Agrégateur de flux

Les propos de nature à porter atteinte à la dignité d’agents publics et au respect dû à leurs fonctions ne rentrent pas dans le champ de l’article 10, § 1, de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. 

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Gerard McCormack, Andrew Keay, Sarah Brown, European Insolvency Law – Reform and Harmonization, Edward Elgar, 2017, ISBN: 9781786433305, 512 pp, GBP 95

Critically analysing the substantive law of insolvency in the EU countries as a whole, this book carries out horizontal cross-cutting analysis of the data gathered from a study of national insolvency laws. It selects particular areas for detailed discussion and considers the pros and cons of particular legislative solutions. Using the US and Norway as comparator countries, the expert authors identify areas where disparities in national laws produce problems that have impacts outside national boundaries. They analyse these against key policy goals including: improving economic performance throughout the EU; promoting a more competitive business environment; efficient asset allocation; and building more stable and sustainable human capital in terms of support for entrepreneurs and responses to consumer over-indebtedness. The book also considers possible reform and harmonization measures situated against the wider contextual background of the Capital Markets Union and the Europe 2020 agenda of promoting jobs and growth. Discerning and practical, European Insolvency Law will appeal to academics in both insolvency and finance as well as insolvency practitioners and lawyers. Its reform suggestions will be of interest to EU Member States’ government departments, while also providing a useful reference for consumer associations and debt charities.

La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a jugé que l’inspection, par les autorités allemandes, du compte bancaire d’un avocat pénaliste ne présentait pas les garanties exigées par la Convention. L’article 8 relatif au droit au respect de la vie privée a été violé.

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Dans un rapport sur les procédures bâillons, la commission Mazeaud formule des préconisations pour renforcer la situation des enseignants-chercheurs contre des actions en diffamation et en dénigrement.

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« Le juge espagnol est seul compétent pour connaître d’un litige relatif à la propriété et au partage, entre des résidents français, d’une indivision portant sur un immeuble situé en Espagne, de sorte que le juge français doit relever d’office son incompétence ».

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A quick note to tickle the interest of the BIT community out there: I have come across a suggestion that recent initiatives on supply chain liability (for the notion see my earlier reblog of Penelope Bergkamp’s piece) may run counter the protection of foreign investment under Bilateral investment treaties. The analysis at issue is directed at Queensland’s chain of responsibility laws. While it is clearly a law firm’s marketing pitch (heyho, we all have to make rain somehow), the issue is real: supply chain liability laws can I suppose under circumstances qualify as regulatory takings just as any other new law.

Or can they?

Geert.

 

The LSE Law and Financial Markets Project will host a workshop on “International Finance, Party
Autonomy and Public Interest” on 18 May 2017. Speakers include Philipp Paech (LSE), Stéphanie Francq (Louvain-la-Neuve), Jan Kleinheisterkamp (LSE)  and Matthias Lehmann (University of Bonn).

Details are available here.

Andriciuc e.a.
Rapprochement des législations PROT
Selon l’avocat général Wahl, la clause d’un contrat de prêt qui prévoit le remboursement de la somme prêtée dans la devise étrangère dans laquelle le prêt a été octroyé ne constitue pas nécessairement une clause abusive

Andriciuc e.a.
Rapprochement des législations PROT
Selon l’avocat général Wahl, la clause d’un contrat de prêt qui prévoit le remboursement de la somme prêtée dans la devise étrangère dans laquelle le prêt a été octroyé ne constitue pas nécessairement une clause abusive

Andriciuc e.a.
Rapprochement des législations
Selon l’avocat général Wahl, la clause d’un contrat de prêt qui prévoit le remboursement de la somme prêtée dans la devise étrangère dans laquelle le prêt a été octroyé ne constitue pas nécessairement une clause abusive

Nogueira e.a.
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice COJC
Selon l’avocat général Saugmandsgaard Øe, les litiges relatifs aux contrats de travail d’hôtesses de l’air et de stewards relèvent de la compétence du juge du lieu « où ou à partir duquel » ceux-ci s’acquittent principalement de leurs obligations à l’égard de leur employeur

L’11 e il 12 maggio 2017 il Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università Roma Tre ospita la nuova edizione dell’annuale incontro fra i giovani cultori del diritto internazionale. Il tema di quest’anno è Frontiere, spazi giuridici e territorio.

Le relazioni toccano, fra gli altri, anche temi di diritto internazionale privato.

Il programma completo dell’incontro è disponibile a questo indirizzo.

Dès lors que la mère qui intente une action en recherche de paternité dispose d’un passeport américain délivré par l’État de Louisiane et d’un certificat de naturalisation de l’État de Virginie, il y a lieu de déterminer, d’après les règles américaines de conflits internes, de quel État fédéré la loi est applicable.

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Les Éditions Dalloz vous proposent de répondre à un questionnaire concernant vos usages numériques. L’objectif est de mieux répondre à vos attentes en termes de formations, de documentations, de services ou d’outils numériques, dans le cadre d’Open Law, un programme de cocréation destiné à accompagner globalement l’ouverture des données juridiques.

Rendez-vous ici

Merci !

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Pourvoi c/ Tribunal de grande instance de Bobigny, chambre 1, section 5, 16 décembre 2016

Pourvoi c/ Cour d'appel de Paris, pôle 7, première chambre de l'instruction, 24 janvier 2017

Non lieu à renvoi

On 19 April 2017, Professor Cyril Nourissat and the lawyers Alexandre Boiché, Delphine Eskenazi, Alice Meier-Bourdeau and Gregory Thuan filed a complaint with the European Commission against France for a violation of several obligations arising from the European Rome III and Brussels IIbis Regulations, as a result of the divorce legislation reform entered into force on 1 January this year. The following summary has been kindly provided by Dr. Boiché.

“Indeed, since January the 1st, in the event of a global settlement between the spouses, the divorce agreement is no longer reviewed and approved in Court by a French judge. The agreement is merely recorded in a private contract, signed by the spouses and their respective lawyers. Such agreement is subsequently registered by a French notaire, which allows the divorce agreement to be an enforceable document under French law. From a judicial divorce, the French divorce, in the event of an agreement between the spouses, has become a purely administrative divorce. The judge only intervenes if a minor child requests to be heard.

The implications and consequences of this reform in an international environment were deliberately ignored by the French legislator, with a blatant disregard for the high proportion of divorce with an international component in France. The main violations arising from this reform are the following.

First of all, as there will be no control of the jurisdiction, anyone will be able to get a divorce by mutual consent in France, even though they have absolutely no connection with France whatsoever. For instance, a couple of German spouses living in Spain will now be able to use this new method of divorce, in breach of the provisions of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. The new divorce legislation is also problematic in so far as it remains silent on the law applicable to the divorce.

Moreover, the Brussels IIbis Regulation states that the judge, when he grants the divorce (and therefore rules on the visitation rights upon the children, or issues a support order, for instance) provides the spouses with certificates, that grant direct enforceability to his decision in the other member states. Yet, the new divorce legislation only authorizes the notary to deliver the certificate granting enforceability to the dissolution of the marriage itself, but not the certificate related to the visitation rights, nor the support order. This omission is problematic insofar as it will force the spouses who seek to enforce their agreement in another member state to seize the local Courts.

Last but not least, article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union makes it imperative for the child’s best interests to be taken into consideration above all else, and article 41 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation provides that the child must be heard every time a decision is taken regarding his residency and/or visitation rights, unless a neutral third party deems it unnecessary. Yet, under the new legislation, it is only the parents of the child who are supposed to inform him that he can be heard, which hardly meets the European requirements. Moreover, article 12 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation provides that, when a Court is seized whereas it isn’t the Court of the child’s habitual residence, it can only accept its jurisdiction if it matches the child’s best interests. Once again, the absence of any judicial control will allow divorces to be granted in France about children who never lived there, without any consideration for their interests. This might be the main violation of the European legislation issued by this reform.

For all those reasons, the plaintiffs recommend that the Union invites France to undertake the necessary changes, in order for this new legislation to fit harmoniously in the European legal space. In particular, they suggest a mandatory reviewal by the judge in the presence of an international component, such as the foreign citizenship of one of the spouses, or a foreign habitual residence. They would also like this new divorce to be prohibited in the presence of a minor child, an opinion shared by the French ‘Défenseur des Droits’“

The full text of the complaint (in French) is available here.

Saugmandsgaard ØE this morning Opined in Joined Cases C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, Nogueira et al and Osacar v Ryanair. Reference in the case was made by the Court of Appeal at Mons /Bergen in the Ryanair case I reported on in first instance. The weakest part of that judgment, I noted, was that it looked to the employer’s organisation as the most relevant criterion when deciding upon place of habitual employment. That clearly went against the favor laboris inherent in Article 19 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation.

The Advocate General at 100 in particular agrees with that view. Regular readers will know that I do not tend to paraphrase for the sake of it hence reference is best made to the AG’s Opinion as a whole. In summary:  Saugmandsgaard ØE recalls that CJEU case-law on the matter essentially requires the courts to either identify the ‘place where’ the employee principally carries out his obligations vis-à-vis his employer, or the ‘place from which’ he principally carries out those obligations. The workers at issue were employed as cabin crew on aircraft operated by Ryanair. Those employees performed their work in more than one Member State, namely in Belgium, where the airport of departure (Charleroi) was situated, the Member State of the airport of arrival and any other Member States crossed during the flight.  The AG suggests (at 92) that it is not possible, in such circumstances, to identify a ‘place where’ those employees principally carried out their obligations vis-à-vis their employers, for it is difficult to attach greater weight to the tasks carried out by those employees in the airport of departure, on board the aircraft or in the airport of arrival.

A ‘place from which’ those employees principally carried out their obligations vis-à-vis their employers, however, can be identified.  The referring court had listed a number of factual considerations among which the AG suggests the following as being highly relevant: (97 ff)

First, appellants started and ended their working day at Charleroi Airport. To the AG’s mind, that fact is of overriding importance, which he suggests is confirmed by the Court’s consistent case-law in particular Koelzch and Voogsgeerd.

Second, appellants received the instructions relating to their tasks and organised their work at Charleroi Airport, by consulting their employers’ intranet. (It is on this point that the AG rejects any relevance of the location of organisation of the work schedule by the employer).

Third, the aircraft operated by Ryanair, and on board which appellants worked as cabin staff, were based at Charleroi. Here the AG refers to CJEU case-law that, in the international transport sector, the place where the work tools are located constitutes a relevant indicium for the purposes of determining the place from which the worker principally fulfils his obligations vis-à-vis his employer.

Fourth, appellants were contractually required to live less than one hour from Charleroi Airport. It is noteworthy that this indication refers not to the worker’s actual place of residence but rather to the place of work near which he lives, namely Charleroi Airport in the main proceedings (at 103).

Fifth, the referring court noted that Ryanair and Crewlink jointly had a ‘crew room’ at Charleroi Airport. The existence of an office made available by the employer is another factor the relevance of which has been emphasised in the Court’s case-law. That this is not formally a ‘branch’ of either company, is irrelevant.

Finally, appellants were required to attend Charleroi Airport if they were unfit for work and in the event of disciplinary problems.

The AG points out that on the basis of the criteria, the Court at Mons formally will have to complete the analysis, however he concludes (at 107) that on the basis of the findings of fact communicated by that court in its request for a preliminary ruling, those six indicia unequivocally designate the courts of the place where Charleroi Airport is situated.

A few other issues are worth mentioning. Firstly (at 108) whether the worker is directly employed by Ryanair (Case C‑169/16) or assigned to Ryanair by Crewlink (Case C‑168/16) is irrelevant for the purposes of identifying the place where the work is habitually carried out, within the meaning of Article 19(2)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001. That place, the AG suggests, is independent of the legal link between the worker and the person who benefits from the work done.

Further, the AG suggests not to have the concept of ‘home base’ infiltrate the analysis: this is a term used in relevant EU civil aviation law. At 109 ff: ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’, used in Article 19(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, should not have to depend on a concept in an act of Union law which belongs to a quite different area, namely that of the harmonisation of rules in the civil aviation sector. At 116: the relevance of the home base, for the purposes of identifying the place where the contract of employment is habitually carried out, is only indirect. Indeed, it should be taken into account only in so far as it supports the indicia mentioned above as relevant for the purposes of identifying that place.

Further and convincingly, the AG emphatically suggests that the nationality of the aircraft is entirely irrelevant for the discussion (118 ff).

Finally, at 73 ff the AG suggests that there ought to be parallel interpretation of the findings on jurisdiction, and the rules on applicable law, among others in the Rome I Regulation. Those rules were not included in the referring court’s request for preliminary ruling.

We have to await the Court’s judgment, of course. However all in al this is a convincing Opinion which, as specifically flagged by the AG (at 101), is instrumental in addressing forum shopping by employers and consequently will be extremely helpful in addressing social dumping in the EU.

Geert.

Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed 2016, Chapter 2, Heading , Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.5.

Expropriation pour cause d'utilité publique