Flux européens

Taricco e.a.
Aide d'État
En empêchant, en matière de fraude grave à la TVA, l’infliction effective et dissuasive de sanctions, en raison d’un délai global de prescription trop bref, la réglementation italienne est susceptible de porter atteinte aux intérêts financiers de l’Union

The European Commission has issued a call for proposals concerning action grants to support transnational projects on judicial training covering civil law, criminal law, fundamental rights and fight against terrorism and radicalisation.

Proposals presented under the civil law priority shall focus notably on legal instruments in family matters and successions, in particular Regulation No 650/2012 successions upon death; legal instruments in civil and commercial matters, in particular Regulation No 805/2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, Regulation No 1896/2006 creating a European Order for Payment Procedure, Regulation No 861/2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, Regulation No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels Ia); Regulation No 655/2014 creating a European Account Preservation Order.

The Commission also calls for proposals aimed at training enforcement authority agents as regards instruments in the area of civil judicial cooperation, in particular: Regulation No 2201/2003 on matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (Brussels IIa); Regulation No 805/2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims and Regulation No 655/2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order.

The deadline for applications is 16 November 2015.

Further information available here.

The Oberlandesgericht of Munich has recently lodged a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Regulation No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, ie the Rome III Regulation (Case C-281/15, Soha Sahyouni v Raja Mamisch).

The request provides the ECJ with the opportunity of delivering, in due course, its first judgment relating specifically to the Rome III Regulation.

To begin with, the referring court asks the ECJ to provide a clarification as to the scope of the uniform conflict-of-laws regime set forth by the Regulation. In particular, the German court wonders whether the Regulation also applies to ‘private divorces’, namely divorces pronounced before a religious court in Syria on the basis of Sharia.

If the answer is in the affirmative, the referring court asks whether, in the case of an examination as to whether such a divorce is eligible for recognition in the forum, Article 10 of the Regulation must also be applied. According to the latter provision, where the law specified by the Regulation to govern the divorce or the legal separation “does not grant one of the spouses equal access to divorce or legal separation on grounds of their sex”, the lex fori applies instead.

Should the latter question, too, be answered in the affirmative, the referring court wishes to know which of the following interpretive options should be followed in respect of Article 10: (1) is account to be taken in the abstract of a comparison showing that, while the law of the forum grants access to divorce to the other spouse too, that divorce is, on account of the other spouse’s sex, subject to different procedural and substantive conditions than access for the first spouse? (2) or, does the applicability of Article 10 depend on whether the application of the foreign law, which is discriminatory in the abstract, also discriminates in the particular case in question?

Finally, were the ECJ to assert that the second of these options is the correct one, the Oberlandesgericht of Munich seeks to know whether the fact that the spouse discriminated against has consented to the divorce — including by duly accepting compensation — constitutes itself a ground for not applying Article 10.

Il Max Planck Institute for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law di Lussemburgo offre anche per il 2016 alcune borse di studio rivolte a dottorandi di ricerca interessati a trascorrere un periodo di studio presso l’Istituto.

Le candidature possono essere presentate entro il 15 settembre 2015.

Ai dottorandi assegnatari della borsa di studio verrà data la possibilità di avere uno spazio di lavoro nella sala di lettura della biblioteca e di partecipare attivamente alle attività di ricerca dell’Istituto.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili qui.

La famiglia si trasforma. Status familiari costituiti all’estero e loro riconoscimento in Italia, tra ordine pubblico ed interesse del minore, a cura di Grazia Ofelia Cesaro, Paola Lovati e Gennaro Mastrangelo, Franco Angeli Editore, 2014, pp. 144, ISBN 9788820452018, Euro 19.

[Dal sito dell’editore] Questo volume raccoglie gli interventi dell’incontro di studio intitolato “Nuove famiglie e circolazione dei nuovi status familiari: le risposte del diritto interno tra interesse del minore ed ordine pubblico”, tenutosi a Milano il 26 ottobre 2012. Esso rappresenta la prima pubblicazione dove giuristi, psicologi, magistrati, avvocati, sociologi si interrogano sul tema. Che cosa accade quando adozione del single, maternità surrogata, fecondazione eterologa, stepchild adoption, genitorialità omosessuale, adozione legittimante del single pronunciate all’estero chiedono di essere riconosciute nel diritto interno? Basterà la clausola di ordine pubblico ad impedire al minore e al suo/suoi genitori, il riconoscimento di tali diritti? È giuridicamente possibile uno status familiare scisso, cioè valevole solo nello Stato in cui è stato prodotto ma non in Italia? Quale peso annettere all’interesse del minore nelle decisioni dell’autorità giudiziaria? Questi interrogativi, nuovi per la realtà italiana, non lo sono in altri Paesi, per cui le relazioni pubblicate esaminano l’esperienza inglese, francese e statunitense per trovare possibili soluzioni.  Il volume rappresenta un’utile raccolta interdisciplinare per approfondire alcuni temi che si porranno sempre di più nella pratica giudiziaria. È infatti certo che l’internazionalizzazione degli status familiari porrà all’interprete sempre maggiori interrogativi.

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Konrad Duden, Leihmutterschaft im Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht — Abstammung und ordre public im Spiegel des Verfassungs-, Völker- und Europarechts, Mohr Siebeck, 2015, pp. 392, ISBN 9783161540240, Euro 69.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Was macht eine Frau zur Mutter? Moderne Leihmutterschaft erschüttert grundlegend unser Verständnis von Familie und Elternschaft: Frauen tragen für Andere Kinder aus, die meist genetisch nicht von den Leihmüttern abstammen. In Deutschland ist dieses Verfahren verboten. Wie geht das Recht jedoch damit um, wenn Paare ins Ausland reisen, um dort durch Leihmutterschaft ihren Kinderwunsch zu erfüllen? Konrad Duden analysiert am Beispiel von sechs Rechtsordnungen, in denen Leihmutterschaft zulässig ist, wer aus Sicht des deutschen Rechts die Eltern solcher Kinder sind. Dabei stellt er fest, dass den Kindern vielfach eine Abstammung von den Wunscheltern verwehrt bleibt. Diesen Befund kontrastiert er mit den Grund- und Menschenrechten der Beteiligten. Insbesondere die Rechte des Kindes fordern, dass das Kind grundsätzlich in eine rechtliche Familie mit den Wunscheltern integriert werden kann.

Ulteriori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

A2A
Aide d'État
Le droit de l’Union ne s’oppose pas à une réglementation italienne qui prévoit, par renvoi à un règlement de l’Union non en vigueur à l’époque, d’appliquer des intérêts composés à la récupération d’une aide d’État

Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami e.a. / Commission
Rapprochement des législations
La Cour confirme la validité du règlement sur le commerce des produits dérivés du phoque

Groupe Steria
Liberté d'établissement
L’imposition différenciée des dividendes touchés par les sociétés mères d’un groupe fiscal intégré en fonction du lieu d’établissement des filiales est contraire au droit de l’Union

Asian Conflict of Laws: East and South East Asia, a cura di Alejandro Carballo Leyda, Wolters Kluwer, 2015, pp. 336,  ISBN: 9789041147561, Euro 160.

[Dal sito dell’editore] An essential resource for both practitioners and academics, Asian Conflict of Laws: East and South East Asia, provides a comprehensive overview of the various approaches to private international law among the crucially important trade jurisdictions of East and South East Asia. Gain expert guidance from local specialists who deliver thorough commentary and analysis on fourteen jurisdictions of the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Macau, Malaysia, Mongolia, The Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. With a lack of legal harmonization between these countries, this useful book will be an essential resource for both practitioners and academics operating in this region. The authors describe, in a clear and logically structured way, practice and procedure regarding: codification of private international law and relevance of case law; jurisdiction of local courts in foreign-related cases (including choice of court and arbitration clauses); applicable law; international civil procedure; recognition and enforcement of foreign (judicial and arbitral) decisions.

L’indice del volume è reperibile qui. Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

On 23 June 2015, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union reached a compromise concerning the amendment of Regulation N0 861/2007, establishing the European Small Claims Procedure.

The text of the amending Regulation, as contemplated by the compromise, may be found here. The actual legislative measure will be formally adopted in the coming months.

Under the reformed Regulation, the European Small Claims Procedure will apply to “civil and commercial matters in cross-border cases … where the value of a claim does not exceed EUR 5000 at the time when the claim form is received by the court or tribunal with jurisdiction, excluding all interest, expenses and disbursements”. The current ceiling is 2000.

In five years’ time the Commission shall present a report on the operation of the Regulation, including an evaluation as to whether a further increase of the threshold above. On the same occasion, the Commission will look into the possibility of extending the scope of the European Small Claims Procedure so as to “facilitate access to justice for employees in cross-border employment disputes with their employer, in particular to claims for remuneration”.

The amended Regulation, though less innovative than the Commission had originally proposed, will have an impact on a number of practical issues raised by the application of the existing rules, including issues relating to the court fees charged to claimants (fees will have to be proportional to the value of the claim, but there will be no fixed cap) and the payment of such fees (Member States will be under an obligation to accept electronic payments).

Videoconferencing and, more generally, the use of remote communications technology, will be encouraged, although the Member States will not be under a legal duty to make the relevant equipment available to courts and litigants.

In Goldman Sachs v Novao Banco SA, the High Court first of all had to consider the scope of the Brussels I Regulation on the issue of ‘civil and commercial’.  This issue came up following the restructuring of a Portuguese Bank and the role of the Portuguese Central Bank, under its statutory powers, in the transfer of liabilities to a Bridge Bank, ‘Novo Banco’. [For the facts of the case see the judgment itself and see also Christopher Bates’ review, which first alerted me to the case. Mr Bates also reviews the issue of mutual recognition under the Bank Recovery Directive].

Hamblen J (soon to move to the Court of Appeal) in my view justifiably rejected Novo Banco’s arguments that the claim was not civil and commercial, given the statutory intervention of the Central Bank. With reference to the traditional line-up of CJEU precedent (see most recently Fahnenbrock, absent from the High court’s judgment; and Sapir, which does feature heavily) he held that the nature of the claim, in spite of the factual intervention of the Central Bank, is one in debt, which is a claim based on private law rights conferred by the relevant Facility Agreement and a civil and commercial matter. A novation of the Facility Agreement would not change the nature of that claim; nor does a statutory transfer.

Having decided that the claim falls under the Regulation, the High Court subsequently had to decide whether Novo Banco was subject to the choice of court, in favour of the English court, part of the Facilities Agreement. As this is a transfer of claims and not a contractual chain, Refcomp does not apply (Hamblen J did not refer to it). The matter needs to be decided by the lex causae, here the lex contractus: English law. Upon consideration of the various arguments, the High Court held that the choice of court clause had so been transferred together with the original claims.

Finally, the Court rejected a stay on ‘case management’ grounds (see Jong and Plaza for earlier applications).

The case shows how some of the core considerations of Brussels I can create a lot of argument, indeed.

Geert.

 

The Court of Pécs, in Hungary, has recently submitted several questions to the ECJ concerning the interpretation of Regulation No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations and Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, respectively the Rome I and Brussels I Regulations (case C-222/15, Hőszig Kft. v Alstom Power Thermal Services).

The requests concerning the Rome I Regulation relate to the fact that the contract that forms the basis of the main proceedings features a choice of law clause to which one of the parties did not consent.

The relevant provision, here, as indicated in Article 3(5) of the Rome I Regulation, is Article 10.

Article 10(1) provides that “the existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this regulation if the contract or term were valid”. However, under Article 10(2), “a party, in order to establish that he did not consent, may rely upon the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence if it appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in accordance with the law specified in paragraph 1”.

The first question raised by the referring court concerns the meaning of the expression “if it appears from the circumstances”. In particular, the court seeks to determine whether the assessment contemplated by Article 10(2) “must cover the circumstances of the conclusion of the contract, the subject-matter of the contract and the performance of the contract”. Furthermore, referring to the case where the relevant circumstances actually demonstrate that consent to the law applicable pursuant to paragraph 1 would not be a reasonable effect of the behavior of the party, the request seeks to determine whether the validity of the contractual clause at hand must then be determined “pursuant to the law of the country of habitual residence of the party who made the reference”.

Secondly, the Hungarian court wonders whether the court has discretion in evaluating if, under the circumstances that must be taken into account, consent to the law applicable pursuant to Article 10(1) was not a reasonable effect of the party’s behaviour.

The third question posed by the court is whether, once a party makes reference to the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence in order to establish that he did not consent, the court must consider this law in the sense that, by virtue of it, and because of the circumstances mentioned, “the consent of that party to the law chosen in the contract was not reasonable conduct”. If this is the case, the court also asks whether the examination of the circumstances carried out in order to determine if there are reasonable grounds to believe that consent was not given “covers the circumstances of the conclusion of the contract, the subject-matter of the contract and the performance of the contract”.

Finally, the court raises a question concerning Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, now corresponding to Article 25(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 (Brussels Ia). Under this provision, the parties may agree to confer jurisdiction on a court of a Member State to settle any disputes between them, as long as these concern a particular legal relationship. Jurisdiction shall lie with the chosen court unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of the Member State of the designated court. The choice of court agreement must meet the formal requirements set forth in the same provision.

In this connection, the request is meant to clarify whether the designation of the court must be specific or, if it is sufficient that the wish or intention of the parties can be deduced unequivocally from the wording, since Recital 14 of the Brussels I Regulation (now Recital 19 of the Brussels Ia Regulation) provides that party autonomy should be respected, subject to the exclusive grounds of jurisdiction, and to the limits stated in the field of protected contracts, where only limited autonomy is allowed.

In particular, having regard to this recital, the court asks whether “a clause conferring jurisdiction, included in the standard contract terms of one of the parties”, under which they stipulate that their disputes concerning validity, performance or termination of the order “are to be subject to the exclusive and final jurisdiction of the courts of a specific Member State”, namely, the court of Paris, could be considered “sufficiently precise, given that the wish or intention of the parties in relation to the designated Member State can be deduced unequivocally from its wording”.

On 16 July 2015, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rendered its judgment in the case of A v. B (C-184/14), clarifying the interpretation of Regulation No 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations (the Maintenance Regulation).

More specifically, the ruling regarded the interpretation of Article 3 of the Regulation. This provides, inter alia, that jurisdiction in matters of maintenance lies with “(c) the court which, according to its own law, has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings concerning the status of a person if the matter relating to maintenance is ancillary to those proceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the nationality of one of the parties”, or with “(d) the court which, according to its own law, has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings concerning parental responsibility if the matter relating to maintenance is ancillary to those proceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the nationality of one of the parties”.

The dispute in the main proceedings concerned the legal separation of two Italians and the custody of their children. These proceedings had been brought by A (the husband) against B (the wife) before the District Court of Milan.

The Court of Milan asserted its jurisdiction in respect of legal separation relying on Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 (Brussels IIa), but held that, pursuant to Article 8(1) of that Regulation, it lacked jurisdiction over parental responsibility, as the children were, at the material time, habitually resident in the UK. The Court of Milan further held that, according to Article 3(c) and (d) of the Maintenance Regulation, it had jurisdiction to decide on the issue of maintenance for the benefit of the wife, but not to decide on maintenance for the benefit of the children, since the latter request was not ancillary to proceedings over personal status, but to proceedings concerning parental responsibility.

The case eventually reached the Italian Supreme Court, which decided to request the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The Supreme Court asked whether, in circumstances such as those described above, a maintenance request pertaining to the child may be ruled on both by the court that has jurisdiction over legal separation or divorce, as a matter ancillary to the proceedings concerning the status of a person, within the meaning of Article 3(c) of that Regulation, and by the court that has jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings concerning parental responsibility, as a matter ancillary to those proceedings, within the meaning of Article 3(d) of that Regulation; or whether a decision on a similar matter can only be taken by the latter court.

Put otherwise, the issue was whether the heads of jurisdiction set out in Article 3(c) and (d) of the Maintenance Regulation must be understood to be mutually exclusive, or whether the conjunction “or” in the provision implies that the courts that have jurisdiction over legal separation and parental responsibility may be both validly seised of an application relating to maintenance in respect of children.

In its judgment, the ECJ begins by observing that the scope of the concept of “ancillary matter” cannot be left to the discretion of the courts of each Member State according to their national law. The meaning of this expression should rather be determined by reference to the wording of the relevant provisions, their context and goals.

The wording of Article 3(c) and (d) indicates that a distinction should be made between proceedings concerning the status of a person and proceedings concerning parental responsibility. In the face of this wording, it cannot be unequivocally established “whether the alternative nature of those criteria means that the applications relating to child maintenance are ancillary only to one set of proceedings concerning parental responsibility, or whether those applications may be deemed ancillary also to proceedings concerning the status of a person”.

As regards the context of the pertinent provisions, the ECJ notes that the above distinction echoes the distinction made by the Brussels IIa Regulation between disputes concerning divorce, legal separation and marriage annulment, on the one hand, and disputes regarding the attribution, exercise, delegation, and restriction or termination of parental responsibility, on the other. The ECJ further notes in this connection, based on Recital 12 of the preamble of the latter Regulation, that the rules on jurisdiction relating to parental responsibility underlie a concern for the best interests of the child, and adds that “an application relating to maintenance in respect of minor children is … intrinsically linked to proceedings concerning matters of parental responsibility”.

The ECJ concludes that “it is vital to take into account, in interpreting the rules on jurisdiction laid down by Article 3(c) and (d) of Regulation No 4/2009, the best interest of the child”, and that the implementation of such Regulation “must occur in accordance to Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, according to which, in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration.

Finally, as regards the goals of the provisions at stake, the Court considers that the main objective of the Maintenance Regulation is to ensure, in this field, the proper administration of justice within the EU. This implies that the court to which jurisdiction is conferred to decide on parental responsibility should be the court that finds itself “in the best position to evaluate in concreto the issues involved in the application relating to child maintenance, to set the amount of that maintenance intended to contribute to the child’s maintenance and education costs, by adapting it, according to (i) the type of custody (either jointly or sole) ordered, (ii) access rights and the duration of those rights and (iii) other factual elements relating to the exercise of parental responsibility brought before it”.

In light of the above, the ECJ concludes that, when the court of a Member State is seised of proceedings concerning legal separation or divorce between the parents of a minor child, and the court of another Member State is seised of proceedings involving matters of parental responsibility over the same child, Article 3(c) and (d) of Regulation No 4/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that “an application relating to maintenance concerning that child is ancillary only to the proceedings concerning parental responsibility, with the meaning of Article 3(d) of that Regulation”.

As the holiday season now is in full swing, here’s a choice of court and choice of law clause I received. For us all to ponder on the beaches /in the mountains /whatever retreat we’ll find ourselves on:

‘LAW AND JURISDICTION
This agreement is between the holiday-maker (the renter) and the agency or property owner. Booking ltd is acting only as a representative of the agency or owner listed on the voucher and as such can not be held directly responsible for any problems concerned with the booking. The owners of Booking LTd its employees or agents shall not be liable for any damage, loss or personal injury which may be sustained by persons or property at any time during the reserved stay. In the event of controversies arising from the booking of the rental, the Irish Court only can deal with the matter and Irish law only applies. Signing the booking form and making the booking implies that the General Letting Conditions have been understood and have thereby been accepted without reserve and without exception. If any of the conditions of this contract have become invalid or were invalid or if in this contract there should be a gap, the other conditions cannot be contested.

Any and all issues regarding the property, such as damages, injury, etc, shall be a dispute between the owner or agency and the renter of the property. In such cases, with no exceptions, Irish law will apply and the jurisdiction will be the local courts in Ireland.’

Happy holidays. Geert.

Massimo V. Benedettelli, Profili di diritto internazionale privato ed europeo delle società, in Rivista di diritto societario, 1/2015, pp. 35 ss.

1. La dimensione internazionalprivatistica ed europea del diritto delle società. – 2. Criteri guida per il coordinamento tra diritto interno, diritto straniero e diritto europeo in materia societaria. – 3. Il coordinamento internazionalprivatistico secondo il diritto italiano: rinvio tendenzialmente integrale alle valutazioni dell’ordinamento di costituzione della società. – 4. L’influenza del diritto europeo sul coordinamento tra gli ordinamenti degli Stati membri in materia societaria. – 5. L’ambito della giurisdizione italiana in materia societaria. 6. – Il riconoscimento di sentenze, altri provvedimenti e lodi arbitrali stranieri in materia societaria. – 7. Il diritto applicabile in materia societaria. – 8. Le fusioni e le scissioni internazionali. – 9. Il trasferimento della sede sociale all’estero.

In una ordinanza del 21 luglio 2015, il Tribunale di Milano si è pronunciato sull’individuazione del “luogo di esecuzione” di una decisione agli effetti dell’art. 22 n. 5 della Convenzione di Lugano del 30 ottobre 2007 sulla competenza giurisdizionale e il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile commerciale. Tale norma, pressoché identica a quella che si leggeva nell’art. 22 n. 5 del regolamento n. 44/2001 (Bruxelles I) e che ora si ritrova all’art. 24 n. 5 del regolamento n. 1215/2012 (Bruxelles I bis), attribuisce una competenza esclusiva, in materia di esecuzione delle decisioni, ai giudici dello Stato, vincolato dalla Convenzione, “nel cui territorio ha luogo l’esecuzione”.

Nella specie, si trattava di localizzare un’attività esecutiva consistente nell’espropriazione forzata di crediti presso terzi.

La domanda, avanzata da una società svizzera, riguardava un lodo arbitrale emesso in Ticino e dichiarato esecutivo in Italia, recante la condanna di un cittadino italiano residente in Tailandia. Il creditore procedente aveva allora provveduto alla notificazione di un atto di pignoramento al debitore pignorato e ad altri due soggetti debitori di costui, aventi entrambi sede in Italia. Su queste premesse, debitore e terzi sono stati citati a comparire davanti al Tribunale di Milano.

Il giudice adito, rilevata la necessità di verificare la sussistenza della giurisdizione italiana, ha ritenuto di dover fare riferimento alla Convenzione di Lugano del 2007, avendo cura di rilevare che la stessa deve interpretarsi “tenendo debitamente conto” dei principi elaborati dalla Corte di giustizia con riguardo a disposizioni analoghe contenute sia nella Convenzione di Lugano del 1988 (che la Convenzione del 2007 ha provveduto a sostituire), sia nella Convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968 e nel regolamento Bruxelles I.

Riferendosi, dunque, all’art. 22 n. 5 della Convenzione, il Tribunale di Milano ha osservato, innanzitutto, che nel determinare il significato di espressioni dal tenore letterale incerto — quale può essere, appunto, “il luogo di esecuzione di una decisione” — occorre preferire, come emerge del resto dalla giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia, un approccio autonomo, cioè sganciato dalle categorie dei singoli ordinamenti nazionali, e valorizzare la finalità perseguita dalla norma in questione, presa individualmente e nel contesto in cui è calata.

Tradizionalmente fondata sull’esistenza di un legame particolarmente stretto tra fatti e foro, la giurisdizione esclusiva dovrebbe allora ritenersi sussistente ogniqualvolta tale prossimità riesca, effettivamente, ad attribuire a questo foro una posizione privilegiata per valutare i fatti in causa, poiché, per usare le parole della Corte di Giustizia nella sentenza Sanders, “è chiaro che i giudici cui è riconosciuta competenza esclusiva [ai sensi dell’allora articolo 16 della Convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968] sono quelli meglio situati per dirimere le controversie di cui trattasi”.

La “buona amministrazione della giustizia”, procede il giudice milanese, è poi, innegabilmente, un valore immanente all’intero sistema di Bruxelles e Lugano, oltre che una finalità espressamente attribuita nella giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia ai titoli di giurisdizione esclusiva.

Su queste basi, il Tribunale ha concluso che, ai fini dell’art. art. 22 n. 5, il luogo dell’esecuzione, in caso di espropriazione forzata di crediti presso terzi, coincida con il “luogo della sede del terzo”.

Nella specie, come detto, i debitori del debitore erano due persone giuridiche aventi sede in Italia, circostanza atta a rendere il foro italiano, stando al Tribunale, la sede maggiormente idonea a garantire un efficiente svolgimento del procedimento, specie sotto il profilo istruttorio.

Nel diritto processuale italiano, infatti, l’espropriazione del credito presso terzi presuppone una verifica incidentale dei rapporti intercorrenti tra il debitore pignorato ed il terzo, la quale, di regola, dovrebbe svolgersi in forma semplificata e meramente documentale (art. 547 del codice di procedure civile, come modificato).

Potrebbe tuttavia rendersi necessario, localmente, il compimento di altre attività istruttorie – nonché la comparizione in udienza – nel caso, non infrequente, di mancanza o contestazione della dichiarazione del terzo, sulla quale il suddetto accertamento è “fisiologicamente” basato.

L’argomento determinante nel ragionamento del giudice è dunque costituito dalla necessità di garantire quella specifica declinazione dell’economia procedurale data dalla “efficacia della prova”. Il rilievo che, nella giurisprudenza europea, tale profilo sia emerso principalmente nella diversa sede dell’interpretazione del foro dell’illecito (come nella sentenza Mines de Potasse d’Alsace o nella sentenza Marinari) nulla toglie alla valenza generale di questa indicazione, derivante dal carattere integrato delle norme giurisdizionali uniformi.

La soluzione adottata per concretizzare il criterio dettato dall’art. 22 n. 5 avrebbe inoltre, secondo l’ordinanza, il merito aggiunto di soddisfare le esigenze di prevedibilità del foro, altro obiettivo dichiarato del regime di Bruxelles e Lugano. La sede del terzo è un dato della realtà oggettiva, per di più dipendente dalla scelta di un soggetto posto in posizione di tendenziale equidistanza rispetto ad entrambe le parti del procedimento esecutivo. Il riferimento a tale circostanza sembra dunque realizzare un duplice vantaggio: in primo luogo, garantisce la disponibilità di un foro prevedibile e certo, ancorato ad un elemento fattuale sottratto a eventuali condizionamenti del debitore pignorato; in secondo luogo, l’individuazione di un tale foro sarebbe resa immediata ed obiettiva, basandosi su una circostanza neutra, indifferente rispetto alla natura del rapporto intercorrente tra debitore pignorato e terzo, spesso ignota al creditore procedente.

Giesela Rühl, The Role of Economic Efficiency in European Private International Law, di prossima pubblicazione in S. Leible (a cura di), General Principles of European Private International Law, 2015, disponibile su SSRN a questo indirizzo.

[Abstact] – In recent years, a growing number of contributions have devoted attention to the “general part” of European private international law: in a number of articles academics have either examined how legal concepts traditionally categorized as “general” (e.g. characterization, choice of law, preliminary questions, ordre public, renvoi) are designed in the Regulations thus far enacted by the European legislature. Or they have asked whether and how these concepts could be codified in a Rome 0 Regulation or, more generally, in a Code of European Private International Law. The following article adds to this debate by looking at European private international law from an economic perspective. It analyses whether and to what extent economic efficiency has been considered by the European legislature when enacting the pertaining Regulations and whether and to what extent it should be considered when revising the Regulations currently in place or when adopting a Rome 0 Regulation. The article finds that the TEU and TFEU permit – and in fact demand – that economic efficiency be taken into account in formulating European choice-of-law rules. However, it also finds that European law-makers have not oriented their efforts on economic efficiency in the past. This, in turn, means that efficiency is unlikely to be given any methodological or systematic regard when the relevant provisions are interpreted and applied, for it is only those objectives which the European legislature actually had in mind which may be taken into account when interpreting the pertaining rules and regulations. In the face of the informative value of the economic efficiency criterion this is, of course, to be regretted. The article, therefore concludes, that European law-makers should pay greater attention to economic efficiency in the future than they have done in the past, particularly when enacting a Rome 0 Regulation.

Thank you Eiríkur Thorláksson (whose expert report fed substantially into the Court’s findings) for flagging and for additional insight: In Tchenguiz v Kaupthing, the High Court had to review the insolvency exception to the Lugano Convention, combined with Directive 2001/24 on the reorganisation and winding-up of credit institutions. Directive 2001/24 applies to UK /Iceland relations following the EFTA Agreement. See my earlier post on Sabena, for Lugano context. Mr Tchenguiz is a London-based property developer. He claims against Kaupthing; Johannes Johannsson, a member of Kaupthing’s winding-up committee; accountants Grant Thornton; and two of its partners.

While Directive 2001/24 evidently is lex specialis vis-a-vis the Insolvency Regulation, much of the ECJ’s case-law under the Regulation is of relevance to the Directive, too. That is because, as Carr J notes, much of the substantial content of the Regulation has been carried over into the Directive. Carr J does emphasise (at 76) that the dovetailing between the Lugano Convention /the Judgments Regulation, and the Insolvency Regulation, carried over into the 2001 Directive does not extend to matters of choice of law. [A bit of explanation: insolvency was excluded from the Judgments Regulation (and from the Convention before it) because it was envisaged to be included in what eventually became the Insolvency Regulation. Consequently the Judgments Regulation and the Insolvency Regulation clearly dovetail when it comes to their respective scope of application]. That is because neither Lugano nor the Judgments Regulation consider choice of law: they are limited to jurisdiction.

On the substance of jurisdiction, the High Court found, applying relevant precedent (German Graphics, Gourdain, etc.), that the claims against both Kaupthing and Mr Johansson are within the Lugano Convention and not excluded by Article 1(2)(b) of that Convention. That meant that Icelandic law became applicable law by virtue of Directive 2001/24, and under Icelandic law proceedings against credit institutions being wound up come not be brought before the courts in ordinary (rather, a specific procedure before the winding-up committee of the bank applies). No jurisdiction in the UK therefore for the claim aganst the bank. The claim against Mr Johansson can go ahead.

[For the purpose of this blog, the jurisdictional issues are of most relevance. For Kaupthing it was even more important that the Bankruptcy Act in Iceland was found to have extra-territorial effect. The Act on Financial Undertakings implemented the winding-up directive and the Icelandic legislator intented it to have extra-territorial effect].

A complex set of arguments was raised and the judgment consequentially is not an easy or quick read. However the above should be the gist of it. I would suggest the findings are especially crucial with respect to the relation between Lugano /Brussels I, Directive 2001/24, and the Insolvency Regulation.

Geert.

The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law has recently launched a questionnaire regarding the legal effects of agreements in the area of international family law involving children, e.g., agreements in disputes regarding child custody, child support, relocation with a child, rights to visit and to have contact with a child.

[From the introduction to the questionnaire] – Agreements between parents or other family members in family disputes involving children have gained more importance and have become more frequent. This development is, in part, attributable to the enhanced promotion of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (such as mediation, conciliation, and negotiation) to achieve agreed solutions in these cases. In addition, party autonomy in the area of family law has gained more importance and States increasingly enable parents and other family members to conclude agreements that regulate child-related matters, in particular custody and contact issues. Due to today’s increasing “internationalisation” of the family, agreements are negotiated more and more in cross-border situations (e.g., one of the parents plans to relocate to his / her country of origin with the child and contact between the child and the other parent will be carried out abroad or would require the child to travel) which may require the recognition and enforcement of the agreement in a State (hereinafter referred to as “requested State”) other than the State in which it was concluded (hereinafter referred to as “State of origin”). 

The questionnaire has been sent to government officials and to the members of the International Hague Network of Judges, but Permanent Bureau is equally seeking the views of practitioners, such as lawyers and mediators, and other experts of international family law.

The questionnaire may be completed online here before 18 September 2015.