Par un arrêt du 9 octobre 2024, la Cour de cassation renvoie à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne quatre questions préjudicielles afin que celle-ci clarifie sa jurisprudence relative à la portée d’une clause attributive de juridiction à l’égard des tiers.
Parmi les orientations politiques de la prochaine mandature de la Commission européenne figure l’idée de créer un 28e droit pour les entreprises innovantes en Europe. Décryptage.
La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne précise la portée du principe de non-refoulement.
La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne précise les conditions dans lesquelles un jugement prononcé dans un autre État membre peut se voir dénier toute force exécutoire en France, lorsqu’il porte atteinte à la liberté d’expression garantie par la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne.
Issue 3 of RabelsZ 2024 has just been released. It contains the following articles:
Chris Thomale and Stephan Schmid, Das Private Enforcement der EU-Lieferkettenrichtlinie – Eine rechtsvergleichende und rechtsökonomische Beurteilung der finalen Fassung mit Anregungen für die mitgliedstaatlichen Umsetzungsgesetze (Private Enforcement in the EU Supply Chain Directive: A Critical Comparative Law and Economics Analysis of the Final Compromise with Suggestions for its Implementation by the Member States), pp. 425–493, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2024-0046
One component of the European Green Deal is the implementation of a harmonized supply chain law in the form of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D). The final compromise imposes a new type of due diligence obligation on companies to protect the climate, human rights and the environment in the supply chain. Its enforcement will rely inter alia on private law mechanisms. This article describes how private-law enforcement mechanisms so far have fallen short in ongoing human rights, environmental and climate litigation. It then assesses the new supply chain regulation’s effectiveness and efficiency, especially in comparison to alternative regulatory instruments. It also contains recommendations for the upcoming implementation process by the EU member states.
Jochen Hoffmann and Lisa-Marie Pischel, Die Kollision von CISG und nationalem Verbraucherschutzrecht (Conflicts Between the CISG and National Consumer Law), pp. 494–526, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2024-0043
Despite the exclusion which Art. 2 lit. a CISG sets out for a sale of goods for personal use, the UN Sales Law may in individual cases be applicable to cross-border sales contracts that are also subject to national consumer protection law. This is due to the fact that the wording of the exclusion may not align with the legal conception of a consumer in the national laws of the Contracting States, in particular the European concept of a consumer. The involved provisions are generally not compatible with each other, with the result that they cannot be applied to the same contract. In resolving such a conflict, it is therefore necessary to interpret Art. 2 lit. a CISG through the lens of the national conception of a consumer. For any remaining conflicts, it falls upon national law to decide which provisions prevail.
Knut Benjamin Pißler, Die Immunität ausländischer Staaten im Recht der Volksrepublik China – Das Gesetz vom 1. September 2023 als Instrument zur Gestaltung des Völkergewohnheitsrechts (Immunity of Foreign States Under the Law of the People’s Republic of China. The Law of 1 September 2023 as an Instrument for the Shaping of Customary International Law), pp. 527–555, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2024-0045
The Law of the PR of China on the Immunity of Foreign States (Immunity Law) has been adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and entered into force on 1 January 2024. The law is a legislative measure to establish a “foreign-related rule of law” that is directed both inwards and outwards. Inwardly, it means that the courts of the People’s Republic of China are now entitled to hear lawsuits brought against foreign states. Outwardly, the Immunity Law enables China to actively participate in the development of customary international law, as many rules regarding restrictive immunity have still not been conclusively clarified. Active participation of this nature is a declared goal of foreign-related rule of law as proclaimed under Xi Jinping, seeking namely to give Chinese law a higher status at the international level and to allow the Chinese government and Chinese courts to influence the shaping of international legal norms.
Leon Theimer, Die unionsrechtliche Zukunft des Schadensersatzes wegen Verletzung einer ausschließlichen Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung (The Future of Damages for Breach of an Exclusive Choice of Court Agreement in EU Law), pp. 556–585, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2024-0038
Damages for breach of an exclusive choice-of-court agreement have fascinated legal scholars for quite some time. Once a peculiarity of the common law, the remedy is now also recognised in the legal systems of Spain and Germany. Recently, the EU-law dimension of the topic has come to the fore. However, despite a recent decision by the CJEU, the issue of whether damages for breach of an exclusive choice of court agreement are compatible with the Recast Brussels I Regulation has not yet been conclusively resolved. The article examines this question with regard to hurdles arising from the CJEU’s case law on (quasi) anti-suit injunctions, hurdles arising from the law on recognition of a foreign judgment, and doctrinal hurdles. In carrying out this analysis, the principle of mutual trust serves as a key standard of assessment. Moreover, the fundamental rights dimension of the topic is examined for the first time. The article concludes that damages for breach of an exclusive choice of court agreement indeed have a future in the EU, but only where the derogated court has not already rendered a decision or declined its jurisdiction.
Jürgen Samtleben, Das Internationale Privatrecht im neuen Zivilgesetzbuch Puerto Ricos – Abkehr vom common law (Private International Law in Puerto Rico’s New Civil Code – Farewell to Common Law), pp. 586–609, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2024-0037
Puerto Rico enacted a new civil code in 2020 the introductory title to which regulates private international law. The code, which supersedes the earlier Civil Code of 1902/1930, was over twenty years in the making. The code it replaced was rooted in the country’s Spanish heritage but overlain by common law principles, as the island of Puerto Rico has been a territory of the United States since 1898. It was against this common law influence that the reform movement arose that led to the creation of the new Civil Code. Article 1 of the Code postulates Puerto Rico’s membership in the civil law family of nations, declaring civilian methods of finding and interpreting the law to be the exclusively binding approach. The same approach is taken to private international law, which was the subject of great controversy during the consultations in advance of the new code. Late in the consultations, a new chapter on „Conflicto de Leyes“ was drafted that takes up elements from various sources but never arrives at a unified synthesis and shows signs of lingering editorial uncertainty. It is a heterogenous body of rules that calls for jurisprudence to build a logically consistent system out of, even as Article 1 of the Civil Code forbids any resort to common law principles.
La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne s’est penchée sur la notion de marché public de travaux au sens de l’article 1er, § 2, sous b), de la directive 2004/18/CE du 31 mars 2004 .
Many thanks to Marta Pertegás for flagging Medeon Sarl v Siem Industries S.A. ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2024:1248, in which the Gerechtshof Den Haag (upon appeal in summary proceedings) confirmed recognition and enforcement of a High Court (London) default order for payment.
Exclusive choice of court for the English courts had been made by the parties in a Bond Transfer and Purchase Agreement – BTPA.
(Both parties are domiciled at Luxembourg. That the case contained enough ‘international’ elements was not at issue, see the limitations on this point in A1(2) of the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention and see CJEU Inkreal’s reference to same).
Medeon’s grounds for refusal of recognition were all held to fail:
The Court held that A13(3) 2 of the English Civil Procedure Rules (CPR)’s ‘In considering whether to set aside or vary a [default] judgment (…), the matters to which the court must have regard include whether the person seeking to set aside the judgment made an application to do so promptly.” (emphasis added) clearly does not include a time limit yet clearly must be made timely.
A passing reference was made to English authorities seemingly referred to by Medeon. However the Dutch court generally held that it would be ‘unreasonable’ (6.11) to deny the enforceability to Siem, seeing as Medeon had all manner of time and options to introduce an opposition to the default order, even alongside negotiations on the amounts due. Its failure to do so must have consequences. Nemo auditur proprium turpitidnimen allegans, in other words.
Here the Court held that the part of a form prescribed by the English CPR rules which had not been duly notified to Siem to an agent’s address in London (identified in the BTPA) – but it was notified in Luxembourg, was not a relevant form for the Hague Convention-instructed notification of the document instituting the proceedings: this, it held, is the claim form, which was duly notified to Medeon in Luxembourg (permission for service out for that was not required seeing as there is exclusive choice of court for England).
A good example of the impact of the Convention. Clearly, pre-Brexit this procedure would have been a lot more straightforward.
Geert.
Guest Blog: Rethinking Private International Law Education – Insights from a Global Webinar
Written by: Corinna Chen (CAPLUS research intern, 2024, Sydney Law School, Australia)
Private international law (PIL) plays a critical role in shaping how future legal professionals and citizens engage with a complex, interconnected world. On 23 September 2024, the University of Sydney Law School hosted a webinar event in collaboration with the American Society of International Law (ASIL), Professor Xandra Kramer from Erasmus University Rotterdam and Utrecht University, and Professor Laura Carballo from the University of Vigo.
The webinar offered fresh perspectives on the evolving landscape of PIL education around the globe. Moderated by Associate Professor Jeanne Huang, co-director of the Centre for Asian and Pacific Law (CAPLUS) at Sydney Law School, the event featured insights from leading academics across Europe, Asia, and Africa. It also celebrated the launch of an exciting new book titled Research Methods in Private International Law: A Handbook on Regulation, Research and Teaching, which was co-edited by Professor Xandra Kramer and Professor Laura Carballo.
Professor Xandra Kramer began with a brief introduction to the motivations and themes explored in the book. Traditionally, research in PIL has been largely concentrated on the qualification and interactions of private and public international laws as well as comparative laws. However, Professor Kramer explained that this book seeks to broaden these horizons by integrating emerging themes such as empirical legal studies, law and economics, and feminism. The book consists of three main sections: the first part concerns the regulation of private international law; the second part explores different research methodologies; the third part discusses how the future of PIL can be shaped through wider educational aspects, and served as the focus of the seminar discussion.
Professor Laura Carballo further elaborated on the importance of viewing PIL not only as a regulatory tool but a framework for global governance, embracing the contributions of colonialist, feminist and various other emerging perspectives from around the world. This broader view aligns with the changing demands of legal education, where students are increasingly required to engage with both local and international issues. The book’s approach signals a shift towards making PIL more inclusive and responsive to contemporary challenges.
The first speaker, Professor Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm from the University of Edinburgh, began by stressing that PIL should not only be limited to legal professionals or students, but also plays a crucial role in shaping the next generation of citizens in society. She identified three key features that she considers crucial for understanding and teaching PIL: intersystemic, heterarchical and pluralistic thinking.
Professor Ruiz Abou-Nigm also argued that educators must cultivate intercultural competence, awareness and dialogue, all of which are essential in helping students to appreciate diverse cultural contexts and navigate different legal systems to solve real-world problems.
Next, Associate Professor Sai Ramani Garimella from South Asia University discussed how colonial legacies continue to shape PIL in South Asia. Interestingly, Associate Professor Garimella noted that although a significant amount of scholarship on international law had emerged in India over the past 50 years, the vast majority of such academia still viewed the private international law discipline as falling under the broad umbrella of domestic law.
Using the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy in India as a case study, she explained how PIL mechanisms were underutilized, reflecting a reliance on outdated frameworks. Associate Professor Garimella emphasized the need for a shift towards localised legislation and jurisprudence that reflects regional realities, enabling PIL to serve justice more effectively in postcolonial contexts.
Echoing this sentiment, Dr Chukwuma Okoli from the University of Birmingham highlighted how PIL remains underdeveloped in many African countries including Nigeria. He expressed concern over the lack of emphasis on PIL in Nigerian law schools as well as the scarcity of active scholarship in the field, significantly hindering students’ ability to engage with cross-border legal issues. Dr Okoli also suggested creating more local moot court competitions focused on PIL to encourage student interest and practical learning in Africa.
Professor Aukje van Hoek from the University of Amsterdam highlighted the EU context of teaching PIL in the Netherlands. She advocates an approach that stimulates multilevel and interjurisdictional thinking. This approach equips students to work across legal systems, though Professor van Hoek cautioned against overloading students with too much content. She recommended focusing on critical attitudes and practical skills over rote learning, enabling students to construct creative arguments from different perspectives, rather than being confined to what is the ‘correct’ law.
During the panel discussion which ensued, the speakers grappled with the challenges of designing effective curricula and assessment regimes for PIL. One issue which educators often grapple with was whether to cover a wide range of topics or focus on specific areas such as commercial or family law.
An insightful discussion also took place regarding the traditional teaching sequence for subtopics in the PIL course and whether they vary across university classrooms. For example, whether the subject should start from jurisdiction, then choice of law, and finally judgments. This is the typical way for courts addressing PIL cases. However, due to the overlapping of jurisdiction and judgments, it is not unusual that these two subtopics are taught together.
Moreover, the webinar underscored the need to move beyond Eurocentric and Anglocentric frameworks in PIL education. Professor Ruiz Abou-Nigm called for legal systems in the Global North to engage meaningfully with traditions from the Global South. Similarly, Associate Professor Garimella commented that including perspectives from South Asia and Africa enriches global legal discourse, promoting more inclusive frameworks.
Dr Okoli further stressed that comparative law can foster intellectual independence, encouraging African legal professionals to develop context-specific solutions rather than relying on borrowed precedents. The speakers unanimously agreed that collaboration across regions is essential for building a more dynamic and inclusive field.
The webinar session concluded with reflections on the future of PIL education, towards which Professor van Hoek harbours a simultaneously optimistic and pessimistic view. The speakers emphasized that teaching PIL is not just about technical expertise — it is about fostering openness, intercultural competence, and critical inquiry. By introducing students to critical theories and promoting cross-cultural dialogue, educators can better prepare them for the demands of an increasingly interconnected world.
A recording of the session can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9Vyd3xoXIs.
The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts“ (IPRax) features the following articles:
S. Deuring: Gender and International Private Law – Comments on the New Article 7a of the German Introductory Act to the Civil Code
Although the attribution of a specific gender to a person has become less important in the German legal order, it can still be relevant. Thus, the rules of descent set out in Sections 1591 et seqq. of the Civil Code provide that a mother is a woman and a father a man. The legislature has therefore done well to address private international law issues of gender attribution in a new specific gender conflict rule, Art. 7a of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code. In doing so, it primarily opted for a nationality-based approach: According to Art. 7a para. 1, a person’s birth gender is determined by the law of the state of whom the person is a citizen. This is remarkable because, in other areas, conflict rules increasingly hold a person’s habitual residence determinative. At the same time, Art. 7a para. 2 provides that a person who habitually resides in Germany can opt for the application of German law to the change of their gender or first name later in life. The following article will outline and discuss these legislative decisions and other questions regarding the scope of Art. 7a.
P. Wittum: No conflict of laws fit for the digital age? Law applicable to contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services
This article shows that Directive (EU) 2019/770 on contracts for digital content and services does not harmonise perfectly with the existing EU conflict of laws. Regarding consumer contracts, Art. 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation convinces through its contract type neutrality; however, the service exception of para. 4(a) does not fit to digital products. Correctly viewed, the Geoblocking Regulation does not affect the directing criterion of para. 1(b). If Member States made use of the option to extend the consumer concept under Directive (EU) 2019/770, conflict of laws would in most cases defeat such an implementation. On the other hand, the trader’s recourse pursuant to Art. 20 of the Directive (EU) 2019/770 is defective. The chain of recourse (implementation variant 1) can be broken if the CISG or a third-country legal system apply. In comparison, the direct claim (implementation variant 2) is superior as the loss cannot be taken by someone halfway up the chain of recourse. The eCommerce Directive, which would also render the direct claim meaningless, is not applicable. If both implementation variants collide, the redress system breaks down entirely. In terms of legal policy, the trader’s recourse should be abolished.
P. Vollrath: Protection of EU Member States’ Treaties with Third Countries in European Private International Law
In a decision from 2020, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom authorised the enforcement of an ICSID-award in the United Kingdom. This arbitral award being incompatible with primary European Union law, the Supreme Court applied Art. 351(1) TFEU to the ICSID Convention, a multilateral treaty signed by both member states and non-member states. Although all the relevant facts of the case were located inside the EU, the Supreme Court held that “rights” of non-member states were affected and therefore a derogation from primary law was permitted. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion characterising the obligations under the ICSID Convention as obligations erga omnes partes. Following an infringement procedure initiated by the European Commission, the CJEU rejected this reasoning in its judgment of 14 March 2024. For the first time, the CJEU affirms its authority to interpret (at least certain aspects of) member states’ international agreements with non-member states also in proceedings under Art. 267 TFEU. The case note proposes criteria in order to determine whether such agreements in the field of private international law fall within the scope of Art. 351(1) TFEU and analyses the decision’s consequences for the court’s TNT Express Nederland case law.
C. Rüsing: International jurisdiction and applicable law for holiday letting agreements
According to Art. 24(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, in proceedings which have as their object tenancies of immovable property, the courts of the Member State in which the property is situated have exclusive jurisdiction. In Roompot Service (C-497/22), the CJEU held that this provision does not apply in a case, in which a tourism professional lets holiday accommodation situated in a holiday park and offers other services in return for a lump sum. The court based its reasoning on a very broad understanding of the concept of “complex contracts” and on a case-by-case assessment leading to considerable legal uncertainty. The article criticises this and proposes an alternative justification that would generally exempt contracts with tourism professionals from exclusive jurisdiction.
P. Huber/M. Boussihmad: Recognition of a Member State decision to establish a liability limitation fund under maritime law and its effects on obligation claims
In this case, the Bundesgerichtshof dealt with the procedural effects of a Member State decision to establish a maritime liability limitation fund. In the past, the CJEU had already classified such decisions as recognisable under the Brussels?I Regulation. The Bundesgerichtshof now drew the consequences and strictly adhered to the extension of the effect to other Member States in accordance with Art. 36(1) Brussels I Regulation. In addition, the Bundesgerichtshof commented on disputed questions of private international law concerning the limitation of liability under maritime law.
J. O. Flindt: Lugano Convention VS national procedural law: How to classify a cause of action between a spouse and a third party
The international jurisdiction of courts is being increasingly harmonised within the European Union and also among the EFTA states. However, the relevant provisions are scattered across various legal acts. Thus, delimitation problems arise. To delineate the scope of the application of the various regulations, a precise qualification of the legal dispute is required. The Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe had to decide on a claim for restitution under property law, which a spouse asserted against a third party by exercising a special right of asserting the ineffectiveness of the other spouses’ disposition (Section 1368 of the German Civil Code). The question arose as to whether this was a general civil matter subject to the Lugano Convention or whether it was a matrimonial property law matter for which there was an exception under Art. 1 para. 2 lit. a) var. 5 Lugano Convention. The Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe makes a distinction according to whether the matrimonial property regime aspect is the main issue of the dispute or merely a preliminary issue. The court concludes that it is only a preliminary issue. The legal dispute should therefore be categorised under property law, which means that the Lugano Convention applies. The author retraces this decision and shows that the question of delimitation is also relevant to the Brussels I Regulation and the EU Regulation on Matrimonial Property. He comes to another solution and argues in favour of a differentiated approach.
F. Berner: Restitution of Wrongs in the Conflict of Laws – a critical evaluation of OLG München, 23.3.2023 – 29 U 3365/17
The classification of restitutionary claims within the Conflict of Laws remains difficult. In particular, the classification of the German “Eingriffskondiktion” is unclear. The Higher Regional Court in Munich (Oberlandesgericht München) held that under both the European and the national jurisdictional regimes, “Eingriffskondiktion” were to be understood as tort claims. Under the Rome II Regulation, however, the court classified such claims not as tort claims but as claims falling under Art. 10 (“unjust enrichment”). The case note argues that the court was correct in its classification under European Conflict of Laws but wrong in its classification regarding the German rules of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the case note challenges the court’s assumption that German national law governs the question of whether one of the defendants had sufficiently contested the court’s jurisdiction.
G. Cuniberti: French Supreme Court Excludes Insolvency Proceedings from Scope of Nationality Based Jurisdiction (Art. 14, C. civ.)
In a judgement of 12 June 2024, the French Supreme Court limited the material scope of nationality-based jurisdiction (Article 14 of the Civil Code) by excluding from its scope insolvency proceedings. The judgment is remarkable as it is the first time in years that the court limits the operation of this exorbitant rule of jurisdiction. The reasons given by the court, however, are substance specific, which makes it unlikely that the judgment announces a more far reaching reconsideration of the rule, in particular on the ground of fairness to foreigners.
M. Klein: Spanish default interest between insurance law and procedure
In Spanish insurance law, there is a provision (Art. 20 para. 4 subpara. 1 LCS) that mandates courts to sentence insurance company defendants to pay default interest without petition by the claimant. The Spanish law is intended to penalise insurance companies for their default. As the provision relates to procedural as well as to substantive law, the question of characterisation arises. This paper argues to characterise it as substantive (insurance) law. Furthermore, it discusses criteria that the CJEU has recently used to differentiate between procedural and substantive law. Finally, this paper suggests liberal construction of the Rome Regulations with respect to Art. 20 para. 4 subpara. 1 LCS and similar provisions that relate to both procedural and substantive law.
Written by Jos Hoevenaars (Erasmus University Rotterdam) & Eduardo Silva de Freitas (Erasmus University Rotterdam), members of the Vici project Affordable Access to Justice, financed by the Dutch Research Council (NWO), www.euciviljustice.eu.
On 9 October, the District Court of Amsterdam issued its final judgment in a collective action against energy supplier Vattenfall. This judgment was eagerly awaited as it is the very first judgment in a mass damage claim under the Dutch WAMCA procedure. The new framework for collective redress, which became applicable on 1 January 2020 (see also our earlier blogpost), has received a lot of attention in international scholarship and by European legislators and policy makers due to its many innovations and making it easier for consumers and small businesses to litigate against large companies. The most notable change in the Dutch act compared to the old collective action regime is the possibility to request an award for damages, making such proceedings attractive for commercial litigation funders. A recent report commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security (published in an English book here) found that most collective actions seeking damages brought under the WAMCA have an international dimension, and that all of these claims for damages are brought with the help of third party litigation funding (TPLF).
Since this judgment is the first of its kind under the Dutch WAMCA, with a claim value of 400 million euros, it has gained a lot of (media) attention. This blogpost provides an update on this most recent judgment and discusses its impact on the current mass claims landscape and TPLF in the Netherlands.
The Case
The claim of Stichting NUON Claim, the claim foundation (‘the foundation’) established to represent a group of SMEs who are or have been clients of energy company Vattenfall, relates to alleged excessive energy costs imposed on specific customers. The foundation alleged that energy supplier NUON, which has since been acquired by Vattenfall, illegitimately charged a compensation for electrical capacity to its business customers and that no actual service or product was provided in exchange for this so-called kW charge. Furthermore, many other similar customers did not have to pay the kW charge. The foundation alleged that this illegitimate charge resulted in bills that were on average 80% higher than those of competing energy suppliers, in some cases resulting in tens of thousands of euros in excessive annual fees.
In short, the main question in this case is whether Vattenfall (formerly NUON) was allowed to charge business customers a fee based on contracted capacity as an electricity supplier. Vattenfall had charged these costs to business customers with a ‘small bulk consumer connection’ (more than 3 × 80 Ampère) on the electricity grid since the liberalisation of the Dutch electricity market in 2002. These included medium-sized enterprises, small enterprises and non-profit institutions. According to the foundation, Vattenfall was not allowed to charge these costs because there was no service or product in return for the kilowatt (kW) fee charged. The foundation therefore initiated collective proceedings against Vattenfall. The foundation based its claim on Article 6:194 Dutch Civil Code (DCC), which contains a prohibition against acquisition fraud within Dutch private law.
The WAMCA and litigation finance
A first judgment in a mass damage case has been eagerly awaited as it could provide for a pivotal moment in which claimants would be awarded a multimillion euro claim and the commercial funder would reap the benefits of its investment. The WAMCA has sparked continuous debate due to the regime’s perceived claimant-friendly design, its attractiveness for international commercial litigation funders and its alleged risk of fostering an ‘American-style’ claim culture. The opt-out system, few restrictions on third-party funding, and the supposed risk of litigation abuse were the target of criticism by, most notably, the US Chamber of Commerce (see report here). This criticism was met with calls for a more nuanced approach (see earlier blogpost here) and the fears of fostering a claim culture have been dampened by the modest numbers of cases that have been brought under the WAMCA so far.
Among other discussions, the WAMCA has especially gotten attention due to the role played by commercial third party funders. (See our discussion on third party litigation funding and the WAMCA in this earlier blogpost.) In the case against Vattenfall too, there was some debate on the nature of the financing agreement between the claim foundation and international funder Bench Walk Guernsey PCC LTD. In an interim decision rendered in October 2023, the court reviewed such an agreement, which outlined the conditions under which the funder would receive a portion of any proceeds from the case. This included paying for legal costs and taking a share of any damages awarded to the claim foundation. It also detailed situations where additional funding might have been required and the rights of the claim foundation to manage the litigation and settlement discussions?.
The agreement also outlined the treatment of the litigation funder’s fees for different groups of claimants. The claim foundation stated that it would withhold 25% of the compensation from the class members, but in cases where the litigation funder’s agreed percentage (8-12%) was lower, it would not retain the difference. This meant, for example, that in case only 12% was due to the litigation funder, the additional 13% would not have been kept by the claim foundation. This 25% withholding would have only been relevant if the claim foundation could not claim compensation for all class members, limiting its representation to a smaller group. The court concluded that the explanation provided by the claim foundation on the reasonableness of the fees was sufficient. It emphasized that the uncertainty about the final amount of fees was acceptable because it depended on factors like the duration of the proceedings.
The Judgment
In its judgment the District Court of Amsterdam dismisses all claims of Stichting NUON-claim against Vattenfall. It rejects the foundation’s claim that Vattenfall concealed essential information about the kW compensation, since the compensation was easy to calculate based on Vattenfall’s offer. Furthermore, the explanation, which was included in the offer and the energy bills, made the price structure clear. According to the court, the customers were therefore not misled. Vattenfall also made it clear that the grid operator charges an amount for the transport of electricity and that this is not included in the price that Vattenfall charges these customers.
The foundation also stated that Vattenfall abused the inaction of some of its customers after a new annual offer. The court ruled that the kW customers in the liberalised market had the choice of which energy supplier they purchased energy from. They were therefore free to negotiate the contract terms and to switch to another supplier. In this situation, a kW customer cannot complain that they themselves did not do the comparative research, which other customers did do. Vattenfall has not exceeded any other standard of care and there is also no question of undue payment of the kW compensation.
The Amsterdam Court held that businesses ought to have exercised greater caution. It is reasonable to expect that ‘average, observant businesses’ will familiarize themselves with the energy prices on offer and will take the initiative to understand the information provided by suppliers. Additionally, the fact that a free market has been in place since 2002 implies that Vattenfall had no obligation whatsoever to inform its business customers about the existence of other customers with better contract terms and that contracts without the kW charge would probably be cheaper. The customers themselves were responsible for their choice of electricity supplier. The court also finds that it is incorrect to state that no product or service is provided in return for the kW fee. Electricity is provided, and including general cost components, such as personnel costs, in a tariff structure is permissible.
The Impact
For those expecting this judgment to be the very first case in which a multimillion-euro damage claim would be awarded, and thus opening the door to many more mass damage claims, the result may be somewhat of an anticlimax. Since the claimants have not been successful and no damages have been awarded, the case does not provide much to go on for funders, mass claim lawyers and others following these developments with interest. At the same time, the claim foundation lost the case on substantive grounds, and nothing in the decision suggests an impairment in the WAMCA’s ability to provide access to justice for victims of mass harms.
From our perspective, there are two points that could be worthy of praise from a procedural point of view. The first is that, even after deeming 92% of the claims unfounded under Article 6:194 DCC, the court still refused Vattenfall’s claim that the remaining 8% would be too small of group to justify a ruling in a collective action, prioritizing the uniformity of the defendant’s conduct instead. This favours procedural expediency and guarantees that a minority of class members wouldn’t suffer from an eventual dismissing of the claim against the rest.
The second point is that the court took the perspective of the average user to rule on the sufficiency of the information provided by Vattenfall. This favours the groupability of class members in an abstract fashion, in contrast to the tendency other courts have shown to excessively scrutinize the similarity of the class members’ situations to consider them a group with acceptably similar claims. In a ruling on EU consumer law earlier this year, the CJEU favoured this approach for collective actions in such area (see Case C-450/22 Caixabank).
That said, this judgment shows that the supposed claimant-friendly design of the WAMCA does not guarantee success and may come as a disappointment to claimants and funders alike. Notably as well is the fact that this case took about 2,5 years from summons to judgement, which is a relatively short time for complex class action cases, as illustrated by the timelines of other cases that were filed well before this case and that have still some ways to go before a judgment can be expected.
The question remains how funders will look at this result and if it has any impact on their willingness to keep funding Dutch class actions. Given the outcome of this case, with a negative result for the claimants and a dismissal of all claims on substantive grounds, it seems both funders and ‘WAMCA-watchers’ will have to wait a bit longer for that first pivotal judgment.
The latest issue of the Dutch Journal on Private International Law (NIPR) has been published.
NIPR 2024 issue 2
EDITORIAL
M.H. ten Wolde / p. 239
Article
C.G. van der Plas, A.F. Veldhuis, B.H.B. Verheul, Automatische erkenning en tenuitvoerlegging van vonnissen in het Europa van nu: de noodzaak van een nieuwe blik op wederzijds vertrouwen na J/H Limited / p. 241-267
Abstract
This article explores the concept of mutual trust in the context of the recognition and enforcement of judgments under Brussel Ibis. Backslidings in the rule of law in Member States such as Hungary and Poland have cast doubts on the reliability of mutual trust in judicial cooperation. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has further complicated the issue of mutual trust in its ruling in J/H Limited. The CJEU held that judgments from third countries, that have been or could have been capable of being subject to an inquiry in adversarial proceedings in a Member State, result in a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Article 2a Brussels Ibis.
This article critically assesses whether the concept of mutual trust justifies the (indirect) automatic recognition and enforcement of third-country judgments under Brussels Ibis. It examines the content of the principle of mutual trust and argues that – although mutual trust is of fundamental importance for European integration – mutual trust must be balanced with adequate safeguards to protect fundamental rights in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. While the public policy exception of Article 45 of Brussels Ibis is generally scrutinized for its effectiveness in addressing human rights violations, the analysis reveals that the current safeguards might not always be efficient in the context of third-country judgments under Brussels Ibis. By re-evaluating the principle of mutual trust in the context of third-country judgments, the article underscores the necessity of a more nuanced approach to mutual trust.
Case law
M.H. ten Wolde, Het forum delicti en de aankoop van een van sjoemelsoftware voorzien voertuig. Nadere uitleg van het Hof van Justitie EU. HvJ EU 22 februari 2024, C-81/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:165, NIPR 2024-515 (MA tegen FCA Italy Spa, FPT Industrial SpA) / p. 269-274
Abstract
In this judgment on Article 7(2) Brussels Ia Regulation (No. 1215/2012), the ECJ clarifies its previous judgment of 9 July 2020, C-343/19 (VKI/Volkswagen). In that judgment, the Court had ruled that where a manufacturer in a Member State has unlawfully equipped its vehicles with software that manipulates data relating to exhaust gas emissions before those vehicles are purchased from a third party in another Member State, the place where the damage occurs (the ) is in that latter Member State. Whereas in the VKI/Volkswagen case, purchase and delivery took place in the same Member State (Austria), in the present case, the purchase took place in Germany but the vehicle was actually delivered in Austria where the purchaser had made normal use thereof. This prompted the Oberster Gerichtshof in Austria to refer a preliminary question to the ECJ as to what should count as the place of purchase in these particular circumstances: the place where the contract of sale for the vehicle was concluded, the place where the vehicle was handed over to the final purchaser or the place where it was used in accordance with its destination? According to the ECJ, the place where the manipulated vehicle was actually handed over to the final purchaser is the only usable criterion and that place should therefore be regarded as the place of purchase (and the Erfolgsort).
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