for such injunctions can run the risk of courts frequently granting injunctions against foreign judgments in breach of international comity. Dispensing with the requirement of “exceptionality” in cases of anti-enforcement injunctions is dangerous in India, especially when the law on exclusive choice of court agreements is still at its nascent stage. In the past, Indian courts have wrongfully granted anti-suit injunctions despite there being an exclusive choice of court clause between the parties. Reducing the threshold for anti-enforcement injunctions to the same level would pose similar risks, with courts completely disregarding the rule of comity as has been done in cases granting anti-suit injunctions.

It was imperative for the court to appreciate the difference between anti-suit and anti-enforcement injunctions. The difference between an anti-suit injunction and an anti-enforcement injunction is not one of material but of degree. There is a spectrum. This is manifested in the fact that injuncting a party from executing a foreign judgment in a foreign court is a greater interference than injuncting a party from initiating foreign proceedings that are still at an early stage. In the present case, the petitioners could have sought an anti-suit injunction while the respondents initiated a suit in the Dubai Court, rather than waiting for the court to finish proceedings and deliver its judgment. As argued by scholars, the earlier an injunction is sought, the less damage is done to international comity, since there is significant wastage of resources of the foreign court in cases of anti-enforcement injunctions.

Thus, keeping the threshold for an anti-enforcement injunction the same as an anti-suit injunction creates significant risks. Indian courts should instead adhere to the high-threshold approach taken by the SCA in Sun Travels while granting an anti-enforcement injunction and relegate it to “exceptional cases” where the defendants are in clear breach of their contractual obligations, as in the present case.

Second, the court’s remark on the difference between S.9 of ACA and S.44 of the UK Arbitration Act is a crucial observation. Even though the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (on which the Indian ACA is based) under Article 9 provides for interim measures, it does not elucidate the nature of such measures or the situations where they can be granted. The inclusion of the “just and convenient” clause in S.9 gives Indian courts an extra degree of discretion that is not contemplated in other jurisdictions. In the UK, the discretionary power of the court to grant interim measures when it is “just and convenient” does not flow from the UK Arbitration Act, but rather from the Senior Courts Act, which is used exceptionally. In India, this power is enunciated in the ACA itself. This distinction is important since it highlights the degree of judicial intervention envisaged by Indian and UK legislation. Ordinarily, S.151 of the CPC does provide the requisite power to the courts to grant remedies in the interest of justice. The specific inclusion of the “just and convenient” clause within the ACA risks a higher degree of judicial intervention in arbitration. Furthermore, incorporating the power to grant an anti-enforcement injunction within the clause can set a dangerous precedent.

More prominently, without delineating specific considerations as to when such injunctions can be granted and by simultaneously reducing the threshold of rarity in granting such injunctions, the court has normalized a higher degree of judicial intervention in cases of transnational litigation. Here, although the court rightly passed an anti-enforcement injunction, it sourced its legality from S.9(1)(ii)(e) as being “just and convenient,” rather than acknowledging the exceptionality of the present case and limiting such injunctions to rare circumstances. The court completely failed to recognize  the risks of lowering the threshold for granting such injunctions especially in India where excessive judicial intervention has been the biggest impediment to the development of transnational litigation.

The concerns raised above become more prominent considering  the absence of a specific legal framework governing the grant of such injunctions. The court’s move to lower the threshold could significantly impact decisions in other jurisdictions, given the lack of a uniform procedural law on this issue. To further contextualize this concern, I will briefly discuss the international framework—or rather, the lack thereof surrounding anti-enforcement injunctions and the concerns that arise due to this legal lacunae.

Which law governs Anti-Enforcement Injunctions?

There is no explicit domestic or international procedural framework that gives the court the power to grant such injunctions. S.9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act adopts Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) that allows courts to grant interim measures at the request of a party. The Model Law does not provide for an express provision authorising the grant of an anti-enforcement injunction in aid of arbitration.

In the absence of such express provision, the question that arises here is  “whether the scope of Article 9 is broad enough to encompass the power to grant anti-enforcement injunctions?” At this juncture, there seems to be no definitive answer to this.  Whether Article 9 is broad enough to restrain enforcement of a foreign court decree in aid of arbitration is a matter of conjecture. Model Law’s silence with respect to this has already lead to inconsistent judgments in domestic courts of States that have adopted it, as demonstrated by jurisprudence in Singapore and India. Thus, the need to incorporate a procedural framework with respect to such injunctions becomes important.

Another concern that arises is the potential conflict between anti-enforcement injunctions and laws related to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  Earlier in this blog, the US Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit’s decision on anti-enforcement injunction was discussed. The court here held that the Recognition Act of the US does not allow pre-emptive anti-enforcement injunctions and the court granting such injunctions are in overreach of their powers. The court reasoned this on the ground that anti-enforcement injunctions preclude the normal operation of New York’s Laws on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment. A party can challenge such judgments at the Enforcement stage according to the laws of the enforcing court but cannot sought an injunction against a party to initiate such enforcement proceedings altogether.  The respondents in this case gave a similar argument on S.13 of CPC which deals with executability of foreign judgments in India. They argued that the court cannot grant “pre-emptive” Injunction against enforcement as the same will be against S.13 of CPC.

The Hague Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments does not contemplate the pre-emptive restrain against the enforcement of a judgment either.  Article 7(1)(d) of the Convention states that recognition and enforcement of a judgment maybe refused if the proceedings were contrary to an Agreement. Thus, although the remedy of refusal of enforcement is available, both domestic and international law is silent on an anti-enforcement injunction as a pre-emptive relief. Unlike the US courts that explicitly disallowed the power to grant anti-enforcement injunctions, the Delhi High Court in this case rooted it in S.9 of Arbitration and Conciliation act as an interim relief. Thus, without any international legal standard, domestic courts are free to interpret the legality of anti-enforcement injunctions in their jurisdictions. While a complete bar on courts to grant anti-enforcement injunction is not the correct approach, a liberal approach in granting it is dangerous as well. Presently, such injunctions can only be incorporated as an interim relief. This significantly lowers the exceptionality threshold. Anti-enforcement injunctions are inherently hostile and aggressive in nature, thus there is a need for an international procedural framework to address such injunctions.

Conclusion:

While the judgment provides much-needed protection of contractual rights, it falls short of addressing the existing lacuna in the law. The court could have taken this opportunity to delineate specific guidelines for granting such injunctions, granted since this was only the second instance when it was granted in India. By failing to do so, the reduced threshold for granting anti-enforcement injunctions becomes even more dangerous. The present case fits into the rare and exceptional category as the respondents were in clear breach of the contract. Thus, the courts attempt in lowering the threshold for granting anti-enforcement injunctions was not needed. Anti-enforcement injunctions raise serious concerns of comity and they interfere significantly with foreign legal systems. It is therefore necessary to determine the relevant factors that necessitate the grant of an anti-enforcement injunction.

The court’s approach in this case highlights the need for clearer guidelines. A more defined framework for when and how anti-enforcement injunctions can be granted will help ensure that domestic courts adhere to certain standards set by the Model Law. The current silence of the Model Law on such injunctions is causing a patchwork of interpretations across different jurisdictions, leading to uncertainty and inconsistency. Establishing clear international standards would help courts manage these complex legal issues more effectively, paving the way for more predictable decisions in the future.