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Intervyuirasht organ na DAB pri MS (Femmes victimes de violences domestiques)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Crime d’honneur, mariage forcé et violence domestique : l’avocat général Richard de la Tour précise les conditions dans lesquelles une ressortissante de pays tiers peut bénéficier de la protection internationale

Blue Air Aviation
Liberté d'établissement
La diffusion d’une œuvre musicale à des fins de musique d’ambiance dans un moyen de transport de passagers constitue une communication au public au sens du droit de l’Union

Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Commune de Ginosa)
Liberté d'établissement
Les concessions autorisant l’exploitation des plages italiennes ne peuvent pas être renouvelées automatiquement mais doivent faire l’objet d’une procédure de sélection impartiale et transparente

The Commentary on the Brussels II ter Regulation, edited by Ulrich Magnus and the late Peter Mankowski, part of the European Commentaries on Private International Law series published by Otto Schmidt, has recently been released.

The list of authors includes Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca, María-Asunción Cebrían Salvat, Gilles Cuniberti, Stefano Dominelli, Agnieszka Frąckowiak-Adamska, Estelle Gallant, Thomas Garber, Oliver Knöfel, Vesna Lazić, Luís Pietro Rocha de Lima Pinheiro, Ulrich Magnus, Peter Mankowski, Maire Ní Shúilleabháin, Marta Pertegás Sender, Walter Pintens, Ilaria Queirolo, Dimitrios K. Stamatiadis and Spyros Tsantinis.

See here for further information.

La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme continue son incursion en droit de la concurrence par le prisme des droits fondamentaux. Elle s’est prononcée sur des visites domiciliaires et saisies par l’Autorité de la concurrence et la compatibilité de l’absence de contrôle a posteriori avec l’article 8 de la Convention, laissant de côté la question substantielle des modalités de réalisation de telles opérations.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Droit de la concurrence Voir la boutique Dalloz

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The University of Urbino will host on 17 May 2023 a conference on the international aspects of the Digital Services Act (DSA) in a hybrid way.

The speakers include Marie-Elodie Ancel, Basile Darmois, Federico Ferri, Valère Ndior, Edoardo Alberto Rossi, Massimo Rubechi and Maria Isabel Torres Cazorla.

For registration and the full programme, see here.

For further info, write an email at edoardo.rossi@uniurb.it.

The author of this post is Verena Wodniansky-Wildenfeld, University of Vienna.

Since the introduction of the Rome II Regulation, the question whether rules of conduct of non-governmental organisations are to be taken into account in the context of Article 17 of that Regulation has been the subject of extensive discussion.

A recent decision of the Austrian Supreme Court dealt with the impact of the FIS Rules, which are drawn up by the international ski federation (FIS) and contain guidelines to assist in the promotion of skiing and snowboarding (I.1. FIS rules), with regard to Article 17 Rome II. The court held that the FIS Rules can generally fall within the “rules of safety and conduct” defined in Article 17 Rome II. However, this is only the case if the rules at the place of the event causing the damage are not identical to the rules of safety and conduct of the applicable law. Further examination was therefore not necessary, as the FIS rules are used to determine the duty of care in both states: the state where the harmful act was committed and the state of the applicable law. Nevertheless, the ruling contributes to provide clarity on the interpretation of “rules of safety and conduct” and enrich the case law on Article 17 Rome II.

Facts of the case

The case at hand concerned the collision of two skiers domiciled in the Netherlands in an Austrian ski resort. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff was on the slope above the defendant when the defendant crossed the plaintiff’s lane without turning to see if any skiers are coming from above. In the following crash, both parties were injured.

Judgment

The Austrian Supreme Court first found the application of Dutch substantive law under Article 4(2) Rome II to be undebated. Article 4(2) Rome II provides an exception to the law of the place where the damage occurred, as appointed in Article 4(1) Rome II, in favour of the law of the common habitual residence of the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining the damage. As the place where the damage occurred and the place where the harmful act was committed normally coincide in skiing accidents, the issue of the FIS rules as foreign rules of safety and conduct arises mainly in cases governed by Article 4(2) Rome II.

The further examination was therefore limited to the assessment of the FIS Rules, as the defendant’s conduct could have constituted a breach of Rule 1. According to this rule every skier must behave in a way not to endanger or harm others. The Court holds that the question whether the conduct in question results in liability is governed exclusively by the lex causae determined in Article 4(2), and thus by Austrian law. However, the court confirms the FIS Rules can be taken into account as a rule of conduct and standard of due care. As both Austrian and Dutch law measure the conduct of skiers against the FIS Rules, the latter are in any case taken into account by the application of Dutch law. Thus, no conduct rules foreign to the applicable law needed to be taken into account and their consideration under Article 17 Rome II was superfluous.

Assessment

Although ultimately the “rules of safety and conduct” at the place of the harmful event were not taken into account, the Supreme Court thus seems to have clarified that for the required standard of care, also norms established by non-state organisations are to be considered under Article 17 Rome II.

While mandatory rules, e.g. of formalised and customary law, distinguishing legal from illegal conduct, are evidently encompassed by Article 17 Rome II, it is debated whether purely private safety and conduct rules can also be considered as “rules” in the understanding of Article 17 Rome II. “Soft law”, such as the FIS Rules of Conduct, is the most prominent example of such standards.

The question of the relevance of the FIS rules to cross-border situations in the context of Rome II has been addressed by other courts before. In a similar case, the Higher Regional Court Munich had assumed that the FIS Rules were to be taken into account as customary law at the place of the harmful event (Austria). However, according to Austrian case law, the FIS Rules cannot be considered customary law in Austria. Moreover, in Austria as in the Netherlands, the FIS Rules of Conduct were never legally codified or given legal force in the form of a decree. The situation, however, differs in European countries. In Italy, for example, the conduct on the ski slopes is prescribed by special law through the third section of the law on safety in skiing (Law No. 363 of 24 December 2003). Also, in Slovenia the obligatory conduct of skiers is regulated by special law (Act No. 110/2002 of 18 December 2002).

There is also controversy in literature as to what significance rules of non-state actors have within the framework of Article 17 Rome II. The key question is whether Article 17 Rome II requires a binding nature of the rule or whether purely factual obedience of rules set by private actors is sufficient.  According to the “local data theory”, a very broad approach is to be taken. As even state law is only taken into account as a matter of fact, a differentiation between the legally or factually binding nature between statutory law and “soft law” created by non-state organizations cannot be justified (Calliess/Renner/v. Hein Art 17, para. 19; Dicey/Morris/Collins CoL 34-069).

A second theory seeks to distinguish between two aspects: The question whether and to what extent non-legal standards of conduct are relevant for the liability shall be assessed exclusively in accordance with the lex causae. Insofar as the lex cause takes recourse to soft law when determining liability, the standards of conduct at the place of the event giving rise to the liability must then be taken into account on a second level (BeckOGK/Maultzsch Art 17 Rn 21; NK-BGB/Lehmann Art 17 para 34).

A third theory considers it neither possible nor necessary for the FIS Rules to be taken into account under private international law per se. Nevertheless, on the level of substantive law, they can serve as an interpretative aid for the liability if the national tort law system provides a general clause for the assessment of the conduct of the tortfeasor (Diehl IPRax 2018, 374)

With the present decision, the Austrian court has not explicitly taken a position on the controversy raised in the literature. Up until now it seemed that the Supreme Court would follow the second theory. In a purely domestic decision, the Supreme Court stated that under Austrian Civil Law, considerable importance to the FIS rules is to be attributed, but only “in applying the general principle that everyone must behave in such a way as not to endanger others.” However, the fact that the Supreme Court does not mention the Dutch sweeping clause and recourse to soft law when determining liability, which would be a necessary precondition for the applicability of the FIS Rules under the second theory, seems contradictory to this approach. The reference in the case at hand to the FIS Rules for assessing the duty of care with regard to Article 17 Rome II without further explanation is therefore rather surprising. For the final act of the ongoing debate, a decision of the CJEU will nevertheless have to be awaited. In any way, whether the FIS Rules are considered under Dutch Law cannot, contrary to the Supreme Court’s judgment, matter in their application under Article 17 Rome II. 

Bien que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme interdise aux juridictions d’exprimer un avis préalable ou une idée préconçue sur le fond lors de questions de procédure ou de compétence, une juridiction nationale qui se prononce sur la matérialité des faits dans le cadre d’un recours préjudiciel ne viole pas le droit à la présomption d’innocence ni le droit à un tribunal impartial dès lors qu’elle entend appliquer les garanties procédurales prévues par le droit national pour les jugements sur le fond.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Droit et pratique de l’instruction préparatoire 2022/23 Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Alors que la Cour européenne tenait audience le 29 mars dernier dans deux affaires concernant l’urgence climatique, dont Carême c/ France, un tour d’horizon s’impose sur les enjeux conventionnels des requêtes en cours d’examen.

Sur la boutique Dalloz Code de l’environnement 2023, annoté & commenté Voir la boutique Dalloz

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Jürgen Basedow, a giant of private international law (and numerous other disciplines), has died –  suddenly, and completely unexpectedly, on April 6. He was my teacher (though only briefly so in a formal position), my predecessor as director of the Hamburg Max Planck Institute (where he served as director 1997-2017) and my colleague as an emeritus. His (impressive) vita is still visible on the MPI website.

Words fail me, as they have many, and so I will not attempt to write more here. A longer appreciation of his life and work and personality is in preparation. Until then, you may wish to read one or more of the following announcements that I am aware of; please announce in the comments or by email what I may have overlooked.

Also, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute is setting up a virtual book of condolences. Please consider sharing your own appreciation there, even if you have already written them up somewhere else.

RIP.

Longer appreciations:

Corinna Budras at Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

Giesela Rühl at EAPIL

Federico Garau at conflictuslegum

José Carlos Fernández Rozas at his personal blog

Brief online announcements:

Max Planck Institute for International and Comparative Law, Hamburg

Leuphana University

Tbilisi University

Università degli Studi di Pavia

International Academy of Comparative Law

Monopolkommission

Brief appreciations on social media (incomplete)

Vasco Becker-Weinberg, Pejovic Caslav, Axel Halfmeier, Matthias Kurth, Michael Kubiciel, Monopolkommission, Gülüm Özçelik, Mateusz Pilich

The European Commission published on 13 April 2023 a study on the application of Regulation 4/2009 on maintenance obligations. The study, authored by Marion Goubet, Sophie Buckingham,  Cécile Jacob, Michael Wells-Greco and Quentin Liger, consists of a final report and various annexes, including a synthesis report. Details on the operation of the Maintenance Convention in the Member States between 2011 and 2019 are found here.

The final report finds that the majority of stakeholders consider the Maintenance Regulation to be effective in establishing common rules for the recovery of maintenance claims across the EU, but acknowledges that, in response to the challenges and issues raised in terms of practical implementation of the Regulation’s provisions, “certain adjustments could be made were it to be recast”.

The report observes, among other things, that the provisions regarding jurisdiction appear to be fragmented and can thus difficult to apply due to there being multiple possible fora and no hierarchy amongst them. In addition, “certain inconsistencies arise both within the Regulation itself, and when compared to other instruments, including Brussels IIa and Brussels IIa recast”.

Concerning the applicable law, which is to be determined in accordance with the Hague Protocol of 2007, the report highlights the practical difficulties experienced in respect of Article 10, concerning public authorities. One issue, the report notes, “was that the process for a public body to prove permissible representation of a creditor is sometimes lengthy and burdensome”. In addition, “if recovery is already under way for the applicant (not a public body) for unpaid maintenance, a public body can be denied legal aid given that two recoveries from the same debtor are not possible”.

As to recognition and enforcement, the study indicates that challenges have arisen in the enforcement of maintenance decisions that set the amount of maintenance obligations on the basis of a percentage of the salary of the debtor or of the requesting State’s minimum wage, but adds that, in this aspect, “a greater uptake and update of the current non-compulsory standard form on the statement of maintenance arrears created by the EJN could be recommended”. For example, “the form could also include information on how to calculate the maintenance based on the State’s minimum monthly wage”. 

The report also signal that “delays are still encountered to enforce maintenance decisions originating from Member States other than the Member State of enforcement”, which is “partly due to the obligation under Article 41 of the Regulation to afford the same conditions for enforcement in the Member State of enforcement to those decisions originating from another Member State”. In fact, if “criteria that are necessary for enforcement in some Member States are not met, this circumstance explains the delays faced for the enforcement of decisions originating from a Member State other than the Member State of enforcement”. The lack of minimum procedural harmonisation, it is contended, “also encompasses differences in the service of maintenance decisions across Member States, termination of maintenance proceedings and different practices in the recovery of lawful interests”. In the end, “a minimum harmonisation of enforcement procedures of maintenance decisions across Member States could be recommended”, in particular as concerns “the procedures for the location of the income and other financial circumstances of the debtor abroad, the possibility to access some information about the debtor, and the introduction of grounds for the suspension and the termination of the maintenance proceedings”.

Challenges (and proposals aimed to address them) are identified in the report also as regards legal aid and cooperation between authorities.

Various remarks are made concerning the interplay between the Maintenance Regulation an other instruments. It is observed, inter alia, that the Regulation and the 2007 Lugano Convention “are not sufficiently aligned, and their interaction can be complex, especially when it comes to jurisdictions rules such as in the case of choice of court agreements”. If the Regulation were to be revised, “the opportunity could be taken to abide by the 2007 Lugano Convention, especially when dealing with the application of exclusive jurisdiction clauses agreed based on the Convention”. Likewise, the Regulation “could allow the EU second seized court to decline jurisdiction in favour of the first seized non-EU court, thus ensuring the respect of the lis pendens rule of the 2007 Lugano Convention”: a recommendation would be to “draft choice of law rules that leaves less leeway for different interpretations in different States”. 

The report also stresses the benefits that (further) digitalisation in this area would provide.

Afrin
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Regroupement familial : le droit de l’Union s’oppose à une réglementation nationale qui requiert sans exception que l’introduction d’une demande de regroupement familial se fasse en personne auprès d’un poste diplomatique compétent

E. D. L. (Motif de refus fondé sur la maladie)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Mandat d’arrêt européen : un risque de mise en danger manifeste de la santé de la personne recherchée justifie la suspension temporaire de sa remise et oblige l’autorité d’exécution à demander à l’autorité d’émission des informations relatives aux conditions dans lesquelles il est envisagé de poursuivre ou de détenir cette personne

Determining financial loss has become the neuralgic point of Art 7(2) Brussels Ibis and Art 4(1) Rome II Regulation. By leaving the EU, the UK has not been able to leave the issue behind. It has retained the Rome II Regulation as domestic law. Additionally, it is obliged to keep the place of damage as a criterion for determining jurisdiction under the Brussels Ibis and the Lugano Convention at least for those proceedings that started before 31 December 2020, the end of the implementation period. This means that English courts will need to continue determining the place of financial loss for a while.

Facts

A recent case, Kwok Ho Wan and Others v. UBS AG (London branch), involved a suit against a Swiss bank brought in London by an individual based in Hong Kong and two companies, one from Hong Kong and the other from the British Virgin Islands.

The subject matter was a botched investment made by the first claimant – a prominent exiled billionaire from China – into shares of a Hong Kong company via a third company, also based in Hong Kong. When entering into the investment agreement, Kwok Ho Wan allegedly relied on misstatements by UBS’ London branch – misstatements which were made in Hong Kong. The London branch of the bank had also partly financed a loan to the acquiring company via a financing and security agreements, which were subject to English law and jurisdiction.

When the investment turned south, the London branch exercised its right under the security agreement and sold the shares, resulting in a heavy loss for the claimants. Unhappy about this, they sued the Swiss bank in London.

Legal Issue and Holding

To decide whether it had jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal had to determine where the damage had occurred in accordance with Art 5(3) Lugano Convention 2007 (“Lugano II”). It held that this was in England.

Rationale

The Court of Appeal discusses the case law of the CJEU, in particular the decisions Kronhofer, Kolassa, Universal Music, Löber and VEB. After a thorough analysis, Sir Geoffrey Vos, the Master of the Rolls, writes that

I am not certain that there is any rule that is universally applicable to financial loss cases, as UBS London seeks to establish. The answer will depend on the facts of those cases as the contrast between the outcomes in Kronhofer and VEB on the one hand and Kolassa and Löber on the other hand, demonstrates. It is, in my judgment, dangerous to seek to define the test for where damage occurs in a wide range of financial loss cases, because they are likely to be so fact dependent” [at 45 and 46].

Few observers on the continent will disagree with this sober assessment.

The Swiss bank submitted that the claimants had suffered loss in Hong Kong when they had entered into the investment agreement there. Sir Geoffrey finds this approach “over technical and not appropriate in this case” [at 51]. In his view, it “puts form above substance, and places too much reliance on the shape of the pleadings” [ibid.]. Instead, an autonomous approach to Art 5(3) Lugano Convention would require an answer to “pragmatic questions”, namely where the damage manifested itself and whether there were sufficient connections to London to displace the rule that defendants have to be sued at their domicile.

He finds such connections in the present case because (1) the loss had manifested itself when the shares were sold in London (2) the loan and the security agreements “were founded” there (3) any real loss to the shares “was always likely to be suffered in London”, and (4) the Swiss domicile of the bank had no connection to the transaction “whatsoever”. As a result, the damage would have occurred in London, not in Hong Kong, and the English courts would have jurisdiction.

Assessment

It is hard to follow the arguments of the Court of Appeal. Under Kolassa, Löber and VEB, the place where the shares are listed or offered is decisive, which would be in Hong Kong. One can of course disregard this line of decisions in the present case on the grounds it does not involve issuer liability. Then, one would end up with Universal Music, which refers to the place where the disadvantageous transaction was entered into. But again, this was in Hong Kong! One way or the other, all roads therefore lead to Hong Kong and away from London.

The counterarguments of the Court are hardly convincing: (1) The sale of the shares certainly generated a loss, but this loss already existed before the sale. It would not have impacted jurisdiction if the Swiss bank had sold the shares from the botched investment e.g. in Zurich. (2) The loss resulted from the investment agreement, not from the financing and the security agreement. The fact that the latter are subject to English law and jurisdiction does not change the place of the loss resulting from the investment itself. (3) Where loss was expected to be suffered cannot impact where it was actually suffered. It was not unforeseeable either that the loss already occurred when the investment agreement was signed in Hong Kong. (4) The rule that the defendant has to be sued at the place of his or her domicile (Article 2 Lugano II) is the general rule of the Convention. It applies irrespective of whether the case has any connection to this place.

The interpretation of the Lugano Convention by the Court of Appeal is thus misconceived. While it is understandable that the English judges prefer not let a profitable case go and assume jurisdiction, one can only hope that this case was an outlier and will not be the harbinger of a larger trend of estrangement from the CJEU’s case law.

This post was written by Giesela Rühl.

The European Association of Private International Law mourns the loss of Jürgen Basedow, director emeritus of the Max Planck Institute of Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg and one of the most influential private international law scholars of our times. He unexpectedly passed away on 6 April 2023 at the age of 73. His untimely and much too early death leaves a painful gap that cannot be filled.

Jürgen Basedow was a giant – physically (he was almost 2 meters tall) and academically. For more than 40 years he shaped discussions in private international law across the board. In numerous contributions, including his groundbreaking 2012 Hague general course on The Law of the Open Society, he provided brilliant legal analyses on a whole range of issues and redefined the frontiers of our discipline. He was also among the first to support the creation of a European association for the systematic study and development of (European) private international law. In particular, he supported the organization of the Berlin conference of 2018, where the idea to establish a European Association of Private International Law gained momentum. He was later among our first members.

Jürgen Basedow’s interest in private international law was born early in his career when he studied law in his hometown Hamburg. It led him to complement his studies through stays in Geneva (Switzerland), Pavia (Italy) and Harvard (USA). And it made him write his PhD on the recognition of divorces obtained abroad. Private International Law was also the focus of his first two professorships at the University of Augsburg and the Free University of Berlin. He was, therefore, a natural – and as it turned out brilliant – choice when the Max Planck Society had to fill the position of a director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg in 1997. During the 20 years of his tenure, he shaped the profile of the Institute, contributed to its reputation around the world and used its enormous resources to further the study of private international law. Among others he initiated and led two working groups that commented on the European Commission’s proposals for the Rome I and Rome II Regulations. These comments substantially influenced the outcome of the negotiations and the way the two Regulations were eventually adopted.

Private international law, however, was not the only field that was shaped and influenced by Jürgen Basedow. In fact, his scholarship also covered (European) private and economic law, notably competition law, transport law, insurance law and contract law. In all these fields he left an enduring mark through his clear, matter-of-fact, yet visionary approach to law – and his always original ideas. Through the participation in various advisory committees, he also induced actual change in practice. As a member – and as a chairman – of the German Federal Monopoly Commission, for example, he (co-) authored a number of highly important opinions that dealt, among others, with the (de-) regulation of the German railroad market as well as the German energy market.

Those who knew Jürgen Basedow will remember him for many things: his brilliant mind, his originality, his enormous ability to lead and summarize complex discussions, – but also for his kindness and his humor, his work-ethic and his enormous productivity. In fact, when he retired from his position at the Max Planck Institute in 2017, he did not retire from academia. On the contrary: relieved from all administrative burden he became more active than ever, travelled the world and published, among others, a monograph on EU Private Law. At the time of his death, he was working on another monograph on uniform law – a monograph that will now remain unfinished.

With Jürgen Basedow, the Private International Law community – and legal academia as such – loses an intellectual mastermind and a great person who will be dearly missed. His legacy, however, lives on in his writings and in his numerous PhD students of whom many are teaching in Germany and elsewhere. I consider myself lucky to be one of them and will always cherish the many precious moments that I had the privilege to share with him – from our first meeting some 24 years ago in Hamburg to our last encounter in Oxford two weeks before his death.

Our thoughts are with his wife, Gesche, and his sons.

On 20 April 2023, the Court will reply to the following questions from the Tribunal de première instance de Liège (Belgium), lodged on 7 May 2021, in case C-291/21 Starkinvest, on the European Account Preservation Order Regulation:

Does a judgment which has been served, ordering a party to make a penalty payment in the event of breach of a prohibitory order, constitute a decision requiring the debtor to pay the creditor’s claim within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 … establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure?

Does a judgment ordering a party to make a penalty payment, although enforceable in the country of origin, fall within the meaning of ‘judgment’ in Article 4 of Regulation No 655/2014 … where there has been no final determination of the amount in accordance with Article 55 of [the Brussels I bis Regulation]?

A summary of the factual background can be read here. In his opinion delivered on 20 October 2022, AG  Szpunar suggests the court to answer:

Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 … establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a judgment which has been served, ordering the debtor to make a penalty payment in the event of breach of a prohibitory order, does not constitute a ‘[judgment] requiring the debtor to pay [the] claim’ within the meaning of that provision, with the effect that the court hearing an application for a European Account Preservation Order sought by the creditor in order to secure payment of the claim relating to that penalty payment must verify the existence and amount of that claim.

The judgement corresponds to a chamber of five judges (S. Prechal, L. Arastey Sahún, N. Wahl, J. Passer, and F. Biltgen as reporting judge).

The decision on C-352/21 A1 et A2 (Assurance d’un bateau de plaisance) is scheduled one week later. The request from the Østre Landsret (High Court of Eastern Denmark) was lodged on 28 May 2021. In the main proceedings it is discussed whether a jurisdiction clause in an insurance contract, under which proceedings must be brought before the courts of the country of the insurance company’s domicile, can be enforced against the policyholder. The question relates to the Brussels I regulation, and reads:

“Must Article 15(5) of the Brussels I Regulation, in conjunction with Article 16(5) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that hull insurance for pleasure craft that are not used for commercial purposes falls within the exception laid down in Article 16(5) of that regulation, and is, therefore, an insurance contract which contains a choice of court agreement departing from the rule laid down in Article 11 of that regulation valid under Article 15(5) of that regulation?”

The deciding chamber is composed by judges T. von Danwitz, A. Kumin (reporting) and I. Ziemele.

On the same day, the Court will render its decision on case C-372/22 CM (Droit de visite d’un enfant ayant déménagé), on Regulation (EC) Nº 2201/2003. The request from the Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg (Luxembourg) was lodged on 9 June 2022. The national court asks:

1. Does Article 9(1) of [the Brussels II bis Regulation]  apply:

(a)    to an application to modify rights of access as defined by Article 2(10) of that regulation, made by a person granted such rights by a judicial decision which, in the interests of the children, was not to take effect until a future time, but which became final and has the status of res judicata, delivered in the State in which the children were formerly habitually resident more than four months before the application is brought before the court on the basis of Article 9(1);

(b)    so as to exclude, if it does so apply, the general rule of jurisdiction contained in Article 8 of that regulation, notwithstanding that recital 12 of that regulation states that ‘the grounds of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility established in the present Regulation are shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity[; t]his means that jurisdiction should lie in the first place with the Member State of the child’s habitual residence, except for certain cases of a change in the child’s residence …’?

2. If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, does the jurisdiction which thus exists under Article 9(1) of [the Brussels II bis Regulation], which is expressed to be ‘by way of exception to Article 8’of that regulation, preclude the application of Article 15 of the same regulation, which is expressed to apply ‘by way of exception’and where it ‘is in the best interests of the child’?

In the case at hand, CM, the father, and DN, the mother, are the parents of two children born in France in 2009 and 2010. The family resided in the Paris region until 2015, when they moved to Luxembourg. By judgment of June 12, 2020, the Luxembourg District Court fixed the legal domicile and habitual residence of the children with their mother, in France, with deferred effect from August 31, 2020, and granted the father , still residing in Luxembourg, a right of access with regard to the children, according to certain terms and conditions, also with effect from August 31, 2020. The delayed effect of the change of legal domicile and habitual residence was motivated by the concern to allow children to complete their school year in Luxembourg and to affect as little as possible any plans already planned for the summer holidays.

The mother and children actually moved to France on 30 August 2020, in accordance with the judgment of 12 June 2020. On 14 October 2020, the father submitted a request to the Luxembourg District Court to modify the terms and conditions of the access rights. At that point in time, the mother had already lodged an application before the family affairs judge of the Nanterre Judicial Court (France). By judgment of 1 December 2020, the District Court of Luxembourg, in accordance with Article 19(2) of Regulation No 2201/2003, stayed the proceedings until the French court ruled on its international jurisdiction.

By judgment of 17 September 2021, the Nanterre Judicial Court (France) declared itself incompetent to rule on the mother’s claim, essentially on the ground that, in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation No 2201/2003, the father, on the one hand, had lodged its application before the Luxembourg District Court within three months following the legal removal of the children and, on the other hand, had in no way accepted the jurisdiction of the French courts.

By judgment of 3 March 2022, the Court of Appeal of Versailles (France) dismissed the appeal against that judgment lodged by the mother.

The decision corresponds to judges L.S. Rossi (reporting), J.C. Bonichot and S. Rodin.

 

As of today, no PIL decisions or opinions are to be published in May 2023, nor will any hearing take place. Early June AG Emiliou will deliver his opinion in C-90/22 Gjensidige, on the relationship between the Brussels I bis Regulation and the CMR Convention. On the 22 there will a hearing on C-339/22 BSH Hausgeräte, on exclusive international jurisdiction regarding patents.

The Institute of International Shipping and Trade Law (Swansea University) and UCL Centre for Commercial Law have joined forces to organise a day event on 19 April 2023 at the UCL Faculty of Laws in London. The conference is devoted to a very contemporary topic with the objective of generating debates that can inform policy making and future direction of law and regulation in the green transition of the shipping industry.

Session chairs include Michael Biltoo and Cathal Leigh-Doyle. The list of speakers includes Lia Amaxilati, Lia Athanasiou, Simon Baughen, Gabriel Castellanos, Grant Hunter, Jolien Kruit, Alicia Mackenzie, Aygun Mammadzada, Melis Ozdel, Tristan Smith, Sam Strivens, B. Soyer, Andrew Tettenborn, Vibe Garf Ulfbeck and Haris Zografakis.

For further info on the conference, and in order to book your place, see here.

Readers of this blog are aware that an EAPIL Working Group has been set to reflect on the reform of the Brussels I bis Regulation. A survey has been launched to collect feedback and comments on the proposals included in the Working Group’s preliminary position paper (see further here and here). Those wishing to share their views are invited to take the survey by 15 April 2023.

Participation in the survey is opened to anybody familiar with Brussels I bis, regardless of their membership in the European Association of Private International Law.

The members of the Working Group are eager to know about the opinion of scholars and practitioners both  on the operation of the Regulation and on the improvements proposed by the Group.

All the received input is valuable for the work that is being done in preparation of the Brussels I bis Reform. Warm thanks to those who have already provided their feedback and to those who plan to so in the next few hours!

Soutien au barreau ukrainien, relations avec la Chambre fédérale du barreau russe, négociations avec la Commission européenne sur le 8e paquet de sanctions… La guerre en Ukraine a pris une large place dans les débats au sein du Conseil des barreaux européens ces derniers mois, entraînant parfois des clivages.

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Le refus des autorités d’inscrire sur l’état civil un homme transgenre en tant que père ou une femme transgenre en tant que mère ne viole pas la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.

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