Droit international général

After the Christmas break the Court of Justice takes up again its public activity. Regarding judicial cooperation on civil matters, the first event in January 2022 is the hearing in case C-18/21, Uniqa Versicherungen, scheduled for Wednesday 19.

The request for a preliminary ruling comes from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria). It focuses on the impact of COVID-19 on procedural periods in civil proceedings in the context of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 creating a European order for payment procedure (here the consolidated text).

In the case at hand, the District Court for Commercial Matters of Vienna had issued a European order for payment on 6 March 2020, which was served on the defendant, a resident in the Federal Republic of Germany, on 4 April 2020. The latter lodged a statement of opposition thereto in a written submission posted on 18 May 2020. The court of first instance rejected the opposition on the ground that the objection had not been filed within the 30-day period foreseen in Article 16(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006.

The Commercial Court of Vienna, ruling on the appeal on the merits, set that order aside holding that the period for lodging a statement of opposition under Article 16(2) had been interrupted pursuant to the Federal Law on accompanying measures for COVID-19 in the administration of justice. According to that law, all procedural periods in judicial proceedings that had started to run on 22 March 2020 or thereafter, up until the end of 30 April 2020, are to be interrupted and are to begin to run anew on 1 May 2020. The applicant’s appeal on a point of law is directed against that decision, and seeks to have the order of the court of first instance restored.

The Austrian Supreme Court has referred the following question to the Court of justice:

Are Articles 20 and 26 of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure to be interpreted as meaning that those provisions preclude an interruption of the 30-day period for lodging a statement of opposition to a European order for payment, as provided for in Article 16(2) of that regulation, by Paragraph 1(1) of the Austrian Bundesgesetz betreffend Begleitmaßnahmen zu COVID-19 in der Justiz (Federal Law on accompanying measures for COVID-19 in the administration of justice), pursuant to which all procedural periods in proceedings in civil cases for which the event triggering the period occurs after 21 March 2020 or which have not yet expired by that date are to be interrupted until the end of 30 April 2020 and are to begin to run anew from 1 May 2020?

K. Jürimäe is the reporting judge in a chamber composed, in addition, by N. Jääskinen, M. Safjan, N. Piçarra and M. Gavalec. Advocate General A. Collins will announce the date of his opinion after the hearing. For the record: the Court has interpreted Articles 16, 20 and 26 of the Regulation already several times, see case C-324/12, joined cases C‑119/13 and C‑120/13, C-94/14, C-245/14, C-21/17.

Advocate General Szpunar‘s Opinion in case C-617/20, T.N. and N.N., will be published the next day (that is, on Thursday 20). The questions have been referred by the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht in Bremen (Germany), in the context of an intestate succession, and relate to the interpretation of Articles 13 and 28 of the EU Succession Regulation:

(1) Does a declaration concerning the waiver of succession by an heir before the court of a Member State that has jurisdiction for the place of his or her habitual residence, which complies with the formal requirements applicable there, replace the declaration concerning the waiver of succession to be made before the court of another Member State that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession, in such a way that when that declaration is made, it is deemed to have been validly made (substitution)?

(2) If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative:

In addition to making a declaration before the court that has jurisdiction for the place of habitual residence of the party waiving succession which complies with all formal requirements, is it necessary, in order for the declaration concerning the waiver of succession to be valid, that the latter inform the court that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession that the declaration concerning the waiver of succession has been made?

(3) If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative and Question 2 in the affirmative:

a. Is it necessary that the court that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession be addressed in the official language of the location of that court in order for the declaration concerning the waiver of succession to be valid and, in particular, in order to comply with the time limits applicable for making such declarations before that court?

b. Is it necessary that the court that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession receive the original documents drawn up in relation to the waiver by the court that has jurisdiction for the place of habitual residence of the party waiving succession and a translation thereof in order for the declaration concerning the waiver of succession to be valid and, in particular, in order to comply with the time limits applicable for making such declarations before the court that has jurisdiction to rule on the succession?

The judgment will be handed down by judges E. Regan, I. Jarukaitis, M. Ilešič (reporting), D. Gratsias, and Z. Csehi.

Finally, another hearing of interest will be taking place at the very end of the month, on Monday 31. C-700/20, London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association, is a Grand Chamber case (K. Lenaerts, L. Bay Larsen, K. Jürimäe, C. Lycourgos, E. Regan, I. Jarukaitis, N. Jääskinen, M. Ilešič, J.C. Bonichot, A. Kumin, L. Arastey Sahún, M. Gavalec, Z. Csehi, O. Spineau-Matei, and M. Safjan as reporting judge), to be decided with the benefit of Advocate General A. Collin’s opinion. The request, from the High Court – Business and Property Courts of England and Wales Commercial Court, was lodged on 22 December 2020. The questions referred arose in the context of an appeal by The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Limited (the “Club”), pursuant to Article 43 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, against a registration order made by the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales pursuant to Article 33 of the same regulation. The registered judgment that is the subject of the registration order is an auto de ejecución (execution order) of the Provincial Court of La Coruña, Spain, delivered following the proceedings related to the sinking of the Prestige (the “Vessel”) at the coast of Spain in November 2002. The Vessel was carrying 70,000 MT of fuel oil at the time she sank causing significant pollution damage to the Spanish and French coastlines. The execution order declares the Club liable in respect of 265 claimants, including the Kingdom of Spain in the sum of € 2.355 billion. Spain applied to register the Spanish judgment against the Club in England. The Club was the Protection & Indemnity (“P&I”) insurer of the Vessel and its owners (the “Owners”) at the time the Vessel sank, pursuant to a contract of insurance where an arbitration clause was included.

The background of the dispute can be summarized as follows:

In late 2002, criminal proceedings relating to the loss of the Vessel were commenced in Spain; civil claims were brought in those proceeding. On 13 November 2013, the Provincial Court of La Coruña handed down a judgment which was confirmed after first and second appeals. On 15 November 2017, the Provincial Court delivered a judgment on quantum concluding that the Club (and others) was liable to over 200 separate parties, including the Kingdom of Spain, in sums in excess of € 1.6 billion as a result of the casualty, subject in the case of the Club to the global US$ 1 billion limit of liability. On 1 March 2019, the Provincial Court issued an execution order (the Spanish judgment referred to above) setting out the amounts that each of the claimants were entitled to enforce against the respective defendants.

In January 2012, the Club had commenced London arbitration proceedings seeking declarations that, pursuant to the arbitration agreement in the contract of insurance, Spain was bound to pursue its claims under Article 117 of the Spanish Penal Code in London arbitration. The arbitral tribunal found that, as a matter of English law, although Spain was not a contractual party to the arbitration agreement in the Contract of Insurance, according to English equitable principles Spain could not be a “beneficiary” of the Owners’ contractual rights without respecting the “burden” of the arbitration agreement. The award declared as well that the Club was not liable to Spain.

In March 2013, the Club applied to the Commercial Court of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales for “leave” (permission) to enforce the Award in the jurisdiction. The application was granted on October 2013.

On 25 March 2019, Spain applied to the High Court of Justice in England and Wales for the registration of the Spanish judgment as a judgment of the High Court pursuant to Article 33 of Regulation Brussels I. The application was successful. One month later the Club lodged an appeal under Article 43 of Regulation No. 44/2001 against the Registration Order based on Article 34(3) and Article 34(4) of the same instrument.

In this context, the High Court is referring the following questions to the Court of Justice:

(1) Given the nature of the issues which the national court is required to determine in deciding whether to enter judgment in the terms of an award under Section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, is a judgment granted pursuant to that provision capable of constituting a relevant “judgment” of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of EC Regulation No 44/2001?

(2) Given that a judgment entered in the terms of an award, such as a judgment under Section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, is a judgment falling outside the material scope of Regulation No 44/2001 by reason of the Article l(2)(d) arbitration exception, is such a judgment capable of constituting a relevant “judgment” of the Member State in which recognition is sought for the purposes of Article 34(3) of the Regulation?

(3) On the hypothesis that Article 34(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 does not apply, if recognition and enforcement of a judgment of another Member State would be contrary to domestic public policy on the grounds that it would violate the principle of res judicata by reason of a prior domestic arbitration award or a prior judgment entered in the terms of the award granted by the court of the Member State in which recognition is sought, is it permissible to rely on Article 34(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 as a ground of refusing recognition or enforcement or do Articles 34(3) and (4) of the Regulation provide the exhaustive grounds by which res judicata and/or irreconcilability can prevent recognition and enforcement of a Regulation judgment?

Max Planck Institute  invites you on Tuesday, 4 January 2022 at 11 am (CET) to a virtual workshop in our series “Current Research in Private International Law”.

 

Zheng Sophia Tang (Wuhan University) will be speaking on “Smart Court in Cross-Border Litigation”. 

 

About the speaker:

Zheng (Sophia) Tang is a professor at the Wuhan University Institute of International Law, an Associate Dean at the Wuhan University Academy of International Law and Global Governance (China Top Thinktank). She is a barrister, an arbitrator and a mediator. 

 

About the topic:

Smart courts integrate modern technology in the court proceedings to improve the efficiency of trial. It can particularly benefit cross-border litigation, which is remarked by the cost and inconvenience for a party to take part in proceedings abroad. However, the current construction of smart courts primarily focuses on domestic trials and leaves the cross-border litigation behind. Although technology can improve procedural efficiency, legal obstacles in cross-border litigation make the efficiency impossible to achieve. Identity verification, service of proceedings, evidence and hearing are four examples demonstrating how the current law, especially the old-fashioned concept of sovereignty, hampers the functioning of smart courts in cross-border litigation. In order to fully embrace the benefit of smart courts, the concept of judicial sovereignty needs to be reconceptualised in the age of technology.

 

About the virtual workshop series:

The virtual workshop series “Current Research in Private International Law” is organised by Prof. Dr. Ralf Michaels and Michael Cremer. The series features guest speakers and Institute staff members who present and discuss their work on current developments and research topics in private international law. The workshops are geared to scholars who are researching in the field of private international law, but attendance is open to all individuals having an academic interest (including doctoral candidates and students).

 

The virtual workshop will be held as a video conference via Zoom. After having registered no later than 3 January 2022 using this LINK you will receive the login details on Monday afternoon. Please confirm upon registration that you agree to the use of Zoom and that you will not record the event. By attending the event you confirm that you have read and agreed to Zoom’s Terms of Service and Privacy Policy. You will find them here and here.

Meetings & Events

On 1 December 2021, the HCCH hosted HCCH a|Bridged – Edition 2021, an online event focused on contemporary issues relating to the application of the HCCH 2005 Choice of Court Convention, including the promotion of party autonomy. More information is available here.

On 6 and 7 December 2021, the HCCH Administrative Cooperation Working Group on the 2007 Child Support Convention met via videoconference. The Group continued its work as a forum for discussion of issues pertaining to administrative cooperation, discussing in particular the collection of statistics under the Convention. More information is available here.

On 10 December 2021, the HCCH hosted a virtual seminar on the HCCH 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention for the Supreme Court of Ukraine. This was the third of a series of seminars, organised with the generous support of the EU Project Pravo-Justice, aimed at facilitating the proper and effective implementation of the HCCH Conventions and instruments in Ukraine.

Publications and Documentation

On 9 December 2021, the Permanent Bureau announced the publication of translations, in Arabic, Chinese, Russian and Spanish, of the Legal Guide to Uniform Instruments in the Area of International Commercial Contracts, with a Focus on Sales. With these new translations, the Legal Guide is now available in all UN languages. More information is available here.

On 14 December 2021, the Permanent Bureau announced the publication of 21 new translations of the Guide to Good Practice on the Use of Video-Link under the Evidence Convention. With these new translations, the Guide to Good Practice is now available in 23 European Union languages. More information is available here.

Vacancies

Applications are now open for the 2022 Peter Nygh Hague Conference Internship. The deadline for the submission of applications is 30 January 2022. More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

 

It’s been another busy year for the EAPIL blog. The 310 posts we have published in 2021 have attracted about 180.000 visits and some 190 comments.

Interactions on social media have been on the rise, too. We witnessed an increase in the number of followers on LinkedIn (they are more than 900 now), and in the intensity of their reactions. Meanwhile, the number of those following our Twitter account (@eapilorg) has reached 400: we are glad to see that our tweets are often retweeted and quote tweeted. Thank you!

Unsurprisingly, the impact of Brexit on existing instruments in the field of private international law ranked among the key topics of the year. Actually, one post of out ten, among those published in 2021 on the EAPIL blog, referred to Brexit in one way or another.

The case law of the Court of Justice relating to judicial cooperation in civil matters also attracted a consistent flow of visits, and so did Marta Requejo’s monthly posts on the upcoming Court’s judgments and the scheduled conclusions of the AGs.

The developments in domestic case law also proved to be of particular interest to our readers. Gilles Cuniberti’s post on a ruling of the French Supreme Court redefining territoriality of enforcement was the single most commented post of the year, with Gilles’ later post on the judgment of the UK Supreme Court in FS Cairo v Brownlie, on tort jurisdiction, ranking second in terms of comments.

Here are the blog’s five posts of the year, based on the number of visits received:

1. Brexit and the Brussels Convention: It’s All Over Now, Baby Blue? by Matthias Lehmann, published on 12 February 2021, part of an on-line symposium on the Fate of the 1968 Brussels Convention which attracted contributions from a number of scholars, including guest posts by Andrew Dickinson, Serena Forlati and Alex Layton
2. French Parliament Adopts Mandatory Law to Enforce Reserved Share in Succession Matters, a guest post by Christelle Chalas, published on 17 August 2021
3. Swiss Court Refuses Post-Brexit Application of the Lugano Convention – Even Good Cases Can Make Bad (Case) Law, a guest post by Rodrigo Rodriguez, published on 10 March 2021
4. Is the 2005 Hague Choice-of-Court Convention Really a Threat to Justice and Fair Play? A Reply to Gary Born, a guest post by Trevor Hartley, published on 30 June 2021
5. The Principle of Mutual Trust in EU law in the Face of a Crisis of Values, a guest post by Cecilia Rizcallah, published on 22 February 2021

The above ranking tells one thing the editors are well aware of: guest posts represent a crucial contribution to this blog.

So, here’s a message to both old and new guest bloggers out there: your submissions are welcome in 2022 as they have been in the past year. So don’t hesitate to get in touch with us: we are eager to read you!

With this post, the EAPIL blog takes a short Winter break. Blogging will resume on 3 January 2022.

All the best for the new year!

On 20 December 2021, the Supreme Court of the UK delivered its judgment in Maduro Board of the Central Bank of Venezuela v Guaidó Board of the Central Bank of Venezuela ([2021] UKSC 57).

The case was concerned with the conflicting instructions over reserves held in England issued by the boards of the Central Bank of Venezuela appointed respectively by Mr Maduro, who was reelected president of Venezuela in 2018, and by Mr Guaido, who is the president of the National Assembly of the country and claims to be its interim president because the 2018 elections were flawed.

The Supreme Court had to decide whether the UK Government has recognised Interim President Guaido as Head of State of Venezuela and, if so, whether any challenge to the validity of Mr Guaido’s appointments to the Board of the Central Bank of Venezuela is justiciable in an English court.

From the Press Summary issued by the Court:

Background

In May 2018, a Presidential election took place in Venezuela, which the incumbent, Mr Nicolás Maduro Moros, claimed to have won. Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom (“HMG”) considered that this election was deeply flawed. On 15 January 2019, the Venezuelan National Assembly announced that Mr Juan Gerardo Guaidó Márquez was the interim President of Venezuela. On 4 February 2019, the then UK Foreign Secretary declared that the United Kingdom recognises Mr Guaidó “as the constitutional interim President of Venezuela, until credible presidential elections can be held”. That statement was reiterated by HMG in a subsequent letter and in statements made to the Court on behalf of the Foreign Secretary in these proceedings.

The Maduro Board and the Guaidó Board both claim to act on behalf of the Central Bank of Venezuela (the “BCV”). The Maduro Board claims to have been appointed to represent the BCV by Mr Maduro as President of Venezuela. The Guaidó Board claims to be an ad hoc board of the BCV, appointed by Mr Guaidó as interim President of Venezuela under a ‘transition statute’ passed by the Venezuelan National Assembly. The Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice (the “STJ”) has issued several judgments holding that the transition statute is null and void. The Maduro Board and the Guaidó Board both claim to be exclusively authorised to act on behalf of the BCV, including in arbitration proceedings in the London Court of International Arbitration and in respect of gold reserves of about US$1.95 billion held by the Bank of England for the BCV. The central issue in this appeal is which of these two parties is entitled to give instructions on behalf of the BCV.

The Commercial Court ordered a trial of two preliminary issues. The first (the “recognition issue”) is whether HMG recognises Mr Maduro or Mr Guaidó and, if so, in what capacity and on what basis. The second (the “act of state issue”) is whether courts in this jurisdiction may consider the validity under Venezuelan law of (among other things) the appointments to the BCV board made by Mr Guaidó and the transition statute passed by the Venezuelan National Assembly.

At first instance, Teare J held, in respect of the recognition issue, that HMG had conclusively recognised Mr Guaidó as Venezuela’s head of state. The judge further held that the validity of the transition statute and the appointments of Mr Guaidó engaged the act of state doctrine and were thus non–justiciable. The Maduro Board appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal on both issues. On the recognition issue, the Court of Appeal considered that HMG had recognised Mr Guaidó as the person entitled to be head of state (de jure) but had left open the possibility that it impliedly recognised Mr Maduro as in fact exercising some or all of the powers of head of state (de facto). It considered that this issue was best determined by posing further questions of the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office and remitted the matter to the Commercial Court for this purpose. The Court of Appeal held that the act of state issue could not be answered at that stage without considering both whether HMG recognises Mr Guaidó as Venezuela’s head of state for all purposes and whether the STJ judgments should be recognised by courts in this jurisdiction.

Judgment The Recognition Issue

Under the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements, the recognition of foreign states, governments and heads of states is a matter for the executive [64]. Courts in this jurisdiction thus accept statements made by the executive as conclusive as to whether an individual is to be regarded as a head of state [69], [79]. This rule is called the ‘one voice principle’. Its rationale is that certain matters are peculiarly within the executive’s cognisance [78]. Historically, courts have drawn a distinction between the recognition of a government de jure and de facto [83]-[85]. This distinction is now unlikely to have any useful role to play before courts in this jurisdiction [99].

HMG’s statement was a clear and unequivocal recognition of Mr Guaidó as President of Venezuela, which necessarily entailed that Mr Maduro was not recognised as the President of Venezuela [92]. Under the one voice principle, it is therefore unnecessary to look beyond the terms of HMG’s statement [93]. No question of implied recognition thus arises, and the Court of Appeal was wrong to think it did [98]. The Court of Appeal’s reliance on the outdated concepts of de jure and de facto recognition was also misplaced [99]. The question of recognition in this case has also been unnecessarily complicated by the distinction between whom HMG recognises as Venezuela’s head of state and whom it recognises as head of government [106]. The relevant matter in these proceedings is the identity of Venezuela’s head of state, not its head of government [109].

It follows that courts in this jurisdiction are bound to accept HMG’s statements which establish that Mr Guaidó is recognised by HMG as the constitutional interim President of Venezuela and that Mr Maduro is not recognised by HMG as President of Venezuela for any purpose [110], [181(1)].

The Act of State Issue

There are two aspects of the act of state doctrine with which this appeal is concerned. The first (“Rule 1”) is that the courts of this country will recognise and will not question the effect of a foreign state’s legislation or other laws in relation to any acts which take place or take effect within the territory of that state. The second (“Rule 2”) is that the courts of this country will recognise, and will not question, the effect of an act of a foreign state’s executive in relation to any acts which take place or take effect within the territory of that state [113]. Although Rule 2 has been doubted, in light of the substantial body of authority in its support its existence should now be acknowledged [135]. Furthermore, there is no basis for limiting Rule 2 to cases of unlawful executive acts concerning property, such as expropriation or seizures [139]-[142].

Rule 2 thus applies to an exercise of executive power such as Mr Guaidó’s appointments to the BCV’s board [146]. However, there are several exceptions to the act of state doctrine, including for acts which take place outside a state’s territory, for challenges to acts which arise incidentally, and for judicial acts [136]. The extra–territorial exception does not apply in this case because the relevant acts of appointment were made within Venezuela and were not in excess of the jurisdiction of Venezuela in international law [149]. The incidental exception does not apply either, because these proceedings involve a direct attack upon the validity of Mr Guaidó’s appointments to the BCV’s board [152]. However, judicial rulings of a foreign state are not subject to the act of state doctrine [157]-[161]. For a court in this jurisdiction to decide whether to recognise or to give effect to the STJ judgments would therefore not engage the act of state doctrine. This is a matter which falls outside the preliminary issues and must therefore be remitted to the Commercial Court for further consideration. However, courts in this jurisdiction will refuse to recognise or give effect to foreign judgments such as those of the STJ if to do so would conflict with domestic public policy. The public policy of the United Kingdom will necessarily include the one voice principle which is a fundamental rule of UK constitutional law. As a result, if and to the extent that the reasoning of the STJ leading to its decisions that acts of Mr Guaidó are unlawful and nullities depends on the view that he is not the President of Venezuela, those judicial decisions cannot be recognised or given effect by courts in this jurisdiction because to do so would conflict with the view of the United Kingdom executive [170].

The transition statute is foreign legislation. Its validity may thus fall within Rule 1. There is no doubt about the existence of Rule 1, which would ordinarily prohibit challenges to the transition statute [172], [174]. However, the validity of the STJ judgments impugning the transition statute is not subject to the act of state doctrine [177]. In any event, Rule 1 is not necessary to the analysis because, subject to the effect to be given to STJ judgments, Rule 2 precludes questioning Mr Guaidó’s appointments to the BCV’s board [180].

Courts in this jurisdiction will therefore (subject to the effect to be given to the STJ judgments) not question the lawfulness or validity of the appointments to the BCV board made by Mr Guaidó [181(2)]. However, it remains necessary to consider whether the STJ judgments should be recognised or given effect in this jurisdiction. The proceedings are remitted to the Commercial Court for it to do so [181(3)].

The periodical Polski Proces Cywilny [Polish Civil Procedure] devoted a whole issue (2021/4) to the Brussels II ter Regulation. The issue is published in open access. Below are the abstracts of (and the links to) the various contributions.

D. Martiny, New efforts in judicial cooperation in European child abduction cases

Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (Recast) contains new and extensive provisions on international child abduction. The 1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction is complemented mainly by chapter III (Arts. 22 to 29). The paper examines the interplay of these two legal sources in the closer intra-EU cooperation that is intended. The author analyses jurisdiction and the procedure for the return of a child in the case of wrongful removal or retention. Amendments in recognition and enforcement of ‘privileged’ decisions ordering the return of a child are also addressed.

B. Hess, Towards a Uniform Concept of Habitual Residence in European Procedural and Private International Law?

In the private international and procedural laws of the European Union, habitual residence has become an often-used concept to determine jurisdiction and applicable law. However, its broad usage does not entail that the concept is based on a uniform understanding. The paper explores the different areas where the principle is being applied. It concludes that a uniform concept of habitual residence does not exist in European law although the concept is primarily based on objective factors. Furthermore, from a regulatory perspective, it does not seem desirable to develop this concept in a uniform way. In this regard, the case law of the European Court of Justice, distinguishing different applications of the concept, appears to be balanced.

M.A. Lupoi, Between parties’ consent and judicial discretion: joinder of claims and transfer of cases in Regulation (EU) 2019/1111

Regulation no. 2019/1111 has introduced new rules and mechanisms in order to ensure that a parental responsibility case is decided by the court more conveniently placed to protect the best interest of the child. Thus, while no general provision on the joinder of related claims is provided for, the recast regulation grants the interested parties a limited possibility to choose the competent forum. More significantly, the judge is granted discretionary powers as concerns the exercise of its jurisdicton and the decision to transfer the case to a more appropriate forum. These new powers and procedural mechanisms enforce the European space of justice and implement cooperation and collaboration between the Courts of different Member States.

M. Szpunar, K. Pacuła, Forum of necessity in family law matters within the framework of EU and international law

The forum of necessity revolves around the idea that a court may be called upon to hear a case, though it lacks jurisdiction under the normally applicable rules. The justification of its jurisdiction lies in the fact that the claimant cannot bring the proceedings before another forum or cannot be reasonably required to do so in a given situation. The present paper constitutes an attempt to contextualize and to position the forum of necessity within the framework in which it operates in the Member States, namely the framework of EU and international law. It juxtapositions three legal concepts (forum of necessity, forum non conveniens and universal civil jurisdiction) in order to determine the boundaries of necessity jurisdiction as it is known under EU law. It also benchmarks the necessity jurisdiction against international law and takes into account the influences of human and/or fundamental rights in an attempt to determine whether international law places on the Member States any constraints or obligations as to ensuring a forum of necessity. Taking into account those findings, the paper presents the spectrum of influences that the doctrine of forum of necessity may produce across various instruments of EU private international law, in particular those pertaining to family law matters.

O. Bobrzyńska, Brussels II ter Regulation and the 1996 Hague Convention on Child Protection – the interplay of the European and Hague regimes in the matters of parental responsibility

The article discusses the issue of the application of the conflict-of-laws rules contained in the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children in matters of parental responsibility heard by the courts of EU Member States when jurisdiction is based on the provisions of EU Regulations. This issue is discussed in the context of the relationship between the 1996 Hague Convention and the new Brussels II ter Regulation (Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on Jurisdiction, the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility, and on International Child Abduction), including the demarcation of the application of the jurisdictional norms of the Convention and the Regulation. The new Regulation seeks to address the problems that arose in this regard under the Brussels II bis Regulation.

F. Gascón Inchausti, P. Peiteado Mariscal, International child abduction in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union: learning from the past and looking to the future 

Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on Jurisdiction, the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility, and on International Child Abduction (Recast) sets up the basis for the treatment of international child abduction among Member States and, for the last fifteen years, some of its most complex elements have been interpreted and developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. This paper aims to explain this approach and the case law, focusing on the changes and on the challenges that the forthcoming entry into force of Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 brings to this delicate issue. 

Z. Kubicka-Grupa, A review of the Polish Supreme Court case law in international family law matters (from January 2015 to April 2021)

 The powers of the Polish Supreme Court include, inter alia, hearing cassation appeals and issuing resolutions. However, in matrimonial matters and matters regarding parental responsibility the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is strongly limited by law. This also applies to cases with a cross-border element. In the period from January 2015 to April 2021, the Supreme Court issued eleven decisions concerning jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility under the Brussels II bis Regulation, the civil aspects of international child abduction as well as the recognition and enforcement of judgments in family law matters. The article provides a review of this case law. It contains a concise description of the facts of the cases, the legal assessment expressed by the Supreme Court and a brief commentary by the author.

The Journal of Private International Law and the Singapore Management University will hold a virtual conference on 23 to 24 June 2022, divided into four sessions, on the conflicts of jurisdiction issue. The conference is aimed at assisting with the ongoing work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) on jurisdiction.

The speakers are leading private international law scholars and experts, many of whom are directly involved in the ongoing negotiations at the HCCH. Specifically, the first session, devoted to the common law approaches to conflicts of jurisdiction, chaired by Jonathan Harris, will include an opening by the dean of Yong Pung How School of Law from Singapore Management University and presentations by Campbell McLachlan, Ardavan Arzandeh, Ronald Brand and Mary Keyes; the second one, on the other, focused on civilian approaches to conflicts of jurisdiction, chaired by Kei Takeshita, will involve Tanja Domej, Geert Van Calster, Nadia De Araujo, Marcelo De Nardi and Zheng Sophia Tang; the third will follow, which, based on the work at the Hague Conference on Private International Law and chaired by Paul Beaumont, will be dealt with by Fausto Pocar, David McClean, João Ribeiro-Bidaoui and Matthias Lehmann; finally, continuing on the same topic, the forth chaired by Adeline Chong, including Trevor Hartley, Yeo Tiong Min, Franco Ferrari and Anselmo Reyes, concluded by closing remarks. Each session, with a break in between, will feature a dedicated Q&A moment.

Registration to attend the conference will open nearer the time. The programme for the conference is available here.

Furthermore, the biennial Journal of Private International Law Conference has been delayed until 2023 in order to enable it to take place in person at the Singapore Management University. This conference will be based on a call for papers. Similarly, further details will be announced in due course.

The CJEU held yesterday in Grand Chamber in C-251/20 GtflixTV – for the facts see my initial flag of the case here. I reviewed the Opinion of Hogan AG here. The AG need not have bothered for the Court entirely ignores the Opinion.

The AG had predicted, as had I, that the CJEU would not heed his calls (joining those of plenty of AGs before him) that the Article 7(2) CJEU Bier introduced distinction between Handlungsort and Erfolgort be abandoned or at least curtailed. The CJEU however also dismisses his suggestion that the case at issue, which involves defamation of competitors over the internet, does not engage the Bolagsupplysningen case-law (infringement of personality rights over the internet) but rather Tibor Trans on acts of unfair competition.

I do not see quite clearly in the Grand Chamber’s mention [28] that Gtlix did not request inaccessibility of the information in France: for Gtflix did request retraction.

Instead of qualifying locus damni jurisdiction, the CJEU squarely confirms its faith in the Mosaic consequences of Article 7(2) locus damni jurisdiction. Each court in whose district damage has occurred, will continue to have locus damni jurisdiction even if the claimant requests rectification of the information and the removal of the content placed online in the Handlungsort or centre of interests jurisdiction. Locus damni jurisdiction in my view extends only to the damage occurring in that district (for Article 7(2) determines territorial, not just national jurisdiction), albeit in current, internet related case the CJEU [38] would seem to speak of ‘national’ jurisdiction, linked to accessibility in the Member State as a whole.

Those courts’ locus damni jurisdiction is subject to the sole condition that the harmful content must be accessible or have been accessible in that Member State. Per CJEU Pinckney, an additional direction of activities to that Member State is not required (the recent High Court approach in Mahmudov on which I shall blog shortly, is at odds with that approach nota bene).

Grand Chamber judgments must not only be expected in cases where earlier authority is radically changed or qualified. It can also occur in cases where the CJEU wishes to reconfirm a point earlier made but stubbornly resisted in scholarship and lukewarmly embraced in national court practice.

Geert.

#CJEU Gtflix. Insulting comments viz competitor do fall within A7(2) Brussels Ia forum delicti. Aggrieved claimant may sue for damages in every jurisdiction where the publication was accessible. Court confirms Mozaik jurisdiction https://t.co/dhz5AlGJ9A https://t.co/GOwADA02Wu

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 21, 2021

John F. Coyle from the University of North Carolina has published on SSRN an article titled The Mystery of the Missing Choice-of-Law Clause.

The abstract reads as follows:

There is widespread agreement among experienced contract drafters that every commercial contract should contain a choice-of-law clause. Among their many virtues, choice-of-law clauses facilitate settlement and reduce litigation costs. While most modern contracts contain these provisions, some do not. In many instances, the absence of these clauses may be attributed to outdated forms, careless drafting, inattentive lawyers, or some combination of the three. In a few instances, however, it appears that sophisticated contract drafters purposely omit choice-of-law clauses from their agreements. If these clauses add value to a contract—and there is near-universal agreement that they do—then this decision raises a perplexing question. Why would any experienced contract drafter ever consciously choose not to write a choice-of-law clause into an agreement?
This Article seeks to answer this question with respect to one type of agreement where choice-of-law clauses are routinely omitted—insurance contracts. All of the available evidence suggests that most insurance contracts lack choice-of-law clauses. This is surprising because insurance companies are the epitome of the sophisticated contract drafter. To unravel the mystery of why so many insurance contracts do not contain choice-of-law clauses, the Article draws upon more than thirty interviews and email exchanges with industry experts. It argues that the absence of these provisions is attributable to a complex amalgam of legislative and regulatory hostility, judicial skepticism, standard forms, and strategic maneuvering on the part of insurers. The Article argues further that manuscript policies—which are negotiated between insurers and policyholders—sometimes lack choice-of-law clauses due to a perceived first-mover disadvantage and the absence of any body of truly neutral insurance law within the United States.
Solving the mystery of the missing choice-of-law clause in insurance contracts unlocks three important insights. First, it informs the efforts of state legislators and insurance commissioners called upon regulate the terms of insurance policies. Second, it suggests that insurance companies should adopt a differentiated approach to drafting choice-of-law clauses that accounts for the relative favorability of the law in the policyholder’s state. Third, and most importantly for contract scholars, solving the mystery sheds light on the nature of the contract production process, the drafting acumen of insurance companies, and the stickiness of absent contract terms.

This Tuesday the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the case Gtflix Tv, C-251/20, where it has been asked to interpret Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation in the context of an online publication allegedly disparaging a legal person and an action for compensation brought by that person before the court of a Member State in the territory of which that content was accessible.

The preliminary question referred to the Court read as follows:

“Must Article 7(2) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation] be interpreted as meaning that a person who, considering  that his or her rights have been infringed by the dissemination of derogatory comments on the internet, brings proceedings not only for the rectification of information and the removal of content but also for compensation for the resulting non-material and material damage, may claim, before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content published online is or was accessible, compensation for the damage caused in the territory of that Member State, in accordance with the judgment in eDate Advertising (paragraphs 51 and 52), or whether, pursuant to the judgment in [Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan] (paragraph 48), that person must make the application for compensation before the court with jurisdiction to order rectification of the information and removal of the derogatory comments?”

In essence, the referring court sought to establish whether the mosaic approach stood up to the test of time (also) in the contexts such as the one described in the preliminary question.

The Court answered in the affirmative.

A person who brings proceedings not only for the rectification of information and the removal of content but also for compensation for the resulting non-material and material damage, may claim, before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content published online is or was accessible, compensation for the damage caused in the territory of that Member State, despite the fact that – as the Court seems to stress it in its answer – these courts would not have jurisdiction to rule on the rectification or removal of content.

The judgments is available here (in French, so far), with a press release in English.

This post was contributed by Olivera Boskovic, who is a Professor at the Université de Paris.

The situation of victims of environmental damages or human rights violations caused in non-EU countries by subsidiaries or subcontractors of companies established in the EU (but the issue can be extended to companies merely operating in the EU) trying to bring actions before the courts of EU Member States is well known. The Shell case, in which victims of serious environmental damage in Nigeria sued the Dutch parent company and its Nigerian subsidiary before the Dutch court, is quite emblematic in this respect. (The last decision in this case has been issued on 29th of January 2021 by the Hague Court of Appeal. See Shell Nigeria liable for oil spills in Nigeria). The need to modify certain rules of private international law in order to address these actions in a satisfactory manner has been debated for some time now. The purpose of this post is to provide an update and examine the current state of the debate. Difficult questions may arise both concerning jurisdiction and concerning the determination of applicable law.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction, first of all, remains problematic although the situation has somewhat improved in recent years. From a European perspective, as the law stands today, a first fundamental distinction is between cases in which the defendant is domiciled in an EU Member State and those in which the defendant is domiciled in a third country.

Where the action is brought against a defendant domiciled in an EU Member State (i.e, in our context, actions brought directly against the parent company or the ordering company), jurisdiction is based on the Brussels Ia Regulation. This regulation always allows a defendant to be sued in the court of his domicile, so that jurisdiction should not be a problem in this case. (For example, in the Shell case the jurisdiction of the Dutch court to hear the action against the Dutch company did not pose any problem). Instead, the obstacles are of a substantive nature and relate to the difficulty of holding companies liable for the actions of their subsidiaries or subcontractors.

The situation is more problematic when the defendant is domiciled outside the EU, (i.e. in our context when the action is brought against subsidiaries or subcontractors who are direct perpetrators of the damage or simply against companies domiciled outside the EU). These actions are excluded from the scope of the Brussels Ia Regulation. They are subject to the national laws of the Member States, and the rules may therefore differ considerably from one country to another. Generally speaking, it is quite difficult to establish the jurisdiction of a Member State court in this type of case. One can therefore consider that there is a problem of access to justice, in so far as the rules of jurisdiction do not take account of economic links, or even the economic unity of groups of companies. Nevertheless, there are avenues available and in particular two worth mentioning: the co-defendants’ rule and the forum necessitatis (or jurisdiction based on the risk of denial of justice) Indeed, several Member States have rules based on one or other of these mechanisms, or even both. As a reminder, the co-defendants’ rule makes it possible, when an action is brought against several defendants, one of whom is domiciled in the forum State and the other outside the EU, to sue all the defendants before the court of the domicile of the one domiciled in the forum State, provided of course that the claims are related. The forum necessitatis, on the other hand, allows the court of the forum to be seized when no foreign court can be seized by the claimant, who therefore risks a denial of justice. More than the issues raised by the application of each of these rules what is noteworthy is the lack of unification at the European level. As regards the forum necessitatis, its introduction into the Brussels I Regulation was proposed in 2010 and again recently in 2020, but without success. As for the co-defendants rule (involving a defendant domiciled outside the EU), its introduction in the Regulation has never been proposed.

New Grounds of Jurisdiction in the Brussels Ibis Regulation

Nevertheless, it appears that the introduction of these two rules into the Regulation would be a real improvement. Of course, this opinion is not shared by all writers. There are divergent views among scholars. Some are hostile to the introduction of the forum necessitatis. (see Ch. Tomale, On the EP draft report on corporate due diligence) They consider there is no need for such a rule, especially at a time when the Supreme court of the United States is moving in the opposite direction and has adopted a very strict position. However, contrary to what can sometimes be read, the idea is not to allow member state courts to hear cases with no connection whatsoever to the EU. A minimum link with the legal order of the court seized is required by all proposals (see the GEDIP proposal concerning the private international law aspects of the future European instrument on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability, October 2021; draft treaty on business and human rights, August 2020; Sofia guidelines for international civil litigation for human rights violation, 2012 adopted by the ILA). Of course, the question is then whether this minimum link should be defined by the rule or left for the court to decide. Taking into account the diversity of situations that may occur, it is preferable to leave the definition of the minimum link to the courts. This seems to be the approach adopted by recent initiatives. On the contrary, other scholars consider that situations where a real risk of denial of justice can be characterised are the only situations in which European courts should rule on this type of dispute. The concern that home state courts should not consider that it is always better for them to decide this type of case and that they should assert jurisdiction only when it is really necessary because the host state courts cannot handle the litigation in a satisfactory way has been voiced by many commentators during debates. Even the Court of Appeal in the famous Vedanta case decided in the UK commented that ‘there must come a time when access to justice in this type of case will not be achieved by exporting cases, but by the availability of local lawyers, experts, and sufficient funding to enable the cases to be tried locally”. Scholars who hold this position are implicitly hostile to the co-defendants rule. These differences raise the question of relations between these two grounds of jurisdiction and whether one should be preferred. In the opinion of the present writer the answer is no. These rules are complementary. (The opinion according to which the forum necessitates rule is a second-best solution and an activity-based rule could be imagined is also worth mentioning. This question was discussed during the interesting webinar on “The recommendation of GEDIP concerning the private international aspects of the future EU instrument on corporate due diligence and corporate accountability” organised by the Italian Interest group on Private international law on December 10 2021 featuring as speakers H. Van Loon and Giulia Vallar.)

Therefore, the minimum solution would be to introduce into the Brussels Ia Regulation the forum necessitatis which allows victims to bring an action in front of the court of a EU Member State, irrespective of the existence of a co-defendant domiciled in an EU Member State, but on condition that they can show that it is impossible to bring the case before another court. The rule is devised as an exceptional rule. If the European legislator wanted to go further, (it is the present writer’s opinion that this is desirable), they should introduce, in addition, the co-defendants rule, which makes it easier to bring an action, without the need to show the impossibility of seizing another court, but provided that a European defendant is also involved in the proceedings and that the claims are related. This approach has been adopted by several recent initiatives. The latest version (August 2020) of the draft binding treaty on business and human rights negotiated within the UN framework contains both rules. The same is true of the GEDIP recommendation to the European Commission. Considering the fact that England has often been described as a magnet forum for this type of litigation, it is interesting to note that in all these proposals, contrary to the English system, the two grounds of jurisdiction (presence of a forum-based co-defendant and the risk of denial of justice) are two separate grounds of jurisdiction. This indeed seems to be a better solution. Another difference lies in the fact that the English system takes into account the risk of substantial denial of justice whereas the forum necessitatis focuses on the impossibility to seize another court. However, the two systems might be closer than they seem at first sight. The impossibility to seize another court can be characterized if the claimant can not “reasonably” seize another court. This is an open door for consideration of a risk of substantial denial of justice. In a nutshell, it appears that the attractivity of the English forum does not lie in rules on jurisdiction.

Parallel Litigation

Another important question relating to jurisdiction is the question of parallel proceedings. The Mariana Dam case recently brought in front of the English courts shed light upon this question. In the aftermath of the worst environmental disaster in the history of Brazil, an action was brought in the UK against the Anglo-Australian mining multinational BHP. It was initially rejected, but has been reopened in July 2021 under exceptional appeals legislations (CPR 52.30) in order to “avoid real injustice”. The way lis pendens and the related actions exceptions are treated is very important. In addition to the problem of parallel litigation brought by victims both in the host and in the home country, It is vital to make sure that they are not transformed into weapons by potential defendants seeking declarations of non-liability in non-member States and then invoking the lis pendens or related actions exception. However, one may consider that the tools that already exist in the Bia regulation are satisfactory and that no legislative reform is needed on this point. Although relying on the conditions of recognition and the concept of “good administration of justice” can seem a bit vague, it is submitted that a certain degree of judicial discretion is inevitable.

Applicable Law

After jurisdiction, the second question concerns the determination of the law applicable to these actions. As the law stands today, a difficulty arises from the fact that choice of law rules often designate the law of the place of the damage, which in these cases is frequently the law of a country outside the EU with a less developed legal system. In reality, to understand the current situation, a twofold distinction must be made, firstly according to whether or not the defendant is domiciled in the EU, and secondly according to whether it is a question of environmental damage or a human rights violation. With regard to actions against defendants domiciled outside the EU, (i.e. in current litigation, actions against subsidiaries and subcontractors), they will always be governed by the law of the place where the damage occurred, which corresponds to the law of their activity. (It is important to note that this does not necessarily mean impunity for these defendants. For example, in the Shell case the Dutch court held the Nigerian subsidiary liable by virtue of Nigerian law). On the other hand, with regard to actions against parent companies or ordering companies established in the EU, as the law stands today, a distinction must be made between cases involving environmental damage and cases involving a violation of human rights. The former are covered by Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation, which allows the claimant to choose between the law of the place of the event giving rise to the damage and the law of the place where the damage occurred. The latter are covered by Article 4, which designates exclusively the law of the place of the damage. This last rule, in our context, is problematic. This problem is at the origin of the proposal by the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs to insert an Article 6a on “Actions for breach of human rights in commercial matters” which would have allowed the victim to choose between several laws.

The first question that arose upon publication of the proposal was: do we need a new choice of law rule? Some scholars consider that we do not and that it is sufficient to classify the rules of the future European instrument as overriding mandatory provisions (see. the post of G. Rühl here). However, a different view is possible. It is the opinion of the present writer that a choice of law rule would indeed be useful. Indeed, by definition, only a limited number of provisions can be characterised as overriding mandatory provisions. The rules on limitation, for example, will not be considered as such. However, they can be quite decisive in litigation. The action may be dismissed because, for example, the law of the place of the damage, which is a law of a non-EU country, contains a very short limitation period. Therefore, a choice of law rule would protect the victims more than the overriding mandatory rules method and consequently contribute to the public interest objective of making companies more responsible. In any event, the two methods can be combined. The adoption of a new choice of law rule for human right abuses, would not make the overriding mandatory rules approach irrelevant. This is also the position of the GEDIP. In its recommendation it combines the two approaches.

Extending the Scope of Article 7 Rome II

Going back to the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs’ proposal, although it is the opinion of the present writer that a special choice of law rule is indeed desirable, the provision as proposed was not immune from criticism (See. O. Boskovic, « La loi applicable aux « actions pour violations des droits de l’homme en matière commerciale », Recueil Dalloz 11 fév. 2021, p. 252). Firstly, having two provisions, one applicable to environmental damage and the other applicable to human rights violations would cause very difficult boundary problems (bearing in mind, for example, that according to some estimates one third of human rights violations involve environmental offences). Secondly, the connecting factors used in the proposed article 6a raised many questions. For this reason, it appears more appropriate to have a single choice of law rule for human rights violations and for environmental damage. Article 7 should therefore be rewritten to include human rights violations. The victim would then be able to choose between the law of the place of the damage and the law of the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred, which would increase their chances of success. (This is also the position of the GEDIP proposal. However, one should note that the scope of the GEDIP proposal is wider and applies, just like the future European instrument, not only to human rights and environmental damages but also to good governance. The precise definition of this last concept is difficult and the desirability of having the same rule is debatable. This very interesting question was discussed during the above-mentioned webinar organised by the Italian interest group on private international law.) However, this idea then gives rise to another question: How should the “event giving rise to the damage” be interpreted in this context? Obviously, for the text to achieve its objective, it must be accepted that the event giving rise to the damage can, at least if the factual circumstances are appropriate, be located at the place where the decisions were or were not taken, i.e. at the domicile of the parent company (a recital could be inserted to encourage such an interpretation) (I have developed these ideas in O. Boskovic, « La loi applicable aux « actions pour violations des droits de l’homme en matière commerciale », Recueil Dalloz 11 fév. 2021, p. 252.). The Hague Tribunal in the Shell case ruled along these lines in its decision issued on May 26th 2021, which has already been characterised as historical. It is interesting to note that a similar question arose in the Arica v. Boliden case decided by the Swedish courts in 2019. In this case under Swedish choice of law rules, applicable rationae temporis, the lex loci delicti commissi applied. In determining the locus delicti commissi, the court held that the center of gravity should be found and that ‘This center may be established with regard to where the qualitatively important elements have their focus rather than according to quantitative criteria’. Therefore, in this case concerning the export of toxic waste from Sweden to Chile, contrary to the first instance decision, the court of appeal held that the event giving rise to the damage was localized in Sweden. It is certain that agreeing on an adequate choice of law rule is not enough. The localization of the connecting factors is of paramount importance. (A similar question arose in the Nestlé v. Doe case. The Supreme Court explained that, because the ATS does not apply extraterritorially, in order for the court to have jurisdiction “plaintiffs must establish that conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States”. This was not the case because the only relevant alleged domestic conduct by the defendants consisted of general corporate activity-like decisionmaking- which  is insufficient to establish domestic application of the ATS. Contrary to the emerging trend in the EU, the Supreme Court of the US has shown continuous caution on this matter, apparently considering that it is not a matter for judicial lawmaking)

Revising Article 17 Rome II

Another important question concerns situations where poor performance of contractual obligations causes damage to third parties. The Kik case in Germany or Begun v. Maran case in the UK come to mind. A very important step in the fight for corporate accountability would be to facilitate actions brought by these third parties The aim is to ensure that the ethical and environmental clauses contained in international contracts do not remain a dead letter. Indeed, as the Court of Appeal observed in Begun v. Maran, often all protagonists know that theses clauses will be totally ignored. A revision of Article 17 of the Rome II Regulation could thus be envisaged in the form of the addition of a sentence: “Account shall also be taken of the ethical clauses contained in the contracts whose breach has caused the damage.” (on this problem see our forthcoming article « Contrats internationaux et protection de l’environnement », in actes du colloque du 15 juin 2021, Le droit économique, levier de la transition écologique ?)

Finally, it appears that the possibility of applying more widely foreign overriding mandatory provisions would contribute to the pursuit of these global governance goals. A modification of Rome I and Rome II along these lines would be welcome.

As these few remarks show, the debate on private international law aspects of corporate social accountability is far from over.

The University of Antwerp is looking for a doctoral candidate in the domain of International Accountability through the value chain.

The research addresses the question of how entities in the North can be held accountable for human rights infringements that happen in their value chain, often in the South. It examines recent and pending legislation on value chain due diligence in selected countries and/or regional organisations. The research can be approached from the perspective of human rights law, public international law or private international law, including private law mechanisms (either in tort or in contract law).

The deadline for applications is 14 February 2022 and the start date is 15 September 2022. For more information, see the full vacancy text.

The jugdment on C-251/20, Gtflix, will be published on Tuesday 21. The request for a preliminary reference of the French Cour de Cassation, focused on Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, had triggered a long opinion by M. Hogan (the Irish Advocate General at that point in time). Although he favoured the characterization of the act at stake as a form of malicious falsehood – thus falling under the scope of unfair competition rules-  and indicated expressly that “the present case is not the right one for the Court to take a position on whether or not the mosaic approach should be maintained” (point 95), the actual relevance of the case lies precisely there. He himself devoted his opinion to it, providing the Grand Chamber (K. Lenaerts, L. Bay Larsen, A. Arabadjiev, A. Prechal, I. Jarukaitis, N. Jääskinen, T. von Danwitz, L.S. Rossi, A. Kumin, N. Wahl, and M. Safjan as reporting judge) with arguments and counterarguments. It would be disappointing if the Court does not take a stance.

Eagerly waiting.

Quick reminder:

The question was:

‘Must Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that a person who, considering  that his or her rights have been infringed by the dissemination of derogatory comments on the internet, brings proceedings not only for the rectification of information and the removal of content but also for compensation for the resulting non-material and material damage, may claim, before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content published online is or was accessible, compensation for the damage caused in the territory of that Member State, in accordance with the judgment in eDate Advertising (paragraphs 51 and 52), or whether, pursuant to the judgment in Svensk Handel (paragraph 48), that person must make the application for compensation before the court with jurisdiction to order rectification of the information and removal of the derogatory comments?’

Advocate General Hogan proposed the following answer:

“Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a claimant who relies on an act of unfair competition consisting in the dissemination of disparaging statements on the internet and who seeks both the rectification of the data and the deletion of certain content and compensation for the non-material and economic damage resulting therefrom, may bring an action or claim before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content published online is or was accessible, for compensation only for the damage caused in the territory of that Member State. In order, however, for those courts to have the requisite jurisdiction it is necessary that the claimant can demonstrate that it has an appreciable number of consumers in that jurisdiction who are likely to have access to and have understood the publication in question.”

After the Coman judgment of 2018, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has again rendered a judgment in the field of free movement of citizens that is of importance for private international law. Like in Coman, the judgment in V.M.A. of 14 December 2021 concerned a non-traditional family of which the members sought to make use of their right to free movement in the EU under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Directive 2004/38. The  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Charter) was also pertinent, particularly its Article 7 on respect for private and family life, Article 9 on the right to marry and the right to found a family,  Article 24 on the rights of the child, and Article 45 on freedom of movement and of residence.

While Coman concerned the definition of “spouse” under Article 2 of the Directive, in V.M.A. the CJEU addressed the definition of  “direct descendants” in the same provision.

Two women, V.M.A., a Bulgarian national, and K.D.K., a national of the United Kingdom, were married and lived in Spain. A daughter, S.D.K.A., was born in Spain. Her Spanish birth certificate indicated V.M.A. as “mother A” and K.D.K. as “mother”. V.M.A. applied to the Sofia municipality for a birth certificate for S.D.K.A. in order to obtain a Bulgarian identity document for her. She submitted a legalised and certified translation into Bulgarian of the extract from the civil register of Barcelona.

The Sofia municipality refused this application, due to the lack of information on S.D.K.A.’s biological mother and because the reference to two mothers was contrary to Bulgarian public policy.

The Administrative Court of the City of Sofia, to which V.M.A. appealed the municipality’s decision, posed four questions to the CJEU. It sought to know whether Articles 20 and 21 of the TFEU and Articles 7, 24 and 45 of the Charter oblige Bulgaria to recognise the Spanish birth certificate despite its mentioning two mothers and despite the fact that it was unclear who the biological mother of the child was. It also questioned EU Member States’ discretion regarding rules for the establishment of parentage. A further relevant point was Brexit and the fact that the child would not be able to get EU citizenship through the other mother, who is a UK citizen.

The Grand Chamber ruled as follows:

Article 4(2) TEU, Articles 20 and 21 TFEU and Articles 7, 24 and 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a child, being a minor, who is a Union citizen and whose birth certificate, issued by the competent authorities of the host Member State, designates as that child’s parents two persons of the same sex, the Member State of which that child is a national is obliged (i) to issue to that child an identity card or a passport without requiring a birth certificate to be drawn up beforehand by its national authorities, and (ii) to recognise, as is any other Member State, the document from the host Member State that permits that child to exercise, with each of those two persons, the child’s right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.

The CJEU thus obliges Bulgaria, through EU law, to recognise the Spanish birth certificate. The CJEU is not concerned with the issue of a  birth certificate in Bulgaria, but rather with the identity document (the requirements under national law for the identity document cannot be used to refuse to issue such identity document – see para 45).

The parentage established lawfully in Spain has the result that the  parents of a Union citizen who is a minor and of whom they are the primary carers, be recognised by all Member States as having the right to accompany that child when her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is being exercised (para 48)

The CJEU refers to the identity document as the document that permits free movement. This wording seems, on a first reading, to be broader than the ruling in Coman, where the CJEU ruled on the recognition of the same-sex marriage only for purposes of the right to residence. However, in para 57 the Court seems to include the Coman limitation: Such an obligation does not require the Member State of which the child concerned is a national to provide, in its national law, for the parenthood of persons of the same sex, or to recognise, for purposes other than the exercise of the rights which that child derives from EU law, the parent-child relationship between that child and the persons mentioned on the birth certificate drawn up by the authorities of the host Member State as being the child’s parents.

But I’m sure much debate will follow about the extent of the obligation to recognise. As readers might be aware, the European Commission earlier this year set up an Expert Group on the Recognition of Parentage between Member States.

 

 

 

Written by Stephen G.A. Pitel, Western University

Many Canadian and some other conflicts scholars will know that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC) has drafted (in 1994) model legislation putting the taking of jurisdiction and staying of proceedings on a statutory footing. This statute, known as the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (CJPTA), has subsequently been adopted and brought into force in 4 of Canada’s 13 provinces and territories (British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, Yukon).

The ULCC has now released a revised version of the CJPTA. It is available here and background information is available here.

The most notable changes, each explained at some length in the commentaries, are as follows: 1. New provisions on exclusive and non-exclusive forum selection clauses in the staying of proceedings (s. 11); 2. A new section on subject matter competence dealing with the foreign immovable property rules (s. 12.2); 3. Use of the phrase “clearly more appropriate” for a stay of proceedings based on forum non conveniens (s. 11); 4. Territorial competence in respect of necessary parties (s. 3(d.1)); 5. Clarification of the meaning of the presumptive connection based on carrying on business in the forum (s. 10(h)).

Disclosure: I was a member of the Working Group for the revised statute. Solely in a personal capacity, I can offer three observations on the revisions. First, s. 12.2 is an attempt to largely (though not perfectly) codify the common law’s Mocambique rule regarding jurisdiction over foreign immovable property (classified as subject matter competence under the CJPTA). Some may find this interesting as there are not many available codifications of this complex rule. Second, the role given to exclusive forum selection clauses reflects the fact that under Canadian common law these are not treated as absolutely binding and instead are subject to a “strong cause” test before they can be disregarded (see ss. 11(3) and (4)). Section 11(5), however, allows a consumer or employer to treat such a clause as non-exclusive rather than exclusive (but also rather than disregarding it altogether). Third, there is a provision for taking jurisdiction (called territorial competence in the CJPTA) over a defendant who is a “necessary party” (s. 3(d.1)). Canadian common law has largely rejected “necessary or proper party” as an acceptable basis on which to exercise jurisdiction, but this flows from the undue breath of what can constitute a “proper party”. The statutory provision uses a very narrow meaning of “necessary party”.

It will now fall to the provinces and territories that have enacted the CJPTA to determine how to act on the changes. It will also be interesting to see if the revised and updated version generates any interest in the provinces and territories that have not so enacted.

All best wishes of the season.

This post has been prepared by He Qisheng, Professor of International Law, Peking University Law School, and Chairman at the Peking University International Economical Law Institute, has published the 7th Survey on Chinese Practice in Private International Law.

 

This survey contains materials reflecting the practice of Chinese private international law in 2020. First, regarding changes in the statutory framework of private international law in China, three legislative acts, one administrative regulation on the Unreliable Entity List and ten judicial interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court were adopted or amended in 2020 on a wide range of matters, including conflict of laws, punitive damages, international civil procedure, etc. Second, 11 typical cases involving Chinse courts’ jurisdiction are selected to highlight the development in Chinese private international law, involving standard essential patents, abuse of market dominance, declaration of non-infringement of patent, asymmetric choice of court agreement and other matters. Third, nine cases on choice of law questions relating, in particular, to habitual residence, rights in rem, matrimonial property regimes and ascertainment of foreign law, are examined. Fourth, five cases involving anti-suit injunction or anti-enforcement injunction are reported and one introduced in detail. Fifth, the first occasion for on international judicial assistance of extracting DNA, as well as three representative cases on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, are discussed. The Statistics of international judicial assistance cases in China is first released in this survey. Finally, this survey also covers five recent decisions illustrating Chinese courts’ pro-arbitration attitude towards the uncertainty brought about by contractual clauses referring to both litigation and arbitration.

Here are the links to the article:

·         Standard link (you may share this link anywhere):
https://academic.oup.com/chinesejil/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/chinesejil/jmab031/6449363

·         Free-access link (see below for how you may use this link):
https://academic.oup.com/chinesejil/advance-article/doi/10.1093/chinesejil/jmab031/6449363?guestAccessKey=4f7f76a9-41f4-4c46-9366-ea0198ab74ca

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Overview

II.A. Report on the Work of the SPC in 2020

II.B. Laws and the SPC’s interpretation

II.C. Provisions on punitive damages

III. Jurisdiction

III.A. Intellectual property

III.A.i. Jurisdiction over the standard essential patent disputes

III.A.ii. Jurisdiction over the disputes of abuse of market dominance

III.A.iii. Jurisdiction over the giving of declaratory judgment in patent disputes

III.B. Choice of court agreement

III.C.i. An asymmetric choice of court agreement

III.C.ii. Choice of court agreement and hierarchical jurisdiction of the Chinese court system

III.C. Other choices in contracts

1. Choice of law

IV.A. Habitual residence

IV.B. Proprietary rights

IV.C. Matrimonial assets

IV.D. Ascertainment of foreign law

1. International judicial assistance

V.A. Statistics of judicial assistance in civil or commercial matters

V.B. Taking of evidence for foreign courts

1. Action preservation and anti-suit Injunction  

VII. Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments

VIII. International arbitration

VIII.A. Agreements with jurisdiction and arbitration clauses

VIII.B. Construction on “judgment upon the award”

Aldricus – Tak bisa dipungkiri, kebhidupan kita saat ini cukup bergantung pada HP. Tak heran jika gadget yang satu ini tidak bisa dipisahkan dalam segala aktifitas kita sehari-hari. Karena itulah penting untuk memberikan perlindungan pada HP kesayanganmu. Di sini, yang kalian butuhkan adalah asuransi HP.

Apa Itu Asuransi HP?

Asuransi ini (asuransi smartphone) merupakan asuransi yang akan memberi ganti rugi dan perlindungan produk elektronik yang dibeli dengan harga tertentu, baik jika ponselmu hilang ataupun rusak. Jika HPmu hilang atau rusak, pihak asuransi akan memberi ganti rugi. Biasanya, kalian akan mendapatkan penawaran asuransi ini Ketika membeli HP baru. Namun, kalian juga bisa mendapatkannya dari perusahaan asuransi seperti PasarPolis.

Kenapa Butuh Asuransi ini?

Dengan asuransi smartphone, kalian dapat melindungi HP kesayangan dari berbagai kemungkinan resiko. Selain itu, kalian juga dapat menghemat waktu dari semua proses transaksi, status, aplikasi, sampai pengecekan online dengan sistem terintegrasi.

Pihak asuransi ini akan memberi data lengkap tentang polis & cara klaim yang simple. Dengan begitu, mobilitas kalian tak akan terganggu apabila harus mengurus klaim. Bahkan, kalian juga dapat memperoleh referensi dari produk asuransi & pembelian lewat toko online.

Perlindungan Layar HP

Asuransi smartphone menawarkan berbagai macam perlindungan. Salah satunya adalah perlindungan layar HP. Seperti kita semua tahu, berbagai model HP saat ini menggunakan layar sentuh. Artinya, layar HP menjadi salah satu bagian terpenting yang harus dilindungi dari resiko retak dan pacah. Itulah kenapa kalian memerlukan asuransi smartphone yang memberi perlindungan pada layar HP.

Efek Negatif Layar HP Retak

Layar HP yang retak/pecah bisa menimbulkan efek negative. Salah satunya adalah jari mudah terluka, lebih lagi kalau kalian suka main game di HP. Selain itu, retak atau pecahnya layar HP juga meningkatkan resiko penyakit mata. Satu lagi, layar HP yang retak/pecah juga membuat pancara radiasi membesar.

Untuk menghindari berbagai efek negative itu, kalian memerlukan asuransi HP. Selain memberikan perlindungan pada layar, asuransi smartphone juga bisa meliputi pemulihan data berharga, penggantian unit baru, dan menghemat pengeluaran.

The post Asuransi HP untuk Melindungi Smartphone Kesayanganmu appeared first on Aldri Blog.

Last week, the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear a case concerning Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Amy Howe has an excellent summary of the case on her blog, Howe on the Court.

Under the convention, children who are wrongfully taken from the country where they live must be returned to that country, so that custody disputes can be resolved there. The convention makes an exception for cases in which there is a “grave risk” that returning the child would expose him or her to physical or psychological harm.

In Golan v. Saada, a U.S. citizen married an Italian citizen in 2015; they had a child, born in Milan, in 2016. The husband was allegedly abusive toward the wife throughout the marriage, but he did not directly abuse their son. In 2018, the wife took the child to the United States and did not return, remaining in a domestic-violence shelter in New York. The husband went to federal court there, trying to compel the child’s return to Italy.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit ruled that, when a district court concludes that a child’s return would pose a grave risk of harm, the district court must consider measures that would reduce that risk. This holding clashes with the holdings of other courts of appeals, which do not mandate the consideration of such measures, particularly in cases involving domestic violence. The case then went back to the district court, which ordered the child’s return to Italy with a variety of protective measures in place – for example, mandatory therapy and parenting classes. The Supreme Court agreed to decide whether courts are required to consider all measures that might reduce the grave risk of harm if the child were to return home.

The case will be argued in the Spring and decided before June 2022; the docket and publicly available filings can be accessed here.

EFFORTS (Towards more EFfective enFORcemenT of claimS in civil and commercial matters within the EU) is an EU-funded Project conducted by the University of Milan (coord.), the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, the University of Heidelberg, the Free University of Brussels, the University of Zagreb, and the University of Vilnius.

The fifth EFFORTS Newsletter has just been released, giving access to up-to-date information about the Project, save-the-dates on forthcoming events, conferences and webinars, and news from the area of international and comparative civil procedural law.

Regular updates are also available via the Project’s website, and  LinkedIn and Facebook pages.

Project JUST-JCOO-AG-2019-881802
With financial support from the Civil Justice Programme of the European Union