Agrégateur de flux

Within the ongoing EU Justice Project “Personalized Solution in European Family and Succession Law”, shortly known by the acronym PSEFS, the first stage of research has resulted in several publications. One of the most important is the e-book consisting of 28 reports by for the EU Member States concerning the forms of couples relations and patrimonial consequences thereof and succession regimes, which is accessible here. It also includes several questions regarding the private international law.

This massive publication has been summarised into the PSEFS Atlas provided for each EU Member State, containing information about the property regimes of married couples and registered partners and rules of succession. Designed as an informative tool for legal professionals and an effective support for citizens, it is accessible by clicking to the territory of the selected EU Member State on the map.

In the attempt to reach the public the team members also created two brochures, one with general information about the three regulations: the Succession Regulation, the Matrimonial Property Regulation and the Registered Partnership Property Regulation, and the other with case studies explaining the functioning of these regulations. The brochures are available in 5 languages by clicking on the pictures of their front pages under the respective results/information and support to the citizens section of the Project webpage.

The Project developments may also be followed on the PSEFS Facebook page. One of the forthcoming activities is the Ljubljana PSEFS Project Events. It is expected to gather close to hundred participants as it is open to both academics and practitioners interested in the topic regardless of their involvement in the PSEFS Project.

Voirie

Assurances - Règles générales

Construction immobilière

Urbanisme

Vente

Crédit-bail

Mineur

Sécurité sociale - Régimes spéciaux

The Piraeus Court of Appeal refused recognition and enforcement of two English orders awarding damages for breaching a choice of court and a settlement agreement due to violation of the Greek procedural public policy.

Apostolos Anthimos

INTRODUCTION

The ruling forms part of the famous The Alexandros T saga. It comes as the expected step forward, after the judgment rendered by the English CoA in the case Starlight Shipping Company v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T [2014] EWCA Civ 1010. The latter decision has been already reported and criticized in our blog by Martin Ilmer. An extensive presentation and critical analysis of the judgment is also included in the doctoral thesis of my blog colleague, Mukarrum Ahmed, pp. 142-151. For a concise, however complete presentation of the case in its previous stages, see here. For a view in favor of the outcome in the UK courts, see here.

THE FACTS

The application for the declaration of enforceability concerned two orders issued by a judge of the High Court of England in 2014, awarding damages (amounting to 300.000 £) for breach of a choice of court and a settlement agreement between the parties. The orders were issued on the basis of a judgment of the High Court [Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG [2014] EWHC 3068 (Comm) (26 September 2014), see also [2015] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 747; [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 579], which granted declaratory relief in favor of the insurers, and specific performance and damages for the solicitors’ and adjuster’s, on the basis that the proceedings in Greece were in breach of the settlement agreements and the exclusive jurisdiction clauses of both the settlement agreements and the underlying policies.

The Piraeus 1st Instance Court granted exequatur [Nr. 3461/2015, unreported]. The Greek shipping company appealed pursuant to the Brussels I Regulation, seeking revocation in accordance with Article 45, in conjunction with Art. 34.1 Brussels I Regulation.

THE RULING

Initially, the Piraeus CoA engaged in an analysis of the Brussels regime, starting from the Brussels Convention. It then focused on the public policy defense under Article 34.1 Brussels I Regulation. In this context, the court underlined the significance of Article 8 of the Greek Constitution, which reads as follows: No person shall be deprived of the judge assigned to him by law against his will. Finally, the court made reference to the institution of anti-suit injunction, concluding what is already common ground for continental legal orders, namely that recognition of such measures may not be tolerated.

With respect to the issue at stake, the reasoning of the Piraeus CoA is brief and to the point. The court stated verbatim the following:

It is true that both the English court and the Judge issuing the orders did not issue anti-suit injunctions. However, judgments hindering the progress of litigation initiated in Greece by ordering damages, and warnings for further damages against the claimants in the Greek proceedings, are included both in the ruling and the orders aforementioned. Consequently, the above contain ‚quasi‘ anti-suit injunctions, which pose barriers towards free access to Greek courts, in violation of Article 6.1 ECHR and Articles 8.1 & 20 of the Greek Constitution, the provisions aforementioned belonging to the core of public policy in Greece.

Piraeus Court of Appeal, Nr. 371/1.7.2019

COMMENTS

The ruling of the Piraeus court does not come as a surprise. The reasoning might be laconic, nevertheless it is crystal clear, and in line with the comments made by Martin Ilmer &  Mukarrum Ahmed.

For the time being, no information is available on a possible final appeal lodged by the English side. I would however tend to believe that a final appeal is to be expected for the following reasons:

• In the course of proceedings initiated by the Greek side, at least three judgments issued by the Piraeus First Instance Court have incidentally recognized the same English judgments and orders, following the analysis embedded in the judgments of the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of England respectively. It is therefore obvious that the Greek side will grab the chance given by the new ruling, and seek reversal in second instance.
• There is no precedent regarding the case at hand. Therefore, all cards are on the table: The Greek Supreme Court may allow or dismiss the appeal, whereas a preliminary reference to the CJEU is not to be excluded. The days of reluctance to submit preliminary questions seem to be gone for the Supreme Court [see C-436/16]. Actually, a preliminary reference would be the most prudent solution, given that the matter needs to be clarified on EU level.[contact-form]

In the last decade, the European Union has unified large segments of private international law for its Member States. However, existing treaties concluded by Member States with Third States enjoy priority over European private international law rules. This priority rule hampers the uniform application of EU law and creates friction with harmonised procedural rules. In addition, the legal relationships for large numbers of Third State citizens are not governed by EU private international law but by rules laid down in international treaties, which often dates back to the beginning of the 20th century.

The implications of this pluralism on the functioning of the rather new European private international law rules have not yet been explored in depth. The various international treaties or conventions concluded by the current Member States have neither been comprehensively collected nor has their content been analysed in a systematic manner. This book, published by Intersentia, aims to fill this gap in part. It is the fruit of a research group led by Anatol Dutta (LMU München) and Wolfgang Wurmnest (Universität Augsburg).

Focused on the area of succession law, a field of law chosen in an exemplary manner, the book analyses the scope and effect of treaties and conventions with Third States on the functioning of the European Succession Regulation (Regulation No 650/2012). There are country reports from selected EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden) on the treaty law and its application. To understand if and how Third States apply and interpret these treaties and conventions, there are also reports form selected Third States (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey). In addition, the book contains a chapter on the competences of the EU and of the Member States to revise the treaty law. The study concludes with a comparative report, which explores the background of the treaty law and discusses various policy options at the national and the European level to ameliorate the legal framework for cross-border succession cases.

To lay the foundation for a cross-border analysis of the treaty law, the book compiles 27 bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions dealt with by the national reports in the area of succession law. The relevant rules of these sources were also translated into English. Such a comprehensive collection and translation of the treaty law thus far does not exist.

The following authors were part of the working group and contributed to the book:

Davor Babi?, Andrea Bonomi,Slavko ?or?evi?, Anatol Dutta, Stéphanie Francq, Pietro Franzina, Samuel Fulli-Lemaire, Biset Sena Güne?, Markku Helin, Tena Hoško,Dirk Looschelders, Julie Mary, Zlatan Meški?, Magdalena Pfeiffer, Walter Pintens, Claudia Rudolf, Wolfgang Wurmnest, Nadjma Yassari.

Advocate General Saugmandsgaard ØE in C-272/18 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v TVP Treuhand opined early September (I have been busy) that the Rome Convention’s and Rome I’s lex societatis exception does not apply to ‘Treuhand’ (a trust-like construction) contracts between investors and the corporation they entrust to manage investment in real estate companies located in Germany. The relevant choice of court rule follows the standard Rome I (cq Convention) rules.

At the time of adoption of the Rome Convention, the Giuliano Lagarde Report went into a bit more detail as to what is and is not excluded:

Confirming this exclusion, the Group stated that it affects all the complex acts (contractual administrative, registration) which are necessary to the creation of a company or firm and to the regulation of its internal organization and winding up, i. e. acts which fall within the scope of company law. On the other hand, acts or preliminary contracts whose sole purpose is to create obligations between interested parties (promoters) with a view to forming a company or firm are not covered by the exclusion.

The subject may be a body with or without legal personality, profit-making or non-profit-making. Having regard to the differences which exist, it may be that certain relationships will be regarded as within the scope of company law or might be treated as being governed by that law (for example, societe de droit civil nicht-rechtsfahiger Verein, partnership, Vennootschap onder firma, etc.) in some countries but not in others. The rule has been made flexible in order to take account of the diversity of national laws.

Examples of ‘internal organization’ are: the calling of meetings, the right to vote, the necessary quorum, the appointment of officers of the company or firm, etc. ‘Winding-up’ would cover either the termination of the company or firm as provided by its constitution or by operation of law, or its disappearance by merger or other similar process.

At the request of the German delegation the Group extended the subparagraph (e) exclusion to the personal liability of members and organs, and also to the legal capacity of companies or firms. On the other hand the Group did not adopt the proposal that mergers and groupings should also be expressly mentioned, most of the delegations being of the opinion that mergers and groupings were already covered by the present wording.

Particularly in KA Finanz, the Court could have done a lot to clarify the scope of the Convention, but did not. Current case however offered a lot less beef to that particular bone for only with a stretch in my view could the issue be considered to fall under the corporate exception. The argument made was that given that the contracts instruct the Treuhand to manage the companies, and that there was ‘alignment’ (‘imbrication’ is the word used in the French version of the Opinion at 36; no English version yet exists) between the contacts and the by-laws of the companies concerned: these were geared in part specifically to facilitate the investment in the companies by the Treuhand.

The AG points out that there is no European code for company law hence no possibility to use harmonised substantive law to help interpret private international law. He relies therefore on the general interpretative rules, including predictability, and sides in my view justifiably with the issue, in essence, being about contractual obligations: not life and death of companies. A link alone with questions relating to corporate law (at 53) is not enough.

Geert.

Il appartient au juge répressif d’appliquer l’article 4 du protocole n° 7 à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme en faisant produire un plein effet à la réserve émise par la France, et le juge pénal n’est tenu de veiller au respect de l’exigence de proportionnalité que s’il prononce une peine de même nature.

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Le droit de l’Union européenne s’oppose à une clause contractuelle qui exclut le paiement par le schéma de prélèvement SEPA lorsque le payeur n’a pas son domicile dans le même État membre que celui dans lequel le bénéficiaire a établi le siège de ses activités.

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