Droit international général

As announced earlier on this blog, the EAPIL Founding Conference will eventually take place on 2, 3 and 4 June 2022 in Aarhus, hosted by the Aarhus University.

Early bird registration for the conference ends on 30 November 2021. See here for further details.

A general presentation of the conference can be found here. See here for the full program as well as for details on venue, travel and accommodation.

For more information, please write an e-mail to Morten Midtgaard Fogt at mmf@law.au.dk.

The third issue of 2021 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP, published by CEDAM) was just released. It features:

Cristina Campiglio, Professor at the University of Pavia, Conflitti positivi e negativi di giurisdizione in materia matrimoniale (Positive and Negative Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters)

Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (Brussels II-bis) provides for a range of alternative grounds for jurisdiction in matrimonial matters and is strongly marked by the favor actoris principle. The system sets the scene not only for forum shopping but also for a rush to the court. However, spouses who have the nationality of different Member States and reside in a Third State remain deprived of the right to an effective remedy before an EU court. Taking a cue from a case currently pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union, this article examines the possible avenues to address these cases of denial of justice, also in light of Art. 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This analysis is conducted, in particular, with the overarching goal of launching, at a political level, a general reflection on the question of conflicts of jurisdiction and on the opportunity to create a coherent, unified “European system” in which general and special regulations operate in a coordinated manner. 

Fabrizio Marrella, Professor at the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Forza maggiore e vendita internazionale di beni mobili in un contesto di pandemia: alcune riflessioni (Force Majeure and International Sales of Goods in the Context of a Pandemic: Some Remarks)

For centuries, national legal systems have recognised both the principle pacta sunt servanda and its exceptions, i.e. the rebus sic stantibus and ad impossibilia nemo tenetur principles. However, the manner in which these basic rules operate varies in the landscape of comparative law. The unforeseeable change of circumstances is among the most relevant issues for international contracts. For this reason, international commercial practice has provided some standard solutions. The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) of 11 April 1980 is among the instruments that provide some uniform law solutions: however, these are not satisfactory when compared to modern commercial practice and the potential litigation arising from the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. In this context, legal doctrine on the private international law aspects of force majeure also seems scarce. This article explores some of the most pressing private international law issues arising from the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on cross-border B2B contracts. Notably, it analyses the choice of the lex contractus and its scope in relation to force majeure, addressing issues of causation, penalty clauses, evidence (with particular reference to “force majeure certificates” imposed by some governments), payment, and overriding mandatory rules.

The following comments are also featured:

Marco Argentini, PhD Candidate at the University of Bologna, I criteri di radicamento della giurisdizione italiana nei contratti di trasporto aereo transnazionale (The Criteria for Establishing Italian Jurisdiction in Contracts for International Carriage by Air)

This article analyses the rules to identify the competent courts, in the field of international air carriage contracts, for passenger claims aimed at obtaining the flat-rate and standardised rights provided for in Regulation No 261/2004 and the compensation for further damage under the Montreal Convention. In particular, the jurisdiction over the former is governed by the Brussels I-bis Regulation, whereas the one over the latter is governed by the Convention itself. Since passengers are the weaker contractual party, the article also addresses some remedies to avoid fragmentation of legal actions between courts of different States, as well as the particular case, tackled by the Court of Justice of the European Union, of a flight forming part of a broader package tour.

Claudia Cantone, PhD Candidate at the University “Luigi Vanvitelli” of Campania, Estradizione e limiti all’esercizio della giurisdizione penale extraterritoriale nel diritto internazionale: riflessioni a margine della sentenza della Corte di cassazione n. 30642/2020 (Extradition and Limits to the Exercise of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in International Law: Reflections on the Court of Cassation’s Judgment No 30642/2020)

This article builds upon the judgment of the Court of Cassation 22 October 2020 No 30642, delivered in an extradition case towards the United States of America. The decision of the Supreme Court is noteworthy since, for the first time, the Court examines the restrictions imposed by public international law on States in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction outside their territory. Notably, it states that the existence of a “reasonable connection” could justify the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law. In this regard, the Author also analyses the emerging principle of jurisdictional reasonableness in the theory of jurisdiction under international law. Finally, the paper focuses on whether, in extradition proceedings, the judicial authority of the requested State might ascertain the basis of jurisdiction upon which the request is based, taking into consideration the absence of any provision in extradition treaties allowing such assessment.

Curzio Fossati, PhD Candidate at the University of Insubria, Le azioni di private enforcement tra le parti di un contratto: giurisdizione e legge applicabile (Private Enforcement Actions between Parties to a Contract: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law)

This article deals with the main private international law issues of antitrust damage claims between contracting parties, according to the latest rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In particular, these issues concern (a) the validity and the scope of jurisdictions clauses, (b) the determination of jurisdiction under the Brussels I-bis Regulation, and (c) the applicable law under the Rome I and the Rome II Regulations. The article aims at demonstrating that the analysis of these aspects should be preceded by the proper characterization of the damage action for breach of competition law between contracting parties. The conclusion reached is that the adoption of a univocal method to characterize these actions as contractual or non-contractual fosters coherent solutions.

In addition to the foregoing, this issue features the following book review by Francesca C. Villata, Professor at the University of Milan: Matthias HAENTJENS, Financial Collateral: Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, New York, 2020, pp. XXXIX-388.

O’Loan and Scott v MIB and AIG (Fintan O’Loan and Elisabeth Scott v Motor Insurance Bureau and AI Europe SA) involves the same Loi Badinter that was also the subject of Marshall v MIB. I was alerted to the case buy Ian Denham’s post. Judgment is as yet unreported and I am grateful to Ian for having sent me copy.

The contested claim is the one of Ms Scott v AIG. She was the front seat passenger of the hire car, insured by AIG and driven by Mr O’Loan, her partner, when the car was driven into by an uninsured, French registered car. Ms Scott therefore turns to the driver, her partner (in reality, the insurer of the hire car), to have her damage covered under the strict liability (no need to show fault) rule of the French Loi Badinter.

To get to French law however she needs to overcome Article 4(2) Rome II’s provision that in case victim and party claimed to be liable are habitually resident in the same country at the time the damage occurs, the laws of that country apply. A4(3) is the portal to that escape route:

(3) Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question.

It was conceded by both parties [12] that the district judge cut quite a few corners on the A4(3) analysis and Platts J therefore started afresh. Winrow v Hemphill of course was referred to, as was Owen v Galgey (the conclusions of which I disagreed with).

The judge notes (as does the Handbook: para 4.39) that it is important to identify what is meant by “the tort/delict’ in A4(3) before considering whether that tort/delict is more closely connected with a country other than England. A4(3) holds that ‘the tort’ (not individual elements of the tort, such as the event and/or the damage and /or anything singular at all) needs to be ‘more closely connected’.

I disagree with the judge [23] that ‘the tort’ or ‘delict’ clearly refers to the event which caused the damage, or ‘the incident’ [24]. In the case of a tortious obligation ‘the tort’ arguably refers to the classic 3 elements of event, damage, and causal link between the two (all three here clearly referring to France). I do agree it does not refer to the cause of action which arises from the incident [24]. While linguistically speaking that may be caught be ‘the tort’ for it would be one of its consequences, it would also mean that remedies available, or not, for instance would play a role in determining lex causae. Where Rome II envisages such assessment, it says so explicitly: such as in Article 7’s environmental damage rule.

The judge’s reasons for opting for displacement are [30]

I therefore consider the connection with France to be manifestly closer than the connection with England: the collision was in France; it was between two vehicles registered in France; the damage was caused in France in that the initial injury was suffered in France. Further, the circumstances were such that the claim of first claimant is to be dealt with under French law.

That last element is in slight contradiction I find to the judge’s consideration signalled above, that an advance on (remedies available or not under the) lex causae, must not play a role. If that is the case for claimant seeking to overturn A4(2)’s presumption, arguably there must not be a role either for the lex causae of other claims involved in the case.

Of note is the judge’s emphasis on the vehicles both being registered in France. If that is an element, travellers of countries without strict liability rules, might have a strong incentive indeed to hire cars rather than drive their own when driving in EU Member States with strict liability rules such as the Loi Badinter.

Appeal dismissed, for the result is the same (French law applies) even if the route to it was quite different from the first judge.

I do not think the analysis on ‘the tort’ is quite there yet.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 4.5.2 (para 4.39 ff).

Of much note and my review shall be on the blog soon. (There is a queue, plus the posts inevitably are playing snakes and ladders with my day jobs). https://t.co/JxrMg02Sxh

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 15, 2021

 

Yesterday (17 November 2021) the Russian Federation signed the HCCH Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention). The HCCH news item is available here.

No declarations were filed. Click here (Depositary’s website).

It should be noted that in order to consent to be bound by the treaty, the Russian Federation would need to deposit an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval (art. 24(2) of the  HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention). In the meantime, a signatory State has the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force (art. 18 of the UN Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

***

The HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention is not yet in force. In accordance with its article 28: “This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which a notification may be made in accordance with Article 29(2) with respect to the second State that has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession referred to in Article 24.”

There are currently five signatory States: Costa Rica, Israel, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Uruguay. The act of signing a treaty does not count towards the timeline specified in article 28 of the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention as it is not an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

 

The fourth issue of the Journal du droit international for 2021 has just been released. It contains two articles and several case notes relating to private international law issues, including the 2020 annual case-law review of EU private international law supervised by Louis d’Avout (University of Paris II).

In the first article, the International Law Association (ILA) pays tribute to the memory of Philippe Kahn (Hommage à Philippe Kahn, by Catherine Kessedjian, Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, Éric Loquin, Jean-Michel Jacquet, Marie Cornu, Ali Bencheneb & Franck Latty).

The English abstract reads:

Philippe Kahn was above all a researcher, an inventive person, an explorer. The French Branch of the International Law Association paid tribute to him on April 8, 2021. The tribute, in its entirety, is available on Youtube. The texts reproduced here concern only his scientific contributions highlighted by the authors in the various fields that his insatiable curiosity led him to tackle: international contracts, the financing of international trade, cultural heritage and the art market, outer space, to mention just a few aspects of his work.

In the second article, Gwendoline Lardeux (Aix-Marseille University) analyses some difficult private international law issues in real property matters (De certaines hypothèses délicates du droit international privé des immeubles).

The English abstract reads:

The autonomous concepts of European conflict of laws are progressively shaped, litigation after litigation, through Court of justice, as European substantive law as such is lacking. This jurisdiction is therefore referring to International private law goals to choose or reject any qualification. This is clearly the case for the immovable suit. The different regulations on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters provide indeed an exclusive jurisdictional competence to the courts of the situs rei « in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property » (see Reg. Brussels I bis, art. 24, 1°, al. 1er). Those both hypotheses are raising difficult legal qualification issues regarding numerous intricate contracts or institutions.

A full table of contents can be downloaded here.

?Chen Zhi?Wangjing & GH Law Firm, PhD Candidate at University of Macau)

Finality of tribunal’s decision without any challenging system on merits issues has been well established and viewed as one of the most cited benefits of arbitration, which can be found in most influential legal documents such as 1958 New York Convention and UNCIITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (issued in 1985, as revised in 2006).

Nevertheless, among all salient features of arbitration, finality of award is probably the most controversial one. In the investment arbitration, the question has been canvassed at length and has been serving as one of the central concerns in the ongoing reform of investment arbitration.[i] While in commercial arbitration, some practitioners and commentators are also making effort to advocate an appeal system. For example, a report by Singapore Academy of Law Reform Committee in February of 2020 strongly recommended introduction of appeals on question of law into international arbitration seated in Singapore,[ii] and has ignited a debate in this regard.

In legal practice, there are some legislations or arbitration institutions provide approaches allowing for the parties to apply for reconsideration of the award, which can be summarized into 3 categories: 1. The appellate mechanism conducted by state courts; 2. Appellate mechanism within the arbitration proceedings and; 3. Alternative to appellate mechanism by arbitration society.

This article will start by giving a brief introduction about the forgoing systems, and comment on the legitimacy and necessity of appellate mechanism in commercial arbitration.

• Appealing mechanism before the court

1.1 Appellate Mechanism in England

When it comes to appellate mechanism conducted by state courts, the appeal mechanism for question of law as set out in section 69 of 1996 English Arbitration Act(EAA) is one of the most cited exceptions. It is undeniable that Section 69 of EAA constitutes an appellate mechanism in respect of arbitration conducted by judicial institutions. Nevertheless, some clarifications shall be made in this regard:

(1) The appellate mechanism serves as a default rule rather than a mandatory one, which allows parties to contract out of it. Apart from an agreement which explicitly excludes the appellate system, such consensus can be reached by other means. One of the methods is the parties’ agreement on dispensing with reasons for the arbitral award, which is overall a rare practice in the field of international commercial arbitration while frequently used within some jurisdictions and sectors. Another way is the designation of arbitration rules containing provisions eliminating any appeal system, such as arbitration rules of most world renowned arbitration institutions. For instance, Article 26.8 of London Court of International Arbitration Rules(The LCIA Rules) explicitly stipulates that parties waive “irrevocably” their right to appeal, review or recourse to any state court or other legal authority in any form.[iii] Therefore, parties may easily dispense with the right to appeal by reference of arbitration before The LCIA Rules or under its rules.

(2) Albeit parties fail to opt out of such appeals, the court is still afforded with discretion on rejection of a leave to commence such appeal. As provided by Section 69 (3) of EAA, such leave shall be granted only certain standards are satisfied, inter alia, the manifest error in the disputed award or raise of general public importance regarding the debating question.

(3) The competence of the appealing court is confined to review the question of laws and shall not impugned on the factual issue. In other words, any alleged errors in fact finding by tribunal is out of the court’s remit. English courts are tended to reject efforts dressing up factual findings as questions of law, and have set up a high threshold regarding mixed questions of law and fact.[iv]

The abovementioned three factors have enormously narrowed down the scope of appellate system under Section 69 of EAA. Statistics in recent years also reveal the extreme low success rate in both granting of leave and overturning of the outcome. From 2015 to March 2018, more than 160 claims had been filed, while only 30 claims were permitted and 4 claims succeeded.[v] Hence, the finality of arbitration award is overall enshrined in England. Parties can hardly count on the appeal proceedings set forth in Section 69.

1.2 Appellate Mechanism Outside England

Some other jurisdictions have embedded similar appellate system, Canada and Australia employed an opt-out model like Section 69 of EAA.[vi] Other jurisdictions have adopted stringent limits on such appeal. in Singapore, appeal on merits of award is only provided by Arbitration Act governing domestic arbitration and not available in arbitration proceedings under International Arbitration Act. The Arbitration Ordinance of Hong Kong SAR of China provides an opt-in framework which further narrows down the use of appellate mechanism.

Appeal in the court is somehow incompatible with the minimal intervene principle as set out in legislations like UNCITRAL Model Law. Further, it will not only enormously undermine efficiency of arbitration but also make the already-clogged state courts more burdensome. The important consideration about the appeal against question of law in the court is the development of law through cases,[vii] while it is not suitable for all jurisdictions.

• Internal appellate of arbitration institution

Apart from state courts, some arbitration institutions may have the authority to act as appellate bodies under their institutional rules, which can be summarized as “institutional appellate mechanism”. While such system can be observed in the arbitration concerning certain sectors such as the appeal board of The Grain and Feed Trade Association, it is rarely used by institutions open for all kinds of commercial disputes, with exceptions such as The Institute of Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) and Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, Inc (JAMS).[viii]

Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) is the first arbitration institution in Mainland China who introduced optional appellate arbitration procedure into its arbitration rules published in December of 2018 (having come into effective since February 2019), enclosed with a guideline for such optional appellate arbitration procedure.

SCIA’s Optional Appellate Arbitration Procedure provides an opt-in appellate system against the merits issue of an award where the below prerequisites are all satisfied: (1) pre-existing agreement on appeal by parties; (2) such appeal mechanism is not prohibited by the law of the seat; (3) the award is not rendered under expedited procedure set out in SCIA Arbitration Rules.[ix]

If all the above conditions are satisfied and one of the dispute parties intend to appeal, the application of appeal shall be filed the appeal within 15 days upon receipt of the disputing award and an appealing body composed of 3 members will be constituted through the appointment of SCIA’s chief. The appealing body is afforded with broad direction to revise or affirm the original award, of whom the decision will supersede the original award.[x]

The SCIA appellate mechanism is a bold initiative, while some uncertainties may arise under the current legal system in Mainland China:

First is the legitimacy of an internal appellate system under current legislation system. Though the current statutes do not contain any provision specifying the institutional legitimacy of an appellate mechanism, while legal risk may arise by breach of finality principle set out in the Article 9 of PRC Arbitration Law, which expressly stipulates that both state court and arbitration institution shall reject any dispute which has been decided by previous award. In this respect, any decision by an appealing system, regardless of whether it is conducted by state court, is likely to be annulled or held unenforceable subsequently. Apparently, SCIA was well aware of such risk and set forth the first prerequisite for the system such that parties may circumvent the risk through designation of arbitral seat.

The second is the risk brought by designation of arbitration seat other than Mainland China while no foreign-related factor is involved. Current law in PRC is silent on the term of arbitration seat, even though the loophole may be well resolved by the new draft of revised Arbitration Law which has been published for public consultation since late July 2021,[xi] it is still unclear whether parties to arbitration without foreign-related factors have the right to designate a jurisdiction other than Mainland China. As per previous cases, courts across the jurisdiction has been for a long time rejecting parties’ right to agree on submission of case to off-shore arbitration institutions provided that no foreign-related factor can be observed in the underlying dispute.[xii]If the same stance keep unchanged in respect of parties’ consent on arbitration seat, parties’ agreement on designating an off-shore seat to avoid the scrutiny will be invalidated and the SCIA appellate mechanism will thereby not be available.

Third is the possibility of contradictory results. In Mainland China, a domestic award is final upon parties and hence enforceable without any subsequent proceedings. With this regard, SCIA’s appellate mechanism may create two contradictory outcomes in one dispute resolution proceeding under the current legal system. If the successful party seeks for enforcement of award by concealing the existence of appeal proceedings, the court will enforce it basing on its text. Even though the court is aware of the appeal proceedings in the course of enforcement, it is not obliged to stay the enforcement in absence of any legal basis. In other words, the appeal mechanism will be meaningless for all parties in case of the launch of enforcement proceedings .

• Alternatives to appealing mechanism

As mentioned above, in Mainland China there is no room for a review on merits system in commercial arbitration under Article 9 of PRC Arbitration Law. This article has been verbatim transplanted into the most recent draft of revised Arbitration Law which has been published for public consultation since late July 2021. Therefore, the much-cited bill brings no assistance in this regard.

With all that said, a few institutions have set up a special system called “pre-decision notification”??????as an alternative to mirror the function of appeal mechanism, which is said to be credited to Deyang Arbitration Commission of Sichuan Province dated back to 2004, according to a piece of news in August 2005 reported by Legal Daily, a nationwide legal professional newspaper run by the Supreme People’s Court.[xiii] Pre-decision notification allows for tribunal to notice parties their preliminary opinions about the case before rendering the final decision, and ask for parties’ comments within fixed duration. Tribunal’s preliminary opinions can be revised by the final award based on comments by parties, occurrence of new fact after deliberation, or merely on the tribunal’s own initiative.

One notable case about the pre-decision notification mechanism is decided by Xi’an Intermediate Court of Shanxi Province dated 18 April of 2018.[xiv] The case concerns an arbitration proceeding administered by Shangluo Branch of Xi’an Arbitration Commission where the tribunal dispatched preliminary opinion to parties at the outset, whilst ruled on the contrary in the final decision. The plaintiff (respondent of the arbitration proceeding) subsequently commenced an annulment proceeding against the award on the basis that the final decision is contradictory with the one set out in pre-decision notice (together with other reasons which were not relevant to the topic of this article), whilst the court refused to set aside the award by simply indicated that the reasons replied upon by plaintiff had no merits, without giving any further comment on such system.

In another noteworthy case which concerns the fact that tribunal ruled adversely after considering parties’ comments on opinion set out in pre-decision notice, in the annulment proceeding, the Guiyang Intermediate Court of Guizhou Province explicitly endorsed the legitimacy of pre-decision notification, by stating that even though it is not regulated in any current legislation, pre-decision notice can be viewed as an investigation method by means of tribunal’s query to the parties, instead of a decision by tribunal. Therefore, the discrepancy between pre-decision opinion and final award does not amount to annulment of the award.[xv]

The abovementioned court decisions are somehow problematic: the pre-decision notification is by no means a mere investigating tool for the tribunal. While the preliminary opinion is made and dispatched, it shall be deemed that the tribunal has taken the stance, which shall be distinguished from tribunal’s query about facts or laws in a neutral and open minded manner which is widely accepted in commercial arbitration.[xvi] Therefore, subsequent comments by parties would constitute a de facto appealing mechanism before the same decision-making body, which will give rise to problems such as postponing the arbitral proceedings and the question of conflict of interest. Moreover, it probably produces unfairness for parties dissatisfying with the preliminary opinion may spare no effort to change the tribunal’s mind by intervening tribunal’s autonomy (even by taking irregular or illegal measures).

Overall, pre-decision notification is a highly controversial practice which received lots of criticisms, and hence does not constitute a mainstream system in China. None of the first-class arbitration institutions (including CIETAC, Beijing Arbitration Commission, Guangzhou Arbitration Commission, etc.) had ever embraced such system in the field of commercial arbitration. Some institutions are seeking to repeal or limit the use of such system. For example, Zunyi Arbitration Commission abolished such system in its rules released in 2018, while other arbitration commissions who are consistently strong champions of this system also opined that it is only used in rare cases with higher controversy and complexity.

Despite of these pitfalls and controversies, the courts’ decisions clearly reveal that pre-decision notification system per se is not necessarily a breach of finality principle set out in arbitration legislation and hence feasible for parties if it is explicitly set out in applicable arbitration rules.

Pre-decision notification has been introduced into investment arbitration in recent years, Beijing Arbitration Commission has incorporated such system into its investment arbitration which was finalized and published in September 2019, which provides that the tribunal shall provide parties with the draft of award and seek for their comments, and may give proper consideration to the parties’ feedback.[xvii] By the language, pre-decision notification will act as a mandatory rule while any investor-state case is being administered by this institution.

4.Comments

Several pertinent issues have been raised with regard to appellate mechanism in arbitration, which can be boiled down to several sub-issues including legitimacy, efficiency and fairness, as well as preference of parties.

4.1 Legitimacy Perspective

According to leading legislations across the world, the competence of state court confined to procedural issues in respect of judicial review over arbitration award, with rare and narrow exceptions such as the public policy set out in UNCITRAL Model Law and New York Convention. With this respect, even though some commentators argue that an appeal on merits is not necessarily a breach of finality and minimal intervene principles set out in UNCITRAL Model Law,[xviii] a mandatory and all-catching appealing system encompassing both factual and legal issues conducted by state court is undeniably incompatible with modern arbitration legislation.

In this respect, an internal appealing mechanism conducted by arbitration institution seems to be less controversial in respect of legitimacy at first glance. While it may also be viewed as a breach of finality of award in the context of some specific legislations such as Article 9 of PRC Arbitration Law.

4.2 Efficiency and Fairness

Finality principle in commercial perceivably enhances the efficiency of dispute resolution by relieving both parties and states from endless and burdensome appealing and reconsidering proceedings, while efficiency is not free from problem while the fairness issue is concerned, giving rise to pertinent considerations about correction of error, enhancement of consistency and the increase of transparency.

Nevertheless, the fairness argument is less convincing in the context of international commercial arbitration in which parties are seeking for a neutral forum in avoidance of local protectionism.[xix] Further, consistency and transparency is less concerned in the context of arbitration which is viewed to be tailored for individual cases while less public concerns are involved, comparing with litigation.

4.3 Preference of Parties

It can be drawn from above analysis that there is no one-standard-fitting all approach for the appeal mechanism in commercial arbitration, in that scenario, parties’ preference shall be taken into account by virtue of the autonomy nature of commercial.

An worldwide survey conducted by Queen Mary University in 2015 provides that 23% of the respondents were in favor of an appeal mechanism in commercial arbitration (compared to 36% approval rate in the same question about investment arbitration),[xx] which reveals a boost about 150% while compared with the rate in 2006 survey (around 9%).In 2018 survey, 14% of the respondents had selected “lack of appeal mechanism on the meritss” as one of the three worst characteristics of arbitration.[xxi]

In a nutshell, statics reveals the increasing demand for appeal system, while it is premature to say that preference for appeal mechanism has been the mainstream in commercial arbitration, it has given rise to concerns by arbitration practitioners and proper response shall be made accordingly.

[i]See Elsa Sardinha, The Impetus for the Creation of an Appellate Mechanism, in Meg Kinnear and Campbell McLachlan (eds), ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, Oxford University Press 2017, Volume 32 Issue(3) pp. 503 – 527S https://www.sal.org.sg/sites/default/files/PDF%20Files/Law%20Reform/2020%20Report%20on%20the%20Right%20of%20Appeal%20against%20International%20Arbitration%20Awards%20on%20Questions%20of%20Law.pdf

[ii] See Singapore Academy of Law Reform Committee, Report on the Right of Appeal against International Arbitration Awards on Questions of Law February 2020, available at

[iii] Article 26.8 of LCIA Arbitration Rules?coming into effective since October 2020?,available at https://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2020.aspx

[iv] See Teresa Cheng, The Search for Order Within Chaos in the Evolution of ISDS, CIArb’s 45th annual Alexander Lecture on 16 January 2020, available at https://www.doj.gov.hk/en/community_engagement/speeches/20200116_sj1.html

[v] Ben Sanderson et al.,Appeals under the English Arbitration Act 1996?available at https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2018/05/appeals-under-the-english-arbitration-act-1996/#:~:text=Section%2069%2C%20meanwhile%2C%20is%20a%20non-mandatory%20provision%20of,the%20English%20courts%20on%20a%20point%20of%20law.

[vi]T. Dedezade, Are You In or Are You Out? An Analysis of Section, 69 of the English Arbitration Act 1996: Appeals on a Question of Law, 2 Intl. Arb. L.J. 56 (2006) available at http://corbett.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/Taner-s-69-article.pdf

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] See Rowan Platt, The Appeal of Appeal Mechanisms in International Arbitration: Fairness over Finality?, Journal of International Arbitration , Volume 30 Issue 5 p. 548?2013?

[ix] See Article 68 of SCIA Arbitration Rules(coming into effective since 2019),available at http://scia.com.cn/upload/20201027/5f97bf7833c8c.pdf

[x] See SCIA Guidelines for the Optional Appellate Arbitration Procedure, available at http://www.scia.com.cn/files/fckFile/file/SCIA%20Guidelines%20for%20the%20Optional%20Appellate%20Arbitration%20Procedure.pdf

[xi] See Anton Ware et al., Proposed Amendments to the PRC Arbitration Law: A Panacea?, available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2021/09/09/proposed-amendments-to-the-prc-arbitration-law-a-panacea/

[xii] See a seminal case (2013)??????10670? by Beijing 2nd Intermediate Court in January of 2014, which concerns an award rendered in proceedings governed by KCAB, the court rejected enforcement of KCAB award by the reason that the underlying dispute did not have any foreign-related factor, despite of the fact that one party to the proceedings is an enterprise wholly subsidized by Korean citizens.

[xiii] See Li Yongli et al., Enhancing Arbitration Legislation through Pre-Decision Notification. Legal Daily, 16 August 2005, p,12???????????“????”???????????????????2005?8?16??12???

[xiv] 2018 Shan 01 Min Te No. 99?2018??01??99?

[xv] 2016 Qian 01 Min Te No. 48?2016??01??48?

[xvi] Per the common practice and well established principle, tribunals are free to delivery query to parties in respect of both factual finding and ascertaining law (Jura Novit Curia), while it shall be conducted in a manner that being prepared to consider legal positions advanced by the parties, irrespective of questions well known to the tribunal. See: Revista Brasileira de Arbitragem, International Law Association Committee on International Commercial Arbitration Ascertaining the Contents of the Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration Report for the Biennial Conference in Rio de Janeiro, August 2008,

[xvii] Article 42.4 of Beijing Arbitration Commission/Beijing International Arbitration Center Rules for International Investment Arbitration?available at https://www.bjac.org.cn/page/data_dl/touzi_en.pdf

[xviii] See Singapore Academy on Law Reform Committee: Report of Appeal Against International Arbitration Awards on Questions of Law, February 2020, available at https://www.sal.org.sg/sites/default/files/PDF%20Files/Law%20Reform/2020%20Report%20on%20the%20Right%20of%20Appeal%20against%20International%20Arbitration%20Awards%20on%20Questions%20of%20Law.pdf

[xix] Noam Zamir ,Peretz Segal, Appeal in International Arbitration—an efficient and affordable arbitral appeal mechanism‘, in William W. Park (ed), Arbitration International, Oxford University Press 2019, Volume 35 Issue 1) p. 84.

[xx] See Queen Mary, 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration, p,8 available at http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2015_International_Arbitration_Survey.pdf

[xxi] See Queen Mary & White Case, 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration, p,8 available at http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2018-International-Arbitration-Survey—The-Evolution-of-International-Arbitration-(2).PDF

Facts

An Austrian national (A) was born in 1975 as a woman. In 2010, at A’s request, the Austrian authorities changed A’ first name, and in 2016 A’s gender to “male”. A married a German male national in July 2019 in Berlin. On the same day, A gave birth to their common child there. The German authorities were unsure about how to enter A into the birth register.

Ruling

On 21 January 2021, the Court of Appeal Berlin (Kammergericht) rendered a Solomonic judgment (docket number 1 W 1290/20, published in NJW-RR 2021, p. 387, paywall access here). It ruled that A was to be registered as the child’s mother, but that A’s gender was to be recorded as “male”. This solution was reached through applying a combination of the formal rules governing the birth register, conflict-of-laws rules, and an interpretation of substantive law.

Formal Rules on Civil Status

The Court justified the registration of A as a “mother” by the formal procedural rules governing the German civil status (Personenstandsgesetz) as the lex fori. According to these rules, the person giving birth to the child is to be registered as the mother, independently of their gender. A’s status as a mother would follow from the fact that A had given birth to the child.

Conflict of Laws

The Court also tried to justify this rather formalistic solution by the law applicable to the substantive legal relationship between A and the child. In order to do so, it had to identify the law applicable to kinship.

The Court highlighted that since the child has its habitual residence in Germany, German law applied to the relation of kinship (Article 19(1) 1 of the German Introductory Act to the Civil Code – EGBGB). Yet in addition to habitual residence, German international family law provides further connecting factors with the goal of establishing, as far as possible, a parent-child relationship. In particular, the relationship of descent from a parent can also be derived from the law of the state of this parent’s nationality (see Art 19(1) 2 EGBGB). In the present case, given A’s Austrian nationality, this would lead to Austrian law. Finally, kinship could also be established under the law governing the general effects of the marriage (Art 19(1) 3 EGBGB). Under German conflicts law, the general effects of same-sex marriages are, in the absence of a choice of law by the spouses, submitted to the law where the same-sex marriage is registered (Art 17b(4) EGBGB).  In the present case, this again led to German law. Hence, German and Austrian law apply to questions of kinship, with a preference for the law that is more likely to establish a parent-child-relationship.

Substantive Kinship Law

A substantive problem is that the German Civil Code defines the mother of a child as the “woman who gave birth to the child” (sec. 1591 German Civil Code – BGB). A very similar provision exists under Austrian law (sec. 143 Austrian Civil Code – ABGB). Seemingly, these provisions do not allow a man to be registered as a mother.

However, the German Federal Court had previously held that the role of the mother and the female gender must always be attributed to the person giving birth to the child (Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 6 September 2017 – XII ZB 660/14). It is true that the Act on Transsexuals, on which the Federal Supreme Court had relied, was not applicable given that A had changed its name and gender abroad, i.e., under Austrian law. Nevertheless, the Berlin Court of Appeal followed the precedent set by the Federal Supreme Court. It argued that the notions “mother” and “woman” in sec. 1591 BGB would refer to a specific role in the procreation of the child, and were to be understood in a biological and not in a legal sense. Since A had given birth to the child, A would have to be considered as the mother and consequently also as a “woman” for the purposes of this provision.

The Berlin Court of Appeal also pointed out that A could not be registered as a father, despite being male. A did not meet the necessary requirements to be registered as the child’s father, as he was neither married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth, nor has his paternity been acknowledged or established by the court (sec. 1592 German Civil Code – BGB). Moreover, under German law, every child can only have one father and one mother. As A’s husband had been registered as the father, this role was precluded for A. The Court also pointed out that gender-neutral registration is not foreseen under German law.

In Austria, no special rules exist for transsexual persons as mothers. Yet the Court of Appeal pointed to the Austrian practice under which a woman who had changed her gender before giving birth to a child could be entered into the central civil status register as the mother. The result would be basically the same as under German law.

Substantive Gender Law

With regard to the recording of A’s gender in the birth register, the Berlin Court of Appeal referred to Art 7 EGBGB, which submits questions concerning the legal personality and legal capacity of natural persons to the law of their nationality. This provision would apply, by analogy, also to gender identity. Hence, Austrian law was applicable. The Court remarked that the Austrian authorities had issued a birth certificate for A with the gender “male”. Similar documents had been submitted for purposes of the wedding. The Austrian authorities had also recorded A’s gender as male when registering the child’s birth in the general civil status register. There could therefore be no serious doubt about A’s gender. The Austrian acts and documents would have to be respected in Germany. As a result, a man was registered as a mother.

Assessment

The case illustrates the need for reform to German and Austrian family law. Both still are based on the assumption that the mother of a child is always a woman, which is no longer universally true, as illustrated by the present case. The Berlin Court of Appeal’s distinction between the sex in a biological sense and gender a legal sense can hardly convince when applied in a purely legal context. Where someone is recognised as having a certain gender, this must apply in all legal circumstances. The proper solution therefore would be to define the mother purely functionally as the person giving birth to remove the reference to a “woman” in both sec. 1591 German BGB and sec. 143 Austrian ABGB. This could be best done by a change of the law; in the absence of such reform, an adaptive interpretation is indispensable.

With regard to A’s gender, the Berlin Court of Appeal could have shortened its ruling. It should simply have accepted the Austrian documents on the basis of the CJEU case law that demands the recognition of civil status acts rendered in other Member States (see for the registration of names e.g. CJEU, C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn). A conflicts analysis was therefore unnecessary in this context.

On 15 November 2021, the JURI committee of the European Parliament held a hearing on EU Private International Law. The focus was on issues that would need to be addressed in a review of the current rules, including as regards Corporate Due Diligence and SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation).

Giesela Rühl (Humboldt University of Berlin, and Secretary General of EAPIL), Geert Van Calster (Leuven University), and Olivera Boskovic (Université Paris Déscartes) took part in the hearing.

The video recording of the hearing can be found here.

On 1 December 2021, at 3 pm CET, the University of Catania will host a webinar, in French, titled Différences culturelles et droit international privé de la famille (Cultural differences and Private International Law in Family Matters), organised by Pasquale Pirrone.

The main speakers are Jean-Yves Carlier (Catholic University of Louvain) and Léna Gannagé (Saint Joseph University, Beirut). Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti (University of Macerata) and Roberto Baratta (Roma Tre University), among others, will also intervene.

Attendance is free, via Teams. Further details here.

On 11 November 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Bank Sepah v. Overseas Financial Limited (case C‑340/20).

The judgment clarifies the effect of the freezing of assets pursuant to European (and U.N.) sanctions on the right of creditors to attach the said assets.

In this case, the sanctions were the restrictive measures against Iran  implemented by Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 of 19 April 2007 and several subsequent regulations replacing it (‘the Regulations’). Regulation 423/2007 froze the assets and resources of certain listed entities. One of them was Iranian bank Sepah.

Article 1 (h) and (j) of Regulation 423/2007 provided:

‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any moving, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management;

‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing the use of economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them;

The issue was whether attaching preventively assets subject to such sanctions fell within these definitions and was thus forbidden. In this case, U.S. creditors were seeking to enforce a French judgment against bank Sepah and had sought enforcement and conservative measures. In a judgment of July 10th, 2020, the French supreme court for civil and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) considered that the situation was clear enough for enforcement measures, but asked the CJUE whether the Regulations prevented granting conservative measures as well.

Background

The US creditors were Delaware companies Overseas Financial Limited and Oaktree Finance Limited. They were seeking to enfore a French judgment against Bank Sepah, a company established in Iran.

After obtaining partial payments made between 2007 and 2011, Overseas Financial and Oaktree Finance on 2 December 2007 requested that the French Minister for the Economy authorise the release of the outstanding amount pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation No 423/2007. Overseas Financial and Oaktree Finance brought an action for annulment against the implicit rejection of their request before the Administrative Court of Paris, which dismissed that action by judgment of 21 October 2013.

On 17 May 2016, Overseas Financial and Oaktree Finance issued formal notices of attachment and sale against Bank Sepah before attaching, on 5 July 2016, receivables, shareholder rights and transferable securities held by a French bank. By judgment of 9 January 2017, the enforcement court of Paris confirmed those attachments and their amount, including the interest provided for by the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Paris of 26 April 2007. While Bank Sepah accepted that it was required to pay the principal amounts ordered against it, it argued that it was not liable for the interest and it therefore contested the enforcement measures before that enforcement court. It inter alia argued that it could not be held liable for interest, taking the view that it had been prevented from paying its debt by a case of force majeure arising from the freezing of its assets by Regulation No 423/2007, which had the effect of suspending the running of that interest.

Questions Referred to the Court

The French Cour de cassation referred two questions to the CJEU.

The first was concerned with the meaning of the concept of changing the ‘destination’ of the frozen funds under Article 1(h). The referring Court wondered whether a subsequent freeze of the assets by a national conservative measure amounted to such a change.

More specifically, the Cour de cassation ruled that, while it thought it likely that an enforcement measure transferring the ownership of the frozen asset would change its destination, it was less clear for conservative measures, which would not result in such a transfer to the benefit of the creditor.

The Cour de cassation insisted on particular feature of French conservative measures: they not only freeze assets, but they also grant an in rem right to the creditor, and thus a right to paid in priority over the relevant funds.

The second question was whether the origin of the claim that the creditor sought to enforce was relevant. In the case at hand, the claims of the U.S. creditors were unconnected to the Nuclear Programme of Iran, or any other activity which justified the sanctions.

Judgment

As to the first question, the CJEU responded that the freezing of assets under the Regulations do prevent further attachement, even if such attachements are not enforcement measures.

46 In terms of measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which establish a right to be paid on a priority basis over other creditors in favour of the creditor concerned, it must be stated, as the Advocate General observed in points 55 to 61 of his Opinion, that such measures have the effect of changing the destination of frozen funds and are liable to permit the use of frozen economic resources to obtain funds, goods or services.

47 It follows that such measures fall within the concepts of ‘freezing of funds’ and ‘freezing of economic resources’ within the meaning of Article 1(h) and (j) and Article 7(1) of Regulation No 423/2007.

48 The fact that such measures do not have the effect of removing assets from the debtor’s estate cannot call that conclusion into question.

49 (…) the concept of ‘freezing of funds’ encompasses any use of funds which results, inter alia, in a change in the destination of those funds, even if such use of the funds does not have the effect of removing assets from the debtor’s estate.

As to the second question, the CJEU noted that the Regulations made no such distinction, and held that it should not be relevant for determining the scope, and effect, of the freezing of funds and resources.

Assessment

The judgment is essentially an exercise of construction of the relevant regulations. Given the very broad language used by the European lawmaker, such exercise was bound to result in an inclusion of the relevant measures in the forbidden uses of the funds. The court does not conduct any purposive interpretation.

While conservative measures grant in rem rights under French, they do not under the law of other Member States. The CJEU responded to the question as framed, but it insisted that the issue was the change of ‘destination’. It seems, therefore, that conservative measures should be considered as falling within the scope of the freezing of funds irrespective of whether they grant in rem rights or not.

By Zheng Sophia Tang, Wuhan University (China) and Newcastle University (UK)

Mr Ting Liao, PhD candidate at the Wuhan University Institute of International Law, published a note on the Chinese Smart Court, which attracted a lot of interests and attention. We have responded a few enquires and comments, some relating to the procedure and feasibility of virtual/remote hearing. Based on the questions we have received, this note provides more details on how the virtual hearing is conducted in China.

1. Background

The fast development of virtual hearing and its wide use in practice in China is attributed to the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic causes serious disruption to litigation. China is a country that has adopted the toughest prevention and controlling measures. Entrance restriction, lockdown, quarantine and social distancing challenge the court process and case management. In the meantime, it offers the Chinese courts a chance to reform and modernize their judicial systems by utilizing modern technology. Since suspending limitation period may lead to backlog and delay, more Chinese courts favour the virtual proceedings. This strategy improves judicial efficiency and helps parties’ access to justice in the unusual circumstances.

Before the pandemic, Chinese courts have already started their exploration of online proceedings. In 2015, the Provisions of the SPC on Several Issues Concerning Registration and Filling of Cases provides the People’s courts should provide litigation services including online filing.[1] In the same year, the SPC published the Civil Procedural Law Interpretation, which states that the parties can make agreement on the form of hearing, including virtual hearing utilizing visual and audio transfer technology. The parties can make application and the court can decide whether to approve.[2] Although online trial from filing to hearing is permitted by law, but it was rarely used in practice due to the tradition and social psychology. The adoption of virtual proceedings for cases with large value is even rarer. The relevant procedure and technology are also taking time to progress and maturase.

Because the pandemic and the controlling measures make serious disruption to traditional form of litigation, online trial becomes more frequently used and develops to a more advanced stage. The SPC provids macro policy instructions that Chinese courts should actively utilize online litigation platform, such as China Movable Micro Court, which allows the parties to conduct litigation through mobile, and Litigation Service Website to carry out comprehensive online litigation activities, including filing, mediation, evidence exchange, hearing, judgment, and service of procedure.[3] While more administrative and technological efforts have been put in, and the pandemic made no better alternatives, more trials were done online. For example, between Feb and Nov 2020, 959 hearings (16.42%) and 5020 mediations were carried out online in the Qianhai Court. Between Feb and July 2020, courts in Beijing conducted average 1,300-1,500 virtual hearings per day.

Some important cases were also tried online. For example, Boa Barges As v Nanjing Yichun Shipbuilding concerned a dispute worth nearly $50,000,000.[4] The contract originally included a clause to resolve disputes in London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) and to apply English law. However, the pandemic outbroke in the UK in March 2020. The parties entered into a supplementary agreement in May 2020 to submit the dispute to Nanjing Maritime Court and apply Chinese law. Chinese commentators believe the change of chosen forum and governing law demonstrates the parties’ trust on Chinese international judicial system and courts’ capacity. Nanjing Maritime Court followed the SPC instruction by allowing the foreign party to postpone submitting authorization notarization and authentication, and conducted online mediation. In China, mediation is part of the formal litigation procedure. The parties settled by mediation within 27 days.

In 2021, the SPC published the Online Litigation Regulations for the People’s Courts, including detailed rules for how online litigation should be conducted.[5] It provides five principles for online litigation, including fairness and efficiency, freedom of choice, protection of rights, convenience and security.[6] This Regulations provides further clarification of certain key procedural issues and provide unified micro-guidance which helps the local courts to operate in the same standards and according to the same rule.

2. Initiation of virtual hearing

Virtual proceedings may lead to several controversies. Firstly, how are the virtual proceedings initiated? Could the court propose by its own motive, or should the parties reach agreement? What if a physical trial is not possible due to the pandemic control, both the court and the claimant want a virtual trial, but the defendant refuse to consent? In such a case, would a virtual trial in the absence of the defendant an infringement of the defendant’s due process right and should not be enforced abroad? What if the defendant and the court agree to go ahead with a virtual trial, but the claimant refuses? Would a default judgment in the absence of the claimant infringe the claimant’s due process right?

The Online Litigation Regulations provides clear guidance. Online litigation should follow the principle of freedom of choice. In other words, parties should consent the online procedure and cannot be forced by the court.[7] If a party voluntarily chooses online litigation, the court can conduct litigation procedure online. If all the parties agree on online litigation, the relevant procedure can be conducted online. If some parties agree on online litigation while others not, the court can conduct the procedure half online for parties who give consent and half offline for other parties.[8] However, what if a party cannot physically participate in the offline litigation because of the pandemic, and this party also refuses online litigation? This party certainly can apply for suspension or postponement of procedure. However, if this party has no legitimate reason to refuse online litigation like technical problems or the lack of computer literacy, would not the court consider such a refusal unreasonable? Does it mean a person may use the refusal rights to delay otherwise legitimate procedure to the detriment of the other party? Would the refusal turn to be a torpedo action? Does this strict autonomy approach meet the purpose of good faith and judicial efficiency? Although the freedom of choice is important, would it necessary to provide some flexibility by allowing the court to assess special circumstances of a case? It seems that this strict consent condition is based on the traditional attitude against online litigation. This attitude makes offline litigation a priority and online litigation an exception, which will only be used by parties’ choice. This approach does not provide online litigation true equal footing as offline litigation, and still reflect the social psychological concern over the use of modern technology in the court room. Although the pandemic speed the development of online litigation in China, it is treated as an exceptional emergency measure and the emphasis on it may fade away gradually after the pandemic is ending, unless the social psychology is also changed after a longer period of successful use of online litigation.

3. Public hearing

Would virtual hearing satisfy the standard of public hearing? Certainly, there is no legal restriction preventing public access to the hearing.[9] Furthermore, the Online Litigation Regulations provides that online litigation must be made public pursuant to law and judicial interpretation, unless the case concerns national security, state secrets, individual privacy, or the case concerns a minor, commercial secrets and divorce where the parties apply for the hearing not be made public.[10] However, how to make online hearing public is a technical question. If the virtual hearing is organised online, without a openly published “link”, no public will be able to access the virtual court room and the trial is “secret” as a matter of fact. This may practically evade the public hearing requirement.

Chinese online litigation has taken into account the public hearing requirement. Both SPC litigation service website and the Movable Micro Court make open hearing an integral part of the platform. The public can register an account for free and log in the website. After log in, the public can find all available services in the page, including Hearing Livestream. After click in, the pubic can find the case that they want to watch by searching the court or browse the Live Courtroom Today. There are also recorded hearing for the public to watch. In contrast to traditional hearing, the only extra requirement for the public to access to the court is registration, which requires the verification of ID through triple security check: uploading the scan/photo of ID card, verifying mobile numbers via security code and facial recognition.

It shows that Chinese virtual hearing has been developed to a mature stage, which meets the requirement of due process protection and public hearing. Chinese virtue hearing has been systematically updated with the quick equipment of modern technologies and well-established online platform. This platform is made available to the local courts to use through the institutional power of the centre. Virtual hearing in China, thus, will not cause challenge in terms of public hearing.

4. Evidence

Although blockchain technology can prove the authenticity of digital evidence, many original evidence exists offline. The parties need to upload an electronic copy of those evidence through the “Exchange evidence and cross-examination” session of the smart court platform, and other parties can raise queries and challenges. During trial, the litigation parties display the original evidence to the court and other parties through the video camera. If the court and other parties raise no challenge during the pre-trial online cross-examination stage and in the hearing, the evidence may be admitted. It, of course, raises issues of credibility, because electronic copy may be tempered with and the image displayed by video may not be clear and cannot be touched, smelled and felt for a proper evaluation. Courts may adopt other measures to tackle this problem. For example, some courts may require original evidence to be posted to the court if the court and other parties are not satisfied of the distance examination of evidence. Other courts may organise offline cross-examination of the evidence by convening a pre-trial meeting. However, in doing so, the value of the online trial will be reduced, making the trial process lengthier and more inefficient.

The practical difficulty also exists in witness sequestration. Article 74 of the “Several Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil Litigations” provides witnesses in civil proceedings shall not be in court during other witnesses’ testimony, so they cannot hear what other witnesses say.[11] This is a measure to prevent fabrication, collusion, contamination and inaccuracy. However, in virtual hearings, it is difficult for judges to completely avoid witnesses from listening to other witnesses’ testimony online.

 

 

[1] Provisions of the SPC on Several Issues Concerning Registration and Filling of Cases, Fa Shi [2015] No8, Art 14.

[2] The SPC Interpretation of the Application of the PRC Civil Procedure Law, Art 295.

[3] Notice of the SPC about Strengthening and Regulating Online Litigation during the Prevention and Controlling of the Covid-19 Pandemic, Fa [2020] 49, Art 1.

[4] The Supreme People’s Court issued the sixth of ten typical cases of national maritime trials in 2020: BOABARGESAS v Nanjing Yichun Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. Ship.

[5] SPC, Online Litigation Regulations for the People’s Court, Fa Shi [2021] No 12.

[6] Art 2.

[7] Art 2(2).

[8] Art 4.

[10] Art 27.

[11] Fa Shi [2019] 19.

In Silverman v Ryanair DAC (Rev1) [2021] EWHC 2955 (QB), claimant was injured whilst going down stairs at an airport terminal in England. The claim is subject to EU private international law. Jurisdiction for the English courts in this personal injury claim is not disputed.

Under A5 Rome I, contracts for carriage of goods are subject to the ordinary lex voluntatis rule, while for carriage of passengers, parties can only choose from a limited selection of leges contractus. The standard approach is for  general terms and conditions to select the law of the carrier’s habitual residence or his place of central administration, which is entirely kosher under Rome I. Unless the booking qualifies as package travel, it essentially means that passengers are generally less protected than ordinary consumers under A6 Rome I.

In the case of Ryanair, the default choice inevitably leads to Irish law, except in this case (because Irish law would lead to higher damages), the airline unusually seeks to divert from its default choice of law.  The airline’s relevant clause, reads

8.2.4: Governing Law: “Except as otherwise provided by the Convention or applicable law, your contract of carriage with us, these Terms and Conditions of Carriage and our Regulations shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of Ireland and any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Irish Courts.”

The Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air 1999 is unaffected by Rome I as a result of the Regulation’s A25, which gives clear priority to multilateral Conventions at least if the Convention concerned also includes non-EU Member States. The Convention also operates to make the choice of court provision invalid, as discussed ia in CJEU  C-213/18 Adriano Guaitoli et al v Easyjet.

Claimant however argues that assessment of quantum of damages is not regulated by Montreal and therefore remains subject to the lex voluntatis. This is where the second line of Ryanair’s defence comes in, namely an attempt to qualify the claim as one in tort, subject to Rome II’s lex loci damni rule, rather than Rome I’s lex voluntatis.

In essence therefore the question is a matter of Treaty interpretation viz the Montreal Convention (what does it mean to regulate in its provisions on liability and damages), subsequently secondary EU law interpretation viz Rome I and II (qualification: is it a claim in contract or tort, and once that held, does the lex casuae indicated by the relevant Regulation, cover quantum of damages).

Master McCloud turns to international comparison not by way of binding authority but pro inspiratio seeing as the case concerns an international Convention [52]. Scalia J’s ‘Pass-through’ approach to the lex fori’s choice-of-law rules in Zicherman (1996) is the approach also followed in this judgment. The judge uses the formulation by Bader Ginsburg J in El Al Israel: that Warsaw drafters intended to resolve whether there is liability, but to leave to domestic law (the local law identified by the forum under its choice-of-law rules or approaches) determination of the compensatory damages available to the suitor.”

Comparative case-law analysis makes sense. However one would have thought a starting point should have been analysis of the Convention and its travaux itself. Master McCloud does get to that when considering the rather awkward , counsel-inspired idea that there needs to be a discussion of the law that applies to the interpretation of the Convention. Determining the ‘Applicable law to matters of interpretation of the Convention’ might perhaps make sense in a dualist jurisdiction like the UK?

At [59] the judge holds the lex causae for interpretation of the Convention is the lex fori, English law therefore. At [61] he calls this

Convention law as understood by this court, ie the lex fori in that rather special international sense.’

Here I am lost.

The judge then employs the ‘natural language’ approach to determine what parts of the Montreal liability scheme parties can and cannot contractually be negotiated away.

Only the liability issues that have ‘passed through’ to the lex fori are then considered with a view to determining the qualification exercise: is the claim one in contract or one on tort. The judge raises the possibility that the claimant could have construed the claim as being a ‘Convention claim incorporated in the contract’ [64] however he holds that claim is not brought on that footing:

‘the Claim and Particulars are clear: they plead a claim for damages for breach of the Convention, they do not plead a claim in the law of contract’ [64].

That, I would submit, is wrong. The claim is subject to European conflict of laws rules. These require the judge to qualify the claim subject to the autonomous interpretation of ‘contract’ and ‘non-contractual obligation’ as most recently discussed by the CJEU in Wikingerhof. While I am the first to acknowledge claim formulation is a powerful tool to manage qualification (indeed Wikingerhof confirms as much), I do not think deference to claimant may be as large as suggested here.

The judge proceeds with the non-contractual nature (causing injury to the claimant through negligence [65]), points out that the Convention covers both contractual and non-contractual claims [66] and seeks support in his analysis on tort and contract in Prof. Thomas Kadner Graziano’s 2016 paper in the Yearbook of Private International Law. With respect, I do not think Thomas’ paper supports the conclusions in this case.

At [72][73] the judge then rather summarily and using A4(3) Rome II displaces the lex loci damni for the ‘passed through’ claim, in favour of Irish law, the lex contractus to the contract of carriage. Once the Rome II path chosen (of which, per above, I am not convinced), I do not think the lex loci damni may be pushed aside quite as concisely as this.

The relationship between international Conventions and European conflicts rules is not always straightforward. Yet here I think it has been presented a touch too convolutedly.

Geert.

Silverman v #Ryanair (Rev1) [2021] EWHC 2955 (QB)
Aviation law, whether airline can disapply its own choice of law & how #Montreal Convention interacts with the choice of law rules of the Forum, here: Rome I and II (and A4(3) escape clause for the latter https://t.co/EWJ7njH5ED

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 12, 2021

In October 2021, the Spanish Supreme Court had the opportunity to show its willingness to follow the Court of Justice and to give an example of a good practice in a matter related to the application of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

The order (auto) of 7 October 2021, was delivered by the Plenary of the Civil Chamber, with M. Ignacio Sancho Gargallo as reporting judge, against the background of an action for damages suffered as a result of an infringement of competition law.

In the case at hand, the Spanish company Garutrans Gasteiz S.L. filed a claim against Paccar Inc. and its subsidiary DAF Trucks NV, domiciled, according to the lawsuit, in San Fernando de Henares (Spain). The case was assigned to the Commercial Court No. 3 of Madrid, which declared the application admissible. After the attempts to serve the process at the address indicated in the claim failed, the plaintiff indicated two new addresses, one in the United States and another in the Netherlands.

The Madrid court, by order of 18 January 2021, declared ex officio its lack of territorial jurisdiction and pointed to the commercial courts of Vitoria as competent, arguing the defendants have their registered office outside of Spain and the DAF trucks were acquired in Vitoria, where the plaintiff is domiciled.

By order of 12 April 2021, however, the Commercial Court No. 1 of Vitoria declared itself incompetent as well on the basis that three of the four trucks had been acquired in Navarra. The situation was therefore one of a negative conflict of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Madrid court’s declaration of incompetence was premature, since according to Article 28, para. 1, of the Brussels I bis Regulation it should have summoned the defendants (NoA: the Regulation imposes such duty only in relation to defendants domiciled in a Member State other than the one where the judge seats; nothing is said about other defendants), so as to give them the possibility of appearing and accepting jurisdiction in accordance with Article 26 of the Regulation, or rejecting it through the procedural tool to the purpose. Only after, and only provided the defendant(s) does not appear, the court seised is entitled to analyse its jurisdiction and to declare ex officio it has none.

What is interesting about the order of the Supreme Court, however, is not the final conclusion, but the Court’s statements showing its awareness and disposition to follow the Court of Justice’s decision C 30/20, Volvo, in order to identify the place of the damage in the framework of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

The Volvo ruling corresponds to a request from a Madrid Court. There, the Court of Justice explicitly asserts that Article 7(2) of the Regulation determines both international and territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court recalls that the centralisation of jurisdiction before a single specialised court may be justified in the interests of the sound administration of justice: as AG Richard de la Tour had suggested in his opinion, the technical complexity of the rules applicable to actions for damages for infringements of competition law provisions may militate in favour of such a centralisation of jurisdiction. In its absence, the courts of the place where the goods were acquired are territorially competent. This notwithstanding, should the buyer not have purchased the goods affected by the collusive arrangements in question within the jurisdiction of a single court, territorial jurisdiction is conferred on the courts of the place where the undertaking harmed has its registered office.

As already said, the Spanish Supreme Court did not need to apply the above-mentioned solutions to the case at hand, but profited from the occasion to endorse them and to explicitly revoke its previous understanding of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

 

Written by Lena-Maria Möller,
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law
Visiting Scholar, New York University Abu Dhabi

 

On 7 November 2021, Abu Dhabi, the largest of seven emirates that form the United Arab Emirates, announced the passing of a new personal status law for non-Muslim foreigners. The law carries forward a series of recent legal reforms that aim at providing greater legal certainty for the country’s large expatriate population. The law’s novelty lies in the fact that it combines aspects of substantive and international family law. It is significant also because it introduces civil marriage – albeit only for non-Muslim foreigners – into the country’s domestic family law regime. While generally welcomed as possibly easing judicial procedure and court proceedings, the new legislation also raises several questions, especially as regards the law’s application alongside the Emirati conflict-of-laws rules.

 

Multinationalism and its challenges for family law

Since the country’s foundation exactly 50 years ago, the United Arab Emirates have been characterized by large-scale labor migration of both low- and high-skilled workers and, as a result, by its highly diverse, multinational population. In a country of around 10 million inhabitants, only a little over one million are national citizens. This demographic makeup has been a challenge for both national and international family law as around 70% of cases filed with the domestic family courts have an international element. Prior to recent legal reforms, foreigners would either settle their personal status matters in their home country, or they would approach the local personal status courts where, in theory, they could choose between having the Islamically inspired Federal Personal Status Codes of 2005 or the laws of their home country applied. In legal practice, however, most personal status cases were settled according to domestic law. Among the main reasons was reluctance on the part of some family court judges to apply a set of rules they were not familiar with as well as the parties’ concerns that the application of their own national law would lead to their case being more costly and time-consuming. This was because Emirati courts have demonstrated a strong tendency to consider the foreign law as a fact which will have to be proven by the parties.

While domestic and international family law have traditionally been a matter of federal legislation, a few years ago, the emirate of Abu Dhabi already launched a first local initiative to offer alternative jurisdiction to its (non-Muslim) expatriate community. In late summer 2017, the emirate announced that it would allow Christian expatriates to divorce through their church. Instead of filing a divorce petition with the domestic family courts, foreigners residing in Abu Dhabi henceforth had the option of seeking mediation in their own place of worship. The proposal envisioned that once the couple, through such church-run mediation, had reached a divorce agreement settling questions regarding assets and the custody of children, these documents only needed to be authorized by the national courts to become enforceable. Initially, the amendment had been agreed upon only between the emirate of Abu Dhabi and local Christian leaders, but the inclusion of Hindu and Sikh religious communities was equally envisioned. The initiative to introduce church-run mediation and dispute resolution for Christian expatriates, however, proved impractical. For example, it remained unclear what legal status such religious out-of-court agreements would have in the home countries of foreigners residing in the United Arab Emirates. This was the case especially for all those expatriates whose home countries had abolished religious family adjudication or required a court’s substantive involvement in the dissolution of a marriage. The proposed alternative jurisdiction thus failed to meet the needs of many non-Muslim expatriates and instead another legislative amendment was introduced at the federal level in 2020.

In September 2020, a federal decree-law amended the country’s international family law by introducing recourse to the lex loci celebrationis. Instead of applying the law of a husband’s nationality, as was the case before, on the federal level, questions of marriage and divorce are now governed by the law of the country in which the marriage was concluded. While, at first glance, this conflict-of-law rule signaled a departure from nationality as the main connecting factor, the amendment was in fact framed in terms of expatriates being given the option of having “their own” laws, and those to which they have a stronger connection, applied. The new decree-law therefore also reiterated that nationality would determine the law applicable to a deceased person’s estate. The principle aim of the amendment was to offer expatriates access to a legal regime that they felt closely connected with and that met their regulatory demands best.

 

New national legislation for international cases

With Abu Dhabi’s new personal status law for non-Muslim foreigners, the transition from religious affiliation to foreign nationality as the main connecting factor (and thereby identity marker in the eyes of the legislator) has been partially reversed. Admittedly, the law, which contains a mere twenty articles (as opposed to the 357 articles-long Federal Personal Status Code), offers an accessible and easy-to-understand basis for adjudicating the most common personal status cases, including concluding and dissolving a marriage before the soon-to-be-established bilingual (Arabic and English) family courts for non-Muslim foreigners. As proclaimed in Article 2, the law is based on international best practices and aims to provide foreigners with a law that they find familiar in terms of “culture”, “customs”, and language. The same article also highlights that among the principle aims of the law is to safeguard the best interests of the child particularly upon divorce of the parents. Article 3 allows foreigners to opt out of the new law and instead request the application of the law of their home country. It must be assumed that in such cases it still falls upon the parties to present the detailed content of the foreign law and provide the court with its official translation.

Eleven articles of the new law are dedicated to substantive questions of personal status and stipulate, inter alia, that spouses to a civil marriage must at least be eighteen years of age (which corresponds to the rules in the Federal Personal Status Code) and must both explicitly declare their consent to marriage (i.e., the woman must not be represented by a marriage guardian as the country’s Islamically inspired family law envisions instead) (Article 4). Both spouses have access to unilateral, judicial divorce without having to demonstrate reasons for divorce, and the court will not establish a party responsible for the breakdown of the marriage (Article 6-7). The law envisions post-divorce maintenance only for the wife and does not contain any provisions entitling the divorced husband to alimony (Article 8). This rule stands in contrast to a general provision in the new law, Article 16, which reiterates the equality of men and women in the application of the law. The default post-divorce custody arrangement is joint custody with the competent court having discretion to decide to the contrary (Article 9-10). Filiation of a child is established either through marriage or acknowledgment (Article 14). Finally, the new law also covers questions of testate and intestate succession, provides for the deposition of a foreigner’s will in a special register (Article 13), and defines proportional rights for inheritance in case a non-Muslim foreigner dies intestate. In this case, the default rule is that the estate is divided in half between the deceased’s spouse and their children (without any distinction between sons and daughters) or the deceased’s parents and siblings (Article 11).

As already noted, the law is rather straightforward and lays down the most basic rules for different matters of personal status. Any questions not covered in the law will be regulated according to local and federal laws and legislation (Article 18), presumably including the Federal Personal Status Code, and the law states that additional executive regulations will be passed to regulate the application of the law in detail (Article 19).

 

Open questions

A substantive family law that is only applicable to foreigners is by any means a novel approach in family law internationally. Had the new law been aimed at governing matters of personal status for all non-Muslims (foreigners and national citizens) in the country, it would be consistent with the firmly established approach in the region of dividing the applicable family and inheritance law along religious lines. In its current form, however, the law conflates religious affiliation and citizenship as connecting factors in international and domestic family law. This poses a problem for all Muslim foreigners in the United Arab Emirates, especially those hailing from countries without religiously inspired family law. Should they not wish to be subject to the country’s Federal Personal Status Code, they must still demand the application of the laws of their home country and will have to go through the time-consuming and costly process of proving the content of these laws to the competent court. Their fellow countrymen and -women are spared such efforts owing merely to their different religious affiliation.

One may also wonder about the chances of judgments based on the new law being recognized in the parties’ home countries. It will be difficult for foreign courts to comprehend why the Emirati conflict-of-laws rules lead to the application of foreign law when instead the same case has been decided by a domestic set of rules designed specifically for foreigners. To add clarity, it would be useful to reference the new personal status law in the relevant rules on international family law. In addition, the wording of Article 3, which allows for foreigners to demand “the application of the law of their home country”, should ideally refer to the applicable conflict-of-laws rules in the country’s Civil Code – as does the corresponding rule in the Federal Personal Status Code. Otherwise, in some personal status matters, divorce for example, a total of three applicable laws are now competing with one another: the new domestic law for non-Muslim foreigners, the law of their home country, and the lex loci celebrationis that was introduced through the abovementioned conflict-of-laws reform of 2020.

 

Note: The Personal Status Law for Non-Muslim Foreigners in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi has not yet been published in the local gazette. The analysis above is based on a first unofficial version of the law that was obtained in advance.

The University of Toulouse (France) will host a conference on Notary’s Role in Private International Law (L’office du notaire en droit international privé) organised by Estelle Gallant, on 25-26 November 2021.

The conference will include sessions on the role of notary as competent authority in the field of private international law, the reception and circulation of public documents, the drawing up of deeds by notaries as well as roundtables on divorce by mutual consent, property regime of couples and international successions.

Speakers will include numerous PIL specialists:

• Scholars : Hugues Kenkack (Toulouse), Fabienne Jault-Seseke (Paris-Saclay), Patrick Wautelet (Liège), Pierre Callé (Paris-Saclay), Christine Bidaud (Lyon 3), Hugues Fulchiron (Lyon 3), Eric Fongaro (Bordeaux), Michel Farge (Grenoble-Alpes), Hélène Péroz (Nantes), Nathalie Joubert (Bourgogne-Dijon), Sara Godechot-Patris (Paris-Est Créteil), Sandrine Clavel (Paris-Saclay), Marc Nicod (Toulouse), Lukas Rass-Masson (Toulouse), Estelle Gallant (Toulouse) & Cyril Nourissat (Lyon 3)
• Notaries: Caroline Deneuville (Paris), Richard Crône (Paris) and François Tremosa (Toulouse) & Jean-Christophe Rega (Mission Europe du CSN),
• Legal practionners working with notaries : Mariel Revillard, Marion Nadaud (Bordeaux) & Sophie Chalas-Kudelko (Lyon)

The full programme is available here. Online registration is open here.

Author: Ting LIAO, Ph.D. candidate, Wuhan University Institute of International Law

A. Technology in the Context of Judicial Reform

According to Max Weber, “the modern judge is a vending machine into which the pleadings are inserted together with the fee, and which then disgorges the judgment together with the reasons mechanically derived from the code.” [1]Max Weber’s conjecture is a metaphor for the vital connotation of intelligence. The key elements of intelligence are people, data and technology. So, how these elements are utilized in the judicial system?

Generally, a significant number of courts are experimenting with the use of internet, artificial intelligence and blockchain for case filling, investigation and evidence obtaining, trials and the initiation of ADR procedures. The so-called smart justice projects are commenced in many countries. China has also made significant progress in this domain. In addition to accelerating the use of the internet technology, the Supreme People’s Court of China has demonstrated its ambition to use AI  and blockchain to solve problems in the judicial proceedings.[2]

B. Smart Court in China: An Overview

In China, the smart justice is a big project contains smart court, smart judicial administration and smart procuratorate. The smart court is the core of the entire smart justice project. “The Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Accelerating the Construction of Smart Courts” encourages people’s courts around the country to apply AI to provide smarter litigation and legal literacy services to the public, while reducing the burden of non-judicial matters for court staff as much as possible.

The construction of China’s smart courts involves more than 3,000 courts, more than 10,000 detached tribunals and more than 4,000 collaborative departments, containing tens of thousands of information systems such as information infrastructure, application systems, data resources, network security and operation and maintenance, etc. The entire smart court information system is particularly big and complex.

The smart court is a functional service platform for the informatization of the people’s courts. The platform integrates several cutting-edge technological capabilities, including face recognition identity verification, multi-way audio and video call functions, voice recognition functions and non-tax fee payment functions. These functions are tailor-made capability packages for courts, and they can be used in a variety of scenarios such as identity verification, online documents accessing, remote mediation, remote proceedings, enforcement, court hearing records and internal things. Through the smart platform, any court can easily access to the capabilities, and quickly get successful experiences from any other courts in China.

C. Examples of Good Practice

1. Provide Litigation Information and Services

Peoples’ Courts in nine provinces or municipalities, including Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong, have officially launched artificial intelligence terminals in their litigation service halls. Through these AI terminals, the public can access information about litigation and judicial procedures, as well as basic information about judges or court staff. The AI terminals can also automatically create judicial documents based on the information provided by the parties. More importantly, the AI can provide the parties risk analysis before filing a lawsuit. For example, artificial intelligence machines in courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Jiangsu can assess the possible outcome of litigation for the parties. The results are based on the AI’s analysis of more than 7,000 Chinese laws and regulations stored in its system, as well as numerous judicial precedents. At the same time, the AI machine can also suggest alternative dispute resolution options. For example, when an arbitration clause is present, the system will suggest arbitration, in divorce cases, if one of the parties unable to appear in people’s court, then the smart system shall advise online mediation.

In addition to parties, as to the service for the court proceeding itself, the new generation of technology[3] is used in the smart proceeding and is deeply integrated with it. These technologies provide effective support for judges’ decision making, and provide accurate portraits of natural persons, legal persons, cases, lawyers and other subjects. They also provide fast, convenient and multi-dimensional search and query services and automatic report services for difficult cases.

2. Transfer of Case Materials

Some People’s Courts in Shenzhen, Shanghai and Jiangsu have set up artificial intelligence service terminals for parties to scan and submit electronic copies of materials to the court. This initiative can speed up the process of evidence submission and classification of evidence. In addition, digital transmission can also speed up the handover of case materials between different courts, especially in appellate cases where the court of first instance must transfer the case materials to the appellate court.

3. Evidence Collection and Preservation

Technically speaking, the blockchain and its extensions can be used to secure electronic data and prevent tampering during the entire cycle of electronic data production, collection, transfer and storage, thus providing an effective means of investigation for relevant organizations. Comparing to traditional investigation methods, blockchain technology is suitable as an important subsidiary way to electronic data collection and preservation. This is because the blockchain’s timestamp can be used to mark the time when the electronic data was created, and the signature from the person’s private key can be used to verify the party’s genuine intent. The traceable characteristics of blockchain can facilitate the collection and identification of electronic data.[4]

In judicial practice, for example, the electronic evidence platform is on the homepage of Court’s litigation services website of Zhengzhou Intermediate People’s. It is possible to obtain evidence and make preservation on judicial blockchain of the court. This platform providing services such as evidence verification, evidence preservation, e-discovery and blockchain-based public disclosure. The evidence, such as electronic contracts, can be uploaded directly via the webpage, and the abstract of electronic data can be recorded in the blockchain in real time. Furthermore, this judicial blockchain has three tiers (pictured below). The first tier is the client side, which helps parties submit evidence, complaints and other services. The second tier is the server side, which provides trusted blockchain services such as real-name certification, timestamping and data storage. The third tier is the judicial side, which uses blockchain technology to form a consortium chain of judicial authentication, notaries and the court itself as nodes to form a comprehensive blockchain network of judicial proceedings.[5] In other words, people’s court shall be regarded as the key node on the chain, which can solve the contradiction between decentralization and the concentration of judicial authority, and this kind of blockchain is therefore more suitable for electronic evidence preservation.

Secondly, for lawyers, the validity of electronic lawyer investigation orders can be verified through judicial blockchain, a technology that significantly enhances the credibility of investigation orders and the convenience of investigations. For example? in Jilin Province, the entire process of application, approval, issuance, utilization and feedback of an investigation order is processed online. Lawyers firstly apply for an investigation order online, and after the judge approves it, the platform shall create an electronic investigation order and automatically uploads it to the judicial blockchain for storage, while sending it to lawyers in the form of electronic service. Lawyers shall hold the electronic investigation order to target entities to collect evidence. Those entities can scan the QR code on the order, and login to the judicial blockchain platform to verify the order. Then they shall provide the corresponding investigation evidence materials in accordance with the content of the investigation order.[6]

In addition, it should be noted that Article 11 of the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases by Internet Courts”, which came into force in 2018, explicitly recognizes data carriers on the blockchain as evidence in civil proceedings for the first time, but their validity needs to be verified by the courts.

The issue of blockchain evidence has already caused discussion among judges, particularly regarding the use of blockchain-based evidence in cases. For instance, what criteria should courts adopt to read such data? Approaches in judicial practice vary. Currently, there is no consistent approach in people’s court as to whether blockchain evidence needs to be submitted as original evidence. In certain recent cases, such as (2019) Jing 0491 Min Chu No. 805 Case and (2020) Jing 04 Min Zhong No. 309 Case, the court’s considerations for the determination of blockchain evidence are inconsistent.

4. Case Management

People’s Courts in Shanghai and Shenzhen are piloting an artificial intelligence-assisted case management system that can analyze and automatically collate similar judicial precedents for judges to refer to. The system is also able to analyze errors in judgments drafted by judges by comparing the evidence in current cases with that in precedent cases. This will help maintain uniformity in judicial decisions. Currently, the system for criminal cases has been put into use, while the system for civil and administrative cases is still being tested in pilot stage.

5. Online Proceedings

Chinese courts had already adopted online proceedings in individual cases before 2018. The Supreme People’s Court had released the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Hearing of Cases in Internet Courts. From 1 January 2020 to 31 May 2021, 12.197 million cases were filed online by courts nationwide, with online filing accounting for 28.3% of all cases filed; 6.513 million total online mediation, 6.142,900 successful mediation cases before litigation; 1.288 million online court proceedings 33.833 million electronic service of documents.[7]

Recently, the Supreme Court, some provincial courts and municipal courts have also issued rules on “online proceedings”. The Supreme People’s Court has issued the Online Litigation Regulations for the People’s Court 2021 which stipulates online litigation should follow the five principles, namely fairness and efficiency, legitimate and voluntary principle, protection of rights, principle of safety and reliability. This regulation emphasizes the principles of application of technology, strictly adhere to technology neutrality, to ensure that technology is reliable. [8]Furthermore, in 2021 the Supreme People’s Court has issued the Several Regulations on Providing Online Filing Services for Cross-border Litigants, relying on the provision of online filing for cross-border litigants through the China mobile micro court. Based on Tencent’s cloud technology, the Micro Court can also be linked to the most used communication tool in China, namely WeChat. Using the micro courts mini programs allows for a dozen functions such as public services, litigation, enforcement and personal case management.[9]

6. Framework of the Litigation Services Network

The litigation service network is an important carrier for the court to conduct business and litigation services on the Internet, providing convenient and efficient online litigation services for parties and litigation agents, greatly facilitating the public’s litigation, while strengthening the supervision and management of the court’s litigation services, enhancing the quality of litigation services and improving the standardization of litigation services. The picture shows the functioning and operation mechanism of a litigation services network.[10]

[1] See Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society (Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein trans., Harvard University Press 1954).

[2] For example, in 2019, the Supreme People’s Court of China approved several documents such as “The Report on the Promotion of China Mobile Micro Courts”, “The Report on the Construction of the Smart Court Laboratory”, and “The General Idea of Comprehensively Promoting the Construction of Judicial Artificial Intelligence”.

[3] Including big data, cloud computing, knowledge mapping, text mining, optical character recognition (OCR), natural language processing (NLP) etc.

[4] See Trusted Blockchain Initiatives, White Paper on Blockchain Preservation of Judicial Evidence (2019).

[5] See Zhengzhou Court Judicial Service Website < http://www.zzfyssfw.gov.cn/zjy/> accessed 09 Nov. 2021; A consortium chain is a blockchain system that is open to a specific set of organizations, and this licensing mechanism then brings a potential hub to the blockchain, and The node access system in a consortium chain means that it already grants a certain level of trust to the nodes.. see also Internet court of Hangzhou < https://blockchain.netcourt.gov.cn/first>accessed 09 Nov. 2021.

[6] See e.g., a pilot project of the Supreme People’s Court of China, the Jilin Intermediate People’s Court proposed the Trusted Operation Application Scene: Full Process Assurance for Litigation Services (Electronic Lawyer Investigation Order); see also People’s Court Daily, Piloting the “judicial chain” and multipions practice of Jilin’s smart court construction< http://legal.people.com.cn/n1/2020/1124/c42510-31942250.html>accessed 08 Nov. 2021.

[7] See Chinanews < https://www.chinanews.com/gn/2021/06-17/9501170.shtml>accessed 08 Nov. 2021.

[8] SPC of PRC, Report about Online Litigation Regulation for the People’s Court< http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-317061.html>accessed 08 Nov. 2021.

[9] See e.g., Xinhuanet < http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2020-05/07/c_1125953941.htm>accessed 08 Nov. 2021.

[10] Xu Jianfeng et.al., Introduction to Smart Court System Engineering (People’s Court Press 2021).

It is common practice for children to be registered in the country where they are born or where they hold nationality. But what if these countries fail to do so? A judgment of 18 October 2021 rendered by a judge of first instance in Montilla (Spain) gives an answer, which was reported in the blog run by José Carlos Fernández Rozas and on the webpage of the Consejo General del Poder Judicial. The judgment can still be appealed.

Facts

A child was born in March 2020 in Oran (Algeria) to a national of Cameron; the father is unknown. The Algerian authorities failed to register the child. One year later, mother and child entered Spanish territory, where they have been living since in a refugee centre in Montilla.

Holding

The judge decided that the child should be registered in the Spanish civil register, despite the absence of a previous registration in the country of its birth or nationality.

Rationale

The Spanish judge stressed that competence for registering the child’s birth lay first and foremost with Algeria, the place of its birth, and with Cameron, the country of its nationality. Since these countries failed to exercise their competence, the judge found that Spain had both the right and the duty to register the child. The legal basis for doing so would be Article 9(2) of the Spanish Act on the Civil Register (Ley 20/2011, de 21 de julio, del Registro Civil), which provides that events and acts that have taken place outside Spain shall be registered in the Spanish register when required by Spanish law.

High-Level Human Rights Principles

Most interesting is where the judge found the requirement to register the event of the child’s birth. In this regard, he referred to the highest-ranking legal sources available. In particular, he cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the various rights it grants to the individual. The judge used these sources to formulate some very far-reaching and important legal propositions. He emphasised that the registration of a person’s identity is “one of the most essential manifestations of the recognition of the individual as such”. It would be “the only form by which society and the law accept its existence”, and it would “facilitate the exercise of all of the rights that the law bestows from the time of birth”. Without an entry in the civil register, there would be no liberty to respect, and no right to recognise.

More Technical Considerations, in particular the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

On a more technical level, the judge referred to Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which says that “Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law”. He also referred to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which had been signed and ratified by Spain, Article 7(1) of which sets out that “[t]he child shall be registered immediately after birth …”.

The judge considered Article 7(1) of the Convention to be of direct and immediate effect because of its clear, precise and unconditional formulation. This was despite Article 7(2) of the Convention, under which the states party to the Convention shall implement the obligation to register, “in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless”. The judge argued that Article 7(2) was mainly focused on avoiding situations of statelessness, and that the registration was a condition prior to the granting of nationality because only persons recognised as having legal personality could be considered as nationals. In other words, the child had to be registered somewhere before nationality could be granted. Article 7(1) of the Convention would thus contain a binding obligation for Spanish tribunals to this effect.

Constitutional Law

The judge cited various other provisions, especially of the Spanish Constitution. Inter alia, Article 39(4) of the Constitution provides that “Children shall enjoy the protection provided for in the international agreements which safeguard their rights”.  He also referred to Article 96(1) of the Constitution, according to which validly concluded international treaties, once officially published in Spain, shall form part of the internal legal order.

Assessment

The judgment requires the registration of children by local authorities where a child has been born abroad but not registered there. This is a significant principle that should also be followed by other nations. As a legal basis, they could use either the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child or, if they have not signed it, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which applies as customary international law.

Nevertheless, the judgment should not be overinterpreted. Even where a child has not been registered, it is entitled the plenitude of human rights, which exist from birth and are not preconditioned on registration. However, without being officially registered, the child (and also its mother) will encounter many difficulties in practical life. This is why registration is so important that it may be considered even as a human right that can be invoked everywhere.

— Special thanks to José Carlos Fernandez Rozas for his contribution to this post.

Aldricus – Kondisi tubuh wanita yang tengah hamil dan tidak memang berbeda, bukan hanya dari segi fisik tapi juga psikis. Ibu hamil lebih rentan mengalami gangguan kesehatan, terutama mengalami anemia. Ada beberapa penyebab anemia ibu hamil yang jika diketahui sejak dini dapat membantu Anda menghindarinya.

Penyebab Bumil Alami Anemia

Anemia pada ibu hamil memang bukan hal langka dan banyak yang mengalaminya. Akan tetapi, masalah ini tidak dapat disepelekan karena dapat berakibat fatal pada kehamilan, seperti bayi lahir prematur atau mengalami cacat fisik. Berikut adalah beberapa penyebab anemia pada wanita hamil:

1. Kekurangan Zat Besi

Zat besi dibutuhkan untuk memproduksi sel darah merah dan sel darah merah sangat dibutuhkan untuk mengalirkan oksigen dan nutrisi ke seluruh tubuh. Jika dibiarkan akan mempengaruhi tumbuh kembang janin dan membuat plasenta tidak lagi optimal. Biasanya anemia ini disebabkan kurangnya ibu mengonsumsi makanan mengandung zat besi, baik selama maupun sebelum masa kehamilan.

2. Kekurangan Asam Folat atau Vitamin B9

Penyebab anemia ibu hamil berikutnya adalah kekurangan asam folat yang dapat mengakibatkan malabsorpsi. Dalam kondisi ini tubuh ibu hamil akan mengalami kesulitan menyerap asam folat sehingga dapat mengganggu perkembangan sel otak janin dan mempengaruhi perkembangan pada bagian tubuh janin.

3. Kekurangan Asupan Vit. B12

Selain vitamin B9, vitamin B12 juga merupakan jenis nutrisi yang diperlukan bagi tubuh. Kondisi ini akan berbahaya karena tubuh tidak mampu mencukupi kebutuhan sel darah merah dan dapat berakibat pada pertumbuhan janin.

Ketika tubuh tidak mampu melakukan penyerapan vitamin B12 dengan baik, maka akan membuat pembentukan sel darah merah berkurang. Jadi, harus ditangani dengan pemberian suplemen mengandung vit.12. Kebiasaan mengonsumsi alkohol saat hamil juga dapat membuat bumil bisa memicu kekurangan vit B12 ini.

Oleh sebab itu, penyebab anemia ibu hamil harus diketahui sehingga dapat diberikan pengobatan yang tepat untuk mengatasi masalah tersebut. Bisa dengan mengatur asupan makanan yang kaya zat besi dan vitamin B9 dan B12 atau menambahkan asupan suplemen.

The post 4 Penyebab Ibu Hamil Mengalami Anemia dan Cara Penangannya appeared first on Aldri Blog.

In a judgment of 9 November 2020, the Greek Supreme Court discussed a highly interesting issue, which is not often dealt with in practice. The question is whether foreign law (English law, in the circumstances) may apply to procedural acts due to take place in the forum (Greece), affecting directly the limitation of the action. Specifically, the issue had arisen of the consequences of the waiver of the lawsuit by the claimant/appellant, and the repercussions of its examination pursuant to either Greek or English law.

Facts and Judgment

An insurance company, seated in the UK, provided insurance in connection with the contract for the sale of fuel concluded among the insured one and a ship carrier having seat in Greece. Due to an accident at sea, the insurance company reimbursed the insured one and, by endorsement, was handed over the bills of lading, which included a choice of English law. The insurance company, then, initiated proceedings against the carrier (which was also at the same time the shipowner) in Greece. Service of process took place on 7 July 2008, but on 16 February 2010 the claimant proceeded to the discontinuance of the action pursuant to Article 294 Greek Code of Civil Procedure. Ten days later, the insurance company filed a new action against the defendant, adding this time as defendant another company – notably the new shipowner – to which the ship was in the meantime sold and which incorporated the first one in its capacity of shipowner, succeeding in the related rights and obligations.

In the ensuing hearing before the Piraeus Court of first instance, both defendants pleaded that the action was time-barred, relying upon Article III(6) of the Hague-Visby Rules, which reads as follows:

Subject to paragraph 6bis the carrier and the ship shall in any event be discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods, unless suit is brought within one year of their delivery or of the date when they should have been delivered. This period, may however, be extended if the parties so agree after the cause of action has arisen.

The claimant countered that the first claim was filed within one year of the supposed delivery (which failed because of the accident). The discontinuance was made with the intention to correct some parts of the claim. The claimant supported that Greek law should apply. This would lead to the application of Article 263(2) Greek Civil Code, which allows the claimant to file a new claim within six months following the waiver of action. Should this happen, the interruption of limitation goes back to the filing of the initial action. Hence, in accordance with Greek law, this procedural act may not be interpreted as a complete and solemn waiver of the action.

On the contrary, the defendant, the first one, insisted, through all stages of the proceedings, that the choice agreed in favor of English law encompasses the interruption of limitation issue too (the outcome of the case with respect to the second defendant is not related to the matter discussed here).

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant/appellee. It underlined that the Hague-Visby Rules stipulate the one-year limitation; however, they do not address other issues connected to it, such as interruption and suspension. Consequently, the above matters should be examined by the proper law of the contract, i.e., English law, as evidenced in the bills of lading. Therefore, Greek law, and most importantly, Article 263 Greek Civil Code, may not be applied in the case at hand.

Following the above, the Supreme Court referred extensively to pertinent provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) i.e. Parts 17.4 (Amendments to statements of case after the end of a relevant limitation period), 19.5 (Special provisions about adding or substituting parties after the end of a relevant limitation period), 38.2 (Right to discontinue claim), and 38.7 (Discontinuance and subsequent proceedings). It concluded that, pursuant to English law, the discontinuance of the claim can bring all or part of the proceedings instigated to an end by serving a formal notice of discontinuance. In other words, there is no such thing as a revival of the proceedings by means of a new claim filed within a specific period of time, similar to what is provided for by Article 263 Greek Civil Code.

The judgment was mostly based on the legal information related to the CPR, delivered by the Hellenic Institute of Comparative Law, which was requested to be furnished before the first instance court. In addition, the judgment gave very convincing answers to the appellant’s assertions, unknowingly following the same path taken by courts in other jurisdictions (see below, the second next paragraph).

Applicable Rules

It is necessary to underline the legal framework surrounding the case. The Supreme Court correctly applied Article 3(1) of the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations. However, no further reference to other provisions of the convention is to be found in the text. Articles 1(2)h and 10(1)d were also pertinent to the case.

Article 1(2)h: The rules of this Convention “shall not apply to: […] (h) evidence and procedure, without prejudice to Article 14”.

Article 10(1):  “The law applicable to a contract by virtue of Articles 3 to 6 and 12 of this Convention shall govern in particular: […] (d) the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and limitation of actions.”

Additionally, reference could be made to Article 21 (Relationship with other conventions), where it is clearly stated that the Rome Convention “shall not prejudice the application of international conventions to which a Contracting State is, or becomes, a party”, for sufficiently justifying the application of Article 3 Hague-Visby Rules.

In light of the above, the answer to the question depends on the interpretation given under the aforementioned provisions of the Rome Convention. Put differently, the crucial issues are, whether the interruption of limitation is covered by the wording of Article 10(1)d, and whether the discontinuance and the subsequent filing of the claim should be considered as procedural matters, therefore not covered by the Rome Convention pursuant to Article 1(2)h.

The situation is similar under the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations, see Articles 12(1)d and 1(3). So far, no preliminary reference has been submitted concerning the questions above. The general trend is to include all aspects of limitation within the scope of the Regulation (interruption, suspension, commencement), even if they are carried out by procedural means. The procedural nature attributed to limitation by virtue of domestic law (here: UK) does not affect the proper application of the Rome I Regulation. In any case, procedural rules related to limitation must be considered as part of the applicable law of the contract (in German: Vertragsstatut).

The Issue in the Prism of the Rome II Regulation

The Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations contains similar provisions, namely Articles 1(3) and 15(h). However, there are visible differences in the wording of the latter provision. Article 15(h) is more precise. It stipulates that the law specified under the Regulation provides, among other things, the rules relating to the commencement, interruption and suspension of a period of prescription or limitation.

Two judgments issued by English courts shed light to the issue: Pandya v Intersalonika General Insurance Co SA,  [2020] EWHC 273 (QB) (the text is not yet accessible on open sources), and Johnson v Berentzen & Anor [2021] EWHC 1042 (QB) (26 April 2021).These cases relate to car accidents with cross-border element.

In the first case, a UK citizen was injured by a Greek national on the island of Kos. The claim against the Greek insurance company was filed in England. The action was registered with the court; however, service was not effectuated within 5 years following the accident, which renders the action time-barred pursuant to Greek law. The claimant considered that the application of Greek law for the service of process by an English court is absurd. The court had a different view: it ruled that the procedural nature of service forms here part of the interruption of limitation issue. The resemblance to the ruling of the Greek Supreme Court is evident. A right to appeal was refused.

In the second case, the accident occurred on Scottish soil. The perpetrator was domiciled in Germany, whereas the victim in England. The issue revolved again around belated service of the claim. The attempt of the claimant to deconstruct the judgment of the court in the Pandya v Intersalonika case remained unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the court granted the request of the claimant to proceed out of time, by providing an extension in accordance with Scottish law.

A webinar in English on The resolution of the Institut de Droit International on Human Rights and Private International Law will take place on 12 November 2021, from 16.30 to 18.30 CET, organised by the Interest Group on Private International Law of the Italian Society of International Law (SIDI).

The speakers will be Fausto Pocar and Patrick Kinsch.

Attendance is free. Those wishing to join the webinar are invited to send an e-mail to sidigdipp@gmail.com.