Droit international général

The 59th edition of the Séminaire de Droit Comparé et Européen d’Urbino (Italy) will be held next summer from August 22nd to September 1st.  

The Séminaire is a common venture of Italian and French jurists taking place since 1959. The venue is ideal for developing a dialogue on Comparative,  International (both public and private) and European law with jurists from different world countries, since it largely benefits of the relaxing time of the year and of the serenity of the environment: Urbino gave birth to humanism and to the Vitruvian man.

This year’s seminar’s main topics are robotics and AI international legal problems, State immunity, the future of family law, arbitration and many others. Speaker include Prof. M.E. Ancel, S. Yansky-Ravid, A. Giussani, C. Malberti, P. Morozzo della Rocca, A. Bondi, L. Mari, I. Pretelli as well as practitioners -lawyers, mediators, arbitrators and notaries. The Seminar promotes multilingual competencies: presentations are in French, English or Italian, often followed by summarized translations in the other two languages.

The whole program as well as email addresses for further information is downloadable  here.

Thank you, Ludo Veuchelen, for alerting me to Adam Liptak’s reporting on Jesner v Arab Bank, in which certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court early April. The case may finally have us hear SCOTUS’ view on the question which led to certiorari in Kiobel but was subsequently ignored by the Court: whether corporations can be culpable for violation of public international law. ‘May’ is probably the keyword in the previous sentence.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Heading 8.2.

Belgium’s Lernout & Hauspie case recently entered a further stage in its civil law chapter. The case is part of Belgium’s (and especially Flanders’) collective memory as an illustration of what can go wrong when markets and investors alike are fooled by corporate greed. Is it world-famous, in Belgium: for those outside, Wiki should help.

Of interest to this blog is the recent judgment of the Gent criminal court on the civil chapter of the case: see my colleague proximus Stefaan Voet’s analysis here. Stefaan has helpfully translated the most relevant sections of the judgment, in particular the court’s rejection of the argument that the US opt-out class action settlement were contrary to Belgium’s ordre public. The court, in my view entirely justifiably, holds that Belgium’s Private international law act does not oppose recognition and enforcement. Of note is the extensive comparative reference which the court makes not just to existing Belgian law on class actions (the Belgian legal order can hardly oppose what it tentatively has introduced itself), but also to a European Recommendation on comparative class action law in the EU (a sort of Ius Commune idea).

Recognition and enforcement rarely makes it to substantive review in Belgian case-law. This judgment is one of note.

Geert.

By Tamás Szabados, LL.M. (UCL), PhD (ELTE), Senior Lecturer at the Eötvös Loránd University (Hungary)

On 11 April 2017, the new Hungarian Private International Law Act (Act XXVIII of 2017), adopted earlier by the Hungarian Parliament, was promulgated. The new Act will enter into force on 1 January 2018 and will fully replace the decree-law of 1979 that currently regulates private international law. The adoption of the new Act was justified by the economic and social changes that occurred since then. The drafting process was based on extensive comparative research and the drafters also paid attention to recent developments in EU private international law.

The new Private International Law Act covers the determination of the applicable law, jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions as well as other aspects of international civil procedure. The new Private International Law Act introduces some changes in comparison to the rules currently in force.

The General Part deals with certain questions not regulated previously: application of the law of states having more than one legal system, overriding mandatory provisions and changes in the circumstances which determine the governing law. As a novelty, the General Part also contains a general escape clause: if, based on the circumstances of the case, it is obvious that the case is substantially more strongly connected with a law other than the law designated by virtue of the Act, the court may exceptionally apply this law. In addition, a general subsidiary choice of law rule provides that, if the new Act does not contain a specific choice of law rule for a legal relationship that is otherwise covered by the Act, the law of the state will apply with which that relationship is most strongly connected.

The Special Part of the Act extends equally to certain issues which were not regulated earlier, such as the (restricted) freedom to choose the applicable law in property matters for spouses and (registered) partners or the determination of the law applicable to illegally exported cultural property.

Jurisdictional rules as well as the provisions on recognition and enforcement of decisions have been restructured and divided into general and special provisions (such as the rules on matters involving an economic interest and matters concerning family law and personal status).

The text of the New Hungarian Private International Law Act is available (in Hungarian language) here.

The Netherlands journal of private international law, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR), vol. 35-1, has just been released: click here to see the full ToC.

Access is possible to the first contribution, written in English by Prof. Dr. Matthias Weller, entitled Mutual trust within judicial cooperation in civil matters: a normative cornerstone – a factual chimera – a constitutional challenge. The abstract reads as follows:

Mutual trust has become a normative cornerstone of the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice, as is being confirmed and reinforced by recent and fundamental decisions of the ECJ. At the same time, some Member States are more than ever occupying low rankings in different surveys on the quality of their administration of justice or are being challenged as not sufficiently implementing the rule of law. Th us, a conflict appears to be currently culminating between norm and fact. Th is conflict puts in question the fundaments of judicial cooperation and contributes to centrifugal tendencies within the European Union. In order to counteract such tendencies, the text offers some deeper, including some historical, thoughts on mutual trust, as well as its facets and functions in judicial cooperation amongst the Member States in civil matters (Brussels Ia Regulation), in particular in relation to the return of abducted children (Brussels IIa Regulation), in administrative matters dealing with asylum seekers (Dublin Regulations) and criminal matters (Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant), i.e. in cases where there is a transfer of persons from one Member State to another. In this context mutual trust has become an element of the very identity of the European Union whereas from the perspective of (at least German) constitutional and European human rights law mutual trust has become a true challenge. On the basis of these considerations on the general framework of mutual trust, the question is posed whether there should be some rebalancing of mutual trust in the cooperation in civil matters.

It is too readily assumed by many that general Member States’ obligations under the EU’s environmental laws are context only, and not really legally binding. In my Handbook of EU Waste law however I report on a number of cases where the European Court of Justice has rebuked Member States for having failed to take measures to attain some of these general objectives. These cases relate to waste law, evidently, however in other cases the Court’s case-law extends this to EU environmental law generally.

One can now add C-153/16 EC v Slovenia to this list. Slovenia had attempted to address the continuation of waste tyres storage and processing at an abandoned quarry, in contravention of an expired environmental permit. The company dug in its heels, ia via prolonged litigation, with storage and processing continuing.

The Court of Justice found that Slovenia had infringed the general duty of care provisions, as well as enforcement obligations of the landfill Directive and the waste framework Directive. (On the related issues with respect to hazardous waste, the Court found the Commission’s infringement proceedings wanting).

Not all that glitters is gold, of course. The direct effect of these general duty of care provisions remains an issue, as does the absence, arguably, in EU law of a duty of care directly imposed upon waste holders and processors. For that, citisens need to pass via national law wich as current case shows, is not always up to scratch.

Geert.

By Stefaan Voet, Leuven University

The Belgian Lernout & Hauspie (L&H) case was one of the largest corporate scandals in European history (for an empirical case study analysis see S. Voet, ‘The L&H Case: Belgium’s Internet Bubble Story’ in D. Hensler, C. Hodges & I. Tzankova (eds.), Class Actions in Context: How Economics, Politics and Culture Shape Collective Litigation, Edward Elgar (2016)).

It was a criminal case that was brought before the Criminal Court of Appeal in Ghent. Contrary to common law jurisdictions, the victim of a Belgian criminal case is not absent from the criminal trial. He or she is a formal party to the proceedings and has standing to plead.  Regarding his or her civil claim, the victim can piggyback on the evidence brought forward by the Public Prosecutor in order to prove a civil fault.  The victim only has to prove causation and his or her damages. Based on this technique, more than 15,000 duped shareholders filed their civil claim during the L&H criminal trial.

On 20 September 2010, the Court ruled on the criminal aspect of the case. L&H’s founding fathers and most previous directors were convicted. The deep-pocket defendants Dexia Bank and KPMG, respectively L&H’s bank and statutory auditor, were acquitted.

On 23 March 2017, seven years after its criminal decision, the Court ruled its first decision on the civil claims. The decision is available in Dutch at https://www.rechtbanken-tribunaux.be/sites/default/files/public/content/lh_-_geanonimiseerd.pdf.

Because L&H also had a second headquarters in the US, some (opt-out) class action procedures, on behalf of all persons and entities who had bought L&H shares on Nasdaq, were brought there against Dexia and KPMG (In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001); In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 208 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Mass. 2002) and Warlop v. Lernout, 473 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass. 2007)). Ultimately, these cases were settled. In the KPMG settlement 115 million dollars were paid, while in the Dexia settlement the shareholders received 60 million dollars.

One of the issues the Belgian Court had to deal with was the impact of these US class action settlements in the Belgian procedure. More particularly, the question arose if the civil claimants in the Belgian procedure who were part of the US class action settlements and who had not opted out, still can claim damages in the Belgian procedure. In other words, does the Belgian Court has to recognize the US class action settlements?

Because the court decisions approving the class action settlements are rendered by a US court, the European rules (i.e. Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters) do not apply. Belgian international private law is applicable, and more particularly the Belgian Code of Private International Law (CPIL) (an English translation is available at http://www.ipr.be/data/B.WbIPR%5BEN%5D.pdf).

The Court first decides that the US decisions approving the class action settlements are foreign judgements that can be recognized and enforced in Belgium (Art 22, §1 CPIL). The Court rebuts the argument of one of the parties that the class actions settlements are nothing more than contractual agreements to which he is not a party (§ 66).

The central issue before the Court is whether the US court decision approving the class action settlements can be recognized in Belgium and whether the class members who did not opt out are bound by these settlements in the Belgian procedure (§ 67). If not, they can bring their civil claim. If so, they cannot bring their civil claim (at least to the amount they received in the US class action settlements).

The Court cannot assess the question whether the US District Court (approving the class action settlements) correctly applied Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) FRCP (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Art 25, §2 CPIL clearly states that under no circumstances the foreign judgment will be reviewed on the merits (§§ 68-69).

Art 22, §1, 4th para CPIL states that the foreign judgment may only be recognized or declared enforceable if it does not violate the conditions of Art 25 CPIL. The latter states (in §1, 1° and 2°): “A foreign judgment shall not be recognized or declared enforceable if 1° the result of the recognition or enforceability would be manifestly incompatible with public policy; upon determining the incompatibility with the public policy special consideration is given to the extent in which the situation is connected to the Belgian legal order and the seriousness of the consequences, which will be caused thereby and 2° the rights of the defense were violated.” These are the two basic questions before the Court (§ 72).

The main criterion is the international public order. According to Belgium’s Supreme Court (i.e. Court of Cassation) a law is of international public order if the legislator wanted to lay down a principle that is vital for Belgium’s established moral, public or economic order. Any foreign rule or decision violating this international public order should be set aside (Court of Cassation 18 June 2007, C.04.030.F, www.cass.be). The criterion is subject to a marginal appreciation by the court (§§ 74-75).

The Court concludes that the US decision approving the class actions settlement does not violate Belgium’s international public order. Consequently, the Court has to recognize the US decision. The Court invokes multiple reasons.

First of all, reference is made to the existence in Belgium, since September 2014, of an opt-out class action procedure (as laid down in Title II of Book XVII of the Code of Economic Law (CEL)) (see about this Belgian class action procedure S. Voet, ‘Consumer Collective Redress in Belgium: Class Actions to the Rescue?’, European Business Organization Law Review 2015, 121-143). Moreover, the legislature emphasized that the opt-out system is compatible with Art 6 ECHM (§§ 79-80).

Secondly, the Court compares the procedural rights of class members according to US federal class action law and to Belgian class action law. The US class action settlements were subject to a fairness hearing (see Rule 23(e)(2) FRCP). A similar provision exists in Belgium (Art XVII.38 CEL). The class action settlements were notified to US and foreign L&H shareholders (see Rule 23(e)(1) FRCP). A special website was also created. Similar provisions exist in Belgium (Art XVII.43, §3 CEL). In the US, the Court assessed whether the class actions settlements were fair, reasonable, and adequate (see Rule 23(e)(2) FRCP). Similar provisions exist in Belgium (Art XVII.49, §2 FRCP). Based on this analysis, the Court concludes that the procedural rights of the class members in the US class actions settlements were protected in a similar way as they would have been protected under Belgian law. The Court adds that the procedural protection under Rule 23 FRCP is even stronger than under Belgian law (§§ 82-83).

Next, the Court examines whether the fact that non-US class members are bound by the US opt-out class action settlements violates Belgium’s international public order. Although there are arguments to be made that only under an opt-in regime foreign class members can be bound by a class action decision or settlement, the Court reiterates that nevertheless opt-out class actions are possible in Europe (see Art 21 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms and the existing opt-out regimes in Portugal, Bulgaria, Denmark and the Netherlands (under the Dutch Collective Settlements Act)). It concludes that the desirability of an opt-in system for foreign class members does not automatically leads to the conclusion that an opt-out regime contradicts Belgium’s international public order (§§ 84-88).

Finally, the Court notes that an opt-out class action, leading to a settlement that could be binding for foreign class members, could entail a violation of the rights of defense if not everything was done to guarantee that the foreign class members were notified of the class action procedure and the opt-out possibility. The Court concludes that this was the case. It for example refers to the following facts: 82.8169 individual notice packages were sent; notification was provided in the Wall Street Journal, the Wall Street Journal Europe and a Belgian journal; a specific website (www.lernouthauspiesettlement.com) was launched; the Belgian press reported about the US class action settlements; one of the Belgian associations representing L&H shareholders informed its clients about the US class action settlements and instructed them what to do if they wanted to opt out or receive money; the US District Court decided that Rule 23(e)(1) FRCP was met and that 288 mainly Belgian shareholders had opted out correctly while 325 other opt-out requests were dismissed; etc. KPMG, one of the parties to the class action settlements, submitted an expert report to the Belgian Court stating that everything possible was done to notify all class members. In conclusion, the Court finds that there was sufficient notice and that the rights of defense of the non-US class members were not violated (§§ 89-93).

The general conclusion of the Court is that all claims brought by the civil parties who were part of the US class action settlements and who did not opt out are only admissible insofar as they claim damages above the amount they received from the US class action settlements.

The Düsseldorf Airport and Professor Stephan Hobe from the Institute of Air and Space Law at the University of Cologne, in cooperation with the international law firm Herbert Smith Freehills, have established a new series of events, which will deal with current topics of the aviation industry, involving internationally renowned experts before a selected audience.
The theme of the kick-off event could not be more up-to-date. Less than a week ago, British Ambassador Tim Barrow handed over to EU Council President Donald Tusk the first petition to trigger the application of Art. 50 TEU in the history of the European Union. The next two years will involve an unprecedented negotiating marathon in which the departure of Great Britain from the EU will be shaped.
Few areas are now as Europeanized as air transport. Air transport agreements need to be re-negotiated, the Single European Sky has to be restructured, airline ownership has to be checked – the impact of the Brexit on the aviation sector is unpredictable. The conference’s aim is to start with a first inventory. To this end, the organizers have invited distinguished experts from politics, academia, aviation associations, lawyers and international airports.
For further details and registration, please click here.

The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law offers a limited number of PhD scholarships for foreign scholars to support their research stay at the Institute for up to twelve months.

Eligibility
Scholarships are offered to PhD students who plan to undertake research at the Institute within the Institute’s areas of research, i.e. international dispute resolution and comparative procedural law.

Application
A complete application file must include the following documents (in English):
.- cover letter (max. 1 page), indicating the motivation and also the link of your research with the research of the Institute;
.- curriculum vitae (indicating grades of the university degrees);
.- summary of the PhD project (max. 2 pages), including subject, description and working plan;
.- two (2) letters of recommendation (including one from the PhD supervisor, with his/her contact details).

Grant and benefits
The scholarship is paid in monthly installments of 1500 €.
Selected scholars will be offered a working place in the library reading room of the Institute and will have the opportunity to participate in the regular scientific events and other activities of the Institute.

Deadline for applications
30 April 2017

Application details
Please follow this link and apply online.

Contact
Viktoria Drumm: scholarship@mpi.lu

Don’t it always seem to go, you don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone. Recognition and enforcement intra-EU is now so smooth in civil and commercial matters, the European Commission wanted to abolish potential for refusal altogether in the Brussels I Recast (regular readers are aware I reported on it at the time of negotiation).

Thank you Clyde & Co for alerting me to the case: In [2017] EWHC 519 (Comm) Midtown Acquisitions v Essar Global parties settled their dispute in an agreement, under which the defendant accepted liability and “confessed to judgment”. The New York courts then entered a Judgment by Confession (similar to an English consent judgment). Recognition and enforcement was sought in England.

In the Brussels system, discussion is still possible on the very notion of ‘judgment’ as I have recently reported (see my postings on Pula Parking and Zulfikarpašić). Refusal of recognition is possible on very narrow grounds. Famously, under the Brussels regime, recognition does not require res judicata of the foreign (intra-EU) judgment. (A misleadingly simple statement made in all Reports. But I’ll leave the detail for another time (see eg Gothaer for earlier analysis).

Outside the Brussels regime however (lest the Brexit negotiations yield a continuing bridge between civil procedure in the UK and EU this will also apply to judgment issued by UK courts), discussion on these two points re-emerges: when can a ruling be considered a ‘judgment’, and does it have res judicata? Defendant in Midtown argues that the New York judgment was not a “judgment” as that expression is used in English law because (i) there was no lis between the parties in New York, (ii) the New York judgment was not final and conclusive and (iii) the New York judgment was not on the merits.

Teare J rejected all three arguments on the basis of relevant precedent. The judgment merits reading for it is a good reminder of the extent of argument ensuing when one is not covered by the umbrella of EU or international harmonisation of recognition and enforcement.  Complications which are not likely to assist the London legal market in maintaining its attraction post Brexit.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.

The European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) launches its pilot webinar programme with two events in April 2017 which are now open for Registration. One of the webinars has special appeal for those working within the field of private international law. The webinar on the Wrongful removal or retention of the child – the Brussels IIbis Regulation will take place on Thursday, 20 April 2017 from 11:00 to 12:30 CET. It will provide participants a better understanding of the current legal landscape of cross-border child abduction in the EU and will also look at other key issues and aspects of the topic.

• Presenter: Carlos M. G. de Melo Marinho, Court of Appeal Judge, Co-Founder and Former National Contact Point of the European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters, Senior Expert on European and International Judicial Cooperation and E-justice, Portugal.
• Objectives: To provide a better understanding of the current legal landscape of the cross-border child abduction in the EU; to analyse the Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 (Brussels IIbis) as a true icon of the achievements of the European Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters generated by the approval of the Amsterdam Treaty; to underline the role of this Regulation as a precursor EU law text in a fruitful and unfinished process of suppression of the exequatur in the proceedings with a cross-border connection developed with a view to create a Common Space of Justice marked by the existence of mutual trust and direct contacts between courts and by the free circulation of decisions; to reveal the swift new ways that envisage to grant the return of a child wrongfully removed or retained, entailed by an enforceable judgment given in a Member State, in cases connected with two or more countries.
• Target audience: Judges and prosecutors, preferably those involved in judicial cooperation in civil matters. Other legal professionals having professional contact with these questions are also welcome to join.
• Registration is open from March 31, 2017, until the end of the webinar. Register online here.

Rincon ((2017) 8 Cal. App 5th 1) is another case suited to comparative conflicts classes. It applies California’s restrictive regime on waiver of jury trial to a contract governed by New York law and with choice of court for New York.

‘Lois de police‘, also known as lois d’application immédiate or lois d’application nécessaire,  are included in the EU’s Rome I Regulation (on applicable law for contracts) in Article 9. (I reported earlier on their application in Unamar).

Jason Grinell has background to the case. Parties had made choice of law and choice of court in favour of New York. The link with New York was real (in EU terms: this was not a ‘purely domestic’ situation), inter alia because of the involvement of New York-based banks, parties being sophisticated commercial undertakings, and the contract having been negotiated in NY. However the real estate development is located at San Francisco, giving CAL a strong link to the case. Under CAL law,  parties generally cannot waive a jury trial before the commencement of a lawsuit unless they use one of two methods approved by the legislature. New York law does not have the same provision and choice of court clauses in favour of New York do not include reference to the only options available under CAL law.

In the case at issue, the boilerplate choice of court clause was set aside by the Court of Appeal. The lower court had denied a substantial enough Californian interest in the case – the CA disagreed. The relevant part of the judgment runs until p.22.

That comparative conflicts binder is filling out nicely.

Geert.

This is no April fool’s prank: The Hague Convention of 5 July 2006 on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities held with an Intermediary will enter into force today. It will apply in the United States, Mauritius and Switzerland. More states will hopefully soon follow.

by Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Burkhard Hess, Executive Director Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law

Against the backdrop of Brexit, an initiative has been launched to strengthen Frankfurt as a hot spot for commercial litigation in the European Judicial Area. On March 30, 2017, the Minister of Justice of the Federal State Hessen, Ms Kühne-Hörmann, organized a conference at which the Justice Initiative was presented. More  than 120 stakeholders (lawyers, judges, businesses) attended the conference. The original paper was elaborated by Professors Burkhard Hess (Luxembourg), Thomas Pfeiffer (Heidelberg), Christian Duve (Heidelberg) and Roman Poseck (President of the Frankfurt Court of Appeal). Here, we are pleased to provide an English translation of the position paper with some additional information on German procedural law for an international audience. The proposal has, as a matter of principle, been endorsed by the Minister of Justice. Its proposals are now being discussed and shall be implemented in the next months to come. The paper reads as follows:

1. Background Information

In the European Judicial Area, London has positioned itself as the most important hub for cross-border disputes arising from the European internal market. According to statistics, in around 80% of all commercial cases at least one party is foreign, while almost 50% of all claims issued in the London court concern only foreigners. The value of disputes before the London Commercial Court is regularly in the 6 – 7-digit range. The court hears approximately 1,000 procedures per year, of which almost 200 concern parties from the continent (see here). A key focus is on financial disputes. Often, the jurisdiction of the High Court of London is based on jurisdiction agreements (Article 25 Brussels Ibis Regulation).

The upcoming Brexit will change this situation in relation to parties from the continent. In the future, the United Kingdom as a state will no longer benefit from the benefits of the European Judicial Area; the UK will rather be a third country. Parties to civil disputes must already consider whether they prefer to choose other courts within the European Judicial Area. The liberal rules of jurisdiction laid down in Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the special jurisdiction rules established in Articles 7 and 8 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation promote appropriate strategies. In financial contracts, jurisdiction clauses do not only provide for London, but also for other courts in the European Judicial Area, such as Frankfurt. Therefore, Germany can become a competing judicial hub. With the expected relocation of the financial center from London to Frankfurt (and indeed, likely to other European locations) a relocation of the judicial hub is also to be expected. It is submitted that one should strive for a shift of financial disputes to Frankfurt; even today, the Frankfurt judiciary is characterized by the existence of its special expertise in commercial areas. Indeed, the Frankfurt civil courts already have a high degree of specialization to hear financial and banking disputes.

Attracting high-profile, commercial disputes entails positive effects with regard to the legal services sector, in particular the legal profession, but also the courts of ordinary jurisdiction. Corresponding developments can be observed with regard to patent litigation. In this highly-specialized area of law, the courts of Düsseldorf, Mannheim and Munich have already established themselves as sought-after throughout Europe.

For these reasons, the Justice Initiative proposes that the attractiveness of the civil and commercial courts of Frankfurt should be strengthened through some targeted (mainly organizational) measures. A simultaneous information campaign would also increase Frankfurt’s visibility as an attractive place for the solution of international commercial disputes. Our considerations are linked to and continue to advance earlier initiatives (“Law Made in Germany”) that aim to strengthen Germany as a compelling place for dispute resolution.

In particular, the authors propose the following measures:

 A. A comprehensive strategy to strengthen Frankfurt as a hub for international dispute settlement

I. The core concern relates to the further specialization of the dispute resolution bodies within the state courts in order to promote the efficient resolution of cross-border commercial disputes. A combination of targeted measures, including the provision of a well-equipped court and experienced judges with good language skills as well as a modern process design shall enable a practical, user-friendly framework for the settlement of international commercial disputes

II. The initiative shall be accompanied by the comprehensive involvement of the judiciary, of the business sector (the Chamber of Industry and Commerce) as well as of the legal profession (including lawyers’ associations and lawyers’ chambers).

III. Simultaneous strengthening of arbitration in Frankfurt (via the creation of a Center for International Dispute Resolution).

B. Establishment of Chambers for International Commercial Matters at LG Frankfurt as well as of appropriately specialized senates at OLG Frankfurt

I. Composition of the Chamber for International Commercial Disputes with judges who have:

1. In-depth experience of business law (and, if possible also experience as lawyers) as well as;
2.  Good English language skills.

II. Occupation of the commercial lay judges in consultation with the Chamber for Commerce with experts from the fields:

1. Finance and banking;
2. International commercial matters;
3. Auditing.

Here again, adequate language skills must be ensured.

III. Sufficient equipment of the Chamber for International Commercial Disputes:

1. Comprehensive use of the electronic support system, for example by providing an IT tool in order to enable an “electronic process and case file management”;
2. Adequate equipment of the registrar of the Chamber / Senate with a staff, which also disposes of a sufficient knowledge of foreign languages and is able to manage (partially or partly) foreign-language files;
3. Borrowing best practices from arbitration with regard to the secretary/registry who adopts active support functions (as a case manager).

C. Process design

I. In respect of its own procedural practice, the Kammer für international Handelssachen should borrow “best practices” from patent litigation and international commercial arbitration:

1. The court should establish a “road map” with the parties at the start of the process; this would structure the course of the procedure. In this respect, it would seem to be a good idea to use the first hearing as a “Case Management Conference” with the parties:
2. Intensive use of the obligation of the court to provide information on open legal and factual issues under section 139 ZPO (German Code of Civil Procedure – the text is reproduced at the end of the document), in order to facilitate a speedy and transparent procedure;
3. Written preparation statements of witnesses shall generally be permitted (see § 377 (3) ZPO);
4. Increased use of sections 142 to 144 ZPO to enable a (structured) exchange of evidence between the parties under the control of the court (“German disclosure”);
5. Recording of the hearing and preparation of a textual record (sections 160 to 164 ZPO) – as an electronic document.

II. Extensive use of the English language within the existing framework of sections 184 and 185 (2) of the Court Organisation Act (but no English-speaking hearings per se). The court should decide at its own discretion whether and to what extent the hearing is held in English. The proposals of the parties must be respected as far as possible.

1. No translation of documents which are drafted in the English language (as already foreseen by section 142 (3) ZPO):
2. Witness will be heard in their original tongue or in English;
3. Extensive use of video conferencing:
4. Elaboration of judgments in a way which allows for their speedy translation into foreign languages.

D. The implementation of the initiative

I. Obtaining the support of lawyers, the judiciary and politicians in Hesse (Fall 2016)

II. Opening symposium on the 30th of March 2017;

III. Establishment of a working group with the aim of defining the necessary measures to be taken;

IV. Development and implementation of an accompanying communication strategy;

V. Establishment of a chamber for international trading at Regional Court of Frankfurt and a parallel specialization at the the Heigher Regional Court preferably on January 1, 2018 (within the business distribution plan of 2018).

All in all, the undertaking of the necessary organizational endeavor as well as the timetable for the implementation of the initiative both appears to be feasible. The implementation requires, in particular, the establishment of the Chamber for International Commercial Disputes (Kammer für international Handelssachen) within the District Court of Frankfurt. The following disputes could be assigned to the Chamber from the date of its establishment: international disputes, where the jurisdiction of the Landgericht Frankfurt (District Court of Frankfurt) is based on the Brussels Ibis Regulation or the Lugano Convention. Within the District Court, the respective disputes would be allocated to the specialized chamber via the business distribution plan of the court.

Annex: The pertinent provisions of the German Code of Civil Procedure and the Court Organisation Act

Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung – ZPO)

Section 139 Direction in substance of the course of proceedings

(1) To the extent required, the court is to discuss with the parties the circumstances and facts as well as the relationship of the parties to the dispute, both in terms of the factual aspects of the matter and of its legal ramifications, and it is to ask questions. The court is to work towards ensuring that the parties to the dispute make declarations in due time and completely, regarding all significant facts, and in particular is to ensure that the parties amend by further information those facts that they have asserted only incompletely, that they designate the evidence, and that they file the relevant petitions.

(2) The court may base its decision on an aspect that a party has recognisably overlooked or has deemed to be insignificant, provided that this does not merely concern an ancillary claim, only if it has given corresponding notice of this fact and has allowed the opportunity to address the matter. The same shall apply for any aspect that the court assesses differently than both parties do.

(3) The court is to draw the parties’ attention to its concerns regarding any items it is to take into account ex officio.

(4) Notice by the court as provided for by this rule is to be given at the earliest possible time, and a written record is to be prepared. The fact of such notice having been given may be proven only by the content of the files. The content of the files may be challenged exclusively by submitting proof that they have been forged.

(5) If it is not possible for a party to immediately make a declaration regarding a notice from the court, then the court is to determine a period, upon the party having filed a corresponding application, within which this party may supplement its declaration in a written pleading.

Section 142 Order to produce records or documents

(1) The court may direct one of the parties or a third party to produce records or documents, as well as any other material, that are in its possession and to which one of the parties has made reference. The court may set a deadline in this regard and may direct that the material so produced remain with the court registry for a period to be determined by the court.

(2) Third parties shall not be under obligation to produce such material unless this can be reasonably expected of them, or to the extent they are entitled to refuse to testify (…).

(3) The court may direct that records or documents prepared in a foreign language be translated by a translator who has been authorised or publicly appointed by the authorities of a Land, under the stipulations of Land law, for the preparation of translations of the nature required, or who is deemed to have equivalent qualifications. The translation shall be deemed to be true and complete where this is confirmed by the translator. The confirmation is to be set out on the translation, as are the place and date of the translation and the translator’s authorisation/appointment/equivalency, and the translated document is to be signed by the translator. It is admissible to prove that the translation is incorrect or incomplete. The order provided for in the first sentence hereof may not be issued to the third party.

Section 143 Order to transmit files

The court may direct the parties to the dispute to produce the files in their possession to the extent they consist of documents concerning the hearing on the matter and the decision by the court.

 Section 144 Visual evidence taken on site; experts

(1) The court may direct that visual evidence is to be taken on site, and may also direct that experts are to prepare a report. For this purpose, it may direct that a party to the proceedings or a third party produce an object in its possession, and may set a corresponding deadline therefor. The court may also direct that a party is to tolerate a measure taken under the first sentence hereof, unless this measure concerns a residence.

(2) Third parties are not under obligation to so produce objects or to tolerate a measure unless this can be reasonably expected of them, or to the extent they are entitled to refuse to testify pursuant to sections 383 to 385. Sections 386 to 390 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

(3) The proceedings shall be governed by the rules applying to visual evidence taken on site as ordered upon corresponding application having been made, or by those applying to the preparation of reports by experts as ordered by the court upon corresponding application having been made.

Section 377 Summons of a witness

(3) The court may instruct that the question regarding which evidence is to be taken may be answered in writing should it believe that, in light of the content of the question regarding which evidence is to be taken and taking into consideration the person of the witness, it suffices to proceed in this manner. The attention of the witness is to be drawn to the fact that he may be summoned to be examined as a witness. The court shall direct the witness to be summoned if it believes that this is necessary in order to further clear up the question regarding which evidence is to be taken.

Court Organisation Act

Section 184

The language of the court shall be German. The right of the Sorbs to speak Sorbian before the courts in the home districts of the Sorbian population shall be guaranteed.

 Section 185

(1) If persons are participating in the hearing who do not have a command of the German language, an interpreter shall be called in. No additional record shall be made in the foreign language; however, testimony and declarations given in the foreign language should also be included in the record or appended thereto in the foreign language if and to the extent that the judge deems this necessary in view of the importance of the case.(…)

(2) An interpreter may be dispensed with if all the persons involved have a command of the foreign language.

The House of Commons’ report on ‘negotiating priorities for the justice system’ reviews more than conflict of laws, indeed it is a tour d’horizon of most (if not all) issues relevant to Justice and Home Affairs in the EU. Martha Requejo makes a number of valid points on the report and indeed plenty of these, and others, have been made by a number of conflicts commentators: I will not review all here. There is a scholarly cottage industry on post-Brexit issues and the area of private international law is no exception.

The report mentions among others that a role for the CJEU in respect of essentially procedural legislation concerning jurisdiction, applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments, is a price worth paying to maintain the effective cross-border tools of justice discussed throughout our earlier recommendations. That is a very sensible approach, not just within the overall context of UK /continent judicial co-operation: it is also an obvious lifeline for London’s legal services market. Without proper integration into the EU’s civil procedure corpus, judgments from UK courts will immediately lose a lot of their appeal. The Government however have manoeuvred itself into a cul-de-sac by rejecting a role for the European Court of Justice post Brexit. The report’s call, and many with it, therefore is likely to fall upon deaf ears. Both for the UK and for EU conflicts rules, this will be a great loss. Few continental courts live up to the same standards as their UK counterparts when it comes to applying the intricate detail of conflict of laws, whether EU based or not.

Geert.

Il Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Roma Tre ospita una serie di incontri su temi di diritto internazionale privato.

Interverranno: Pietro Franzina (il 10 Aprile 2017, La tutela internazionale dell’adulto vulnerabile), Caroline Adolphsen (2 maggio 2017, Children seeking asylum in Europe: a Scandinavian approach), Francesco Salerno (2 maggio 2017, “Bruxelles I-bis” e titolo esecutivo europeo: l’efficacia delle decisioni straniere nelle discipline uniformi europee), Javier Carrascosa González (8 maggio 2017, Il nome nel diritto internazionale privato e Matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso e unioni registrate in Europa), Maria Asunción Cebrián Salvat (8 maggio 2017, Il regime patrimoniale nel matrimonio e nelle unioni registrate), Javier Carrascosa González e Maria Asunción Cebrián Salvat (9 maggio 2017, Il divorzio nel diritto dell’Unione europea: giurisdizione e legge applicabile e Il regolamento dell’Unione europea sulle successioni) e Francesca Pietrangeli (15 maggio 2017, La clausola di individuazione della legge applicabile al contratto).

Gli incontri si collocano nel quadro delle attività della Cattedra di Diritto internazionale della prof.ssa Antonietta Di Blase.

Maggiori informazioni nella locandina reperibile a questo indirizzo.

Since Wednesday it is official: The UK will leave the EU. What this means for judicial cooperation in cross-border matters has been the subject of an intense debate over the last months. The UK government, however, has thus far not indicated how it plans to proceed. A White Paper that was released yesterday now gives some basis for speculation:

• The UK will adopt a Great Repeal Bill that will convert the current body of EU law, notably directly applicable EU Regulations, into UK domestic law (para. 2.4).

• When applying the EU-derived body of law UK courts will be required to give “historic” CJEU decisions, i.e. decisions that the CJEU will render up until the day of Brexit, the same binding, or precendent status as decisions of the UK Supreme Court (para. 2.14).

• To the extent that EU law cannot simply be converted into domestic law, because it is based on reciprocity, the UK will seek to secure reciprocal arrangements as a part of the new relationship with the EU (para. 3.3).

Applied to conflict of laws this suggests that the UK will most likely convert the non-reciprocal regulations, notably the Rome I and the Rome II Regulations, into domestic law and apply them unilaterally. UK courts will then be required to follow and apply relevant CJEU decisions that have been and will be rendered up to the date of Brexit. As regards regulations that rest on the principle of reciprocity, notably the Brussels Ia Regulation but also the Service and Evidence Regulation, the UK will mostly seek to secure their continued reciprocal application.

Of course, this leaves a lot of questions open. What will, for example, happen to post-Brexit CJEU decisions relating to the Rome I and the Rome II Regulation? Will they have any meaning for UK courts? And what happens to the Brussels Ia Regulation if the UK and the EU do manage to reach agreenement on its continued reciprocal application?

So, stay tuned.

On Friday, 12 May 2017, Professor Sabine Corneloup and Alexandre Boiché will organize a symposium on the recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Paris. The following announcement has been kindly provided by Professor Corneloup:

“On June 30th 2016, the European Commission submitted a proposal for the revision of Regulation n° 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility. While the overall operation of the Regulation is considered to be satisfactory, the Regulation has shortcomings and lacks clarity on some points, in particular with regard to questions of parental responsibility. Problems encountered include excessive delays, caused by imprecisions in the Regulation on the length of proceedings, or by the necessity to obtain the exequatur. Cross-border recognition and enforcement of decisions are still too often hampered by divergent national practices, may it be the hearing of the child or the enforcement measures that may be taken. Furthermore, the role of the central authorities has not been defined with sufficient precision, possibly leading to dysfunctional cross-border cooperation, thus jeopardizing mutual trust between Member States and the protection of the fundamental rights of children. Regarding matrimonial matters, on the other hand, the Commission proposes the status quo: choice of court agreements are not among the innovations selected.
The symposium brings together experts from the academic and institutional worlds as well as from the bar, who share their experience in order to work together to reach solutions to the problems and shortcomings observed.”

The full programme is available here.

The event will take place at:

University Paris II, Panthéon-Assas
Centre Vaugirard 1
391 rue de Vaugirard
75015 Paris
France

The conference will be held in French.

For further information and registration, please contact Ms Laurence Tacquard:
+ 33 1 44 41 56 01
laurence.tacquard@u-paris2.fr

Closely linked to my post this morning re Chiquita and CSR, here’s a review of the French CSR corporate vigilance /duty of care Act. I had planned to do my own review but hey, why re-invent the wheel when Ms Bergkamp’s is ticking over nicely.
See also a follow up post here http://bit.ly/2ofirlK on the French Constitutional court seeing little issue with the civil liability side of the Act.

Corporate Finance Lab

On 21 February 2017, the French Parliament adopted a law (the “Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law” or “Law”) that creates novel corporate supply chain liability. Specifically, the Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law imposes a duty of vigilance on large companies to prevent serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and serious environmental damage in their supply chain. In a previous post, I discussed the concept of supply chain liability. As I pointed out there, the concept had not been defined by law makers yet. The French legislature has now attempted to operationalize the concept through new legislation.

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The title of this post is a result of my confusion on the state of various suits against Chiquita, on alleged collusion in or perpetration of human rights abuses in Columbia. I had reported earlier (scroll down to ‘update on linked development’; this hyperlinks to all relevant links) that the US Supreme Court had denied certiorari in a ruling of the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Miami. This left that ruling standing (a strict application of SCOTUS’ view in Kiobel).

End November (I had tweeted it at the time; my ledger has not left me an opportunity to post on it since) the Southern District court of Florida dismissed an application on forum non conveniens grounds in what must be related litigation. Except my limited knowledge of jurisdictional levels in the US leaves me in doubt where the link is between these two developments (US readers please assist if you can).

At any rate, the ruling reviewed here is a textbook example of forum non conveniens (motion dismissed, nota bene) and a great source for a comparative conflicts class. Such as I teach at Monash :-).

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.14.5.