Flux des sites DIP

Many thanks, Dr Richard Schmidt for signalling and reviewing  the recent Hungarian Supreme Court judgment (in Hungarian) discussing unilateral aka asymmetric aka hybrid choice of court. I do not have Hungarian and happily rely on Richard’s analysis and review.

As Richard reports, the contract was governed by the law of Liechtenstein and provided that any legal disputes would be brought before the court of Vaduz (Liech). However, the claimants had the option of seeking the performance of the contract before the courts of the defendant’s domicile. The defendant failed to pay the service charges and the claimants sued him in Hungary.

Upon appeal it seems the lower courts had held that choice of court ex-EU is not covered by Brussels Ia (compare CJEU Gothaer) and stayed the case in favour of the court at Vaduz. The Supreme Court however in principle would see to have upheld the choice of court provision as exercised by the claimant even if it decided the case ultimately on a finding of submission.

As I said I do not read Hungarian, text search however does not suggest that the SC looked at the issue at all viz Brussels Ia. Which is odd.

Richard justifiably refers to the approaches of both the English (see e.g. here) and the French Courts (contrast Rotschild with Apple). Thankfully there is now also the volume edited by Mary Keyes, looking comparatively at the issue (Michiel Poesen and I contributed the Belgian chapter).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9, Heading 2.2.11.1, Heading 2.2.11.2 .

Most interesting Hungarian SC judgment on asymmetric choice of court.
Case in the end turned on submission (voluntary appearance). Adopts an approach on such unilateral jurisdiction clauses somewhere between the EN and (former) FR approach. https://t.co/u2a5mpYBss

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 11, 2020

Written by Elijah Granet

In a recent decision of the Family Division of the English and Welsh High Court—VB v TR (Re RR) [2020] EWFC  28, Mr Justice Mostyn highlighted a lacuna in the protection of children from abduction under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (‘the Convention’).  As a result of what Mr Justice Mostyn (at para 7) refers to  as a ‘colonial anachronism’, unconsented removals of children from the British overseas territory of Bermuda to the UK proper fall outside the remit of either the convention or domestic law.

Facts

VB and TR are parents from Bermuda with a young son, RR.  In 2019, TR removed RR from Bermuda secretly, without the consent of VB, and in violation of Bermudian court orders.  The UK ratified the 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in 1986 and implemented it domestically by way of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985.  Section 28(1)(c) of that Act enables the UK to extend the effect of the Convention to Overseas Territories by means of an Order in Council.  However, Bermuda, which enjoys full internal self-governance (with its own laws, parliament, and courts) instead passed the International Child Abduction Act 1988, which essentially transposed the 1985 Act into Bermudian law.  As a consequence, the UK made an Article 39 Notification  declaring that the Convention applied to Bermuda, which is now listed in the annex of authorities required by Article 18 of the Convention.

Decision

As both Bermuda and the UK are signatories to the Convention, one would expect that arrangements for the return of RR could be easily carried out.  Mr Justice Mostyn notes (at para 12), if TR had gone to the USA (or indeed, any state other than the UK), the Convention would unquestionably applied as Bermuda is listed in the aforementioned annex of authorities.  The problem arises because, for the purposes of the Convention, the UK and Bermuda are a single state party; therefore, because there is no ‘international’ element to child abduction between the UK and Bermuda, the Convention is not considered to apply.  This ‘counterintuitive’   (para 21) state of affairs has caused confusion, including a 2014 ruling which (mistakenly) held that Bermuda is not a party to the Convention.

Of course, there is no inherent problem with the Convention being inapplicable between different British jurisdictions. For example, if a parent who removed a child from  Northern Ireland to England against a court order, the English court would automatically recognize the Northern Irish court order under the Family Law Act 1986, s 25, which provides for mutual enforcement of family court orders across the UK. However, that Act does not apply to Bermuda, because Bermuda is not a part of the United Kingdom (whatever the Convention might say).  A Bermudian court is, for all intents and purposes, a foreign court in the eyes of the law of England and Wales.

Thus, there is a paradoxical and frustrating outcome: for the purposes of the Convention, Bermuda is part of the UK, but, for the purposes of  English and Welsh family law, Bermuda is a foreign country. This is contrary to the intention of both the Bermudian and British Parliaments in implementing the Convention: namely, to prevent the unlawful abduction of children. The result is that Mr Justice Mostyn, rather than beginning with the presumption that RR should be returned (as he would under the Convention) or automatically implementing the Bermudian court’s order (as he would with a court from a ‘domestic’ UK jurisdiction), was forced to essentially ignore the Bermudian court’s order, and to circuitously employ a complex legal test under the Children Act 1989, s 1(1) to determine if it would be in the interests of the welfare of RR for him to be returned to Bermuda. Mr Justice Mostyn ultimately held that it was in the child’s best interests to return to Bermuda, albeit at a time more conducive to international travel than the current pandemic. The only alternative route would be to employ the test for the recognition of foreign custodial orders set out by the Privy Council in C v C (Jersey) [2019] UKPC 40, which focuses on questions of public policy rather than the child’s welfare.

Comment

The lacuna in the UK’s regime for protecting against child abduction is, as Mr Justice Mostyn correctly put it (at para 12), ‘an embarrassment’. The defect in this very important area of the law was so severe that the judge felt it appropriate to state (in the same paragraphs) , bluntly, ‘the law needs to be changed’—either to add Bermuda (and other overseas territories) to the domestic list of recognised Hague Convention authorities,  or to extend the automatic recognition of orders under the Family Law Act to all British Overseas Territories. Either option would be a welcome and necessary respite from the current state of affairs, by which abduction from a territory party to the Convention (Bermuda) to another party (the UK) is not covered by the law.  In a matter as serious as this, it is astonishing that, two decades after Bermuda joined the Convention, there is still no UK framework for ensuring the swift return of abducted children to their homes.

The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg has launched a call for applications for PhD scholarships in 2021.

Advanced doctoral students working in comparative procedural law, international procedural law and adjudication are invited to apply by 15 May 2020. While proficiency in English is compulsory to be able to participate in the Institute’s scientific activities, the call is also open to doctoral candidates writing their thesis in a language other than English.

The scholarship offers young scientists the opportunity to stimulate their scientific inspiration and advance their research in a dynamic environment. In addition to a monthly grant of 1.500 €, the selected candidates will be offered a workstation in the reading room, and will have the opportunity to participate in the Institute’s scientific activities.

To apply, the interested candidates meeting the requirements of the call must submit the following documents, in English: a cover letter (max. 1 page), stating the motivation for their application, the correlation between the topic of their research and the Institute’s areas of research, and the desired time frame for the scholarship stay; an up-to-date curriculum vitae, with an indication of the class of degree awarded (undergraduate and postgraduate, if relevant); a summary of the PhD project (max. 2 pages), including subject, description and work plan; two letters of recommendation (including one from the PhD supervisor, with his/her contact details).

More information about the call is available here.

Contact persons: Christiane Göbel & Viktoria Drumm, scholarship@mpi.lu.

Research demonstrates that the permanent income loss for the Asia-Pacific region, including India, from the impact of COVID-19 to be $620 billion as of March 24, 2020. It is undeniable that the pandemic has not only resulted in the loss of human health and life but has also adversely affected the Indian economy. A United Nations labour report states that the Coronavirus has impacted tens of millions of informal sector workers as of 8th April 2020, and is predicted to put around 2 billion more people at risk. The Indian economy has been severely hit since most of the Indian population consists of daily wage workers. On 24th March 2020, the Prime Minister invoked his powers under Sec.6(2)(i) of the National Disaster Management Act, 2005, to enforce a lockdown for an initial period of 21 days in the country with effect from 25th March 2020. The “total” lockdown has now been extended until 3 May 2020 and, will be treated under force majeure as per the Government order. The current scenario where India is put under what is reported to be the “world’s most stringent lockdown” (also referred to as Lockdown 2.0) has forced millions of persons out of work, with the hardest hit being the poor, including the daily wage earners and migrant workers. Besides, airports, private clinics and most other shops providing daily essentials have shut.

Drawing from the situation in other countries, India reflected on its own capacity to prevent pandemic considering the resources available in the country. This is a country of 1.3 billion people and the healthcare system in place is very fragile. The latest National Health Profile 2019, released in October 2019, shows India’s public expenditure on health has been less than 1.3% of the GDP for many years. The investment in public healthcare is one of the lowest in the world as the country is more driven towards private investment in healthcare. This will result in human cost because the treatment cost, which involves vaccines, tests and medical facilities, will be more than what most of the population will be able to afford. Looking at the lack of accessibility and affordability to medical care the Prime Minister has announced a public charitable trust under the name of ‘Prime Minister’s Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations Fund’ (PM CARES Fund)’ with the Prime Minister as the Chairman of the trust. In face of such a high-risk situation, the WHO Country Office for India is working closely with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) to strengthen surveillance, build the capacity of the health system and optimize the ‘window of opportunity’ created by mandatory physical distancing in India. Even though such rampant measures have been taken, India is still not fully equipped to deal with a full-scale pandemic.

The outbreak and the consequent Government decision have resulted in an overwhelming financial/economic loss to the Indian population. People have been banned from leaving homes and supply to all ‘non-essential’ commodities has been cut-off to prevent a further spread of the deadly virus, which originated in Wuhan, China. The recent times additionally witnessed the Indian Government’s order to blacklist the 960 foreigners who participated in the Tablighi Jamaat Meetings as they became a key source for the spread of Coronavirus in India. These foreigners violated the terms of their tourist visas by attending an Islamic congregation at the Nizamuddin Market in New Delhi in March. The foreigners were found in different states all over the country and as on 2nd April, 245 COVID-19 cases and about 12 deaths in the country were found to have links with the Tablighi Jamaat Meeting.

Recently, citizens of the United States filed a class-action suit filed against the Chinese Government for damages suffered as a result of “incalculable harm” done to the plaintiffs. Whether the near future will see a similar class-action suit by Indian citizens against the Chinese Government and the 960 Tablighi Jamaat foreigners, remains to be seen.

Under India’s conflict of law rules, which remain uncodified, an Indian court can assume jurisdiction by being the place where the cause of action – in this case, the tort occurred. Sections 9 and 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 empowers the courts in India to try all suits, which result in damage caused by negligence, including those initiated by Indian citizens against foreign entities. At the same time, India lacks any coherent mechanism to identify the applicable law that will govern damages arising from such transnational torts. Rigidly following the common law principles, India continues to hold fast to the traditional principle of ‘double actionability’ – a rule, which has long been discarded by all other common law jurisdictions including Australia and Canada.

Under the present rules, the plaintiff(s) suing before an Indian court will have to prove that the act of the Chinese government in concealing the nature of the virus and failing to take appropriate steps to contain it, was actionable under the Chinese and Indian law – upon which, the suit will be governed concurrently by the Chinese and the Indian law of tort.

Under the Indian law of torts, the plaintiffs will need to prove a breach in a duty of care on the part of the Chinese government and the Tablighi Jamaat attendees who were foreign nationals, which caused the tort of negligence. The Indian law of torts is based on the principles of Common Law as iterated in Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum (1992 ACJ 792). According to the common law principles as evolved by the House of Lords, negligence signifies failure in executing a degree of care which should have been exercised by the doer. The essentials for establishing negligence under the Indian law may be summarized as follows. Firstly, that the defendant owed a “legal” duty of care towards the plaintiff. Secondly, that there was a breach of this duty; and thirdly, that the plaintiff experienced damage (including economic loss) as a result of such breach by the defendant.

In the international realm, China’s ‘duty of care’ towards India and its citizens may be traced through the relevant provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Health Regulations of 2005. Under Article 12(2)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Chinese government was under a duty to take measures for the “(t)he prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases” for nationals and non-nationals alike. However, this provision does not extend to economic loss. In particular, China’s duty of care towards non-nationals may be recognised under the International Health Regulations of 2005 as well. As per Article 6 of the IHR, China was required to notify the WHO of the “events which may constitute a public health emergency of international concern within its territory”. Hence, China owed a legal duty of care towards its non-nationals.  This legal duty towards the non-nationals can further be extended to infer as a duty towards other countries and their nationals.

Since China failed to notify the World Health Organisation according to the International Health Regulations of 2005 within sufficient time despite the given indications towards the public health concern, it has negligently breached its duty of care towards the rest of the world.  Dr. Li Wenliang was the first to create awareness and intimate the Chinese Government about the hazardous virus. Instead of adopting effective measures, the Chinese Government reprimanded the scientist. This is depictive of the negligent conduct of the Chinese Government.

On the other hand, the legal duty of care of the 960 foreigners can be established under section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 insofar they had partaken in a religious activity which violates the terms of their tourist visas. Besides, sections 6(2)(i) and 10(2)(l) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 will also be applicable due to their failure to adhere to social distancing guidelines issued by the government in wake of the COVID-19 outbreak.

At the same time, having regard to the present principles of the Indian conflict of law, no claim before an Indian court for damages in relation to the outbreak will sustain unless the plaintiffs are simultaneously able to prove negligence on the part of the Chinese government and/or under each of the laws of tort of 960 Tablighi Jamaat attendees. Suits initiated in relation to the pandemic in India could, therefore, act as a revolutionary moment for India to ramp-up its conflict of law principles – especially in matters arising from cross-border torts.

That said, the spread of COVID -19 has undoubtedly been one of the most challenging times for the judiciary in all the countries. Countries like the Netherlands and Germany have proven its judiciary to be effective and efficient during the times of crisis by adapting to the digital mode in adjudicating disputes.  In the largest democracy of the world, India, the judiciary has always remained under challenge due to the overwhelming number of litigation matters approaching courts every day.

The humongous load of backlog along with current lockdown had come as a huge blow and stir to the judicial system in India. The Supreme Court has, thus, decided that vital matters before it would be conducting video conferencing.  The digitalisation of the judiciary has been a huge respite especially in the case of granting bails and avoiding overcrowding of the prison to control the spread of the virus. All other smaller courts (including the High Court are shut during the lockdown).

In Lecta Paper [2020] EWHC 382 (Ch), Trower J picks up where Zacarolii J left off in [2019] EWHC 3615 (Ch) (which I briefly flagged in my post here and which is referred to in current judgment 12) and goes through the usual matrix for assessing the international impact of an English scheme of arrangement on the European continent.

Ultimate parent company is a Luxembourg company, with further controlling interests held by yet another Luxembourg and a Spanish company. A 10-11 Trower J flags a sensitive issue for credit and other financial arrangements: financial instruments subject to New York law, where amended to English law as governing law and the courts at England as non-exclusive jurisdiction. This was done in accordance with New York law, and approved by over 90% of the instruments’ holders. Yet again therefore a crucial question viz schemes of arrangement and the Brussels jurisdictional and applicable law regimes remains unaddressed, namely the event of opposition of a sizeable stake of creditors.

At 33 ff the issue of jurisdiction is discussed along the lines of Apcoa, Codere and NN2 Newco. Under residual private international law, the sufficient connection to England, engineered by the aforementioned change of governing law and jurisdiction in line with the law governing the instruments at the time (New York law, at 38), was held not to be unfair viz the creditors even in the case of the mother company with COMI in Luxembourg. At 44 ff Trower J returns to the issue of whether Brussels Ia can apply at all to the case, particularly via Article 4 juncto Article 8(1), holding for application of Article 25 in the end. However as in the authority he applies, there continue to be a lot of assumptions in this analysis which, failing substantial opposition by creditors, still have not been settled by either UK, CJEU or continental authority.

At 40 follows the equally standard reference to national experts testifying to the scheme’s recognition in the jurisdictions concerned: France, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg.

At 41 Trower J then briefly mentions Brexit (see my reference to similar cases here). Referring again to the national experts but also to his own insight, Justice Trower simply notes that

‘The Recast Judgments Regulation will continue to apply to the recognition of an English judgment in EU member states, notwithstanding the occurrence of Brexit, provided that the judgment has been given in proceedings which were instituted before 31 December 2020, being the end of the transition period. This follows from Article 67(2) of the Withdrawal Agreement. It follows that any sanction order made in this case should be recognised in EU member states, pursuant to the Recast Judgments Regulation, as will their own domestic law dealing with the recognition of judgments. It is also the case that the application of the Rome I Regulation ought to be unaffected by Brexit in any event. As I read the expert reports, they each confirm that that Regulation will continue to apply after the end of the transition period so that the law of the jurisdiction in respect of which they give evidence will recognise the governing law of the relevant contracts, in this case English law, as applying to the variation and discharge of rights under that contract.’

Note as I did above, the continuing Brussels IA cover assumptions, as well as the position post Brexit (whether under Lugano 2007 or not, remains to be seen).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5.

Peter Mankowski is the editor of a Research Handbook on the Brussels Ibis Regulation, juest published by Edward Elgar.

Here’s the blurb.

The Brussels Ibis Regulation is the magna carta for jurisdiction and the free circulation of judgments in civil and commercial matters in the EU, and forms a cornerstone of the internal market. This timely Research Handbook addresses the cutting edges of the regime, in particular its place within the overall system of EU law and its adaptations in response to specific kinds of lawsuits or the needs of particular industries.

Featuring original research by leading academics from across Europe, chapters take a systematic approach to examining a broad variety of topics in relation to the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Such topics include collective redress, injunctive relief, lis pendens and third states, negotiorum gestio, arbitration, intellectual property lawsuits, and its interface with the European Insolvency Regulation (Recast). Moving beyond what is offered by textbooks and commentaries, this incisive Research Handbook analyses the most recent developments in legislation and practice, as well as providing an outlook on the future of this field of EU law.

This Research Handbook will prove a critical read for scholars and students of EU law. Judges and practitioners working in this area will also find its insights to be of significant practical relevance.

Contributors include Tomas Arons, Sylvain Bollée, Tim Dornis, Etienne Farnoux, Thomas Garber, Christian Heinze, Antonio Leandro, Leander D. Loacker, Peter Mankowski, Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, Johan Meeusen, Dario Moura Vicente, Guillaume Payan, Aukje van Hoek, Cara Warmuth and Matteo Winkler.

For more information see here and here.

Edoardo Rossi is the author of a monograph in Italian titled La Sharing economy nel diritto internazionale privato europeo (Sharing Economy – A European Private International Law Perspective), published by Giappichelli.

The author provided the editors of this blog with an abstract in English. The abstract reads as follows.

In the current economic and social context new and controversial sharing practices, offering anyone the opportunity to search for or make available goods or services on the market regardless of the professional or amateur nature of the persons involved, have emerged. These practices, very heterogeneous and concerning the most different areas of daily life, such as mobility, housing, business activities, communications, work, culture, communication, education and finance, have been linked  to the notion of “sharing economy”, which brings them together by virtue of temporary access to goods or services, facilitated by the large-scale intervention of digital platforms, through which requests and offers are coordinated online in order to share goods or services.

The legitimacy of schemes linked to this new economic models has been challenged in a number of aspects, including low quality of services, safety of consumers, authorisation and licensing, taxes and compliance with competition rules. The inadequacy of the existing rules to deal with the provision of services through the sharing economy models has consequently emerged.

In spite of these critical profiles, the legal relations established through sharing economy platforms are constantly increasing around the world, implying the emergence of elements of transnationality, from which derives the recourse to the rules of private international law, in order to determine the applicable law and the judge competent to rule on any disputes.

The monograph thus attempts to analyse some of the most important private international law issues, such as the inadequacy of the party autonomy in regulating the phenomenon, especially with reference to the general terms and conditions of contract unilaterally drawn up by platform operators, which state that the latter is totally unrelated to the legal relations between users, often in conflict with the minimum level of consumer protection guaranteed by EU law and by the national legislations. Critical profiles have also been identified in the online conclusion of contracts that bind the parties involved in sharing economy legal relations, in ascertaining the effectiveness of consent on the choice of forum and choice of law clauses, in cases of potential related actions and in the location of the “domicile” of the platform operators.

Further information can be found here.

The relationship between the conflict of laws and constitutional law is close in many legal systems, and Australia is no exception. Leading Australian conflict of laws cases, including, for example, John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, which adopted a lex loci delicti rule for intra-Australian torts, are premised on public law concepts essential to our federation. These cases illustrate how the conflict of laws bleeds into other disciplines.

Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 is a recent decision of the High Court of Australia that highlights the breadth and blurry edges of our discipline. Most legal commentators would characterise the case in terms of constitutional law and migration law. The Court considered a strange question: can an Aboriginal Australian be an ‘alien’?

Australia’s disposition to migration is controversial to say the least. Our government’s migration policies, which often enjoy bi-partisan support, are a source of embarrassment for many Australians. One controversial migration policy involves New Zealanders. Australia and New Zealand enjoy a very close relationship on several fronts, including with respect to private international law: see the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth). New Zealanders often enjoy privileges in Australia that are not afforded to persons of other nationality.

Yet recently, Australia began to deport New Zealanders who had committed crimes in Australia no matter how long they had lived in Australia. In February, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said that the policy was ‘testing’ our countries’ friendship. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison replied, ‘[w]e deport non-citizens who have committed crimes in Australia against our community’. Sections of the Australian community are seeking to change Australia’s policy on point, which is effected by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The Court heard two special cases together. As Kiefel CJ explained: ‘[e]ach of the plaintiffs was born outside Australia – Mr Love in Papua New Guinea and Mr Thoms in New Zealand. They are citizens of those countries. They have both lived in Australia for substantial periods as holders of visas which permitted their residence but which were subject to revocation. They did not seek to become Australian citizens’.

Section 501(3A) of the Migration Act requires the Minister for Home Affairs to a cancel a person’s visa if they have been convicted of an offence for which a sentence of imprisonment of 12 months or more is provided. Each of the plaintiffs committed crimes and had their visas cancelled. The effect of which was that they became ‘unlawful non-citizens’ who could be removed from Australia.

The plaintiffs’ cases turned on s 51(xix) of the Commonwealth Constitution, which provides:

The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to… naturalization and aliens…

The plaintiffs contended that they were outside the purview of the Migration Act, the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) and s 51(xix) because they each had a special status as a ‘non-citizen, non-alien’. ‘They say that they have that status because although they are non-citizens they cannot be aliens because they are Aboriginal persons’: [3]. Each plaintiff arguably satisfied the tripartite test for Aboriginality recognised at common law and considered below. Thoms was even a native title holder.

The High Court was asked to consider whether each plaintiff was an ‘alien’ within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution. Kiefel CJ clarified that the question is better understood as follows: ‘whether it is open to the Commonwealth Parliament to treat persons having the characteristics of the plaintiffs as non?citizens for the purposes of the Migration Act’: [4].

The High Court’s seven justices departed from usual practice and each offered their own reasons. The majority of four (Bell, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ) answered as follows:

The majority considers that Aboriginal Australians (understood according to the tripartite test in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 70) are not within the reach of the “aliens” power conferred by s 51(xix) of the Constitution. The majority is unable, however, to agree as to whether the plaintiff is an Aboriginal Australian on the facts stated in the special case and, therefore, is unable to answer this question.

Arcioni and Thwaites explain: ‘The majority rested their reasoning on the connection of Aboriginal Australians with Australian land and waters. Aboriginal Australians were a unique, sui generis case, such that Aboriginality may generate a class of constitutional members (non-aliens) who are statutory non-citizens’. The minority of Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ dissented for different reasons. A common theme of those reasons was that ‘alien’ is the antonym of ‘citizen’.

The case is about constitutional law. It is also about status. ‘Alienage or citizenship is a status created by law’: [177] per Keane J. One understanding of the difference between the majority and minority is a difference in opinion as to the applicable law to determine status as ‘alien’ in this context.

According to Nettle J, ‘status [as a member of an Australian Aboriginal society] is inconsistent with alienage’: [272]. ‘Aboriginal Australians are not outsiders or foreigners – they are the descendants of the first peoples of this country, the original inhabitants, and they are recognised as such’: [335] per Gordon J. The majority appealed to the common law’s recognition of native title rights underpinned by traditional laws and customs in support of their analyses (see, eg, [339]).

The minority denied that status as Aboriginal could determine whether a person has the status of an ‘alien’ within the meaning of the Constitution.

Nettle J quoted (at [269]) the following passage from the native title case Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, 445 [49] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ):

Laws and customs do not exist in a vacuum. They are, in Professor Julius Stone’s words, ‘socially derivative and non-autonomous’. As Professor Honoré has pointed out, it is axiomatic that ‘all laws are laws of a society or group’. Or as was said earlier, in Paton’s Jurisprudence, ‘law is but a result of all the forces that go to make society’. Law and custom arise out of and, in important respects, go to define a particular society. In this context, ‘society’ is to be understood as a body of persons united in and by its acknowledgment and observance of a body of law and customs.

The status of the laws and customs of Australia’s Aboriginal peoples has been the subject of case consideration for decades. In Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141, 267, for example, Blackburn J said:

The evidence shows a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the country in which the people led their lives, which provided a stable order of society and was remarkably free from the vagaries of personal whim or influence. If ever a system could be called “a government of laws, and not of men”, it is that shown in the evidence before me.

Later, in Mabo (No 2), the High Court finally recognised the significance of those laws to recognition of native title. In that case, the Court articulated a tripartite test for whether a person is an Aboriginal Australian: biological descent, self-identification, and recognition by the relevant Aboriginal community (see [291] per Gordon J). As explained further below, satisfaction of this test depends on application of traditional laws and customs. Arguably, satisfaction of the test requires recognition of the positive force of that non-state law.

Against that, Keane J held, ‘[t]he common law’s recognition of customary native title does not entail the recognition of an Aboriginal community’s laws’: [202]. Rather, it goes the other way: Aboriginal laws are necessary for recognition of native title. Kiefel J also explicitly rejected recognition of Aboriginal customary law: ‘[i]t is not the traditional laws and customs which are recognised by the common law. It is native title … which is the subject of recognition by the common law, and to which the common law will give effect. The common law cannot be said by extension to accept or recognise traditional laws and customs as having force or effect in Australia’: [37]. Arguably, this means that there is no choice of law at play in this case: there is just one law at issue, being the law of Australia.

Yet even in transnational cases within the traditional domain of the conflict of laws, Australian courts will only apply foreign laws via application of the lex fori: Pfeiffer, [40]–[41]; Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia, ch 12. For practical purposes, the majority approach does recognise Aboriginal non-state law as capable of application to resolve certain issues of (non-Aboriginal) Australian law.

Nettle J came close to articulation of a new intra-Australian choice of law rule at [271]:

for present purposes, the most significant of the traditional laws and customs of an Aboriginal society are those which allocate authority to elders and other persons to decide questions of membership. Acceptance by persons having that authority, together with descent (an objective criterion long familiar to the common law of status) and self-identification (a protection of individual autonomy), constitutes membership of an Aboriginal society: a status recognised at the “intersection of traditional laws and customs with the common law”.

If there is a choice of law rule in there, its significance might be expressed through this syllogism:

• P1. Whether a person is capable of being deported after committing a serious crime depends on whether they are an ‘alien’.
• P2. Whether a person is an ‘alien’ depends on whether they are ‘Aboriginal’.
• P3. Whether a person is ‘Aboriginal’ depends on whether they satisfy the tripartite test in Mabo [No 2] with respect to a particular Aboriginal society.
• P4. Whether a person satisfies the tripartite test turns on the customary law of the relevant Aboriginal society.

Like questions of foreign law, ‘[w]hether a person is an Aboriginal Australian is a question of fact’: [75] per Bell J. How does one prove the content of the relevant Aboriginal law? Proof of traditional laws and customs often occurs in native title cases. It was considered at [281] per Nettle J:

It was contended by the Commonwealth that it might often prove difficult to establish that an Aboriginal society has maintained continuity in the observance of its traditional laws and customs since the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over the Australian territory. No doubt, that is so. But difficulty of proof is not a legitimate basis to hold that a resident member of an Aboriginal society can be regarded as an alien in the ordinary sense of the term. It means only that some persons asserting that status may fail to establish their claims. There is nothing new about disputed questions of fact in claims made by non-citizens that they have an entitlement to remain in this country.

As a dissentient in the minority, Gageler J offered a compelling critique of what I construe to be the choice of law approach of the majority (at [137]):

To concede capacity to decide who is and who is not an alien from the perspective of the body politic of the Commonwealth of Australia to a traditional Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander society or to a contemporary Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander community, or to any other discrete segment of the people of Australia, would be to concede to a non?constitutional non?representative non?legally?accountable sub?national group a constitutional capacity greater than that conferred on any State Parliament. Yet that would be the practical effect of acceptance of either of the first and second variations of the plaintiffs’ argument.

The choice of non-state law is arguably made more controversial by the character of those laws’ content. Nettle J explained at [276]: ‘As is now understood, central to the traditional laws and customs of Aboriginal communities was, and is, an essentially spiritual connection with “country”, including a responsibility to live in the tracks of ancestral spirits and to care for land and waters to be handed on to future generations’. Gordon J held at [290], ‘[t]hat connection is spiritual or metaphysical’. Tacit in the majority’s mode of analysis, then, is that a person’s spiritual or religious views can have an impact on their status as an ‘alien’, or otherwise, within the Commonwealth Constitution. (A once-Aboriginal non-citizen who lacks those spiritual views and renounces their membership of their Aboriginal society may still be an ‘alien’ following this case: see [279], [372].) From a secular perspective within an increasingly secular nation, that is a striking proposition.

This is not the first time that the relationship between the conflict of laws and issues affecting indigenous peoples has been considered. More generally, whether non-state law may be the subject of choice of law is a topic that has been considered many times before. One of the factors that makes Love v Commonwealth unique, from an Australian legal perspective, is the majority’s effective choice of Aboriginal customary law to determine an important issue of status without really disturbing the common law proposition that Aboriginal groups lack political sovereignty within the Australian federation (see [37], [102], [199]). COVID-19 may have stalled sought after changes to the Australian Constitution with respect to recognition of indigenous peoples (see (2019) 93 Australian Law Journal 929), yet it remains on the national agenda. In any event, Australia’s very white judiciary may not be the best forum for recognition of the sovereignty of Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

Written by Sophie Hunter

With more than 200 countries affected to date, the current crisis presents far reaching implications for competition law and policy on a global scale. This crisis is affecting developed and developing countries alike, especially by putting young competition authorities under a stress test of the resilience of their competition rules.  As the pandemic of COVID19 spreads to every parts of the world, most recently the African continent, competition authorities are looking at whether relaxing their competition rules to allow for cooperation between key actors of the health sector and other essential economic sectors, like the airline industry. However, full or partial relaxation of competition rules may have adverse effects on industries, business and consumers by resulting in anti-competitive practices such as price fixing, excessive pricing and collusion between competitors.

Competition authorities have responded to this crisis in a piecemeal approach. While the European Commission was quick to a temporary framework[1] and relied on measures implemented during the 2008 financial crisis[2] , in the US, the FTC and DOJ only recently issued a guidance note based on previous emergency situations (Harvey and Irma hurricanes) to allow cooperation of competitors in the health sector, especially in the development of vaccines.[3] The UK has granted temporary exemptions from anti collusion rules to supermarkets. An approach also adopted by the German competition authority to ensure continuity of food supplies. South Africa promptly enacted an overall sector wide block exemption for the health sector.[4] Some countries like France and China have toughened up their price regulations.[5]

With a surge in excessive pricing of health-related products such as masks and hand sanitizers, competition authorities are currently dealing with ongoing investigations in a wide range of jurisdictions, namely the UK, France, Brazil, Russia, Spain and Italy. Some have announced price controls over high demand items. This has already been done in France through a decree regulating the price of hand sanitizers to prevent retailers and pharmacists engaging in abusive price increases.[6] Enforcement of sanctions against anti-competitive conducts toughened up, especially from competition authorities in Kenya and China, which have already heavily put sanctions on retailers engaged in excessive pricing of health-related products.

In times of crisis, governments can allow specific exceptions for joint research projects because they understand the need for collaborative efforts between firms to, for instance, develop a vaccine. Such exceptions have already been granted during other pandemics such as Swine Flu in 2009, MERS in 2015 and influenza in 2019. Those exceptions may be exempted from competition rules. For instance, the European Commission has called for an increase effort in research and development at the European level to develop a vaccine against COVID 19 within an exceptional regulatory framework (as it already did in 2009). [7] In South Korea, similarly, the government encouraged the main pharmaceutical companies to work together on a vaccine through an emergency use authorisation that was established post MERS in 2015.[8]

Apart from exceptions, certain countries granted exemptions from anti collusion rules to businesses in specific economic sectors. The most far reaching measures were taken by South Africa with the COVID-19 Block Exemption for the Healthcare Sector 2020. It established price controls on everyday goods as well as a list which exempts hospitals, medical suppliers, laboratories and pathologists, pharmacies, and healthcare funders from engaging in anti-competitive collaboration.[9]Other temporary exemptions have been granted to the airline industry by Norway, the retail sector in Germany, banking in Australia, the distilled spirit industry in the US, education in Denmark and tourisms in Italy and Kazakhstan.

Competition authorities must enforce strict compliance to competition rules, even during this time of pandemic. Despite this, some leverage and legal leeway enacted by certain competition authorities demonstrates a willingness to allow for a temporary flexibility to mitigate the economic impact. This can be achieved through sector specific block exemptions, strict guidance on collaboration in times of emergency or enhanced legislation on price controls. This time of crisis creates a great opportunity for competition authorities around the world to engage in international cooperation to share best practices. Prompt responses to the crisis in developing countries demonstrates the ambition and dynamism of such agencies (Peru, South Africa, Kenya). Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how competition authorities will cope during the crisis with sustaining investigation, enforcement and compliance with competition rules.

[1] François-Charles Laprévote, Theodora Zagoriti, Giulio Cesare Rizza, The EU Commission adopts a Temporary Framework to support the economy in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, 19 March 2020, e-Competitions Bulletin Preview, Art. N° 93837

[2] https://www.concurrences.com/fr/bulletin/special-issues/competition-law-covid-19/competition-policy-covid-19-an-overview-of-antitrust-agencies-responses

[3] https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/ftc-and-doj-announce-expedited-antitrust-procedure-for-coronavirus-public-health-efforts/

[4] Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa, ‘Covid-19 Block Exemption for the Health Care Sector, 2020 – South Africa’ (2020) 657 Government Gazette 12.

[5] State Administration of Market Supervision (SAMR) of People’s Republic of China, ‘Urgent Notice of the General Administration of Market Supervision on Severely Cracking down on Price Violations in the Production of Preventive and Control Materials during the Epidemic Prevention and Control Period’ (5 February 2020) <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-02/06/content_5475223.htm> accessed 22 March 2020.

[6] ‘Encadrement Des Prix Pour Les Gels Hydroalcooliques’ (Economie.gouv.fr, 2020) <https://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/encadrement-des-prix-pour-les-gels-hydroalcooliques-voir-la-faq> accessed 22 March 2020.

[7] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Pandemic (H1N1) 2009’ (15 September 2009) 1 <http://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/9ec8052e-c269-4b57-9be9-4b40c5101d15/language-en> accessed 22 March 2020.

[8] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-testing-specialrep/special-report-how-korea-trounced-u-s-in-race-to-test-people-for-coronavirus-idUSKBN2153BW

[9] South African Government, ‘Guidelines – Coronavirus Covid-19 in South Africa’ (23 March 2020) <https://www.gov.za/coronavirus/guidelines> accessed 23 March 2020.

The latest issue of Journal of Private International Law is out. It features the following articles:

Matthias Lehmann – Regulation, global governance and private international law: squaring the triangle

Abstract
Regulatory rules are omnipresent today. Increasingly, they also influence private rights and obligations, from employment contracts to competition law and data protection. Private international law traditionally treats them with a certain reserve because they do not fit its paradigms of “neutral” and “interchangeable” rules of law. This article argues that it is time to change this attitude. Regulatory rules often protect global public goods, such as the environment, or shield against global bads, such as pandemics. Others serve aims shared between different countries, like the fight against money laundering and tax evasion. For these reasons, administrative authorities around the world cooperate in the enforcement of regulation. Private international law should open up its methodology to this new reality. After exploring the traditional ways in which regulation has been dealt with, this article makes concrete proposals for changes. Besides overcoming the “public law taboo”, these include the more liberal application of foreign public law and foreign overriding mandatory rules, the development of multilateral conflicts rules for areas permeated by regulation, the recognition of foreign administrative decisions, and the development of a global public policy.

Adeline Chong – Moving towards harmonisation in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment rules in Asia

Abstract
This paper provides a comparative overview of the laws on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in ASEAN and Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea. It considers the principles which are shared in common and the significant differences in the laws on foreign judgments in the region. This paper argues that the laws which are canvassed here share many principles, albeit the interpretation on certain aspects may differ. Though differences exist, the differences are becoming less sharp. Further, there is a practical need for harmonisation given the plans for closer economic integration in the region. This paper argues that harmonisation is possible and should be pursued.

Maisie Ooi – Re-enfranchising the investor of intermediated securities

Abstract
Efforts to devise a choice-of-law rule for intermediated securities in the last two decades have almost entirely been centred on issues of property and title. Intermediation of securities does not, however, give rise to issues of property alone, even as they are mostly represented as such. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG (hereinafter referred to as “Secure Capital”) signals a possibly larger problem of the disenfranchisement of the investor of intermediated securities. Consideration of Secure Capital and its implications on choice-of-law have however been curiously sparse. This article seeks to bring the debate which still continues for issues of property to the issues of disenfranchisement, and to demonstrate why they are no less problematic, complex and in urgent need of a viable solution.

Mekuria Tsegaye Setegn – Legislative inaction and judicial legislation under the Ethiopian private international law regime: an analysis of selected decisions of the Federal Supreme Court’s Cassation Division

Abstract
The Cassation Division of the Ethiopian Federal Supreme Court has the power to review any court decision containing a basic error of law. The interpretations of the Division reviewing such decisions are binding on all other courts. So far, the Division has rendered a handful of binding precedents pertaining to private international law. Nevertheless, the appropriateness of the Division’s decisions in some private international law cases is questionable, let alone correcting errors committed by other courts. In two employment cases, the Division utterly invalidated choice of law agreements concluded by the parties. In another case, it characterized a dispute involving a foreigner as a purely domestic case. Through a critical analysis of the case laws, this Article strives to answer the question of whether the Division’s decisions are consonant to the foundational principles of private international law such as party autonomy. It also examines the validity of the precedents in light of the doctrine of separation of powers. The absence of a dedicated private international law statute and the bindingness of the Division’s decisions make the second question worthwhile. The Article will argue that the Division’s decisions undermine some generally accepted principles such as party autonomy: the decisions involve a judicial invention of eccentric norms. Hence, they also encroach on the lawmaking power of the Legislature.

Sharon Shakargy – Choice of law for surrogacy agreements: in the in-between of status and contract

Abstract

Surrogacy agreements regulate various matters, including parentage, consent to medical procedures, the performance of a very personal service, and monetary compensation. All these questions, which jointly structure the surrogacy, are bundled up together, separated only by extremely fine lines. Collectively, they comprise the basis upon which local and transnational surrogacies are executed. Legislators world-wide hold different positions on the matter of surrogacy in general and on the regulation of each sub-issue in particular; thus, the enforceability and possible outcomes of the procedure vary, depending on the law governing it. As such, it is crucial for the parties to know which law will apply to the surrogacy they are planning. Application of law is usually made by each country’s choice-of-law rules, which at this time are generally non-existent. This paper suggests guidelines for drafting rules to regulate these special agreements and adequately balance the different interests involved.

Felix M. Wilke – Dimensions of coherence in EU conflict-of-law rules

Abstract
EU conflict-of-law rules are contained mainly in six separate Regulations, with several others flanking them. This complex picture raises the questions of how easy access to this area of law is and to what extent it promotes legal certainty and predictability of results. Both issues link to the idea of coherence. Against this background, this article employs several different perspectives to examine the current level of coherence in EU conflict-of-laws rules analytically, also taking into account the recent Commission Proposal for a further Regulation. The article shows that, in particular, many structural and topical parallels exist, and argues that many remaining inconsistencies can easily (and should) be corrected because they are obvious and in part nearly inexplicable outliers.

Chukwuma Samuel Adesina Okoli – International commercial litigation in English-speaking Africa: a critical review (Review Article)

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:

H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner: European Conflict of Law 2019: Consolidation and multilateralisation

This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from January/February 2019 until November 2019. It provides an overview of newly adopted legal instruments and summarizes current projects that are presently making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. Furthermore, the authors look at areas of law where the EU has made use of its external competence. They discuss important decisions of the CJEU. In addition, the article looks at current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.

B. Hess: The Abysmal Depths of the German and European Law of the Service of Documents

The article discusses a judgment of the Higher Regional Court Frankfurt on the plaintiff’s obligations under the European Service Regulation in order to bring about the suspension of the statute of limitations under § 167 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO). The court held that the plaintiff should first have arranged for service of the German statement of claim in France pursuant to Art. 5 Service Regulation because, pursuant to Art. 8(1) Service Regulation, a translation is not required. However, the article argues that, in order to comply with § 167 ZPO, the translation must not be omitted regularly. The service of the translated lawsuit shall guarantee the defendant’s rights of defense in case he or she does not understand the language of the proceedings.

H. Roth: The international jurisdiction for enforcement concerning the right of access between Art. 8 et seq. Brussel IIbis and §§ 88 et. seq., 99 FamFG

According to § 99 para. 1 s. 1 No. 1 German Act on Procedure in Family Matters and Non-Contentious Matters (FamFG), German courts have international jurisdiction for the enforcement of a German decision on the right of access concerning a German child even if the child’s place of habitual residence lies in another Member State of the Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 (EuEheVO) (in this case: Ireland). Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 does not take priority according to § 97 para. 1 s. 2 FamFG because it does not regulate the international jurisdiction for enforcement. This applies equivalently to the Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (KSÜ).

J. Rapp: Attachment of a share in a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) by German courts

Attachment of a share in a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) by German courts: Despite Brexit, the LLP still enjoys great popularity in Germany, especially among international law and consulting firms. Besides its high acceptance in international business transactions, it is also a preferred legal structure due to the (alleged) flexibility of English company law. In a recent judgement, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) had the opportunity to examine the LLP’s legal nature in connection with the attachment of a share in a Limited Liability Partnership. The court decided that German courts have jurisdiction for an attachment order if the company has a branch and its members have a residence in Germany. By applying § 859 Code of Civil Procedure, it furthermore ruled that not the membership as such but the share of a partner in the company’s assets is liable to attachment.

U. Spellenberg: How to ascertain foreign law – Unaccompanied minors from Guinea

The Federal Court’s decision of 20 December 2017 is the first of four practically identical ones on the age of majority in Guinean law. It is contested between several Courts of Appeal whether that is 18 or 21 years. As of now, there are nine published decisions by the Court of Appeal at Hamm/Westf. and five by other Courts of Appeal. For some years now, young men from Guinea have been arriving in considerable numbers unaccompanied by parents or relatives. On arrival, these young men are assigned guardians ex officio until they come of age. In the cases mentioned above, the guardians or young men themselves seized the court to ascertain that the age of majority had not yet been reached. The Federal Court follows its unlucky theory that it must not state the foreign law itself but may verify the methods and ways by which the inferior courts ascertained what the foreign law is. Thus, the Federal court quashed the decisions of the CA Hamm inter alia for not having ordered an expert opinion on the Guinean law. The CA justified, especially in later judgments, that an expert would not have had access to more information. With regards to the rest of the judgment, the Federal Court’s arguments concerning German jurisdiction are not satisfying. However, one may approve its arguments and criticism of the CA on the questions of choice of law.

D. Martiny: Information and right to information in German-Austrian reimbursement proceedings concerning maintenance obligations of children towards their parents

A German public entity sought information regarding the income of the Austrian son-in-law of a woman living in a German home for the elderly, the entity having initially made a claim for information against the woman’s daughter under German family law (§ 1605 Civil Code; § 94 para. 1 Social Security Act [Sozialgesetzbuch] XII). German law was applicable to the reimbursement claim pursuant to Article 10 of the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations. Pursuant to § 102 of the Austrian Act on Non-Contentious Proceedings (Außerstreitverfahrensgesetz), and in accord with the inquisitorial principle, third persons like a son-in-law are also obligated to give information. The court applied this procedural rule and declared possible restrictions under Austrian or German substantive law inapplicable.

In the reverse case of an Austrian recovery claim filed in Germany, the outcome would be doubtful. While true that under German law an adjustment (Anpassung) might allow the establishment of an otherwise non-existing duty to inform, restrictions on the duty to disclose information pursuant to Austrian and German law make it difficult to justify such a claim.

M. Gernert: Effects of the Helms-Burton Act and the EU Blocking Regulation on European proceedings

For more than 20 years, each US president had made use of the possibility of suspending the application of the extraterritorial sanctions of the Helms-Burton Act, thus preventing American plaintiffs from bringing actions against foreigners before American courts for the „trafficking“ of property expropriated to Cuba. This changed as President Trump tightened economic sanctions against the Caribbean state. The first effects of this decision are instantly noticeable, but it also has an indirect influence on European court proceedings. In this article, the first proceeding of this kind will be presented, focusing on international aspects in relation to the Helms-Burton Act and the EU-Blocking-Regulation.

K. Thorn/M. Cremer: Recourse actions among third-party vehicle insurance companies and limited liability in cases of joint and several liability from a conflict of laws perspective

In two recent cases, the OGH had to engage in a conflict of laws analysis regarding recourse actions among third-party vehicle insurance companies concerning harm suffered in traffic accidents which involved multiple parties from different countries. The ECJ addressed this problem in its ERGO decision in 2016, but the solution remains far from clear. The situation is further complicated because Austria, like many European states, has ratified the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents. This causes considerable differences in how the law applicable to civil non-contractual liability arising from traffic accidents is determined.

In the first decision discussed, the OGH endorsed the decision of the ECJ without presenting its own reasoning. The authors criticizes this lack of reasoning and outline the basic conflict of laws principles for the recourse actions among third-party vehicle insurance companies. The second decision discussed provides a rare example for limited liability in the case of joint and several liability. However, given that the accident in question occurred almost 20 years ago, the OGH was able to solve the problem applying merely the Convention and autonomous Austrian conflict of laws rules. The authors examine how the problem would have been solved under the Rome II Regulation.

A. Hiller: Reform of exequatur in the United Arab Emirates

In the United Arab Emirates, an extensive reform of the Code of Civil Procedure entered into force on 2 February 2019. The reform covers half of the Code’s provisions, among them the law regulating the enforcement of foreign judgments, arbitral awards and official deeds. This article provides an overview of the amendments made on the enforcement of foreign decisions and puts them into the context of the existing law. The article also sheds light on the procedure applying to appeals against decisions on the enforcement. The reform does away with the requirement of an action to declare the foreign decision enforceable. Instead, a simple ex parte application is sufficient, putting the creditor at a strategic advantage. However, with a view to arbitral awards in particular, important issues remain unadressed due to the somewhat inconsistent application of the New York Convention by Emirati courts.

In Islandsbanki & Ors v Stanford [2020] EWCA Civ 480, upon appeal from Fancourt J in [2019] EWHC 1818 (Ch), Asplin LJ discussed whether purported execution of a foreign judgment registered in the High Court pursuant to the Lugano Convention, can be execution issued in respect of the judgment debt (for the purposes of section 268(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986), if the execution occurred before the period for appealing the registration of the judgment has expired and, if not, whether the defect can be cured.

An unpaid Icelandic judgment debt from 2013 which together with interest, is now in excess of £1.5 million sterling equivalent. The judgment was given against Mr Stanford in the Reykjanes District Court in Iceland on 26 June 2013. A certificate was issued by the Icelandic court on 16 October 2013, pursuant to Articles 54 – 58 Lugano. IB applied to register the Icelandic judgment in England and Wales on 16 March 2016. A registration order was sealed on 23 March 2016 (the “Registration Order”).

Some of the issues in the Appeal (and before Fancourt J) concern purely English procedural rules however their effect is of course to facilitate, or obstruct, recognition and enforcement under the Lugano Convention. The confusion to a great degree results from the UK, despite Lugano’s direct effect, having implemented the Convention in the CPR rules anyway (at 24). The submission made by appellant (the Bank) before the Court is essentially that a narrow interpretation of the English CPR rules which would not allow remedying an error in the procedure, would run counter Lugano’s objective of facilitating recognition and enforcement (reference is made to the Pocar report and the recitals of Lugano itself).

Asplin LJ at 38 points to the language of Lugano itself: ‘during the time specified for an appeal pursuant to Article 43(5) against the declaration of enforceability and until any such appeal has been determined, no (emphasis in the original) measures of enforcement may be taken other than protective measures against the property of the party against whom enforcement is sought. The ordinary and natural meaning of those provisions is quite clear.’ She also at 37 points to the Convention’s objectives not being restricted to ease of enforcement: ‘the underlying policy of Articles 43(5) and 47(3) is that a fair and proportionate balance must be struck between the interests of the party which applies for a registration order having obtained a judgment in a foreign jurisdiction to which the Convention applies, and the defendant/debtor whose rights of appeal are prescribed by law and should not be undermined by allowing irreversible measures of enforcement.’

Conclusion, at 40: ‘It is for that reason that CPR 74.6(3) provides that a registration order must contain reference to the period in which an appeal against registration can be lodged and that no measures of enforcement can be taken before the end of that period and the reason why that prohibition was repeated in the Registration Order itself at paragraph 2. Accordingly, any attempt to remedy the premature issue and execution under the Writ of Control by means of an exercise of the discretion under CPR r3.10(b) or the use of CPR r3.1(2)(m) or 3.1(7) (or the inherent jurisdiction of the court, for that matter) would fundamentally undermine Article 47(3) and section 4A(3) in a way which is impermissible.’

at 62 ‘The defect in the execution in this case, if it can be called a defect, was fundamental….It was not a mere technicality or a formal defect which might be rectified pursuant to what is now Rule 12.64 of the Insolvency Rules 2016. It went to the heart of the execution process’.

Appeal dismissed following an interesting and clear application of both Lugano’s provisions and its spirit.

Geert.

Recognition and enforcement, Lugano.
Whether purported execution of foreign judgment can be issued in respect of the judgment debt, for purposes of Insolvency Act, if execution occurred before the period for appealing the registration of the judgment has expired. https://t.co/bPt9U1IaHt

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 2, 2020

The author of this post is Giulio Monga, a PhD student at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan.

On 8 July 2019, Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) ruled on the jurisdiction of Italian courts over passengers’ claims for compensation against air carriers established in non-EU countries (order No 18257 of 2019).

D.M. and R.G., two Italian citizens residing in Italy, purchased tickets to fly from Copenhagen to Havana, and back. The flights were operated by the Russian airline Aeroflot. The tickets were purchased through the Aeroflot website.

The flight to Havana was first cancelled and only replaced with a longer flight the day after. On the return flight, the two passengers’ luggage was mishandled only to be delivered ten days later.

The two sued the Italian subsidiary of Aeroflot for damages before the Justice of Peace of Rome.

Aeroflot challenged the jurisdiction of Italian courts and asked the Supreme Court to give a ‘preliminary’ ruling on jurisdiction, as provided for in Article 41 of Italian code of civil procedure (this is a ruling on jurisdiction alone, which either party may request for as long as the case is not decided at first instance).

Specifically, Aeroflot submitted that the action had no connection with Italy, apart from the nationality and the residence of the plaintiffs. It stressed that the tickets had been purchased through the Moscow-based website of the company and that Italy was neither the country where the contract ought to take place nor the country where the alleged non-performance had occurred.

In its ruling, the Supreme Court began by pointing out that the matter came with the purview of the Montreal Convention of 1999 for the unification of certain rules for international carriage by air.

The Convention, to which Italy is a party, applies to all international carriage performed by aircraft for reward (Article 1(1)). A carriage is ‘international’ for the purposes of the Convention where, among other situations, the place of departure and the place of destination are situated in the territories of two States parties. The latter condition was met in the circumstances, given that the Convention is also in force for Cuba and Denmark.

The Montreal Convention deals with jurisdiction over passengers’ claims for damages in Article 33. Specifically, Article 33(1) provides that an action for damages may be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, before the courts of the following contracting States: the State of the carrier’s domicile, the State of the carrier’s principal place of business, the State where the carrier has a place of business through which the contract was made, or the State of the place of destination of the flight.

In the instant case, the Court noted, the question was whether the defendant, Aeroflot, could be regarded to have a ‘place of business’ in Italy, and whether such place could be considered to be the place of business through which the contracts between Aeroflot and the plaintiffs had been made.

The Court observed that, where tickets are purchased on-line, the place of business through which the contract was made must be identified regardless of the physical location of the agencies, subsidiaries or branches of the carrier concerned.

Air carriers, the Court remarked, present themselves on the web as commercial operators interacting with users based anywhere in the world. Neither the carrier’s nor the website users’ location or geographical origin are relevant to the transaction, since no physically identifiable intermediation occurs between the passenger and the carrier for the purposes of the purchase.

According to the Supreme Court, the online purchase of tickets challenge the traditional methods of localisation of a contract for jurisdictional purposes.

Against this background, the ‘place of business through which the contract has been made’, as referred to in Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention, cannot be determined based on the location of the server used for completing the purchase. It would be unreasonable, the Court added, to burden the passenger with the task of assessing the location of the relevant server. Moreover, an inquiry to that effect would lead to uncertain results, and would hardly be consistent as such with the goals of predictability that the rules on jurisdiction, including Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention, are expected to pursue.

Having stressed that the Montreal Convention must be given an autonomous interpretation, the Court observed that Article 33(1) should be read in light of other provisions in the Convention concerning jurisdiction. By this statement, if the understanding of the author of this post is correct, the Court meant to refer, in particular, to Article 33(2).

The latter provision applies, alongside Article 33(1), to actions for damages ‘resulting from the death or injury of a passenger’. It provides that those actions may also be brought before the courts of the State Party ‘in which at the time of the accident the passenger has his or her principal and permanent residence and to or from which the carrier operates services for the carriage of passengers by air, either on its own aircraft, or on another carrier’s aircraft pursuant to a commercial agreement, and in which that carrier conducts its business of carriage of passengers by air from premises leased or owned by the carrier itself or by another carrier with which it has a commercial agreement’.

While Article 33(2) was inapplicable as such to the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court apparently relied on the latter provision to construe, consistent with the principles of the Convention, the expression ‘place of business through which the contract was made’ as used in Article 33(1), in particular as regards on-line purchases. The Court argued that in on-line purchases, that place should be understood to correspond to the place where the purchase order is made and the payment is likely to take place: in the Court’s view, that place should in fact be identified with the domicile of the passenger, a connecting factor that complies with the requirements of certainty and foreseeability.

In the Court’s view, one of the general goals underlying the Montreal Convention, as it arises from an overall analysis of the above provisions, is in fact to enhance the protect of the passenger, namely by facilitating access to justice. To corroborate its findings, the Court also referred to the rules of the Brussels I bis Regulation on contracts concluded by consumers, as an example of the kind of protection that jurisdictional rules may want to afford to weaker parties.

In light of all of the foregoing, the Supreme Court concluded that, in the event of tickets purchased online by the passenger himself, the expression ‘place … through which the contract has been made’ in Article 33(1) should be deemed to refer to the place where the passenger becomes aware of conclusion of the contract, that is, in fact, the domicile of the passenger himself. This interpretation, the Court finally contended, complies with the goal of giving adequate protection to the passenger as a weaker party, while ensuring predictability and protecting air carrier against forum shopping.

The second 2020 issue of RabelsZ is now available online. It features two essays as well as the contributions to a Symposium on career paths into legal academia held at the Max Institute in June 2019:

Lord Hodge, The Scope of Judicial Law-Making in the Common Law Tradition, pp. 211 et seq

Judge-made law is an independent source of law in common law systems. To jurists brought up in legal systemswhich have codified law, this is one of the striking features of the common law tradition. Instead of interpreting a code to develop the law, common law judges develop the law which their predecessors have made. While statute law nowimpinges on many areas of private law, large tracts of our private law remain predominantly the product of judicialdecisions. [In this contribution] I wish to discuss some of the areas of private law which have been and remainpredominantly judge-made and the limits in the common law tradition on judicial law-making.

Markus G. Puder, Law and Language in Action. Transformative Experiences Associated with Translating the Louisiana Civil Code into German, pp. 228 et seq

In the course of translating the Louisiana Civil Code into German I had to overcome the unique challenges posed bythe source text and the receptor text. Beyond the translation issues stemming from its own bilingual origins, theLouisiana Civil Code codifies mixed law in unprecedented ways. Different but no less challenging conditionssurrounded the destination text, as distinct species of legal German exist. In addition to the legal German of Germany, these include the legal German of Austria and Switzerland. Resolving these challenges required tailored translationapproaches within the spectrum of source text and receptor text orientation. My article discusses the challenges I encountered and the decisions taken in response. It concludes with final thoughts on my experiences as legal translator and legal comparativist.

SYMPOSIUM: Career Paths into Legal Academia

Reinhard Zimmermann, Akademische Karrierewege für Juristen im Vergleich. Einführung in das Symposium (Career Paths into Legal Academia Compared. Introduction to the Symposium), pp. 264 et seq.

By highlighting characteristic aspects of an academic career in the United States, the present contribution attempts toprovide an interesting contrast to the career paths into legal academia available in the countries on which thesymposium, held in the Hamburg Max Planck Institute in June 2019, focuses. The countries considered in thesymposium are Germany and Austria, France, Italy, England and Scotland, and Japan. Here, too, we find considerable differences which both shape different legal cultures and are shaped by them.

Walter Doralt, Akademische Karrierewege für Juristen in Deutschland und Österreich (Career Paths into Legal Academia in Germany and Austria), pp. 268 et seq.

Seen from a distance, it is often presumed that career paths in law and legal education in Austria and Germany arevery similar. This assumption is also widely held in Germany (with regards to Austria). Some similarities do indeedexist. However, many aspects during the university education are surprisingly different in both countries. Equally, thisis true for subsequent career stages in academia. This article analyses the common points and differences.

Dorothée Perrouin-Verbe & Samuel Fulli-Lemaire, Career Paths into Legal Academia in France, pp. 299 et seq.

It is likely that a description of the way university careers unfold in France, at least as far as law is concerned, will surprise even seasoned observers of the academic world. Not everything, naturally, will appear outlandish: that the single most important precondition is having a PhD thesis is perhaps to be expected for a civilian jurisdiction; that the overall system is centralized will not astonish those that have come into even superficial contact with the country. But the extent of that centralization, the sheer number of unwritten rules, the relative lack of importance attributed to publications and the specificities of the agrégation, the competitive exam which serves as the main point of entry into the body of law professors, as well as the acceleration it is designed to provide to young academics’ careers, may surprise some readers.

Francesco Paolo Patti, Career Paths into Legal Academia in Italy, pp. 324-350 (27)

The present contribution aims to explain the relevant steps in the Italian academic career path and its most relevant traits. It is divided in three parts. The first contains a brief outline of the Italian legal framework on universityrecruitment and its evolution over the last forty years. The various structures are presented in a synthesised and simplified way, with the purpose of indicating the rationales underlying the different reforms. After having sketched out the playing field, the article describes a typical Italian academic career and points out the unique aspects of each stepon the long path of academia, from university graduation to the call as full professor. Finally, the paper outlinesfundamental features of the Italian academic social environment, which are essential to understand how the rules on university recruitment actually work in practice. Needless to say, the last part is the most important one. In addressingthe subject matter, it is not possible to limit the treatment to a description of the rules and their rationales as there areseveral non-written rules belonging to the Italian academic tradition that need to be presented in order to understanduniversity recruitment in actual practice. Aspects discussed in the present contribution concern especially the field of private law.

Andrew Sweeney. Career Paths into Legal Academia in Scotland, pp. 351 et seq.

This contribution deals with the smallest country represented at the symposium. Its size, however, is not the solefeature that distinguishes Scotland from the others. As a legal system, Scotland sits exactly neither with theContinental systems (represented here by Germany, France and Italy), nor with England. It is, instead, often describedas a mixed legal system, sharing features with both Civilian and Common-law systems. […] This [contribution] focusesprimarily on the position in Scotland. But much of what is discussed will be equally applicable to an English academic, and it is easy to overstate the differences between the two jurisdictions. Where interesting differences exist betweenthe two jurisdictions, an attempt has been made to point them out. […] Space constraints restrict the assessment to a select few of the myriad of subjects which the topic of academic career paths could include, and some of thoseselected are permitted only a cursory glance. Particular focus is given to a career in private law, and it must be bornein mind that differences – sometimes significant ones – exist in other areas such as criminology, legal theory and legal history.

Harald Baum, Akademische Karrierewege für Juristen in Japan (Career Paths into Legal Academia in Japan), pp. 374 et seq.

The landscape for an academic legal career in Japan shows some striking differences from its German counterpart. While in Germany a large number of qualified young academics struggle to secure a university posting, Japanese lawfaculties presently face difficulties in filling free positions. A second major difference is the way in which an academiccareer is achieved. In Japan, in-house, tenure-track careers are the norm whereas, at least up until now, they are a rare exception in Germany, where it is highly unusual to be appointed by the university where one has obtained his orher academic qualification. Accordingly, a change of universities in the course of an academic career is rare in Japan while in Germany the opposite is true. Japanese law faculties are entirely free to determine the qualificationsnecessary for an academic promotion. A second monograph, like the German »Habilitation«, is unknown in Japan. A PhD thesis, however, is increasingly common. The typical academic career starts after four years of undergraduatestudies, followed by a two-year period of study at graduate level or, alternatively, two years of training at a law school. Thereafter, a three-year doctoral programme has nowadays become the norm. This is followed by employment as an assistant, and in the event that the candidate’s qualifications are seen as sufficient, by a promotion to the position of associate professor. The latter is a member of the faculty and employment is no longerlimited in terms of duration. The final step is promotion to full professorship at the average age of 36 to 40.

A late-ish flag to keep an eye on Greenpeace’s class-action suit filed in the Austrian courts to have the Austrian tax breaks on air traffic (tax exemption on kerosene fuel for domestic flights and a VAT exemption on international flights) lifted. It is certain to engage the Chicago Convention and the European implementation of same. The argument is inter alia that the non-exemption for rail is a form of State Aid to the airlines. I wrote on the issues in 2016, featuring T-351/02 Deutsche Bahh, arguing that the CJEU could have forced the issue then. What would be most excellent would be for the Austrian courts to refer to Luxembourg so as the CJEU may revisit the issue 14 years on from the judgment of the then Court of First Instance, in a world were many look a lot less forgivingly at the exemptions’ implications for internalising negative environmental externalities.

Geert.

EU environmental law (with Leonie Reins), Edward Elgar, 2018.

BREAKING: first ever climate change case directly targeting aviation emissions, as @GreenpeaceAT asks Austria's Constitutional Court to repeal laws offering tax credits on plane fuel, alleging violation of international human rights law, Articles 2/8 ECHR.https://t.co/Bmozqd8M3b pic.twitter.com/B0p1MKGrh5

— Sam Varvastian (@SamVarvastian) February 20, 2020

The creation of the European Patent Court has been fraught with difficulties. After Spain and Italy had impeded its establishment for linguistic concerns, it was embedded in 2013 in an international treaty, the Agreement on a European Patent Court. In March 2017, the German Parliament (Bundestag) passed a law ratifying the Agreement. A mere 35 of its more than 600 members were present at the vote.

Patent lawyer Dr Ingve Björn Stjerna from Düsseldorf was unhappy. He saw his right of democratic representation, protected under Art 38 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz), being violated. That is why he brought a constitutional complaint against the law by which the German Parliament had consented to the Agreement.

The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) affirmed the complaint. It declared the German act assenting the Agreement to be void. In the view of the majority of the Justices, the procedure in which the law had not been adopted was defective. The act would require the consent by at least two thirds of all members of Parliament and of the Federal Council (Bundesrat), which is necessary normally only for amendments to the text of the Constitution (Art 79(2) German Constitution).

The rationale of this ruling was the following: In the Court’s view, the act ratifying the Agreement on the European Patent Court materially alters the German Constitution. By creating a new international court, Germany would transfer sovereign powers, which it would find impossible to regain later. As a result, German citizens would no longer be able to influence the exercise of the state powers through their vote. Hence their right of being democratically represented would be violated.

The decision was rendered by a 5 to 3 majority. In a dissenting opinion, the minority criticised the Court for having overstretched the right of democratic representation (Art 38 of the German Constitution). The latter would not be put into question by a merely formal mistake in the legislative procedure. Furthermore, the dissenters warned that the position taken by the majority would endanger further European integration, which enjoys constitutional status in Germany.

It is remarkable that the Constitutional Court requires a majority of two thirds of the Parliament for the act ratifying the Agreement on a European Patent Act. Can it really be said that this act amounts to a change of the German Constitution? Doubts are in order.

The court also conveniently ignores that judges are not elected representatives. It is therefore strange to invoke the right of democratic representation to invalidate such a law.

Even more peculiar, from an outsider’s view, must seem the fact that a single person can trigger the constitutional review of a legislative act based on merely formal errors. This creates opportunities for putting spanners in the work of the legislative procedure.

The German Constitutional Court’s emphasis on sovereignty is odd and throws a spanner in the works of further European integration. There seems to be an agenda behind this. Mind you that this is the same chamber of the Court that has repeatedly questioned the legality of monetary policy measures by the European Central Bank.

Fortunately, most other Member States do not have courts with similar far-reaching powers and extreme positions. But already, some – like Hungary – are starting to imitate Germany and endow their Constitutional Courts with powers to control the EU and its institutions. If more were to follow that path, this would surely be the end of European integration.

The decision by the Constitutional Court does not make the creation of the European Patent Court impossible. The German Parliament and the Federal Council have to vote for the law once more with two thirds of their members. However, precious time will be lost again.

Access to justice in times of corona

When COVID-19 makes the case for greater digitalisation of justice

Written by Emma van Gelder, Xandra Kramer and Erlis Themeli, with thanks to Georgia Antonopoulou, Alexandre Biard and Betül Kas (Erasmus University Rotterdam, ERC-Co project ‘Building EU civil justice: challenges of procedural innovations – bridging access to justice’)

The disruption of society has naturally also affected our justice system. While there is no total lockdown in The Netherlands, as of 16 March people working in non-vital sectors are required to stay at home, schools and universities are closed, and events and social gatherings are forbidden. These measures also meant that courts in the Netherlands had to restrict their daily activities. All courts were closed on 17 March and will stay closed in any case until 28 April 2020. This means that most court proceedings are postponed for the time being. To proceed with continuing obligations and proceedings, thereby ensuring ongoing access to justice, judiciaries around the world are increasingly adopting various forms of technology in their court procedures.

This blogpost sets out the Dutch approach of the judiciary to the COVID-19 crisis, and highlights some global examples of other approaches.

COVID-19’s disrupting effect to the functioning of the court system

COVID-19 caused a sudden lockdown of courts. Court hearings are delayed, resulting in complaints that the backlog in the judiciary will grow, and attorneys have urged for more cases to be processed. Against the background of the health safety measures by the RIVM (National Institute for Public Health and the Environment), the public is temporarily no longer allowed to attend the few court hearings that still do take place. The lockdown of courts and offices emphasises the need for remote access to courts and better communication between courts and their constituents.

The adoption of a General Regulation during the COVID-19 crisis

The Dutch Judiciary has taken steps to respond to these problems by adopting a general regulation on case-handling by the Judiciary during the COVID-19 period. This general regulation was the result of the proposal for temporary emergency COVID-19 legislation (spoedwetgeving COVID-19 Justitie en Veiligheid ), proposed by the Minister of Legal Protection, Sander Dekker, and by the Minister of Justice and Security, Ferdinand Grapperhaus. This proposal for legislation allows communication that normally is prescribed to take place physically, to take place through electronic means, such as audio or video livestream. Moreover, it enables annual general meetings to be held online or a testament by a notary to be signed online.

The Dutch Judiciary has created general rules on case-handling by the Judiciary during the COVID-19 period. The starting point of this regulation is that the courts will continue to deal with urgent cases, which are divided into serious urgent cases and other urgent cases. Urgent cases include certain hearings in criminal cases, insolvency cases, and family cases, particularly those concerning child protection. Judges work with digital files and have secured remote access from home. Law firms are also expected to have their staff working from home whenever possible, though not all law firms are closed.

The General Regulation deals among others with the attendance of courtroom hearings (Para. 1, sub 1.1 General Regulation), the use of secure email (Para. 1, sub 1.2 General Regulation) and closed hearings (Para. 1, sub 1.3 General Regulation). In principle oral hearings with the physical attendance of the parties will not take place during the COVID-19 period, unless the judge decides otherwise. Both serious and other urgent cases will take place as much as possible in writing or through telephone (video) connection. If the judge decides that an oral hearing with physical presence of the parties should take place, the guidelines of the RIVM are taken into account. Where possible, livestreaming will be used. Procedural guidelines that allow documents and messages to be sent through post or fax, can be sent via a safe email channel of the Judiciary.

Positive side-effects

Often, radical innovations are dictated by crisis. A positive side effect of the current health crisis is that it may boost the digitisation of the judiciary that has been severely hampered in the Netherlands (see our blogpost on EUCP; more extensively: Xandra Kramer, Erlis Themeli and Emma van Gelder, e-Justice in the Netherlands: The Rocky Road to Digitised Justice, 2018). To enable the functioning of the General Regulation, the IT department of the judiciary has extended the facilities for a telephone and video connection between the judiciary and external parties. Another side-effect boosting digitisation in the Dutch Judiciary regards the introduction of secure email to be used by parties and for filing procedural documents and communicating messages as of 9 April 2020. Several safeguards are required for the use of email, regarding the subject of the email and the capacity of the attachments to the email. Regarding signatures, no digital signature is prescribed, but a ‘wet’ signature scanned and uploaded through PDF (see para. 1.2.4 under 6 of the General Ruling). The moment of receipt of the e-mail within the secured email system of the Judiciary counts as the time of receipt (see para. 1.2.5 of the General Regulation).

Perhaps the most important side effect of this crisis would be the experience with these implemented facilities. Using remote access to courts, secure emails, video conferencing and other electronic means for a protracted period will provide the Ministry of Justice and Security important lessons on how to better utilize these. Video conferencing is of course not new in the Netherlands, but it is not used at a wide scale, particularly not in civil cases.

Challenges

While these side-effects must be praised, in reality there are a number of challenges caused by this ‘sudden’ shift towards digitisation that cannot be neglected. The lack of face-to-face contact results in an absence or lesser extent of non-verbal cues such as body language, tone of voice, facial expression. Especially in family law cases – often involving emotional discussions – this may prove a challenge and can risk miscommunication. Another challenge relates to the identification of parties; if e-mail is used, it can be difficult to ensure that the documents are also received by the correct person. In the Netherlands, judicial officers play an important role in securing the correct service of documents. Another challenge – although less relevant in the Dutch context – relates to vulnerable users having no or limited access to the internet or having minimum skills with digital technology. The absence of an offline channel forms a challenge for access to justice in certain cases.

The exclusion of public attendance during a court hearing, challenges the principles of a public hearing and transparency. To counter these challenges, attendance of maximum of three journalists is still allowed, and more decisions are published on the website of the judiciary (rechtspraak.nl). For example, the website of the administrative law department (Afdeling Bestuursrechstpraak) of the Council of State, states that decisions are temporarily published online and posted on their internal website and rechtspraak.nl.

Also, across the Dutch borders, examples of challenges are found. For example, small criminal cases in France – such as ‘immediate appearances’ (comparution immédiate), rarely allow for online hearings or other forms of digitalisation.

In Germany, since 2013 § 128a ZPO (German Civil Procedure Code) gives the possibility of using video-conferences for the oral negotiation and the hearing of evidence in civil litigation. Although all German states have equipped their judiciaries with the necessary technology, they are not widely used in practice. The current approach to face the corona crisis consists rather of the postponement of non-urgent proceedings. However, first signs towards a stronger move of the digitization of justice appears to be driven by the judiciary of Nord-Rhine-Westphalia.

Other global developments

Similar approaches to the COVID-19 crisis can be seen around the globe.

For instance, the UK has adopted the Coronavirus Act 2020 (hereinafter: Act). Regarding provisions on digitisation, Point 53 and 54 of the Act enshrine the expansion of the availability of live links in criminal proceedings and in other criminal hearings. Furthermore, point 55 and 56 of the Act rule that public participation in proceedings will be conducted by video or audio, and live links are used in magistrates’ court appeals for requirements or restrictions imposed on a potentially infectious person. The Economist, quotes in a paper of 4 April 2020, that before the COVID-19 crisis, about 200 cases a day were being heard at least partially via conference-call and video link in the UK. By March 31st this number had increased to around 1800 cases.

Richard Susskind, launched a new website at the outset of the corona crisis, in order to create a platform to share experiences of ‘remote’ alternatives to traditional court hearings. The website provides an overview of interesting developments on a global level. In any event, Susskind can be delighted as he has noted a sudden spike of sales of his recent book ‘Online courts and the future of justice’.

In Italy, the Court of Cassation uses video technology to decide appeal cases. It required an adaption of the procedural rules to allow video connection for the judges unable to travel due to the COVID-19 crisis.

In Canada, some courts are encouraging counsel and the public to use alternative dispute resolution forms in order to reduce delays now that many court hearings are postponed for the time being. The use of technology in out-of-court dispute resolution is more widespread and accepted, resulting in various forms of online dispute resolution (ODR). For example, in the COVID-19 period, ODR procedures offer benefits of virtual hearings centralizing disputes regardless of geographical distances between parties, paperless processes, flexibility and convenience enabling parties to participate from their own home computer. Positive side-effects are cost and time reductions as online procedures eliminate inter alia travel costs. In any case, the Covid-19 crisis may lead to a ‘wake-up’ call among lawyers and parties to consider the ability of ODR/ADR as a viable option of dispute resolution.

In Colombia, on 19 March new procedural rules were enacted to allow for virtual conferences and videoconferencing in Colombian Courts.

In Brazil, Brazilian courts work with the Cisco system enabling videoconference for court proceedings.

Also in Kenya, digitalisation is welcomed, as a Kenyan Judge has used Zoom for remote hearings and is now planning to oversee more than 20 court hearings over video link, including verdicts, rulings on appeals as well as applications.

Conclusion

It remains to be seen if the rapid uptake of digitisation will continue after the COVID-19 crisis comes to an end. In any case, the present health crisis shows the ability to implement emergency legislation and of the judiciary to amend a vast array of procedures in a short period of time.

Sánchez-Bordona AG issued his opinion in C‑343/19 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Volkswagen last Thursday. He relies heavily of course on CJEU authority almost all of which is reviewed on the blog – with Tibor Trans making a star appearance given its recent nature as well as its focus, like in Volkswagen, on financial damage.

Not long after, yesterday, the High Court in England in [2020] EWHC 783 (QB) held on a first preliminary issue in the class action suit pending there. Matthias Weller has already reviewed that judgment here. In that judgment, a lex causae argument on the binding authority of a German public body’s decision was advanced by claimants in subsidiary fashion. This was not entertained by the High Court for it had already found a binding effect on other grounds. Incidentally, the nature and timing of the High Court’s ruling suggest that there is no contestation of jurisdiction being brought forward by Volkswagen – I am enquiring with counsel in the case.

Returning to CJEU C-343/19, though: Raphael de Barros Fritz has analysis here and I am happy to refer, for timing for the release of my own ponderings on the Opinion suffered from a Friday afternoon call on injunctive relief and jurisdiction. A few additional notes of interest and subject to further pondering:

Firstly, the AG is too kind when he suggests that the Brussels Convention had left open the (now) Article 7(2) question. The Court’s locus damni /locus delicti commissi distinction was not at all required by then Article 5(3). Much as the distinction may have been clear to make in the Bier case itself, it was not at all advanced by the text of the Brussels Convention. Many of us have been pointing out the fallacy, including Cruz Villalon AG in his Opinion in Pez Hejduk, case C-441/13 which I reviewed here and Szpunar AG in his Opinion in Universal Music reviewed here. As Sánchez-Bordona AG points out in Volkswagen, the distinction has become a paradigm (at 2); ‘obstinance’ might also be a good word for it. The result of the CJEU refusing formally to reverse its Bier distinction, means itself and the national courts have been having to conjure up all sorts of distinguishing to respect both the Handlungsort /Erfolgort distinction, and the predictability of Brussels Ia as well as the need to interpret special jurisdictional rules restrictively.

Raphael makes a most valiant effort to do justice to the AG’s attempt at systemisation, yet the reality remains that most certainly on the locus damni front, the ever unclearer distinction between direct and indirect aka ‘ricochet’ damage is a Valhalla for reverse engineering – and we have not even thrown Lazar into the mix.

The AG suggests that not only the first purchasers of the vehicle may be direct victims, but also downstream purchasers of second-hand vehicles, however in each case constrained (if I understand the Opinion properly) to those purchasers, first or not, where the loss of value of the vehicles did not become a reality until the manipulation of the engines was made public: at 41; ‘ The loss of value of the vehicles did not become a reality until the manipulation of the engines was made public. In some instances, the applicants may be end users who obtained the vehicle from another, previous buyer; however, the latter did not experience any loss because, at that time, the damage was latent and was not disclosed until later when it affected the then owner. Therefore, it is not possible to describe the damage as being passed on from the original buyers to successive buyers.’

Further, given that the location of the vehicle is unforeseeable, the Advocate General considers that the place where the damage occurred is the place where that transaction was concluded, pursuant to which the product became part of the assets of the person concerned and caused the damage. However even for these cases other elements (per Universal Music) will have to be shown to avoid forum shopping and for these other elements, the AG suggests in particular a minimum contacts rule such as in US conflict of laws: at 75: ‘the defendant’s intention to sell its vehicles in the Member State whose jurisdiction is in issue (and, as far as possible, in certain districts within that State).’

On locus delicti commissi, the AG suggests at 34 that the event giving rise to the damage in this case consists of the installation, during the vehicle manufacturing process, of software which alters the vehicle’s emissions data. I do not think that is the only possible Handlungsort: other events in the Dieselgate chain arguably may qualify as Handlungsort, too: the executive decision to go ahead with the program, for instance. Or the regulatory steps (including type approval under EU law such as discussed in [2020] EWHC 783 (QB), above; or other steps required under EU or national law) needed to market the product in the country.

The last words on this Opinion have far from been said.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.7

A free webinar on Force Majeure and Hardship under Cross-border and Comparative Perspectives will take place on 8 April 2020 at 17.00 BST, organised by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law.

Speakers include Alice Decramer (avocat, Signature Litigation Paris), Nicole Langlois (Barrister, XXIV Old Buildings) and Tom Sullivan (partner & attorney, Shook Hardy Bacon, Philadelphia). The webinar will be chaired by Duncan Fairgrieve (Senior Research Fellow in Comparative Law & Director, Product Liability Forum). 

The objective of this webinar is to examine the legal consequences of a party’s inability to perform a contract due to events outside their control, by comparing and contrasting a series of different juridictions including the US, France and the UK. An analysis will be made of the issue of force majeure / and hardship in comparative perspective, looking at the impact of contractual force majeure clauses, and their interpretation by the courts in a series of different juridictions. The seminar will look at supply of goods contracts, as well as commercial contracts more generally. An analysis will be given of the position where there is no specific contractual provision, and reliance is instead placed on frustration / hardship or impracticability. What are the conditions of these doctrines and what is the remedy that might be awarded? Distinguished speakers will examine the issues with a particular focus on the impact of the current circumstances.

More details and advance registration here.

Yesterday, the High Court of London decided two preliminary issues in a large group action, certified as a Group Litigation Order (sub no. 105), brought by about 91,000 owners or lessees of VW, Audi, Skoda and SEAT cars. The claim is brought, against the manufacturers of the affected vehicles (VW, Audi, Skoda, and SEAT), against the relevant VW financial services arm and against a variety of authorised UK based VW dealers. Article 8 no. 1 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation will have been of relevance to the foreign ones amongst the defendants. No express explanations are offered how claimants eligible for the UK group litigation are determined – presumably it depends on where the car was bought.

The precise personal/territorial scope of the respective mass litigations would have been interesting, since the proceedings in the UK are just some of many by disaffected VW owners around the world, and the outcomes for the claimants seem to differ quite substantially. As early as in 2015, a class-action similar to the UK one was commenced against VW in the Federal Court of Australia, on behalf of around 100,000 VW owners, which was settled for up to AusD 87 million. The total amount may go up to AusD 127 million, depending on the ultimate number of claimants. On 1 April 2020, the Federal Court of Australia approved the settlement of the Australian class actions. The settlement was approved on the basis of a Settlement Scheme developed by the solicitors for the applicants and made public here, that sets out the process by which claims can be registered, assessed and paid, and the Deed of Release and Settlement that was agreed between the parties, made publicly available by those solicitors here. In Germany, proceedings under the (quite restrictive) collective redress mechanism of the “Musterfeststellungsklage” were settled recently as well, in this case for up to € 830 Million in total in relation to around 400.000 claimants. These claimants still need to accept individually the offered sums until 20 April 2020 after receiving offers from VW based on the remaining value of their cars these days. Individual litigations outside the Musterfeststellungsklage about the influence of the amount of kilometres that the respective car has already run (amongst other issues) are reaching the German Federal Court of Justice these days (the hearings will take place on 5 May 2020). In addition, the Court of Justice of the European Union is dealing with other aspects of the VW case, see on CoL here.

The claim in the UK proceedings alleges a variety of causes of action against the Defendants, including fraudulent misrepresentation in relation to the sale of the affected vehicles. A number of those causes of action proceed upon the basis that the software function of the Engine amounts to a “defeat device” within the particular meaning of Article 3 (10) of EU Parliament and Council Regulation 715/2007 dated 20 June 2007. If so, then one consequence is that its use in the engine and thus, the sale of the affected vehicles, was unlawful, being prohibited by Article 5 (2) of the Regulation.

Thus, the question arose whether Brexit altered anything in this respect. This question is easy to answer at the moment, see para. 12: “Brexit makes no difference here because EU Law (including the jurisdiction of the CJEU) will continue to have effect as if the UK was still a Member State until the end of the transition period which is 31 December 2020”.

A further issue relates to the Claimants’ reliance on formal letters to VW, issued by the “competent authority” in Germany for these purposes, being its Federal Motor Transport Authority, the German “Kraftfahrtbundesamt” (“the KBA”) dated 15 October, 20 November, and 11 December 2015 (“the KBA Letters”). The Claimants contended that these letters constitute decisions that the software function is a defeat device, that those decisions bind the courts in Germany as a matter of German law, that they also bind other authorities in other Member States, including English courts, either as a matter of EU law or as a matter of German law and by reason of EU and/or English law, there is a conflicts rule to the effect that the question as to whether they bind the UK court must be decided by reference to their binding effect or otherwise under German Law, being the law of the seat of the KBA.

For a number of reasons, including analogies to competition law, the Court decided that the KBA’s finding binds all Member States (including their courts) as a matter of EU law. This is why the Court abstained from taking a decision on the alternative grounds advanced by the Claimants.

At the same time and independently from the binding effects of the KBA’s finding, the Court found on its own account that the affected vehicles did contain defeat devices. Another bad day for VW.

The full text of the judgment is available here.