
For those (like myself) who view private international law as we know it today as essentially a European invention of the 19th century it is fascinating to see examples of earlier and non-European regimes. One example is Article 48 (on ‘Infringements between peoples outside civilization’) of the Tang Code (653 CE) which reads:
For the people outside [our] civilisation, if infringements occur between those of the same kind, they will be judged by their customary law. If they are of different kinds, then the law [of our empire] shall be applied.
諸化外人, 同類自相犯者, 各依本俗法; 異類相犯者, 以法律論
There has long been a debate of whether this is a true conflicts rule, much of which rests on how broadly to define what conflict of laws actually is and presupposes (for earlier discussion see, e.g. Qingkun Xu, The Codification of Conflicts Law in China: A Long Way to Go, 65 Am. J. Comp. L. 919, 925-6 (2017) with references). Thảo Anh Hoàng (Huế University, Vietnam), in a new article, sides with those who view this as a true conflict of laws rule and also discusses its reception and application in Vietnam and elsewhere in Asia. (Thảo Anh Hoàng, Early conflict-of-laws rules: Vietnam’s Lê Code (1483) in East Asian and global contexts, 14 Comp. Leg. Hist. 29–54(2026). In addition, she provides a fascinating and enlightening discussion of the risks of applying modern concepts to ancient phenomena that is instructive to everyone interested in private international law beyond its black letters. Based on parts of her doctoral thesis currently being written at Montpellier under the supervision of Carine Becharef Jallamion, the article is a tribute to both the productive potential of comparison beyond Europe and North America, and the promising young researchers from Asia.
Thảo Anh Hoàng, Early conflict-of-laws rules: Vietnam’s Lê Code (1483) in East Asian and global contexts, 14 Comp. Leg. Hist. 29–54 (2026).
The proceedings of the 18th Jornadas ASADIP in Rio de Janeiro 2025 have been published. María Mercedes Albornoz César González, Jaime Moreno-Valle and Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm as editors have collected no less than 46 contributions (plus a prologue and a foreword) by authors from Latin America and elsewhere to the 800 page tome entitled “Imaginario regional – resonancia global. El derecho internacional privado interamericano y el escenario mundial”. Most are in Spanish or Portuguese, a few in English. They cover a vast array of topics, doctrinal and/or theoretical, structured along seven themes: (i) foundations, (ii) normative structure, (iii) procedure, (iv) substantive protections, (v) digitization, (vi) human rights, (vii) teaching of private international law. The volume once again demonstrates both the ambition and the high quality of private international law reasoning on the continent. It can, as can many other excellent OAS publications, be downloaded free of charge from the OAS website.
Lorsqu’un forfait touristique a pour objet une croisière maritime, les demandes de dédommagement en raison du décès d’un passager ou de lésions corporelles subies par celui-ci sont régies par le droit maritime ou par le droit du tourisme selon qu’ils sont survenus à bord du navire ou bien à terre.
La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne précise les conditions dans lesquelles l’absence d’assurance peut conduire à une réduction de l’indemnisation des exploitants agricoles que l’État verse en cas de calamité naturelle. À travers une interprétation finaliste du règlement d’exemption, la Cour confirme le mouvement de verdissement du droit des aides d’État tout en consacrant une limite fondée sur l’exigence d’un effort raisonnable, destinée à encadrer les conditions environnementales imposées aux bénéficiaires.
As announced previously, the next Journal of Private International Law Conference will take place in Zurich on 1–3 April 2027. With the deadline for submitting proposals for papers to present at the conference, 30 June 2026, approaching fast, the organizers would like to remind everyone of the opportunity to submit a proposal. The same deadline also applies for the travel grants offered by the University of Zurich.
More information can be found on the conference website.
Earlier today, the Court of Justice rendered its decision in Case C-232/25 Idzinski, essentially confirming its previous case law, combined with a restrictive reading of its infamous decision in Joint Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate.
The facts of the case (which was given the entirely fictitious name Idzinski) are eerily similar to those of the Court’s 2021 decision in Case C-800/19 Mittelbayrischer Verlag. Just like in that earlier case, they involved a claim by Polish claimants against a German media outlet regarding the correction of, and damages for, the publication of content that allegedly violated their personality rights, including their national dignity. Only two elements of the facts were different: first, the content complained of was broadcasted on television, in addition to being published online; second, the claimants were (1) a private person who was part of a Polish military unit during World War II, which the German broadcaster had allegedly portrayed as ‘anti-Semitic and nationalistic and as having collaborated with the Nazis in the Holocaust’, and (2) an association bringing together members of that unit.
After two decisions against the defendants (to varying degrees), the Polish Supreme Court had submitted two questions relating to the international jurisdiction of the Polish courts.
Centre-of-Interests JurisdictionFirst, the court wanted to know whether the claimants could rely on Art 7(2) Brussels Ia in the interpretation developed by the CJEU in eDate to establish the (full) jurisdiction of the Polish courts as the courts of the claimants’ centre of interests, even with regard to the content broadcasted on television and even though neither of the claimants had been named in the broadcast.
Dismissing the claimants’ argument that any distinction between online content and a TV broadcast would be largely meaningless given how much the lines between the two formats have blurred, the CJEU reaffirms the narrow scope of the centre of interests criterion (see already eDate, [48]), which remains only available with regard to online content:
[44] That said, the television broadcast of audiovisual content in several Member States must be distinguished from the dissemination of such content on the internet. The placing online of content on a website is to be distinguished, generally, from the regionalised distribution of media in that it is intended, in principle, to ensure the ubiquity of that content. That content may be consulted instantly by an unlimited number of users throughout the world, irrespective of any intention on the part of the person who placed it as regards its consultation beyond that person’s Member State of establishment and outside of that person’s control […].
[45] Those considerations do not apply to the broadcasting of audiovisual content on television. Such broadcasting is not, in principle, available instantly and worldwide, but is regionalised, limited to the geographical area in which the television signal is received.
Regarding the fact that neither of the two claimants had been mentioned by name in the broadcast in question, which could be seen as falling short of the requirement for centre-of-interests jurisdiction developed in Mittelbayrischer Verlag, namely that the content complained of must containt ‘objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, [the claimant] as an individual’, the CJEU draws a distinction between the two claimants. The first claimant did not pass the threshold of identifiability as the broadcast
[54] […] does not make it possible to identify individually the applicants in the main proceedings inasmuch as it is a work of fiction which recounts the conduct of a group of soldiers – members of unit X – without it being possible to ascertain the true identity of the members depicted in the series.
The second claimant, however, whose members were all part of that group of soldiers, passed the test and could thus bring a claim at its centre of interests, as far as the online publication of the series is concerned.
Mosaic JurisdictionAs a second question, the referring court also inquired (again – see also Cases C-194/16 Bolagsupplysningen and C-251/20 Gtflix Tv) about the extent to which jurisdiction could be based on the mosaic approach to Art. 7(2) Brussels Ia. Indeed, for all claims of the first claimant as well as for the claims of the second claimant regarding the TV broadcast, jurisdiction could only be based on the fact that the content had been made available in Poland, which traditionally only creates jurisdiction for a proportion of the overall harm. In Bolagsupplysningen, the CJEU had essentially restricted this type of jurisdiction to damage awards.
In Idzinski, the CJEU simply reiterates its earlier decisions (see [63]). In particular, it confirms that mosaic jurisdiction remains unavailable for any kind of injunction requiring the defendant to display specific information before the series (both online and on TV) – a remedy, of course, with limited chance of being enforced in Germany anyway (for reasons explained here).
ConclusionUltimately, the CJEU simply reaffirms its previous case law. While any revirement de justice in that area would have been highly surprising, especially after the decision in Gtflix Tv, the decision may well be seen as another indication that the area is ripe for legal reform.
Par un arrêt du 4 juin 2026, la grande chambre de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne précise les conditions dans lesquelles l’autorité judiciaire d’un État membre, ayant refusé d’exécuter un MAE émis aux fins d’exécution d’une peine privative de liberté au motif d’un risque avéré d’atteinte aux droits fondamentaux de la personne recherchée, peut, afin d’éviter qu’elle reste impunie, poursuivre l’exécution de cette peine sur son propre territoire.
International Symposium | 9–10 October 2026 | Faculty of Law, University of Coimbra (Portugal)
The University of Coimbra Institute for Legal Research (UCILeR), in collaboration with the Associação de Estudos Europeus de Coimbra (AEEC – Coimbra Association of European Studies), is organizing the International Symposium “Crossing Dialogues, Disciplines and Borders: How far can Private International Law go?”, to be held on 9 and 10 October 2026 at the Colégio da Trindade, Coimbra, Portugal.
Organised by Dulce Lopes and Afonso Patrão , the event brings together leading scholars, early-career researchers, and practitioners to debate the evolving role and limits of Private International Law (PIL) in novel situations that increasingly challenge its traditional scope.
About the SymposiumPrivate International Law is undergoing a period of deep transformation. The boundaries between substantive and procedural law have become more fluid and porous; fundamental rights and freedoms permeate classical conflict-of-laws reasoning; and adjacent disciplines — constitutional law, human rights law, immigration law, and register law — are reshaping the very foundations of PIL doctrine and methodology.
The symposium is structured around five thematic panels:
Confirmed speakers include Ilaria Viarengo (University of Milan), Stéphanie Francq (UCLouvain), Yuko Nishitani (Kyoto University), Laura Carballo Piñero (University of Vigo), Rosario Espinosa Callabuig(University of Valencia), Guillermo Palao Moreno (University of Valencia), Gustavo Monaco (University of São Paulo), Antonia Duran Ayago (University of Salamanca), Dário Moura Vicente (University of Lisbon), Luís de Lima Pinheiro (University of Lisbon), Rui Moura Ramos (University of Coimbra), and many others.
The full program is accessible on-line: https://ucpages.uc.pt/fduc/ij/agenda-ij/crossing-dialogues-disciplines-and-borders-how-far-can-private-international-law-go/
Attendance, whether in person or online, is free of charge but subject to registration: https://ls.uc.pt/index.php/395373?lang=pt&
Call for PapersThe organising committee invites abstract submissions from scholars and practitioners wishing to present papers at the symposium. Contributions may address any of the following themes (non-exhaustive):
Submission requirements:
Key dates:
Abstract submission deadline 18 July 2026 Notification of acceptance 31 July 2026 Draft papers due 9 October 2026Presentations will take place in a hybrid format on 9 October 2026. A peer-reviewed publication of the proceedings is planned following the event.
We look forward to welcoming submissions from researchers working at the intersection of PIL and the many disciplines with which it increasingly dialogues.
This Call for Papers was shared with us by Procedural Law Unit of the University of Nicosia, Cyprus.
The Procedural Law Unit is a research unit within the School of Law at the University of Nicosia, focusing on civil procedure, private international law, and broader developments in judicial process and court reform. Each year, the Unit hosts its Annual Courts and Justice Conference, which brings together academics, practitioners, judges, and policymakers to discuss contemporary issues in procedural law and justice systems.
This year’s conference, the Annual Courts and Justice Conference 2026, is themed “The Algorithmic Courtroom: Trust, Accountability, and the Future of Justice”, and will examine the implications of artificial intelligence in adjudication and court processes.
If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.
Like all my posts, this post is entirely AI free.
Marion Ho-Dac reported a short while back on the French Supreme Court’s decisions 24-21.790 and 24-21.422 ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:C100235. The facts of the case involve the Lebanese banking crisis, the jurisdictional implications of which have been reported on the blog before. The lower courts had held (and the SC does not second-guess that finding) that the activities of the bank where not directed at France and that the consumer title of Brussels Ia did also not otherwise apply.
In the absence of other jurisdictional anchors in Brussels Ia, jurisdiction therefore was left to be decided under residual French rules. As Marion reports, the SC has now extended its rule in employment contracts (jurisdictional arrangements pointing away from France, cannot deprive employees employed in France of the international and territorial jurisdiction of the French labour courts) to consumer contracts: French substantive consumer law ringfences jurisdiction for French courts. Marion cites the relevant provisions:
According to Article R. 631-3 of the French Consumer Code, “the consumer may bring proceedings either before one of the courts having territorial jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, or before the court of the place where he was resident at the time the contract was concluded or the harmful event occurred”. Furthermore, according to Article R. 632-1 of the same Code, “the court may, of its own motion, apply all the provisions of this Code in disputes arising from its application”.
In essence, the French SC dropped the direction of activities criterion of BIa and CJEU Pammer Alpenhof, leading to a more universal jurisdiction for French courts for parties qualifying as consumers and with habitual residence in France.
Now, I am not going to repeat professor Ho-Dac’s analysis, which is excellent both viz its French and EU PrivIntLaw angles. What I wanted to add (over and above emphasising Marion’s point that the issue needs to, and will be addressed in the review of Brussels Ia), is the difference between these cases and CJEU Roi Land Investments. In that case the CJEU held inter alia that more protective national rules (in Roi Land: a direct right to sue the “successor in title” of the employer) cannot trump Brussels Ia’s jurisdictional provisions for the protected categories. However that is ‘more protective’ in cases where Brussels Ia’s protected categories title is engaged. In current case, the protective title is not engaged at all, neither are other parts of Brussels Ia, hence giving Member States free range in their jurisdictional space (subject to any relevant Hague or bilateral instruments, of course).
Geert.
If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.
Like all my posts, this one is entirely AI free.
In Case C‑43/25 SML Maschinengesellschaft mbH v AK, the CJEU reminded us end of March of the narrow opportunity which Article 16 of the European Insolvency Regulation – EIR offers to escape claw-back by the insolvency practitioner with use of an insulating lex contractus. Yet its ruling leaves open an important question on the lex cause for shareholder loans.
I realise that for the uninitiated, the intro above is a bit puzzling. Readers may want to refer to my post on CJEU Lutz or Nike to appreciate the context.
The Court essentially held that Article 16’s insulation mechanism does not extend to actions related to the relative ranking of claims in the collectivity.
Context is [31] “whether the Article may be relied on by a person who has received repayments in respect of a shareholder loan, which are regarded as detrimental to all of the creditors, in response to a request for restitution submitted by the insolvency administrator of the company that is the debtor of the loan where that request seeks to ensure compliance with the ranking of claims that is laid down in the legislation of the State of the opening of the insolvency proceedings.”
In other words the kind of debt at issue is a shareholder loan. These are commonly used as way to finance a business. Arie van Hoe and Melissa Vanmeenen flagged some of the issues already in 2011 .
[33] the CJEU effectively handles the question of insulation with the use of Article 16 EIR, by simply referring to the need to apply Article 16 restrictively, as an exception to (now) Article 7 EIR, and [35] it concludes from that restrictive angle that “[Article 16’s] scope is limited to the situation envisaged in the latter provision, namely where what is at issue are the rules relating to the voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all the creditors, and not the rules relating to the claims to be lodged against the debtor’s estate or their ranking.”
This is a pretty sec statement, made without AG Opinion. Sec, because while the shareholder’s action at issue did not indeed directly see to a pauliana scenario, the context of ranking is evidently one of (escaping) clawback.
As Arie notes in his review (in Dutch) of the judgment, the affirmative reply to the first question (the ranking request does not fall under A16), cancelled out an opportunity to respond to the second and further questions, These included the issue of determination of lex causae for shareholder loans: are these subject to Rome I’s lex voluntatis; or are they necessarily covered by lex incorporationis.
More questions are therefore to be expected…..
Geert.
EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024 (5th ed forthcoming 2027), Chapter 5.
Dans un arrêt du 21 mai 2026, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne juge contraire au droit de l’Union un dispositif permettant la suspension d’une procédure d’exécution fiscale visant à récupérer une aide d’État incompatible avec le marché intérieur et illégale. La solution est justifiée par l’exigence d’effectivité qui implique la suppression des aides illégales et l’exécution immédiate et effective des décisions ordonnant leur récupération. Le principe d’autonomie procédurale des États membres dans la récupération des aides d’État illégales en ressort corrélativement affaibli, au détriment de la garantie des droits reconnus aux bénéficiaires des aides.
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