
Background to Emiliou AG’s Opinion just a few weeks back, in Case C‑198/24 TQ v Mr Green Limited is Malta’s Bill 55, on which more here. As I noted at the time the Opinion came out, the AG takes a nuanced view on the circumstances for a player asserting a claim for restitution against a Maltese gambling company, to secure its future enforcement pursuant to a European Account Preservation Order under Regulation 655/2014. This provisional measure targets funds allegedly held by the company in bank accounts across multiple Member States.
As the AG puts it (7)
the referring court seeks clarification of one of the conditions for issuing a Preservation Order (laid down in Article 7 of the EAPO Regulation), namely the requirement for the claimant to show the ‘urgent need’ for such a measure (a condition commonly referred to as ‘periculum in mora’ that the Court has, so far, never explored). The referring court wonders about the kind of evidence that a creditor, requesting such a measure, must adduce in that respect. Among other issues, the referring court requests clarification as to whether the requisites for granting a Preservation Order must be confined exclusively to evidentiary elements demonstrating the debtor’s subjective intent to frustrate the enforcement of the claim – such as acts of dissipation, concealment, or disposal of assets – or whether objective factors, including interventions by national legislature as exemplified in the present case, may also be taken into account in that evaluation.
In other words the case is one of many (see also my review of the AG’s Opinion in Wunner] attempting to carve a chink in Bill 55’s armour.
(21) ff the AG first deals with an interesting issue of the combined nature of the CJEU preliminary reference procedure (namely that all parties to the procedure be informed of its existence), and the required (for the element of surprise) ex parte character of the APO. He suggests national courts should de lege lata wait with the reference until after an order has been issued, preferably requiring the CJEU to use the urgent (‘PPU’) procedure to offset the disadvantage (their accounts being frozen for a long time, awaiting CJEU judgment).
(47) ff the AG then, seeking support in both travaux and statutory language, suggests a narrow reading of the periculum in morta requirement: one referring to only the risk of a (recalcitrant) debtor taking measures to evade payment, and not also any other ‘real’ threats for the recovery of the claim, such as the risk of a (benevolent) debtor becoming insolvent before enforcement due to poor or deteriorating financial circumstances in the normal course of business or to the fact that the debtor has multiple creditors to satisfy.
(56) comes a crucial issue: what sort of evidence does the creditor have to adduce? In the AG’s view
the creditor cannot be required to furnish full proof that the debtor intends to evade payment or that he or she is currently attempting to do so. Such a requirement would, in practice, often be impossible to meet and significantly undermine the usefulness of the EAPO Regulation. On the other hand, to avoid a Preservation Order being granted against a debtor who has no intention of evading payment, the creditor’s application cannot rest on mere conjecture or general assertions either. In my view, the ‘balanced’ approach is to require the creditor to adduce concrete indications giving rise to a reasonable probability that, if the Order is not issued, the debtor may have dissipated, concealed or destroyed his or her assets or disposed of them at an undervalue by the time enforcement measures may be taken.
(57) nationals courts are required to make, on a case-by-case basis, an ‘overall assessment’ of all the circumstances relied upon by creditors in that respect. Bill55 is included in that assessment, seeing as (63) it means for the time being (the legality of Bill55 under Brussels Ia being investigated by the EC, and potentially the subject of other proceedings, too) no enforcement measures may be taken against the debtor in Malta. The assets it holds in Malta (which, with respect to gambling companies established and operating from that Member State, probably means most of them) are effectively ‘concealed’ from the creditor.
However, Bill55 is not enough: (65):
it cannot reasonably be assumed, in an abstract manner, that each and every Maltese gambling company will take advantage of the opportunity afforded by Article 56A of the Maltese Gaming Act and ‘conceal’ all its assets in Malta to evade payment of players’ claims for restitution – such as the one held by TQ. In my view, this depends on an ‘overall assessment’, on a case-by-case basis, of other elements indicating a reasonable probability that, if the Preservation Order is not issued, the company concerned may do so (which would, in turn, justify ‘freezing’ the potential funds that that company holds in other Member States to counter that risk).
This is a balanced opinion which gets the APO requirements right imo.
Geert.
Il peut être donné un avis favorable à une demande d’extradition formée pour l’exécution d’une mesure de sûreté en milieu ouvert. La personne réclamée peut par ailleurs être soumise à certaines des obligations qui sont prévues en matière de contrôle judiciaire dès lors qu’elles ont pour objet de garantir sa représentation à tous les actes de la procédure.
Dans le cadre de l’affaire des assistants parlementaires du Rassemblement national, le Conseil d’État s’est prononcé sur le régime applicable au mandat des députés européens lorsqu’une inéligibilité assortie d’exécution provisoire est prononcée à leur encontre. Sans surprise au vu du récent avis rendu sur le même sujet par la juridiction, les eurodéputés concernés ne se voient pas déchus de leur mandat avant toute décision définitive, à l’instar des parlementaires nationaux.
The German Law Journal has published a Special Issue featuring the proceedings of the international conference on Informed Consent to Dispute Resolution Agreements, held in Bremen on 20–21 June 2024 (see our earlier announcement here).
Edited by Gralf-Peter Calliess and Nicholas Mouttotos of the University of Bremen, the special issue brings together contributions from leading scholars in private international law, international civil procedure, and international arbitration. Contributors include: Symeon C. Symeonides, Nancy S. Kim, Gralf-Peter Calliess, Frederick Rieländer, Peter McColgan, Laura E. Little, Kermit Roosevelt III, Sören Segger-Piening, John F. Coyle, Hannah L. Buxbaum, Marta Pertegás Sender, Stephen Ware, Stefan F. Thönissen and Nicholas Mouttotos.
The collection addresses a central tension in modern dispute resolution: how to reconcile party autonomy in forum and choice-of-law agreements with the requirement of consent, and how informed should consent be, particularly where such agreements are embedded in standard-form contracts affecting weaker parties such as consumers and employees.
The issue encompasses perspectives from both the United States and the European Union, examining questions of constitutional fairness, access to justice, and the legitimacy of contractual self-determination. Contributions trace the historical development of party autonomy, critique the adequacy of existing consent models, examine their outward abandonment while also exploring comparative regulatory approaches to protecting vulnerable contracting parties.
The special issue is available in the German Law Journal, Volume 26, Special Issue 5, and the editorial can be found here. The German Law Journal is a pioneering (Gold) open-access, peer-reviewed forum for scholarship and commentary on comparative, European, and international law, offering free and unrestricted online access to its publications since 1999.
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
Operafund Eco-Invest Sicav Plc & Anor v Spain [2025] EWHC 2874 (Comm) is a truly exciting judgment for many reasons, most of all Pelling J’s entirely opposite view on the assignability of ICSID, ECT awards as compared to Stewart J in the Federal Court of Australia.
The latter, in Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v Kingdom of Spain [2025] FCA 1028, reviewed here by Claudia Wortmann, held [287] ff that neither under public international law (the ICSID Convention and the Energy Charter Treaty): [304] ff nor under domestic Australian law, there is a bar to the principle of assignment of ICSID and indeed ECT awards.
In current English case the claim is one for substitution as claimants, of Opera Fund Eco Invest Sicav Plc and Schwab Holding AG, by Blasket Renewable Investments LLC. The claim failed.
The judge first of all held that Spain is not estopped from making assignment objection in the English proceedings. Before a foreign judgment can give rise to an estoppel, the judgment must be capable of being registered in E&W and that is not currently the position in relation to the FCA proceedings: the order is not yet final under Australian law and Spain has not submitted to the Australian proceedings. The judgment in the FCA proceedings is not final or binding therefore which in and of itself rules out issue estoppel. An additional argument by Spain that there can be no issue estoppel on a point of law was correctly dismissed with reference [29] ia to SKAT v MCML 2025] EWCA Civ 371.
Next however the judge here diverges entirely from the approach in Australia on assignment. Stewart J at the FCA held that there is no basis in public international law to read into the ICSID Convention a prohibition on assignment, and neither is there in in Australian law. [His findings on public international law essentially mean that the notoriously dualist approach of the Australian courts is in fact of little relevance to the judgment].
I am inclined to agree, including with the arguments in his judgment concerning the object and purpose of the Convention. Stewart J [309] ff and Pelling J [42] ff come ia to a different conclusion on the meaning of ‘party’ in A 54(2) ICSID.
I understand Hanno Wehland’s argument, cited in the English judgment, that investment law is a particularly sensitive area closely linked to issues of sovereignty. I also appreciate that this makes assignment of the right to bring a claim as an investor (transfer of standing as it were) particularly problematic.
Yet that is in my view radically different at the enforcement stage where the award effectively has become a money judgment.
Permission to appeal in the English case would seem guaranteed, and in the Australian case it is one as of right (which Spain is yet to effect but has said it will). Upon appeal both judgments might be reversed, either still leading to an opposite approach in both courts or to alignment in either direction.
A judgment of most high relevance.
Geert.
High Court: ICSID, ECT awards are unassignable Exciting issues viz issue estoppel following foreign judgment (Spain not having submitted in the AUS proceedings) & treaty interpetation, customary international lawOperafund v Spain [2025] EWHC 2874 (Comm)www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…
— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-11-11T22:19:41.389Z
When I reported Airgas USA v Universal Africa Lines ECLI:NL:HR:2025:1665 on BlueSky last Saturday, it led to a rather wonderful reply which I am now definitely including in my conflict of laws slides.
A quick note on the judgment (Ekaterina Pannebakker meanwhile also looks at the background here) which for its Rome I discussion is fairly uncontroversial imo.
The relevant clause in the bill of lading (transport of dangerous goods by sea) reads [2.1 of the judgment]
The law of The Netherlands, in which the Hague-Visby Rules are incorporated, shall apply. Nevertheless if the law of any other country would be compulsorily applicable, the Hague-Visby Rules as laid down in the Treaty of Brussels of 25th August 1924 and amended in the Protocol of Brussels of 23rd February 1968 shall apply, save where the Hamburg Rules of the UN Convention of the Carriage of Goods by Sea of 1978 would apply compulsorily, in which case the Hamburg Rules shall apply. If any stipulation, exception and condition of these conditions would be found inconsistent with The Hague-Visby Rules or Hamburg Rules, or any compulsory law, only such stipulation, exception and condition or part thereof, as the case may be, shall be invalid. In case of carriage by sea from or to a port of the USA, this Bill of Lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States, approved 16th April 1936, which shall be deemed to be incorporated herein, and nothing herein contained shall be deemed a surrender by the carrier of any of its rights or immunities or an increase of any of its responsibilities or liabilities under said Act. The provisions stated in said Act shall, except as may be otherwise specifically provided herein, govern before the goods are loaded on and after they are discharged from the ship and throughout the entire time the goods are in custody of the carrier. The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any delay, non-delivery or mis-delivery, or loss of or damage to the goods occurring while the goods are not in the actual custody of the carrier.
Choice of court in the bill of lading is for the Netherlands. For choice of law, the Bill employs dépeçage: Dutch law was picked as the lex voluntatis (the law freely chosen by the parties), with one carve-out: for goods carried by sea from or to a port in the United States, the 1936 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States (COGSA) was chosen to apply. With COGSA the US implemented the 1924 Hague Rules. I understand that COGSA is considered lois de police in the US, for any goods carried by sea from or to a US port.
The appealing party argued [3.1.1] that because COGSA is only part of the law of a State and not all of it, the dépeçage or carve-out is invalid.
The Supreme Court suffices with holding [3.1.3] very sec that under Rome I parties may select parts only of a given State law to apply dépeçage-style. In my view that is clearly correct (and with Rob Rooman I expand on choice of law per Article 3 Rome I in a forthcoming chapter for Pietro Franzina’s Edward Elgar’s commentary on Rome I).
The dépeçage at issue is not redundant, despite parties’ clearly being aware that COGSA is lois de police (overriding mandatory law) in the US. With the clause the application of COGSA is extended even when, such as here, not a US but a Dutch court hears the case.
The remainder of the (succinct) judgment deals with issues of ius (alienum) novit curia under Dutch CPR.
Dépeçage does not often reach the courts and for that reason it is worthwhile reporting on it.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 3.37
L’article 63, § 1er, du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne s’oppose pas à la réglementation d’un État membre en vertu de laquelle les émoluments d’un notaire aux services duquel un héritier est tenu de recourir, dans certaines circonstances, pour établir la déclaration de succession prévue dans le droit national sont calculés sur l’intégralité de l’actif brut de la succession comprenant des biens situés dans cet État membre et dans un autre État membre et non pas seulement sur l’actif brut correspondant aux biens situés dans le premier État membre, sans que soient pris en compte les émoluments payés par l’héritier en contrepartie de la déclaration de succession établie par un notaire dans le second État membre, calculés eux aussi sur l’intégralité de l’actif brut de la succession.
La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme poursuit la construction de sa jurisprudence climatique par l’arrêt Greenpeace Nordic et autres c/ Norvège. Elle élève l’évaluation environnementale préalable au rang d’exigence procédurale européenne mais son contrôle demeure hésitant : l’audace des principes s’efface devant la confiance institutionnelle.
A new issue of ZEuP – Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht is now available and includes contributions on EU private law, comparative law and legal history, legal unification, private international law, and individual European private law regimes. The full table of content can be accessed here: https://rsw.beck.de/zeitschriften/zeup.
The following contributions might be of particular interest for the readers of this blog:
The volume also features to book reviews related to private international law:
The Jean Monnet Chair in Legal Aspects of Migration Management in the EU and in Türkiye and Bilkent University Faculty of Law cordially invite you for the next Migration Talk by Professor Paul James Cardwell (King’s College London) on “Decoding the Language of Law in the post-Migration Crisis Period: the Informalisation of Migration”.
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