Agrégateur de flux

ConflictofLaws.net will be hosting an ad-hoc virtual roundtable on the Commission’s Rome II Report

on 11 March 2025, 12pm–1.30pm.

The conversation will focus on the long-awaited report published by the Commission on 31 January 2025 and its implications for a possible future reform of the Regulation.

The event will feature the following panellists:

Rui Dias
University of Coimbra

Thomas Kadner Graziano
University of Geneva

Xandra Kramer
Erasmus University Rotterdam

Eva Lein
University of Lausanne &
British Institute of International and Comparative Law

Tobias Lutzi
University of Augsburg

Everyone interested is warmly invited to join via this Zoom link.

Background to Case C-537/23 Società Italiana Lastre SpA (SIL) v Agora SARL, in which the CJEU held yesterday, is here.

The choice of court clause that is the subject of the proceedings reads

the court of Brescia [(Italy)] will have jurisdiction over any dispute arising from or related to this contract. [SIL] reserves the right to bring proceedings against the purchaser before another competent court in Italy or elsewhere.

When I understood late in 2024 that there had been no hearing and that neither would there be an AG Opinion, I suspected this most likely indicated that nothing earthshattering would be held, rather that the CJEU would give the kind of straightforward replies as I flagged in my post on the referral.

I was wrong! : surprisingly in my view the Court has held asymmetry IS covered by BIa and that it is in principle perfectly kosher.

The case deals with asymmetric aka hybrid aka unilateral choice of court, on which readers will find plenty of posts when entering these search strings on the blog.

Article 25’s lex causae rule (which law determines whether unilateral choice of vcourt is valid) reads in relevant part

‘1.      If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member State. …. “(emphasis added)

Recital 20 adds

20)      Where a question arises as to whether a choice-of-court agreement in favour of a court or the courts of a Member State is null and void as to its substantive validity, that question should be decided in accordance with the law of the Member State of the court or courts designated in the agreement, including the conflict-of-laws rules of that Member State.’

As I noted in the Handbook and elsewhere, the insertion into the Regulation of the lex fori prorogati rule often does not assist. In particular, where parties expressly make choice of court non-exclusive or where they designate a plurality of specifically identified courts, the lex fori prorogati is not immediately ascertainable. Neither is it in the event of so-called ‘unilateral’ or ‘one-sided’ choice of court. At the very least for these cases which are not solved with the new lex fori prorogati rule, parties are best advised to continue to (or start to) make separate and express choice of law for unilateral and non-exclusive choice of law.

Recital 20, whose status is uncertain anyway on account of it being a mere recital, is in my view extraordinarily unhelpful in conjuring up renvoi to the lex causae mix.

The CJEU first of all and as is standard for BIa, reminds us [30] that the concept of ‘null and void as to its substantive validity’ must be given an autonomous, EU law meaning, “which must be established by reference to the usual meaning of those terms in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they are used and the objectives pursued by the legislation of which they form part.”

[31] ‘Substantive’ ordinarily would refer to ‘questions of fact or law which the [national, GAVC] court must decide’ at the merits stage. However [32] here the reference to substantive validity clearly means something else ,namely “that provision indicates which national law applies as regards whether, notwithstanding the fact that all of the conditions of validity laid down in that article are satisfied, such an agreement is null and void on other grounds under that national law.”: in other words ‘that provision is merely a conflict-of-laws rule’.

[33] the Court observes that recital 20 “has wording analogous” to A25. When it cites recital 20 however it quotes incompletely, namely “‘where a question arises as to whether a choice-of-court agreement in favour of a court or the courts of a Member State is null and void as to its substantive validity, that question should be decided in accordance with the law of the Member State of the court or courts designated in the agreement’.”

Leaving out the reference to renvoi is disingenuous imo, and it is not the first time the CJEU completely ignores recital 20’s inclusion of renvoi: see C-519/19 Ryanair v DelayFix where it did exactly the same.

[36] continuing with statements which reveal nothing new to the seasoned conflicts eye, the CJEU recalls that A25 itself only discusses the existence and expression of consent, hence that ‘substantive validity’

“covers the general causes of nullity of a contract, namely, in particular, those which vitiate consent, such as error, deceit, violence or fraud, and incapacity to contract, causes which, unlike the conditions of validity pertaining to the agreement conferring jurisdiction themselves, are not governed by the Brussels Ia Regulation but by the law of the Member State whose courts are designated.

[40] the Court refers to the travaux to point out that A25 was meant to mirror the 2005 Choice of Court Convention on this point: see A5 of that Convention (“The court or courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that State.”) and A6(a) (“A court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court shall suspend or dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies unless – a) the agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court;…”

Like professor Cuniberti, I am a bit puzzled by the reference to the 2005 Convention seeing as it only applies to exclusive choice of court.

[39] is then the reminder of BIa’s core DNA: reasonable foreseeability of forum for defendant and ease of identification of forum for the claimant (reference here to C-774/22 FTI Touristik which itself had referred to Inkreal.

Now, [42]

the terms ‘have agreed’, …cannot be interpreted as meaning that it is necessary for such a clause to be formulated in such a way that the competent court can be determined on its wording alone. It is sufficient that the clause state the objective factors on the basis of which the parties have agreed to choose a court or the courts to which they wish to submit disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them. Those factors, which must be sufficiently precise to enable the court seised to ascertain whether it has jurisdiction, may, where appropriate, be determined by the particular circumstances of the case being examined by the court…” (reference ia to Hőszig).

Put another way, [44]

the condition that the parties ‘have agreed’ on a court or courts of a contracting State or a Member State includes a requirement of precision in order to be valid.

or [45]

an agreement conferring jurisdiction must, in order to be valid, identify with sufficient precision the objective factors on the basis of which the parties have agreed to choose a court or the courts to which they wish to submit disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them.

This [46] also assists in the attainment of the objectives of foreseeability, transparency and legal certainty, set out in recitals 15 and 16 BIa.

[48] the Court recalls asymmetry of choice of court being specifically dealt with viz the weaker party to an insurance contract, a consumer contract or an employment contract.

[50]

“as regards those contracts, Article 25(4) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, read in conjunction with Articles 15, 19 and 23 thereof, expressly governs the situations in which an asymmetric agreement conferring jurisdiction is valid and those in which it is not.”

[51]

“Therefore, it must be held that the validity of an agreement conferring jurisdiction in view of its alleged asymmetry must be examined having regard not to criteria relating to the causes of an agreement being ‘null and void as to its substantive validity’, within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 25(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, but to autonomous criteria which are derived from that Article 25 as interpreted by the Court.”

I do not understand the leap (“therefore”): the Court seems to reason that seeing as BIa for protected categories imposes conditions curtailing asymmetry, such asymmetry is a BIa-covered condition of validity, not one which A25 refers to an applicable national law. The CJEU in my view could just as well have reasoned with reference to the protected categories being an exception to the rules otherwise applicable, that the asymmetry discussed there is an outlier in what is otherwise an area covered by the lex fori prorogati.

Having thus held that the validity of asymmetric choice of court is to be determined using BIa and not using an applicable law causae, the CJEU then goes on to hold whether BIa does or does not allow them.

[55] Party autonomy, protected by BIa, means the parties must not necessarily designate the courts of a single and the same Member State (or [58] Lugano Convention States). [57] The existence of forum shopping possibilities in the application of the special jurisdictional rules of A7, too, supports the room which BIa leaves for proceedings being brought in various Member States.

[60] The wording of the clause at issue: ‘another competent court …elsewhere’ however leads to the possibility of a third State court, neither an EU or Lugano State court, having jurisdiction. This [61] leads an “an increased risk of conflicts of jurisdiction arising which would be detrimental to legal certainty, since the application of those national rules would be likely to lead to divergent answers..”

The Court’s conclusion therefore is

In the light of the forgoing considerations, the answer to the second question is that Article 25(1) and (4) of the Brussels Ia Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that an agreement conferring jurisdiction pursuant to which one of the parties thereto may only bring proceedings before the sole court that it designates whereas it permits the other party to bring proceedings before, in addition to that court, any other competent court, is valid, in so far as, first, it designates courts of one or several States which are either Members of the European Union or parties to the Lugano II Convention, secondly, it identifies objective factors which are sufficiently precise to enable the court seised to ascertain whether it has jurisdiction, and, thirdly, it is not contrary to the provisions of Articles 15, 19 or 23 of that regulation and does not derogate from an exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Article 24 thereof.

A surprising outcome as far as I am concerned, and one which as I noted, oddly was taken without the benefit of an AG Opinion.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, para 2.349.

 

by Guillaume Croisant, Claudia Cavicchioli, Nicole Rölike, Alexia Kaztaridou, and Julie Esquenazi (all Linklaters)

In a nutshell: reinforced legal certainty but questions remain

In its decision of yesterday (27 February 2025) in the Lastre case (Case C-537/23), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) handed down its long-awaited first judgment on the conformity of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses with the Brussels I recast regulation and the 2007 Lugano Convention.

The Court ruled that the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses is assessed in the light of the autonomous rules of Article 25 of the regulation (rather than Member States’ national laws) and confirmed their validity where the clause can be interpreted as designating courts of EU or Lugano States.

This decision dispels some of the previous uncertainties, particularly arising from the shifting case law of the French Supreme Court. The details of the decision and any possible impact, in particular the requirement for the clause to be interpreted as designating courts of EU or Lugano States, will need to be analysed more closely, but on the whole the CJEU strengthened foreseeability and consistency regarding unilateral jurisdiction clauses under the Brussels I regulation and the Lugano convention.

Besides other sectors, this decision is of particular relevance in international financing transactions, including syndicated loans and capital markets, where asymmetric jurisdiction clauses in favour of the finance parties have been a long-standing practice.

Background

A so-called asymmetric or unilateral jurisdiction clause allows one party to choose any competent court to bring proceedings, while the other party is restricted to a specific jurisdiction. Such clauses are common in financial agreements, like international syndicated loan transactions, where lenders, bearing most of the financial risk, reserve the right to enforce claims wherever the borrower may have assets.

Article 25 of the Brussels I recast regulation provides autonomous conditions for the formal validity of jurisdiction clauses designating EU courts. By contrast, for the jurisdiction clause’s substantive validity, Article 25 refers to the law of the Member State designated by the jurisdiction clause. While one of the Brussels I recast regulation’s predecessors, the 1968 Brussels Convention, referred to jurisdiction clauses “concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties”, the regulation is silent on the validity of asymmetrical jurisdiction clauses. Their precise working under Article 25, particularly in relation to the substantive validity rule, awaited authoritative consideration by the CJEU.

In the absence of relevant national case law in many Member States and diverging approaches in jurisdictions where decisions had been rendered, today’s judgment brings welcomed clarity and legal certainty. For instance, in Commerzbank AG v Liquimar Tankers Management Inc, the English Commercial Court considered (pre-Brexit, when EU jurisdiction law still applied in the UK) that asymmetric jurisdiction clauses are valid under Article 25, whereas the evolving jurisprudence of the French Supreme Court (discussed below) has led to many debates.

Arbitration is excluded from the scope of application of the Brussels I recast regulation, meaning that the validity of asymmetric arbitration clauses generally depends on the law applicable to the arbitration clause (lex arbitri). Under some laws, they are accepted if no consent issues, such as duress, arise (see e.g. under English law the NB Three Shipping case).

Discussions in France spur crucial CJEU review

In the case at hand, an Italian and a French company entered into a supply agreement including an asymmetric jurisdiction clause, similar to clauses often seen in financial documentation favouring the lenders:

“The jurisdiction of the court of Brescia (Italy) shall apply to any dispute arising from this contract or related to it, [the Italian supplier] reserving the right to proceed against the buyer before another competent court in Italy or abroad.”

When a dispute arose, the French company brought proceedings before the French courts. The supplier challenged the competence of French courts on the basis of the unilateral jurisdiction clause. The French courts dismissed this objection, declaring the clause unlawful due to its lack of foreseeability and one-sided nature.

The case was brought before the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation). In the past, its First Civil Chamber had ruled, in its 2012 Rothschild decision, that jurisdiction clauses giving one party the right to sue the other before “any other competent court” are invalid both under the French civil code and the Brussels I regulation, on the ground that this would be “potestative” (i.e. that the execution of the clause would depend on an event that solely one contracting party has the power to control or to prevent).

Although the First Chamber later abandoned any reference to the “potestativité” criteria, there now appear to be diverging positions among the chambers of the French Supreme Court regarding the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses. On the one hand, further to several decisions, the latest being in 2018, the First Civil Chamber of the Cour de Cassation appears to hold that asymmetric jurisdiction clauses are invalid if the competent courts are not identifiable through objective criteria or jurisdiction rules within a Member State. On the other hand, the Commercial Chamber of the French Supreme Court ruled in 2017 that such clauses are valid if the parties have agreed to them, regardless of  predictability.

In this case, the Cour de cassation sought guidance from the CJEU through a preliminary ruling reference. The Cour de cassation requested the CJEU’s position on:

• whether the lawfulness of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses should be evaluated under (i) the autonomous principles of the Brussels I recast regulation or (ii) the applicable national law;
• if the Brussels I recast regulation applies, whether this regulation permits such asymmetric clauses;
• if national law is applicable, how to determine which Member State’s law should take precedence.

After the hearing, the Court deemed a prior opinion from the Advocate General not necessary.

CJEU upholds asymmetric clauses… under conditions

On the first question, the CJEU ruled that, in the context of the assessment of the validity of a jurisdiction clause, complaints alleging the imprecision or asymmetry of that agreement must be examined in the light of autonomous criteria which are derived from Article 25 of the Brussels I recast regulation. Matters of substantive validity, for which the law of the relevant Member States shall apply, only concern causes which vitiate consent, such as error, deceit, fraud or violence, and incapacity to contract.

Turning to the interpretation of these autonomous criteria under Article 25, the Court confirmed the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses designating courts of EU Member States or States that are parties to the Lugano Convention.

The Court first confirmed that parties are free to designate several courts in their jurisdiction clauses, and that a clause referring to “any other competent court” meets the requirements of foreseeability, transparency and legal certainty of the Brussels I recast regulation and the Lugano Convention since it refers to the general rules of jurisdiction provided for by these instruments.

However, the Court importantly held that these requirements are met only insofar as the jurisdiction clause can be interpreted as conferring jurisdiction to the court designated in the clause (in the case at hand, Brescia) and the competent courts of the EU/Lugano States to hear disputes between the parties. EU law alone would not make it possible to confer jurisdiction to a court of third countries, as this designation would depend on the application of their own private international law rules. The exact implications of this requirement will require careful assessment, in particular where non-EU/Lugano parties are involved.

With respect to the alleged “unbalanced” nature of such clause, the Court stressed that the Brussels I recast regulation and the Lugano Convention are based on the principle of contractual autonomy and thus allow asymmetric clauses, as long as they respect the exceptions foreseen by these instruments, in particular with respect to exclusive jurisdiction (Art. 24 Brussels I recast regulation) as well as the protective rules in insurance, consumer and employment contracts (Arts. 15, 19 and 23 Brussels I recast regulation).

Registration is now open for the inaugural conference of the Australasian Association of Private International Law, to be held at the Ship Inn conference centre at Southbank, Brisbane from 16-17 April 2025.

The program features panels on

• Private International Law and Technology;
• Anti-suit and Anti-enforcement Injunctions;
• Private International Law and Climate Change; and
• Prenuptial Agreements.

Attendance at conference sessions can be used for CPD; check local requirements.

Conference fees

Reduced fees apply to members of AAPrIL. You can join the Association at https://aapril.org/membership/

Member (2 days) $110
Member (1 day) $60

Non-member (2 days) $150
Non-member (1 day) $80

Student: Free to attend the conference only.

Conference dinner: $110 for a three course meal and a selection of drinks

Register here

 

Aboute AAPrIL

The Australasian Association of Private International Law (AAPrIL) is a group of people committed to furthering the understanding of private international law in Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific region.

AAPrIL was founded in 2024 by private international lawyers from Australia and New Zealand who have known one another for years through engaging with the discipline of private international law, including through conferences of the Journal of Private International Law, meetings of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, and numerous other academic activities. The inuagural AAPrIL President is Professor Mary Keyes. The Hon Andrew Bell, Chief Justice of New South Wales.

A new issue of ZEuP – Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht is now available. It comes with contributions on EU private law, comparative law and legal history, unification of law, private international law, and individual European private law regimes. The full table of content can be accessed here. The following contributions might be of particular interest […]

On 27 February 2025, the CJEU delivered its ruling in Case C‑537/23, Società Italiana Lastre SpA (SIL) v. Agora SARL. The case was referred by the French Cour de cassation which, at last, asked the CJEU whether asymmetric jurisdiction clauses are valid under the Brussels I bis Regulation. As is well known, the Cour de […]

Engagement solennel devant la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne de la Médiatrice européenne

Commission / Hongrie (Reclassification du cannabis)
Droit institutionnel
Selon l’avocate générale Medina, en votant d’une manière incompatible avec la décision du Conseil établissant la position de l’Union européenne sur le reclassement du cannabis et des substances apparentées, la Hongrie a violé le droit de l’Union

Autriche / Commission (Centrale nucléaire Paks II)
Aide d'État
L’avocate générale Medina propose d’annuler l’arrêt du Tribunal qui a confirmé la décision de la Commission approuvant l’aide de la Hongrie pour deux nouveaux réacteurs nucléaires à Paks

Apothekerkammer Nordrhein
Rapprochement des législations
Les États membres peuvent autoriser des actions publicitaires pour l’achat de médicaments indéterminés soumis à prescription médicale qui revêtent la forme de réductions de prix ou de paiements d’un montant exact

Dun & Bradstreet Austria
Principes du droit communautaire
Évaluation de crédit automatisée : la personne concernée a droit à ce qu’on lui explique comment la décision a été prise à son égard

AEON NEPREMIČNINE e.a.
Services d’intermédiation immobilière : le droit de l’Union ne s’oppose pas au plafonnement de la commission de l’agence immobilière à 4 % du prix de vente ou de location

The legislative work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) currently revolves around eight projects. The Jurisdiction Project occupies a prominent position in this context. With the conclusion of the Judgments Convention, in 2019, the focus of the normative work of the HCCH in the area of civil and commercial law turned to […]

The German Wissenschaftliche Vereinigung für internationales Verfahrensrecht, an association of German-speaking academics working on questions of international civil procedure law, will be holding its bi-annual conference at the University of Münster on 27–29 March 2025. The event is only open to members of the association.

The full programme can be found here; registration is possible here.

 

The German Notarial Institute (Deutsches Notarinstitut; DNotI), located in Würzburg, is currently looking for lawyers interested in contributing to the Institute’s mission of providing expert advice to German notaries, including in cross-border settings.

The full job advertisement can be found here.

Written by Hadrien Pauchard (assistant researcher and doctoral student at Sciences Po Law School)

The fourth issue of the Revue Critique de droit international privé of 2024 will very shortly be released. It contains four articles, eight case notes and many book reviews. In line with the Revue Critique’s recent policy, the doctrinal part will shortly be made available in English on the editor’s website (for registered users and institutions).

In the first article, Prof. Myriam Hunter-Henin (University College London) delves into La rencontre du droit international privé et du climat : réflexions de méthode au sujet des KlimaSeniorinnen (Private international law encountering climate: methodological reflections on KlimaSeniorinnen). Its abstract reads as follows:

The article draws on the European Court of Human Rights decision Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, to reflect on the interaction between human rights reasoning and private international law methods.  It argues that an expansionist interpretation of human rights need not amount to their imperialist enforcement or to an undemocratic encroachment upon the domain of the executive or legislature. Far from threatening to take over the discipline of private international law, human rights reasoning, as displayed in the present case, might usefully inspire private international law jurists to a renewed openness towards the other.

In the second article, Prof. David Sindres (Université d’Angers) asks Faut-il admettre la radiation d’un pourvoi en cassation en cas d’inexécution d’une décision d’exequatur ? (Should a cassation appeal be struck out in the event of non-enforcement of an exequatur decision?). This procedural question gives the author an opportunity to deploy thought-provoking considerations of legal theory, which are presented as follows:

Under article 1009-1 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal in cassation lodged by a party who fails to justify having complied with the challenged decision shall, with limited exceptions, be struck off the roll. Yet, the Cour de cassation tends to reject applications to strike out, for non-execution, cassation appeals lodged against exequatur decisions, on the ground that article 1009-1 of the French Code of Civil Procedure requires, for its application, that a cassation appeal is filed against an enforceable judgment, which is not the case when the judgment whose non- execution is invoked is an exequatur decision. Seemingly flawless, the current solution nonetheless yields curious consequences in practice: in particular, it implies that the party lodging a cassation appeal against an exequatur decision does not, beforehand, have to enforce anything, even though the exequatur is supposed to confer enforceability in France on the foreign decision. The purpose of this article is therefore to reexamine the relevance of the current solution adopted by the Cour de cassation, by considering the idea that it is not the foreign decision or the arbitral award that needs to be enforced in France, but rather the exequatur decision itself.

In the third article, Prof. Dominique Bureau (Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas) reviews L’article 14 du Code civil entre continuité(s) et changement (Article 14 of the French Civil code between continuity and change). The contribution clarifies the current “destiny” of this famous provision, while shedding light on a major jurisprudential shift. Its abstract reads as follows:

Handed down by four different chambers of the Court of Cassation, four recent judgments illustrate an important sequence of case law in matters of international jurisdiction, regarding Article 14 of the French Civil Code, which establishes the jurisdiction of French courts when the plaintiff is of French nationality. Specifically, the Court of Cassation decided in a judgment of June 12, 2024 that Article 14 of the French Civil Code was not applicable in insolvency matters. Thus, a French creditor can no longer initiate collective proceedings in France against a debtor who has virtually no connection with France. This solution will have a significant impact on French litigation in this area.

Finally, in the last article, Prof. Horatia Muir Watt (Sciences Po) navigates the maze of La restitution internationale d’œuvres d’art spoliées (The international restitution of looted art). The piece discusses the Cassirer v. Thyssen – Bornemisza Collection Foundation saga, illustrating the limitation of any conflict of laws methodology when confronted with objects that blur the boundaries between traditional legal categories. Its abstract reads as follows:

What is the legal regime for the international restitution of a work of art, the object of plunder (in this case by the Nazi regime) and discovered more than half a century later by the original owner’s successor in title, displayed in the collection of a major museum? It is the fate of a magnificent painting by Camille Pissaro, Rue St. Honoré, après midi, effet de pluie (1897), which provides here, if not a satisfactory answer, at least an opportunity to reflect on various moral and political enigmas that lie beneath the legal technique of private international law, in one of its most complex instantiations. If these lead to the question of the responsibility of intermediaries, and hence the banality of the evil that can be at work in the workings of the art market, the path also serves here to sketch out other controversies on the fate of cultural property looted in diverse contexts, whether colonial, post-colonial or war-related, and hence on the notion of art, culture and our understandings of the tortuous course of history.

The full table of contents will be available here.

Previous issues of the Revue Critique (from 2010 to 2022) are available on Cairn.

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts“ (IPRax) features the following articles:

 

C. Budzikiewicz/H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner: European Conflict of Law 2024: Business as usual?

This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from January 2024 until December 2024. It presents newly adopted legal instruments and summarises current projects that are making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. The authors discuss both important decisions and pending cases before the CJEU as well as important decisions from German courts pertaining to the subject matter of the article. In addition, the article also looks at current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.

 

Th. Klink: The Proceedings in Cross-Border Disputes before the Commercial Court

By establishing the Commercial Courts and the Commercial Chambers, the Legal Venue Strengthening Act, which will enter into force on 1 April 2025, aims to enable innovative proceedings before state courts in important areas of commercial law (B2B cases, M&A cases and cases of D&O liability). State jurisdiction is to become more attractive, especially for cross-border disputes. Based on a litigation agreement pursuant to Sections 119b (2), 184a (3) of the German Courts Constitution Act on the first instance jurisdiction of the Commercial Court and on the conduct of proceedings in English, the article analyses details of the newly created procedural instruments and their implementation in practice. The focus is on trial proceedings. In addition, the special features of appeal proceedings and cross-border enforcement of judgments are also presented.

 

A. S. Zimmermann: Passportisation – Nationality between Public and Private International Law in Times of Forced Naturalisations by the Russian Federation

In the course of its aggression against Ukraine, Russia employs its nationality as a strategic tool: It naturalises Ukrainian citizens living in occupied territories in large quantities, making them dual nationals. Their cooperation is often ensured by substantial pressure. This article aims to investigate the Private International Law consequences of this strategy, taking into account the Public International Law rules on naturalisations. The article thereby intends to provide a foundation for a common Public and Private International Law discourse on the subject.

 

G. Kulov: The justification and conflict of laws problems of liability of domestic companies by piercing the corporate veil in the light of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive

The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (EU) No. 2024/ 1760 sets out certain due diligence obligations, negligent non-compliance with which can lead to civil liability. The Directive applies not only to companies in Member States, but also to companies in third countries that exceed certain turnover thresholds. However, civil liability cannot always be enforced against such third-country companies, as Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 does not foresee the jurisdiction of European courts for such claims. This provides an opportunity for companies in Member States to avoid civil liability under the Directive through intra-group restructuring. The exploitation of these enforcement deficiencies of the Directive to avoid civil liability may justify the cross-border liability of European companies by piercing the corporate veil, especially when they were originally intended to be covered by the Directive. Such liability may be applied as an overriding mandatory rule irrespective of the lex causae where the foreign company law is applicable. However, in the absence of a corresponding provision in the Directive, the establishment of such liability by case law inevitably leads to an impairment of legal certainty. Consideration should therefore be given to establishing such liability by amending the Directive.

 

S. L. Gössl: Ukrainian declaratory judgements in surrogacy cases – filiation link to the intended parents ex tunc or ex nunc?

Since the BGH ruling that a Ukrainian birth registration does not constitute a recognisable decision, practice in Ukrainian surrogacy cases has changed. In order to obtain a recognisable filiation decision in favour of the intended parents, a (declaratory) court decision is sought in Ukraine after the child’s birth. Such a court decision can be recognised in Germany under procedural law. Dogmatically, it is convincing to recognise such an allocation of parents with ex tunc effect if this is the content of the court decision. The problem of protection of the child’s right to know its own origins in cross-border surrogacy cases – which would be better protected by an ex nunc effect – remains unresolved. A corresponding register should be introduced.

 

J. Kondring: The European Service Regulation and the service of documents on a domestic representative

In a recent preliminary ruling by the ECJ, the ECJ had to rule on the question of whether, within the geographical scope of application of the European Service Regulation, an action for damages under antitrust law can be served on the domestic subsidiary of a foreign cartelist under the “unity of undertakings” doctrine which was developed in the field of antitrust law. According to the ECJ, such a possibility does not arise from the European Service Regulation itself. However, the European Service Regulation is not applicable to the service of a document in the forum Member State on a representative authorised by the person to be served. Such an authorisation for service can also be based on statutory law including the lex fori of the forum state. To such extent, the forum state can permit, under certain conditions, in its autonomous law even domestic service to the domestic subsidiary of a foreign parent, as is the case in the law of some US states for so-called “involuntary agents”. If service is made on an inadequately authorised person in the forum state, it is not possible to remedy the service error. However, this only applies to documents instituting proceedings as the European Service Regulation does not claim exclusivity for the service of documents that do not institute proceedings. This can be concluded from the materials on the 2020 version of the European Service Regulation as well as from its Article 22 which is silent on documents that do not institute proceedings.

 

L. Liu: Service of judicial documents in the People’s Republic of China

The service of court documents from German proceedings in China is often challenging in practice due to the differences in the legal and judicial systems, legal bases and procedures between the two countries. Numerous judgments have already addressed this issue, including public service in Germany. This article will first outline the legal basis for the service of foreign judicial documents in China, as well as the process, methods and means of service, and then analyse whether the public service in the case of the judgment by the Krefeld Regional Court on October 6, 2022 – 7 O 156/20, was defective.

 

F. Maultzsch: Der Einfluss US-amerikanischer Iran-Sanktionsprogramme auf Verträge mit deutschem Vertragsstatut

The Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt a.M. (OLG Frankfurt a.M.) had to deal with the extraterritorial effect of so-called US secondary sanctions on contracts to which German law is applicable. Especially, it had to decide to what extent the foreign sanctions might influence the application of the German provisions on breach of contract on a substantive level if the foreign rules cannot be applied as overriding mandatory provisions under Art. 9(3) Rome I Regulation. In doing so, the court also had to deal with the relevance and coverage of the EU Blocking Regulation. The following article analyses the findings of the court and argues in favour of a rather narrow role for foreign extraterritorial rules in contractual relations.

 

M. Fornasier: Aligning the European Certificate of Succession with the Member States’ national rules on land registration

Article 69(5) of the European Succession Regulation (ESR) provides that the European Certificate of Succession constitutes a valid document for the recording of succession property in the registers of foreign Member States. The same provision, however, contains a reference to point l of Article 1(2) ESR, which clarifies that the Regulation does not affect the Member States’ domestic rules on the recording of rights in registers. In order not to undermine the effectiveness of the Certificate, the Member States’ national rules on registers and the European provisions on the issuance of the Certificate need to be aligned with each other. In the recent Registr? centras case, which came before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) more than five years after its ruling in Kubicka, the Court was faced for the second time with the task of striking a balance between the effectiveness of the Certificate and the Member States’ regulatory autonomy in matters of land registration. While, in Kubicka, the CJEU had advocated a rather narrow interpretation of point l of Article 1(2) ESR, placing a strong emphasis on the effet utile of the Certificate, the Court took a different – and more formalistic – approach in Registr? centras, thus putting the effectiveness of the Certificate at risk. The following case note analyses the Court’s judgment, shedding light on the legal context of the case, and assesses its implications for the national authorities responsible for issuing the European Certificate of Succession. .

 

M. Scherer/O. Jensen/C. Kalelio?lu: The Law of the Arbitration Agreement Meets Russia-related Anti-Suit Injunctions: The United Kingdom Supreme Court’s Decision in UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance LLC

In retaliation to Western sanctions against the Russian Federation, Russia has introduced legislation that allows Russian courts to proceed with litigation involving entities affected by Western sanctions despite valid choice of foreign court or arbitration agreements. Russian courts make use of this option by assuming jurisdiction where otherwise none would exist and by issuing injunctions against parties attempting to rely on their arbitration agreements. Faced with such a scenario in UniCredit v RusChem, the UK Supreme Court strengthened the protective role of the English courts over contracts governed by English law that contain arbitration agreements. While the decision offers significant protections for contracts governed by English law, it also introduces further uncertainty to the common law test for determining the law governing arbitration agreements under English law. This case note examines the Supreme Court’s decision from both angles. It explores the decision’s impact on contracts governed by English law that designate arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism, as well as the current developments on the law governing arbitration agreements under English law.

 

S. Noyer/E. Schick: Conference of the German Council for Private International Law on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Council, September 10-11, Cologne, Germany.

 

J. Bruls: “Who’s Afraid of Punitive Damages?“, March 8-9, Augsburg, Germany

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Thomas Rauscher, formerly a professor of private international law at the University of Leipzig (Germany) and still one of the most prolific commentators on German and European PIL, has been honoured by a Festschrift on the occasion of his 70th birthday. The volume, titled “Europeanization of private law”, has 623 pages and is published by CH Beck (Munich). It contains numerous contributions on private international law, comparative law and international civil procedure. The authors come from various countries, including Germany, Austria, Hungary, the United States and Vietnam. Most contributions are in German. For further information and a table of contents, please click here.

Issue 1/2025 of RabelsZ has just just been released. It contains the contributions to a family law symposium held at the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg in June 2024. All content is Open Access: CC BY 4.0 and more articles are available Online First.

 

Anne Röthel, Preface to this family law special, pp. 1–2, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2025-0003

 

FAMILY LAW PARADIGMS – SYMPOSIUM, JUNE 2024

Anne Röthel, Familienrechte unter den Bedingungen der Moderne – eine Erprobung, [Family Law Under the Conditions of Modernity – An Assay], pp. 3–34, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2024-0069

Since the turn of the twentieth century, many European legal concepts of marriage, divorce, parentage, and family have been fundamentally transformed. These shifts are spoken of in terms of relaxation, liberalization, pluralization, individualization, and emancipation, whereupon family law is often said to have been »modernized« or become »more modern«, premised on the everyday usage of »modern« to signify what is new or has changed. This article focuses instead on the concept of modernity as the quintessential identifier of particular legal ideals and particular assumptions about developments in the law as they have unfolded in the sociological theory of modernization. Based on examples, this article shows how family law in European jurisdictions can be described as »modern« in this specific sense of the word, identifies the legal structures through which these modernizing instances have been accomplished, and points out ongoing tensions over the legal ideals of modernity. The result is a nuanced portrait of the modernity of family law in Europe and the various dynamics affecting it. Modernity is as much of a failure as it is a fait accompli. But modernity has fundamentally changed expectations, both about how the core notions of family law are to be justified as well as about law’s legitimate function.

 

Johanna Croon-Gestefeld, Is There Such a Thing as Transnational Family Law?, pp. 35–58, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2025-0007

Analysis of transnational law embraces the idea that thinking about the law almost exclusively in national terms is inadequate. Transnational legal analysis further rests on the concept of legal pluralism. Family law has received little attention in the field of transnational law so far. But the existence of transnational and migrant families is plain. Moreover, family law pertains to events that take place in a pluralist environment. Does it therefore make sense to look at family law from the transnational point of view? This article explores this question in detail. It sets forth that the transnational perspective assists in depicting the operation of family law in a globalized world, including by encompassing the phenomenon of non-state actors being heavily involved in the creation, application and enforcement of family law.

 

Anatol Dutta, Familie und Personenstand: Die zunehmende Bedeutung des Personenstandswesens, [Family and Personal Status: The Increasing Importance of Civil Status Registration], pp. 59–82, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2025-0005

This article focuses on the civil status registration system, an area of public administration whose central task is to record as completely as possible important life events of citizens – birth, marriage, the establishment of a registered partnership, and death. In many jurisdictions, the civil registrars thereby engage in public enforcement of otherwise private family status laws. The registry offices not only record the facts relevant for civil status but also certify parentage, marriage and partnership, name and gender as legal status relationships based on family law and the law of natural persons. This paper aims to show that certain recent developments have increased the importance of civil status registration, but so far the consequences of this increase have not always been sufficiently recognized, neither in legal policy nor in legal academia.

 

MORE ESSAYS

Katharina Kaesling, Kindliche Autonomie und elterliche Sorge im (digitalen) Binnenmarkt, [Children’s Autonomy and Parental Rights of Care in the (Digital) Single Market], pp. 83–131, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2025-0006

Children are increasingly important actors in the (digital) single market. The realization of their (digital) autonomy has to be reconciled with their protection. The developing capacities of minors, to which the legal systems of the Member States and the European regulatory approaches refer in different ways, are crucial in this respect. The rules of the Member States determine how children can shape their external relations autonomously and how their opinions are taken into account within the family. Starting with the General Data Protection Regulation and continued by new EU digital legislation, such as the Digital Services Act, new, largely indirect regulatory approaches have emerged, based on the obligations of other private actors, such as data controllers and online platforms. Against this background, the article comparatively analyses context-specific regulations and their application in the analogue and digital spheres. The legal fragmentation resulting from the differences in regulation jeopardizes not only the internal market, but also the steering function of state law and thus the guarantee of children’s autonomy in the EU – especially in the data and platform economy.

 

Iryna Dikovska, Removal and Retention of Children in Times of War: The Hague Child Abduction Convention and the Case of Ukraine, pp. 83–131, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2025-0009

It seems fair that a parent who has custody of a child who is removed or retained abroad without the parent’s consent should be able to have the child returned. However, what if this entails return to a country at war? What if the child has settled down in a new country to such an extent that returning to the country from which he or she was once removed would be highly traumatic? What should happen when the child objects to his or her return? To which state can a child be returned? Does the parental right of return depend on the legis-lative provisions regarding border crossings and whether they stipulate that a child may be taken out of the country without the parent’s consent? These and other questions are analysed under the lens of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Abduction of Children, con-sidering in particular the specific example of Ukrainian children who, after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, were taken to the territory of states that are party to the Convention.

 

BOOK REVIEWS

This issue also contains several reviews of literature, this time with a special focus on family law (pp. 165–192).

Stefan Arnold (University of Münster) and Bettina Heiderhoff (University of Münster) edited Children in Migration and International Family Law – The Child’s Best Interests Principle at the Interface of Migration Law and Family Law with Springer. The book, part of the EU-funded FAMIMOVE project, explores the challenges faced by children and families migrating to the […]