Droit international général

Over the course of the last decades the European legislature has adopted a total of 18 Regulations in the area of private international law (including civil procedure). The resulting substantial degree of legislative unification has been described as the first true Europeanisation of private international law and even as a kind of “European Choice of Law Revolution”. However, until today it is largely unclear whether the far-reaching unification of the “law on the books” has turned private international law into a truly European ”law in action”: To what extent is European private international law actually based on uniform European rules common to all Member States rather than on state treaties or instruments of enhanced cooperation? Is the way academics and practitioners analyse and interpret European private international law really different from previously existing domestic approaches to private international law? Or is the actual application and interpretation of European private international law rather still influenced or even dominated by national legal traditions, leading to a re-fragmentation of a supposedly uniform body of law?

In order to discuss these (and other) questions Jürgen Basedow (Max Planck Institute Hamburg), Jan von Hein (University of Freiburg), Eva-Maria Kieninger (University of Würzburg) and Giesela Rühl (University of Jena) will be hosting a conference in Berlin on 2/3 March 2018.

Registration will open later this year (We’ll keep you posted!). Here is the Programme:

How “European” is European Private International Law?

Friday, 2 March 2018

9.00 am  Registration

9.30 am  Welcome addresses: The Europeanisation of Private International Law

• Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Jürgen Basedow, Max Planck Institute Hamburg (Germany)
• Prof. Dr. Giesela Rühl, University of Jena (Germany)
• Dr. Andreas Stein, Head of Unit, DG Justice and Consumers, European Commission

1st Part: Europeanness of Legal Sources

10.00 am   The relationship between EU and international Private International Law instruments

• Speaker: Prof. Pietro Franzina, Università degli Studi di Ferrara (Italy)
• Commentator: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Jürgen Basedow, Max Planck Institute Hamburg (Germany)

10.45 am   Discussion

11.15 am   Coffee break

11.45 am   The relationship between EU and Member State Private International Law

• Speaker: Prof. Johan Meeusen, Universiteit Antwerpen (Belgium)
• Commentator: Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein, University of Freiburg (Germany)

12.30 pm   Discussion

1.00 pm    Lunch break

2nd Part: Europeanness of Actual Court Practice

2.00 pm   The application of European Private International Law and the ascertainment of foreign law

• Speaker: Prof. Marta Requejo Isidro, Max Planck Institute Luxembourg (Luxembourg)
• Commentator Prof. Paul Beaumont, University of Aberdeen (United Kingdom)

2.45 pm   Discussion

3.15 pm   Coffee break

3.45 pm   The application of European Private International Law and the role of national judges

• Speaker: Prof. Agnieszka Frackowiak-Adamska, University Wroclaw (Poland)
• Commentator: Prof. Michael Hellner, Stockholms Universitet (Sweden)

4.30 pm   Discussion

5.00 pm   The application of European Private International Law and the role of national court systems

• Speaker: Prof. Xandra Kramer, Universiteit Rotterdam (Netherlands)
• Commentator: Prof. Pedro de Miguel Asensio, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain)

5.45 pm   Discussion

6.15 pm   End of day 1

8.00 pm   Conference dinner 

Saturday, 3 March 2018

3rd Part: Europeanness of Academic Discourse and Legal Education

8.30 am   National styles of academic discourse and their impact on European Private International Law

• Speaker: Prof. Sabine Corneloup, Université de Paris/Sorbonne (France)
• Commentator: Prof. Dário Moura Vicente, Universidade de Lisboa (Portugal)

9.15 am   Discussion

9.45 am   Coffee break

10.15 am   Overriding mandatory laws, public policy and European Private International Law

• Speaker: Prof. Marc-Philippe Weller, University of Heidelberg (Germany)
• Commentator: Prof. Stephanie Francq, Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgium)

11.00 am   Discussion

11.30 am   Legal education and European Private International Law

• Speaker: Prof. Thomas Kadner Graziano, Université de Genève (Switzerland)
• Commentator: Prof. Gilles Cuniberti, Université de Luxembourg (Luxembourg)

12.15 pm   Discussion

12.45 pm   Lunch break

2.00 pm   Panel discussion: The future of European Private International Law in theory and practice

• Opening statement: Karen Vandekerckhove, Former Head of Unit, DG Justice and Consumers, European Commission
• Discussants: Prof. Paul Beaumont, Prof. Gilles Cuniberti, Prof. Dr. Eva-Maria Kieninger Prof. Johan Meeusen, Prof. Marta Requejo Isidro

4.00 pm   Concluding remarks

• Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein, University of Freiburg (Germany)

4.15 pm  End of conference

The EUFam’s Project’s Consortium is glad to announce that a new Report is available for download and consultation on the Project website.

The Report on Internationally-Shared Good Practices, drafted by the EUFam’s Team of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, is based on the outcomes of the International Exchange Seminar that was held at the Institute on 11-12 May 2017.

Over 80 experts – judges, practitioners, academics, EU policymakers, and national civil servants – took part to the lively discussion by sharing their knowledge, experiences, and views on the application of the existing EU PIL Regulations in family matters in their daily practice.

This new Report further enriches the set of tools offered by the Project’s Consortium to the wider public, such as the National Case-Law Database, the Additional ECtHR Case-Law Index, the First Assessment Report on the Collected Case-Law, the Report on the Outcomes of an Online Questionnaire circulated in the past months, and several reports on national good practices.

Website: www.eufams.unimi.it

Facebook page: www.facebook.com/eufams

Readers of our blog will recall that we posted a translation of the new German choice-of-law rule for agency last week. That translation, however, was misleading because it referred to the law “applicable to a contract between principal and agent”, thus implying that the provision applies to the agency contract itself. The provision, however, is only meant to fill the gap left by Article 1(2) lit. g) of the Rome I Regulation. It is, therefore, limited to the agent’s authority (granted by contract). We thank an attentive reader for making this point and offer the following revised translation of the newly adopted Article 8 of the German Introductory Law to the German Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – BGB):

(1) An agent’s authority is governed by the law chosen by the principal before the agency is exercised, if the choice of law is known to both agent and third party. Principal, agent and third party are free to choose the applicable law at any time. The choice of law according to Sentence 2 of this Paragraph takes precedence over Sentence 1.

(2) In the absence of a choice under Paragraph 1 and if the agent acts in exercise of his commercial activity, a contract between principal and agent, is governed by the law of the country in which the agent has his habitual residence at the time he acted, unless this country is not identifiable by the third party.

(3) In the absence of a choice under Paragraph 1 and if the agent acts as employee of the principal, a contract between principal and agent is governed by the law of the country in which the principal has his habitual residence, unless this country is not identifiable by the third party.

(4) If the agent does not act in a way described by Paragraph 2 or 3 and in the absence of a choice under Paragraph 1, a permanent contract between principal and agent is governed by the law of the country, in which the agent usually exercises his powers, unless this country is not identifiable by the third party.

(5) If the applicable law does not result from Paragraph 1 through 4, a contract between principal and agent is governed by the law of the country in which the agent acts in exercise of his powers. If the third party and the agent must have been aware that the agency should only have been exercised in a particular country, the law of this country is applicable. If the country in which the agent acts in exercise of his powers is not identifiable by the third party, the law of the country in which the principal has his habitual residence at the time the agent exercises his powers, is applicable.

(6) The law applicable for agencies on the disposition of property or the rights on property is to be determined according to Article 43 Paragraph 1 and Article 46.

(7) This Article does not apply to agencies for exchange or auction.

(8) The habitual residence in accordance with this Article is to be determined in line with Article 19, Paragraph 1 and 2, first alternative of Regulation (EG) No. 593/2008, provided that the exercise of the agency replaces contract formation. Article 19, Paragraph 1 and 2, first alternative of Regulation (EG) No. 593/2008 does not apply, if the country according to that Article is not identifiable by the third party.

Authored by Alexandre Biard

To what extent can mandatory mediation procedures be compatible with consumers’ right to access to the judicial system? The preliminary ruling of the First Chamber of the CJEU delivered on 14 June 2017 (case C-75/16, Menini & Rampanelli v Banco Popolare – Società Cooperativa, and the associated Opinion of the Advocate General) brings interesting clarifications on this issue at a time where several Member States have – or are about to – introduce mandatory alternative dispute resolution procedures into their national legislations.

In 2015, two Italian individuals brought an appeal before the District Court of Verona (Tribunale Ordinario di Verona, hereafter “the referring court”) against an order for payment obtained against them by the credit institution Banco Popolare. The order required them to pay the amount of 991,848 EUR corresponding to the balance that remained outstanding under a contract signed between the parties in 2009. However, as the referring court noted, under Italian law (Legislative Decree 28/2010), an application to have an order set aside is admissible only if the parties have first initiated a mediation procedure. The referring court therefore requested clarifications on the interpretation of Directive 2013/11 (“ADR Directive”) and Directive 2008/52 (“Mediation Directive”), and on the compatibility of Italian legislation with EU law.

The Court used this opportunity to set down the criteria that mandatory mediation procedures should fulfil in order to be compatible with consumers’ right to judicial access in the EU (I). Furthermore, although the case does not bring a definitive answer on the articulation between the ADR Directive and the Mediation Directive, it nonetheless provides some clarifications on the hierarchy and relationship between those two directives (II).

(I) Admissibility Criteria for Mandatory Mediation Procedures in the EU

The referring court sought to clarify whether the mandatory mediation procedure imposed by Italian law is compatible with the provisions of the ADR Directive, whose Article 1 ambiguously provides that consumers can, on a “voluntary basis”, submit complaints against traders by using ADR procedures, but also indicates that this is “without prejudice to national legislation making participation in such procedures mandatory (…)”.

As the Court points out, “the voluntary” nature of ADR schemes does not lie in consumers’ freedom of access, but in the freedom of process. In other words, what is important is not that the parties can choose whether or not to use ADR, but the fact that they should be “themselves in charge of the process, and may organise it as they wish and terminate it at any time”. Put simply, “what is important is not whether the mediation system is mandatory or optional, but the fact that the parties’ right of access to the judicial system is maintained”. Therefore, the mere fact that a national legislation imposes a mandatory mediation procedure should not, as such, be regarded as being contrary to the provisions of the ADR Directive.

That said, the Court also acknowledges that mandatory mediation procedures introduce an additional layer of complexity for consumers. They may therefore ultimately prevent them from exercising their right to access to judicial bodies. While referring to and transposing the conditions set down by the Fourth Chamber of the CJEU in Alassini and Others (Case 317/08 to C-320/08 of 18 March 2010), which concerned a settlement procedure, the Court identifies six conditions for a mandatory mediation procedure to be compatible with the principle of effective judicial protection:

1. The mediation procedure should not result in a binding decision for the parties;
2. It should not cause substantial delays;
3. It should suspend the period for the time-barring of claims;
4. It should entail no (or very limited) costs;
5. Electronic means should not be the only means by which the procedure can be accessed; and
6. Interim measures should remain possible in exceptional circumstances.

It is up to the referring court to assess whether the mandatory procedure under consideration indeed complies with the criteria set above.

In parallel, national legislations should not include obligations deemed too burdensome for consumers. In particular:

• National legislation may not include an obligation for consumers to be assisted by a lawyer when they take part in a mediation procedure. This is in accordance with Article 8(b) and 9 of the ADR Directive; and
• Legislation should not authorize consumers to withdraw from a mediation procedure only under the condition that they can demonstrate valid reasons to do so. In accordance with Article 9(2) of the ADR Directive, such a withdrawal should remain possible at any time.

(II) Preliminary Clarifications on the Relationship Between the ADR Directive and the Mediation Directive

The referring court also sought to clarify the respective scopes of the Mediation Directive and the ADR Directive, as well as their articulation. In particular, the Italian court requested clarifications on whether the provisions of those two directives overlap, or if, on the contrary, the Mediation Directive only governs cases to which the ADR Directive does not apply.

The Court ultimately took the view that reference to the Mediation Directive was here not relevant as the Directive only applies to cross-border situations, which is not the case in the present situation (the litigants being all located in Italy). Although the Court did not address this issue, the conclusions of the Advocate General nonetheless provided some interesting food for thought. The latter indeed considered that, if a conflict between those two directives should arise, the Mediation Directive should, in his view, ultimately prevail. This is because Article 3(2) and Recital 19 of the ADR Directive clearly provide that the Directive “shall be without prejudice to Directive 2008/52/EC”.

This decision is an important step towards combining consumers’ effective access to judicial bodies on the one hand, and the use of mandatory alternative dispute resolution schemes on the other hand. The key issue is now to see how those criteria will be applied by national courts, and if they are likely to constitute sufficient safeguards to preserve consumers’ rights in the EU.

On Friday, 12 May 2017, Professor Sabine Corneloup and Alexandre Boiché organized a symposium on the recast of the Brussels IIbis Regulation in Paris (see our previous post here). The symposium brought together experts from the academic and institutional worlds as well as from the bar, who shared their experience in order to work together to reach solutions to the problems and shortcomings observed. The conference has been recorded on video; the clips are now available here.

The Private International Law Group at the School of Law of Carlos III University of Madrid organises an international congress on matrimonial property regimes and property consequences of registered partnerships.

The event will take place on 16 and 17 November 2017.

Young researchers are invited to send their papers in Spanish or English by 20 September 2017 to mjcastel@der-pr.uc3m.es.

Further information available here.

The Electronic CISG, edited by / a cura di Ingeborg Schwenzer, Lisa Spagnolo, Eleven International Publishing, 2017, ISBN 9789462367517, pp. 136, EUR 60.

In this book the authors engage with the interface between the rise of electronic communications and the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The contributors consider the opportunities, challenges and problems in adapting the CISG to deal with issues arising from the information age. In revisiting the CISG in light of technological advances that have changed the world since it was drafted, this book collects chapters dealing with the intersection between the CISG, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (MLEC), and the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts 2005 (e-CC). A detailed comparison of their respective provisions is provided in one, while the other gives an insight into the policies behind their development, including critical commentary and recommendations. In addition, it covers the inclusion of electronic standard terms pursuant to the CISG, the CISG’s effect on the domestic law of electronic transactions in the Middle East, on how communications by social media may become binding representations under the CISG, and whether it is time to update the CISG Advisory Council Opinion No.1.

Prof. Albert Henke (scientific coordinator) has set up a new website on European Civil Procedure. Its goal is to keep academics, professionals, students and all those involved in cross-border litigation in Europe updated about current trends and recent developments in legislation, case law and literature in this area, as well as to create an open educational resource and possibly promote scientific partnerships among Universities, Centres of Research and Institutions active in the field.

The website has been set up within the Jean Monnet Module on European Civil Procedure in a Comparative and Transnational Perspective, a teaching and research project funded by the EU and hosted by Università degli Studi in Milan.

The website is still under construction.

The ICSID award in case Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg SARL v. Kingdom of Spain, case number ARB/13/36, concluding that Spain had violated the Energy Charter Treaty, has been recognized on an ex parte petition by a New York court on June 27. Further information can be found here, edited by K. Duncan.

The award was issued on May 4 by an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes tribunal after it unanimously determined that Spain had violated its international obligations to the companies by upending a series of subsidies aimed at encouraging investment in the renewable energy sector, several years after the companies sunk more than €126 million into three solar plants. The award also includes additional interest.

The case is EISER Infrastructure Limited et al v. Kingdom of Spain, case number 1:17-cv-03808, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.  Spain is seeking annulment of the decision for violation of the FSIA (1976).

The Belgian Council of State (the highest administrative court) has annulled the Flemish waste agency’s export permit in the so-called ‘Slufter’ case, involving large quantities of toxic dredging spoil (for the aficionados: classified as EURAL 17 05 05*; ia with heavy doses of tributyltin – TBT) dredged from the port of Antwerp. The case made by applicants was that the waste would be disposed of in the port of Rotterdam’s ‘slufter’ by way of mere dumping, as opposed to processing ‘at home’ in the Flemish region.

At issue was Article 11 of the Waste shipments Regulation 1013/2006, which allows Member States of export to object to planned shipments of waste destined for disposal. Applicants’ case was that the Flemish waste agency – OVAM should have disallowed the shipment on the basis of the proximity and the self-sufficiency principles. OVAM however pointed out that even if in optimal circumstances, processing in Flanders could lead to higher rates of recovery of the waste, much of it would still simply have to be landfilled. Importantly, it preferred disposal in the Slufter on the basis that the logistics chain was much shorter: load up, transport, dump. As opposed to load up, transport to processing facility for partial recovery (involving three separate processes); load-up of the solid waste left; transport and dump.

The Council of State ruled at the end of May that this decision by OVAM, in particular the reliance of the extent of the logistics chain, lacks proper assessment of the Best Available Technologies for dredging spoil, hence leading to insufficient assessment of the proximity and self-sufficiency principles. The ruling is relevant also with a view to the remainder of the spoil that will continue to be dredged.

For easy of reference (for those wishing to locate copy of the ruling): case numbers are 238220 -238224 included).

Geert.

The Institute for Private International and Comparative Law, University of Cologne, Germany invites applications for a Ph.D. Candidate and Fellow with excellent English language skills, starting at the earliest possible date with 19,92 weekly working hours (50% position). The contract will first be limited to one year with an option to be extended. Payment is based on the German TV-L E13 scale if terms and conditions under collective bargaining law are fulfilled. You may find further details here: job-vacancy-institute-for-private-international-and-comparative-law.

Jean-Sylvestre Bergé, Genevieve Helleringer, Operating Law in a Global Context – Comparing, Combining and Prioritising, Edward Elgar, 2017, pp. 256, ISBN 9781785367328, GBP 80

Lawyers have to adapt their reasoning to the increasingly global nature of the situations they deal with. Often, rules formulated in a national, international or European environment must all be jointly applied to a given case. This book seeks to make explicit the analysis the lawyer engages in every time he or she is confronted by the operation of several laws in different contexts. This reasoning is organised according to a basic three-step approach, consisting of the comparison (Part 1), combination (Part 2) and, finally, ordering or ‘prioritization’ (Part 3) of the methods and solutions of national, international and European law to be used to solve the case. The book conveys in detail how the law is operated through a wide range of concrete examples cutting across domains including criminal law, contract law, fundamental rights, internal market, international trade and procedure. This book focuses on the needs of a global lawyer who must reach conclusions in a pluralistic context. Illustrations from the domestic case law of the UK, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, France and the US are used to demonstrate how lawyers can combine different contexts to improve their legal reasoning. Operating Law in a Global Context will appeal to lawyers in these jurisdictions and beyond, as well as to students training to practice in a global environment.

A website has recently been launched in the framework of the EU-funded Jean Monnet Module on European Civil Procedure in a Comparative and Transnational Perspective taught by Professor Albert Henke at the University of Milan. Its purpose is “to keep academics, professionals, students and all those involved in cross-border litigation in Europe updated about current trends and recent developments in legislation, case law and literature in this area, as well as to create an open educational resource”. The website is called European Civil Procedure, and can be found here. 

È da qualche tempo accessibile on-line un sito web realizzato nell’ambito del modulo Jean Monnet su European Civil Procedure in a Comparative and Transnational Perspective di cui è titolare, all’Università Statale di Milano, il prof. Albert Henke. Il sito si rivolge a quanti si occupano di diritto processuale civile internazionale da studiosi, professionisti e studenti, e si propone di fornire aggiornamenti sugli sviluppi normativi, giurisprudenziali e di dottrina in questa materia, oltre che fungere da risorsa formativa aperta. Il sito si chiama European Civil Procedure e si trova a questo indirizzo.

Thank you to both Patrick Wauthelet and Arie van Hoe for forwarding a copy of the judgment of the Brussels commercial court in Parfip. Please pop me an e-mail should you like a copy. The judgment is textbook application of CJEU precedent, including of course Eurofood and Interedil. Fully respecting the presumption of individual COMI in the case of a group of companies, the judgment refers to ia German and French precedent in rebuking the presumption. Not only were the companies effectively run from Brussels, notwithstanding non-Belgian seat for some of them; to third parties it was also clear that this was the case.

The judgment also confirms a narrow interpretation of the exception for ‘credit institutions’.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.6.1.2.Heading 5.6.1.2.4.

Aarhus, Access to Environmental Information Directive. Review of Henney [2017] EWCA Civ 844 .

UK Human Rights Blog

Department for Business, Energy and Industry Strategy v. Information Commissioner and Henney [2017] EWCA Civ 844 , 29 June 2017 – read judgment

As many will know, there are two different systems of freedom of information, the first and better known, the Freedom for Information Act 2000, and the second, the Environmental Information Regulations 2009. From the perspective of the inquirer (Mr Henney, here), the EIRs are the more favourable, and it was the differences between the systems which gave rise to this long-running dispute to do with energy Smart Meters.

The appeal went in favour of Mr Henney, and the Information Commissioner who had ruled in his favour. But the ultimate case is not resolved, as I shall explain.

View original post 1,171 more words

On June 11 the German legislature has adopted a new choice of law rule for the law of agency. The new Article 8 of the German Introductory Law to the German Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – EGBGB) reads as follows (private translation):

(1) A contract between principal and agent shall be governed by the law chosen by the principal before the agency is exercised, if the choice of law is known to both agent and third party. Principal, agent and third party are free to choose the applicable law at any time. The choice of law according to Sentence 2 of this paragraph takes precedence over Sentence 1.

(2) In the absence of a choice under Paragraph 1 and if the agent acts in exercise of his commercial activity, a contract between principal and agent, shall be governed by the law of the country in which the agent has his habitual residence at the time he acted, unless this country is not identifiable by the third party.

(3) In the absence of a choice under Paragraph 1 and if the agent acts as employee of the principal, a contract between principal and agent shall be governed by the law of the country in which the principal has his habitual residence, unless this country is not identifiable by the third party.

(4) If the agent does not act in a way described by paragraph 2 or 3 and in the absence of a choice under Paragraph 1, a permanent contract between principal and agent shall be governed by the law of the country, in which the agent usually exercises his powers, unless this country is not identifiable by the third party.

(5) If the applicable law does not result from paragraph 1 through 4, a contract between principal and agent shall be governed by the law of the country in which the agent acts in exercise of his powers. If the third party and the agent must have been aware that the agency should only have been exercised in a particular country, the law of this country is applicable. If the country in which the agent acts in exercise of his powers is not identifiable by the third party, the law of the country in which the principal has his habitual residence at the time the agent exercises his powers, is applicable.

(6) The law applicable for agencies on the disposition of property or the rights on property is to be determined according to Article 43 Paragraph 1 and Article 46.

(7) This Article does not apply to agencies for exchange or auction.

(8) The habitual residence in accordance with this Article is to be determine in line with Article 19, paragraph 1 and 2, first alterative of Regulation (EG) No. 593/2008, provided that the exercise of the agency replaces contract formation. Article 19, paragraph 1 and 2, first alterative of Regulation (EG) No. 593/2008 does not apply, if the country according to that Article is not identifiable by the third party.

The original German version is available here.

The European Commission Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the United Kingdom under Article 50 TEU has submitted a Position Paper on Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters on 28 June 2017.  It claims to contain the main principles of the EU position in this regard. A closer look, however, reveals that it only deals with the temporal application of the relevant EU instruments, notably the Brussels Ia Regulation, the Rome I Regulation and the Rome II Regulation. It suggests that all EU instruments should continue to apply to all choices of forum and choices of law made prior the withdrawal date and that judicial cooperation procedures that are ongoing on the withdrawal date should continue to be governed by the relevant provisions of Union law applicable on the withdrawal date.

The Position Paper is available here.

Yesterday in Case C-436/16 Leventis the Court of Justice summarily confirmed the principle of privity of choice of court under the Brussels I Recast. I have looked at this issue before e.g. when I discussed Refcomp and Profit Sim. The tos and fros between the various parties in the case meant they were acquainted with each other in the courtroom and in arbitration panels. It also meant that actions, settlements etc. between one of them and a third party necessarily impacted commercially on the other.

However the Court of Justice essentially held that such a close, voluntary or not, relationship between the two parties does not mean that a jurisdiction clause in a contract between two companies can be relied upon by the representatives of one of them to dispute the jurisdiction of a court over an action for damages which aims to render them jointly and severally liable for supposedly tortious acts carried out in the performance of their duties. The Court simply noted that the referring national court had given no indication of choice of court made between the parties as to the latter issue, employing the classic (now) Article 25 set of criteria.

Of note is that unlike other cases such as Goldman Sachs v Novo Banco, there did not seem to be any kind of theory in relevant national law which would have led to imputability (or potential to call upon) choice of court to a third party under the given circumstances.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9.7.

On 8 June 2017 the CJEU has rendered another opinion regarding the interpretation of the concept of ‘habitual residence’ of the child under the Brussels II bis Regulation.

The facts of the case, C-111/17 PPU, indicate that OL, an Italian national, and PQ, a Greek national, married in Italy in 2013 and that they resided together in Italy. When PQ was eight months pregnant, the couple travelled together to Greece so that PQ could give birth there. On 3 February 2016 PQ gave birth, in Greece, to a daughter, who has remained since her birth in that Member State with her mother. After the birth of the child, OL returned to Italy. According to OL, he had agreed that PQ should stay in Greece with their child until May 2016, when he expected his wife and child to return to Italy. However, in June 2016 PQ decided to remain in Greece, with the child. OL brought an application before the Monomeles Protodikeio Athinon (Court of First Instance of Athens, Greece), for the return of that child to Italy, the Member State where the child’s parents resided together before the birth of the child.

Having emphasised the importance of the primary caretaker’s situation for determining the child’s habitual residence, the CJEU stresses that it is nevertheless important to bear in mind that linking the child’s habitual residence to that of his primary caretakers should not result ‘in making a general and abstract rule according to which the habitual residence of an infant is necessarily that of his parents’. To adopt the position suggested by the father in OL v PQ, that the intention originally expressed by the parents as to the return of the mother accompanied by the child from Greece to Italy, which was the MS of their habitual residence before the birth of the child, constitutes an preponderant element in determining the child’s habitual residence would go beyond the limits of that concept. Allowing the initial intention of the parents that the child resides in Italy prevails over the fact that she or he has been continuously resident in Greece since her or his birth would render the concept of ‘habitual residence’ essentially legal rather than fact-based.

The CJEU rules that Article 11(1) of the Brussels II bis Regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation in which a child was born and has been continuously residing with his or her mother for several months in accordance with the joint agreement of the parents in a Greece, while in Italy they had their habitual residence before birth, the initial intention of the parents as to the return of the mother accompanied by the child in Italy cannot allow the child to be regarded as having his or her habitual residence in Italy. The CJEU concludes that in such a situation the refusal of the mother to return to Italy accompanied by the child cannot be regarded as an ‘unlawful displacement or non-return’ within the meaning of Article 11(1).

This case seems to resolve the dilemma, dividing national courts, as to whether the physical presence of the child in the territory of a state is a necessary precondition for establishing the child’s habitual residence.

The second issue of 2017 of the Dutch Journal on Private international Law, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, includes papers on the Commission’s proposal to amend the Posting of Workers Directive,  the establishment of the Netherlands Commercial Court and the enforcement of foreign judgments in Nigeria.

Aukje van Hoek, ‘Editorial: Online shopping en detachering van werknemers – twee hoofdpijndossier op de grens van IPR en interne markt’, p. 175-177.

Fieke van Overbeeke, ‘The Commission’s proposal to amend the Posting of Workers Directive and private international law implications’, p. 178-194.

This article discusses the Commission’s proposal to amend the Posting of Workers Directive (PWD), launched on 8 March 2016. One amendment in particular will be highlighted: the insertion of a type of conflict-of-laws rule, determining from when the law of the host Member State would be fully applicable to the posted worker, namely after the posting lasted for two years. This would lead to a pre-determined qualification of Article 8 section 2 Rome I Regulation in posting of workers cases that are covered by the PWD. This has clear private international law implications, which will be discussed thoroughly. Yet, before entering into these aspects the interaction between the PWD and Rome I will be discussed. Uncertainty still exists on this matter, which makes it important to map this first. This results in an article divided into two parts: 1. Elaborating on the general conflict-of-law rules of the PWD and Rome I and their interaction; 2. Analysing the Commission’s proposal from a private international law point of view by giving three private international law comments, some final remarks and assessing whether this proposal has implications for the formerly discussed interaction between the two conflict-of-law instruments.

Serge Vlaar, ‘IPR-aspecten van het NCC-wetsvoorstel’, p. 195-204. (in Dutch, the English abstract reads:)

For the last twenty years, London has already had an international commercial court and this court has been very successful in attracting cases from the European continent. In order to reduce this outflow various European countries have created international commercial courts of their own and the Netherlands is on the verge of doing so. This new court will be a court for large international cases, conducting proceedings in English. The draft law necessary for the functioning of this court has been published for consultation and includes a few interesting topics regarding private international law. This contribution intends to describe these topics and the new court in general.

Abubakri Yekini, ‘Foreign judgments in Nigerian courts in the last decade: a dawn of liberalization’, p. 205-403

Nigeria has largely been governed by military dictators since it gained independence from Great Britain in 1960. Sustained democratic transition is a recent phenomenon and that, possibly, account for the recent increase in foreign direct investment, international trade and trade in services between Nigeria and its trading partners such as the European Union, China and the US. The surge in international trade has caused an increase in transnational litigation and requests for the enforcement of foreign judgments in Nigeria. An assessment of reported cases reveals that the majority of these cases were decided roughly between 2005 and 2015. There is a need to evaluate the Nigerian regime for enforcement of foreign judgments, with a particular focus on judicial opinions and legislative policy in this area. The article seeks to achieve this by analyzing the two relevant statutes on judgment enforcement and judicial precedents over the last decade. The article finds that while reciprocity appears to be the policy behind the relevant statutes, the courts have adopted a liberal and pragmatic approach towards recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The article therefore concludes that while the liberal approach of the Nigerian Supreme Court is a welcome development, it needs to be supported by clear, consistent, and robust judicial reasoning. This will set a clear agenda for lawmakers tasked with aligning the relevant statutes with already established judicial approach and, above all, will make it easier to offer legal advice to foreign investors.