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Posted at the request of Aastha Asthana, Managing Editor, Trade Law and Development

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

General Issue

Issue 13.2 | Winter ’21

The Board of Editors of Trade, Law and Development is pleased to invite original, unpublished
manuscripts for publication in the Winter ’21 Issue of the Journal (Vol. 13, No. 2) in the form of
‘Articles’, ‘Notes’, ‘Comments’ and ‘Book Reviews’.

Founded in 2009, the philosophy of Trade, Law and Development has been to generate and sustain a
constructive and democratic debate on emergent issues in international economic law and to serve
as a forum for the discussion and distribution of ideas. Towards these ends, we have published
works by noted scholars such as WTO DDG Yonov F. Agah, Dr. Prof. Ernst Ulrich Petersmann,
Prof. Steve Charnovitz, Prof. Petros Mavroidis, Prof. Mitsuo Matsuhita, Prof. Raj Bhala, Prof. Joel
Trachtman, Gabrielle Marceau, Simon Lester, Prof. Bryan Mercurio, and Prof. M. Sornarajah
among others. TL&D also has the distinction of being ranked the best journal in India across all
fields of law for seven consecutive years by Washington and Lee University, School of Law.

Manuscripts received by August 1st, 2021, pertaining to any area within the purview of international
economic law will be reviewed for publication in the Winter ’21 issue.

Manuscripts may be submitted via e-mail. For further information about the Journal, please
click here. For submission guidelines, please click here.

In case of any queries, please feel free to contact us at: editors[at]tradelawdevelopment[dot]com.

 

LAST DATE FOR SUBMISSIONS: 01 AUGUST, 2021

 

PATRON: P.P. Saxena | ADVISORS: Raj Bhala | Jagdish Bhagwati | B.S. Chimni | Glenn
Wiser | Daniel B. Magraw, Jr. | Vaughan Lowe | Ricardo Ramirez Hernandez | W.
Michael Reisman | M. Sornarajah | FACULTY-IN-CHARGE: Dr. Rosmy Joan | BOARD OF
EDITORS: Amogh Pareek | Sahil Verma | Sukanya Viswanathan| Aastha Asthana|
Abilash Viswanathan| Malaika Shivalkar | Nishant Sharma | Pranav Karwa | Rashmi
John | Swikruti Nayak | Akshita Saxena | Ananya Awasthi | Anushka Mathur | Jahnavi
Srivastava | Khushi Agrawal | Maulik Khurana | Nidhi Lakhotia | Ria Chaudhary |
Yashvi Hora | Aarzoo Gang | Anoushka | Lipika Singla | Priyanshu Shrivastava | Simran
Bherwani | Sneha Naresh | Vipashyana Hilsayan

Axis Corporate Capital UK Ltd & Ors v Absa Group Ltd & Ors [2021] EWHC 225 (Comm) is a good illustration of choice of court and law clauses that are a gift to conflict of laws practitioners. Choice of law and in particular choice of court was as Calver J put it [35] ‘somewhat poorly worded’. This is what the clauses look like in the various (re)insurance agreements [36 ff]

The primary reinsurances contain the following provision: “Any disputes concerning the interpretation of the terms, conditions, limitations and/or exclusions contained in this policy is understood and agreed by both the Reinsured and the Reinsurers to be subject to England Wales Law. Each party agrees to submit to a worldwide jurisdiction and to comply with all requirements necessary to give such court jurisdiction.”

The excess reinsurances contain the following provision: “Any dispute concerning the interpretation of the terms, conditions, limitations and/or exclusions contained in this policy is understood and agreed by both the insured and the insurers to be subject to England and Wales. Each party agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of England and Wales to comply with all requirements necessary to give such court jurisdiction. In respect of claims brought against the Insured and indemnified under this policy, as more fully described herein, the choice of law applicable is Worldwide and the choice of jurisdiction is Worldwide.”

Thirdly, the ARR [aggregate retention reinsurance, GAVC] contains the following two provisions: “Supplemental Clauses … “Policy Interpretation, Jurisdiction and Service of Suit Clause.” And then: “Choice of Law and Jurisdiction. “Any dispute concerning the interpretation of the terms, conditions, limitations and/or exclusions contained in this policy is understood and agreed by both the (re)insured and the (re)insurers to be subject to England and Wales. Each party agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of Worldwide to comply with all requirements necessary to give such court jurisdiction.”

The policy interpretation, jurisdiction and service of suit clause, which is specifically referred to as a supplemental clause, provides as follows and was contained in a schedule: “Any dispute between the Reinsured and the Reinsurer alleging that payment is due under this reinsurance shall be referred to the jurisdiction of the courts of the England and Wales and the meaning of this reinsurance policy shall be decided by such courts in accordance with the law of England and Wales.”

Claimant submits that, on the proper construction of the reinsurance contracts, the defendants were obliged to submit to and to submit any dispute arising under or in connection with any of the reinsurances contracts to the exclusive (A25 BIa imposes exclusive choice of court in principle: [56]) jurisdiction of the English courts. Calver J agrees that that is the case with a high degree of probability (this is an interlocutory stage). Generali Italia v Pelagic features as authority. Note the ‘worldwide’ reference in some of the clauses means that parties agree that all courts worldwide should ensure that the dispute be referred to the English courts.

The formulation in the excess reinsurance agreements, include what is construed as a carve-out of worldwide jurisdiction, which is non-exclusive, for claims brought against the insured and indemnified under the excess reinsurance. This is taken by the judge to mean that for all other claims, choice of court for E&W is, a contrario, exclusive.

At 81 ff, the judge grants an interim anti-suit injunction against proceedings in South Africa. The very possibility for this is not discussed at all (possibly as a result of the nature of the proceedings). It is not established that anti-suit to protect jurisdiction of a court in the EU, against that of courts outside the EU, is at all possible. In Gray v Hurley the Court of Appeal suggested it is not possible within the context of A4 BIa, yet referred to the CJEU where the case was withdrawn. This might become a contested issue.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 2.24, para 2.296 ff.

Axis Corporate Capital UK ea v Absa Group ea [2021] EWHC 225 (Comm)
Arcane choice of court clauses in insurance and reinsurance contracts (A25 BIa, A3 Rome I) which are a true gift to conflict of laws practitionershttps://t.co/jTCR3BhkoO

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 20, 2021

 Comparative Procedural Law and Justice (CPLJ) is a global project of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, with the support of the Luxembourg National Research Fund (019/13946847), involving more than one hundred scholars from all over the world.

CPLJ is envisioned as a comprehensive study of comparative civil procedural law and civil dispute resolution schemes in the contemporary world. It aims at understanding procedural rules in their cultural context, as well as at highlighting workable approaches to the resolution of civil disputes.

In this framework, the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law will host its 5th CPLJ Webinar on 4 June 2021, 4:00 – 6:15 pm (CET).

The programme reads as follows:

Chairs:  Margaret Woo (Northeastern University and CPLJ Editor) and Burkhard Hess (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Comparative Procedural Law and CPLJ Editor)

4:00 PM          Ralf Michaels (Max Planck Institute Hamburg for Comparative and International Private Law)

            Decoloniality and Comparative Civil Procedure

4:30 PM          Discussion

5:00 PM          Intermission

5:15 PM          John Haley (University of Washington)

            Historical and Political factors Influencing Dispute Resolution

5:45 PM          Discussion

6:15 PM          End of conference

The full programme is available here.

Participation is free of charge, but registration is required by 1 June 2021 via a short e-mail to events@mpi.lu.

(Image credits:  Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam)

 

Semtech Corporation & Ors v Lacuna Space Ltd & Ors [2021] EWHC 1143 (Pat) at its core concerns an alleged breach of copyright between competitors, with former employees of one acting as a trojan horse in the conspiracy. Purvis DJ held [52 ff] with little difficulty (and with reference ia to Bosworth) that the claim however ‘relates to’ the contract of employment of the two main alleged culprits: ‘ the issues of the scope of their authority and the question of vitiation will be at the centre of their defence, and will have to be considered by reference to the contracts of employment which set out their duties and obligations with regard to Semtech. Thus, the employment contracts are not merely context and opportunity, they provide the entire legal framework for resolving Sornin and Sforza’s defence.’ The case against the two therefore needs to be brought in the employees’ domicile, France, and not in E&W.

Directing the judge away from what seems a prima facie applicable gateway in Brussels Ia is something creative counsel may of course attempt. In the case at issue, the employment DNA was all over the place rather than merely incidental. At 73-74 the judge adds that the protected categories section must of course be considered in isolation to give it its full effect: that the litigation will now splinter against various defendants cannot be rescued by an A8(1) anchor mechanism ‘sound administration of justice’ argument, nor any type of forum conveniens analysis.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.278 ff.

Semtech ea v Lacuna Space ea [2021] EWHC 1143 (Pat) (05 May 2021)
Jurisdiction, protected categories
A22(1) Brussels Ia
Proceedings found to 'relate to' contract of employmenthttps://t.co/3jhqXvK1qn

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 18, 2021

On 12 May 2021, the Court of Justice rendered its long-awaited judgment in the case Vereniging van Effectenbezitters v. BP. The case concerned the international jurisdiction for a collective action based on issuer liability for inaccurate, incomplete and misleading information in capital markets.

The Court ruled that under Article 7(2) Brussels I bis Regulation such actions may be brought at the place where the issuer is subject to statutory reporting obligations, which is usually the place where the financial instruments are traded on a stock exchange. In contrast, they could not be brought at the location of the investment account in which the financial instrument are held.

The ruling is important from a capital markets perspective, yet it also adds another piece to the puzzle of where to localise purely financial or economic loss.

Facts

The facts of this case go back to the accident at the Deep Water Horizon oil platform in 2010, which was one of the biggest environmental disasters of all time and laid the Southern coast of the U.S. to waste.

The Dutch action underlying the reference alleges that BP, who operated the platform, failed to properly inform its shareholders about its security and maintenance programme prior to the accident. What is particular about this case is that the claim was brought by an association under Dutch law as a collective action on behalf of all persons who bought, held or sold BP shares in the three years preceding the accident. It is also important that the shares of BP are dually listed in London and Frankfurt, but not in the Netherlands.

The Rechtbank Amsterdam and the Gerechtshof (Court of Appeal) Amsterdam denied international jurisdiction of the Dutch courts on the grounds that no damage was suffered in the Netherlands.

Legal Questions 

The Dutch Hoge Raad, to which the dispute was presented at last instance, decided to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU. It wanted to know whether Dutch courts have jurisdiction to decide over (1) the collective action, and (2) any individual claim that may be brought subsequently by BP investors. In addition, the Dutch highest court asked two questions on whether Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation determines, besides international jurisdiction, internal territorial jurisdiction as well.

Ruling

The CJEU held that the Dutch courts have no jurisdiction over the action brought. Importantly, the court also stated that this jurisdiction is independent of the collective nature of the action. It refused to answer the questions regarding international and internal territorial jurisdiction as they would be merely hypothetical at this stage.

Rationale

The reasoning of the CJEU centres around the well-known question of how purely financial damage is to be localised. This problem has already kept the CJEU busy in many other cases, e.g. Kronhofer, Marinari, Dumez, Kolassa, Universal Music and Löber, to name but a few.

Of these, the most relevant for the current case were Kolassa and Löber, given that both were as well concerned with allegations of incorrect investor information. However, the present case differs from these precedents in that it does not relate to deficiencies of informing the primary market – the market on which financial instruments are issued by the issuer to the investors – through a prospectus. Instead, it concerns deficient information of the secondary market – on which financial instruments are traded amongst investors – through insufficient ad hoc disclosure.

This difference is crucial. In Kolassa and Löber, the CJEU located the loss of investors on the primary market at the place of the investor’s domicile provided that it coincides with the place of establishment of the bank with which the investor held his account. The account meant here was most probably a payment account, because the investor had paid the financial instruments from this account and thus arguably suffered damage there.

The same reasoning could not be applied in the case of Effectenbezitters because many of the investors had already bought (and paid) the financial instruments on the secondary market when the deficient disclosure occurred. The most likely place of the damage they suffered was thus not the place of their payment account, but that of their investment account, i.e. the account in which they hold the BP shares. The difference is important because the payment and the investment account are not necessarily administered by the same institution, and thus do not need to be located at the same place.

Yet in the end, the CJEU did not localise the damage at the place of the investment account. Its main argument was that this would not ensure foreseeability of the competent court in the same way as in the Kolassa and Löber cases (para. 34). Indeed, investors in the secondary market potentially hold their investment accounts anywhere in the world. The issuer could thus not know in which country it may be sued for insufficient investor information.

Instead, the Court opts for the place in which the issuer has to comply with his statutory reporting obligation for the purposes of the listing of its shares on a stock exchange (para. 35). This solution is remarkable. It deviates from the conclusions by AG Sánchez-Bordona, who suggested to disapply Article 7(2) Brussels I bis in such cases for lack of an identifiable place of damage. The Court instead adopts for a ‘market localisation’ of the damage, which has long been defended in the literature.

The collective nature of the action brought is, in the opinion of the Court, “not in itself decisive” for the determination of the place where the harmful event occurred in the sense of Article 7(2) Brussels I bis (para. 36). It thus does not matter for jurisdictional purposes whether the claim is brought on behalf of a number of investors or by an individual investor. In either event, the Dutch courts had no jurisdiction because the BP shares were not listed in the Netherlands.

Provisional Assessment

The ruling of the CJEU is to be welcomed. In particular, the Court must be applauded for rejecting to localise the at the place of the investment account, since such a localisation would have resulted in a dispersal of court competence. This would not only have led to unforeseeable venues from the point of view of the issuer, but also been disadvantageous for investors, as they could have brought a collective action exclusively at the domicile of the issuer (Article 4 in conjunction with Article 63 Brussels I bis).

The solution chosen by the Court to retain the place where shares are listed as the place of damage is certainly ingenuous. This criterion leads to predictable results and chimes well with the regulatory duties, which largely depend on the place where the instruments are traded. It also facilitates the bundling of investor claims in collective actions, provided that the law of the country of listing disposes of a mechanism for collective redress. The Court is also right in holding that collective action and individual actions are not treated differently under the current Brussels Ibis regime.

Two points remain open: (1) the place of damage in case of dual listings in the EU, and (2) the place of damage in case of non-listed financial instruments (those that are traded over the counter – OTC). The Court will possibly have the opportunity to clarify these points in later rulings.

While the decision of the CJEU is thus satisfying from a policy point of view, it is hard to reconcile with the option offered in the Bier case between the ‘place where the damage occurred’ and the ‘place of the event which gives rise to and is at the origin of that damage’.

The CJEU allegedly determined the first place in Effectenbezitters, but it needs considerable tongue twisting to say that the ‘damage occurred’ at the place where the issuer failed to fulfil its statutory duties of information. This is rather the place at the origin of the damage than that where the damage occurred. This point is important, as it may create difficulties in the context of Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation, which has taken up the first-mentioned prong of the Bier case and refers to the ‘law of the country in which damage occurs’. In reality, the CJEU has created a new, special localisation rule for wrongful investor information cases, which deviates partially from the Bier case. Transposing this case law to the Rome II Regulation may be difficult.

This is merely a first assessment of the case. The European Association of Private International Law will use the occasion of this ruling for an online symposium on the localisation of financial loss. The question is of general importance and has already been addressed several times on this blog (see e.g. the CJEUs Volkswagen judgement or Rechtbank Rotterdam’s judgment in Petrobas). We will discuss it in more depth, with the first contribution coming from Laura van Bochove (Leiden).

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑913/19 (CNP spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością v Gefion Insurance A/S), which is about Brussels I bis:

“1. Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […], read in conjunction with Article 10 thereof, must be interpreted as not applying in the case of a dispute between, on the one hand, a business which has acquired a claim originally held by an injured party against a civil liability insurance undertaking and, on the other hand, that same civil liability insurance undertaking, so that it does not preclude jurisdiction to hear and determine such a dispute from being founded on Article 7(2) or Article 7(5) of that regulation, as appropriate.

2. Article 7(5) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that an undertaking which adjusts losses in the context of motor liability insurance in one Member State pursuant to a contract concluded with an insurance undertaking established in another Member State, in the name and on behalf of that undertaking, must be regarded as being a branch, agency or other establishment, within the meaning of that provision, where that undertaking:

–        has the appearance of permanency, such as an extension of the insurance undertaking; and

–        has a management and is materially equipped to negotiate business with third parties, so that they do not have to deal directly with the insurance undertaking”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=241468&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5098926

Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered today his opinion in case C‑25/20 (Alpine Bau), which is about the Insolvency Regulation. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 32, paragraphe 2, du règlement (CE) no 1346/2000 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que, lorsque le syndic d’une procédure principale d’insolvabilité produit les créances dans une procédure secondaire, les délais de production de ces créances, ainsi que les conséquences de leur production tardive, sont régis par la loi de l’État dans lequel la procédure secondaire a été ouverte ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=241485&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5098907

The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered on Tuesday (18 May 2021) an important decision on the Rule of Law in Romania (joint cases C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 et C‑397/19). The judgment is currently available only in a selection of EU official languages, and it is not available in English either. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« 1) La décision 2006/928/CE de la Commission, du 13 décembre 2006, établissant un mécanisme de coopération et de vérification des progrès réalisés par la Roumanie en vue d’atteindre certains objectifs de référence spécifiques en matière de réforme du système judiciaire et de lutte contre la corruption, ainsi que les rapports établis par la Commission européenne sur la base de cette décision constituent des actes pris par une institution de l’Union, susceptibles d’être interprétés par la Cour au titre de l’article 267 TFUE.

2) Les articles 2, 37 et 38 de l’acte relatif aux conditions d’adhésion à l’Union européenne de la République de Bulgarie et de la Roumanie et aux adaptations des traités sur lesquels est fondée l’Union européenne, lus en combinaison avec les articles 2 et 49 TUE, doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la décision 2006/928 relève, en ce qui concerne sa nature juridique, son contenu et ses effets dans le temps, du champ d’application du traité entre les États membres de l’Union européenne et la République de Bulgarie et la Roumanie, relatif à l’adhésion de la République de Bulgarie et de la Roumanie à l’Union européenne. Cette décision est, aussi longtemps qu’elle n’a pas été abrogée, obligatoire dans tous ses éléments pour la Roumanie. Les objectifs de référence qui figurent à son annexe visent à assurer le respect, par cet État membre, de la valeur de l’État de droit énoncée à l’article 2 TUE et revêtent un caractère contraignant pour ledit État membre, en ce sens que ce dernier est tenu de prendre les mesures appropriées aux fins de la réalisation de ces objectifs, en tenant dûment compte, au titre du principe de coopération loyale énoncé à l’article 4, paragraphe 3, TUE, des rapports établis par la Commission sur la base de ladite décision, en particulier des recommandations formulées dans lesdits rapports.

3) Les réglementations régissant l’organisation de la justice en Roumanie, telles que celles relatives à la nomination ad interim aux postes de direction de l’Inspection judiciaire et à l’institution d’une section du ministère public chargée des enquêtes sur les infractions commises au sein du système judiciaire, relèvent du champ d’application de la décision 2006/928, de sorte qu’elles doivent respecter les exigences découlant du droit de l’Union et, en particulier, de la valeur de l’État de droit énoncée à l’article 2 TUE.

4) L’article 2 et l’article 19, paragraphe 1, second alinéa, TUE ainsi que la décision 2006/928 doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils s’opposent à une réglementation nationale adoptée par le gouvernement d’un État membre, qui permet à ce dernier de procéder à des nominations intérimaires aux postes de direction de l’organe judiciaire chargé de mener des enquêtes disciplinaires et d’exercer l’action disciplinaire à l’encontre des juges et des procureurs, sans que soit respectée la procédure de nomination ordinaire prévue par le droit national, lorsque cette réglementation est de nature à faire naître des doutes légitimes quant à l’utilisation des prérogatives et des fonctions de cet organe comme instrument de pression sur l’activité de ces juges et procureurs ou de contrôle politique de cette activité.

5) L’article 2 et l’article 19, paragraphe 1, second alinéa, TUE ainsi que la décision 2006/928 doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils s’opposent à une réglementation nationale prévoyant la création d’une section spécialisée du ministère public disposant d’une compétence exclusive pour mener des enquêtes sur les infractions commises par les juges et les procureurs, sans que la création d’une telle section

–        soit justifiée par des impératifs objectifs et vérifiables tirés de la bonne administration de la justice et

–        soit assortie de garanties spécifiques permettant, d’une part, d’écarter tout risque que cette section soit utilisée comme un instrument de contrôle politique de l’activité de ces juges et procureurs susceptible de porter atteinte à leur indépendance et, d’autre part, d’assurer que cette compétence puisse être exercée à l’égard de ces derniers dans le plein respect des exigences découlant des articles 47 et 48 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne.

6) L’article 2 et l’article 19, paragraphe 1, second alinéa, TUE doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils ne s’opposent pas à une réglementation nationale régissant la responsabilité patrimoniale de l’État et la responsabilité personnelle des juges au titre des dommages causés par une erreur judiciaire, qui définit la notion d’« erreur judiciaire » en des termes généraux et abstraits. En revanche, ces mêmes dispositions doivent être interprétées en ce sens qu’elles s’opposent à une telle réglementation lorsqu’elle prévoit que le constat de l’existence d’une erreur judiciaire, effectué dans le cadre de la procédure visant à la mise en cause de la responsabilité patrimoniale de l’État et sans que le juge concerné ait été entendu, s’impose dans le cadre de la procédure subséquente liée à une action récursoire visant à la mise en cause de la responsabilité personnelle de celui-ci et lorsqu’elle ne comporte pas, d’une manière générale, les garanties nécessaires pour éviter qu’une telle action récursoire soit utilisée comme instrument de pression sur l’activité juridictionnelle et pour assurer le respect des droits de la défense du juge concerné afin que se trouve écarté tout doute légitime, dans l’esprit des justiciables, quant à l’imperméabilité des juges à l’égard d’éléments extérieurs susceptibles d’orienter leurs décisions et exclue une absence d’apparence d’indépendance ou d’impartialité de ces juges de nature à porter atteinte à la confiance que la justice doit inspirer à ces mêmes justiciables dans une société démocratique et un État de droit.

7) Le principe de primauté du droit de l’Union doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il s’oppose à une réglementation de rang constitutionnel d’un État membre, telle qu’interprétée par la juridiction constitutionnelle de celui-ci, selon laquelle une juridiction de rang inférieur n’est pas autorisée à laisser inappliquée, de sa propre autorité, une disposition nationale relevant du champ d’application de la décision 2006/928, qu’elle considère, à la lumière d’un arrêt de la Cour, comme étant contraire à cette décision ou à l’article 19, paragraphe 1, second alinéa, TUE ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=241381&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5098836

The Nigerian Group on Private International Law (“NGPIL”) will hold its inaugural lecture on June 21, 2021 at 6pm CEST and 5pm BST. Registration and attendance online is free. For more information on the programme and registration  see the  NGPIL flyer and the NGPIL inaugural programme.

 

The Organization of American States (OAS) is organizing a virtual forum as noted in the poster above. It will take place on Monday 24 May 2021 at 11 am (Washington USA time). For more information, click here.

This event will be held in Spanish only and is free of charge. The event will also be streamed live via social media networks.

This event follows an important and recent milestone of the OAS in which the Inter-American Juridical Committee completed its 98th Regular Session approving the Principles on Privacy and Protection of Personal Data and Supporting the Hague Principles on the Choice of Law Applicable to International Commercial Contracts. Click here for the specific resolution (9 April 2021) and here for general information.

In February 2019, the Inter-American Juridical Committee adopted the “Guide on the Law Applicable to International Commercial Contracts in the Americas.”

From 9 to 11 September 2021, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law will host a conference titled The Private Side of Transforming our World – UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030 and the Role of Private International Law. Depending on the course of the pandemic, the organizers plan that the conference will take place either at the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg virtually or in a hybrid form. An official invitation was issued and registration is now open.

The conference is designed to present findings of the research project bearing the same title led by Ralf Michaels (Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law), Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm (University of Edinburgh) and Hans van Loon (former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law). The project, as explained by its leaders, “aims to raise an awareness of how PIL – with its methods and institutions – is also capable of making a significant contribution in the quest for sustainable development” defined in UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030. The edited volume presenting findings of the project will be published by Intersentia and is scheduled to be released in September 2021, to be ready for the conference. The volume will be freely accessible online, in open access.

The following 19 contributors involved in the project will present and discuss their findings on respective SDGs (the exact conference program will be ready in the coming weeks):

SDG 1 No Poverty

Benyam Dawit Mezmur (University of the Western Cape, South Africa)

SDG 2 Zero Hunger

Jeannette Tramhel (Organization of American States, United States of America)

SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being

Anabela Susana de Sousa Gonçalves (Universidade do Minho, Portugal)

SDG 4 Quality Education

Klaus Beiter (North-West University, South Africa)

SDG 5 Gender Equality

Gülüm Özçelik (Bilkent Üniversitesi, Turkey)

SDG 6 Clean Water and Sanitation

Richard Frimpong Oppong (Kamloops, Canada)

SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy

Nikitas E. Hatzimihail (University of Cyprus, Cyprus)

SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth

Ulla Liukkunen (University of Helsinki, Finland)

SDG 9 Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure

Vivienne Bath (University of Sydney, Australia)

SDG 10 Reduced Inequality

Thalia Kruger (Universiteit Antwerp, Belgium)

SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities

Klaas Hendrik Eller (Universiteit van Amsterdam, Netherlands)

SDG 12 Responsible Consumption and Production

Geneviève Saumier (McGill University, Canada)

SDG 13 Climate Action

Eduardo Álvarez-Armas (Brunel University London, United Kingdom and Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium)

SDG 14 Life Below Water

Tajudeen Sanni (Kampala International University, Uganda)

SDG 15 Life on Land

Drossos Stamboulakis (Monash University, Australia)
Jay Sanderson (University of the Sunshine Coast, Australia)

SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Sabine Corneloup (Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, France)
Jinske Verhellen (Universiteit Gent, Belgium)

SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals

Fabricio Polido (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazil)

The preliminary programme for the TMC Asser Institute Masterclass on investing in English speaking Africa through private international law is now out.

During a two-day masterclass Chukwuma Okoli from the TMC Asser Institute will be joined by experts in the field of private international law such a Dr Pontian Okoli, lecturer in Private International Law and Commercial Law at the University of Stirling, Scotland, Professor Elsabe Schoeman, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, Richard Frimpong Oppong, Associate Professor a the University of Bradford School of Law, and Anthony Kennedy, Associate Member of Serle Court Chambers in London.

 

These professionals will offer you theoretical and practical insights into commercial law, private international law and transnational litigation. Among other topics, they will discuss the questions of jurisdiction, choice of court agreements, foreign currency obligations, and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Knowledge of these topics in English-speaking Africa is essential for effective investment, as the number of international commercial transactions on the continent grows.

 

For more information please visit the event page.

 

Relevance for investment

Africa’s population is approximately one billion people, and its growing population is expected to reach nearly 2.2 trillion dollars in consumer spending by 2030. The recent African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA) Agreement seeks to create free movement of persons, goods and services within the African Union. This has accentuated the role of private international law in resolving potential cross-border disputes involving international commercial actors. Lawyers, judges, arbitrators and other stakeholders will have to gain advanced knowledge of the specific operation of private international law in the African context.

 

PO points

Dutch lawyers can obtain 10 PO points for their attendance.

 

About the masterclass series

Lifelong learning is essential for those engaged in today’s legal and business world. The Asser Academy Masterclass series are short courses tailored to professionals who wish to deepen their knowledge, stay up-to-date and remain competitive by mastering skills the global market needs. The Asser Academy Masterclass series will combine the cutting-edge knowledge of academia with the hands-on experience of practitioners.

 

Date: 24 – 25 June 2021

Fee: €995,- €745,-(IJI and Asser clients),- €495,-(Students and NGO-workers)

Venue: Online

Organiser: T.M.C. Asser Instituut

The European Group of Private International Law, also known as GEDIP (Groupe européen de droit international privé), has just launched a new website.

Created in 1991, GEDIP aims to study the interactions of private international law and European law in the broad sense. It is a place for the exchange of information and ideas for scientific and academic purposes, bringing together a small number of colleagues, mainly from Universities in various Member States of the European Union. The Group, chaired by Catherine Kessedjian, holds an annual three-day meeting at the invitation of a member.

The new website, which is bilingual (English and French), provides for easier and more comprehensive access to information regarding the Group’s activities, namely the documents adopted by the Group over the years and the papers drafted by individual members in preparation of the meetings.

Searches within the Group’s rich collection can be made by meeting and by topic.

The new website, like the previous one, also includes a list of acts and conventions (or projects) related to the European Union which include provisions of private international law.

The latest issue of RabelsZ has just been published. It features the following articles:

Horst Eidenmüller: Recht und Ökonomik des Extremsport-Sponsorings in vergleichender Perspektive, Volume 85 (2021) / Issue 2, pp. 273-325 (53), DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2021-0002

The Law and Economics of Extreme Sports Sponsoring in Comparative Perspective. – This article investigates the law and economics of extreme sports sponsoring in a comparative perspective. It is based on 40 structured interviews with sponsored athletes from various common law and civil law jurisdictions. The article demonstrates that the current contracting practice is unbalanced and inefficient. It entices athletes to take unreasonably high risks. There are ways to significantly increase the cooperative surplus compared to the status quo. The article further demonstrates that sponsor firms face increased and mandatory duties of care towards young and/or inexperienced athletes. In particular, such athletes should not be influenced by bonus systems in their risk-taking behaviour. The duties of care of a sponsor under contract and/or tort law are also determined by the degree of control exercised by a sponsor and the economic dependence of the athlete on the sponsor. This allows creating a finely tuned regulatory system that, unlike the dichotomy of an independent contractor and dependent worker, is better able to do justice to individual cases.

Arnald J. Kanning: Unification of Commercial Contract Law: The Role of the Dominant Economy, Volume 85 (2021) / Issue 2, pp. 326-356 (31), DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2021-0003

This paper is about the unification of commercial contract law. Showing that the legal rules preferred by the “dominant economy” frequently end up in uniform commercial contract laws does not show that those legal rules are inherently superior to any other legal rules. It will be argued that approval of a uniform commercial contract law by the “dominant economy” is the environmental factor that is crucial to its ultimate success, independent of the innate quality of the legal rules preferred by the “dominant economy”. Within the conceptual framework of historical and comparative institutional analysis (HCIA), a study is offered of several well-known attempts to unify (and codify) divergent bodies of commercial contract law in the past two centuries. The argument is not so much that the American UCC Article 2 on Sales greatly influenced the CISG as that United States adoption of the CISG was crucial to its ultimate success, independent of the innate quality of the legal rules preferred by the United States.

Justus Meyer: Die praktische Bedeutung des UN-Kaufrechts in Deutschland, Volume 85 (2021) / Issue 2, pp. 357-401 (45), DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2021-0004

The Practical Significance of the CISG in Germany. – The UN Sales Law is in different respects a clear success: worldwide, reforms of contract law are oriented towards the CISG. In September 2020 Portugal became the 94th contracting state. The importance of international trade in goods is steadily increasing. However, there is still uncertainty about the acceptance of UN sales law by internationally operating companies and their legal advisors. The present study is based on a survey of 554 attorneys in Germany and compares the answers with results from 2004 as well as from Austria and Switzerland. According to this survey, the international sales contracts heard by courts and arbitrators are predominantly not subject to UN sales law and the proportion of those who regularly use a choice-of-law clause with CISG exclusion has even risen from 42.2 to 52.9 % since 2004. In Austria and Switzerland this proportion has also risen and is even higher than in Germany. Many lawyers are well aware of the advantages of a neutral legal regime. However, it seems to be easier for them to recommend choice-of-law clauses that exclusively invoke domestic law.

Krzysztof Riedl: Natural Obligations in Comparative Perspective, Volume 85 (2021) / Issue 2, pp. 402-433 (32), DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2021-0005

A natural obligation (obligatio naturalis) is a legal construction whose roots stretch back to Roman law. This common source means that we will find similar solutions in legal systems descended from Roman legal culture – with respect to both the understanding of natural obligations and specific instances where they arise. The aim of this paper is to answer the question of whether these different systems define natural obligations in the same manner or whether the natural obligations encountered in these systems are distinct legal institutions sharing only a common name. In this paper, the various approaches of contemporary legal systems to this issue are characterized. Then, a comparative-law analysis focuses on three fundamental aspects of natural obligations: their legal construction (definition), a catalogue of instances, and their legal effectiveness. Under the constructional perspective, two basic models of obligatio naturalis are distinguished and discussed – the obligative model and the causal model – and it is around these two models which the particular conceptions converge. The analysis presented in the paper demonstrates that the similarities between the various models outweigh the differences. This permits us to refer to obligatio naturalis as a universal legal construction.

Ludovic Pailler (University of Lyon 3)  has just published a monograph on respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the European judicial area in civil and commercial matters, based on his doctoral thesis: Le respect de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne dans l’espace judiciaire européen en matière civile et commerciale, Pedone, 2021.

The author has provided the following abstract in English:

When the Treaty of Lisbon gave the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union its legally binding force, it gave rise, in article 67, paragraph 1, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to a legal obligation to respect fundamental rights while building the Freedom, Security and Justice Area. As this legal obligation concerns all the rules of this space, it raises questions in the European Judicial Area in civil and commercial matter where rules coordinating national legal systems are partially resistant to the influence of fundamental rights. Polysemy of the notion of respect make it possible to consider different ways for the Charter and the European Judicial Area law to interact. If the hierarchical principle seems to be the most obvious way to ensure the respect of the Charter, it transpires to be inappropriate by itself and because of the specific context fort the application of the Charter commanded by the European Judicial Area. So, it would be more convenient to substitute the hierarchical principle with a more supple way of interaction, the combination, so as to conform the studied space to the article 67, paragraph 1, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

More details are available here, including a foreword by Fabien Marchadier (University of Poitiers) and Eric Garaud (University of Limoges) and the table of contents (here).

 

On 12 May, 2021, Advocate General Hogan delivered his opinion in Case C‑124/20 Bank Melli Iran v. Telekom Deutschland GmbH on the interpretation of the EU blocking statute (Regulation 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extraterritorial application of legislation adopted by a third country).

The context of the case was the newly reinstated sanctions of the U.S. against Iran. The main issue raised in the case was that of the impact of Article 5 of the blocking statute on the right of EU businesses to terminate private contracts.

Article 5 reads:

No person referred to in Article 11 shall comply, whether directly or through a subsidiary or other intermediary person, actively or by deliberate omission, with any requirement or prohibition, including requests of foreign courts, based on or resulting, directly or indirectly, from the laws specified in the Annex or from actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.

Persons may be authorised, in accordance with the procedures provided in Articles 7 and 8, to comply fully or partially (…).

Background

The German branch of Bank Melli Iran had entered into a framework contract with Telekom Deutschland GmbH which allowed Bank Melli to group all its company connections at various sites in Germany under one contract. In the context of this contractual relationship, Bank Melli ordered different services which formed the exclusive basis of its internal and external communication structures in Germany and were therefore indispensable to its business activities.

After the Trump administration decided that the U.S. would withdraw from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action aimed at controlling Iran’s nuclear programme and lifting economic sanctions against Iran, the U.S. reinstated sanctions against Iran in 2018.

In November 2018, ten days after the new U.S. sanctions entered into force, Telekom Deutschland GmbH terminated its contract with Bank Melli. It gave similar notice to four other German based entities with connections with Iran.

Bank Melli brought proceedings against Telekom Deutschland GmbH in a German court based on the infringement of the EU blocking statute and requesting performance of the contract.

Obligation to Give Reasons to Terminate Contracts

The most far reaching proposition of A.G. Hogan is to consider that the effet utile of Article 5 of the Blocking Statute requires a redistribution of the burden of proof. He opined that private parties terminating contracts in circumstances where they might be subject to foreign sanctions should have a duty to demonstrate that they did not do so because of the said sanctions.

Article 5 would therefore establish a duty to give the reasons for terminating the contract. Article 5 would also require that the reason be precise and objective, so that it could be verified that it was not to comply with the foreign sanction legislation.

AG Hogan explained:

89. (…) it (…) follows from the uncompromising terms of the first paragraph of Article 5 of the EU blocking statute that – in principle, at least – an undertaking seeking to terminate an otherwise valid contract with an Iranian entity subject to the US sanctions must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the referring court that it did not do so by reason of its desire to comply with those sanctions.

Should the CJEU follow A.G. Hogan, a first consequence would be that persons subject to the EU regulation could not rely on their freedom of terminate contracts without giving reasons under the law governing the contract. Article 5 of the blocking statute would establish an obligation to give a reason for terminating, or refusing to enter into, a contractual relationship with a person sanctioned by the relevant foreign legislation.

A second consequence would be that contractual clauses granting broad discretion to a contractual party to terminate the contract on vague regulatory grounds would be unenforceable. A.G. Hogan explained:

In particular, in my view, a person referred to in Article 11 of that statute should not be able to invoke a termination clause for force majeure to justify the termination of the contractual relationship without at least demonstrating that the event constituting force majeure is unrelated to the US sanctions legislation listed in the annex to that statute.

Sanctions: Punishing vs Redressing

Article 5 does not provide sanctions for the obligations that it establishes.

A.G. Hogan concluded that, in principle, it was for each Member State to lay down sanctions for infringements of the provision, and that their margin of discretion would be wide as far as punitive sanctions are concerned.

However, he opined that the margin of discretion of Member States would be very limited for civil sanctions, and that they would be bound to provide full effect to the provision by offering remedies which would put right-holders in the situation they would have been in in the absence of that unlawfulness.

108. Accordingly, I consider that, in the event of a breach of a provision prescribing a rule of conduct which must be complied with on a continuing basis (such as here), the national courts are required to order the infringer to put an end to the breach, on pain of a periodic penalty payment or other appropriate sanction, since only then can the continuing effects of the unlawfulness committed be brought to an end and compliance with EU law fully guaranteed.

Other Issues

The conclusions are long and address a number of other issues.

A.G. Hogan concluded by the following summary:

1) The first paragraph of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 … is to be interpreted as not applying only where an administrative or judicial authority of a country whose laws and regulations are listed in the annex to that regulation has addressed, directly or indirectly, some instructions to a person referred to in Article 11 of that regulation. The prohibition contained in this provision accordingly applies even in the event that an operator complies with such legislation without first having been compelled by a foreign administrative or judicial agency to do so.

2) The first paragraph of Article 5 of Regulation No 2271/96 is to be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of national law under which a person referred to in Article 11 of that regulation may terminate a continuing contractual obligation with a contracting party named on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List held by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control, without ever having to justify its decision to terminate those contracts.

3) The first paragraph of Article 5 of Regulation No 2271/96 is to be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of a failure to comply with the provisions of that article, the national court seised by a contracting party subject to primary sanctions is required to order a person referred to in Article 11 of that regulation to maintain that contractual relationship, even though, first, the second paragraph of Article 5 should be interpreted restrictively, secondly, such an injunction measure is liable to infringe Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and, thirdly, such a person is therefore liable to be severely penalised by the authorities responsible for applying one of the laws referred to in the annex to that regulation.

The Conference “the Office of the Judge and the Conflict-of-Law Rule” (L’office du juge et la règle de conflit de lois) will be held on Monday 17 May 2021 (in French) and will be streamed live via the Cour de cassation website and social media networks.

This Conference is part of the Lecture Series “Thinking about the office of the judge” (Penser l’office du juge) – 2020-2021 (directed by Sylvie Perdriolle, Honorary President of the Chamber, Sylvaine Poillot-Peruzzetto, Judge at the French Cour de cassation, and Lukas Rass-Masson, professor at the University of Toulouse 1 Capitole).

The programme is as follows:

5:00 p.m. – The Office of the Judge and the Nature of the Conflict-of-Law Rule
Nicolas Nord, Secretary General of the International Commission on Civil Status, Co-chairman of the China Section of the Société de législation comparée
Gian Paolo Romano, Professor at the University of Geneva, Co-director of the Yearbook of International Private Law

5:40 p.m. – The Office of the Judge and the European Conflict-of-Law Rule
Lukas Rass-Masson, Professor at the University of Toulouse I Capitole, Director of the European School of Law Toulouse

6:05 p.m. – The Office of the Judge and the Application of the Conflict-of-Law Rule
François Mélin, Judge at the Court of Appeal of Paris

18:30 p.m. – Discussion

Moderators:
François Ancel, President of the International Commercial Chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal
Gustavo Cerqueira, Professor at the University of Nîmes, France

 

For several years, Greek scholars and practitioners had no access to a periodical in Greek specialized in Private International Law and International Civil Litigation.

Upon the initiative of Prof. Vrellis, a Private International Law Review [Κοινοδίκιον = Koinodikion] was published biannually between 1995-2003. Since then, conflict of laws issues were hosted in law reviews which were concerned generally with civil, commercial and civil procedure law.

Those days are now over! A new quarterly has just been launched by Sakkoulas Publications. ‘Lex & Forum’ is a brand new review, focusing on civil and commercial cross border matters from a European or international perspective.

Lex & Forum will host articles, notes, comments and book reviews in Greek and major European languages; it will publish rulings of international and national courts alike, not limited to the Greek legal order; finally, it will cover developments and report on news in the field of Private International Law.

The first issue contains an article by the Greek Judge at the CJEU, Michail Vilaras, and an extensive focus on judicial cooperation after Brexit, reflecting a webinar, organized earlier this year. The issue also comes with comments on recent rulings rendered by the CJEU (namely C-500/18, Reliantco, C-774/19, Personal Exchange, and C-272/18, VKI), as well as by Greek courts (among them, Supreme Court No 662/2020, and Court of Appeal of Piraeus No 120/2021, reported in this blog here, and here), UK courts [High Court of Justice, Gategroup Guarantee, EWHC 304(Ch)2021], and Swiss courts (Bezirksgericht Zürich, 24 February  2021).

The first issue contains an introductory note drafted by the scientific directors, Mr Arvanitakis, Ordinary Professor at the law faculty of the Aristotle University, Thessaloniki, and Mr Kranis, former Vice President of Areios Pagos, the Hellenic Supreme Court, and ex Vice Minister of Justice. The team of editors consists of academics, judges, staff members of the Ministry of Justice, lawyers, and Phd candidates in the field.

In response to the EU Commission’s formal refusal to allow the UK to accede to the Lugano Convention, a coalation between several NGOs and legal scholars, lead by the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ) has issued an open letter, calling upon the EU to reverse this decision. In essence, they argue that a full return to the common-law rules on jurisdiction, including the forum non conveniens doctrine, will reduce access to the UK courts in cases of corporate human-rights abuses, which has only recently been rendered much more attractive by the UK Supreme Court’s decisions in Vedanta v Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 and Okpabi v Shell [2021] UKSC 3.

The full letter can be found here. It is still open for signatures (via e-mail to christopher.patz[at]corporatejustice.org).