Droit international général

The author of this post is Prof Dr Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Professor at the Faculty of Law, Bond University (Australia), Visiting Professor at Masaryk University (Czech Republic) and Associated Researcher at the Swedish Law & Informatics Research Institute, Stockholm University (Sweden).

On 6 December 2020, I had the great honour of giving a presentation at the Royal Netherlands Society of International Law’s Annual General Meeting. The topic I had been invited to address was the questions of whether (public and private) international law is ready for the, already ongoing, digital age. In essence, I made six observations:

1. Examples can be found of the online environment undermining the proper functioning of public and private international law structures;
2. As structured and applied online today, public and private international law creates a situation of ‘hyperregulation’;
3. The complexity of international law stems in part from the fact that the frameworks and concepts applied were developed in other eras and under other conditions resulting in them being insufficient to address the issues with which we are confronted now at the beginning of the 21st century;
4. The international law community must do more to engage with, and prioritise, Internet-related legal issues, and must seek to increase the profile of public and private international law in the Internet regulation community;
5. Examples can already be found of, more or less, self-regulatory Internet-related ADR schemes that effectively exclude international law altogether (see here). We must recognise that, with a proliferation of such schemes, the role and influence of international law decreases; and
6. The international law community ought to do more to engage with large, forward-looking, questions such as how AI may support, and indeed reform, how we work with international law (see further here). In this context, we must be brave enough to be willing to reconsider also the most entrenched notions.

I am happy to have the opportunity to summarise some of my arguments here. Focus will be placed on the first four of the topics outlined above.

The Online Environment Undermining the Proper Functioning of Public and Private International Law Structures

There is a long-standing recognition of a tension between the largely borderless Internet and the border-focused law. However, here I want to point to a more specific (and recent) illustration of how the online environment challenges the proper functioning of private international law.

Ordinarily, the need for recognition and enforcement works to counter the impact of excessive foreign claims of jurisdiction that are contrary to a country’s public policy. However, the protection and equalising effect normally provided by the need for recognition and enforcement has been severely undermined by courts claim a broad ‘scope of jurisdiction’ (see also here) or ‘scope of remedial jurisdiction’ as preferred by the Court of Appeal for British Columbia (see here).

Scope of jurisdiction relates to the appropriate geographical scope of orders rendered by a court that has personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. This question has gained far less attention to date than the other two types of jurisdiction. Yet, to understand its significance we need only consider the fact that, any time a court orders an Internet actor to block, delist, deindex, de-reference, delete, remove, or takedown content, it will need to consider whether to grant that order only in relation to publications in the state where the court sits, or to extend the order more widely – perhaps even globally. Thus, it is unsurprising that scope of jurisdiction has emerged as one of the most hotly contested ‘battle ground’ in the intersection between international law and the Internet.

In a situation where a court claims worldwide scope of jurisdiction in the context of an order against a major Internet platform, and that platform complies with the order, there simply is no need for recognition and enforcement – the worldwide impact is automatic.

Imagine, for example, that a Dutch citizen in the Netherlands posts something on a US social media site. The posting, while perfectly legal in both the Netherlands and in the US, is seen to be offensive to the Communist Party of China and a Chinese court or authority orders its removal. If the US social media company complies, the removal is effective worldwide without the need for any enforcement action in neither the Netherlands nor in the US. In fact, the laws and legal systems – including the public policies – of these countries do then not feature in the equation at all.

The threats to free speech posed by this scenario are beyond intelligent dispute. However, things get much worse when we consider that the CJEU’s recently adopted approach means that Internet platforms are not only subject to orders to remove posted content, but also to block – potentially with worldwide effect – future content that is ‘equivalent’ to the content removed (see further here and here).

Applying this to the China-related example above, we are heading towards a situation in which e.g. Chinese law may stifle regime critics from other countries to the degree that their postings, while lawful where the person resides, are censored by non-Chinese Internet platforms. In such a situation, the private international law of the state in which the person or the platform are based, has no influence. Further, it is doubtful that public international law as it stands provides sufficient protection, at least if the interpretation of the relevant rules of public international law are left to the country wishing to effect the censorship as suggested by the CJEU.

As Structured and Applied Online Today, (Public and) Private International Law Creates a Situation of ‘Hyperregulation’

The only reason law does not make impossible the operation of the Internet is found in the combined effect of, on the one hand, self-imposed state restraint in not applying their laws as widely as they could and, on the other hand, more pragmatically, enforcement difficulties. Worryingly, it seems to me that the latter of these factors plays a considerably larger role than does the former.

To see the extent of the challenge, we need only consider the number of countries’ laws that may apply to something as mundane as an unflattering social media post about another person. The person making the posting may have to take account of the law of the country she is in at the time of making the posting, the law of the country in which she is habitually residing (and/or has domicile) and, if different, the law(s) of her country of citizenship(s). Then she will probably also need to consider US law as most major social media platforms are based in the US (although there is also a considerable uptake in social media – such as the Chinese platform TikTok – from other parts of the world). We are here already confronted by a few, potentially very different, legal systems providing laws with which the person making the posting is meant to comply.

Given that our hypothetical posting relates to another person, we may also need to consider the laws of that person’s location, residence, domicile and citizenship(s). And we may also need to consider the laws of any additional countries in which that person has a reputation to protect.

Furthermore, under the law of many, not to say most, countries focus may be placed on where content is downloaded or read; two distinct, but often conflated, activities. Thus, the person making the posting will also need to comply with the laws of all the countries in which her ‘friends’ or ‘connections’ are found; and less predictably, the laws of all the countries in which they may be located when reading her posting. It goes without saying that, the number of additional legal systems to be considered grows with the number, and geographical diversity, of her friends or connections, and in light of the mobility of people, may never be fully ascertained at the time of posting.

As if the complexity alluded to so far was not enough, things get even messier when we confront the liability that may stem from re-publications; that is, to map out the full extent of potentially applicable laws, we must also take account of the laws of all the countries in which re-posted versions of the original posting may be downloaded or read. Here the original poster obviously loses all possibilities of predicting the scope of laws to which she may be exposed.

Finally, content placed on social media platforms is often stored in ‘the cloud’, and while we as users may not necessarily be able to find out where our content is located, we may be legally obligated to consider the laws of the country in which it is stored.

This legal situation, of extraordinary complexity, is what billions of social media users face on a daily basis. For the absolute majority, their postings will not lead to any legal drama. However, the thought of being exposed to potential legal liability in a large number of countries should be a concern to anyone. And of course, the very idea that you strictly speaking should inform yourself of all those laws you are meant to follow is daunting indeed.

Elsewhere (see here), I have described this as a situation of ‘hyperregulation’ characterised by the following conditions:

1. the complexity of a party’s contextual legal system (i.e., the combination of all laws that purport to apply to that party in a given context) amounts to an insurmountable obstacle to legal compliance; and
2. the prospect of legal enforcement of (at least parts of) the laws that make up the contextual legal system is more than a theoretical possibility.

The Complexity of International Law Frameworks and Concepts

In the context of applying international law to Internet activities or situations there are numerous instances of competing legitimate interests; State A’s protection of free speech may be difficult to reconcile with State B’s restrictions on hate speech, and so on. On a slightly more general level, we may observe that broad claims of jurisdiction may unreasonably interfere with the rights of people in other States, while restrictive approaches to jurisdiction may render a victim without realistic access to justice. Thus, the difficulties we experience in applying international law to the Internet stem from the fact that the ‘genuine regulatory challenges’ we need to work with are both numerous and go to the depth of involving the most fundamental legal notions. Yet this does not fully explain the complexity of our situation.

The application online of the pre-Internet legal concepts that make up public, and private, international law often involves decisions on the appropriate analogies and metaphors. As I have been arguing for the past 15 years, we must try to avoid inappropriate reliance on metaphors and analogies (see here).

In the survey that formed the base for the Internet & Jurisdiction Global Status Report 2019, several interviewed experts emphasised the concern that, in the jurisdiction field, legal concepts are old fashioned and outdated. Furthermore, one of the survey questions posed the claim that we already apply the right legal concepts to address cross-border legal challenges on the Internet. Among the surveyed experts, 46% either disagreed or strongly disagreed, 36% indicated that they neither agreed nor disagreed, and only 18% either agreed or strongly agreed.

This, it is submitted, hints at what may be termed ‘artificial (i.e. manmade) regulatory challenges’ in that the frameworks and concepts being applied are insufficient to address the issues with which we are confronted. In general, it seems that international lawyers are looking at all changes taking place in today’s world through the lenses of vested concepts such as extraterritoriality, sovereignty etc. They want the world to be guided by reference to these concepts. Yet it should perhaps be the other way round – the concepts we use should be guided by how the world in fact is. While we of course ought to make use of those concepts that truly remain useful, we must also be prepared to develop new concepts if reality so requires. In other words, the inadequacy of the tools may cause regulatory challenges preventing, or at least limiting, progress.

It seems to me that the Internet jurisdiction debate these days is focused on tackling the most imminent day-to-day issues (some of the ‘genuine regulatory challenges’), at the expense of attention being directed at the underlying conceptual mess (the ‘artificial regulatory challenges’). This is of course natural given the very real impact these challenges have for society. However, real progress can only be made where we also tackle the ‘artificial regulatory challenges’.

Examples of proposals I have advanced to address these artificial regulatory challenges include:

1. A new jurisprudential framework for the concept of jurisdiction (see here);
2. The categorisation of types of jurisdiction under public international law, introducing the concept of ‘investigative jurisdiction’ (see here);
3. The introduction of the concept of ‘scope of jurisdiction’ (discussed above); and
4. A clarification of the status of ‘sovereignty’ (see here).

The International Law Community and the Internet

In 2019, online retailer Amazon surpassed Walmart to become the world’s largest retailer, and tech companies feature prominently on lists ranking the world’s most powerful companies. The world’s most populous states – China and India – have an estimated 1.39 and 1.35 billion citizens respectively; but Facebook has a ‘population’ of 2.45 billion active users. Thus, a rule introduced in the laws of China directly affects just over half as many people as does a rule introduced in Facebook’s Terms of Service!

In addition, there is a clear ongoing trend of borders between the online data-driven world and the physical world are eroding. In the Internet of Things (IoT) era, however, the speed with which these borders erode is increasing dramatically, with effects for all aspects of society. Put simply, the offline world is no longer offline.

To all this may be added the changes in the world due to the, at the time of writing, ongoing pandemic. With large parts of the physical world currently in lockdown, it may be said that the online world is now working better than does its offline counterpart.

Our currently increased reliance on online at the expense of the offline may well affect behaviour patterns long-term, meaning that we will continue to live an even greater segment of our lives online in the future also after the world has overcome the pandemic. This is an aspect of a broader phenomenon that may be termed ‘COVID-19 driven trend acceleration’; that is, already existing trends are significantly accelerated due to the COVID-19 pandemic and how society adjusts to it.

The message stemming from the above is clear, loud and beyond intelligent dispute – cross-border Internet-related legal issues are central matters in society and need to be treated as such also private and public international law.

Yet, law in general, but public and private international law in particular, treats Internet issues as an exotic side dish to the main course taken for granted as being the offline – physical – world. Anyone doubting this claim need only take a glance at the tables of content of textbooks and journals in those respective fields: Internet issues do feature but typically only to a very limited, subsidiary, extent. Approaching Internet-related legal issues in this manner is unsustainable in today’s world where cyber is such a big part of our lives.

Thus, it seems to me that an important task that remains to be completed is to recalibrate the debate from one of a clash between (international) law and the Internet, to one focused on how international law can better help facilitate a desirable online environment.

Final Remarks

As it turns out, the Internet is not a fad after all. It is not just here to stay; it is here to dominate our lives. Looking at news reports, and indeed society in general, this is obvious. Yet looking at legal literature in general, and international law in particular, it is not adequately reflected. This is unsustainable and those who take pride in proclaiming that they do not deal with Internet issues are escapists at risk of irrelevance. What is worse, much could have been achieved to create better Internet regulation – and ultimately a better world – had more experts from non-technology fields been more willing to engage with these novel legal issues as they became apparent. I hope the 2020 Royal Netherlands Society of International Law’s debate on a current issue in the domain of international law can help create real awareness and greater discussions of these issues, at least for the Netherlands – a longstanding leader in progressive, constructive, and creative thinking in international law – but hopefully more broadly.

But as noted by Juenger: “[T]urmoil is bound to happen whenever old principles clash with new realities” (see here), and in few other areas has this so clearly proven to be the case as it has when applying private and public international law principles to the online environment. Much remains to be done to improve the relationship between international law and the Internet, and the tasks that lie ahead – tasks for us all – are huge indeed. But they are neither unsurmountable, nor are they optional.

Decisions on the definition of waste under the EU waste framework Directive 2008/98 inevitably involve quite a bit of factual analysis and Safety-Kleen UK Ltd v The Environment Agency [2020] EWHC 3147 (Admin)  is no exception.

Safety-Kleen UK Ltd, the Claimant, provides specialist mechanical parts washers, containing kerosene, to businesses, such as those undertaking automotive repairs and to small engineering businesses. They are used for cleaning the parts of heavy oil, grease, paint, ink, glues and resins. The machines enable a cleaning process by physical means, such as scrubbing and automatic agitation with kerosene, and by kerosene acting as a solvent. Safety-Kleen collects the used kerosene from its customers in drums and replaces it with cleaned kerosene. Safety-Kleen takes the drums of used kerosene back to a depot, empties them into a sump or reservoir and then rinses out the drums with used kerosene from the reservoir, to which the now re-used kerosene returns. From there, the re-used kerosene is pumped into the “dirty” tanks, whence it is tankered away to a different company for a specialised industrial waste recovery or regeneration process, by which the dirty kerosene is distilled and cleaned. The cleaned kerosene is returned to a Safety-Kleen depot, and placed into the cleaned drums.

There was no issue but that the dirty kerosene, when it reached the “dirty” tanks at the depot was “waste”, within the WFD, and remained waste when transferred to the depot for distillation and waste until it was cleaned for re-use by customers. Until 2017, there had been no issue between Safety-Kleen and the Environment Agency but that the used kerosene was waste when it was collected by Safety-Kleen from its customers’ premises. However, in 2017, Safety-Kleen concluded that the kerosene did not become waste until it had been used for the cleaning of the drums back at the depot, and was sent to the “dirty” tanks, to await removal for recovery or regeneration. The Agency thought otherwise.

Ouseley J discussed the classics with particular focus on Arco Chemie and  Shell, and at 50-51 a rather odd deference even in judicial review, to what the regulator itself held. The EU definition of waste is a legal concept; not one to be triggered by the Agency’s conviction. Nevertheless he reaches his ‘own judgment’ (52) fairly easily and, I believe on the basis of the facts available, justifiably, that the kerosene is being discarded by the holder, it being ‘indifferent to what beneficial use Safety-Kleen may be able to make of it back at the depot’ (at 56).

Claimant’s reliance on Shell seemed not the most poignant, seeing as the case here is not one of reverse logistics but rather one of truly spent raw materials on their way to perhaps receiving a second life following treatment.

Geert.

Handbook of EU Waste law, OUP, second ed, 2015.

Definition of waste under the EU Waste framework Directive
Re-used kerosene pumped into tanks
CJEU Shell authority featuring
Held for the Agency https://t.co/FMH1dK3DXE

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) November 20, 2020

On Tuesday, December 1, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its sixth monthly virtual workshop in private international law at 11:00-12:30. Marc-Philippe Weller (Heidelberg University) will speak, in German, about the topic

„Nationalismus, Territorialismus und Unilateralismus: Pandemiebewältigung durch IPR?
(“Nationalism, Territorialism, Unilateralism: Managing the Pandemic Through Private International Law”?

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

This is the sixth such lecture in the series, after those by Mathias Lehmann in June, Eva-Maria Kieninger in July, Giesela Rühl in September, Anatol Dutta in October, and Susanne Gössl in November. Starting in January 2021,  we plan to alternate between German and English, in order to enable more interested scholars to participate. We found a special speaker to start us off in English – stay tuned!

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de

The topic of international commercial courts or chambers was a trendy one a couple of years ago. It has been dropped to a large extent in academia – although, if I am not wrong, it will come up again in the form of a course at The Hague Academy in the next future. It remains important in practice.

On 1 November 2020, two Commercial Courts were inaugurated in Baden-Württemberg: one in Stuttgart, the other one in Mannheim. A dedicated website in German, English and French, provides information about their main features which, to the extent it is possible under German law, are cut to fit the specificities of cross-border disputes in the following commercial matters: disputes in connection with the acquisition of companies or shares of companies (both courts); disputes resulting from mutual commercial transactions with a value in dispute of at least € 2 million (both courts); corporate disputes (both courts); and disputes resulting from bank and financial transactions (Mannheim).

The website has definitely been designed with care and with the purpose to attract litigants; it may therefore be looked at as an example to be followed in other Länder. Hessen, where a Chamber for International Commercial Disputes at the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main was established already in 2018, opted for a much more sober model: no pictures, no colours, no links, most basic information in one sheet in German and English; possibly not the best-selling strategy. The same applies to Hamburg. This being said, relevant information is still lacking in the Baden-Wüttemberg site in comparison, for instance, with the NCC in Amsterdam.

Among the interesting features of the new courts, I would like to highlight that they are staffed with German judges: the system would not allow hiring foreigners as it happens in other courts for international commercial litigation, such as the DIFC Courts. However, all the judges in the Stuttgart and Mannheim commercial courts have been appointed in light of their expertise in commercial matters, and because (so the website) they will be able to conduct the proceedings in English if the litigants choose the option. Their academic background, former positions, command of a foreign language, excerpts of their cv regarding academic publications, as well as their age, have been made public on the website: a novelty in Germany, by all means. It is worth noticing that not all other international commercial courts provide information regarding their judges. A curiosity: those who make it include even personal data like whether married or not, and number of children; difficult not to wonder why.

On the language of the proceedings, in spite of the reference to a choice of English by the parties I am not sure it is possible to have the whole process, nor the decision, in English. In any event, documents in English can be used so that it is not necessary to obtain extensive translations of contractual documents or engage the services of interpreters.

It looks as if the new courts are better suited than the average German ones (at least, in pre-covid19 times) regarding the IT equipment in the courtrooms and the support staff: ‘Hearings can be held using state-of-the-art technology in both Stuttgart and Mannheim. The technical equipment includes modern video-conference technology and the latest presentation technology’.

On the conduct of the proceedings, the commercial courts of Bade-Württemberg will follow the common rules, but are willing to reinvent already existing faculties under German procedural law: regarding the length of the proceedings, it is acknowledged that speedy determination is of the essence, therefore a ‘case management conference’ is possible in order to structure the later stages of the proceedings. In addition, the parties may agree to limit the opportunities to file appeals by a mutual agreement not to seek legal remedies, even at the start of the proceedings; in this way, the dispute is to be decided quickly and conclusively in just one court. This possibility is highlighted in the website together with other features bringing to mind immediately the traditional disadvantages of arbitration: easy involvement of third parties, effective coercive measures and efficient enforcement. As it happens, the comparison is even explicit at some point: ‘Additionally, unlike arbitration tribunals, the courts can administer oaths or declarations in lieu of an oath’. In a similar vein, the indication to the court fees being moderate and capped when the value in dispute reaches € 30 million can be read as an indirect hint to the expensive costs of litigation in other countries (EU and non EU) with similar judicial bodies.

Should the parties not agree on excluding appeals, specialised appeal panels have been set up at the Stuttgart and Karlsruhe Higher Regional Courts, which are responsible for appeals and complaints against the decisions of the Stuttgart and Mannheim Chambers and also offer comparable advantages.

Finally, the Baden-Württemberg commercial court’s website refers to relevant systemic features of the German judiciary and legal system, in particular to compliance with the rule of law, the impartiality and independence of the judges: an added value not to be taken for granted any longer (let me refer you to this shocking, but also saddening editorial in Verfassungsblog).

NoA: Because of the federal order of the Federal Republic of Germany, the court system is also structured federally. Jurisdiction is exercised by federal courts and by the courts of the 16 federal states (Länder). The main workload of the administration of justice lies with the Länder. The decision to have specialized chambers or divisions devoted to cross-border commercial litigation lies with the Ministry of the respective Land.

As announced earlier on this blog, EAPIL will hold its first Virtual Seminar on 11 December 2020, from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. (MET).

Devoted to the impact of Brexit on Private International Law, the seminar will feature speakers from the United Kingdom and the European Continent.

They will analyze the legal framework that will apply to cross-border cases in the short-term, i.e. as of 1 January 2021 when the transition period provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement expires. Speakers will also discuss what the future relationship between the EU and the UK could and should look like.

Special emphasis will be placed on the question of whether the EU and the UK should strive to adopt a new – bespoke – bilateral agreement (or whether it should simply join existing international conventions).

The speakers of the first session, on civil and commercial matters, will be Alexander Layton (Twenty Essex Street Chambers, London), Eva Lein (University of Lausanne) and Michiel Poesen (KU Leuven).

In the second session, Sir Andrew Moylan (Court of Appeal of England and Wales), Pietro Franzina (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan) and Anatol Dutta (Ludwig Maximilian University Munich), will focus, instead, on family matters.

Register here if you wish to discuss with us. Registered participants will receive the details to join the seminar on 10 December 2020.

We are glad to announce that registration for the first (Virtual) Seminar of the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL) is now open. If you wish to join, just fill out this form.

The Seminar will take place on 11 Dezember 2020 from 11 am to 1 pm (MET).  Devoted to the impact of Brexit on Private International Law it will feature speakers from the United Kingdom and the European Continent:

• Alexander Layton (Twenty Essex Street Chambers, London)
• Eva Lein (University of Lausanne)
• Michiel Poesen (KU Leuven)
• Sir Andrew Moylan (Court of Appeal of England and Wales)
• Pietro Franzina (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan)
• Anatol Dutta (Ludwig Maximilian University Munich).

For more information see our earlier post as well as the information available on the EAPIL website.

If you have questions concerning the first EAPIL Seminar or the EAPIL Seminar Series as such please get in touch with the Secretary General of EAPIL, Giesela Rühl, at secretary.general@eapil.org.

Background:

The EAPIL (Virtual) Seminar Series seeks to contribute to the study and development of (European) Private International Law through English-language seminars on topical issues. It will provide an easily accessible and informal platform for the exchange of ideas – outside the bi-annual EAPIL conferences. At the same time, it will serve as a means for EAPIL members to connect with other EAPIL members and non-members.

Conference ‘Frontiers in Civil Justice’ held on 16 and 17 November 2020 (online)

By Jos Hoevenaars & Betül Kas, Erasmus University Rotterdam (postdocs ERC consolidator project Building EU Civil Justice)

As announced earlier on this blog, the Conference Frontiers in Civil Justice organized by the ERC team together with Ilja Tillema of Erasmus School of Law in Rotterdam, took place on 16 and 17 November 2020.

The conference addressed four key issues in civil justice, which require a deeper and renewed reflection in light of their contribution to facilitating access to justice. Those concern the shaping of the interaction between formal and informal justice (panel I), the digitalization of consumer dispute resolution (panel II), the collectivizing and monetizing of civil litigation (panel III) and justice innovation and frontier developments in civil justice (panel IV). Renowned speakers and selected speakers following a call for papers gave their views during the two-day conference that, although set up previously as a blended event with online as well as live attendance at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, was forced to move fully online due to the tightening of Covid-19 measures in the Netherlands.

The Needs and Challenges of Digitizing Justice in Europe (Keynote 1)

The first day of the conference was kicked-off by the keynote speech of Hrvoje Grubisic (DG Justice and Consumers, European Commission). Grubisic underlined the necessity of digitalisation in the justice field in order to guarantee Europe’s citizens access to justice. The EU’s efforts of furthering the employment of digital technologies in the justice area is particularly warranted by the persistent increase in cross-border activities in civil and commercial matters. Grubisic pointed to the importance of the principles contained in the Tallinn ministerial declaration in framing and guiding the Commission’s strategy of the digitalisation of justice in the EU. The current COVID-19 crisis has accelerated the Commission’s activities. On the basis of its roadmap setting out the need to steer and coordinate the digitalisation of justice at EU level, the Commission plans to publish a communication of its policy priorities by the end of 2020. In practical terms, the Commission intends to employ a toolbox approach, starting with the identification of cross-border judicial procedures that can be digitised, ascertaining the appropriate IT tools (e.g. e-CODEX based systems) and ensuring funding sources for the Member States.

Shaping the Interaction between Formal and Informal Justice (Panel I)

Subsequently, Elisabetta Silvestri (University of Pavia) introduced the first panel dealing with the interaction between formal and informal justice. Silvestri stressed the importance of understanding how formal and informal justice can coexist in a balanced relationship that is able to grant individuals access to justice. According to her, the need for a fruitful cooperation between courts and ADR providers in the best interest of stakeholders became even more pronounced in the current pandemic. The presentation of Diana Wallis (Hull University; former ELI president) reflected on the differing nature of formal and informal justice. Wallis traces how the EU has promoted the shift of the delivery of justice away from the nation states’ courts to ADR bodies. While the ELI Statement addressed the practicalities of the relationship between private and public justice, the deeper question about how to address the dangers and drawbacks of privatized justice remains unresolved. Anna Nylund (The Arctic University of Norway) submitted in her presentation that many ADR processes fail to deliver on their promises of improved access to justice. Nylund sees ADR to be based predominantly on individualistic values, expecting citizens to exercise self-determination, and as such therefore geared towards the highly educated middle class. The gap between theory and practice contributes to the reluctance towards ADR processes in Europe. She therefore proposed a step-by-step approach of re-designing ADR according to context-dependent goals. The following two presentations provided insights into the relationship between formal and informal justice by drawing on the concrete experiences of two national legal systems: Masood Ahmed (University of Leicester) presented the experience of the English civil justice system with compulsory ADR. While compulsory ADR has been traditionally dismissed by the English judiciary, a divergent judicial approach has emerged which impliedly obliges the parties to engage with ADR. Ahmed criticises the persistence of the traditional approach and calls upon the courts to fully embrace their case management powers in making ADR orders. Stefaan Voet (KU Leuven) reports how informal justice has been introduced by a number of procedural reforms in Belgium. Voet’s presentation addresses five critical issues regarding informal justice processes, namely (1) their possible mandatory nature; (2) their quality; (3) the procedural guarantees offered by them; (4) the enforcement of their outcomes; and (5) the interaction with the formal justice process.

Digitalization of Consumer Dispute Resolution (Panel II)

The second day of the conference started with a panel, chaired by Burkhard Hess (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg), focusing on online dispute resolution (ODR) for consumer claims, using case-studies as a starting point to discuss how different types of cODR procedures can contribute to consumers’ access to justice. Martin Ebers (University of Tartu) presented on the promise and challenge of AI based techniques in cODR and its impact on due process. Giving an overview of current uses of AI in different phases of disputes, from case management and automated anonymisation to data inference and automated decision-making, Ebers laid out the framework for future regulation of the use of AI in European ODR. Subsequently, Marco Giacalone (Vrije Universiteit Brussels) used examples from the US, Canada, Australia and Slovakia to zoom in on the concept and application of e-negotiation. Reflecting on the potential of this mode of assisted and automated negotiation in resolving disputes, Giacalone considers EU practices of e-negotiation for consumer dispute resolution as significant yet insufficient, with considerable room for improvement in enhancing consumer access to justice in the EU?. Eline Verhage (Leiden University) presented on the recent experience of the Dutch Foundation for Consumer Complaints Boards (Geschillencommissies) in responding to the Covid-19 crisis. Presenting very recent data on the move to online hearings she reflected on the impact on the ‘voluntariness gap’ in these out-of-court alternative dispute schemes, concluding that virtual hearings seem a promising cODR tool for enhancing business participation, due to the increased option and lower costs. Finally, Emma van Gelder (Erasmus University Rotterdam) discussed observations from empirical research on Klachtencompas (a free online complaint platform of the Dutch consumer protection organization Consumentenbond) and the in-house dispute resolution platform used by Paypal, to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of these ‘first-line’ complaint resolution mechanisms. The main point of discussion following the various examples presented during the panel was on the applicability of Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter, and on the question of how to apply the notions of fair trial and due process to both certified and uncertified ADR schemes in the EU.

Current Issues in Access to Justice: An English Perspective (Keynote 2)

In the second keynote of the conference, professor Dame Hazel Genn (University College London) provided a very timely insight into current developments in the English civil justice system in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Bringing together the most recent insights from (some unpublished) rapid reviews of the rush to mostly online justice administration and reflecting on the impact of online courts and tribunals on access to justice especially for those that are in most dire need of legal assistance and resolution. Quite in contrast to previous discussions about the great potential of technological innovations in the areas of small claims and consumer dispute resolution, Professor Genn stressed the need to also look at what we potentially lose in procedural and substantive terms when hearings are undertaken remotely or on paper. Contrasting the great benefits of technology in terms of convenience, economy and efficiency with its downsides apparent in both the experiences of litigants as well as the judiciary, Genn ended on the pertinent question: Are we processing cases or are we doing justice?

Collectivizing & Monetizing Civil Litigation (Panel III)

The third panel chaired by John Sorabji (Barrister, 9 St John Street; University College London) turned attention to collective redress via adjudication and, specifically, the funding of civil litigation. Ianika Tzankova (Tilburg University) drew lessons for the funding of collective redress in global disputes from the Dutch experience. In particular, Tzankova explored and compared the financing of collective civil litigation on the basis of the Dexia case which was the first major consumer mass claim in the Netherlands and the investor litigation in the Fortis collective action, which resulted in the first global collective settlement that can be considered ‘EU-originated’. Astrid Stadler (University of Konstanz) explained in her presentation the German situation regarding litigation funding of collective actions. In particular, Stadler presented on how the judiciary dealt with third-party funding arrangements and funding by legal tech companies and SPVs in recent case law. The judiciary’s strong aversion against entrepreneurial litigation endangers the effective enforcement of the law. Stadler concluded that third-party funding must be available for representative claimants and should be regulated by the legislator. Complementing Tzankova’s presentation, Ilja Tillema (Erasmus University Rotterdam) reflected on the rise of entrepreneurial mass litigation in the Netherlands. Particularly in the last decade, spurred by the potential of large earnings, entrepreneurial parties have started to diversify the Dutch mass litigation landscape. Tillema reflected on the pros and cons of their involvement, presented empirical material of the amount and types of cases in which entrepreneurial parties are involved, and evaluated the way that the legislator and courts have dealt with this development. Catherine Piché (Université de Montréal) elucidated Quebec’s experience with public forms of financing class litigation. According to Piché, the Canadian province of Quebec’s Fonds d’aide aux recours collectifs (the assistance fund for class action lawsuits) serves not only as an effective class litigation funding mechanism, but also as a mandatory independent oversight body. Piché evaluates that financing class actions publicly through assistance by such entities is the most appropriate and effective way to finance class action litigation and could therefore serve as a model for other legal systems.

Innovations in Civil Justice (Panel IV) 

Chaired by professor Alan Uzelac (University of Zagreb) the final panel brought together speakers following a call for papers. The call invited submissions on topics relating to justice innovation, specifically about the development of initiatives aimed at bringing justice closer to citizens, their relevance for access to justice and the judicial system, and the challenges they may pose for judicial administration, litigants and other stakeholders. The presentation of Iris van Domselaar (UvA) kicked off with legal philosophical reflections on civil justice innovations that aim to ‘bring justice closer to the citizen’, and posed the question to what extent the ‘pragmatic turn’ in civil justice systems is reconcilable with courts being objective justice-affording institutions, as such setting the scene for the specific examples of innovation and developments that were to follow. Pietro Ortolani (Radboud University Nijmegen) & Catalina Goanta (Maastricht University) and next Naomi Appelman & Anna van Duin (UvA) presented to the audience two specific examples that raised divergent questions about the frontier civil justice development playing out in the realm of online social media. The former, by comparatively analyzing reporting systems and underlying procedural rights of users related to content moderation by four social media platforms (Facebook, Twitch, TikTok and Twitter), presented an example where innovation may actually pose a threat to access to justice. While the latter, reporting on the findings of empirical research on the need for procedural innovation in the Netherlands to quickly take down online content that causes personal harm, presented how innovations in civil justice could contribute to the effective protection of rights in the digital realm. The final topic of this panel was presented by Nicolas Kyriakides & Anna Plevri (University of Nicosia) who, taking Zuckerberg’s predictions on AI’s role in guaranteeing access to justice as a starting point, presented their own evaluation on this matter, encouraging further debate on AI’s role in adjudication. By elucidating the potential of AI to render the familiar open-court, multi-party process of justice completely unrecognisable, they warned about the potential loss of perceived legitimacy of the justice system as a whole, should AI systematically penetrate the entire justice system.

Although the conference was forced to move fully online, the digital setting did not stifle the interaction with the audience. Through the use of the chat function and live chat moderators the speakers were able to answer questions from the audience in the chat and the chairs were able to open up the floor to members of the audience. This led to lively discussions very much resembling a live setting.

This conference was organised by Erasmus School of Law of Rotterdam University and funded by an ERC consolidator grant from the European Research Council for the project ‘Building EU Civil Justice’.

 

 

 

Orji Agwu Uka (the author of this piece) is a Senior Associate at Africa Law Practice NG & Company, Lagos. He holds a Masters’ Degree in International Business Law from King’s College London and an LLB from Abia State University, Uturu Nigeria.

 

Introduction

Over three score and ten years ago, Professor G. C. Cheshire, then Vinerian Professor of Law at the University of Oxford, issued a clarion call for the wider study of private international law in general and the renaissance of English private international law in particular.[1] As explored below, it is pertinent for African States to respond to that call today, especially within the context of the need to actualise the Agenda 2063 of the African Union, which aims for the establishment of a continental market with the free movement of persons, goods and services which are crucial for deepening economic integration and promoting economic development in Africa.

 

The Agreement establishing African Continental Free Trade Area

In January 2012, the 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, which held in Addis Ababa – Ethiopia, adopted a decision to establish an Africa wide Continental Free Trade Area. On 30th May 2019, the Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (“AfCFTA”), entered into force.[2] With an expected participation of 55 countries, a combined population in excess of 1.3 billion people and a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of over $2.5 trillion, the AfCFTA will be the largest trade area since the formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995.

Despite the benefits that the AfCFTA is widely expected to bring, Nigeria curiously delayed at first in signing the Agreement. Thankfully, reason ultimately prevailed and Nigerian signed the agreement at the 12th Extraordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Heads of State and Government held in Niamey, Niger. Very recently, the Federal Executive Council of Nigeria has also taken the decision to ratify the AfCFTA. What is now left is for the Nigerian National Assembly to domesticate the Agreement as required by the Nigerian Constitution.

It is pertinent to note that although the AfCFTA has justifiably received – and continues to receive – wide publicity, what is seldom talked about is that the Agreement is only a part of a larger long term plan, christened Agenda 2063, to ultimately establish an African Economic Community with a single Custom Union and a single common market to “accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent” in accordance with Article 3 of the AU’s Constitutive Act.[3]

 

The case for Harmonisation

The economic integration and the concomitant growth in international relationships that are sure to result from these integration efforts will undoubtedly lead to a rise in cross border disputes, which call for resolution using the instrumentality of private international law. When, not if, these disputes arise, questions such as what courts have jurisdiction, what law(s) should apply, and whether a judgment of the courts of one member State will be recognised and enforced by the courts of the other member States, are just some of the key questions that will arise.[4]In the words of Professor Richard Frimpong Oppong, a well-developed and harmonised private international law regime is an indispensable element in any economic community.[5]Curiously however, the role of private international law in facilitating and sustaining the on-going African economic integration efforts is conspicuously missing.[6]

It is against this backdrop that this writer joins others in calling for the establishment of a pan-African harmonised private international legal regime as an instrument of economic development in general and as part of the modalities for the actualisation of Agenda 2063 in particular. Incidentally, one of the first of such calls predates the adoption of the decision to establish the AfCFTA. As far back as 2006, Professor Oppong had argued that given the significant divergence in the approaches to the subject of private international law in Africa, if the idea of a common market is to materialise, African countries must embark on a comprehensive look at, and reform of, the regime of private international law.[7]He specifically stressed the need for harmonised private international law rules to govern the operation of the divergent national substantive rules.[8]Very recently, Lise Theunissen has stated, and rightly too, that the non-harmonised state of private international law in Africa forms an important obstacle to international trade and to cross-border economic transactions and that for this reason, it is crucial for the African economic integration to strive for a harmonisation of private international law.[9]Beyond these, harmonisation has other benefits.

It has been argued that harmonisation helps promote equal treatment and protection of citizens of an economic community as well as other economic actors transacting or litigating in the internal market by subjecting them to a uniform and certain legal regime.[10]As the learned authors of Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws observed, part of the rationale behind the EU Judgments Regulation and its predecessor Convention is, “to avoid as far as possible the multiplication of the bases of jurisdiction in relation to the same legal relationship and to reinforce legal protection by allowing the plaintiff easily to identify the court before which he may bring an action and the defendant reasonably to foresee the court before which he may be sued”.[11]Accordingly, it has been said that harmonisation boosts certainty in the law, thus reducing transaction and litigation costs for economic actors within the Community.[12]Africa is in dire need of this certainty.

 

Potential Challenges to Harmonisation

This writer is not unmindful of the challenges that such a project will pose especially having regard to the diverse legal traditions in Africa; the underdeveloped nature of the subject of private international law in Africa;[13]and the diversity of approach to the question.[14]These challenges are however not insurmountable. Thankfully, there are precedents and successful examples that the relevant actors can point to, for inspiration. And the first that readily comes to mind is the well-established harmonised private international law system applicable within the European Union. There are also other examples like the Organisation of American States with its Inter-American Conference on Private International Law. Similarly, within the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MECOSUR) [comprising  Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay] Article 1 of the Asuncion Treaty 1991 expressly recognises the ‘harmonization of legislation in relevant areas’ as cardinal to the strengthening of their stated integration process.

 

Recommendation on the Modalities for Harmonisation

In considering the above examples, however, the question must be asked whether it is desirable to import, for instance, the tried and tested European Union private international law model into Africa or whether it is necessary to develop an autochthonous private international law system that responds to the socio-economic, cultural, and political interests of countries in Africa. In my view, the answer is in the question. It is pertinent to state at this juncture that what this writer advocates at this stage is the harmonisation of the private international law rules of the various member states in the African Union as opposed to the unification of the substantive laws which is the subject of other efforts, a case in point being the Organisation for the Harmonization of Commercial Law in Africa (OHADA).

Lise Theunissen[15]has very helpfully recommended a four-pronged approach to tackling the issue of the underdeveloped and non-harmonised state of private international law in the African Union as follows – (i) sensitization of national courts and the enlargement of regional economic community courts to ensure a harmonised and authoritative interpretation to relevant private international law legislation; (ii) a methodical continent wide engagement effort including the establishment of a private international law orientated body under the African Economic Community; (iii) the ratification of international conventions by African Union member states for instance the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters; and (iv) the exploration of a potential collaboration with non-State actors for instance the Research Centre for Private International Law in Emerging Countries at the University of Johannesburg. At the very least, these suggestions deserve to be accorded close consideration.

 

Before now, Oppong had equally suggested the establishment of a specialised body with the specific mandate to deal with private international law regime. He also advocated for the establishment of a court empowered to provide authoritative and final interpretation of the unified rules of private international law and the entrenchment of the principle of mutual trust and respect by all African Union member states of each other’s national judicial competence.[16]Above all, urgent steps must be taken to elicit the requisite political will and obtain the institutional support necessary to actualise the harmonised rules of private international law in Africa. As a starting point, however, this paper calls for the immediate convocation of an Inter-African Conference on Private International Law.

 

Conclusion

 

Despite the enormous challenges that is sure to militate against the harmonisation of the private international law rules in a divergent community like Africa, the general belief is that the African Union and the people of Africa stand a better chance to actualise the aims of establishing a common market, deepening economic integration and promoting economic development in Africa with a harmonised private international legal regime. Since Professor Cheshire issued his clarion call in 1947, European courts, lawyers and academics have largely heeded the call, but the same cannot be said of their African counterparts. The best time to have heeded the call was in 1947, the next best time is now.

 

*This Paper was first published in Law Digest Journal Spring 2020

[1]G. C. Cheshire ‘Plea for a Wider Study of Private International Law’ (1947) Intl L Q 14.

[2]African Union, Agreement establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area, available at https://au.int/en/treaties/agreement–establishing–african–continental–free–trade–arealast accessed on 14 February 2020.

[3]African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union, available at https://au.int/en/treaties/constitutive–act–african–unionlast accessed on 14 February 2020.

[4]Chukwuma Okoli, ‘Private International Law in Africa: Comparative Lessons’ available at http://conflictoflaws.net/2019/private–international–law–in–africa–comparative–lessons/last accessed on 15 February 2020.

[5]Richard Frimpong Oppong, ‘Private International Law and the African Economic Community: A Plea for Greater Attention’ The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Oct., 2006), Cambridge University Press pp.911-928 available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/4092623

[6]Richard Frimpong Oppong, (n 5 above).

[7] Richard Frimpong Oppong, (n 5 above).

[8]Richard Frimpong Oppong, (n 5 above).

[9]Lise Theunissen, ‘Harmonisation of Private International Law in the African Union’ available at https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/02/08/harmonisation–of–private–international–law–in–theafrican–union/accessed on 15 February 2020.

[10]Richard Frimpong Oppong, (n 5 above). See also A. Dickinson, “Legal Certainty and the Brussels Convention Too Much of a Good Thing?” in Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007), ch 6.

[11]L Collins (gen ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 14thedn, 2006), observed at para 11-062.

[12]Richard Frimpong Oppong, (n 5 above).

[13]Chukwuma Okoli on his part believes that there has been significant progress and that is a growing interest in the study of private international law in Africa. See Chukwuma Okoli, ‘Private International Law in Africa: Comparative Lessons’ available at http://conflictoflaws.net/2019/private–internationallaw–in–africa–comparative–lessons/accessed on 15 February 2020. While this is true, he must however acknowledge that there is still a lot of room for improvement.

[14]In this regard, Lise Theunissen, (n 8 above) has lamented the lack of any efforts to establish a private international law orientated body under the African Economic Community, despite the necessity and urgent need for same.

[15]Lise Theunissen, (n 8 above).

[16]Richard Frimpong Oppong, (n 5 above).

 

 

 

 

On 23 November 2020, at 9 am MET, the Université Côte d’Azur will host, via Zoom, the final conference of the EU co-funded research project called En2Bria – Enhancing Enforcement under Brussels Ia.

The topics addressed include: transport matters and Article 67 of the Brussels I bis Regulation (Rosario Espinosa Calabuig); Article 67 of the Brussels I bis Regulation and Directives in special matters (Laura Carpaneto); GDPR, International Treaties Concluded by the EU, and “Optional Regulations” (Stefano Dominelli); Connections, disconnections and fragmentation in international civil procedure (Paula-Carmel Ettori, Jessica Sanchez and Chirouette Elmasry).

The full programme, together with further details, can be found here.

Attendance is free. Those interested may write to Giulio Cesare Giorgini at giulio-cesare.giorgini@univ-cotedazur.fr to obtain a link to access the platform.

(The following case comment is written by Chen Zhi, a PhD candidate at the University of Macau?

The parallel proceeding is a long-debated issue in International Private Law, by which parties to one dispute file two or more separate dispute resolution proceedings regarding the same or similar problems. Such parallel proceedings will increase the cost and burdensome of dispute resolution, and probably result in the risk of conflicting judgements, undermining the certainty and integrity of it.
In the field of international civil and commercial litigation, parallel proceeding issue is always subject to domestic civil procedure rules or principles like lis pendens, res judicata and forum non-convenience, while the problem may be complicated when arbitration proceeding is involved. According to the New York Convention, state court which seizes the dispute has an obligation to refer the case to arbitration at the party’s request, except in case the arbitration agreement is void, inoperable or unable to be performed. Nonetheless, the New York Convention does not address the standards for the validity of arbitration agreement nor the scope of judicial review on such agreement. In particular, it is silent on the scenario where the validity of the same arbitration agreement is filed before the judges and arbitrators simultaneously. This problem can be exacerbated when the court seizure of the issue concerning validity of arbitration agreement is not the court in the place of the seat of arbitration, which in principle does not have the power to put final words on this issue.i
Some jurisdictions are inclined to employ an arbitration-friendly approach called prima facies review, by which the court will constrain from conducting a full review on the substantive facts and legal matters of the case before the tribunal decide on the jurisdictional issues, and grant a stay of litigation proceeding accordingly. This approach derives from a widely accepted principle across the world called “competence-competence” which endows the tribunal with the power to decide on its jurisdiction.ii Admittedly, prima facies review is not a corollary of the competence-competence principle. Still, it was instead thought to maximize the utility of competence-competence and enhance the efficiency of arbitration by minimizing the judicial intervention beforehand.
However, some jurisdictions like Mainland China do not employ a prima facies review, and they are reluctant to acknowledge tribunal’s priority in deciding jurisdiction issue, irrespective of the fact that the seat is outside their territories. This article aims to give a brief introduction on the most recent case decided by the Supreme People’s Court (hereinafter as SPC), and discuss how Chinese courts would like to tackle parallel proceeding.
Case Information
Keep Bright Limited?Appellant?v. SuperAuto Investments Limited and others 2013 Min Zhong Zi No. 3 (hereinafter as Keep Bright Case), decided on 20 December 2018.
Facts and background
The dispute regards four parties, among which two major ones are companies both incorporated in the British Virgin Islands: Keep Bright Limited and SuperAuto Investments Limited (hereinafter as K and S respectively). All parties signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) on 12 April 2006 regarding a complicated transaction which involved two main parts; the first part is the transfer all share of S’s Hong Kong based 100% subsidiary to K, the second part is the transfer of title of a real estate located in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province. The LOI stipulated that it shall be governed by and construed according to the Hong Kong law, while the dispute resolution clause provided that any dispute arises from the LOI can be referred to either arbitration in Hong Kong or litigation in the location of the asset.
Following the conclusion of the contract, both K and S were dissatisfied with the performance of the LOI and commenced separate dispute resolution proceedings. K initiated an arbitration before the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (HKIAC) in March of 2010, while S filed a lawsuit against H and other parties before the Guangdong Provincial Court in April of the same year. Following two partial awards in 2011 and 2012, the HKIAC tribunal concluded the proceeding through rendering a final award in 2014, and K subsequently sought for enforcement of the awards which was granted by the Hong Kong Court of First Instance in 2015.
The litigation proceeding in Guangdong Court, instead, was still ongoing during the arbitration in Hong Kong, and for this reason, in 2011 K applied for a stay of litigation proceeding due to ongoing arbitration concerning the same matter in Hong Kong before the court, but the latter dismissed such request. The Guangdong Court issued its judgment on August 2012 which was contradictory with the awards given by the HKIAC, by using laws of Mainland China as the governing law by reason of failure to identify relating Hong Kong laws under the choice-of-law clause of LOI. The case was then appealed to the SPC, leaving two main issues to be decided: first, whether the Guangdong Court’s rejection to the stay of proceeding constituted a procedural error, and second, whether the Guangdong Court has wrongfully applied the law of Mainland China instead of the Hong Kong law.
The decision of the SPC
As for the first issue, SPC decided that parallel proceeding phenomenon shall not prejudice the jurisdiction of courts in Mainland China, except in case the arbitration awards rendered offshore has been recognized in China already. Therefore, it is proper for the Guangdong Court to continue litigation proceeding irrespective of the ongoing arbitration in Hong Kong. The SPC also noted in its final decision that H did not raise an objection to jurisdiction before the court based on the arbitration agreement.
As for the second issue, the SPC found that Guangdong Court was in error in the application of law and overturned the substantive part of the Guangdong Court’s decision, making the judgment in line with awards in Hong Kong.
Comment
By the above decision of the SPC, it’s clear that courts are in no position to decide on the stay of proceeding despite a pending arbitration outside the territory of Mainland China, with one exception that is the case of arbitration proceeding concluded, recognized and ready to be or already under enforced by Chinese courts. This approach is in line with the stipulation of the SPC’s Judicial Interpretation on Civil Procedural Law in 2015 which tackle parallel proceedings where parties have filed other litigation proceeding before courts other than Mainland China regarding the same or identical dispute. iii Though the Judicial Interpretation does not cover parallel proceeding involving arbitration, the Keep Bright Case reveals that it makes no difference. There is no comity obligation for arbitration.
Moreover, though no objection to jurisdiction was raised in Keep Bright, it is safe to conclude that Chinese courts would likely grant arbitration tribunals the priority to decide on the jurisdiction issue, even when they are not the court in the place as the seat of arbitration, which, per the New York Convention, should have no power to put the final word on the effectiveness of arbitral agreement or award. As per another case ruled in 2019, a court in Hubei Province refused to recognize and enforce a Hong Kong seated arbitral award based on the reason that court in Mainland China had decided otherwise on the jurisdictional issue, by which the recognition of such an award would constitute a breach of public policy.iv
In a nutshell, Chinese courts’ approach to coping with parallel proceeding is far from pro-arbitration, contrary to other arbitration-friendly jurisdictions like England, Singapore, France and Hong Kong SAR. Admittedly, effective negative approach is not a standard fits for all circumstances, and it may cause prejudice to the parties when the enforcement of arbitration agreement is burdensome (in particular, boiler-plate arbitration clauses in consumer agreement which are intendedly designed by the party with more substantial bargain power for circumvention of judicial proceeding). Nonetheless, in the circumstances like the Keep Bright, proceeding with two parallel processes at the same time could be oppressive to the parties’ rights. It could likely create uncertainty through conflicting results (which occurred in Keep Bright itself). With this respect, the negative effective approach seems to be the best approach to keep dispute resolutions cost and time-efficient.

_____________

i, As per Article 5.1(a) of New York Convention, which stipulates that validity of arbitration agreement shall be subject to the law chosen by parties, failing which shall be subject to the law of the country where the award was made (arbitration seat), see also Article 6 of New York Convention which said that the enforcing court may stay the enforcement proceeding if the setting aside application is seized by competent court.
ii, For instance, English Court of Appeal stated in landmark Fiona Turst that: “[…]that it is contemplated by the Act that it will, in general, be right for the arbitrators to be the first tribunal to consider whether they have jurisdiction to determine the dispute”. Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] EWCA Civ 20, at 34. See also judicial opinions by court of Singapore in Tomolugen Holdings Ltd and another v Silica Investors Ltd and other appeals [2015] SGCA 57 , court of Hong Kong PCCW Global Ltd v Interactive Communications Service Ltd [2007] 1 HKLRD 309, and France court in Société Coprodag et autre c Dame Bohin, Cour de Cassation, 10 May 1995 (1995?
iii, See the controversial Article 533 of SPC’s Interpretation on Application of Civil Procedure Law(adopted in 2015) ,which stipulates that: “Where both the courts of the People’s Republic of China and the courts of a foreign country have jurisdiction, the People’s Court may accept a case in which one party files a lawsuit in a foreign court and the other party files a lawsuit in a court of the People’s Republic of China. After the judgment has been rendered, no application by a foreign court or request by a party to the case to the People’s Court for recognition and enforcement of the judgment or ruling made by a foreign court in the case shall be granted, unless otherwise provided in an international treaty to which both parties are parties or to which they are parties. If the judgment or ruling of a foreign court has been recognized by the people’s court, the people’s court shall not accept the case if the parties concerned have filed a lawsuit with the people’s court in respect of the same dispute.”
iv, See the decision of Yichang Intermediate Court on Automotive Gate FZCO’s application for recognition and enforcement of arbitral award in Hong Kong SAR, 2015 E Yi Zhong Min Ren No. 00002, in which the court rejected to enforce a HKIAC award on the basis that the award rendered in 2013 is contradictory with Shijiazhuang Intermediate Court’s ruling on the invalidity of arbitration agreement, which amounted to a breach of public policy in Mainland China, though the ruling was made five year later than the disputed award.

The fourth online public workshop on Private International Law after Brexit from global, European, Commonwealth and intra-UK perspectives, organised by Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling), Mihail Danov (University of Exeter) and Jayne Holliday (University of Stirling), will be held on 26 and 27 November 2020.

Speakers include Reid Mortensen (University of South Queensland), Mihail Danov, Susanne Goessl, Ruth Lamont (University of Manchester), Fausto Pocar (University of Milan), Jonathan Harris QC (King’s College London), Lord Mance (former UK Supreme Court Judge), Ardavan Arzandeh (University of Bristol), Giuditta Cordero-Moss, and Paul Beaumont.

The following topics, among others, will be discussed: The opportunities of Brexit for the development of Private International Law in the Commonwealth; Connecting factors in Private International Law – A global perspective; Pluses and minuses of the UK being a party to the Lugano Convention after Brexit; Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction after Brexit at a global level; The Hague Adults Convention 2000 and the role of the UK and the EU in the Hague Conference after Brexit; Private International Law of Arbitration – A global perspective and the impact of Brexit on arbitration in the UK.

Further information available here.

Two months ago I reported that the enactment of a new Uruguayan private international law statute was forthcoming after the bill had passed the Senate. Similar hope had been premature in the past, but this time it proved justified:On November 17, the bill was approved by the Cámara de Representantes. Opposition to the establishment of party autonomy proved unsuccessful. The debate is here, the text of the statute is here. Some more background information is in my earlier post.

Congratulations, Uruguay, and congratulations, world of private international law.

The Multiple Uses of the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Theory and Practice is the title of a book edited by Pietro Galizzi, Giacomo Rojas Elgueta and Anna Veneziano, which has just been published by Giuffrè.

The publication of this Volume comes at a time when Governments are still struggling to get ahead of the COVID-19 pandemic and firms are still figuring out what will be the economic impact of the coronavirus outbreak and how to adjust to changing business conditions. In this evolving scenario, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts («UPICC»), being the only global instrument offering a set of comprehensive general rules applicable to different types of commercial contracts, represent an ideal answer to the impact of the pandemic on the performance of contractual obligations. While the essays of this Volume have been written before the coronavirus outbreak and do not specifically address the application of the UPICC to the contractual disruption caused by the pandemic, they are extremely timely, offering an in-depth analysis of (i) the different ways in which the UPICC can be used in practice, (ii) how the UPICC regulate (and can help preserve) long-term contracts, (iii) how, in practice, in-house counsel of multinational companies avail themselves of the UPICC (particularly using them as an instrument for negotiating, drafting, interpreting and supplementing commercial contracts). The idea behind this Volume (which includes among its Authors scholars, practitioners and in-house counsel) is to strengthen the bridge between the theory and practice of the UPICC and to favor a greater diffusion of their knowledge among the business community.

The table of contents can be found here. See here for more information.

The Université Côte d’Azur will host the final conference of the EU co-funded research Project En2BrIa, Enhancing Enforcement under Brussels Ia.

Speakers will deal with transport matters and Article 67 Brussels Ia Regulation (prof. Rosario Espinosa Calabuig); Article 67 Brussels Ia Regulation and Directives in special matters (prof. Laura Carpaneto); GDPR, international treaties concluded by the EU, and “Optional Regulations” (Dr. Stefano Dominelli); Connections, disconnections and fragmentation in international civil procedure (Mrs Paula-Carmel Ettori, Mrs Jessica Sanchez and Mrs Chirouette Elmasry).

The event will take place on Monday 23 November 2020 at 09:00 through ZOOM platform.

Participation is free; more info, specially about the access to the ZOOM channel, may be found here

In C-519/19 Ryanair v DelayFix, the CJEU held yesterday. The case echoes the facts in Happy Flights v Ryanair at the Belgian Supreme Court.

Following inter alia  CJEU Jana Petruchova, the (absence of) impact of substantive European consumer protection rules on the consumer section of European private international law is now fairly settled. The separation between the two sets of laws seems quite clear for the application of the consumer section itself.

However under A25 BIa, EU consumer law might still play a role in those circumstances where the conditions of the consumer Section are not met (dual-use contracts, contracts for transport (such as here) etc.) yet where one of the parties may qualify as a consumer under substantive EU consumer protection law.

A core issue of contention is the consideration of the EU unfair terms in consumer contracts Directive 2019/2161 and its predecessor Directive 93/13 , which was applicable in Ryanair v DelayFix. Via Article 25’s lex fori prorogati rule on substantive validity for choice of court, the Directive plays an important role.

In the case at issue at the CJEU, Passenger Rights, now DelayFix, a company specialised in the recovery of air passengers’ claims under the EU Regulation on air passenger rights, has requested the courts at Warsaw to order Ryanair,  to pay EUR 250 in compensation, a passenger on the relevant flight having assigned DelayFix their claim with respect to that airline.

The CJEU first of all looks at the issue from the limited extent of what is actually materially regulated by A25: the requirement of ‘consent’ (as well as the formal expression of that consent. It holds, not surprisingly, that in principle of course a jurisdiction clause incorporated in a contract may produce effects only in the relations between the parties who have given their agreement to the conclusion of that contract (referring ex multi to Refcomp).  In the case at issue,  a jurisdiction clause incorporated in the contract of carriage between a passenger and that airline cannot, in principle, be enforced by the latter against a collection agency to which the passenger has assigned the claim.

However, at 47, there is a gateway for the choice of court nevertheless to extend to third parties, namely when the third party not privy to the original contract had succeeded to an original contracting party’s rights and obligations, in accordance with national substantive law. At 49, referring to A25(1), that law is the lex fori prorogati. Here: Irish law.

Recital 20 BIa in fact instructs to include the lex fori prorogati’s conflict of laws rules (in other words: an instruction for renvoi) to be part of the referral. In the aforementioned Belgian SC ruling in Happy Flights, renvoi was simply ignored. Here, the CJEU does not mention renvoi, even if it does not expressly exclude it.

The CJEU does point out that Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts of course is part of the Irish lex fori prorogati, as it is of all the Member States. In making that reference it would seem to have answered in the negative the question whether the ‘consent’ provisions of that Directive have not been superseded in the context of the ‘consent’ requirements of Article 25 Brussels Ia, as recently discussed obiter in Weco Projects.

Per previous case-law, the capacity of the parties to the original agreement at issue is relevant for the application of the Directive, not the parties to the dispute.  Further, a jurisdiction clause, incorporated in a contract between a consumer and a seller or supplier, that was not subject to an individual negotiation and which confers exclusive jurisdiction to the courts in whose territory that seller or supplier is based, must be considered as unfair under Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13 if, contrary to requirement of good faith, it causes significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer. Reference is made in particular to Joined Cases C‑240/98 to C‑244/98 Océano Grupo (at 58).

It will be up to the national courts seised of a dispute, here: the Polish courts, to draw legal conclusions from the potential unfairness of such a clause (at 61). DelayFix therefore are not quite yet home and dry.

Geert.

European Private International Law, 3rd ed. February 2021, Chapter 2, para 2.240.

The European Order for Payment (EOP, Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006), the European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP, Regulation (EC) No 861/2007) and the European Account Preservation Order (EAPO, Regulation (EU) No 655/2014) applied for several years in Romania without any specific implementation legislation being adopted to coordinate their interaction with the national procedural rules.

As generally regulations do not require any specific additional legislative action from the Member States to be applied at national level, Romanian authorities relied on the principle of direct application of the three instruments. However, the referral to national procedural rules in several articles of the regulations (e.g. existence of an appeal mechanisms, costs of proceedings, assistance) as well as reliance on national rules when no specific provisions are contained in the European legislation (Article 26 EOP, Article 19 ESCP, and Article 46 EAPO) can create disparities and give rise to variations in the application of these instruments even within one Member State.

Recently, this direct application approach changed. In December 2019 the Romanian Government and, subsequently, the Parliament initiated acts to amend national laws. These legislative amendments were aimed at facilitating the application of these regulations and clarifying particular procedural aspects in order to ease judicial cooperation between Member States for the EOP, ESCP, and EAPO procedures. The new national rules dedicated to the EOP, ESCP, and EAPO focus mainly on issues of jurisdiction of Romanian courts, identifying the national authorities involved in the application of the Regulations, and establishing the applicable procedural fees.

EAPO: A Guided Implementation Process to Avoid an Infringement Procedure

The amendment of national legislation regarding the EAPO has been triggered by the initiation of an infringement procedure by the European Commission. A letter of formal notice (letter C(2019) 6729 final) was sent to the Romanian authorities in 2019 – more than two years since the regulation became applicable – because the Government failed to communicate relevant information for the application of the regulation as required by Article 50 EAPO Regulation.

Following this formal notice, the Romanian Government acted expediently to avoid a possible referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union in an infringement procedure. The Government’s Note proposing the legislative amendment as well as in the Statement of Reasons for the law approving the Government Emergency Ordinance containing implementation provisions refer to this risk as well as that of hefty fines for the national budget due to non-compliance with EU law. Based on these reasons the Government moved quickly in December 2019 to adopt an Emergency Ordinance – Ordonaţa de urgenţă nr. 75 din 13 decembrie 2019 pentru completarea Ordonanţei de urgenţă a Guvernului nr. 119/2006 privind unele măsuri necesare pentru aplicarea unor regulamente comunitare de la data aderării României la Uniunea Europeană, precum şi pentru modificarea Ordonanţei de urgenţă a Guvernului nr. 80/2013 privind taxele judiciare de timbre.

Based on the Government’s Note, the Emergency Ordinance No. 75/2019 was meant to address information that had not been clearly provided for the application of the EAPO in Romania. This concerned:

• the methods that could be used to obtain account information regarding a debtor holding a bank account in Romania (Article 50(1)(c) EAPO Regulation) and
• which courts were competent to handle EAPO requests, the available means of appeal, the national authority competent to receive requests for obtaining account information about bank accounts and to provide such information, and the methods applicable to receive this information (by Romanian and authorities in other Member States).

The new article Article I8 of the Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 regarding certain measures necessary for the application of some Community Regulations after the date of accession of Romania to the European Union explicitly addresses the information requirements contained in Article 50(1) letters (a)-(d), (l) and (m) EAPO Regulation.

Based on this legislative amendment, the courts competent to issue Preservation Orders in Romania based on an authentic instrument would be the ones having jurisdiction to handle the claim at first instance (Article 1(1) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Articles 6(4) EAPO Regulation). Further, any appeal against a decision to reject in whole or in part an application for a Preservation Order would be handle by the hierarchical higher court to the one that issued the initial decision (Article 1(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Articles 21 EAPO Regulation). This means that different type of courts can have jurisdiction to receive an application for an EAPO based on the threshold of the claim. These would be either the district courts (judecătorii) for requests of up to 200.000 RON (approx. 42.000 euros) or the general courts (tribunale) for applications above this threshold. Similarly, any request to revoke or modify a Preservation Order based on Article 31(1) EAPO Regulation will be handled by the hierarchical higher court to the one that issued it (Article 1(3) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006).

The remedies available to the debtor against the enforcement of a Preservation Order according to Article 34 EAPO Regulation will rest with the enforcement court (Article 1(4) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006). Again any appeal against the remedies available to the creditor and the debtor based on the provisions of Articles 33-35 EAPO will lie with the hierarchical higher courts to the courts that issued the Preservation Order (Article 1(3)-(4) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Articles 33(1), 34 and 35 EAPO Regulation). In such circumstances, the appeal would have to be introduced within a period of 30 days from the date of communication of the decision challenged, unless the law establishes otherwise. This last part gives rise to some uncertainty, especially for foreign parties which are presumed not to be familiar with the Romanian legal system and its particularities. Hence, relying on a local practitioner would remain necessary although representation is not mandatory in the EAPO procedure (Article 41 EAPO Regulation).

Any request to obtain information and identify a debtor’s potential bank accounts in Romania according to Article 14 EAPO Regulation will be dealt with by the National Union of Judicial Enforcement Officers (Uniunea Naţională a Executorilor Judecătoreşti, UNEJ). The National Union of Judicial Enforcement Officers is the designated information authority competent to provide this information upon request. For this purpose, the Union has been granted direct and free of charge access to the Ministry of Public Finance IT system – PatrimVen (Article 2 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006).

With regard to procedural costs related to the issuance of a European Account Preservation Order, the court fees are fixed at 100 RON (approx. 21 euros) (Article 11(1) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees). The EAPO court fee is similar to fees applicable in other national procedures concerning protective measures. Its low value is certainly convenient, especially for high-value EAPOs.

EOP and ESCP: Implementation Legislation A Decade into their Application

The EOP and ESCP have been the testing ground for direct application of ‘second-generation’ European regulations into national procedure. This has led to interpretation difficulties (e.g. amount of court fees to be paid, appeal and review mechanisms, lack of legal assistance) and mixed results according to previously published research findings (e.g. further Luxembourg Report on Mutual Trust and Free Circulation of Judgments and Cross-Border Debt Recovery in the EU). During this initial period, the only legislative provision implicitly referring to these instruments was Article 636 New Code of Civil Procedure. The article states that European enforceable titles for which the exequatur procedure is not required are immediately enforceable in Romania without any preliminary formality.

The legislative change for these two European procedures came in July 2020. A law – Law No 132 of 15 July 2020 – was adopted by the Parliament. The law amended one more time the Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 regarding certain measures necessary for the application of some Community Regulation after the date of accession of Romania to the European Union and the Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees. Two new articles were added to facilitate the application of the EOP and ESCP Regulation in Romania – Articles I9 and I10 (see Statement of Reasons). As for the EAPO Regulation, these articles address only some of the elements that require coordination between the European rules and national legislation, namely: the requirements of Article 29(1)(a)-(b) EOP Regulation and Article 25(1)(a), (c) and (g) ESCP Regulation

For the EOP, the jurisdiction will rest with the courts that would be competent to handle the claims on the merits at first instance (Article 1 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006). These would be either the district courts (judecătorii) or the general courts (tribunale). The district courts have competence for claims up to 200.000 RON (approx. 42.000 euros). The claims above this threshold will be handled by the general court as first instance court.

Any review request in the framework of the EOP Regulation will be examined by the same court that issued the EOP but in a panel of two judges (Article 2 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006). Although this legislative step clarifies some organisational aspects of the review proceeding, it does not solve how the review should be handled based on various national means (see here also). The national procedures according to which the review should be handled are broader in scope than the provisions of Article 20 EOP Regulation and require some legal knowledge. This keeps the proceeding rather complex for a first-time user with little legal training.

With regard to the ESCP, the Romanian courts competent to issue the ESCP judgment are the district courts (judecătoriile) according to Article 2(1) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006. The ESCP judgment will be subject only to appeal before the competent general court (tribunal) and will have to be filed within 30 days from the moment the judgment was communicated to the party (Article 2(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006 in conjunction with Article 17 ESCP Regulation).

A request for review – as for the EOP procedure – will rest with the court that issued the ESCP judgment. However, unlike for the EOP, the provisions related to the ESCP do not expressly indicate that the review will be handled by a panel of judges. This difference in the drafting of the legal text is regrettable as it gives rise to potential confusions and interpretations per a contrario given the special nature of the rules.

Both EOP and ESCP provisions related to the competent courts to receive the application forms do not change the practice of the Romanian courts but confirm the already existing interpretation followed by practitioners.

For court fees, the Romanian legislator opted for a fixed court fee as for similar national procedures (ordonanţa de plată and procedura cu privire la cererile de valoare redusă). Hence, an application for an EOP will cost the applicant 200 RON (approx. 41 euros) (Article 6(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees). While the ESCP claims will vary between 50 RON (approx. 10,5 euros) for claims below 2.000 RON (or their equivalent) and 200 RON (approx. 41 euros) for claims above this threshold (Article 6(2) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013). The procedure following opposition to an EOP and review requests will involve an additional fixed fee of 100 RON (approx. 21 euros) (Article 6(21) Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 regarding the judiciary stamp fees. This legislative action is welcomed as it puts an end to the different approaches followed by Romania courts. These varied between a fixed cost identical to the equivalent national procedures and a court fee based on the value of the claim submitted.

The most important legislative development related to the application of the ESCP concerns the implementation of specific provisions regarding the assistance to the provided to the parties (Article 11 ESCP Regulation).

According to Article 1 Government Emergency Ordinance No 119/2006, practical assistance for filling in the Claim Form (Form A) will be provided by the lawyers designated for this purpose by each local Bar Association for periods of three months (on a rotation basis). The list of lawyers to provide legal assistance and their contact details will be published online by the Union of National Bar Associations in Romania and each local Bar Association. This list is also to be communicated to each district court for publication at its premises as well as online on the website of the Romanian Courts. Finding the necessary details will remain certainly more challenging for foreign users as the information on the websites is generally available only in Romanian.

The costs for this assistance will be fixed based on a protocol of understanding establishing the representation fees for ex officio legal representation. No fee will have to be paid by the party receiving assistance in accordance with Article 11 ESCP Regulation. Although a welcomed legislative clarification such lists do not appear to have been published for the time being with the indicated national websites or their whereabouts are not easy to spot (even for a legally trained subject). Given that the legislative changes were only introduced four months ago, practical application and technical adjustments may take some time to be calibrated by the local Bar Associations and district courts.

These legislative steps undertaken by the Romanian authorities are certainly a good development for facilitating the interaction between the European and national procedural rules and the application of the EOP, ESCP, and EAPO. Domestic rules have an important influence on the manner in which the European procedures are applied and represent a key prerequisite for certainty, visibility of the procedures, and their subsequent success.

The Court of justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑519/19 (Ryanair DAC v DelayFix, formerly Passenger Rights sp. z o.o.), which is about jurisdiction clauses, assignment of passenger claim and unfair terms:

“Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to contest the jurisdiction of a court to hear and determine an action brought for compensation under Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 […]  establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, […] and against an airline, a jurisdiction clause incorporated in a contract of carriage concluded between a passenger and that airline cannot be enforced by the airline against a collection agency to which the passenger has assigned the claim, unless, under the legislation of the Member State whose courts are designated in that clause, that collection agency is the successor to all the initial contracting party’s rights and obligations, which it is for the referring court to determine. Where appropriate, such a clause, incorporated, without having been subject to an individual negotiation, in a contract concluded between a consumer, that is to say, the air passenger, and a seller or supplier, that is to say, the airline, and which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts which have jurisdiction over the territory in which that airline is based, must be considered as being unfair within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts”.

Source: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=233867&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=14547437

        

Witten by Abubakri Yekini, Lecturer at Lagos State University, Nigeria.

 

The idea of economic integration is not new to Africa. It is a phenomenon that has been conceived as far back as the 1960s when many African countries gained independence. In 1980, the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) came up a blueprint for the progressive development of Africa: the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000. However, the first concrete step towards achieving this objective was taken in 1991 when the African Heads of State and Government (AHSG) signed the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) (Abuja Treaty) in Nigeria.  One of the operational stages of the AEC was the creation of a Continental Free Trade Area by 2028. In 2013, the AHSG further signed a Solemn Declaration during the 50th anniversary of the African Union. The Declaration sets another blueprint for a 50-year development trajectory for Africa (Agenda 2068). Item C of that Declaration is a commitment from the Member States to the speedy implementation of the Continental Free Trade Area. At last, this is now a reality.

 

The AfCFTA was adopted 5 years later on 21st March 2018 and it became effective on 30th May 2019. It was expected that trading activities under this framework would commence in July 2020. The ongoing global pandemic and shutdown of national economies frustrated the plan. The Agreement is now scheduled to take effect from 1st January 2021.

 

Africa seems to be showing some seriousness with the AfCFTA compared to previous attempts. Concerns were initially expressed when Nigeria was reluctant to sign the Agreement (Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority, 2020; Mizner, 2019; Financial Times, 2019). Such concerns cannot be dismissed considering that Nigeria is the biggest economy in Africa and has a population of about 200 million people. Happily, the Nigerian Federal Executive Council formally approved the ratification of the Agreement on 11th November 2020(Government of Nigeria, 2020). As at today, all the African countries are members of the AfCFTA except Eritrea. We can safely say that AfCFTA has come to stay.

 

According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the AfCFTA will be the biggest single market, with a GDP of $2.5 trillion and a whooping population of 2.5 billion people across 55 countries (UNECA, 2020). By 2050, it is also projected that Africa’s population will be 2.5 billion; contributing about 26% of the world’s working-age population (UNECA, 2020). As expected, AfCFTA has been generating interesting debates. Some legal commentators have penned some thoughts on the Agreement largely from international economic/trade law perspectives (Magwape, 2018; Onyejekwe and Ekhator, 2020; Akinkugbe 2019). Only a few private international scholars have written on the framework (Theunissen, 2020; Uka, 2020).

 

Nigeria’s ratification of AfCFTA indicates that AfCFTA will become effective in Nigeria from next year, although Nigerian law requires AfCFTA to be domesticated (Abacha v. Fawehinmi [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228). AfCFTA is projected to have significant impacts on the Nigerian economy. Although Nigeria’s trade in goods and services to other African countries stands at 19.6% (export) and 2.13% (import) as indicated in the Q4 2019 statistic (National Bureau of Statistics, 2019), it is expected that this should witness a significant growth when AfCFTA becomes effective. More intra-African trading activities would potentially lead to the increase in cross border litigation in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular. The relevant question is to what extent does Nigerian private international law support trade liberalisation agenda of AfCFTA?

 

The AfCFTA has a dispute settlement mechanism modelled along the WTO system. This affects only disputes between the Member States. The Agreement is conspicuously silent on cross-border disputes amongst private citizens and the divergent systems of law operating in the Member States. It thus appears that for the meantime, the divergent national private international rules which are obsolete in many Member States will continue to govern cross-border disputes. To what extent this can support the objective of intra-African trade facilitation is left to be seen.

 

For Nigeria, it is time we revamped the Nigerian private international law. As a prominent member of AfCFTA, Nigeria should take a special interest in the progressive development of private international law through multilateral platforms both under the AfCFTA and other global bodies such as the Hague Conference. The current lackadaisical attitude to multilateral private international rules needs to change. For instance, Nigeria has neither joined the Hague Conference nor acceded to any of its conventions. The Evidence and Service Conventions would have delivered a more efficient international civil procedure for Nigeria. Also, the 2005 Choice of Court Convention (and hopefully the 2019 Judgments Convention) would give Nigerian judgments wider circulation and respect. At the Commonwealth level, Nigeria did not pay any significant role in the making of the 2017 Commonwealth Model Law on Judgments and has no intention of domesticating it. The point we are making is that Nigeria needs to be responsive to international calls for the development of private international law, not just from AfCFTA when such is made, but also ongoing global private international law projects.

 

To reap the benefit of AfCFTA, the Nigerian justice system must be made to be attractive to foreign businesspersons. No doubt, foreign litigants will be more interested in doing business in countries that have in place an efficient, effective and credible legal system that enforce contracts and dispose of cases timeously. Nigeria will be competing with countries such as South Africa, Egypt, Rwanda and Ghana. In one recent empirical research carried out by Prof Yemi Osibajo, the current Vice President of Nigeria, on the length of trial time in civil cases in Lagos State, it takes an average of 3.4 years to resolve a civil and commercial transaction in Nigeria. A further period of 2.5 and 4.5 years is required if the matter proceeded to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court respectively (Osinbajo, 2011). Excessive delays in dispute resolution may make Nigeria unattractive for resolving business disputes. The other side of the coin is the enforcement of contracts, especially jurisdiction agreements. Foreign litigants may be persuaded to trade with Nigeria if they are assured that foreign jurisdiction clauses will be respected by Nigerian courts. The current approach is not too satisfactory as there are some appellate court decisions which suggest that parties’ choice may not be enforced in certain situations (Okoli, 2020b). Some of the local statutes like the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act which grants exclusive jurisdiction over a wide range of commercial matters may equally need to be reviewed.

 

Jurisdiction and judgments are inextricably linked together. Nigerian litigants should now be concerned about how Nigerian judgments would fare in other African countries. Our jurisdictional laws need to be standardised to work in harmony with those of foreign countries. Recent decisions indicate that Nigerian courts still apply local venue rules – designed to determine which judicial division should hear a matter (for geographical and administrative convenience) within a State in Nigeria – to determine jurisdiction in matters involving foreign element; consider taking steps to release property as submission; may even exercise jurisdiction based on temporary presence (Okoli, 2020a; Okoli, 2020b; Bamodu, 1995; Olaniyan, 2012; Yekini, 2013). It is doubtful if judgments from these jurisdictional grounds will be respected in other African countries, the majority of whose legal systems are not rooted in common law. In the same vein, Nigerian courts will recognise and enforce judgments from other African countries notwithstanding that Nigeria has not extended its statutory enforcement scheme to most African countries (Yekini, 2017). Nigerian judgments may not receive similar treatment in other African states as our reciprocal statute can be misconstrued to mean that their judgments are not enforceable in Nigeria without a treaty. Nigerian government should either discard the reciprocity requirement or conclude a treaty with other African states to guarantee the enforcement of Nigerian judgments abroad.

 

Boosting investors’ confidence requires some assurances from the Nigerian government for the respect of rule of law. The government’s rating is not too encouraging in this regard. In its 2020 Rule of Law Index, the World Justice Project ranked Nigeria 108 out of 128 countries surveyed (World Justice Project, 2020). This should not surprise practitioners from Nigeria.  For instance, the Nigerian government does have regard for ECOWAS judgments although court sits in Abuja, Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory. Such judgments are hardly recognised and enforced thereby contravening art 15(4) of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty which stipulates that judgments of the court shall be binding on Member States (Adigun, 2019).

 

Lastly, AfCFTA should spark the interest of Nigerian practitioners, judges, academia, policymakers and other stakeholders in private international law matters. Nigeria cannot afford to be a spectator in the scheme of things. It should leverage on its status in Africa to drive an Afrocentric and global private international law agenda. More awareness should be created for the subject in the universities. Government and the business community should fund various programmes and research on the impact of AfCFTA, and subsequent frameworks that will be rolled out to drive AfCFTA, on the Nigerian legal system, its economy and people.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Administrative Court of the City of Sofia, Bulgaria, has recently submitted a request for a preliminary revolving around the recognition of a foreign birth certificate issued by another EU Member State (Case C-490/20):

The case concerns a refusal of a municipality in Sofia to issue a Bulgarian birth certificate to a child of two female same sex mothers of Bulgarian and UK nationality who entered into a civil marriage in Gibraltar, UK. The child was born in Spain, where a birth certificate  was issued on which it was recorded that mothers of the child were both a Bulgarian national, designated ‘Mother A’, and a UK national, designated ‘Mother’, both persons being female. The municipality refused to issue the requested birth certificate because the applicants did not point out who was the biological mother, intending most probably to issue the certificate only for one mother. Bulgaria is one of the few EU Member States without access to either same sex marriage or any type of civil partnership.

The Bulgarian mother brought legal proceedings before the Administrative Court of the City of Sofia against the refusal by the Sofia municipality, where the court referred  the following questions to the CJEU for a for preliminary ruling:

1. Must Article 20 TFEU and Article 21 TFEU and Articles 7, 24 and 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that the Bulgarian administrative authorities to which an application for a document certifying the birth of a child of Bulgarian nationality in another Member State of the EU was submitted, which had been certified by way of a Spanish birth certificate in which two persons of the female sex are registered as mothers without specifying whether one of them, and if so, which of them, is the child’s biological mother, are not permitted to refuse to issue a Bulgarian birth certificate on the grounds that the applicant refuses to state which of them is the child’s biological mother?

2. Must Article 4(2) TEU and Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that respect for the national identity and constitutional identity of the Member States of the European Union means that those Member States have a broad discretion as regards the rules for establishing parentage? Specifically:
– Must Art. 4(2) TEU be interpreted as allowing the Member State to request information on the biological parentage of the child?
– Must Article 4(2) TEU in conjunction with Article 7 and Article 24(2) of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that it is essential to strike a balance of interests between, on the one hand, the national identity and constitutional identity of a Member State and, on the other hand, the best interests of the child, having regard to the fact that, at the present time, there is neither a consensus as regards values nor, in legal terms, a consensus about the possibility of registering as parents on a birth certificate persons of the same sex without providing further details of whether one of them, and if so, which of them, is the child’s biological parent? If this question is answered in the affirmative, how could that balance of interests be achieved in concrete terms?

3. Is the answer to Question 1 affected by the legal consequences of Brexit in that one of the mothers listed on the birth certificate issued in another Member State is a UK national whereas the other mother is a national of an EU Member State, having regard in particular to the fact that the refusal to issue a Bulgarian birth certificate for the child constitutes an obstacle to the issue of an identity document for the child by an EU Member State and, as a result, may impede the unlimited exercise of her rights as an EU citizen?

4. If the first question is answered in the affirmative: does EU law, in particular the principle of effectiveness, oblige the competent national authorities to derogate from the model birth certificate which forms part of the applicable national law?

 

Thank you, Boriana Musseva, for the tip-off!

 

Dimitry Kochenov (University of Groningen) and Uladzislau Belavusau (T.M.C. Asser Institute) have posted on After the Celebration: Marriage Equality in EU Law post-Coman in Eight Questions and Some Further Thoughts on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

This article provides a detailed critical analysis of the case of Coman, where the Court of Justice of the EU clarified that the meaning of the term ‘spouse’ in Directive 2004/38 was gender-neutral, opening up the door for same-sex marriage recognition for immigration purposes all around the EU, thus destroying the heteronormative misinterpretations of the clear language of the Directive practiced in a handful of Member States. The state of EU law after Coman is still far from perfect, however: we underline a line of important questions which remain open and which the Court will need to turn to in the near future to ensure that marriage equality in moves beyond mere proclamations in the whole territory of the Union. In particular, we: (1) Question the effectiveness of the Commission as an effective guardian of the Treaties, puzzled by its failure to make basic EU citizenship rights available to EU citizens who are in a same-sex relationship. (2) Interrogate the deficiencies of single-purpose marriage recognition and question the speed of the eventual spill-overs of such recognition into other fields outside immigration per se. (3) We demonstrate that Coman is a textbook example of the free-movement paradigm of non-discrimination at work, which is, besides obviously being accepted in EU law, also deeply questionable, since those who do not move within the internal market might also want to have a family. (4) Issues of coherence among different instruments of secondary EU law equally arise, (5) just as the issue of ‘genuine residence’, which Coman brings up, whatever this might mean in the 21st century with its fast pace of life and increasing numbers of people – not all of them heterosexual – living between countries and homes. (6) Numerous questions arise as a result of the natural conflict, which is omnipresent, between principles of EU law and private international law approaches. (7) The CJEU’s language of ‘strengthening family life’ is both dangerous and out of place, in our respectful opinions, informed by the desire to keep the Court out of Europeans’ (and Americans’, as in Coman) spousal beds. (8) The last issue we raise is the question of ‘what’s next?’ for others who are still arbitrarily persecuted by EU and national law and for whom (and how many of them) they love. Once the principle is established that states should not interfere with our sexuality without imperative reasons of the public good – what the LGBTQ community has been subjected to abundantly and still suffers from, and to which Coman is a wonderful illustration – the same test is bound to apply in other contexts, especially polygamy and other persecuted or ‘non-recognised’ loving relationships. But first we turn back to the facts and the context of the case, and praise the Court for a significant achievement, which righted the failure of the Commission to ensure the basic applicability of the Directive 2004/38 to gay European citizens.

The paper is forthcoming in the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law.