Feed aggregator

Even Advocate-General Bobek has not managed to turn jurisdictional issues re prospectus liability into the prosaic type of analysis which many of us have become fond of. His Opinion in C-307/17 Löber v Barclays is a lucid, systematic and pedagogic review of the CJEU’s case-law on (now) Article 7(2)’s jurisdiction for tort in the context of ‘prospectus liability’ aka investment misrepresentation. Starting with the direct /indirect damage distinction; and focusing of course on the determination of pure economic loss.

Ms Helga Löber invested in certificates in the form of bearer bonds issued by Barclays Bank Plc. In order to acquire those certificates, the corresponding amounts were transferred from her current (personal) bank account located in Vienna, Austria to two securities accounts in Graz and Salzburg. Payment was then made from those securities accounts for the certificates at issue.

Note immediately that the jurisdictional discussion is a result of Article 7(2) not just identifying a Member State: it identifies specific courts within that Member State. Here: claimant brought her claim before a court in Vienna, the place of her domicile. This is also where her current bank account is located, from which she made the first transfer in order to make the investment. The first- and second-instance courts in Vienna however decided that they did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The case is now pending before the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria). That court is asking, in essence, which of the bank accounts used, if any, is relevant to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear the claim at issue.

Close reference is made to Kolassa. In my posting on that case at the time, I noted that the many factual references which the Court built in in its decision, gave it dubious precedent value. Bobek AG in Löber necessarily therefore distinguishes many factual situations. The almost sole focus lies on 7(2): unlike in Kolassa, contracts neither consumer contracts are an issue.

Here are a few things of note:

First, in his review of the existing case-law the AG at 38 points out like I did at the time of the judgment, that the CJEU’s finding in CDC that locus damni for a pure economic loss, in the case of a corporation, is the place of its registered office, is at odds with precedent (he made the same remark in flyLAL).

Next, on locus delicti commissi, the AG suggests that despite Article 7(2)’s instruction, a single ldc within the Member State cannot be determined. The relevant point in his view is the moment from which the prospectus can, by operation of law, start influencing the investment behaviour of the relevant group of investors. In the present case, and considering the national segmentation of the capital market regulation at issue, that relevant group is made up of investors on secondary markets in Austria. At 65:  once it became possible to offer the certificates on the Austrian secondary market, that possibility was immediately available for the whole territory of Austria. ‘The nature of the tort of misrepresentation at issue does not allow for the identification of a location within the national territory because once the author of the tort is allowed to influence the given national territory, that influence immediately covers the whole territory, irrespective of the actual means used for the publication of a specific prospectus.’ As we know from CDC, the Court does not readily accept that a single ldc cannot be determined.

Further, for locus damni, the AG suggests (at 78) ‘The place where…a legally binding investment obligation is factually assumed… The exact location of such a place is a matter for the national law considered in the light of available factual evidence. It is likely to be the premises of a branch of the bank where the respective investment contract was signed, which may correspond, as in the Kolassa case, to the place where the bank account is held.‘ That in my view first of all is not a warranted outcome. The investor in Löber is not a consumer within the protected categories of the Regulation. Suggesting the place of conclusion of the obligation leaves room for the claimant to manipulate the forum of any future suit in tort. This is exactly what the Court objected to in Universal Music. Moreover, note the reference to ‘the national law’. It is quite unusual to suggest such a role for lex fori in light of the principle of autonomous interpretation. Unless the AG in fact means the ‘lex contractus’, presumably to be determined applying Rome I.

In summary there are quite a few open questions here – not something of course which I would necessarily object to.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.7

 

Le bilan de la lutte contre le travail dissimulé reste décevant malgré des progrès. Publié hier, celui de 2017 confirme que l’agence centrale des organismes de sécurité sociale (ACOSS) doit relever deux défis structurels : la faiblesse des redressements et du recouvrement.

en lire plus

In Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, the Canadian Supreme Court as I reported at the time confirmed the country’s flexible approach to the jurisdictional stage of recognition and enforcement actions. Following that ruling both parties files for summary judgment, evidently advocating a different outcome.

The Ontario Court of Appeal have now held in 2018 ONCA 472 Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation that there are stringent requirements for piercing the corporate veil (i.e. by execution on Chevron Canada’s shares and assets to satisfy the Ecuadorian judgment) and that these are not met in casu.

Of particular note is Hourigan JA’s argument at 61 that ‘the appellants’ proposed interpretation of the [Canadian Corporation’s] Act would also have a significant policy impact on how corporations carry on business in Canada. Corporations have stakeholders. Creditors, shareholders, and employees, among others, rely on the corporate separateness doctrine that is long-established in our jurisprudence and that is a deliberate policy choice made in the [Act]. Those stakeholders have a reasonable expectation that when they do business with a Canadian corporation, they need only consider the liabilities of that corporation and not the liabilities of some related corporation.’

Blake, Cassels and Graydon have further review here. Note that the issue is one of a specific technical nature: it only relates to veil piercing once the recognition and enforcement of a foreign ruling is sought.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8.

 

 

 

Today the fourth meeting of the Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments concluded in The Hague. Further information (incl. a revised Draft Convention text) will be uploaded on the Hague Conference website soon (< www.hcch.net >). Please check this website for the latest updates.

A background document related to the Treatment of Intellectual Property-Related Judgments under the November 2017 draft Convention was published this month by the Hague Conference (HCCH). It was drafted by the co-Rapporteurs of the draft Convention (Professors Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain and Geneviève Saumier, McGill University, Canada) and the Permanent Bureau. This document will be discussed at the Diplomatic Session (a high-level negotiation meeting with a view to adopting a final text – envisaged to take place in mid-2019) and was not meant to be discussed at this Special Commission.

For those of you who are interested in the interaction between intellectual property rights and the Judgments Project, please refer to the above-mentioned background document (instead of the Revised Preliminary Explanatory Report as this will be further revised to reflect the content of this document).

Kreuziger
Libre circulation des personnes
L’avocat général Bot propose à la Cour de justice de juger que le seul fait qu’un travailleur n’a pas demandé à prendre ses congés ne peut pas automatiquement entraîner la perte du droit à indemnité financière pour congés non pris à la fin de la relation de travail

Bauer
DFON
L’avocat général Bot propose à la Cour de justice de juger que le droit de l’Union s’oppose à une réglementation nationale qui empêche les héritiers d’un travailleur défunt de réclamer une indemnité financière pour congés non pris

Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen e.a.
Agriculture
La Cour confirme que les abattages rituels sans étourdissement ne peuvent avoir lieu que dans un abattoir agréé

Le tribunal de l’Union européenne a considéré que Lionel Messi pouvait enregistrer la marque « Messi » pour des articles et vêtements de sport.

en lire plus

In Platinum Partners, Chapman J held that foreign discovery laws should be considered
for comity concerns, yet they are not determinative of whether discovery should be
permitted under United States law.

Foreign Representatives sought access to documents from US audit firms concerning investment funds that were debtors in Cayman Islands liquidation proceedings recognized under Chapter 15 as foreign main proceedings. Jacob Frumkin has excellent insight and I am happy to refer.

Section 1521(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, upon recognition of a foreign main proceeding, a bankruptcy court may, “at the request of a foreign representative, grant any appropriate relief” … “where necessary to effectuate the purpose of [chapter 15] and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors.”  The first main argument of the auditors was that Cayman law does not permit the discovery of audit work papers or materials that are not a debtor’s property and, if the Court were to grant the motion, its interests and the interests of comity would not be protected.

The Court dismissed this argument, noting that

“it is well-established that comity does not require that the relief available in the United States be identical to the relief sought in the foreign bankruptcy proceeding; it is sufficient if the result is comparable and that the foreign laws are not repugnant to our laws and policies.” and that

“requiring this Court to ensure compliance with foreign law prior to granting relief sought pursuant to chapter 15 would require the Court to engage in a full-blown analysis of foreign law each and every time a foreign representative seeks additional relief in the United States, which may result in differing interpretations of U.S. law depending on where the foreign main proceeding was pending.”

Comity considerations surface in the most technical of corners.

Geert.

 

La marque constituée des lettres HP (signe verbal et signe figuratif représentant les lettres entourées d’un rond noir) est suffisamment distinctive pour être enregistrée.

en lire plus

Le Conseil d’État admet, sous conditions, l’existence de tarifs réglementés de vente de l’électricité.

en lire plus

« Lorsqu’une succession comporte des immeubles situés dans l’un et l’autre de deux pays dont le défunt a la nationalité, le renvoi opéré par la loi du lieu de situation de l’immeuble impose que le critère de rattachement à la loi nationale du défunt soit apprécié selon les règles de conflit de lois prévues par la loi du pays renvoyant. »

en lire plus

The School of Law of the University of Bologna is organizing the III Edition of the Summer School on European and Comparative Environmental Law, to be held in Ravenna, July 9-13, 2018.

For more information click here.

You can also get directly in touch with Prof. Lupoi [micheleangelo.lupoi@unibo.it].

 

In 4A_417/2017 (litigants’ names per usual unnecessarily anonimysed; Ganzoni reveal it to be Swatch AG) the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (at 2) first of all correctly reminds us that neither the Lugano Convention nor Brussels I (or indeed the Recast) capture the procedural interest required for a party to request a negative declaration (of liability; in tort, contract or otherwise). In C-113/11 Folien Fischer the CJEU held that negative declarations are covered by Article 7(2); the national court can, indeed must examine its jurisdiction under that provision (and the corresponding one in Lugano) but that does not say anything about standing requirements vis-a-vis interest. (As far as I am aware there is no similar judgment viz 7(1) but the rule must be the same).

Such negative declarations are often part of the race to court; via the lis alibi pendens rules they undercut the forum which the counterparty might have preferred.

As Walderwyss summarise, Hitherto the Swiss Supreme Court had a rather strict approach to the interest required for a negative declaration. Race to court (or ‘forum running’ as the SC calls it) alone was not a sufficient reason. With the March 2018 judgment, that has now been relaxed: Swatch Group AG’s interest in securing a Swiss forum  in a dispute against an English counterparty, was considered sufficient to grant it interest: at 5.4: ‘Zusammenfassend ist festzustellen, dass jedenfalls im internationalen Verhältnis das Interesse einer Partei, bei einem bevorstehenden Gerichtsverfahren einen ihr genehmen Gerichtsstand zu sichern, als genügendes Feststellungsinteresse zu qualifizieren ist.‘

With race to court following Swatch no longer hindered by a restrictive approach to standing, the Swiss surely must have an advantage in this time-sensitive part of international litigation. (Not a great pun, I realise. But I am nearing the end of yet another long working week).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.6.

Thanks to Horatia Muir Watt and Hélène van Lith (Sciences Po) for this post

Moving from Paris to The Hague for the PAX MOOT Finals – Moot Court Conflict of Laws/Droit International Privé – 6th Edition
Sciences Po – Law School / école de droit

The PAX Moot Eliminatory Round took place last Tuesday in Paris with 8 universities mooting the cross border climate change moot case which addressed a number of complex transnational legal questions in Private International Law and was generously hosted by the ICC (see also our previous post).
The four winning teams who made it to the finals are Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Heidelberg, Paris I Sorbonne and Sciences Po.
The Panel of the PAX Moot Court Judges consisted of the following members:

Hans van Loon – Former Secretary General of the HCCH (The Hague)
Agnès Maitrepierre – Cour de cassation (Paris)
Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer –Nauta Dutilh (Amsterdam)/ Christine Lecuyer- Thieffry (Paris)
Clément Dupoirier – Herbert Smith Freehills (Paris)
Patrick Thieffry – Environmental Lawyer and Associate Professor. (Paris)
Alexis Foucard – Clifford Chance (Paris)
Michal Chajdukowski and Vasili Rotaru (PAX moot winning team 2017)
The PAX Moot Finals will be held on 1 June at the Peace Palace – hence the name – in The Hague, paying tribute to the city as the “legal capital of the world” and home of The Hague Conference of Private International Law, which also marks its 125th anniversary.

The winning Mooters and best pleaders will be rewarded with an internship at international commercial litigation departments of renowned law firms Nauta Dutilh in Amsterdam and Herbert Smith in Paris.
The concept and goal of the PAX Moot is to study and apply private international law for the resolution of cross border disputes through a concrete problem “the Case” and to train law students and practitioners of tomorrow in arguing and analysing complex global legal questions in international litigation.

The inter-university PAX Moot organized by Sciences Po Law School is a pleading competition addressing issues of Private International Law and this year’s 6th edition has gone global to include teams from universities in Europe and beyond. The organizers thank the following institutions for their support and willingness to open the competition to their students: Sorbonne University Paris I, London School of Economics, HEC, Heidelberg University, Luxembourg University, Cambridge University, University College London (UCL), King’s College London, University of Antwerp, Erasmus University, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Sciences Po Law School and Statale University of Milan. Participation was also open to US exchange students from Harvard, Columbia, Duke, Northwestern, Northeastern, Duke and Penn law schools.

Inquiries can be addressed to Dr. Hélène van Lith by email at helene.vanlith@sciencespo.fr

In [2018] EWHC 1230 (Comm) St Vincent v Bruce Roberston et al Males J set aside a worldwide freezing order in summary judgment but that is not the trigger for this blog post. Rather, consider paras 33 and 34:

1. St Vincent (and two associated companies) attempted to stop the sale [of a chunk of assets by commencing proceedings in Cyprus against 19 defendants, including Mr Robinson, Winterbourne Pte and the other defendants to these proceedings and also HHL and HDP. On 5 August 2013 the District Court of Nicosia granted an injunction, purporting to restrain any dealings with HDP’s assets. [GAVC: for the jurisdiction of the Cypriot courts: see 12: The Shares Pledge was governed by the law of Cyprus and provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of that country]
2. Notwithstanding the Cyprus order, on 30 September 2013 the creditors of HDP approved the sale to KFTP. The arrangement was then approved by the District Court of Gliwice on 24 October 2013. The Polish court did not regard the order of the Cyprus court as an impediment to the sale, taking the view that it had exclusive jurisdiction over a Polish company under its supervision and was not required to recognise the Cypriot order in accordance with the provisions of the Brussels Regulation. The court did not rule on any issue whether the proposed sale to KFTP was at market value and was not asked to do so.

I have tried to locate the Polish judgment but have failed to do so (which is where assistance from Polish readers would be appreciated). Presumably however the Polish courts argued that Article 24(2) Brussels I Recast was engaged, and then either per Weber ignored lis alibi pendens (were it to have found the case was still pending in Cyprus), or applied Article 45(1) e ii to ignore the Cypriot findings. In either case, the relevant point is how widely the Polish courts seem to have interpreted Article 24(2).

Come to think of it this would have been good exam material and I have one or two of those coming up (although there is plenty in the ‘exam material’ ledger).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.5, Heading 2.2.16.

 

Adoptée à l’origine aux États-Unis pour sanctionner des Russes accusés d’être impliqués dans la mort de l’avocat Sergeï Magnitski, la loi s’est élargie à tous les suspects de violation des droits de l’homme. En France, des parlementaires commencent à se mobiliser pour l’adoption d’une loi similaire.

en lire plus

Incapacité

Protection de la nature et de l'environnement

Extradition - Prescription