
La Cour de justice confirme l’illégalité des aides accordées par le gouvernement allemand à la société mère du groupe Lufthansa dans le cadre de la crise liée à l’épidémie de covid-19. La Commission, qui avait adopté une déclaration de compatibilité sans ouvrir de procédure formelle d’examen, n’a pas respecté l’une des règles fixées dans son propre encadrement temporaire des aides covid-19. Si la solution retenue par le Tribunal de l’Union européenne est confirmée, son arrêt est largement remis en cause. La Cour de justice lui reproche notamment d’avoir excédé le cadre du contrôle restreint à l’erreur manifeste d’appréciation qui prévaut lorsque la Commission statue sur la compatibilité des aides d’État avec le marché intérieur.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, which has been enacted by every U.S. state, discourages forum shopping in child custody disputes by assigning subject-matter jurisdiction to the court located in the “home state” of the child. In Allen v. Allen, decided on April 21, 2026, the Montana Supreme Court had to determine whether the child’s “home state” was Montana or the Netherlands. This case shines an important spotlight on the importance of timing in international child custody disputes. The left-behind parent’s likelihood of success is strongly correlated with how quickly her or she acts to vindicate their legal rights.
FactsJonathan Edward Allen (Father) and Petronella Gerline (Van Oosterom) Allen (Mother) were married in Colorado in 2009. Father is a United States citizen. Mother is a dual citizen of the United States and the Netherlands. Their child (R.A.A.) was born in 2015. In 2020, the family moved from Colorado to Montana.
In August 2023, after Father and Mother began having marital difficulties, Mother and R.A.A. relocated to the Netherlands. In February 2024, Mother filed a petition for divorce and custody with the District Court of Central Netherlands (Netherlands District Court).
In January 2025, Father filed a petition with the District Court of The Hague seeking the return of R.A.A. pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This petition was denied. Although the court held that R.A.A. had been wrongfully removed from the United States, the court reasoned that the one-year automatic return period had passed and that R.A.A. had become settled in her new environment in the Netherlands. This decision was affirmed on appeal.
In September 2025, Father filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Custody and Petition for Permanent Parenting Plan in Montana state court. That court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, it held that it lacked the power to adjudicate the dispute because Montana was no longer the “home state” of R.A.A. Father, acting pro se, appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
AnalysisThe Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) assigns exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to courts located in the child’s “home state” when it comes to matters relating to child custody. The “home state” is “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” The UCCJEA specifically provides that courts “shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States” for purposes of resolving these disputes.
On the facts presented in Allen v. Allen, the Montana Supreme Court correctly held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Father’s emergency motion. Mother and R.A.A. relocated to the Netherlands in August 2023. Six months later—in February 2024—R.A.A.’s home state shifted to the Netherlands. The Dutch courts—not the Montana courts—now had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve custody disputes involving R.A.A. Father did not file his motion in Montana until September 2025, which was nineteen months too late.
ConclusionIf Father had filed his suit in Montana before February 2024, he could have shown that Montana was R.A.A.’s “home state” because she had not yet resided in the Netherlands for six months. The suit was, however, not filed until September 2025.
If Father had filed suit in the Netherlands before August 2024, he could have argued that R.A.A. should be returned to the United States pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction because R.A.A. had not yet resided in the Netherlands for a year. The suit was, however, not filed until January 2025.
The takeaway of Allen v. Allen is the need for speed in international child custody cases. The timelines baked into the relevant laws and treaties mandate that the left-behind parent move quickly to assert their rights. If they are slow off the mark, they be forced to litigate in foreign courts under less favorable legal rules.
Les arrêts rendus en comité à la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme souffrent d’une réputation injuste. Formations allégées, jurisprudence balisée, affaires réputées simples : tout semblerait plaider pour leur discrétion doctrinale. Cette chronique démontre le contraire. À travers l’analyse de 112 arrêts et 159 décisions d’irrecevabilité rendus en mars et avril 2026, se dessinent des dynamiques révélatrices : la prégnance des violations répétées dans des États structurellement défaillants, les traces judiciaires encore vives des régimes autoritaires, la répression insidieuse des minorités et des opposants politiques. La France, seul État épargné par tout constat de violation sur la période, offre quant à elle un contrepoint méthodologique instructif. Loin d’être négligeables, les arrêts de comité sont à la fois un thermomètre des droits fondamentaux en Europe et un révélateur des raccourcis argumentatifs que la routine jurisprudentielle peut parfois autoriser.
On Tuesday, June 2, 2026, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST).
Thalia Kruger (University of Antwerp) will speak, in English, about the topic
“The Problem with Legal Certainty in Private International Law”
Legal certainty is often considered foundational in private international law. It is used as justification for some of our connecting factors, and their application in time, as well as for our standards on recognition of foreign authentic instruments and judgments. However, if understood in a positivistic and precise manner, legal certainty can impede or complicate legal changes. The paper investigates where legal certainty has undesired consequences, especially in a context of righting past wrongs.
The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.
If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.
Par un arrêt Eisenauer et autres c/ France du 12 mai 2026, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme était saisie de plusieurs requêtes relatives à l’inexécution prolongée de décisions juridictionnelles ordonnant le relogement de demandeurs reconnus prioritaires au titre du droit au logement opposable (DALO). Malgré l’absence persistante de relogement plusieurs années après les injonctions prononcées par les juridictions administratives, la Cour conclut à la non-violation de l’article 6, § 1er, de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.
Written by Jeremy MEI Ziyang
LLM student at Wuhan University
Visiting student at Singapore Management University
I. BackgroundOn 15 May this year, Ministry of Justice (MOJ) of China issued its Official Notice No 5 of 2026 (‘the MOJ Notice’), announcing that the relevant extraterritorial investigation carried out by EU on Chinese entities Nuctech constitutes improper extraterritorial jurisdiction measures under China’s Regulation on Countering Improper Foreign Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (ROCIFEJ, State Council Decree No 835).[1] This Regulation was promulgated and entered into force on 7 April 2026. As a nationwide regulation promulgated by State Council, although it cannot be called an ‘Act’ that should be passed by the National People’s Congress, its legal hierarchical force directly follows an ‘Act’, higher than the previous Blocking Rules issued by Ministry of Commerce (MOC).[2]
The MOJ Notice arises from an information request issued by the European Commission to Nuctech’s EU entities. Nuctech is a multinational threat-detection systems manufacturer and seller headquartered in China. The Commission started investigation under Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) and sought access to emails of employees of Nuctech’s EU entities. Although those entities are registered and operate within the EU, their email are stored on their parent company’s servers in China.
II. Legal basis and effects under Chinese lawThe legal basis for this declaration is Articles 3 and 6 of ROCIFEJ. Article 3 empowers Chinese government to take measures countering foreign improper extraterritorial jurisdiction. Article 6 mandates MOJ to issue official notices identifying a foreign measure constitutes improper extraterritorial jurisdiction, taking into account (1) violation of international law and basic norms governing international relations; (2) inappropriate jurisdictional nexus with that foreign state; (3) danger to China’s national sovereignty, security and development interests, or damage to lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens and organisations; and (4) other factors that shall be taken into consideration.
According to the press releases of MOJ and MOC (which also participated in the investigation), the Notice is issued on these grounds: (1) the scope of requested data is broad that ‘obviously violates international law and basic norms governing international relations’; and (2) EU has also compelled Chinese banking institutions to provide vast and unrelated information located in China, adversely affecting the normal investment and business operations of Chinese enterprises.[3] Although the factor of inappropriate jurisdictional nexus is not mentioned, it can be impliedly conveyed that the Chinese authorities find it inappropriate for EU to unilaterally acquire data stored in China.
The MOJ Notice states that ‘any organisation or individual shall not enforce or assist in enforcing such improper extraterritorial jurisdiction measures.’ It is immaterial whether the provider or assistant is a Chinese entity. The MOJ Notice creates a direct conflict between EU law and Chinese law. Nuctech EU entities will face the dilemma of either violating EU law or violating Chinese law. There is also no doctrine like ‘foreign sovereign compulsion’ in either EU or China.[4] Under EU law, entities choosing to carry out commercial activities in the EU internal market cannot, in principle, rely on the rules of a non-EU state to violate mandatory regulations of the EU.[5] If the European Commission insists acquisition of those data, Nuctech cannot use the Chinese prohibition as an effective defence.
III. The Deepening Jurisdictional Conflict and the Limits of Existing FrameworksThe Nuctech case is not an isolated incident but a manifestation of a systemic problem: the escalating horizontal conflict between states’ assertions of data jurisdiction. This conflict is not new. The Microsoft v. United States (2016) litigation already demonstrated the core tension. However, The Nuctech situation under the ROCIFEJ represents a qualitative escalation for three reasons.
First, it involves a direct, public, and legally binding prohibition by China against compliance with an EU measure. Unlike the US where the Microsoft litigation ultimately turned on statutory interpretation, China has now issued a formal notice under a newly enacted regulation (ROCIFEJ), declaring the EU’s FSR investigation ab initio improper and imposing a positive legal duty on “any organisation or individual” not to comply. This is a blocking statute in its most potent form. It transforms a conflict of jurisdiction between states into a direct legal dilemma for the corporate entity: comply with the EU and violate Chinese law with potential sanctions under ROCIFEJ, or comply with Chinese order and risk penalties from the EU including fines or a negative inference under the FSR. The only possible way out is Art 5 of the ROCIFEJ which allows the affected company to apply for an exemption from MOJ.
Second, the conflict is now hardwired into the enforcement actions of two major economies without a mutual legal assistance or data-sharing framework. The EU and China have no equivalent of the US-EU Data Privacy Framework, no bilateral judicial assistance treaty specifically tailored to data, and no CLOUD Act-style agreement. The EU’s FSR allows it to demand broad access to information, including electronically stored data, from any entity receiving EU subsidies. China’s ROCIFEJ allows it to block precisely such demands if they are deemed to violate international law or threaten national interests. Neither legal order contains a doctrine of “foreign sovereign compulsion” that would excuse non-compliance. From an EU law perspective, the Nuctech EU entities are established in the EU, operate within the EU internal market, and are subject to EU law. The CJEU has consistently held that EU mandatory rules can follow EU entities even in their extra-EU activities. A Chinese blocking notice is unlikely to be recognised as a valid defence.
Third, the underlying jurisdictional nexus is fundamentally contested. The EU’s FSR investigation targets Nuctech’s EU entities, which are legally incorporated in EU member states. The Commission’s information request is directed at those EU entities. The fact that those emails are stored on parent company servers in China is, from an EU perspective, a matter of corporate organisation, not a jurisdictional bar. The Chinese government, however, views the request as an improper extraterritorial measure because it seeks data physically located in China, effectively compelling production from the Chinese parent company via its EU subsidiaries. This is the classic “data controller” (EU) versus “data location” (China) jurisdictional conflict, now weaponised by two comprehensive legal regimes.
The MOJ Notice declares that the EU measure shall not be enforced or assisted in enforcement. But what are the practical consequences, given the EU’s likely disregard for the Chinese notice? Under Chinese law, the ROCIFEJ provides for enforcement mechanisms. Article 7 allows the Chinese government to “take necessary measures” against any person who complies with a foreign improper extraterritorial measure, including prohibiting them from doing business with Chinese entities, restricting or denying them certain rights, and imposing fines. More significantly, Article 8 allows Chinese citizens or organisations that have suffered losses due to another person’s compliance with such foreign measures to sue for damages in Chinese courts. Nuctech’s EU entities or any third parties, such as lawyers, service providers, etc., if they comply with the EU’s data demand, could theoretically face legal action in China. However, enforcement against EU-based entities with no assets in China is largely symbolic.
Under EU law, as noted, there is no “foreign sovereign compulsion” defence. The European Commission can and likely will ignore the MOJ Notice. The FSR empowers the Commission to impose fines for non-compliance with information requests (Article 26). The Commission could also draw adverse inferences about Nuctech’s subsidy status from the refusal. Thus, if Nuctech’s EU entities cannot receive exemption from China, the MOJ Notice creates a classic compliance dilemma.
[1] Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Notice on the Constitution of Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as regards Relevant Measures Taken by EU in Foreign Subsidies Investigation’ (Gov.cn 15 May 2026) <https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zwxxgk/fdzdgknr/fdzdgknrtzwj/202605/t20260515_535049.html> accessed 21 May 2026.
[2] Rules on Blocking Improper Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Laws and Measures (Decree [2021] No 1 of Ministry of Commerce) (China).
[3] Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Spokesperson for the Ministry of Justice Answers Questions from the Press about the Constitution of Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as regards Relevant Measures Taken by EU in Foreign Subsidies Investigation’ (Gov.cn 15 May 2026) <https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/gwxw/xwyw/202605/t20260515_535048.html> accessed 21 May 2026; Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce Answers Questions from the Press about the Determination that Relevant Measures Taken by EU in Foreign Subsidies Investigation Constitute Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Measures’ (Gov.cn 16 May 2026) <https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xwfb/xwfyrth/art/2026/art_df1b7dd65f014ea29f7de59bb04e2ebf.html> accessed 21 May 2026.
[4] Re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation 8 F 4th 136 (2d Cir US 2021); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 (2018) (US).
[5] Nuctech (n 3) [80]–[81].
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