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On 31 July 2020, the Depositary (i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) notified that the Marshall Islands acceded to the HCCH Service Convention. A six-month period for filing objections has been set to run from the date of the Depositary’s notification until 31 January 2021. In the absence of any objection from an already ratifying State, the Convention will enter into force for the Marshall Islands on 1 February 2021.

So far the Marshall Islands has made no declarations under the treaty (think for example of Articles 8, 10, 15 and 16). Nor has it designated Central Authority. While this can be done at a later date, it is undoubtedly of great importance that the designation of Central Authority be made as soon as possible for the treaty to operate smoothly and avoid potential objections, even if this is only a theoretical possibility as the objection-mechanism has never been used in practice.

In the Pacific region, there are a few other States already a party to the Service Convention, such as the Philippines (date of entry into force: 1 October 2020!), Japan and Australia.

The HCCH news item is available here.

The Hague Conference announced today that the Marshall Islands ratified on 29 July 2020 the Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, which will enter into force for this country on 1 February 2021.

Source: here

Directive (EU) 2020/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 laying down specific rules with respect to Directive 96/71/EC and Directive 2014/67/EU for posting drivers in the road transport sector and amending Directive 2006/22/EC as regards enforcement requirements and Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012  has been published today at the OJEU (L 249, 31.7.2020, p. 49).

Readers of this blog will be interested in particular by Article 1 paragraphs 1 to 9.

The Directive should be read with the declaration of the European Commission on the “Mobility Package I on road transport”, equally published at the OJEU (C 252, 31.7.2020, p. 1).

Sources: here et there

Recently published paper The Reception of Collective Actions in Europe: Reconstructing the Mental Process of a Legal Transplantation, authored by Csongor István Nagy, Professor at the University of Szeged, is a must read for those studying collective actions in EU. It is intended to identify the differentia specifica of the European collective actions as opposed to those in US, which in itself is not an easy task as there are various models in different Member States. However, the paper elegantly navigates these waters and offers a firm grasp of the history and present state on this increasingly important topic on this side of the Atlantic (you may track the EU developments at the legislative train site). For the rest, you need to read the paper…

It is published in Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2020, No. 2, pp. 413-443 (2020), and also available at SSRN.

Apostolos Anthimos has posted on SSRN a paper titled Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Field of Bilateral Conventions of Greece with Balkan States.

The purpose of this paper is to present the current legislative framework and the practice of Greek courts with respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments falling under the scope of bilateral conventions signed with Balkan States. Prior to presenting individual conventions and related case-law, few brief remarks are given on the role of bilateral treaties in the Greek landscape. A special chapter is dedicated to the conditions for recognition and enforcement, cutting horizontally through all conventions included in the scope of this paper. The findings of the research suggest that, on a bilateral level, judgments from the Balkan States are generally recognized in Greece.

Readers of this blog may be interested to hear of a new textbook on private international law, recently published by LexisNexis. The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand is the first comprehensive treatment of the subject from a New Zealand perspective. Drawing on principles developed in common law countries while adopting a comparative perspective, it explains how New Zealand law has developed into an indigenous body of rules to deal with problems of jurisdiction, choice of law, recognition of judgments and international civil procedure. The textbook may be of interest to scholars and academics outside New Zealand who are looking for a comparative treatment of problems in modern private international law, as well as any lawyers who find themselves interacting with New Zealand law in practice.

The first part of the book covers the four distinct functions of the conflict of laws: adjudicatory jurisdiction (including personal and subject-matter jurisdiction), choice of law, recognition and enforcement of judgments, and international civil procedure. The second part of the book addresses the conflict of laws rules as they relate to the main subject areas of private law, including obligations, property and trusts, succession, family law and corporations and insolvency

After years of discussion the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament have finally reached agreement on the reform of the Evidence and the Service Regulation. The new rules aim to improve the cross-border taking of evidence as well as the cross-border service of documents in particular through an enhanced use of information technology (notably electronic communication and videoconferencing).

The European Parliament’s official press release is available here. For a more detailed coverage see the contributions on the International Litigation Blog and the EAPIL Blog. 

Written by Vito Bumbaca, University of Geneva

On 16 July the CJEU issued its preliminary ruling in case E.E. & K.-D. E. (CJEU, C-80/19, ECLI:EU:C:2020:569, not yet available in English). The case concerned, inter alia, the assessment of the deceased’s habitual residence under the EU Succession Regulation No. 650/2012. Given the novelty of the ruling, which represents the very first CJEU assessment of the deceased’s habitual residence under the EU Succession Regulation, we will focus on this particular aspect only.

Facts:

A Lithuanian mother and her son moved to Germany to live with the mother’s husband. Prior to her death in Germany, she drew up a testament in Lithuania, naming her son as her sole heir. The mother owned an apartment in Lithuania and when she died (in Germany), her son approached a notary in Lithuania concerning the apartment and in order to obtain a Certificate of Succession. This notary refused both requests based on their interpretation of the EU Succession Regulation according to which the deceased’s last habitual residence was in Germany at the time of death. The deceased’s son appealed against such a decision; subsequently the proceedings reached the Lithuanian Supreme Court (Lietuvos Aukš?iausiasis Teismas), which decided to stay proceedings and ask the preliminary ruling of the CJEU. The CJEU found that a person can have only one habitual residence.

Relevance:

This is the first CJEU ruling on the determination of the deceased’s habitual residence under the EU Succession Regulation.

It is  welcomed to the extent that it provides a guiding assessment of the hierarchical order and practical implementation of recitals 23, 24 and 25. These are considered as explanatory rules for the determination of international competence and applicable law in matters of EU 25 cross-border succession based on habitual residence as a primary connecting factor.

Specifically, the Court clarifies which key factors should be assessed in the determination of the deceased’s habitual residence by virtue of the above-mentioned recitals and in line with the objectives followed by the EU Succession Regulation. Furthermore, it confirms that, when assessing the deceased’s habitual residence at the time of death, a lengthy determination of the deceased’s life circumstances preceding his/her death should be made. Lastly, it leaves unresolved the factual assessment of the manifestly closest connection criterion applicable on an exceptional basis.

Brief analysis:

According to the Court, the deceased cannot simultaneously have more than one habitual residence at the time of death (§ 41). This however does not exclude the possibility of acquiring an alternative and consecutive habitual residence at different points in time during the deceased’s life. The Court indicated that by virtue of recital 23 the main element in determining the deceased’s habitual residence is the stability of his/ her stay, and therefore of his/ her physical presence, at the time of death (§ 38). In the absence of stability, therefore on a subsidiary basis (§ 39), recital 24 advises national authorities, in some circumstances including notaries (§ 46), to refer to the deceased’s nationality (personal factor) and/ or assets (economic factor). Finally, the criterion relating to the “manifestly closest connection” in relation to the determination of applicable law will have to be applied in a strict manner and not subsidiary to the complex determination of habitual residence, in accordance with the principles of predictability and legal certainty as provided for by the EU Regulation (§ 37). The exceptional use of the “manifestly closest connection” criterion, however, is left to the judicial discretion of the first seised national courts (§ 45).

Ultimately, according to the Court’s reasoning, which follows the Advocate General’s Opinion of 26 March 2020 (§ 52), the element of stability relating to the deceased’s physical presence at the time of death must be sought in the reasons (subjective element) and the conditions (objective element) of his/ her stay showing a close and stable link between the succession and the given State, in line with the objectives of the EU Succession Regulation (§ 37). The assessment of both objective and subjective elements, and generally of habitual residence, should consider the deceased’s life circumstances at the time of death and the years preceding his/ her death (§ 23). Such a “lengthy” determination of the deceased’s life assessment leaves the debate open as to its pertinence in an increasingly globalised society within which cross-border settlements regularly occur, in particular when involving expats holding multiple nationalities and various assets in different countries.

Lastly, the Court has made clear that the habitual residence assessment must be twofold in matters of competence and threefold in relation to applicable law. With regard to competence, according to the Advocate General, the Court first seised will have to look primarily at the duration and regularity of the deceased’s settlement and subsidiarily at his/ her nationality and/ or assets. In relation to the deceased’s settlement, the Advocate General clarified that duration (time factor) cannot be considered, in itself, a decisive element and that it should be accompanied by other relevant factors such as the deceased’s family and social integration, or his/ her proximity to the State in question (Advocate General’s Opinion, § 54). Furthermore, the Advocate General confirmed that, in line with recital 24, the contexts typically falling under the subsidiary assessment of the deceased’s nationality and/ or assets are: (i) the scenario involving expats; and (ii) that involving a “peripatetic” cross-border movement and life not allowing the establishing of stable connection (Advocate General’s Opinion, § 55-57).

In relation to applicable law, the Court first seised should consider, as a last resort when none of the above elements can be traced, specific factors indicating a situation falling under “manifestly closest connection”. According to the EU Succession Regulation, and confirmed by the Advocate General (§ 25 of the Opinion), a typical situation falling under “manifestly closest connection” is when the deceased moved to his/ her new habitual residence fairly recently before his/ her death. Nonetheless, the Court has not yet identified any specific elements for the determination of the exceptional “manifestly closest connection” criterion (§ 59).

 

The number of transnational couples continuously increases within the European Union. At the same time, there are still large differences between the national rules on matrimonial property regimes and on the property consequences of registered partnerships. These disparities do not only affect the property relations among such couples themselves, but also – and even more – third parties contracting with transnational couples.

Some jurisdictions provide, for instance, that contracts between one spouse and a third party are not legally effective without the consent of the other spouse, especially in case of real estate transactions. One example of such a rule is the notorious Article 215(3) of the French Code Civil.

Third parties can be surprised by such limitations because they may not be aware that the law of another jurisdiction applies. In many cases, third parties may not even know at all that their business partner belongs to a couple with a transnational background. There is thus a strong need for third party protection not only on the national level, but also in private international law.

In the future, these conflict-of-laws problems must be solved on the basis of the new Council Regulations (EU) 1103/2016 and 1104/2016, which became applicable in their entirety on 29 January 2019. The scope of the Regulations explicitly includes third-party relations. However, the Regulations only provide fragmentary rules on third party protection. A new book analyses these provisions, identifies open questions and submits proposals how the gaps in the Regulations could be filled (Stephan Gräf, Drittbeziehungen und Drittschutz in den Europäischen Güterrechtsverordnungen, Mohr Siebeck 2019).

As the title indicates, the book is written in German. It starts with a comparative analysis of the differences between the national rules on matrimonial property regimes focussing on third party effects. In a subsequent chapter, the author outlines the conflict of law rules of the Regulations and points out that the applicable law can hardly be foreseen by third parties.

On this basis, Stephan Gräf analyses the core provision of third-party protection in both Regulations, namely their respective Article 28 (protection of the good faith of third parties). Although the provision appears to be quite detailed, it is in fact merely fragmentary and partially inconsistent. For example, it does not mention the exact subject of the required good faith of the third party (the applicable law, the particular matrimonial regime within the applicable law or the particular legal effect of the applicable law?). The provision also does not clarify that it is restricted to contractual transactions.

The Regulations furthermore contain provisions for the protection of third-party rights in case of a change of the applicable law with retroactive effect. The wording of the provisions, however, is extremely short. Many questions are left to the interpretation by the courts. Stephan Gräf analyses the scope and the legal consequences of these provisions. He shows, for instance, that they also apply when the applicable law changes only with effect for the future.

The book furthermore deals with the highly controversial coordination between international property law (lex rei sitae rule) on the one hand and the international matrimonial law on the other hand. This matter also affects third parties contracting with married persons. The author argues for the primacy of the lex rei sitae in so far as immovable property is concerned. On this point, he disagrees with the Kubicka decision of the European Court of Justice, which deals with the relationship between the EU Succession Regulation and the lex rei sitae rule.

Additionally, the book addresses the Regulations’ rules on jurisdiction (Articles 4 et seq.). It focuses on the question whether these rules apply in disputes between married persons and third parties. Despite its relevance this question has rarely been discussed so far. The Regulations lack explicit provisions on this matter. Relying on the ECJ’s approach on Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation (recast: Article 29), Stephan Gräf argues that Articles 4 et seq. of the Regulations govern where matrimonial property law is the “heart of the action”. In disputes with third parties, this is rarely the case, as matrimonial property law typically only becomes relevant on the level of preliminary questions.

Overall, this new book provides valuable insights on the relation of Regulations on matrimonial property regimes and on the property consequences of registered partnerships with the rights and obligations of third parties. Interestingly, the author not only addresses the protection of spouses, but also that of third parties that do not know about the family relation. The Regulations are still young, and is to be expected that this book will influence their interpretation and application in practice.

In January 2018, we reported on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Asia, a publication by the Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI).

The sequel to this publication, the Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, will shortly be released by ABLI. This is a more ambitious piece of work which seeks to set out the principles which are common to the countries within the scope of the ABLI Foreign Judgments Project (namely the 10 ASEAN Member States and Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea). There are 13 principles in total and each principle is accompanied by a commentary which fleshes out how the various countries apply each principle.  Among other things, the principles cover the rules on international (or ‘indirect’) jurisdiction, reciprocity, the enforcement of non-money judgments, public policy, due process and inconsistent judgments. A detailed write-up on the project and principles can be found at Adeline Chong, ‘Moving towards harmonisation in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment rules in Asia’ (2020) 16 Journal of Private International Law 31-68 (https://doi.org/10.1080/17441048.2020.1744256).

ABLI has kindly offered to ‘soft-release’ the 13 principles which form the subject-matter of the 13 chapters of the Asian Principles to readers of conflictsoflaws.net. The 13 principles are set out below.

The Asian Principles will be released in eBook and hardcopy formats. Further details are available here.

Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

Principle 1

As a general proposition and subject to these Principles, a foreign judgment in a commercial matter is entitled to recognition and enforcement.

Principle 2

A foreign judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if the court of origin has international jurisdiction to render that judgment.

The typical grounds on which a court is considered to have international jurisdiction include:

(a) where the judgment debtor was present, resident or domiciled in the country of the court of origin;

(b) where the judgment debtor, being a corporation, had its principal place of business in the country of the court of origin;

(c) where the judgment debtor submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of origin by invoking its jurisdiction or by arguing the merits of the case against it; and

(d) where the judgment debtor submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of origin by way of a choice of court agreement for the court of origin.

Principle 3

A foreign judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if it is final.

Principle 4

The court addressed must not review the merits of a foreign judgment, except to the extent necessary for the application of these Principles.

A foreign judgment may not normally be challenged on the ground that it contains an error of fact or law, or both.

Principle 5

A foreign judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if there is reciprocity between the country of the court addressed and the country of the court of origin.

Principle 6

Monetary judgments that are not for a sum payable in respect of a foreign penal, revenue or other public law are enforceable.

Principle 7

Non-monetary judgments that are not preliminary or provisional in nature may be enforced.

Principle 8

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if the judgment was obtained by fraud.

Principle 9

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if to do so would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the country of the court addressed.

Principle 10

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if there was a lack of due process in the proceedings before the court of origin.

Principle 11

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if it is inconsistent with a judgment in a dispute between the same parties that is given by the court addressed.

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if it is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given by a court of another country between the same parties and on the same subject matter, provided the earlier judgment fulfils the requirements for recognition.

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused on the ground that proceedings between the same parties and on the same subject matter are pending before the court addressed if the court addressed was seized of the matter before the court of origin.

Principle 12

A foreign judgment that has as its object a right in rem in immovable or movable property is eligible for recognition and enforcement.

Principle 13

A foreign judgment that is objectionable in part may be severed and the unobjectionable part recognised and enforced.

In advising on a territorial restriction in an insurance clause earlier this month, I studied the CJEU judgment in C-581/18 Rheinland, important for the (limitations to the) reach of Article 18 TFEU, the general non-discrimination requirement on the basis of nationality. Bobek AG had earlier opined, and the Court followed, that in the absence of harmonisation and in a scenario with no EU links, Article 18 TFEU is not engaged. I had missed the AG’s earlier opinion – forgive me if I am late to this party.

It is important to sketch the context: Bobek AG had summarised the facts as

A German patient received, in Germany, defective breast implants manufactured by Poly Implant Prothèse SA (‘PIP’), a French undertaking that is now insolvent. The patient seeks compensation before the German courts from Allianz IARD SA, the French insurer of PIP. In France, manufacturers of medical devices are under a statutory obligation to be insured against civil liability for harm suffered by third parties arising from their activities. That obligation led PIP to conclude an insurance contract with Allianz, which contained a territorial clause limiting the cover to damage caused on French territory only. Thus, PIP medical devices that were exported to another Member State and used there were not covered by the insurance contract.

In this context, the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main (Higher Regional Court, Frankfurt am Main, Germany) enquires whether the fact that PIP was insured by Allianz for damage caused by its medical devices on French territory only, to the exclusion of that potentially caused in other Member States, is compatible with Article 18 TFEU and the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality contained therein.

This post is not on Article 18 TFEU. Rather, consider the excellent (and eloquent) discussion by Bobek AG at 109 ff. Does the imperative of equal protection of all European citizen-consumers, in the absence of EU harmonising law on the issue, preclude a national rule that, in effect, limits insurance cover to persons who undergo surgery on the territory of the Member State, thus indirectly limiting the cover to citizens of that Member State? Bobek AG emphatically and despite moral sympathy for the victims, says no. The alternative would be ‘like Dassonville on steroids’ (at 111), it would ‘turn regulatory competence within the internal market on its head’ (at 109).

Consider his link with conflict of laws at 114-115:

In other words, the fact that goods once came from another Member State is not a sufficient reason to suggest that any matter later concerning those goods is covered by EU law. If that logic were to be embraced, by a questionable interpretation of Article 18 TFEU, the movement of goods in Europe would become (once again) reminiscent of medieval legal particularism, [at footnote 78 he refers to the excellent work by my legal history colleague Randall Lesaffer] whereby each product would, like a person, carry its own laws with it. Goods would be like snails, carrying their homes with them in the form of the legislation of their country of origin, to be applicable to them from their production to their destruction.

Such a consequence would not only displace any (normal) territoriality in the application of laws, but would also generate conflicts of regulatory regimes between the Member States. Indeed, such an expansionist interpretation of Article 18 TFEU could make the legislation of any of the Member States potentially applicable on the same territory without any clear and objective criteria as to which legislation should prevail in a given dispute, with the victim being able to choose the most favourable legislation.’

Most delightful analysis.

Geert.

 

On 13 May 2020, the French Supreme Court for private and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) issued an interesting decision on jurisdiction based on Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation in case of online defamation (here).

The French Court implemented the Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan Case ruled by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2017, but also asked for clarification on its scope of application to the CJEU (here).

Facts

A Czech company, Gtflix Tv, content producer and distributor, sued a film director and distributor, MX, domiciled in Hungary, before French court for unfair competition resulting from online defamation. The company accused MX of having used insulting language against itself and its website materiel on different online forums and websites. Therefore, the company asked for the removal and rectification of the defaming contents as well as for financial compensation. According to it, French jurisdiction should arise under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, since French viewers are the main audience. MX opposed a lack of international jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal of Lyon followed the latter position and dismissed the demand. Gtflix Tv appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue at Stake

The legal issue submitted to the French Supreme Court was therefore to determine if any relevant connecting factors pursuant Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, as interpreted by the CJEU, could assert the French jurisdiction.

Legal Background

The application of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation (corresponding to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation) regarding online defamation matters is not a new issue. In the eDate Case on online infringements of personality rights, the CJEU held that the victim has “the option of bringing an action for liability, in respect of all the damage caused, either before the courts of the Member State in which the publisher of that content is established or before the courts of the Member State in which the centre of his interests is based”. In addition, the Court of justice also admitted that the victim could bring “his action before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content placed online is or has been accessible” but “only in respect of the damage caused in the territory of the Member State of the court seised”.

Then, this acquis was partially extended by the Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan Case to infringements related to online publication of incorrect information and failure to remove comments. On the one hand, the CJEU ruled, by analogy, that the victim could bring an action for rectification and removal of the contested comments and for compensation in respect of all the damage sustained “before the courts of the Member State in which its centre of interests is located”. On the other hand, the CJEU refused to distribute the jurisdiction between “the courts of each Member State in which the information published on the internet was accessible” to rule on rectification and removal of the comments. It is worth noting that the Court of Justice left out the claim for damages.

Response of the French Supreme Court and Preliminary Reference to the CJEU

In the present case, the French Supreme Court applied, by analogy, the Bolagsupplysningen acquis to the unfair competition claim, following publication on the Internet of defaming information against Gtflix TV and failure to remove comments. Since France is not the Member State in which the victim has its centre of the interests under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation (the Czech Republic is), nor the Member State in which the defendant, MX, is domiciled pursuant Article 4, French courts have no competent jurisdiction to hear this part of the case. However, according to the French Supreme Court, the question of jurisdiction for financial compensation remains unclear (for other national judgements on this issue, see the post of Geert Van Calster on Gtflix Tv). Should the Bolagsupplysningen interpretation be extended to that additional issue and exclude the distribution of jurisdiction based on the different places where the information published on the Internet is accessible? Or, on the contrary, should the eDate alternative in favour of the fragmentation of jurisdiction remain applicable? Following the latter solution, French courts could indeed have a partial jurisdiction.

This is the question referred by the French Supreme Court to the CJEU.

As encouraged by the CJEU in its Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings, the French Supreme Court sketched out a response. Considering the proper administration of justice, it took position in favour of an extension of the Bolagsupplysningen ruling. The competent jurisdiction for ruling on rectification and removal of online comments under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation should have an exclusive jurisdiction to rule on damages, because of the obvious connection between the two actions.

This solution would make online defamation claims much easier and more predictable. And it would contribute to adapt the European jurisdictional rules to the transnational digital area.

For the earliest possible starting date, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Law and Private International Law in Hamburg  is offering up to two positions as a

Research Fellow (m/f/d) (post-doctoral or Habilitation)

under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Ralf Michaels in a full-time or part-time capacity.

More info here

Written by Fieke van Overbeeke, Legal Counsel at the International Institute for International and Foreign Law  – the Netherlands and research fellow at the University of Antwerp – Belgium

On 10 June conflictoflaws.net posted a piece about ‘new conflict of laws rule for minimum wages in road transport’. At that time it seemed that the EU institutions still needed to overcome severe difficulties. However, fully according to the course of events around this very unpredictable file, on 10 July the institutions officially reached a compromise: the directive with conflict of law rules for road transport was finally has adopted and it will enter into force 18 months after publication in the EU’s Official Journal.

In short about these conflict of law rules: 1) Transit operations do not fall under the Posting of Working Directive and the labour conditions, i.a. minimum wages, cannot be applied to this type of transport; 2) Cabotage operations do fall under the Posting of Working Directive and the labour conditions should be guaranteed to this type of transport (‘guaranteed’ because this only needs to be done in case these conditions are more favourable to the lorry driver, see Article 3 section 7 Posting of Working Directive); 3) Bilateral operations do not fall under the Posting of Working Directive, and some correlated crosstrade operations do not either; 4) Crosstrade operations are supposed to fall under the Posting of Working Directive (however, a clear rule about this is lacking and provokes many questions).

The author of this post is Giulio Monga, a PhD student at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan.

On 16 April 2019, the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) ruled on the relevance of the Incoterm “FCA – Free Carrier (named place of delivery)” to the operation of Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation , corresponding to Article 7(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

The Facts

An Italian company (Agusta) sued a French company (Team) before the Court of Frosinone seeking the termination of the sales agreement concluded between the two, on the ground that the goods supplied by the latter were defective. Team argued that the seised court lacked jurisdiction. It observed that the goods had been sold FCA (Free Carrier) the Paris International Airport, thereby contending that Paris ought to be regarded as the place of delivery agreed by the parties for the purposes of Article 5(1)(b), first indent, of the Brussels I Regulation (pursuant to the latter provision, jurisdiction over sales of goods lies with the courts for the place “where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered”).

The Relevance of Incoterms to Jurisdiction over Contractual Matters

Incoterms are standard commercial terms drawn up by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Under the FCA rule, the seller undertakes to deliver the goods, cleared for export, to the carrier or another person nominated by the buyer at the seller’s premises or at another named place. The seller bears all costs and risks of delivery, while the buyer undertakes to take care of the delivery of the goods to their final destination, bearing the costs and risks of the onward carriage.

The Italian Supreme Court recalled that in Electrosteel the Court of Justice of the European Union held that the seised court, in order to verify its jurisdiction under Article 5(1)(b), first indent, of Brussels I Regulation, must first ascertain whether the parties have agreed on a place of delivery in the contract. For this, account must be taken “of all the relevant terms and clauses … which are capable of clearly identifying that place, including terms and clauses which are generally recognised and applied through the usages of international trade or commerce, such as the Incoterms …”. According to the Corte di Cassazione, where an Incoterm is incorporated into a contract, and the issue arises of the relevance of that incorporation to the issue of jurisdiction, the seised court must assess whether the Incoterm in question is merely concerned with the allocation of the risks and costs related to the transaction, or whether the parties also meant it to identify – with sufficient clarity – the place of delivery of the goods.

The Judgment

The Corte di Cassazione concluded that by incorporating the Incoterm FCA into their contract, the parties failed to agree on a clear identification of the place of delivery of the goods for the purposes of Article 5(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation. The Incoterm FCA, the Court argued, concerns nothing more than the allocation between the parties of the risks and costs related to the transaction.

Some Remarks

Regrettably, the Corte di Cassazione failed to state the reasons for the latter finding. The Court acknowledged that the key issue is whether the chosen Incoterm conveys an agreement of the parties as to the place of delivery of the goods, but did not provide an analysis of the Incoterm FCA, as used in the contract at issue, and did not explain why the naming of the International Airport of Paris could not be regarded as signifying an agreement to that effect (according to the ICC rules that accompany the Incoterms, when goods are sold FCA the seller ‘must deliver the goods to the carrier … nominated by the buyer at the named point, if any, at the named place …’).

Actually, all Incoterms concern the allocation of risks and costs between the parties. By providing for such allocation they perform, in fact, the key part of their job. On top of that, however, they may – as the Court of Justice acknowledged in Electrosteel – convey an agreement as regards the place of delivery. Whether this happens in a particular case depends on the analysis of the circumstances. The way in which the Corte di Cassazione engaged in this analysis is, methodologically, unconvincing. Arguably, one should examine the rules set out by the ICC itself to describe the Incoterm in question, and any other element as may help determine the intended meaning of the agreement (the negotiations between the parties etc.). The fact is that the Corte di Cassazione failed to indicate the circumstances which it considered to be relevant to the issue, and failed to elaborate on their assessment. It merely stated, in rather general terms, that the incorporation of the Incoterm FCA is not evidence, as such, of an agreement as to the place of delivery of the goods.

It’s a missed opportunity, for establishing a clear methodology, ideally one shared by domestic courts across the EU, would serve the needs of predictability and would foster the uniform application of the Brussels I regime.

Jorg Sladič is an associate professor of international and European law at the European faculty of law in Ljubljana (Slovenia). He was a member of the European Commission’s expert group on modernisation of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters. This post is based on an article to be published shortly in the Revue des affaires européennes (L’obtention de preuves en matière civile et commerciale dans l’espace judiciaire européen : status quaestionis et la réforme envisagée, RAE 2020/1, pp. 191 – 212).

Taking of evidence abroad is hampered not only by foreign languages, distances etc. The scope of application ratione loci of a given law of civil procedure is limited by the principle of territoriality. Therefore the gathering of evidence in a pending civil proceedings before a forum is limited by the forum’s traditional inherent inability to perform judicial activities abroad. However, Europe is changing. Therefore an assessment of the principle of territoriality in the law of civil procedure is required.

1. Evidence Taking in Civil Procedure in Continental Europe as acta jure imperii

In the EU, judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters also covers international legal assistance – comprising traditionally the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents abroad and taking of evidence abroad. European rules on cross-border taking of evidence are to be found in the Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters. The said regulation can be regarded as an update of existing traditional methods of international legal assistance and is heavily influenced by the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. Even the direct taking of evidence by the requiring forum goes back to influences of the 1970 Hague Convention.

Traditionally a forum from one EU Member State cannot take evidence in other EU Member States. Continental European States consider evidence gathering and taking as acta jure imperii. The Latin maxim judici fit probatio explains it all (see e.g. O. L. Knöffel, Grenzüberschreitende Beweisaufnahme durch Private, in R. Geimer, R. A. Schütze, T. Garber (eds.), Europäische und internationale Dimension des Rechts, Festschrift für Daphne-Ariane Simotta, Vienne, LexisNexis, 2012, p. 333 and 334; M. Virgós Soriano, F. J. Garcimartín Alférez, Derecho procesal civil internacional : litigación internacional, 2nd ed., Madrid, Thomson Reuters, 2007, p. 486; B. Audit, L. D’avout, Droit international privé, 7th ed., Paris, Economica, 2013, par 484). Evidence is taken by the judge (forum). However, in the common law world, evidence is taken by the parties before the judge and not by the judge. Gathering of evidence is rather a private matter left to the parties. However, in all Member States the Regulation is applied under the principle of national procedural autonomy.

This difference between evidence taking as a private matter between the parties or evidence taking as a performance of public authority by a forum is in short also a major part of the of the famous Justizkonflikt between the US and Germany.

Practical aspects of evidence taking abroad were assessed in the 2017 Luxembourg Study (see B. Hess, M. Requejo Isidro, F. Gascón Inchausti, P. Oberhammer, E. Storskrubb, G. Cuniberti, C. Kern, K. Weitz, X. Kramer, An evaluation study of national procedural laws and practices in terms of their impact on the free circulation of judgments and on the equivalence and effectiveness of the procedural protection of consumers under EU consumer law, Report prepared by a Consortium of European universities led by the MPI Luxembourg for Procedural Law as commissioned by the European Commission, JUST/2014/RCON/PR/CIVI/0082, Strand 1, Mutual Trust and Free Circulation of Judgments, Brussels, Luxembourg, 2017, paras 240 – 263).

2. Principle of Territoriality of a Pending Civil Procedure

As judicial functions belong to performance of a public authority of a State, they are not supposed to be performed in an extraterritorial manner (the principle of territoriality of a pending civil procedure). Without going in the famous Lotus case law of the PCIJ the European version (Opinion of Advocate General JÄÄSKINEN, Lippens, C-170/11) of the rule reads as:

29. A court of a Member State can validly exercise its powers and make use of its ‘imperium’, that is to say, its power of enforcement, only within the limits of its geographical jurisdiction. Measures of inquiry are an exception to this rule in that they can be taken over the whole of national territory. Nevertheless, in view of the principle of territoriality in international law, which is linked to the principle of State sovereignty, the court cannot normally take action to enforce such measures in another Member State.

Fn. 44: However, a court ruling on a civil or commercial matter covered by Regulation No 1206/2001 cannot exercise public authority outside the territory of the Member State in which it is situated by carrying out substantive acts necessitating the use of State coercion such as using the State’s police force to bring a party resident in another Member State by force to appear before it.

It might also be added that the principle of territoriality prohibits in the continental legal thinking the recognition of foreign anti-suit injunctions, an issue that will become of importance if post Brexit negotiations do not produce a sufficient PIL framework between the EU and the UK.

According to the Belgian Court of Cassation, Belgian courts can condemn a third party residing in another EU Member State to produce documents in accordance with the Belgian lex fori and even apply the periodic monetary penalties (astreinte). The application of the regulation Nr 1206/200 is not mandatory (Court of Cassation, 1st Chamber, 26 April 2018, case Banque de Luxembourg, n° C.16.0192.N). The Belgian Court of Cassation also ruled quite laconically that it results clearly from the judgment of the Court of Justice in Lippens (C-170/11) that a court of a Member State may condemn a party resident in another Member State to produce a documents before it in accordance with its lex fori and even apply sanctions for non production of documents (Court of Cassation, 1st Chamber, 25 April 2013, aff. Fortis Luxembourg Vie, n° C.11.0103.F/1). However, as far as sanctioning witnesses residing abroad and having defaulted, the situation appears to be different. The Austrian Regional Court of Appeal in Linz dealt with the question of a regularly summoned German witness residing in Germany and not appearing before an Austrian forum (Oberlandesgericht Linz, 5 September 2013, case 3 R 145/13h, ECLI:AT:OLG0459:2013:RL0000147). The forum of first instance issued a heavy fine against the German witness. The appellate court ruled however that, due to the principle of territoriality of the pending civil proceedings, such a witness is not subject to jurisdiction of Austrian courts. An Austrian forum may summon him so that he can appear and testify, however, due to a non-existent duty to testify in another state, such a witness doesn’t have to comply with the summons. A foreign witness who fails to comply with the summons cannot to be sanctioned. Where the evidence is located abroad, an Austrian forum can order that this evidence be transferred to Austria as for example in the case of the summons of a witness – or may within the scope of Regulation No 1206/2001 proceed to the taking of evidence abroad, either through the requested court (Art. 10 and following of the regulation), or directly (art. 17 of the regulation). The regulation does not prevent the forum to summon a witness living abroad. However, means of constraint cannot be applied against such a witness residing abroad.

3. Methods of Taking of Evidence Abroad

It is generally recognised that evidence from abroad is to be gathered according to certain methods (A. Sengstschmid, Die europäische Beweisaufnahme, in P.G. Mayr (ed.), Handbuch des europäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts, Vienna, Manz, 2017, par. 15.1; L. Fumagalli, La disciplina comunitaira dell’assunzione delle prove all’estero in materia civile e commerciale: il regolamento (CE) n. 1206/2001 in S. M. Carbone, M. Frigo, L. Fumagalli, Diritto processuale civile e commerciale comunitario, Milano, Giuffrè, 2004, pp. 169 and 170):

1. the order of the forum before which the proceedings are pending ordering the parties to transfer themselves the evidence (or the means of evidence) which is located abroad to the forum State;
2. the active international legal assistance (the requesting court issues a letter rogatory which will be executed by the foreign requested forum according to the lex diligentiae, see Art. 10 of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001);
3. the passive international legal assistance (the requesting court performs itself or through its agents directly the taking of evidence abroad according to its own lex fori. In principle, such an approach requires a prior consent of the requested foreign state. There is also the problem of coercive measures adopted by the requesting forum on the territory of the requested State. Such direct taking of evidence is allowed in the EU Under the conditions of Art. 17 of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001);
4. videoconferencing or any other modern means of communication where the evidence remains abroad while the proceedings take place before the forum of origin (see Art. 10(4) of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001);
5. the taking of evidence is performed in cooperation or dialogue between the requesting forum and the requested forum (see Art. 10(3) and (4) and Art. 12 of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001));
6. obtaining evidence through diplomatic officers or consular agents.

Neither obtaining evidence through diplomatic officers or consular agents nor the request of the forum before which the proceedings are pending ordering the parties to transfer themselves the evidence (or the means of evidence) which is located abroad to the forum State are regulated by the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001.

In this framework the Council Statement Nr. 54/01 of 4 July 2001 on Regulation Nr. 1206/2001 shall be mentioned. According to the Council of the EU “The scope of application of this Regulation shall not cover pre-trial discovery, including the so-called “fishing expeditions”.” (Statement, p. 16).

4. Effet utile of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001 – Is it of American origin?

However, the effet utile of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001 has lead the Court of Justice in cases Lippens (C-170/11) and ProRail (C-332/11) to construe that text as being optional and facultative.

It would appear that the US Supreme Court’s decision in case Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale et al. V. United States District Court for The Southern District of Iowa 82 U.S. 522 (1987), on the 1970 Hague Convention was a direct though not cited source of the European case-law. According to the US case law the “Convention does not provide exclusive or mandatory procedures for obtaining documents and information located in a foreign signatory’s territory”. “its purpose [is] to “facilitate” discovery and to “improve mutual judicial co-operation.”” “Although they are not mandatory, the Convention’s procedures are available whenever they will facilitate the gathering of evidence, and “apply” in the sense that they are one method of seeking evidence that a court may elect to employ”.

Documents having lead to the Lippens case, especially the opinion of Advocate General before the High Council of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, the Dutch Supreme Court) M. P. Vlas of 1st April 2011, ECLI:NL:PHR:2011:BP3048 and the preliminary reference, judgement of the High Council of the Netherlands, 1st Chamber, 1st April 2011, case 10/02071, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP3048, show an in-depth assessment of the US Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale case.

The interpretation of facultative and facilitative nature of international instruments on taking of evidence abroad was extended by the CJEU to the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001. Such an interpretation is indeed not a forgone conclusion. If the rigour used to combat conflicts caused created between EU private international law (Brussels Ia Regulation) and national traditions in anti-suit injunctions (Turner, C-159/02, Allianz, C-185/07, Gazprom, C-536/13) and the forum non conveniens doctrine (Owusu, C-281/02) were to be extended also to the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001, then there there could be no space for facilitative nature of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001 (C. Thole, Kein abschließender Charakter der Europäischen Beweisaufnahmeverordnung, IPrax, Nr. 3/2014, p. 255). Indeed, there are connecting points linking the Regulation on taking of evidence and the Brussels Ia regulation such as exclusion of arbitration (see on that issue B. Hess, Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht, Heidelberg, C.F. Müller, 2010, p. 465; M. Fartunova-Michel, JurisClasseur Europe Traité, fasc. 2800 : Obtention des preuves en matière civile et commerciale – Coopération entre les juridictions des États membres – Règlement (CE) n° 1206/2001 », update 27 May 2019, par. 20). However, the effet utile lead to a different conclusion.

Indeed, the CJEU ruled in Lippens:

according to recitals 2, 7, 8, 10 and 11 in the preamble to Regulation No 1206/2001, the aim of the regulation is to make the taking of evidence in a cross-border context simple, effective and rapid. The taking, by a court of one Member State, of evidence in another Member State must not lead to the lengthening of national proceedings. […]. Thus, it is clear that, in certain circumstances, in particular if the party summoned as a witness is prepared to appear voluntarily, it may be simpler, more effective and quicker for the competent court to hear him in accordance with the provisions of its national law instead of using the means of taking evidence provided for by Regulation No 1206/2001. (paras. 29 and 31)

Finally, the interpretation according to which Regulation No 1206/2001 does not govern exhaustively the taking of cross-border evidence, but simply aims to facilitate it, allowing use of other instruments having the same aim, is supported by Article 21(2) of Regulation No 1206/2001, which expressly authorises agreements or arrangements between Member States to further facilitate the taking of evidence, provided that they are compatible with the regulation. (par 33)

However, the facilitative nature of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001 is limited by an exception of public powers of EU Member States (see e.g. C. Thole, op. cit., p. 257 ; G. Cuniberti, L’expertise judiciaire en droit judiciaire européen, Rev. crit. DIP, Nr. 3/2015, p. 535 ; M. Fartunova-Michel, op. cit., point 2 ; see in general law of international civil procedure S. Triva, M. Dika, Građansko parnično procesno pravo, Narodne novine, Zagreb, 2004, p. 57 ; A. Maganić, Pravna pomoć u građanskim stvarima između Republike Hrvatske i Republike Makedonije », Zbornik PFZ, 2/2011 p. 245).

Indeed, the CJEU has ruled in ProRail:

47. in so far as the expert designated by a court of a Member State must go to another Member State in order to carry out the investigation which has been entrusted to him, that might, in certain circumstances, affect the powers of the Member State in which it takes place, in particular where it is an investigation carried out in places connected to the exercise of such powers or in places to which access or other action is, under the law of the Member State in which the investigation is carried out, prohibited or restricted to certain persons.

48. In such circumstances, unless the court wishing to order cross-border expert investigation foregoes the taking of that evidence, and in the absence of an agreement or arrangement between Member States within the meaning of Article 21(2) of Regulation No 1206/2001, the method of taking evidence laid down in Articles 1(1)(b) and 17 thereof is the only means to enable the court of a Member State to carry out an expert investigation directly in another Member State.

Such a ruling was then interpreted e.g. by the Belgian Court of Cassation as follows. A plea entirely based on the argument that the forum of a Member State which requires the act of investigation entrusted to an expert to be performed in the territory of another Member State is always required to request a prior authorization of the other Member State in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001, without distinguishing according to whether the taking of evidence may or may not have an influence on the powers of this other Member State or according to whether or not there is a convention or regulation within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 21 of Regulation 1206/2001, is not founded (Court of Cassation, 1st Chamber, 7 November 2013, case C.10.0286.N/1)

5. Reform

The European Commission proposed a reform of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001. The EAPIL reported extensively on that. As a consequence an indepth assessment in the article was superseded by posterior legal development. Such direct taking of evidence is allowed in the EU under conditions of Art. 17 of the Regulation Nr. 1206/2001.

The third 2020 issue of RabelsZ has been released this week. It contains the following articles:

Reinhard Zimmermann, Pflichtteil und Noterbenrecht in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive (Compulsory Portion and Forced Heirship in Historical and Comparative Perspective), pp. 465–547

The essay traces the development of mandatory family protection from Roman law through the ius commune to the modern civilian codifications. The Justinianic reform of 542 AD had failed to streamline and simplify the pertinent rules of classical Roman law. It was left, therefore, to the draftsmen of the codifications from the end of the 18th century onwards to tackle that task. Two models were particularly influential; one of them can be found in the Austrian Civil Code of 1811, the other in the French Code civil of 1804. Germany adopted the Austrian model of a „compulsory portion“ (i.e. a personal claim for the value of a part of the estate). Outside of Germany, the French model of „forced heirship“ (part of the testator’s property is reserved to his closest relatives) was extremely influential at first. The essay then looks at reforms in a number of countries of the Germanic and Romanistic legal systems, with some of the Romanistic countries having undergone a change of system. Mandatory family protection by means of a compulsory portion thus appears to gain ascendancy. Apart from that the range of persons entitled to such compulsory portion tends to be drawn more narrowly today than in earlier times. Also, the quotas granted to persons entitled to mandatory family protection have, in many places, been lowered.

Characteristic for a number of legal systems and reform drafts is also an endeavour to render the law concerning mandatory family protection more flexible. The power to deprive a person of his right to a compulsory portion, or to become forced heir, has been extended in some legal systems. Finally, in view of the long-standing tradition in the continental legal systems of fixed quotas it is interesting to see that, time and again, the concept of a needs-based claim for maintenance has been considered, or even implemented, particularly for the surviving spouse.

 

Frederick Rieländer, Schadensersatz wegen Klage vor einem aufgrund Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung unzuständigen Gericht (Damages for Breach of an Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreement), p.. 548-592

Whilst the prima facie remedy for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause at common law had always been a stay of proceedings or an anti-suit injunction, English courts started to embrace the remedy of damages for breach of a choice-of-court agreement by the turn of the millennium. This trend is gradually spilling over to civil law jurisdictions as a recent decision by the German Federal Court of Justice indicates. Although this judgment may be welcomed in policy terms, many issues remain unresolved. At the heart of the debate lies the question whether damages for breach of a choice-of-court clause are available in the intra-European context. If the non-chosen court gives effect to the jurisdiction clause by dismissing the proceedings, there is no reason to preclude an action for damages brought in another Member

State per se. An award of damages over and above any costs order awarded by the non-chosen court would not undermine the fundamental policy goals underlying the Brussels regime. While some commentators argue that damages should be available even if the non-chosen court decides to hear the case on the merits, this amounts to an inadmissible jurisdictional review and is likely to infringe the effet utile of cross-border recognition of judgments within the EU. Moreover, since Gothaer Allgemeine may be extended so as to apply to a decision by the non-chosen court on the merits in respect of the incidental question of the invalidity of the choice-of-court agreement, this decision could acquire the binding force of res judicata in all other Member States. Hence, the defendant in the court first seised will be precluded from establishing a breach of contract.

 

Jan Frohloff, Das anwendbare Recht auf Kollisionen im Weltraum (The Law Applicable to Collisions in Space), pp. 593-614

Dropping costs in both the manufacturing and launch of spacecraft have increased the orbital traffic around Earth. An ever-increasing number of spacecraft in orbit brings a rise in the likelihood of collisions between them. Assessing the claims arising from such collisions necessitates the determination of the applicable law. The determining factors should take into account the particularities of space and planetary orbits, in and on which spacecraft move differently and with considerably higher speeds than vessels on water and in the air.

In geostationary orbit, satellites sit in fixed orbital slots, which are limited in number and allotted to states by the International Telecommunications Union. Thus, a collision in this orbit is likely the result of a (defective) satellite drifting out of its orbital slot along the orbital arch into another slot. The law applicable to this collision should be the law of the state to which the orbital position in which the collision occurred is allotted. Although not a lex loci damni proper, applying the law of the state to which the orbital slot is allotted is the closest to the law of the state where the damage occurred in a space that is not subject to national appropriation.

In low Earth orbit and medium Earth orbit, satellites move relative to Earth. Here, the factors for designating the applicable law should be whether one of the satellites had a propulsion system and which satellite was in orbit first so as to incentiviseoperators to act against the most pressing problem in low and medium Earth orbit: the danger of defunct satellites and debris. As a result, where one of the satellites in the collision has a propulsion system and the other does not, the applicable law should be the law of the state to which the satellite with the propulsion system is registered (regardless of who was in orbit first). Where both satellites have a propulsion system or neither does, it should be the law of the state where the satellite in orbit first is registered.

These factors for the law applicable to collisions in space are easy to determine in practice and would enhance the foreseeability of court decisions, while at the same time ensuring a reasonable balance between the interests of the spacecraft operators involved.

 

Dorota Miler, Evasion of the Law Resulting from a Choice of Law under the Succession Regulation, pp. 615–636

Excerpt taken from the introduction]:

[This paper] will consider whether a German court can identify a case of evasion of the law as resulting from a choice of law made under the Regulation, based on different jurisdictions’ varying regulation of the circumstances that allow for a disqualification from forced heirship. Could the exercise of the right to choose the applicable law (Art. 22 of the Regulation) be challenged under certain circumstances as an evasion of the law under private international law? Particularly, where the aim of the testator’s choice was to deprive his descendants of a compulsory portion based on facts (disqualification by conduct) that would not support such an action under German law, could a German court conclude that the result would be inappropriate from the perspective of German law?

In considering these questions, [the paper] will first give some brief examples of factual circumstances that would, in jurisdictions outside Germany, allow a testator to deprive his family member of a forced heirship, these being circumstances that vary significantly from those provided under German law. Secondly, [it] will identify the conditions for finding an evasion of law under European and German private international law and, in turn, consider those instances where a choice of law under Art. 22 of the Regulation might serve to fulfil these conditions. In conclusion, [the paper] will reflect on the likelihood of a German court making a finding of evasion of law under private international law.

 

Konrad Duden, Richterwahl und parteipolitische Einflussnahme. Vergleichende Anregungen zum Schutz der Unabhängigkeit des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und der obersten Bundesgerichte (The Selection of Judges and Partisan Justice – Comparative Inspiration for the Protection of the Independence of Germany’s Federal Courts), pp. 637-665

In many countries, politicians are attempting to influence the selection of supreme court judges and to achieve a court composition favourable to their party’s positions. This paper highlights that it would be possible to achieve changes in the composition of Germany’s federal courts similar to those that have recently taken place in Poland and the USA. This observation poses a question: How can the courts be protected from partisan influence? One possibility would be a protection againstchanging the courts’ constitution by including core features of the courts’ institutional design into the German Constitution. Such an approach is not without flaws, however. Accordingly, this paper suggests to at least compliment such steps with measures to protect the courts when changing the courts’ constitution. The proposed measures do not seek to protect certain specific features of the institutional design; rather, they look to ensure that changes to that design are based on a consensus between the ruling government and the opposition. Such a consensus would support the presumption that undertaken changes do not aim at advancing the partisan influence of one political party.

In Avonwick Holdings Ltd v Azitio Holdings Ltd & Ors [2020] EWHC 1844 (Comm), Picken J among quite a few other claims, at 146 ff discussed a suggested defrauding by misrepresentation of the best available market price for a bundle of stocks. Toss-up was between Ukranian law and English law and, it was suggested, was only relevant with respect to the issue of statute of limitation. Counsel for both parties agreed that the material differences between Ukranian and English law were minor.

They omitted, it seems, to discuss the relationship between statute of limitations and the carve-out in Rome II for procedural issues.

At 151:

It was not in dispute…that the default applicable law under Article 4(1) is the law of Cyprus in that this was the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred since, although Avonwick was incorporated in the BVI and its entry into the Castlerose SPA was formally authorised in Ukraine, Avonwick’s directors were based in Cyprus and the steps necessary to transfer its shares in Castlerose to Azitio and Dargamo would, therefore, have been taken by those directors in Cyprus.

Here I am simply lost. A4(1) does not suggest locus delicti commissi (‘country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred’) rather it instructs specifically to ignore that. Even if a locus damni consideration was at play, for purely economic loss as readers will know, there is considerable discussion on that exact location. How the judgment could have ended up identifying locus delicti commissi is a bit of a mystery.

At 153 then follows a discussion of a displacement of Cypriot law by virtue of A4(3)’s ‘manifestly more closely connected’ rule, including interesting analysis of any role which Article 12’s culpa in contrahendo provision might play.

For the reasons listed at 166 ff, the judge agrees that A4(3) applies to replace Cypriot law with Ukranian (not: English) law. Those reasons do seem to make sense – yet despite this, the A4(1) analysis should have been carried out properly.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.5.2.

 

Picken J: 'very substantial proceedings..described..as being akin to divorce proceedings between 3 extremely wealthy Ukrainian businessmen.

Tortious shenanigans re share transfers.
Extensive discussion of A4 Rome II: applicable law for tort, particularly 'more closely connected' https://t.co/htk39XHQeq

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 14, 2020

On 21 July 2020 the Unidroit Secretariat released a Note on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the COVID-19 health crisis.

As stated in the website of Unidroit, the Note is to be considered as work in progress, and the Secretariat welcomes any comments or suggestions.

The Note’s presentation reads:

In the context of the outbreak of COVID-19, UNIDROIT has prepared this note as a form of guidance as to how the Principles could help address the main contractual disruptions caused by the pandemic directly as well as by the measures adopted as a consequence thereof. The note analyses whether parties may invoke COVID-19 as an excuse for non-performance, and if so, based on which concepts and under what conditions. The analysis also covers the scenario, likely to be common in practice, where performance is still possible, but has become substantially more difficult and/or onerous under the circumstances.

The document aims to guide the reader through the process, leading her to ask appropriate questions and to consider the relevant facts and circumstances of each case. Naturally, solutions will vary according to the particular context of the pandemic in each jurisdiction and there is no one-size-fits-all approach. In particular, the document, considering the different ways the Principles have so far been used in practice, aims to: (i) help parties use the Principles when implementing and interpreting their existing contracts or when drafting new ones in the times of the pandemic and its aftermath; (ii) assist courts and arbitral tribunals or other adjudicating bodies in deciding disputes arising out of such contracts; and (iii) provide legislators with a tool to modernise their contract law regulations, wherever necessary, or possibly even to adopt special rules for the present emergency situation.

The open nature of the Principles furnishes the parties and interpreters with a much-needed flexibility in such an extreme context, constituting an efficient tool to offer a nuanced solution that can help preserve valuable contracts for the parties. Especially in mid-to-long term contracts, and in view of the – apparently – temporary nature of the impediment, mechanisms that allow for an adequate renegotiation and proportionate allocation of losses could ultimately help preserve the contract and maximise value for the jurisdiction(s) involved.

Arguably, the world of contracts has never suffered such an unforeseeable, global, and intense interference. Extraordinary situations require extraordinary solutions, and there is a global need to ensure the economic value enshrined in commercial exchanges is not destroyed. The Principles offer state-of-the-art, best-practice tools to deal with the problem; a set of rules that result from years of study and analysis, with the participation and consensus of the most prominent academics and practitioners in the field, from civil law and common law traditions.

— Many thanks to Carmen Tamara Ungureanu (Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Romania) for drawing the editors’ attention to this development.

The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (Rapporteur: Juan Fernando López Aguilar) released earlier this week (20 July 2020) its interim report on the proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835 – 2017/0360R(NLE)), PE650.665v03-00. You can read it here.