Droit international général

I diritti delle famiglie migranti fra integrazione e tutela della diversità, a cura di Alessandra Annoni e Paola Mori, Giappichelli, 2015, ISBN: 9788834859605, pp. XII + 204, Euro 24.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Il volume fornisce la riflessione di un gruppo di studiosi su alcune fra le principali problematiche giuridiche connesse alle migrazioni di gruppi familiari. La prima parte è dedicata ai profili di diritto internazionale e di diritto dell’Unione europea, la seconda a quelli di diritto internazionale privato.  

La seconda parte del volume ospita, fra gli altri, un contributo di Francesco Salerno (Univ. Ferrara) su I diritti fondamentali della persona straniera nel diritto internazionale privato: una proposta metodologica, e un contributo di Ester di Napoli (Univ. Cagliari) su Il richiamo ad ordinamenti plurilegislativi a base personale tra protezione dell’identità culturale e divieto di discriminazione.

L’indice del volume è disponibile qui. Ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

The latest issue of the “Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)” features the following articles:

Holger Jacobs, The necessity of choosing the law applicable to non-contractual claims in international commercial contracts
International commercial contracts usually include choice-of-law clauses. These clauses are often drafted narrowly, such that they do not cover non-contractual obligations. This article illustrates that, as a result, contractual and non-contractual claims closely linked to the contract risk being governed by different laws. This fragmentation might lead to lengthy and expensive disputes and considerable legal uncertainty. It is therefore advisable to expressly include non-contractual claims within the scope of choice-of-law clauses in international commercial contracts.

Leonard Hübner, Section 64 sentence 1 German Law on Limited Liability Companies in Conflict of Laws and European Union Law
The article treats the application of the liability pursuant to § 64 sentence 1 GmbHG to European foreign companies having its centre of main interest in Germany. At the outset, it demonstrates that the rule belongs to the lex concursus in terms of Art. 4 EuInsVO. For the purposes of this examination, the article considers the case law of the ECJ as well as the legal consequences of the qualification. At the second stage, it illustrates that the application of the rule to foreign companies does not infringe the freedom of establishment according to Art. 49, 54 TFEU.

Felix Koechel, Submission by appearance under the Brussels I Regulation and representation in absentia
In response to two questions referred by the Austrian Supreme Court, the ECJ ruled that a court-appointed representative for the absent defendant (Abwesenheitskurator) cannot enter an appearance on behalf of the defendant for the purposes of Article 24 of the Brussels I Regulation. This solution seems convincing because the entering of an appearance by the representative would circumvent the court’s obligation to examine its jurisdiction on its own motion under Article 26 para 1 of the Brussels I Regulation. Considering also the ECJ’s decisions in cases C-78/95 (Hendrikman) and C-327/10 (Hypote?ní banka) it seems that the entering of an appearance within the meaning of the Brussels I Regulation is generally excluded in case of a representation in absentia. It is, however, doubtful whether the very specific solution adopted by the ECJ in the present case should be applied in other cases of representation in proceedings.

Peter Mankowski, Tacit choice of law, more preferential law principle, and protection against unfair dismissal in the conflict of laws of employment agreements
Labour contracts with a cross border element are a particular challenge. They call for a particularly sound administration of justice. Especially, the discharge of employees gives rise to manifold questions. The final decision of the Bundesarbeitsgericht in the case Mahamdia provides a fine example. It tempts to spend further and deepening thoughts on tacit choice of law (with a special focus on jurisdiction agreements rendered invalid by virtue of Art. 23 Brussels Ibis Regulation, Art. 21 Brussels I Regulation/revised Lugano Convention), the most favourable law principle under Art. 8 (2) Rome I Regulation, and whether the general rules on discharge of employee might possibly fall under Art. 9 Rome I Regulation.

Christoph A. Kern, Judicial protection against torpedo actions
In the recent case Weber v. Weber, the ECJ had ruled that, contrary to the principle of priority provided for in the Brussels I Regulation, the court second seized must not stay the proceedings if it has exclusive jurisdiction. The German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) applies this ratio decidendi in a similar case. In its reasons, the BGH criticizes – and rightly so – the court of appeal which, in the face of a manifestly abusive action in Italy, had denied an identity of the claims and the parties by applying an “evaluative approach”. Nevertheless, the repeated opposition of lower courts to apply the principle of priority is remarkable. The Brussels I recast, which corrects the ECJ’s jurisprudence in the case Gasser v. Misat, would, however, allow for an approach based on forum selection: Whenever the parties have had no chance to protect themselves against torpedo actions by agreeing on the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or the courts of a Member State, the court second seized should be allowed to deviate from a strict application of the principle of priority.

Jörn Griebel, The Need for Legal Relief Regarding Decisions of Jurisdiction Subject to Setting Aside Proceedings according to § 1040 of the German Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1040 section 3 of the German Code of Civil Procedure prescribes that a so called “Zwischenentscheid”, an arbitration tribunal’s interim decision on its jurisdiction, can be challenged in national court proceedings. The decision of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) concerned the procedural question whether a need for legal relief exists in such setting aside proceedings concerning an investment award on jurisdiction, especially in situations where an award on the merits has in the meantime been rendered by the arbitration tribunal.

Bettina Heiderhoff, No retroactive effect of Article 16 sec. 3 Hague Convention on child protection
Under Article 21 German EGBGB it was possible that a father who had parental responsibility for his child under the law of its former habitual residence lost this right when the child moved to Germany. This was caused by the fact that Article 21 EGBGB connected the law governing parental custody to the place of habitual residence of the child.
Article 16 sec. 1 Hague Convention on child protection (1996) also connects the parental custody to the habitual residence. However, in Article 16 sec. 3 it has a different rule for the above described cases, stating that parental responsibility which exists under the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence subsists after a change of that habitual residence to another State.
The author is critical towards the common understanding of Article 21 EGBGB. The courts should always have interpreted this rule in the manner that is now explicitly fixed in Article 16 sec. 3 Hague Convention. As the rule has been virtually out of force for many years due to the overriding applicability of the Hague Convention, a retroactive change in its interpretation would cause great insecurity.
The essay also deals with various transitional problems. It supports the view of the OLG Karlsruhe, that the Hague Convention cannot be applied retroactively when a child moved to Germany before January 2011.

Herbert Roth, Rechtskrafterstreckung auf Vorfragen im internationalen Zuständigkeitsrecht
The European procedure law (Brussels I Regulation) does not make any statement concerning the scope of substantive res judicata of national judgments. However, the European Court of Justice extends the effects of res judicata to prejudicial questions of the validity of a choice-of-forum clause, in this respect it approves a European conception of substantive res judicata (ECJ, 15.11.2012 – Case C 456/11 – Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG ./. Samskip GmbH, IPRax 2014, p. 163 Nr. 10, with annotation H. Roth, p. 136). The verdict of the higher regional court of Bremen as appellate court had to consider the precedent of the ECJ. It is the final decision after the case was referred back from the ECJ. The international jurisdiction of German courts was rejected in favour of the Icelandic courts, in spite of the defendant’s domicile in Bremen.

Martin Gebauer, Partial subrogation of the insurer to the insured’s rights and the incidental question of a non-contractual claim
The decision, rendered by the local court of Cologne, illustrates some of the problems that arise when the injured party of a car accident brings an action as a creditor of a non-contractual claim against the debtor’s insurer, despite the injured party having already been partially satisfied by his insurer as a consequence of a comprehensive insurance policy. The partial subrogation leads to separate claims of the injured party, on the one hand, and its insurer on the other. According to Article 19 of the Rome II Regulation, the subrogation, and its scope, is governed by the same law that governs the insurance contract between the injured party and its insurer. The non-contractual claim, however, which is the object of the subrogation, is governed by a different law and presents an incidental question within the subrogation. The injured party, as claimant, can sue the debtor’s insurer in the courts of the place where the injured party is domiciled. The injured party’s insurer, however, may not sue the debtor’s insurer in the courts of the place where the injured party is domiciled, but is rather forced to bring the action at the defendant’s domicile. This may lead to parallel proceedings in different states and runs the risk of uncoordinated decisions being made by the different courts regarding the extent of the subrogation.

Apostolos Anthimos, On the remaining value of the 1961 German-Greek Convention on recognition and enforcement
Since the late 1950s, Greece has established strong commercial ties with Germany. At the same time, many Greek citizens from the North of the country immigrated to Germany in pursuit of a better future. The need to regulate the recognition and enforcement of judgments led to the 1961 bilateral convention, which predominated for nearly 30 years in the field. Following the 1968 Brussels Convention, and the ensuing pertinent EC Regulations, its importance has been reduced gradually. That being the case though, the bilateral convention is still applied in regards to cases not covered by EC law and/or multilateral conventions. What is more interesting, is that the convention still applies for the majority of German judgments seeking recognition in Greece, namely cases concerning divorce decrees rendered before 2001, as well as adoption, affiliation, guardianship, and other family and personal status matters. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the significance of the bilateral convention from the Greek point of view, and to report briefly on its field of application and its interpretation by Greek courts.

David B. Adler, Step towards the accommodation of the German-American judicial dispute? – The planned restriction of Germany’s blocking statute regarding US discovery requests.
Until today, US and German jurisprudence argue whether US courts are allowed to base discovery orders on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead of the Hague Evidence Convention, despite the fact that evidence (e.g. documents) is located outside the US but in one of the signatory states. While the one side argues that the Hague Convention trumps the Federal Rules and has to be primarily, if not exclusively, utilized in those circumstances, the other side, especially many US courts, constantly resisted interpreting the Hague Evidence Convention as providing an exclusive mechanism for obtaining evidence. Instead, they have viewed the Convention as offering discretionary procedures that a US court may disregard in favor of the information gathering mechanisms laid out in the federal discovery rules. The Hague Evidence Convention has therefore, at least for requests from US courts, become less important over time.
The German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection intends to put this debate to an end and to reconcile the differing legal philosophies of Civil Law and Common Law with regard to the collecting of evidence. It plans to alter the wording of the German blocking statute which, up to this date, does not allow US litigants to obtain pretrial discovery in the form of documents which are located in Germany at all. Instead of the overall prohibition of such requests, the altered statute is intended to allow the gathering of information located in Germany if the strict requirements of the statute, especially the substantiation requirements towards the description of the documents, are fulfilled. By changing the statute, Germany plans to revive the mechanisms of the Hague Evidence Convention with the goal of convincing the US courts to place future exterritorial evidence requests on those mechanisms rather than on the Federal Rules.
The article critically analyses the planned statutory changes, especially with regard to the strict specification and substantiation requirements concerning the documents requested. The author finally discusses whether the planned statutory changes will in all likelihood encourage US courts to make increased usage of the information gathering mechanisms under the Hague Evidence Convention with regards to documents located in Germany, notwithstanding the effective information gathering tools under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Steffen Leithold/Stuyvesant Wainwright, Joint Tenancy in the U.S.
Joint tenancy is a special form of ownership with widespread usage in the USA, which involves the ownership by two or more persons of the same property. These individuals, known as joint tenants, share an equal, undivided ownership interest in the property. A chief characteristic of joint tenancy is the creation of a “Right of Survivorship”. This right provides that upon the death of a joint tenant, his or her ownership interest in the property transfers automatically to the surviving joint tenant(s) by operation of law, regardless of any testamentary intent to the contrary; and joint tenants are prohibited from excluding this right by will. Joint tenancies can be created either through inter vivos transactions or testamentary bequests, and for the most part any asset can be owned in joint tenancy. A frequent reason for owning property in joint tenancy is to facilitate the transfer of a decedent’s ownership interest in an asset by minimizing the expense and time-constraints involved with the administration of a probate proceeding. Additional advantages of owning property in joint tenancy include potential protections against a creditor’s claims or against assertions by a spouse or minor children of homestead rights. Lastly, owning property in joint tenancy can result in inheritance, gift, property and income tax consequences.

Tobias Lutzi, France’s New Conflict-of-Laws Rule Regarding Same-Sex Marriage and the French ordre public international
On 28 January, the French Cour de cassation confirmed a highly debated decision of the Cour d’appel de Chambéry, according to which the equal access to marriage for homosexual couples is part of France’s ordre public international, allowing the court to disregard the Moroccan prohibition of same-sex marriage in spite of the Franco-Moroccan Agreement of 10 August 1981 and to apply Art. 202-1(2) of the French Code civil to the wedding of a homosexual Franco-Moroccan couple. The court expressly upheld the decision but indicated some possible limitations of its judgment in a concurrent press release.

Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe – Matières civile et commerciale, 5a ed., L.G.D.J., 2015, ISBN: 9782275040004, pp. 912, Euro 67.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Les textes étudiés dans cet ouvrage – Convention de Bruxelles du 27 septembre 1968, règlements 44/2001 et 1215/2012 – portent sur la compétence directe ainsi que sur la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions ; ils doivent assurer la réalisation d’un véritable « espace judiciaire européen » en matière civile et commerciale. Le règlement 1215/2012 (dit Bruxelles I bis) a apporté des modifications substantielles au règlement 44/2001. L’application de ces textes est guidée par une riche jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne. Dans le cadre de l’AELE, les Conventions de Lugano de 1988, puis de 2007, ont adopté des systèmes « parallèles », d’abord à la Convention de Bruxelles de 1968 puis au règlement 44/2001. La Convention de 2007 est en vigueur entre tous les États de l’Union européenne, la Norvège, l’Islande et la Suisse.  Cette cinquième édition, tenant compte de l’évolution des textes et de la jurisprudence, a pour ambition d’être utile non seulement aux universitaires (étudiants et enseignants) s’intéressant au droit international privé européen, mais aussi aux praticiens (magistrats, avocats, notaires) qui appliquent ces textes. 

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

On 7 July 2015 the University of Bedfordshire (Luton, UK) will host a symposium on The New Frontiers of Parenthood.

Law-makers and courts around the world are attempting to develop legal frameworks to regulate the changing nature of parenthood, in light of recent scientific advances and developments in societal attitudes. This symposium brings together academics, researchers and practitioners engaging in a multidisciplinary conversation on parenthood and its implications in legal terms.

Presentations will address, among others, private international law issues, including The legal implications of “procreative tourism”: the private international law dimension of international surrogacy arrangements (Ornella Feraci, Univ. Florence), and  The best interests of the child as a tool for legislative (r)evolution: an Italian case-law perspective (Ester di Napoli, PhD Univ. Padova).

A draft programme is available here. For more information see here.

In continuation of my previous work on the international attractiveness of contract laws in ICC arbitration, I have posted the draft of a new empirical study focusing on Asia (The Laws of Asian International Business Transactions). It is based on unpublished data provided by the main arbitral institutions active in that part of the world. The abstract reads:

The purpose of this Article is to assess the preferences of parties to Asian international business transactions when they choose the law governing their contracts. For that purpose, I conduct an empirical analysis of unpublished data of the four main arbitral institutions active in Asia (outside Mainland China) for years 2011 and 2012. I find that three laws dominate the Asian market for international contracts: English law, U.S. laws and, to a lesser extent, Singapore law.

The Article makes three contributions. First, it documents the regional variations in parties’ preferences: the laws which are successful in Asia are different from those which are in Europe. Secondly, it shows that, while English and U.S. laws might govern an equivalent number of transactions, they are chosen in very different circumstances. U.S. laws are typically chosen in transactions between a U.S. and an Asian party where the parties also agree to settle their dispute in the United States under the aegis of the international division of the American Arbitration Association. These are thus transactions where the bargaining power of the U.S. party was strong, and enabled that party to impose choice of a U.S. dispute resolution institution and of a U.S. law. By contrast, English law is chosen in transactions between parties of all nationalities, in the context of arbitration under the aegis of almost all institutions, in proceedings with their seat anywhere in Asia. English law appears to be the only law to be considered as attractive to international commercial parties operating in Asia and seeking an option other than the laws of one of the parties.

Finally, the Article seeks to explain the remarkable attractiveness of English law in Asia. It explores whether certain substantive rules of English law might be especially appealing to international commercial parties, and whether the fact that many Asian jurisdictions are former English colonies might play a role. It concludes that the most convincing reasons are the wide presence of Commonwealth educated lawyers in Asia, and the fear of the American way of law.

The article is forthcoming in the Washington International Law Journal (formerly Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal). All comments welcome!

I have delayed reporting on the Hague Principles on choice of law in international commercial contract for exam reasons. The principles (and accompanying commentary) have not taken the form of a classic Hague convention, rather, it is hoped that they inspire practice. Bottom-up harmonisation, in other words. For the EU, the Rome I Regulation evidently already harmonises choice of law hence the principles must not be followed where Rome I applies. However in particular given the principles’ ambition to be applied by arbitral tribunals, they may have some effect in the EU, too.

I asked my students to compare the Principles with the Rome I Regulation. Such quick and dirty scan, without wishing to be complete, reveals the following: (I take a bullet-point approach such one might follow in an exam setting. = refers to similarities; ≠ to differences

• ≠ The Hague principles concern choice of law principles only. Rome I covers applicable law in the wider sense (it also determines applicable law if no choice of law has been made).
• ≠: The Principles apply to courts and arbitral tribunals. General consensus is that arbitral panels subject to the laws of an EU Member State as the lex curia are not bound by Rome I.
• ≠The Hague principles only apply B2B, not B2C. They deal with international ‘commercial’ contracts only. Famously Rome I includes and indeed pampers B2C contracts.
• Purely domestic contracts are covered by Rome I, with choice of law being corrected to a considerable degree. ≠ Hague principles: these do not cover purely domestic contracts because they are not ‘international’.
• = party autonomy and depecage are supported in both.
• = universal character: Parties may choose any law, they or the contract need not have any material link with that law.
• ≠ rules of law. Rome I probably allows choice of State law only (its recitals are inconclusive, as is its legislative history). Hague Principles: allows parties to opt for non-State law.
• Tacit choice of law is effectively dealt with the same in both.
• Scope of the chosen law: while more or less similar, one obvious ≠ is that the Hague Principles cover culpa in contrahendo. In the EU, this is subject to the Rome II Regulation.
• Article 11 of the Hague Principles allow for a wider remit for courts and tribunals to apply overriding mandatory law that is not that of the forum.
• Article 9(2): formal validity of the contract may be established by many a law that might have a bearing on it. Favor negoti, in other words: as in Rome I.

A fun exercise, all in all. I for one am curious how arbitral tribunals will approach the principles.

Geert.

I have been asked by Giacomo Pailli, Università degli Studi, Florence, to spread the word about this study on the service of documents. Good luck with it!

The EU Commission has recently launched a European-wide study on the service of documents in EU Member States, which is being carried out by a consortium composed by the University of Florence, the University of Uppsala and DMI, a French consulting firm.

The Commission is particularly interested in understanding the existing disparities between the national regimes on service of documents that might constitute an obstacle to the proper functioning of Regulation 1393/2007 on the service of documents. The focus of the study is on domestic service of documents.

Anyone who works in the field of civil procedure, private international law and international litigation in general–either as private practitioners, in-house counsel, legal academics or neutrals– and has knowledge of how service of documents works in a EU Member State is invited to participate to the study by answering to an online questionnaire. On the website of the project you may also find the questionnaire translated in almost all languages of EU Member States.

The questionnaire is complex and articulated, but participants are free to answer only some of the sections, especially those that relate more closely to their direct experience or knowledge. The answers are all collected anonymously, unless the participant wish to be included in the public list of contributors to the study and answers question no. 1.5.

The survey will remain open until July 7th, 2015.

We warmly thank anyone who will take the time to ensure the success of this study.

Joanna Jemielniak, Legal Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration, Ashgate Publishing, 2014, ISBN 9781409447191, pp. 278, GBP 63.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – This book fills a gap in legal academic study and practice in International Commercial Arbitration (ICA) by offering an in-depth analysis on legal discourse and interpretation. Written by a specialist in international business law, arbitration and legal theory, it examines the discursive framework of arbitral proceedings, through an exploration of the unique status of arbitration as a legal and semiotic phenomenon. Historical and contemporary aspects of legal discourse and interpretation are considered, as well as developments in the field of discourse analysis in ICA. A section is devoted to institutional and structural determinants of legal discourse in ICA in which ad hoc and institutional forms are examined. The book also deals with functional aspects of legal interpretation in arbitral discourse, focusing on interpretative standards, methods and considerations in decision-making in ICA.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili qui.

The 10th Anniversary of the Journal of Private International Law Conference is being held at the Faculty of Law, Cambridge University on 3-5 September 2015.  Booking for accommodation closes soon – on 15th July.  Booking for the conference and dinner will close on 13th August.

The conference offers an excellent opportunity to hear and discuss many issues currently facing private international law.

More information and registration is here.  A draft programme is available on the same web site.

È disponibile il volume del 2015 del Czech Yearbook of International Law. Vi compaiono, tra gli altri, i seguenti scritti: Law applicable to international carriage: EU law and international treaties (Alexander J. Bělohlávek); The CMR Convention, Brussels I Regulation and ‘Empty International Competence’ (Luboš Kliment, Filip Plašil); Resolution of Disputes in the International River and Maritime Transport in Arbitration (Bohumil Poláček).

Ulteriori informazioni sul volume disponibili a questo indirizzo. Il sommario del volume è consultabile qui.

At the beginning of 2015, the publication of the 4th edition of Thomas Rauscher’s commentary on European private international law (including international civil procedure), “Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht (EuZPR/EuIPR)”, has started. So far, the volumes II (covering the EU Regulation on the European Order for Uncontested Claims, the Regulation on the European Order for Payment, the Small Claims Regulation, the Regulation on the European Account Preservation Order, the Service of Process and the Taking of Evidence Regulations as well as the Insolvency Regulation and the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction Agreements) and IV (covering, inter alia, Brussels IIbis, the Maintenance Regulation and the new Regulation on mutual recognition of protective measures in civil matters) have been published. The various Regulations have been commented on by Marianne Andrae, Kathrin Binder, Urs Peter Gruber, Bettina Heiderhoff, Jan von Hein, Christoph A. Kern, Kathrin Kroll-Ludwigs, Gerald Mäsch, Steffen Pabst, Thomas Rauscher, Martin Schimrick, Istvan Varga, Matthias Weller and Denise Wiedemann. Further volumes will cover Rome I and II as well as the Brussels Ibis Regulation. This German-language commentary has established itself internationally as a leading, in-depth treatise on European private international law, dealing with the subject from a comprehensive, functional point of view and detached from domestic codifications. For more details, see here.

On 15 June 2015, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision authorising certain Member States to accept, in the interest of the European Union, the accession of Andorra to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, and an analogous decision regarding the acceptance of the accession of Singapore to the same Convention (publication of both decisions in the Official Journal is pending).

The two decisions rest on Opinion 1/13 of 14 October 2014. In this Opinion, the ECJ — having regard to Regulation No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (Brussels IIa) — stated that the declarations of acceptance under the Hague Child Abduction Convention fall within the exclusive external competence of the Union.

Before the ECJ rendered this Opinion, some Member States had already accepted the accession of Andorra and Singapore. Presumably, they did so on the assumption that the European Union was not vested with an exclusive competence in this respect and that, accordingly, each Member State was free to decide whether to become bound by the Convention vis-à-vis individual acceding third countries, as provided by Article 38(3) of the Convention itself (for an updated overview of the accessions to the Convention and the acceptances thereof, see this page in the website of the Hague Conference on Private International Law).

The two Council decisions of 15 June 2015 are addressed only to the Member States that have not already accepted the accession of Andorra and Singapore, respectively. In fact, the Council preferred not to question in light of Opinion 1/13 the legitimacy of ‘old’ declarations made by Member States, and noted, with pragmatism, that a decision regarding the acceptance of the two accessions was only needed with respect to the remaining Member States.

In two identical statements included in the minutes of the above Council decisions (see here and here), the European Commission regretted that the decisions “cover only the Member States which have not yet accepted Andorra and Singapore”, so that “the Member States which proceeded to accept third States’ accessions in the past are not covered by any authorisation by the Union, which is in principle necessary pursuant to Article 2(1) TFEU” (according to the latter provision, “when the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts”).

In its statements, the Commission also stressed “that any future acceptance by Member States of the accession of a third country must be covered by a prior authorisation”.

On 15 June 2015, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision authorising certain Member States to accept, in the interest of the European Union, the accession of Andorra to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, and an analogous decision regarding the acceptance of the accession of Singapore to the same Convention (publication of both decisions in the Official Journal is pending).

The two decisions rest on Opinion 1/13 of 14 October 2014. In this Opinion, the ECJ — having regard to Regulation No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (Brussels IIa) — stated that the declarations of acceptance under the Hague Child Abduction Convention fall within the exclusive external competence of the Union.

Before the ECJ rendered this Opinion, some Member States had already accepted the accession of Andorra and Singapore. Presumably, they did so on the assumption that the European Union was not vested with an exclusive competence in this respect and that, accordingly, each Member State was free to decide whether to become bound by the Convention vis-à-vis individual acceding third countries, as provided by Article 38(3) of the Convention itself (for an updated overview of the accessions to the Convention and the acceptances thereof, see this page in the website of the Hague Conference on Private International Law).

The two Council decisions of 15 June 2015 are addressed only to the Member States that have not already accepted the accession of Andorra and Singapore, respectively. In fact, the Council preferred not to question in light of Opinion 1/13 the legitimacy of ‘old’ declarations made by Member States, and noted, with pragmatism, that a decision regarding the acceptance of the two accessions was only needed with respect to the remaining Member States.

In two identical statements included in the minutes of the above Council decisions (see here and here), the European Commission regretted that the decisions “cover only the Member States which have not yet accepted Andorra and Singapore”, so that “the Member States which proceeded to accept third States’ accessions in the past are not covered by any authorisation by the Union, which is in principle necessary pursuant to Article 2(1) TFEU” (according to the latter provision, “when the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts”).

In its statements, the Commission also stressed “that any future acceptance by Member States of the accession of a third country must be covered by a prior authorisation”.

A conference organised by AIGA, the Italian Association of Young Lawyers, will take place on 2 July 2015 in Brussels, in the Paul-Henri Spaak building of the European Parliament, to discuss the legal aspects of the Digital Single Market (the creation of which is one of the ten priorities of the European Commission presided by Jean-Claude Juncker).

The conference, which is titled Building the legal infrastructure of the Digital Single Market, will consist of three sessions.

The first session, Setting the policy framework, will be chaired by Hans Schulte-Nölke of the University of Osnabrück. It will feature presentations by Gintare Surblyte of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Munich (Internet and Regulation: the debate on Net Neutrality) and Oreste Pollicino of the Bocconi University of Milan (The sense of the Court of Justice of the European Union for digital privacy: interpretation or manipulation?).

Michael Lehmann of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition will chair the second session, devoted to A European law for digital contents: the challenge of harmonisation. It will feature presentations by Johannes Druschel of the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (Digital contents under the European Sales Law) and Alberto De Franceschi of the University of Ferrara (The issue of digital contents after the Consumer Rights Directive – The ‘button solution’ and the right of withdrawal).

Under the title Managing legal diversity within the Digital Single Market, the third session, chaired by Francisco Garcimartín Alférez of the Universidad Autónoma of Madrid, will address some private international law issues relating to the functioning of the Digital Single Market. Presentations will be delivered by Lorna E. Gillies of the University of Leicester (Cross-border online digital service contracts: Which court decides ? What law applies?) and Pietro Franzina of the University of Ferrara (Localising digital torts: settled and open issues).

Admittance is free, but, for security reasons, those wishing to attend the conference must send an e-mail by Wednesday, 24 June 2015 to Mario Galluppi di Cirella, Vice-President of the AIGA Foundation, at mariodicirella@hotmail.com. The seating capacity of the conference room is limited. Successful applicants will receive a confirmation by 27 June 2015.

The poster of the conference may be downloaded here.

A conference organised by AIGA, the Italian Association of Young Lawyers, will take place on 2 July 2015 in Brussels, in the Paul-Henri Spaak building of the European Parliament, to discuss the legal aspects of the Digital Single Market (the creation of which is one of the ten priorities of the European Commission presided by Jean-Claude Juncker).

The conference, which is titled Building the legal infrastructure of the Digital Single Market, will consist of three sessions.

The first session, Setting the policy framework, will be chaired by Hans Schulte-Nölke of the University of Osnabrück. It will feature presentations by Gintare Surblyte of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Munich (Internet and Regulation: the debate on Net Neutrality) and Oreste Pollicino of the Bocconi University of Milan (The sense of the Court of Justice of the European Union for digital privacy: interpretation or manipulation?).

Michael Lehmann of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition will chair the second session, devoted to A European law for digital contents: the challenge of harmonisation. It will feature presentations by Johannes Druschel of the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (Digital contents under the European Sales Law) and Alberto De Franceschi of the University of Ferrara (The issue of digital contents after the Consumer Rights Directive – The ‘button solution’ and the right of withdrawal).

Under the title Managing legal diversity within the Digital Single Market, the third session, chaired by Francisco Garcimartín Alférez of the Universidad Autónoma of Madrid, will address some private international law issues relating to the functioning of the Digital Single Market. Presentations will be delivered by Lorna E. Gillies of the University of Leicester (Cross-border online digital service contracts: Which court decides ? What law applies?) and Pietro Franzina of the University of Ferrara (Localising digital torts: settled and open issues).

Admittance is free, but, for security reasons, those wishing to attend the conference must send an e-mail by Wednesday, 24 June 2015 to Mario Galluppi di Cirella, Vice-President of the AIGA Foundation, at mariodicirella@hotmail.com. The seating capacity of the conference room is limited. Successful applicants will be notified by 27 June 2015.

The poster of the conference may be downloaded here.

It is my pleasure to announce the release of this work aiming at the preparation of a Model Law OHADAC of private international law. The project has been carried out thanks to the cooperation between ACP Legal, based in Guadeloupe (France), and the entity Iprolex, SL, Madrid, financed by European funds from the INTERREG project for actions in the field of harmonization of business law in the Caribbean.

The initiative began with the establishment of a team led by experts from Spain, France and Cuba: Prof. Dr. Santiago Álvarez González (Santiago de Compostela), Prof. Dr. Bertrand Ancel (Paris II), Prof. Dr. Pedro A. de Miguel Asensio (Complutense, Madrid), Prof. Dr. Rodolfo Dávalos Fernández (La Habana), and Prof. Dr. José Carlos Fernandez Rozas, (Complutense, Madrid). In carrying out this ambitious project Iprolex, SL has also benefited from the support of a large group of specialists who have worked along three distinct stages for a period of over a year.

In the book the preparatory works in view of the Model Law are preceded by in-depth studies on the various systems involved: Jose Maria DEL RIO VILLO, Rhonson SALIM and James WHITE: “Private International Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean and British Overseas Territories”; Bertrand ANCEL, “Départements et collectivités territoriales françaises dans l’espace caraïbe”; Lukas RASS–MASSON, “Enquête sur le droit international privé des territoires de l’Ohadac – l’héritage des Pays–Bas”; José Luis MARÍN FUENTES, “Caracteres generales del sistema de Derecho internacional privado colombiano”, Patricia OREJUDO PRIETO DE LOS MOZOS, “Le droit international privé colombien et le projet de Loi modèle de l’Ohadac”; José Carlos FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS y Rodolfo DÁVALOS FERNÁNDEZ, “El Derecho internacional privado de Cuba”; Enrique LINARES RODRÍGUEZ, “Le droit international prive du Nicaragua et le projet de loi modèle de l’Ohadac”; Ana FERNÁNDEZ PÉREZ, “El Derecho internacional privado de Puerto Rico: un modelo de americanización malgré lui”; José Carlos FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, “Pourquoi la République Dominicaine a–t–elle besoin d’une loi de droit international prive ?”; Claudia MADRID MARTÍNEZ, “Características generales del sistema de Derecho internacional privado venezolano”.

The volume, written in Spanish, French and English and conceived as a combination of structured reflections and general proposals at a time, aims to achieve two main objectives. The first one is to consistently gather quantitative data and qualitative information in view of an assessment of already existing instruments that may be useful for optimizing the codification of private international law in the Caribbean geographical context. The second objective is to identify the need, social or institutional demands that must be met by a regulation, evaluating its legal and substantive feasibility and setting up the materials, steps and reports which are deemed appropriate to reach the final aim.

The great political and economic importance of the proposed Model Law, together with the fact that the regulation is complex and very broad, suggests that the involvement of stakeholders (through lobbies or directly), being crucial, may prove insufficient or incomplete. For this reason, public dissemination of the Draft is essential in order to make it known and to invite all agents or individuals interested in participating to express their views, opinions or propositions about a possible adjustment of the work while in progress. The following email address has been set for this purposes: iprolex@iprolex.com.

The deliberations that will start after the release of Draft will be vital: they will provide a sufficient perspective of the views and concerns expressed, thus allowing moving on to elaborate a final proposal, which will then be submitted to the corresponding legislative process.

Armonización del Derecho Internacional Privado en el Caribe.  L’harmonisation du Droit International Privé dans le Caraïbe – Harmonization of Private International Law in the Caribbean. Estudios y materiales preparatorios y proyecto de Ley Modelo OHADAC de derecho internacional privado de 2014, Madrid, Iprolex, 20015, 687 pp. ISBN: 978-84-941055-2-4.

Professor Catherine Kessedjian, President of the French Branch of the International Law Association (ILA), is organising an international conference on “INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW – Harmony and Dissonance in International and European Business Law Practice” in conjunction with the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Academy of European Law (ERA) which will take place on 24 and 25 September 2015 in Trier (Germany).
The aim of this conference is to provide legal practitioners with a comprehensive overview and high-level discussions on key topics and recent developments affecting their daily practice at the crossroads of international law and EU law.
Key topics include:
– EU/Member States and international law: who does what? Issues relating to international negotiations, international responsibility, representation in international litigation, international law as a standard of review in CJEU case-law;
– The international dispute resolution mechanism jigsaw: Litigation before European courts: private parties’ access to the ECtHR and the CJEU, equivalent protection system;
– Brussels I and the arbitration exception, primacy of the New York Convention, parallel proceedings and conflicting court and arbitral decisions, recent EU case-law (C-536/13, Gazprom and C-352/13, CDC), 2015 entry into force of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: changes and coordination;
– Relationship between ISDS and national judicial systems, protection of the State’s right to regulate and legitimate public policy objectives, establishment and functioning of arbitral tribunals, review of ISDS decisions by bilateral or multilateral appellate mechanisms;
– UN, EU and State sanctions: role and effectiveness, (extra-)territorial scope, impact on fundamental rights and judicial review by the ECtHR (Nada and Al Dulimi) and by the CJEU (Kadi and recent cases), impact on international sales contracts.

It should be noted that the conference fee for members of the ILA is reduced to 100 €.

Further information is available here and here.

Con sentenza depositata il 15 giugno 2015, il Tribunale di Firenze si è pronunciato su una domanda di scioglimento del matrimonio presentata con ricorso congiunto da una donna italiana e dal marito di cittadinanza italiana e marocchina.

I coniugi — non previamente separati, senza prole — avevano dato atto nella domanda di aver rinunciato, l’uno nei confronti dell’altro, a qualsiasi pretesa economica avente causa nel vincolo coniugale.

La decisione dedica poche battute alla questione della competenza giurisdizionale. La giurisdizione, si afferma, “appartiene al giudice italiano dal momento che la vita familiare si è svolta in Italia e che il marito ha la doppia cittadinanza, mentre la moglie è cittadina italiana”.

Questa terminologia sembra evocare gli articoli 31 e 32 della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato. Tali norme, in realtà, sono prive di rilievo ai fini della verifica della giurisdizione in un caso come quello in esame. L’art. 31 della legge è irrilevante perché si tratta di una norma di per sé deputata a risolvere un conflitto di leggi, non a delimitare l’ambito della giurisdizione italiana. L’art. 32 è irrilevante perché, negli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, il ricorso alle norme interne che disciplinano la giurisdizione in materia matrimoniale è oramai consentito solo alle condizioni di cui agli articoli 6 e 7 del regolamento n. 2201/2003 (Bruxelles II bis), estranee al caso di specie.

La conclusione cui perviene il Tribunale, in punto di giurisdizione, coincide comunque con quella desumibile dal regolamento ora citato, e segnatamente dall’art. 3, par. 1, lett. a), trovandosi in Italia, come si evince dalla sentenza, la residenza (abituale?) di entrambi i coniugi (si noti che, in caso di domanda congiunta, il giudice adito può dichiararsi provvisto di giurisdizione quando risieda abitualmente nel paese del foro anche uno solo dei coniugi: così il quarto trattino della disposizione menzionata da ultimo).

Affermatosi competente a pronunciarsi sulla domanda di scioglimento del matrimonio, il Tribunale di Firenze non sembra interrogarsi sulla propria legittimazione a prendere cognizione anche dei connessi profili alimentari.

Il quesito, ad avviso di chi scrive, avrebbe invece meritato di essere affrontato in modo specifico. Sembra infatti di capire che i coniugi — lungi dall’escludere dall’oggetto del processo, con le proprie reciproche rinunce, gli aspetti patrimoniali della crisi — abbiano chiesto al giudice di dichiarare lo scioglimento del vincolo alle condizioni economiche da essi pattuite. Ne è prova il dispositivo della sentenza, che pronuncia il divorzio, per l’appunto, “alle condizioni stabilite dalle parti con il ricorso”.

Una simile statuizione presuppone la sussistenza in capo al giudice adito di uno specifico titolo di giurisdizione, ulteriore e diverso rispetto a quello ricavato dal regolamento Bruxelles II bis, dato che tale regolamento espressamente esclude le obbligazioni alimentari, nel suo art. 1, par. 3, lett. e), dalla propria sfera di applicazione materiale.

Anche sotto questo aspetto, peraltro, la decisione fiorentina perviene a una conclusione conforme alle norme pertinenti, da identificarsi nel regolamento n. 4/2009 sulle obbligazioni alimentari, risultando perfezionato nel caso di specie più di uno dei titoli di giurisdizione previsti in tale strumento.

Venendo ai conflitti di leggi, il Tribunale identifica anzitutto la normativa pertinente nel regolamento n. 1259/2010 sulla legge applicabile al divorzio e alla separazione personale (Roma III).

Si legge nelle motivazioni che, nei giorni immediatamente precedenti la presentazione del ricorso, i coniugi avevano convenuto, tramite scrittura privata, di assoggettare il divorzio alla legge marocchina.

Il Tribunale, rilevata la validità formale dell’accordo ai sensi dell’art. 7 del regolamento Roma III, ritiene che la scelta della legge marocchina rientri fra le opzioni offerte ai coniugi dall’art. 5 dello stesso regolamento, prevedendosi in particolare all’art. 5, par. 1, lett. c), che una scelta di legge possa cadere, in questo campo, su “la legge dello Stato di cui uno dei coniugi ha la cittadinanza al momento della conclusione dell’accordo”.

Sul punto, la sentenza non sembra attribuire alcun rilievo al fatto che il marito, al momento dell’accordo, possedesse, oltre alla cittadinanza marocchina, anche la cittadinanza italiana.

Il passaggio avrebbe forse meritato una riflessione. Il regolamento Roma III omette, infatti, di chiarire come vadano intesi i riferimenti che esso fa allo status civitatis dei coniugi allorché questi possiedano due o più cittadinanze. Nel considerando n. 22 del regolamento si legge che quando, “ai fini dell’applicazione della legge di uno Stato, il presente regolamento si riferisce alla cittadinanza quale fattore di collegamento, la problematica dei casi di cittadinanza plurima dovrebbe essere disciplinata dalla legislazione nazionale, nel pieno rispetto dei principi generali dell’Unione europea”.

Difficile, alla luce di ciò, in un caso di doppia cittadinanza che coinvolga la cittadinanza di uno Stato membro e quella di uno Stato terzo, eludere in Italia la questione della rilevanza, o meno, dell’art. 19, comma 2, della legge n. 218/1995, ai sensi del quale, se la persona a cui è riferito il criterio di collegamento possiede più cittadinanze, “si applica la legge di quello tra gli Stati di appartenenza con il quale essa ha il collegamento più stretto”, con la precisazione che, se tra queste cittadinanze vi è quella italiana, “questa prevale”.

Ricercando nel diritto marocchino le norme che fissano i presupposti dello scioglimento del matrimonio, il Tribunale di Firenze rileva che l’art. 114 del Codice marocchino della persona e della famiglia (Mudawwana), del 2004, consente ai coniugi di chiedere di comune accordo lo scioglimento del vincolo coniugale sul solo fondamento della comune volontà di porre fine alla relazione. Il divorzio, in base alle norme marocchine considerate dal Tribunale, può essere chiesto con o senza condizioni, purché tali condizioni non siano in contrasto con le norme del Codice e non siano incompatibili con gli interessi dei figli.

Il diritto del Marocco, osserva il Tribunale, prefigura dunque la possibilità di un immediato scioglimento del matrimonio senza preventiva separazione e senza che occorra accertare la sussistenza di “motivi specifici che giustifichino la recisione del vincolo coniugale”.

La decisione fiorentina ritiene di poter trarre dal diritto marocchino anche le indicazioni pertinenti per pronunciarsi sulle condizioni economiche del divorzio (e dunque, nella specie, sull’ammissibilità delle reciproche rinunce fatte constare dai coniugi). Senonché, analogamente al regolamento Bruxelles II bis, anche il regolamento Roma III dichiara, all’art. 1, par. 2, lett. g), di non volersi occupare di obbligazioni alimentari, lasciando ogni determinazione in proposito al citato regolamento n. 4/2009 (che la sentenza non cita neppure a questo proposito). Quest’ultimo, per quanto concerne i conflitti di leggi, rinvia, facendolo proprio, al protocollo dell’Aja del 23 novembre 2007 sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni alimentari.

Il protocollo dell’Aja, all’art. 8, par. 1, lett. a), permette alle parti del rapporto alimentare di assoggettare convenzionalmente la propria relazione alla legge del paese di cittadinanza di uno di loro (qui il riferimento è a “the law of any State of which either party is a national”, così risultando superato ogni dubbio circa la possibilità di designare una qualsiasi delle leges patriae di uno dei coniugi, quale che sia l’orientamento del diritto internazionale privato del foro circa il funzionamento del criterio della cittadinanza in caso di bipolidi). Non si può dunque escludere che nel caso di specie il Tribunale di Firenze possa aver rinvenuto nell’atto di optio iuris formato dai coniugi agli effetti dell’art. 5 del regolamento Roma III anche una scelta di legge ai sensi dell’art. 8 del protocollo (peraltro, dato che il protocollo sembra ammettere solo delle designazioni espresse, una simile conclusione avrebbe comunque richiesto un riscontro sicuro nella scrittura prodotta dai coniugi).

Anche così, peraltro, il riferimento alla lex patriae del marito suscita in questo caso qualche perplessità. L’art. 8, par. 4, del protocollo dispone infatti che, nonostante la designazione operata convenzionalmente dalle parti ai sensi dell’art. 8, par. 1, la questione della rinunciabilità del diritto al mantenimento va decisa secondo “the law of the State of the habitual residence of the creditor at the time of the designation”, vale a dire — assumendo ancora una volta che i coniugi possedessero in Italia la “residenza abituale” di cui parla il protocollo — secondo la legge italiana.

In realtà, nella decisione, che non richiama il protocollo, si fa questione dell’ammissibilità delle rinunce consentite dai coniugi in base ai parametri del diritto italiano, ma tale verifica viene condotta dal Tribunale secondo lo schema della eccezione di ordine pubblico (per pervenire alla conclusione, non sorprendente, che le rinunce in questione non contrastano con i principi fondamentali dell’ordinamento italiano).

Per quanto questo modo di procedere mal si concili con i dati normativi pertinenti (un conto è fare applicazione di una certa legge in quanto legge richiamata dalla pertinente norma di conflitto per decidere una data questione, un altro conto è accertare se i principi fondamentali di quella legge sono pregiudicati dal ricorso a una diversa legge, ritenuta applicabile al caso di specie), sembra possibile concludere che, anche in relazione a questo profilo, gli esiti del ragionamento del collegio fiorentino non differiscano, nel caso in esame, da quelli a cui si sarebbe verosimilmente pervenuti applicando l’art. 8, par. 4, del protocollo.

A short piece on two recently released papers, both accessible in pdf format (first one in Spanish, second in English). Just click on the title.

I reproduce the abstracts by the authors.

F. J. ZAMORA CABOT, Chair Professor of Private International Law, UJI of Castellon, Spain

Sustainable Development and Multinational Enterprises: A Study of Land Grabbings from a Responsibility Viewpoint

The international community has adopted sustainable development as one of its priority issues. Multinational corporations can however interfere or render it impossible through land grabbings, a complex phenomenon because on many occasions they reach a prominent role that can be seen, among their different appearances, as a real pathology of the above mentioned development.

After having been previously scrutinized with relation to a comment on the case Mubende-Neuman I entertain no doubt at all that such grabbings more often than not turn out to be diametrically opposed to the various targets that outline sustainable development, as have already been revealed, for instance, by Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki- Moon, along his consolidated report over the agenda in this regard after 2015.

I propose in here, then, after an Introductory Section, a presentation of the problem following recent cases, showing different conflict situations in selected sectors, Section 2, and others under which collective efforts have achieved or are in the process of attaining remedies in terms of justice, Section 3. I will put an end to my survey with some final reflections, Section 4, within which I will raise the relevant activity carried out by the human rights defenders, in this particular case deeply rooted in the communities and the land where they live and the great credit that deserves to us their continued and brave fight all around the world.

N. ZAMBRANA TÉVAR LLM (LSE), PhD (Navarra) Assistant Professor, KIMEP University (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Can arbitration become the preferred grievance mechanism in conflicts related to business and human rights?

International law demands that States provide victims of human rights violations with a right to remedy, also in the case of violations of human rights by legal entities. International law also provides some indications as to how State and non-State based dispute resolution mechanisms should be like, in order to fulfil the human rights standards of the right to remedy. Dispute resolution mechanisms of an initially commercial nature, such as arbitration or mediation, could become very useful grievance mechanisms to provide redress for victims of human rights abuses committed by multinational corporations. Still, there are problems to be solved, such as obtaining consent from the parties involved in the arbitration process. Such consent may be obtained by imitating other dispute resolution mechanisms such as ICSID arbitration.

(I am grateful to Prof. Francesca Villata – University of Milan – for the following presentation of the latest issue of the RDIPP)

The first issue of 2015 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features three articles, two comments, and three reports.

Sergio M. Carbone, Professor Emeritus at the University of Genoa and Chiara E. Tuo, Associate Professor at the University of Genoa, examine the issue of third-state defendants and the revised Brussels I Regulation in “Non-EU States and Brussels I: New Rules and Some Solutions for Old Problems” (in English).

The central purpose of this article is to critically assess the changes brought about by the new Brussels I Regulation as regards its scope of application vis-à-vis disputes connected with non-EU countries. Therefore, following an initial outline of the relevant amendments in the Recast, a critical evaluation of the latter against the background of both the ECJ case-law and national practice is presented. The reform is then assessed in the context of the original 2010 recast proposal presented by the EU Commission as well as of the views expressed in literature in relation thereto. The paper maintains that the Recast regime should undergo further revision with a view to implementing cross-border business transactions in the global economy and to satisfying the concomitant demand for greater certainty in international commercial litigation.

Stefania Bariatti, Professor at the University of Milan, analyses the compatibility of recent Italian legislation aimed at the efficiency of the judiciary with the Brussels I and the Brussels Ia Regulations in “I nuovi criteri di competenza per le società estere e la loro incidenza sull’applicazione dei regolamenti europei n. 44/2001 e n. 1215/2012” (The New Jurisdiction Criteria for Foreign Companies and Their Impact on the Application of EU Regulations No 44/2001 and No 1215/2012; in Italian).

Since 2012, the Italian legislature has adopted several statutes aimed at reducing the costs and enhancing the efficiency of the judiciary also through the reduction of the number of courts competent to hear cases where one of the parties is a company having its seat abroad. The latest version of such provisions has been adopted with Decree-Law No 145 of 2013 that centralises these cases at eleven courts. This approach has been taken by other Member States in several fields, mainly invoking the goal of increasing consistency and uniformity of judgments and the specialization of judges to the benefit of all parties. These provisions raise significant questions of compliance with the principles enshrined in the Constitution and they do not seem to attain the goal of uniformity since they provide a double track for purely internal vs cross-border cases. But they appear to be also contrary to some provisions of the Brussels Ia Regulation, in particular where the Regulation directly designates the competent court within a Member State. Hence the question of whether EU law establishes any limits to the power of the Member States to determine the territorial extension of the competence of national courts. The Court of Justice has provided some guidance on these issues in Sanders and Bradbrooke, where the protection of a maintenance creditor and of a minor were at stake. According to the Court, national legislatures should assure the effet utile of EU provisions, while at the same time ensure effective proceedings in cross-border situations, preserve the interests of the weaker party and promote the proper administration of justice. Within the “Brussels I system” such guidance may apply in cases where the position of the parties is unbalanced and the Regulation provides special fora in favour of the weaker party that are based upon proximity. Yet, one may ask whether the solution may differ according to the subject matter of the dispute. Moreover, the fact that the Italian legislature has declared that the fora established under Decree-Law No 145 of 2013 may not be derogated raises the further issue of their compatibility with Article 25 of the Brussels Ia Regulation.

Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca, Professor at the University Carlo III of Madrid and Javier Carrascosa González, Professor at the University of Murcia, provide an assessment of interim and provisional measures under the Brussels Ia Regulation in “Medidas provisionales y cautelares y reglamento Bruselas I-bis” (Interim and Provisional Measures and the Brussels Ia Regulation; in Spanish).

This paper addresses the impact of Council Regulation No 1215/2012 on provisional and protective measures in civil and commercial matters. The paper shows that this Regulation definitively enhances the recognition and enforcement of those measures in the European Union. Provisional and protective measures attempt to reduce the risks of litigation when the debtor tries to hide or sell his assets, which is relatively easy in a globalized international society where free movement of goods and capitals is assured. Hence, Art 42(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides that enforcement in a Member State of a judgment given in another Member State ordering a provisional or protective measure is possible only if the applicant provides the competent authority proof of service of the judgment ordering that provisional measure, in the case that provisional or protective measure was ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear. The new Regulation gives those measures wider possibilities of recognition and enforcement in the EU even if they were adopted inaudita parte debitoris.

In addition to the foregoing, two comments are featured:

Francesca Capotorti, PhD candidate at the University of Milan, “La nuova direttiva sul riconoscimento delle qualifiche professionali tra liberalizzazione e trasparenza” (The New Directive on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications between Deregulation and Transparency; in Italian).

This article focuses on the most innovative features of Directive 2013/55/EU amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications and Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012. After having outlined the path that led to the adoption of the Directive and showed the need to modernise Union law in this area, this article analyses a) the European Professional Card; b) partial access; c) professional traineeship; d) common training principles; and e) the further most important revisions of Directive 2005/36/EC aiming at promoting the free movement of professionals. This paper also addresses the novelties introduced by Directive 2013/55/EU to ensure consumer protection and to increase transparency and administrative cooperation. Finally, this article shows that in most cases the European Court of Justice anticipated the results of the new Directive. Still, a Directive is deemed as necessary to clearly and completely regulate the efforts of modernisation in this area, which hopefully will be shared by the European Commission and Member States.

Petr Dobiáš, Senior fellow at the Charles University in Prague, “The New Czech Private International Law” (in English).

The new Act No 91/2012 Coll. on Private International Law was adopted in the Czech Republic on 25 January 2012 and came into force on 1 January 2014. The Act on Private International Law, which takes into consideration the developments in Czech, European and international legislation, was also created with the aim of removing deficiencies and obsolete elements of legislation contained in Act No 97/1963 Coll. on Private and Procedural International Law. In terms of its internal structure, the Act on Private International Law is divided into a total of nine parts which regulate the content of private international law and procedural international law. This article presents and analyses this new legislation, taking into consideration the provisions of the relevant international conventions and secondary law of the European Union. Indeed, the new Act on Private International Law is a response to the new trends in private international law that stem as a result of the current and ongoing developments in international economic relations and in social relationships. As a result of such developments, further flexibility is asked of the domestic provisions of private international law, which must take into account the development of EU Regulations in this area of the law. As this article illustrates, the response to this demand is reflected in several of the provisions laid down in the Act on Private International Law, which emphasize the primacy of EU Regulations and international conventions.

Finally, this issue of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale features three reports; one on restitution of cultural objects and two on recent German case-law on private international and procedural issues:

Sebastian Seeger, Assistant at the University of Heidelberg, “Restitution of Nazi-Looted Art in International Law. Some Thoughts on Marei von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena” (in English).

Georgia Koutsoukou, Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg, “Report on Recent German Case-Law Relating to Private International Law in Civil and Commercial Matters” (in English).

Stefanie Spancken, PhD Candidate at the University of Heidelberg, “Report on Recent German Case-Law Relating to Private International Law in Family Law Matters” (in English).

Indexes and archives of RDIPP since its establishment (1965) are available on the website of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale. This issue is available for download on the publisher’s website.