Flux européens

Erzberger
DISC
Selon l’avocat général Saugmandsgaard Øe, la loi allemande sur la codétermination est compatible avec le droit de l’Union

It is one of the pinnacle theories of conflict of laws and when first introducing students to it, they almost invariably respond glassy-eyed. Renvoi has an unlimited ability to surprise parties and courts alike. It is best excluded, either by Statute, or by the parties, but frankly to be on the safe side: always and everywhere best by both. (Lest there are well considered arguments not to do so in a specific instance. As readers of my book now, the Brussels I Recast provisions on renvoi for choice of court (complicating less fori prorogati) is not such an instance: Handbook 2016, p.128-129, Heading 2.2.9.4.2).

At issue in Dankor [Dancor Construction, Inc. v. FXR Construction, Inc., 2016 IL App (2d) 150839] was the choice of court and governing law clause cited by the court at 44:

“The parties agree that this agreement was executed in Kane County, Illinois and shall be governed by the law of the State of Illinois. Any claims, lawsuits, disputes or claims arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be litigated in Kane County, Illinois.”

This clause could be a boilerplate or midnight clause except those routinely do exclude renvoi. ‘The law of the State of Illinois’ in the clause would then be followed by ‘excluding its choice of law rules’ or something of the kind. Why it was dropped here is entirely unclear. As Clifford Shapiro writes ‘So what happens when an Illinois general contractor fires a New York subcontractor who was working on a New York project under a subcontract that required Illinois law to apply and litigation to take place in Illinois? Unfortunately for litigants, what can happen is nearly three years of jurisdictional litigation in both New York and Illinois, and then dismissal of the Illinois case less than 60 days before trial with an order directing the case to be re-filed in New York.’

As the court notes (at 69) choice of court and choice of governing law are separate issues (for that reason they are als best deal with in clearly separated contractual clauses). Relevant precedent for the validity of the former is Rieker 378 Ill. App. 3d 77, 86 (2007). Applying Rieker, and following Section 187(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Court held (reference is best made to Clifford’s summary or to the judgment itself) that New York law applied to the validity of the clause, leading to its being void: New York law mandatorily prohibits application of another State’s law or litigation outside of the State for New York construction projects (Illinois incidentally has a mirror provision).

Need one say more? Renvoi is always best excluded. It would not necessarily have made this clause enforceable: ordre public discussions could always still be raised. However it sure as anything would have made the validity of the clause much more likely.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 1, Heading 1.4).

 

Recognition of Foreign Administrative Acts, edited by / a cura di J. Rodríguez-Arana Munoz, M. Garcìa Pérez, J.J. Perna Garcìa, C. Aymerich Cano, Springer, 2016, ISBN 9783319189741, pp. 388, EUR 135,19.

This book presents an analysis of the concept of the administrative act and its classification as ‘foreign’, and studies the administrative procedure for adopting administrative acts in a range of countries in and outside Europe. While focusing on the recognition and execution of foreign administrative acts, the book examines the validity, efficacy and enforceability of foreign administrative acts at national level. The book starts with a general analysis of the issue, offering general conclusions about the experiences in different countries. It then analyses the aforementioned themes from the perspective of the domestic law of different European nations and a number of international organisations (European Union, MERCOSUR, and Andean Community). In addition, the book studies the role of the European Union in the progress towards the recognition and execution of foreign administrative acts, where the principle of mutual recognition plays a vital part. Finally, the book analyses the international conventions on the recognition and execution of administrative acts and on the legalisation of public documents.

 

Gerard McCormack, Andrew Keay, Sarah Brown, European Insolvency Law – Reform and Harmonization, Edward Elgar, 2017, ISBN: 9781786433305, 512 pp, GBP 95

Critically analysing the substantive law of insolvency in the EU countries as a whole, this book carries out horizontal cross-cutting analysis of the data gathered from a study of national insolvency laws. It selects particular areas for detailed discussion and considers the pros and cons of particular legislative solutions. Using the US and Norway as comparator countries, the expert authors identify areas where disparities in national laws produce problems that have impacts outside national boundaries. They analyse these against key policy goals including: improving economic performance throughout the EU; promoting a more competitive business environment; efficient asset allocation; and building more stable and sustainable human capital in terms of support for entrepreneurs and responses to consumer over-indebtedness. The book also considers possible reform and harmonization measures situated against the wider contextual background of the Capital Markets Union and the Europe 2020 agenda of promoting jobs and growth. Discerning and practical, European Insolvency Law will appeal to academics in both insolvency and finance as well as insolvency practitioners and lawyers. Its reform suggestions will be of interest to EU Member States’ government departments, while also providing a useful reference for consumer associations and debt charities.

A quick note to tickle the interest of the BIT community out there: I have come across a suggestion that recent initiatives on supply chain liability (for the notion see my earlier reblog of Penelope Bergkamp’s piece) may run counter the protection of foreign investment under Bilateral investment treaties. The analysis at issue is directed at Queensland’s chain of responsibility laws. While it is clearly a law firm’s marketing pitch (heyho, we all have to make rain somehow), the issue is real: supply chain liability laws can I suppose under circumstances qualify as regulatory takings just as any other new law.

Or can they?

Geert.

 

Andriciuc e.a.
Rapprochement des législations PROT
Selon l’avocat général Wahl, la clause d’un contrat de prêt qui prévoit le remboursement de la somme prêtée dans la devise étrangère dans laquelle le prêt a été octroyé ne constitue pas nécessairement une clause abusive

Andriciuc e.a.
Rapprochement des législations PROT
Selon l’avocat général Wahl, la clause d’un contrat de prêt qui prévoit le remboursement de la somme prêtée dans la devise étrangère dans laquelle le prêt a été octroyé ne constitue pas nécessairement une clause abusive

Andriciuc e.a.
Rapprochement des législations
Selon l’avocat général Wahl, la clause d’un contrat de prêt qui prévoit le remboursement de la somme prêtée dans la devise étrangère dans laquelle le prêt a été octroyé ne constitue pas nécessairement une clause abusive

Nogueira e.a.
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice COJC
Selon l’avocat général Saugmandsgaard Øe, les litiges relatifs aux contrats de travail d’hôtesses de l’air et de stewards relèvent de la compétence du juge du lieu « où ou à partir duquel » ceux-ci s’acquittent principalement de leurs obligations à l’égard de leur employeur

L’11 e il 12 maggio 2017 il Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università Roma Tre ospita la nuova edizione dell’annuale incontro fra i giovani cultori del diritto internazionale. Il tema di quest’anno è Frontiere, spazi giuridici e territorio.

Le relazioni toccano, fra gli altri, anche temi di diritto internazionale privato.

Il programma completo dell’incontro è disponibile a questo indirizzo.

Saugmandsgaard ØE this morning Opined in Joined Cases C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, Nogueira et al and Osacar v Ryanair. Reference in the case was made by the Court of Appeal at Mons /Bergen in the Ryanair case I reported on in first instance. The weakest part of that judgment, I noted, was that it looked to the employer’s organisation as the most relevant criterion when deciding upon place of habitual employment. That clearly went against the favor laboris inherent in Article 19 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation.

The Advocate General at 100 in particular agrees with that view. Regular readers will know that I do not tend to paraphrase for the sake of it hence reference is best made to the AG’s Opinion as a whole. In summary:  Saugmandsgaard ØE recalls that CJEU case-law on the matter essentially requires the courts to either identify the ‘place where’ the employee principally carries out his obligations vis-à-vis his employer, or the ‘place from which’ he principally carries out those obligations. The workers at issue were employed as cabin crew on aircraft operated by Ryanair. Those employees performed their work in more than one Member State, namely in Belgium, where the airport of departure (Charleroi) was situated, the Member State of the airport of arrival and any other Member States crossed during the flight.  The AG suggests (at 92) that it is not possible, in such circumstances, to identify a ‘place where’ those employees principally carried out their obligations vis-à-vis their employers, for it is difficult to attach greater weight to the tasks carried out by those employees in the airport of departure, on board the aircraft or in the airport of arrival.

A ‘place from which’ those employees principally carried out their obligations vis-à-vis their employers, however, can be identified.  The referring court had listed a number of factual considerations among which the AG suggests the following as being highly relevant: (97 ff)

First, appellants started and ended their working day at Charleroi Airport. To the AG’s mind, that fact is of overriding importance, which he suggests is confirmed by the Court’s consistent case-law in particular Koelzch and Voogsgeerd.

Second, appellants received the instructions relating to their tasks and organised their work at Charleroi Airport, by consulting their employers’ intranet. (It is on this point that the AG rejects any relevance of the location of organisation of the work schedule by the employer).

Third, the aircraft operated by Ryanair, and on board which appellants worked as cabin staff, were based at Charleroi. Here the AG refers to CJEU case-law that, in the international transport sector, the place where the work tools are located constitutes a relevant indicium for the purposes of determining the place from which the worker principally fulfils his obligations vis-à-vis his employer.

Fourth, appellants were contractually required to live less than one hour from Charleroi Airport. It is noteworthy that this indication refers not to the worker’s actual place of residence but rather to the place of work near which he lives, namely Charleroi Airport in the main proceedings (at 103).

Fifth, the referring court noted that Ryanair and Crewlink jointly had a ‘crew room’ at Charleroi Airport. The existence of an office made available by the employer is another factor the relevance of which has been emphasised in the Court’s case-law. That this is not formally a ‘branch’ of either company, is irrelevant.

Finally, appellants were required to attend Charleroi Airport if they were unfit for work and in the event of disciplinary problems.

The AG points out that on the basis of the criteria, the Court at Mons formally will have to complete the analysis, however he concludes (at 107) that on the basis of the findings of fact communicated by that court in its request for a preliminary ruling, those six indicia unequivocally designate the courts of the place where Charleroi Airport is situated.

A few other issues are worth mentioning. Firstly (at 108) whether the worker is directly employed by Ryanair (Case C‑169/16) or assigned to Ryanair by Crewlink (Case C‑168/16) is irrelevant for the purposes of identifying the place where the work is habitually carried out, within the meaning of Article 19(2)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001. That place, the AG suggests, is independent of the legal link between the worker and the person who benefits from the work done.

Further, the AG suggests not to have the concept of ‘home base’ infiltrate the analysis: this is a term used in relevant EU civil aviation law. At 109 ff: ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’, used in Article 19(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, should not have to depend on a concept in an act of Union law which belongs to a quite different area, namely that of the harmonisation of rules in the civil aviation sector. At 116: the relevance of the home base, for the purposes of identifying the place where the contract of employment is habitually carried out, is only indirect. Indeed, it should be taken into account only in so far as it supports the indicia mentioned above as relevant for the purposes of identifying that place.

Further and convincingly, the AG emphatically suggests that the nationality of the aircraft is entirely irrelevant for the discussion (118 ff).

Finally, at 73 ff the AG suggests that there ought to be parallel interpretation of the findings on jurisdiction, and the rules on applicable law, among others in the Rome I Regulation. Those rules were not included in the referring court’s request for preliminary ruling.

We have to await the Court’s judgment, of course. However all in al this is a convincing Opinion which, as specifically flagged by the AG (at 101), is instrumental in addressing forum shopping by employers and consequently will be extremely helpful in addressing social dumping in the EU.

Geert.

Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed 2016, Chapter 2, Heading , Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.5.

Andriciuc e.a.
Rapprochement des législations
Selon l’avocat général Wahl, la clause d’un contrat de prêt qui prévoit le remboursement de la somme prêtée dans la devise étrangère dans laquelle le prêt a été octroyé ne constitue pas nécessairement une clause abusive

Nogueira e.a.
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice COJC
Selon l’avocat général Saugmandsgaard Øe, les litiges relatifs aux contrats de travail d’hôtesses de l’air et de stewards relèvent de la compétence du juge du lieu « où ou à partir duquel » ceux-ci s’acquittent principalement de leurs obligations à l’égard de leur employeur

The first issue of a new periodical, called Freedom, Security & Justice: European Legal Studies, is now on-line.

In addition to the inaugural editorial by Angela Di Stasi, the issue hosts contributions (some written in Italian, others in English) by Maria Caterina Baruffi (on international child abduction), Dominik Düsterhaus (on mutual trust), Caterina Fratea (on the labour mobility), Angela Maria Romito (on cross-border debt recovery), Valentina Faggiani (on fundamental guarantees in criminal proceedings), Maria Font i Mas (on the movement of public documents across borders), Sílvia Morgades-Gil (on forced migration) and Alfredo Rizzo (on the external dimension of the European area of freedom, security and justice).

 

 

Stichting Brein
La vente d’un lecteur multimédia qui permet de regarder gratuitement et facilement, sur un écran de télévision, des films disponibles illégalement sur Internet peut constituer une violation du droit d’auteur

The University of Ferrara will host on 5 May 2017 a seminar titled ‘Universal Civil Jurisdiction – Which Way Forward?‘, in cooperation with the Interest Groups on International and European Human Rights Law and Private International Law of the Italian Society of International and EU Law (ISIL).

The seminar will be chaired by Judge Giorgio Gaja (International Court of Justice). Speakers and discussants include Beatrice Bonafè (University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’), Francesco Costamagna (University of Turin), Malgosia Fitzmaurice (Queen Mary University of London), Serena Forlati (University of Ferrara), Pietro Franzina (University of Ferrara), Patrick Kinsch (University of Luxembourg), Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti (University of Macerata), Makane Moïse Mbengue (University of Geneva), Cesare Pitea (University of Parma), Chiara Ragni (University of Milan), Cedric Ryngaert (University of Utrecht), Andrea Saccucci (University of Campania ‘Luigi Vanvitelli’). 

Si svolgerà a Ferrara, il 5 maggio 2017, un seminario intitolato “Universal Civil Jurisdiction – Which Way Forward?”, organizzato in cooperazione con i Gruppi di interesse sul Diritto internazionale ed europeo dei diritti umani e sul Diritto internazionale privato e processuale della Società italiana di diritto internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea (SIDI).

I lavori saranno coordinati dal Giudice Giorgio Gaja (Corte internazionale di giustizia). Interverranno: Beatrice Bonafè (Università di Roma‘La Sapienza’), Francesco Costamagna (Università di Torino), Malgosia Fitzmaurice (Queen Mary University di Londra), Serena Forlati (Università di Ferrara), Pietro Franzina (University di Ferrara), Patrick Kinsch (Università di Lussemburgo), Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti (Università di Macerata), Makane Moïse Mbengue (Università di Ginevra), Cesare Pitea (Università di Parma), Chiara Ragni (Università di Milano), Cedric Ryngaert (Università di Utrecht), Andrea Saccucci (Università della Campania ‘Luigi Vanvitelli’).

Charles Oellermann has excellent analysis of Spizz v. Goldfarb Seligman & Co. (In re Ampal-Am. Israel Corp. 562 B.R. 601 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017). The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not apply outside the U.S. because, on the basis of the language and context of the provisions, Congress did not intend for them to apply extraterritorially. In so holding, it applied the Morrison test which was central to the United States’ Supreme Court ruling in Kiobel, which of course has been the subject of repeated analysis on this blog.

Whether an avoidance action (which in civil law jurisdictions would be tackled by an actio pauliana) is extraterritorial in and of itself, is not easily ascertained. In his review, Charles has superb overview of case-law applying a centre of gravity test: depending on the facts of the case, parties’ action does or does not take place outside the US in relation to the parties’ domicile, the subject of the transaction, etc.  He also rightfully highlights that courts are aware that even if one were to apply the provisions extraterritorially, a US judgment might not be easily enforced against foreign debtors.

Case-law is evidently not settled and one imagines that the extraterritoriality of bankruptcy laws will in some form further end up at the USSC.

Geert.

 

Silvia Pfeiff,  La portabilité du statut personnel dans l’espace européen, Bruylant, 2017, ISBN 9782802757429, pp. 718, EUR 150

Opposer un refus de reconnaissance au statut personnel d’un individu revient à renier une partie de son identité. Le fait que des citoyens européens puissent subir les inconvénients liés, par exemple, à un refus de reconnaissance de leur mariage, de leur partenariat ou de leur filiation lors de l’exercice de leur liberté de circulation est-il compatible avec les droits et libertés garantis par la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les traités européens ? Cette question a mené l’auteur à s’interroger sur l’étendue des droits et libertés européens, tels qu’ils découlent de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, et à explorer les pistes de solutions que recèle aujourd’hui le droit européen en tant que cadre supranational pour l’ensemble des États membres. Sur base de cet acquis européen est élaborée une méthode européenne de la reconnaissance. Celle-ci impose aux autorités nationales d’intégrer la logique européenne dans leur raisonnement lorsqu’elles sont saisies de la question de la reconnaissance d’un élément du statut personnel cristallisé par l’intervention d’une autorité publique d’un État membre. Ce faisant, elle ambitionne de réduire la survenance de statuts personnels boiteux et de contribuer ainsi à faciliter la circulation des citoyens. Cet ouvrage s’inscrit dès lors à la croisée du droit de la famille, du droit international privé, du droit européen et des droits fondamentaux.

Koray Söğüt and Suha Yılmaz reported recently on Turkish Supreme Court case-law in the area of choice of court. The report is very much worth a read. On choice of court agreements, what the Supreme Court seems to say is that when choice of court is made away from Turkey,  Turkish law will make that choice subject to a de facto forum conveniens assessment: if Turkey is a suitable forum especially when the eventual judgment will be easily enforced against Turkish assets, a defendant’s insistence on exercising the clause must be seen as violating Turkey’s general provision on bad faith (a form of fraus omnia corrumpit).

It is also reported that the Supreme Court accepted a unilateral /asymmetric jurisdiction clause – the issues surrounding these clauses are a regular feature on this blog.

More cases for the comparative law class! (At least if and when I get hold of an English translation).

Geert.

 

Many of the issues in [2017] EWHC 161 (Comm) Commerzbank v Liquimar Tankers were also raised in Perella v Codere,  albeit there, as I reported, obiter. In current case, they were very much dicta, and they amount to the English courts viewing (properly constructed) asymmetric clauses as being exclusive. As such they fall under the new anti-torpedo provisions of Article 31(2).

Applications of defendants Liquimar Tankers (registered in Liberia but with head office in Athens) are being made in the course of proceedings in London by Commerzbank  in two separate actions in relation to the repayment of loans which the Bank extended for the building of a number of ships. There are ongoing proceedings taken by the defendants against the Bank in Piraeus, Greece concerning the same and/or related issues.

The Liquimar guarantee contained a governing law and an asymmetric jurisdiction clause, which was essentially similar in the other loan agreements. It provided:

“16 Law and Jurisdiction

16.1 This Guarantee and Indemnity shall in all respects be governed by and interpreted in accordance with English law.

16.2 For the exclusive benefit of the Lender, the Guarantor irrevocably agrees that the courts of England are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which may arise out of or in connection with this Guarantee and Indemnity and that any proceedings may be brought in those courts.

16.3 Nothing contained in this Clause shall limit the right of the Lender to commence any proceedings against the Guarantor in any other court of competent jurisdiction nor shall the commencement of any proceedings against the Guarantor in one or more jurisdictions preclude the commencement of any proceedings in any other jurisdiction, whether concurrently or not.

16.4 The Guarantor irrevocably waives any objection which it may now or in the future have to the laying of the venue of any proceedings in any court referred to in this Clause and any claim that those proceedings have been brought in an inconvenient or inappropriate forum, and irrevocably agrees that a judgment in any proceedings commenced in any such court shall be conclusive and binding on it and may be enforced in the courts of any jurisdiction …”.

 

Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Recast reads:

‘where a court of a Member State on which an agreement as referred to in Article 25 confers exclusive jurisdiction is seized, any court of another Member State shall stay the proceedings until such time as the court seized on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement.’

Cranston J held that the concept of ‘exclusivity’ should be autonomously interpreted under the Brussels I (Recast) regime. He did not however refer for preliminary reference to the CJEU: as such, the High Court’s finding continues to be vulnerable until we have precedent from Luxembourg. The judgment as a whole is worth a read – readers in for concise summary, please refer to Herbert Smith’s analysis.

Summing up is done in para 70, with justifiable emphasis on parties’ and the Regulation’s intentions (but as noted with considerable reference to precedent and principles of statutory interpretation): Thus with the asymmetric jurisdiction clauses in the present case, the defendants agreed to sue only in the courts of one EU Member State, England. Instead, they have enabled another court, the Greek court, to be seized of the matter. It would undermine the agreements of the parties, and foster abusive tactics, if the jurisdiction clauses in these agreements were to be treated not as exclusive, but as non-exclusive.’ 

Of note is also the discussion on the role of recitals (eg. at 69; also at 77 ff). Justice Cranston’s arguments are supported by reference to a number of recitals. Defendant in my view has a valid point in principle where they argue at 77 that ‘a recital cannot constitute a rule when it is not reflected in the words of Article 31(2).‘ (Although they were wrong on substance).

A subsidiary argument in the case also merits further attention. Defendants argue that Article 25 requires the parties to have designated the courts of a Member State to enable the law applicable to the substantive validity of a jurisdiction clause to be identified and to provide certainty as to the forum in which a putative defendant can expect to be sued. That, they submit, is not achieved by a clause which designates the courts of all other competent states, including those of non-Member States, outside the territorial competence of the EU, which could mean suits in multiple jurisdictions. Although the argument could be phrased more precisely, I do agree with it: in the absence of a nominatim lex contractus for the choice of court clause specifically, the new lex fori prorogati rule in Article 25 Brussels I Recast, combined with recital 20 (yet again the troublesome habit of EU private international law to include substantive rules in recitals only) does create a vacuum in the case of hybrid, asymmetric or even non-exclusive choice of court.

An important case. Not the last we have heard of the issues.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Ch.2, Heading 2.2.9, Heading 2.2.9.4.1, Heading 2.2.9.5.