Agrégateur de flux

Cour d'appel d'Aix-en-Provence, 17 décembre 2020

Conseil de prud'hommes de Nantes, 27 novembre 2020

Tribunal judiciaire de Coutances, 16 décembre 2020

Tribunal judiciaire de Bobigny, 15 décembre 2020

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Cayenne, 6 octobre 2020

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Cayenne, 27 octobre 2020

Tribunal de police de Paris, 14 décembre 2020

Tribunal de police de Paris, 14 décembre 2020

Written by Andrew Dickinson (Fellow, St Catherine’s College and Professor of Law, University of Oxford)

The belated conclusion of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement did not dampen the impact of the UK’s departure from the European Union on judicial co-operation in civil matters between the UK’s three legal systems and those of the 27 remaining Members of the Union. At the turn of the year, the doors to the UK’s participation in the Recast Brussels I Regulation and the 2007 Lugano Convention closed. With no signal that the EU-27 will support the UK’s swift readmission to the latter, a new era for private international law in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland beckons.

The path that the United Kingdom has chosen to take allows it, and its constituent legal systems, to shape conflict of laws rules to serve the interests that they consider important and to form new international relationships, unfettered by the EU’s legislative and treaty making competences. This liberty will need to be exercised wisely if the UK’s legal systems are to maintain their positions in the global market for international dispute resolution, or at least mitigate any adverse impacts of the EU exit and the odour of uncertainty in the years following the 2016 referendum vote.

As the guidance recently issued by the Ministry of Justice makes clear, the UK’s detachment from the Brussels-Lugano regime will magnify the significance of the rules of jurisdiction formerly applied in cases falling under Art 4 of the Regulation (Art 2 of the Convention), as well as the common law rules that apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the absence of a treaty relationship. This is a cause for concern, as those rules are untidy and ill-suited for the 21st century.

If the UK’s legal systems are to prosper, it is vital that they should not erase the institutional memory of the three decades spent within the EU’s area of justice. They should seek to capture and bottle that experience: to see the advantages of close international co-operation in promoting the effective resolution of disputes, and to identify and, where possible, replicate successful features of the EU’s private international law framework, in particular under the Brussels-Lugano regime.

With these considerations in mind, I began the New Year by suggesting on my Twitter account (@Ruritanian) ten desirable steps towards establishing a more effective set of conflict of laws rules in England and Wales for civil and commercial matters. Ralf Michaels (@MichaelsRalf) invited me to write this up for ConflictofLaws.Net. What follows is an edited version of the original thread, with some further explanation and clarification of a kind not possible within the limits of the Twitter platform. This post does not specifically address the law of Scotland or of Northern Ireland, although many of the points made here take a broader, UK-wide view.

First, a stand-alone, freshly formulated set of rules of jurisdiction replacing the antiquated service based model. That model (Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rr 6.36-6.37 (CPR) to be read with Practice Direction 6B) dates back to the mid-19th century and has only been lightly patched up, albeit with significant ad hoc extensions, since then. The new rules should demand a significant connection between the parties or the subject matter of the claim and the forum of a kind that warrants the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction. In this regard, the Brussels-Lugano regime and the rules applied by the Scots courts (Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Sch 8) provide more suitable starting points than the grounds currently set out in the Practice Direction.

Taking this step would allow the rules on service to focus on the procedural function of ensuring that the recipient of a claim form or other document is adequately informed of the matters raised against it. It would enable the cumbersome requirement to obtain permission to serve a claim form outside England and Wales to be abolished, and with it the complex and costly requirement that the claimant show that England and Wales is the ‘proper place’ (ie clearly the appropriate forum) for the trial of the action. Instead, the claimant would need to certify that the court has jurisdiction under the new set of rules (as has been the practice when the rules of the Brussels-Lugano apply) and the defendant would need to make an application under CPR, Part 11 if it considers that the English court does not have or should not exercise jurisdiction. The claimant would bear the burden of establishing jurisdiction, but the defendant would bear the burden of persuading the court that it should not be exercised. This brings us to the second point.

Secondly, stronger judicial (or legislative) control of the expensive and resource eating Goffian forum conveniens model. Senior judges have repeatedly noted the excesses of the Spiliada regime, in terms of the time, expense and judicial resource spent in litigating questions about the appropriate forum (see, most recently, Lord Briggs in Vedanta Resources Plc v Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [6]-[14]), yet they and the rule makers have done little or nothing about it. In many ways, the model is itself to blame with its wide ranging evaluative enquiry and micro-focus on the shape of the trial. Shifting the onus to the defendant in all cases (see above) and an emphasis on the requirement that another forum be ‘clearly [ie manifestly] more appropriate’ than England would be useful first steps to address the excesses, alongside more pro-active case management through (eg) strict costs capping, a limit in the number of pages of evidence and submissions for each side and a greater willingness to require the losing party to pay costs on an indemnity basis.

Thirdly, a clipping of the overly active and invasive wings of the anti-suit injunction. English judges have become too willing to see the anti-suit injunction, once a rare beast, as a routine part of the judicial arsenal. They have succumbed to what I have termed the ‘interference paradox’ ((2020) 136 Law Quarterly Review 569): a willingness to grant anti-suit injunctions to counter interferences with their own exercise of jurisdiction coupled with an overly relaxed attitude to the interferences that their own orders wreak upon foreign legal systems and the exercise of constitutional rights within those systems. Moreover, the grounds for granting anti-suit injunctions are ill defined and confusing – in this regard, the law has travelled backwards rather than forwards in the past century (another Goffian project). Much to be done here.

Fourthly, steps to accede to the Hague Judgments Convention and to persuade others to accede to the Hague Choice of Court Convention. Although the gains from acceding to the Judgments Convention may be small, at least in the short term, it would send a strong signal as to the UK’s wish to return to centre stage at the Hague Conference, and in the international community more generally, and may strengthen its hand in discussions for a future Judgments Convention. By contrast, the success of the Hague Choice of Court Convention is of fundamental importance for the UK, given that it wishes to encourage parties to choose its courts as the venue for dispute resolution and to have judgments given by those courts recognised and enforced elsewhere.

Fifthly, a review of the common law rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments, which are in places both too broad and too narrow. These rules have been little changed since the end of the 19th century. They allow the enforcement of foreign default judgments based only on the defendant’s temporary presence in the foreign jurisdiction at the time of service, while treating as irrelevant much more substantial factors such as the place of performance of a contractual obligation or place of commission of a tort (even in personal injury cases). Parliamentary intervention is likely to be needed here if a satisfactory set of rules is to emerge.

Sixthly, engagement with the EU’s reviews of the Rome I and II Regulations to test if our choice of law rules require adjustment. The UK has wisely carried forward the rules of applicable law contained in the Rome Regulations. Although not perfect, those rules are a significant improvement on the local rules that they replaced. The EU’s own reviews of the Regulations (Rome II currently underway) will provide a useful trigger for the UK to re-assess its own rules with a view to making appropriate changes, whether keeping in step with or departing from the EU model.

Seventhly, statutory rules governing the law applicable to assignments (outside Rome I) and interests in securities. The UK had already chosen not to participate in the upcoming Regulation on the third party effects of assignments, but will need to keep a close eye on the outcome of discussions and on any future EU initiatives with respect to the law applicable to securities and should consider legislation to introduce a clear and workable set of choice of law rules with respect to these species of intangible property. These matters are too important to be left to the piecemeal solutions of the common law.

Eighthly, a measured response to the challenges presented by new technology, recognising that the existing (choice of law) toolkit is fit for purpose. In December 2020, the UK Law Commission launched a consultation on Smart Contracts with a specific section (ch 7) on conflict of laws issues. This is a welcome development. It is hoped that the Law Commission will seek to build upon existing solutions for offline and online contracts, rather than seeking to draw a sharp distinction between ‘smart’ and ‘backward’ contracts.

Ninthly, changes to the CPR to reduce the cost and inconvenience of introducing and ascertaining foreign law. The English civil procedure model treats foreign law with suspicion, and places a number of obstacles in the way of its effective deployment in legal proceedings. The parties and their legal teams are left in control of the presentation of the case, with little or no judicial oversight. This approach can lead to uncertainty at the time of trial, and to the taking of opportunistic points of pleading or evidence. A shift in approach towards more active judicial case management is needed, with a move away from (expensive and often unreliable) expert evidence towards allowing points of foreign law to be dealt with by submissions in the same way as points of English law, especially in less complex cases.

Tenthly, measures to enhance judicial co-operation between the UK’s (separate) legal systems, creating a common judicial area. It is a notable feature of the Acts of Union that the UK’s constituent legal systems stand apart. In some areas (notably, the recognition and enforcement of judgments – Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Sch 6 and 7), the rules operate in a way that allows the recognition of a single judicial area in which barriers to cross-border litigation have been removed. In other respects, however (for example, the service of documents, the taking of evidence and the ascertainment of foreign law), the UK’s legal systems lack the tools that would facilitate closer co-operation and the more effective resolution of disputes. The UK’s legal systems should consider what has worked for the EU, with its diverse range of legal systems, and for Commonwealth federal States such as Australia and work together to adopt comprehensive legislation on a Single UK Judicial Area.

31 December 2020, the Seventh day of Christmas, delivered a hard Brexit in the area of judicial co-operation in civil matters – the core subject area of this blog. The moment the draft  Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK broke, a few of us poured over the text to find any deal on the issue – in vain. Peter Bert has reporting and analysis here and here; Ralf Michaels summarised here (he also links to our Twitter reactions, which readers might find of use) and Marta Requejo Isidro links further to official documents here.

The UK’s application to join Lugano is still out there (the EU have an effective veto), however as things stand it seems unlikely the EU will agree.

Andrew Dickinson summarises the many things on the UK’s to do list here. As was clear to many of us, Sylvester 2020 was never going to be an end to, rather the start of interesting times in the sector.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 1.36 ff.

Not much to be reported on the activity of the Court for January 2021 on PIL (nor for February, as of today).

The Opinion by AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona in C-913/19, CNP, will be delivered on 14 January. The request comes from the District Court in Białystok, and concerns an insurance case involving the interpretation of Chapter I, Section 3, of the Brussels I bis Regulation, and the systematic relationship with Articles 7.2 and 7.5:

(1) Should Article 13(2), in conjunction with Article 10, of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 … be interpreted as meaning that, in a dispute between a trader and an insurance company, the former having acquired from an injured party a claim arising from civil liability insurance against that insurance company, the establishment of court jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(2) or Article 7(5) of the regulation is not precluded?

(2) If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, should Article 7(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 … be interpreted as meaning that a commercial company operating in a Member State which adjusts losses under compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles pursuant to a contract with an insurance undertaking established in another Member State is a branch, agency or other establishment of that insurance undertaking?

(3) If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative, should Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 … be interpreted as meaning that it constitutes an independent basis for the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State in which the harmful event occurred, before which court the creditor who has acquired the claim from the injured party under compulsory insurance against civil liability brings an action against an insurance undertaking established in another Member State?

The case will be decided by a chamber of five judges, with Mme Rossi reporting.

Next date will be 28 January, with the hearing in C-603/20 PPU, a case on the Brussels II bis Regulation from the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Family Division, filed last in October 2020. The proceedings relate to the abduction of a girl to India. The question submitted to the Court reads as follows:

Does Article 10 of Brussels 2 retain jurisdiction, without limit of time, in a member state if a child habitually resident in that member state was wrongfully removed to (or retained in) a non-member state where she, following such removal (or retention), in due course became habitually resident?

The case has been allocated to a chamber of five judges, with Mr. Regan reporting. M. Rantos has been appointed AG.

Laurent Dargent, chef des rubriques Droit civil et Avocat, devient rédacteur en chef de Dalloz actualité.

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Le Parlement européen a adopté le 16 décembre 2020, trois mois après le Conseil, l’accord sur la révision de la directive relative à l’eau potable. Publiée au Journal officiel de l’Union dans les prochains jours, la nouvelle directive devra être transposée par les États membres dans un délai de deux ans.

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Symeon Symeonides, without doubt the doyen of US conflict of laws, just published what he says is the last of his annual surveys of American Choice of Law. (The series will be continued by John F. Coyle, William S. Dodge, Aaron D. Simowitz, and Melissa L.Tatum, suggesting it takes four of our most eminent scholars to replace Symeonides.)

As everyone in our discipline knows, reliably, at the end of the year, Symeon has posted his survey of conflict-of-laws decisions rendered over the year, according to Westlaw. He would assemble the most important decisions (of which he finds a lot), organize them around themes, and comment on them, always with (sometimes admirable) restraint from criticism. Anyone who has ever tried to survey the case law of an entire year in a jurisdiction knows how much work that is. (We at Max Planck, with IPRspr, certainly do.)

The service rendered to the discipline is invaluable. Conflict-of-laws opinions are hard to track, not least because courts themselves do not always announce them as such, and because they cover all areas of the law. Moreover, conflict of laws in the United States remains disorganized, with different states following different methods. (Symeon helpfully provides a table listing each state’s methodological approach.) Of course, Symeonides also compiled his superb knowledge of the case law in his Hague Lectures on the past, present, and future of the Choice-of-Law Revolution (republished as a book) and his book on (US) choice of law in the series of Oxford Commentaries.

Incredibly, this is Symeon’s 30th survey in 34 years. In this one, he uses the occasion to ruminate about what the 30 years have taught him: reading all the cases, and not missing the forest for the trees, enabled him (and thereby us) to gain a truer view of the conflicts landscape.( Of course, Symeonides also compiled his superb knowledge of the case law in his Hague Lectures on the past, present, and future of the Choice-of-Law Revolution (republished as a book) and his book on (US) choice of law in the series of Oxford Commentaries.) Such surveying shows that some of our assumptions are dated, as he showed in two special surveys on product liability and more generally cross-border torts. And it shows, as he beautifully puts it, that judges are not stupid, just busy.  Which is one of the reasons why the practice of conflicts owes such an amount of gratitude for these surveys.

Our discipline has seen a theoretical revival over the last ten or so years. A discipline once viewed as overly technical, doctrinal and untheoretical (a “dismal swamp”, in Dean Prosser’s much-cited words) is now being analyzed with newly-found theoretical and interdisciplinary interest – from economic analyses to political theory, philosophy, and even gender theory. The risk of such work is always to disentangle from the actual practice of the discipline, and thereby to lose what is arguably one of conflicts’ greatest assets: the concrete case. Symeonides (himself no enemy to methodological and sometimes theoretical discussions) has, with his annual surveys, made sure that such theories could always remain tied to the actual practice. For this, he deserves gratitude not only from practice but also from theory of private international law. His oeuvre is, of course, much much richer than the surveys. But even if he had written nothing beyond the surveys (and truth be told, it is not fully clear how he ever managed to write so much beyond them), his stature would have been earned.

The last twenty of Symeonides’ surveys have been compiled in a three volume edition published by Brill, a flyer allows for a 25% discount. While you wait for delivery (or maybe for approval of the loan you need to afford the books), you may want to download his lates survey, read Symeonides’ own thirty-year retrospective in the beginning, and marvel.

MF Moscati, M Palmer, and M Roberts just published a book titled “Comparative Dispute Resolution.”

The blurb reads as follows:

Comparative Dispute Resolution offers an original, wide-ranging, and invaluable corpus of chapters on dispute resolution. Enriched by a broad, comparative vision and a focus on the processes used to handle disputes, this study adds significantly to the discourse around comparative legal studies.

From a comparative perspective, this Research Handbook analyses the field of dispute processing, generally and across a broad range of legal systems and their legal cultures. It explores the nature of disputes and the range of basic processes used in their resolution, examining emerging issues in theory and practice and analysing differing traditions of dispute resolution and their ‘modernization’. Offering a balanced combination of theory and praxis, chapters present new understandings of theoretical, comparative and transnational dimensions of the manner in which societies and their legal systems respond to difficulties in social relations.

Showcasing opportunities for new research and debate, Comparative Dispute Resolution will be helpful to practitioners and others engaged in the practice of handling disputes. Students and scholars in disciplines such as law, sociology, politics and psychology will also find this topical Research Handbook useful in their understanding of the theory and practice of disputing and dispute management, legal reform and enhanced access to justice.

More information on the book can be found here

As reported in other blogs (see for instance here and here), the Trade and Cooperation Agreement that the EU and the UK managed to conclude right before the end of the Brexit transition period does not seem to make any provision for judicial cooperation in civil matters.

On the European side, the Notice to Stakeholders issued by the European Commission in August 2020 already took lack of agreement in this area for granted.

Surprisingly, the press release of the Commission of 24 December 2020, under the heading “A new partnership for our citizens’ security”, states

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement establishes a new framework for law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil law matters. (italics added)

And to top it all, have a look a recital 47 of the Recast Service Regulation:

In accordance with Article 3 and Article 4a(1) of Protocol No 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the United Kingdom and Ireland have notified their wish to take part in the adoption and application of this Regulation.

Probably just a clerical mistake.

On the UK side, the gov.uk website on Brexit was updated on 31 December 2020 (see here), providing information on the rules applicable to cross border cases in civil and commercial matters involving the courts of England and Wales. Links to all relevant Acts and Regulations are found there, too. For cross-border divorces, nothing has been added to the previous information, which already distinguished between proceedings initiated pre- and post-Brexit. The same applies to maintenance and disputes about parental responsibility.

The latest amendments to the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) Arbitration Rules enter into force today, providing for a restyling to the 2012 rules (as earlier amended in 2017). The restyling aims to fine-tune the current rules by increasing flexibility, efficiency and transparency of the ICC arbitrations and taking in the practice that the International Court of Arbitration (“Court”) has meanwhile developed and consolidated.

This post briefly lists the main novelties.

1.Multi-party disputes (and disputes arising out of multi-tier contracts) will profit from an improved joinder and consolidation regime. The new rules entitle the tribunal, once constituted and upon request of a party addressed to the Secretariat, to join third parties after considering “all the relevant circumstances”, provided that the additional parties accept the constitution of the tribunal and agree to the Terms of Reference, where applicable (Article 7 (5)). Among the circumstances to be taken into account, the tribunal shall assess prime facie its jurisdiction over the additional party, the timing of the request for joinder, possible conflicts of interest and the impact of the joinder on the proceedings. As regards consolidation, it is also available in the case of two or more ICC arbitrations in which the disputed claims are made under multiple arbitration agreements (Article 10 (b)).

2.Yesterday a year closed which saw arbitration increasingly making use of virtual hearings and electronic filings, thereby experiencing a process of digitalization against the backdrop of the pandemic. Many benefits for the “good administration of arbitration” easily came into light, compared with the difficulties for arbitrators, parties and staff to personally meet.

Admittedly, the ongoing efforts to make arbitration resilient in these dramatic days should result in getting it more efficient (and cheaper) also in the upcoming post-pandemic era.

In this vein, the new ICC rules allow the tribunal to decide, after consulting the parties, that hearings can be conducted remotely (Article 26 (1)), thereby easing the proceedings conduct and adding to efficiency in the light of the circumstances of the case. The option for electronic submission is acknowledged for the Request for Arbitration, the Answer and any written communication.

3.Any revision, even the slightest, in the realm of arbitration always attempts to strengthen transparency, equality of parties, and enforceability of the awards.

Article 11 (7) compels parties to disclose any third-party funder (referred to as “any non-party which has entered into an arrangement for the funding of claims or defences and under which it has an economic interest in the outcome of the arbitration”). This will assist arbitrators in complying with their duties of impartiality and independence, while lessening the deal of information that parties habitually keep confidential. The aim to reinforce transparency, impartiality and independence also marks the contents of Article 17 (2) and Article 13 (6). The first empowers the tribunal to “take any measure necessary to avoid a conflict of interest” stemming from a change in party representation. The tribunal will act so only after giving an opportunity to the parties to comment in writing within a suitable period of time. Article 13 (6) takes care of impartiality and independence in the appointment of arbitrators in investment arbitration, requiring the prospected arbitrators not to have the same nationality of any party.

Transparency also underpins the amendment of Appendices I and II, which respectively gather the Statute and the Internal Rules of the Court. Particularly, Appendix II features new Article 5, which governs the communication from the Court of the reasons of its decisions. Only exceptionally may the Court refuse such communication.

With the view to protecting the equality of parties and the validity of the award, the Court may exceptionally appoint each member of the tribunal (Article 12 (9)). This power aims to discourage practices which threaten the validity of the tribunal constitution, such as drafting arbitration agreements with one-sided clauses for the appointment of the members.

4.A clarification has been inserted as to the tribunal’s power to render “additional awards” in case of claims that it “omitted to decide” (Article 36 (3)). Parties have to apply to the Secretariat for an additional award only in respect of “claims made in proceedings”.

5.Finally, fast track arbitration will be open to more transactions as the maximum dispute value to trigger expedited procedures raises from 2 to 3 US$ million for arbitration agreements concluded as of today. The chance to opt-in for applying the expedite procedure to higher-value disputes remains, as it does the opt-out and the Court’s assessment, upon request of a party, that the expedite procedure is inappropriate in the circumstances.

In the light of foregoing, it is apparent that, even if no full-blown revision unfolds to the arbitration community’s eyes, the listed “adjustments” are designed to benefit parties, arbitral tribunal and staff in the short and long term.

Membership

On 4 December 2020, Mongolia was issued with a certificate confirming an affirmative vote in favour of its admission as a Member of the HCCH, following a six-month voting period which ended on 3 December 2020. Mongolia has now been invited to deposit an instrument of acceptance of the HCCH Statute to become a Member of the HCCH.

Meetings & Events

On 3 December 2020, the HCCH and ASADIP co-hosted an International Conference on the 2019 Judgments Convention. A full recording of the event, held in Spanish, is available on the HCCH Facebook Page and the HCCH YouTube Channel.

On 11 December 2020, the HCCH and UNCITRAL co-hosted a Virtual Colloquium on Applicable Law in Insolvency Proceedings. More information, including documentation and audio recordings, is available here.

From 14 to 17 December 2020, the Administrative Cooperation Working Group on the 2007 Child Support Convention met via videoconference. The Group provided guidance in relation to the development of a standard statistical report under the Child Support Convention, including the use of the iSupport case management system, and other matters such as recommended forms and country profiles. More information is available here.

Publications & Documentation

On 22 December 2020, the Permanent Bureau announced the publication of the 4th Edition of the Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Evidence Convention (Evidence Handbook). This edition commemorates the 50th anniversary of the Convention and is complemented by the Guide to Good Practice on the Use of Video-Link released earlier this year. More information is available here.

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

As president of EAPIL and an editor of the blog, and on behalf of all the officers of the association and the editors of the EAPIL blog, I would like to wish to the members of the association and the readers of the blog the best for year 2021.

In 2020, the blog has published 325 posts. In case you missed some of them, here are the 15 most popular ones:

1. Corona Virus and Applicable Law
2. COVID-19 and the Right to Respect for Family Life under Article 8 ECHR
3. UK Applies for Accession to Lugano Convention
4. Paris Court Issues Anti Anti Suit Injunction
5. New Courts for International Commercial Disputes in Germany
6. The Impact of Corona Virus on the Management of Judicial Proceedings in Italy
7. Law and Global Value Chains at the Time of Covid-19: A Systemic Approach Beyond Contracts and Tort
8. French Supreme Court Accepts First Degree Renvoi in Parenthood Matters
9. Wikingerhof: A View from Oxford
10. Another Preliminary Reference on the Succession Regulation Involving (and Referred by) a Polish Notary
11. CJEU Significantly Weakens Jurisdiction Clauses in Case Assignment
12. The COVID-19 Crisis and Employment Contracts: the Italian Emergency Legislation on Dismissals
13. Anti-Anti-Suit Injunctions by German Courts – What Goes Around, Comes Around
14. On ‘Habitual Residence’ under the EU Regulations on Family Matters: Once and for All?
15. Human Rights in Global Supply Chains: Do We Need to Amend the Rome II Regulation?