Agrégateur de flux

L’ordonnance relative à la prorogation des délais échus pendant la période d’urgence sanitaire , adoptée hier en conseil des ministres, prévoit une période spéciale qui ira du 12 mars à un mois après la fin de l’état d’urgence sanitaire.

en lire plus

On 26 July 2019, the Greek Supreme Court gave a ruling involving the interpretation of the Brussels II bis Regulation in a matter of parental responsibility (Ruling No 927 of 2019).

The facts

A. and B., of Greek and German nationality, respectively, an unmarried couple, had two children. They all lived in Greece.

The mother, B., seised the Court of First Instance of Rhodes seeking the exclusive custody of the children as well as an interim measure to the same effect. In the resulting summary proceedings, A., the father, declared that he would not object, as long as the court ordered that the children keep their habitual residence in Rhodes. B. stated that she did not intend to relocate the children.

The Court provisionally granted exclusive custody to B., without issuing any order regarding the habitual residence of the children. A hearing on the merits was scheduled to take place a few months later.

Shortly after the above prrovisional order was issued, B. informed A. that she planned to spend Christmas with the children at her parents’ house in Germany.

A. formally notified B. that he disagreed. Nevertheless, B. travelled to Germany with the children. Although she had bought return tickets, she eventually decided to stay in Germany with the children.

As a reaction, A. sought the revocation of the provisional measures on custody, as well as the return of the children to Greece and an order granting him exclusive custody rights. A.’s efforts were initially successful. The provisional measures were revoked, and custody was provisionally granted to him.

B., however, challenged the jurisdiction of the Greek courts over A.’s action for custody.

The Rhodes Court of First Instance considered the challenge to be founded and accordingly declined jurisdiction. A.’s appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Dodecanese Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court’s ruling

The case reached the Supreme Court. The latter began by considering Article 8 of the Brussels II bis Regulation, whereby, as a general rule, jurisdiction over matters of parental responsibility lies with the courts of the Member State where the child habitually resides. The Supreme Court held that relocation while proceedings are pending does not affect the jurisdiction of the court seised.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the practical difficulties that relocation may entail in particular for the parent not exercising custody rights have no bearing as such on the issue of jurisdiction, which depends solely on the habitual residence of the children at the time the court is seised. Thus, once the habitual residence of a child has been transferred from one Member State to another, the courts of the latter State come to have jurisdiction, unless the transfer amounts to a wrongful removal or retention, as defined in Article 2(11) of the Regulation.

Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court confirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeal. Specifically, it held that when A. filed his action (in February 2015), the children were already habitually resident in Germany. Actually, the names of the children had been entered in the register of the population of the town of Kevelaer in February 2014; they benefited from a health insurance there since April 2014; they attended a kindergarten there; they had developed strong relations with B.’s relatives living nearby. The Court also noted that the children, who were also German nationals, spoke German, whereas they barely spoke any Greek.

The Supreme Court held that no wrongful removal had taken place in the circumstances, stressing that, at the time when the transfer took place, B. had temporary exclusive custody rights. Against this backdrop, relocation was lawful, and A. should have rather pursued a re-arrangement of his contact rights with the children.

The statement made by B. in the course of the summary proceedings that she did not intend to relocate the children was not considered to be decisive. Given that B. had exclusive custody rights over children, she was entitled, pursuant to Article 2(9) of the Regulation, to determine the children’s place of residence.

With respect to Article 10, on jurisdiction in case of child abduction, the Supreme Court found that no wrongful retention had taken place after the revocation of the provisional measure, which granted A. exclusive custody rights. The Court noted that A. had not sought to have the new provisional measures recognised and enforced in Germany, and held that A.’s assertion that the latter measures are enforceable without any procedure being required is erroneous. The revocation of a provisional measure, the Court held, is not a judgment for the purposes of Article 11(8) of the Brussels II bis Regulation. Actually, at that time, the children had already an established place of residence in Germany.

The final line of defence for A. was Article 12(3) of the Brussels II bis Regulation. This provides that the courts of a Member State have jurisdiction over parental responsibility in proceedings unrelated to a matrimonial matter where: (a) the child has a substantial connection with that Member State, namely by virtue of the fact that one of the holders of parental responsibility is habitually resident in that Member State, (b) their jurisdiction ‘has been accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings at the time the court is seised and is in the best interests of the child’.

In particular, A. argued that B. had implicitly accepted the jurisdiction of Greek courts by initially filing an action before the Court of First Instance of Rhodes.

The Supreme Court dismissed the argument. First, it stated that, by filing her initial petition, B. could not be deemed to have tacitly accepted the jurisdiction of Greek courts for any ensuing proceedings. Secondly, the Court noted that the initial action had been brought prior to the relocation of B. and the children in Germany, adding that B. had then asked for her action in Greece to be discontinued. Finally, the Court observed that no tacit acceptance could be deemed to exist, since B. expressly challenged the jurisdiction of Greek courts as a result of A.’s action.

In Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council v KC et al [2020] EWFC 20, Dancey J at  62 ff is the first UK judge to my knowledge to discuss the implications of the UK’s separation from the EU’s civil procedure /justice and home affairs agenda, particularly in the transition period. It includes a discussion of the UK’s Brexit (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/2003, reg 3, and the European Commission notice on transition provisions.

The care proceedings concern W, a girl aged 9, nearly 10. W’s parents, who were married, are Polish nationals and W was born there. Following the separation of the parents in Poland in April 2016, contested contact proceedings there resulted in an order providing that W live with the mother with contact to the father. The father’s parental responsibility was limited to decisions about medical treatment and education. Following the breakdown of the father’s contact with W, the mother brought her to the UK in June 2018 where they have remained since. That was done without the father’s agreement, although he was aware the mother planned to relocate and acquiesced once the move had taken place. The mother did not tell the father of her and W’s location within the UK.

The legal framework therefore is Brussels IIa, Regulation 2201/2003. Dancey J at 63 concedes that by reg 8 of 2019/2003, dealing with saving/transitional provisions, the UK’s revocation from Brussels IIa does not apply to proceedings before a court in a Member State seised before 31 December 2020. However he then refers to the EC Notice to Stakeholders: Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU Rules in the Field of Civil Justice and Private International Law: 18/1/2019, and suggests it means that EU rules on recognition and enforcement will not apply to a UK judgment, even if the judgment was given, or enforcement proceedings started, before 1 January 2021 unless the judgment has been exequatured (declared enforceable by the courts of the Member State where recognition or enforcement is required) before 1 January 2021. Support for his opinion is found I suspect mostly in Heading 2.2 of that Notice.

At 66 Dancey J suggests in practice the consequence should not be too dramatic in the case at issue for ‘one or other of the parents should apply promptly in Poland for a declaration recognising this judgment and the order that will follow (exequaturing the judgment).’ That absence of real delay in the case at issue may well be true (it is confirmed by a letter from the Polish consulate) however the  implications are already clear and no surprise. Enforcement of UK judgments will be a lot less smooth post Brexit.

Geert.

Bru IIA Regulation
Incl 1st (?)) application of Jurisdiction, Judgments (Family) part of the #Brexit (EU Exit) Regulations 2019/2003, reg 3.
EC notice on transition provisions
Exequatur needed even if judgment was given, or enforcement proceedings started, before 1 January 2021. https://t.co/Ve8MKYzMdd

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 20, 2020

Dans une communication n° 2020/C 91/01, publiée au JOUE du 20 mars 2020, la Commission européenne annonce l’encadrement temporaire des mesures d’aide d’État visant à soutenir l’économie dans le contexte de l’épidémie de covid-19. Ce document décrit les possibilités offertes aux États membres par le droit de l’Union pour garantir la liquidité et l’accès au financement des entreprises et fournit dès lors un cadre juridique qui s’impose aux autorités françaises.

en lire plus

Dalloz actualité diffuse les 26 ordonnances, après leur passage au Conseil d’État, avant la présentation en conseil des ministres.

en lire plus

The European Law Institute‘s (ELI) members on 21 March 2020 approved the Report on the Protection of Adults in International Situations.

This report is the outcome of the work of a team of academics and professionals chaired by Pietro Franzina and Richard Frimston. It sets out the current legal framework on the protection of persons above 18 years old who are not in a position to protect their own insterests (due to an impairment or incapacity).

The Report acknowledges the importance in this field of the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults and encourages further ratification of it. The Convention has been ratified by only nine EU Member States (and signed by an additional seven).

After investigating the institutional possiblities of EU action on this topic, the Report also calls for action, both legislative and non-legislative, to complement the Convention. Possible measures include providing a (limited) choice of juridisdiction and securing the effective circulation of private mandates.

The European Law Institute‘s (ELI) members on 21 March 2020 approved the Report on the Protection of Adults in International Situations.

This report is the outcome of the work of a team of academics and professionals chaired by Pietro Franzina and Richard Frimston. It sets out the current legal framework on the protection of persons above 18 years old who are not in a position to protect their own insterests (due to an impairment or incapacity).

The Report acknowledges the importance in this field of the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults and encourages further ratification of it. The Convention has been ratified by only nine EU Member States (and signed by an additional seven).

After investigating the institutional possiblities of EU action on this topic, the Report also calls for action, both legislative and non-legislative, to complement the Convention. Possible measures include providing a (limited) choice of juridisdiction and securing the effective circulation of private mandates.

On 3 March 2020, the international chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal confirmed that French courts may issue an anti anti suit injunction against two US corporations which had obtained an anti suit injunction from a US court in a patent case.

When the Paris court of appeal delivered its judgment, the French anti anti suit injunction had already proven successful, as the motion for the anti suit injunction filed before the US court had been withdrawn in the meantime. The French higher court nevertheless addressed the issue and confirmed that the Paris first instance court had the power to grant the remedy.

Background

The dispute arose between, on the one hand, various companies of the Lenovo and Motorola groups and, on the other hand IPCom, a German company.  IPCom claims it owns various patents that Lenovo and Motorola use for manufacturing their devices. Lenovo and Motorola claim that IPCom did not offer them a license on appropriate terms and conditions (fair, reasonable and non discriminatory, or FRAND), and in particular that IPCom royalty demands violate these terms.

Initial Proceedings in California

In March 2019, Lenovo Inc. (‘Lenovo US’) and Motorola Mobility LLC (‘Motorola US’) sued IPCom before a US District in San Jose, California, for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, antitrust monopolization and declaratory judgment of non violation of certain U.S. patents. The suit was predicated on the allegation that IPCom failed to offer Lenovo and Motorola a license to its alleged standards essential patents (SEPs) relevant to the 2G, 3G and 4G cellular standards on FRAND terms and conditions.

IPCom challenged the jurisdiction of the U.S. court. It explained that it is a small company, employing six people only in Germany, and it argued that its contacts with the USA were not significant enough to justify the jurisdiction of a U.S. court under the Due Process jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.

In December 2019, the U.S. court accepted that the plaintiffs had failed to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over IPCom and thus limited discovery to the issue of personal jurisdiction.

Subsequent Proceedings in England

IPCom counterattacked in England, where it initiated proceedings against Lenovo UK and Motorola UK in July 2019. I understand that IPCom claims revolve around the allegation that it owns certain patents, and that these patents were infringed by the two UK defendants.

In September 2019, Lenovo US and Motorola US sought an anti suit injunction from the US court against IPCom and requested that the California court :

(1) enjoin IPCom from prosecuting the patent infringement action IPCom filed in the United Kingdom against Plaintiffs’ U.K. affiliates; and

(2) enjoin IPCom from instituting against Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ affiliates, or any of their customers any action alleging infringement of IPCom’s claimed 2G, 3G and/or 4G SEPs during the pendency of this action.

In November 2019, the London High Court issued an anti anti suit injunction against Lenovo UK and Motorola UK enjoining them from preventing the continuation of the English proceedings.

The French Injunctions

In October 2019, IPCom had also initiated proceedings in Paris, but this time against the Lenovo and Motorola US and French entities.

IPCom first initiated interim proceedings and sought injunctions against all the defendants. In November 2019, IPCom also initiated proceedings on the merits against the French subsidiaries only.

On November 8th, 2019, the Paris first instance court issued two anti anti suit injunctions.

The first was concerned with the existing US application. The French court ordered Lenovo US and Motorola US to withdraw their motion for an anti suit injunction in the California proceedings, insofar as such motion related to any judicial proceedings initiated by IPCom and alleging infringements of the French part of the European patent owned by IPCom, materialising by acts on French territory.

The second was a prospective anti anti suit injunction, whereby the court enjoined Lenovo US and Motorola US from initiating any such new proceedings (i.e. seeking an anti suit injunction), before any foreign court.

Both injunctions were to be sanctioned by a civil penalty (astreinte) of € 200 000 per day of non compliance (first injunction) or per instance of violation (second injunction).

Lenovo US and Motorola US moved to give notice of partial withdrawal of their motion in the U.S., in accordance with the French injunctions.

By a judgment of 3 March 2020, the Paris Court of Appeal confirmed the power to issue the first injunction. It held, however, that the second injunction was too broad (no limitation of either its temporal or territorial scope), and did not meet the requirements for issuing interim remedies, as the goal was neither to stop actual harm, nor to prevent imminent harm.

The judgment focused on whether the general requirements for granting interim relief were met. French courts have general power under the Code of civil procedure (Article 835) to issue interim measures for the purpose of stopping manifestly illegal harm. The court found that the harm was to be enjoined by the U.S. court from initiating proceedings alleging infringement of the patent in France, and that the harm was manifestly illegal, because it violated the exclusive jurisdiction of French courts and two fundamental rights of IPCom: its right to (intellectual) property and its right to a fair trial.

The Power of French Courts to Issue Anti Anti Suit Injunctions

French courts were long hostile to anti suit injunctions. In 2004, the French supreme court for private and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) had ruled in an obiter dictum that anti suit injunctions violate French public policy as the affect the jurisdiction of French courts. However, in 2009, the Cour de cassation qualified this ruling, by holding that foreign anti suit injunctions would not violate French public policy where their aim was solely to sanction a pre-existing contractual obligation, i.e. a jurisdiction clause (in favour of a foreign court).

After the 2009 decision, they were some attempts to go one step further and seek anti-suit injunctions from French courts. As far as I know, they all failed (see, e.g., the Vivendi case in 2010).

In Lenovo, the issue was obviously different, as the parties sought a remedy against anti suit injunctions. While the court’s decision is quite remarkable, the judgment did not attempt to lay down general principles. It is a narrow decision, focused on the general requirements for granting interim measures.

Yet, two series of reasons should be more specifically underlined.

First, the court insisted that French courts had exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the infringements to a French patent (here, the French part of a European patent). This suggests that it would be more difficult to obtain a similar remedy in a contractual or tort case, where no court could seriously claim exclusive jurisdiction (except in presence of a jurisdiction clause).

Secondly, the court ruled that the U.S. anti suit injunction would violate several fundamental rights of the German plaintiff. The first was the right to property under Protocol 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights.  The second was the right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR, and more precisely, it seems, the right of access to court. The court explained that, because the patent of the plaintiff was to expire shortly, the anti suit injunction would, in effect, deprive IPCom from its IP right. The court added that the plaintiff could not be protected in the meantime by the U.S. court, since the French court had exclusive jurisdiction. This last proposition is not fully convincing. It is not because French courts consider their jurisdiction as exclusive that a U.S. court would necessarily decline jurisdiction.

Ultimately, Lenovo was probably a good case for issuing such an injunction. The  jurisdiction of the French court was strong, while there were already signs that the foreign court might decline jurisdiction.

In case you are looking for something to read while many parts of the world are under some form of lockdown, you may be pleased to learn that the conference volume of the 2nd German Conference for Young Scholars in PIL, which took place at University of Würzburg in 2019, has recently been published. It includes nine contributions by young researchers, including two English papers, on the conference theme of PIL between Tradition and Innovation as well as a keynote address by Professor Jürgen Basedow. Further information can be found on the publisher’s website.

What is more, the date and theme for the next iteration of the conference have just been announced. The conference will take place on 18 and 19 March 2021 (when Corona lockdowns will hopefully be no more than a distant memory) at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg and explore the theme of PIL for a better world: Vision – Reality – Aberration?. Further information can be found in the German and English Save-the-Date announcements as well as on the conference website.

Christoph Schmon is the author of The Interconnection of the EU Regulations Brussels I Recast and Rome I – Jurisdiction and Law, published by Springer.

The publisher’s blurb reads as follows.

This book deals with the interconnection between the Brussels I Recast and Rome I Regulations and addresses the question of uniform interpretation. A consistent understanding of scope and provisions is suggested by the preamble of the Rome I Regulation. Without doubt, it is fair to presume that the same terms bear the same meaning throughout the Regulations. The author takes a closer look at the Regulations’ systems, guiding principles, and their balance of flexibility and legal certainty. He starts from the premise that such analysis should prove particularly rewarding as both legal acts have their specific DNA: The Brussels I Recast Regulation has a procedural focus when it governs the allocation of jurisdiction and the free circulation of judgments. The multilateral rules under the Rome I Regulation, by contrast, are animated by conflict of laws methods and focus on the delimitation of legal systems.

See here for further information.

In case you are looking for something to read while many parts of the world are under some form of lockdown, you may be pleased to learn that the conference volume of the 2nd German Conference for Young Scholars in PIL, which took place at University of Würzburg in 2019, has recently been published. It includes nine contributions by young researchers, including two English papers, on the conference theme of PIL between Tradition and Innovation as well as a keynote address by Professor Jürgen Basedow. Further information can be found on the publisher’s website.

What is more, the date and theme for the next iteration of the conference have just been announced. The conference will take place on 18 and 19 March 2021 (when Corona lockdowns will hopefully be no more than a distant memory) at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg and explore the theme of PIL for a better world: Vision – Reality – Aberration?. Further information can be found in the German and English Save-the-Date announcements as well as on the conference website.

On 27 February 2020 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) gave its ruling in BALTA, a case concerning the enforceability of choice-of-court clauses in insurance contracts (an English translation of the judgment was not available at the time of publishing this post).

The Court had addressed a similar issue in 2005, in the case of Société financière et industrielle du Peloux. It held then that a jurisdiction clause in an insurance contract cannot be relied upon against an insured who has not expressly subscribed to that clause and is domiciled in a State other than that of the policy-holder and the insurer.

BALTA concerned an insurance contract covering ‘large risks’ within the meaning of the Solvency II Directive. In principle, the provisions in the Brussels I bis Regulation aimed to protect the weaker party, including the provisions that restrict the enforceability of choice-of-court agreements, do not apply to such disputes as relate to those contracts (see Article 15(5) and Article 16(5) of the Regulation).

The Court of Justice ruled that this leeway shall not be permitted where the insured is not the policyholder and is not a qualified professional in the insurance sector.

Facts

The case concerned a dispute between a Latvian insurance company and a Lithuanian security company. The latter had sued the insurance company in Lithuania for compensation under a ‘large risks’ insurance contract that the defendant had concluded with a Latvian company holding the shares of the security company. The insurance company challenged the jurisdiction of the seised court on the basis of a clause in the insurance contract which conferred jurisdiction on the courts of Latvia.

As regards matters of insurance, the Brussels I bis Regulation provides for a special exception for disputes concerning contracts covering ‘large risks’. It is assumed that the parties to a ‘large risks’ insurance contract have significant and equivalent economic power and do not need the protection that is normally afforded by the Regulation to the weaker parties, including the insured. Prorogation of jurisdiction agreed upon by the parties to settle disputes is, accordingly, then fully allowed. However, in the present case, the insured was not the policyholder and had not expressly subscribed to the clause (which the Court reworded as not having agreed with the clause: see para. 25).

The Issue at stake and the Court’s answer

The Lithuanian court asked the Court whether, in the described circumstances, the insured is entitled to claim the protection provided for under the Brussels I bis Regulation. The Court answered in the affirmative, on the ground that the insured was not a qualified insurance professional. Accordingly, the choice of court was not enforceable against him.

The court’s Reasoning

The Court elaborated in its reasoning on the specific protection granted to insured parties, beside that of policyholders, under the Brussels I bis Regulation, especially pursuant to Article 11(1)(b). The Court observed that derogation for ‘large risks’ insurance contracts should be limited to policyholders, when the insured has not expressly subscribed to the clause. Although the latter statement had already emerged in the Court’s case law (notably in Société financière et industrielle du Peloux), the exact scope of the ‘large risks’ derogation remained uncertain. How should the significance of a third party insured bargaining power be evaluated? The question is critical as it is on that single basis that Article 16(5) of Brussels I bis Regulation may be set aside.

According to the Court, the ‘large risks’ derogation only apply to contracting parties and shall not be extended, in principle, to any insured third party (para. 41 of the judgment). While refusing a case-by-case analysis, the Court stated that the protective provisions in matters relating to insurance should be restricted to parties in need of protection. This would not be the case, in particular, of professionals in the insurance sector.

It is however not clear what other situations could be relevant. According to the Court, the security company may benefit from the protective provisions of the Brussels I bis Regulation in matters relating to insurance. Surprisingly, the Court does not take into consideration the legal relationship between the policyholder (i.e., the mother company in the case at issue) and the insured (i.e., its subsidiary) to assess the applicability of the ‘large risks’ derogation. This will not be without operational implications for European undertakings with activities in multiple markets.

Marion Ho-Dac, of the Polytechnic University of Hauts-de-France, has joined the team of editors of this blog. Check her first post here!

Thank you Ennio Piovesani for signalling and reviewing one of the first conflicts-specific developments on the Corona /Covid 19 landscape.

In an effort to safeguard the economic position of the travel sector, the Italian Government by decree has essentially frozen the travel sector’s statutory duty to reimburse travellers whose package travel has become impossible due to the pandemic. Ennio reports that the decree refers specifically to Article 9 Rome I’s overriding mandatory law provisions (earlier applied in Unamar), (in his translation): ‘“The provisions of the present article constitute overriding mandatory provisions within the meaning of Article 17 of Law of 31 May 1995, No. 218 [“Italian PIL Act”] [5, 6] and of Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 17 June 2008 [“Rome 1 Regulation”]”.

Ennio signals and important issue: how much leeway may be given to Member States to push their own definition of the concept of ‘lois de police’ /overriding mandatory law in light of the CJEU definition in Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade. In Brussels Ia of course the CJEU has pushed the concept of ordre public in a limited direction. Lois de police however are different from ordre public and Rome I is not Brussels Ia, and I am therefore not so pessimistic as Ennio when it comes to leaving a lot of discretion to Member States. What to me looks a touch more problematic is the relation with the package travel Directive 2015/2302 which applies to many of the travel arrangements concerned and which is the source of many of the protections for travellers.

No doubt to be continued.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.8.3.