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The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑199/19 (RL sp. z o.o. v J. M.), which is about the Late Payment Directive. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version:

« 1) L’article 2, point 1, de la directive 2011/7/UE […] doit être interprété en ce sens qu’un contrat dont la prestation principale consiste en la remise, à titre onéreux, d’un bien immobilier pour un usage temporaire, tel qu’un contrat de location d’un local professionnel, constitue une transaction commerciale conduisant à une prestation de services, au sens de cette disposition, pourvu que cette transaction soit effectuée entre des entreprises ou entre des entreprises et les pouvoirs publics.

2) Dès lors qu’un contrat à durée déterminée ou indéterminée, stipulant un paiement périodique à des intervalles définis par avance, tel que le loyer mensuel afférent à un contrat de location d’un local professionnel, relève du champ d’application matériel de la directive 2011/7, en tant que transaction commerciale conduisant à une prestation de services contre rémunération, au sens de l’article 2, point 1, de cette directive, l’article 5 de celle-ci doit être interprété en ce sens que, pour qu’un tel contrat puisse faire naître, en cas de paiement non réglé à l’échéance, les droits aux intérêts et à l’indemnisation prévus à l’article 3 et à l’article 6 de ladite directive, il ne doit pas nécessairement être considéré comme constituant un accord sur un échéancier fixant les montants à payer par tranches, au sens de cet article 5 ».

Source : here

Following successful events in Bonn and Würzburg, the third iteration of the conference for young German-speaking scholars in private international law will take place – hopefully as one of the first events post-Corona – on 18 and 19 March 2021 at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg. The conference will focus on the theme of PIL for a better world: Vision – Reality – Aberration?; it will include a keynote by Angelika Nußberger, former judge at the European Court of Human Rights, and a panel discussion between Roxana Banu, Hans van Loon, and Ralf Michaels.

The organisers are inviting contributions that explore any aspect of the conference theme, which can be submitted until 20 September 2020. The call for papers and further information can be found on the conference website.

Toni Marzal (University of Glasgow) has posted From World Actor to Local Community: Territoriality and the Scope of Application of EU Law on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

This chapter offers a reconstruction of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in relation to the territorial scope of application of EU law. Thus, it will focus on the manner in which the Court approaches the question of whether EU law should apply to cases that are at least partly connected to non-EU jurisdictions. This is a topic that has attracted significant interest in recent years from EU lawyers as well as experts in public and private international law, given in particular how EU law has been said to take the role of a ‘world actor’ in tackling problems that lack a clear geographical basis, such as the protection of personal data, environmental degradation or competition law. Under the most common understanding, the question of the territorial applicability of EU law is essentially a functional one: the scope of application of EU law will be that which is required by the effective pursuit of whatever goal is at stake, which may mean that in many instances it will apply ‘extraterritorially’. It will however be argued that this leaves aside an important dimension of the territorial applicability of EU law – its contribution to the construction of the EU legal system as a ‘local community’. Indeed, the EU legal system should not only be seen as an institutional tool in the promotion of certain objectives, but should also be understood as a space of inclusion and exclusion. It will not only be argued that this is a necessary dimension to EU law’s scope of application, but also that this dimension is already present in the case law. This will be seen through a study of three different lines of cases, where the Court deduces the applicability of EU law from the location of a legal relationship, the imperativeness of the particular EU legal regime, and the integrity of the EU legal system as a whole.

The paper is forthcoming in L. Azoulai (ed), European Union Law and Forms of Life. Madness or Malaise? (Hart Publishing, 2020).

By Anubhav Das (National University of Advanced Legal Studies, Kochi) and Aditi Jaiswal (Ram Manohar Lohia National Law University, Lucknow)

The internet brought significant changes in society, leading to a massive collection of data which necessitated legislation to regulate such data collection. The European Union enacted the General Data Protection Regulation, 2016(Hereafter GDPR), replacing the Data Protection Directive, 1995. Meanwhile, India, which currently lacks a separate data protection legislation, is in the process of enacting the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 (Hereafter PDP). The PDP has been introduced in the Indian parliament and is currently under the scrutiny of a parliamentary committee. The primary purpose of these legislations is the protection of informational privacy.

Even though GDPR and PDP follow the same set of data protection principles, but, there exists an inevitable conflict between the two. This conflict determines the applicability of the legislation on the data subject. The territorial scope of GDPR and the PDP makes it clear that both overlap each other and this overlap can be used by companies involved in data processing or collection, to circumvent the civil liability arising under the laws. This post analyses the conflict between both the laws and in conclusion, it will suggest a way to overcome such an issue.

Territorial Scope: GDPR and PDP   

Article 3 of the GDPR provides for the territorial applicability of the law. The Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a controller or a processer. According to Article 3(1), any controller or processer that is established in the member state (European Union) shall fall under the scope of the GDPR. In other words, any company which has an office in the European Union shall come within the purview of the GDPR. Article 3(2) states that even if any processer or controller is not established in the European Union, but if they are offering goods or services irrespective of payment or monitoring behaviour in the European Union, then they will also fall under the scope of GDPR.

On the other hand, the PDP provides for the territorial applicability under Section 2. It applies to the processing of personal data by data fiduciary (similar to the controller under GDPR) and data processer (similar to processer under GDPR). Section 2(A) (a) states that if personal data is collected, disclosed, shared or otherwise processed within the territory of India, then it shall fall under the PDP. Section 2(A) (b), makes it applicable to the State, any Indian company, any citizen of India or any person or body of persons incorporated or created under Indian law. Section 2 (A) (c) makes it applicable to data fiduciary or data processor which are not in India but are processing in connection with any business carried on in India, or any systematic activity of offering goods or services to data principals within the territory of India or any activity concerning the profiling of data principle.

The Overlap of Jurisdiction

The internet has provided a way for companies to operate anywhere without the existence of an entity in a particular country. This also includes those companies which deal with data. In the context of Europe and India, a company doesn’t need to have an entity in Europe or India to operate and do business. Thus, an Indian company can easily do business related to data in Europe without any real existence in Europe and vice versa. Consequently, the problem that arises concerning data protection laws is complicated. An Indian company will fall under the purview of the PDP as per Section 2(A) (b) but at the same time if this Indian company also deals with ‘personal data for offering goods or services’ in the European Union, then it will also be regulated by the provisions of the GDPR.

Similarly, a European company ‘collecting data in India’ will fall under the scope of both PDP and GDPR. It is a matter of fact that judicial courts do not have jurisdiction over foreign land. Hence, no monetary damages can be imposed on companies which operate from Europe by using PDP or companies operating from India by using GDPR.

A European company or an Indian company can also claim that there is proper compliance with GDPR or PDP, respectively. In the context of Europe and India, a company only needs to follow the data protection law of the land from where it operates even though such an act violates data protection law of the other jurisdiction. This is possible as GDPR and PDP differ from each other on every key and essential aspect such as the very meaning of personal data.

The Difference and its Implications

The primary purpose of GDPR and PDP is the protection of personal data. But, the definition of personal data differs when GDPR is compared with PDP. The reason why such a description is essential is that a substantial part of both laws is based on the processing of personal data. This includes fair consent, purpose limitation, storage limitation, rights of data principle etc. Such aspects, when read with the territorial scope of both the laws, outlines the applicability of its provisions. The table below shows the difference in the definition of personal data.

 

 

GDPR PDP   Personal data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’).

An identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; Personal data is data about or relating to a natural person who is directly or indirectly identifiable, having regard to any characteristic, trait, attribute or any other feature of the identity of such natural person, whether online or offline, or any combination of such features with any additional information, and shall include any inference drawn from such data for profiling.

 

Note – Underlined are the parts which show that it is not present in the other law.

Both GDPR and PDP refer to personal data as information/data relating to identified/identifiable natural person. At the same time, the nuances of what constitutes an identifiable natural person differ significantly as both use different terminology which creates a diversion in the meaning of the personal data.

Deviation 1 – PDP provides for words such as ‘any other feature of identity, a combination of such feature with other information, any inference drawn for profiling’, in the meaning of an identifiable natural person. These terms can be interpreted more liberally and will probably be explained by courts in India and shall have an evolving meaning. GDPR, on the other hand, provides for specific terms like ‘physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural, social identity’. Hence, European Courts will have to interpret personal data by mandatorily considering such terms, making it’s scope narrower when compared to PDP in this context.

Deviation 2 – Terms such as ‘identification number’ and ‘location data’ is mentioned explicitly in GDPR and not in PDP, making PDP narrower in scope here.

This above discussion can be easily understood with the help of the following figure –

Deviation 1 – The green circle represents inference in PDP. The blue circle represents inference in GDPR. The green stripe represents personal data which is covered in PDP and not covered in GDPR.

Deviation 2 – The yellow circle represents personal data in GDPR. The red circle represents personal data in PDP. The yellow stripe represents personal data which is covered in GDPR and not covered in PDP.

In the figure above, in Deviation 1, the green strip represents that personal data, which when processed by a company shall not fall under the scope of GDPR even though it shall be under the scope of the PDP. Such a difference implies that companies falling under the territorial ambit of both the laws, can follow one and circumvent the other.

A European company can process personal data represented in the green strip from India, and for that, it doesn’t need to comply with GDPR as that data is not personal data under GDPR. Now even though, there is a violation of the provisions under PDP the company can escape liability as Indian courts do not have jurisdiction in Europe, and European Courts cannot adjudge the matter as it falls outside the material scope of GDPR. The vice versa will happen if the case of deviation two is considered.

The consequence of such inconsistencies will be faced by data subjects who won’t be able to claim damages provided under their respective data protection law. One of the ways to ensure that damages can be claimed is by harmonising the data protection laws which can only be done by international cooperation.

The Need For International Cooperation in Data Protection

The existence of such issues in the framework of GDPR and PDP is not because of the extraterritorial application. Advocating against the extraterritorial application to resolve the problem of overlap in the jurisdiction of data protection laws would only give rise to more infringement of informational privacy of data subjects by foreign companies. This, in turn, will be detrimental for the very purpose for which data protection legislation is enacted.

The requirement at present is to harmonise the key definitions such as personal data in the data protection legislation. This will ensure that a right of action lies in both GDPR and PDP. Even if a foreign company cannot be dragged to the national court, harmonisation will at least ensure that a data subject has a right to seek damages in the international court.

The aspect discussed in this article is regarding two jurisdictions. However, consider, for instance,  the complications that could arise when more than two jurisdictions are involved. To illustrate, an Indian Company having an office in Canada and that office is doing business in data from the European Union. In such cases, the best way to ensure data protection rights is by harmonisation, and this can only be achieved with the help of international cooperation. Thus, data protection in the age of internet needs multilateral international agreements.

Conclusion

The international regime of data protection is complicated in today’s world. There is no proper international agreement which governs the data protection legislation across the globe, which resulted in a difference in the critical terms of data protection when GDPR and PDP are compared. This, in – turn can be used by corporates to get away with liability. So, the aim must be not to let anyone violate the data protection principles by using this inconsistency and get away with it. To deal with this and safeguard the privacy of data subject, international cooperation in data protection is essential.

 

 

 

Mr Villiers reacted to Villiers v Villiers [2020] UKSC 30 with a letter in the FT yesterday, set against the general background of ‘divorce tourism’ said to have been encouraged by the Supreme Court ruling last week. Ms Villiers now lives in England however the majority of the marriage was spent in Scotland which is also where divorce proceedings were issued.

Sales J for the majority summarises the legislative background at 8:

The national legislation governing jurisdiction in cross-border cases is primarily contained in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (“the CJJA 1982”). That Act gave effect in domestic law to the [1968] Brussels Convention… [which] was amended on the association of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1978. It was replaced as the principal instrument governing jurisdiction in cross-border cases between member states of the European Union by [Brussels I] which in large part replicated the provisions of the Brussels Convention. The CJJA 1982 was amended to refer to and give effect in domestic law to the Brussels Regulation. The Brussels Regulation has been replaced by [Brussels Ia].

The Brussels Convention did not apply to issues of the status of natural persons, including marriage, nor to rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship (article 1(1)), but it did apply in respect of claims for maintenance. This was later carved out and titled into a separate Regulation, the Maintenance Regulation 4/2009. The UK until Brexit day chose to apply the Regulation intra-State, too, i.e. between the constituent parts of the Kingdom. 

Lord Sales posits that all in all, the application of the jurisdictional rules is ‘straightforward’ (at 25) however his needing 32 paras to set out the test somewhat belies that statement, as does Lord Wilson’s and Lady Hale’s lengthy dissent at 93 ff. (and Lady Black’s at

There is no forum non conveniens rule in the Maintenance Regulation. The CJEU held so in C-468/18 R v P and Lord Sales refers to that judgment.

The only viable route to a stay of the jurisdiction in principle of the English courts, the place of habitual residence of Mrs Villiers, the maintenance creditor, is via the ‘related actions’ gateway of A13 of the Regulation. Are the husband’s divorce proceeding in Scotland a “related action” for the purposes of A13? And, pursuant to that provision, should the English court decline jurisdiction in respect of the wife’s maintenance claim? At 45 Sales LJ holds that to be related actions, they must refer

‘primarily to maintenance claims of the kind to which the special regime in the Regulation applies. If the position were otherwise, and the word “actions” meant legal proceedings of any kind whatever, that would undermine the fundamental object of the Maintenance Regulation that a maintenance creditor has the right to choose in which jurisdiction to claim maintenance. On such a reading, there would be a substantial risk that this object of the Maintenance Regulation would be undermined by the commencement of proceedings by the maintenance debtor according to the jurisdictional provisions of instruments other than the Maintenance Regulation, laid down in pursuance of entirely different jurisdictional policies than that reflected in the Maintenance Regulation.’

At 48 he adds obiter (for the husband’s suit in Scotland here concerned the divorce and the divorce only) that contra to the likely position in Moore v Moore [2007] EWCA Civ 361, even a maintenance debtor’s claim for distribution of family property with an impact on maintenance, cannot be a related action for the purposes of A13: for it would hand the debtor a torpedo against the creditor’s Regulation-protected choice.

It is on the issue of related actions that Lord Wilson and Lady Hale disagree at 147 ff., with Lord Wilson adding an arguably stinging postscript at 172 ff. At 162 Lord Wilson refers to A13(2) as ‘the dog. The reference to “irreconcilable judgments” is no more than the tail.’ A wide interpretation therefore of A13 (Lady Black, consenting with Sales, at 85 puts more emphasis in the irreconcilability of the judgments).

A most interesting to and fro of arguments and one which post Brexit will be recommended reading for the continuing application of the Maintenance Regulation in the EU.

Geert.

 

Maintenance regulation Brussels II, applied intra-State (UK) by incorporation by that Member State.
Application of lis alibi pendens. Non-existence of forum non conveniens. Distinction with matrimonial Regulation. https://t.co/AllsUqm05Q

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 1, 2020

 

In the last decade, the French law of diplomatic immunity has changed numerous times. This is not great for legal certainty, but it can get much worse if the different rules are applied in the same case. This should not be possible in a democratic State, but this is what happened in Commisimpex v. Republic of Congo.

Background

Commisimpex is a Congolese company which conducted serious construction work in Congo in the mid 1980s. It was headed by Lebanese businessman Mohsen Hojeij who was presented by the general press as a personal friend of the President of Congo, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, although Hojeij himself denies it. Commisimpex claimed that Congo did not pay some of the work and initiated arbitral proceedings which eventually led to two arbitral awards ordering Congo to pay various sums which total today over a billion euros. Since then, Commisimpex has been trying to enforce the awards over any assets of Congo that it may find.

To resist enforcement, Congo developed two strategies. The first was to generate a contradictory judgment which might bar the enforcement of the awards. The second was to challenge the enforceability of the waiver of its sovereign immunities.

A Timely Congolese Judgment

A few months after Commisimpex initiated enforcement proceedings of the arbitral awards in France (see below), the Congolese social security institution claimed that Commisimpex had failed to pay its contributions for decades and requested that insolvency proceedings be opened against the company. Two insolvency officials were appointed. French courts would later find that the first had represented the State of Congo, and the second was employed by the Presidency of the State of Congo.

In 2014, Congolese tax authorities also started to review the tax situation of Commisimpex, to eventually fid that Commisinpex owed over a billion euros of taxes to the Congolese State. Remarkably, the amount corresponded pretty much to the amounts of the arbitral awards.

At the end of 2014, the Congolese judge in charge of the liquidation issued an order whereby he ruled that a set off occurred between the claims resulting from the awards and the tax claims, and that the latter being higher than the former, a tax claim still remained. French courts would later find that Comminsimpex was neither informed about this particular aspect of the proceedings, and even less heard.

Congo then attempted to have the 2014 Congolese order declared enforceable in France. Its enforcement was denied by the Paris first instance court in 2015, and then by the Paris Court of appeal, on the ground of lack of impartiality of the insolvency officials and violation of the right to be heard.

The Evolving Law of Diplomatic Immunity in France

In a letter of 1993, the Republic of Congo had waived all jurisdiction and enforcement immunities in this case. A critical issue became whether the waiver covered assets protected by diplomatic immunity.

A New Rule of Customary International

In two cases of 2011 and 2013, the French Supreme Court for Criminal and Civil Matters (Cour de cassation) invented a rule of customary international law, allegedly grounded in the 2004 UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, providing that diplomatic immunity could not be waived by a general waiver of all sovereign immunities, whether of jurisdiction or enforcement, but that it could only be waived by a declaration which was both express and “special”, i.e. specifically mentioning diplomatic immunity.

Meanwhile, in the same year 2011, Commisimpex attached the bank accounts of the diplomatic mission of Congo and its delegation to UNESCO in Paris. French lower courts applied the new 2011 precedent of the Cour de cassation and set aside the attachements, as Congo has not expressly and specifically waived its diplomatic immunity.

A New Precedent

Commisimpex appealed to the Cour de cassation which, remarkably, overruled itself in a judgment of 13 May 2015 and held that customary international law only required an express waiver of diplomatic immunity. Indeed, that is all that the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations ever required. The waiver of Congo did not mention diplomatic immunity and was thus not specific, but it was express. The Court allowed the appeal.

The case was thus sent back to the Paris Court of Appeal. In June 2016, the Paris Court of Appeal applied the new doctrine of the Cour de cassation and ruled that Commisimpex could attach the bank accounts of the Diplomatic Mission and UNESCO Delegation in Paris. Congo appealed to the Cour de cassation.

A New Law

However, the French Parliament got concerned that creditors of States could enforce too easily their awards (or judgments) in France and thus intervened in December 2016 to reinstate a requirement that diplomatic (and consular) immunities may only be waived by express and specific waivers (see today Article L. 111-1-2 and L. 111-1-3 of the French Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures). Of course, the new law could only apply to enforcement proceedings initated after its entry into force.

Two years later, the case came back before the Cour de cassation, which it seems, took very seriously the message sent by the Parliament that France should be more understanding with foreign states. In a judgment of 10 January 2018, the Cour de cassation ruled that, although the Cour of Appeal of Paris had perfectly applied the 2015 ruling, the law had changed, and a waiver of diplomatic immunity could only be enforced if express and specific. Of course, the Cour de cassation noted, the new law was not applicable to enforcement proceedings initiated 7 years earlier, but it still decided to apply the new requirements in the present case, because

it was absolutly necessary, in a field touching on the sovereignty of states and the preservation of their diplomatic representation, to treat like cases alike. Thus. the objective of legal consistency and certainly requires to come back to the previous case law [the 2011-2013 precedents] conforted by the new law.

And as if it was not enough, the Cour de cassation decided to close the case and thus, instead of sending it back to a lower court, to finally rule that the diplomatic monies attached in 2011 were protected by a diplomatic immunity which had not been waived.

Is this Constitutional? A New Rule of Customary International Law

The most remarkable part of the 2018 judgment was that the Cour de cassation decided to apply retroactively new rules in a case where it had taken an entirely different position a few years earlier. At first sight, that looks contrary to the most basic principles of the rule of law.

Commisimpex lawyers decided to create a situation to allow them to bring the matter before the French constitutional council. They attached again diplomatic funds. Lower courts ruled that they could not, as per the 2018 judgment of the Court de cassation. Commisimpex appealed to the Cour de cassation, and requested that the issue of the constitutionality of the retroactive application of the new rules (whether judge made or statutory) be put to the Contitutional Council.

In a judgment of 2 October 2019, the Cour de cassation ruled that there was no issue, and thus no need to petition the Constitutional Council, on the ground that the 2018 judgments had not applied the new law, but only Articles 22 and 25 of the 1961 Vienna Convention and customary international law.

The French reconstruction of customary international law continues.

Meanwhile, Commisimpex has attached Falcon 7X business jet belonging to the presidency of Congo. Is it covered by diplomatic immunity? Stay tuned.

written by Michael Wells-Greco

(Note: publication of this book was announced earlier.)

 

La gestación por sustitución en el derecho internacional privado y comparado

Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas UNAM – Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE)

México, 2020

 

This highly informative and timely book edited by María Mercedes Albornoz addresses the pressing challenges presented by surrogacy arrangements. With contributions from Nuria González Martín, Verónica Esparza, Ximena Medellín Urquiaga, Isabel Fulda, Rebeca Ramos, Regina Tamés, Mónica Velarde, Federico Notrica, Cristina González Beilfuss, Rosa Elvira Vargas, María Virginia Aguilar, Francisco López González, María Mercedes Albornoz and Nieve Rubaja, and a thought provoking preface by Eleonora Lamm,  this collection contains a remarkable wealth of comparative Ibero-America legal materials on surrogacy. While comparisons are made with the diverse national surrogacy approaches in other parts of the world, much of the comparative discussion centres on the experience of surrogacy in the Americas (in Mexico and Argentina, in particular). The careful analysis demonstrates the challenges for many states arising from surrogacy arrangements.

The book contains a number of contributions that provide international perspectives on surrogacy. These include, for example, a careful consideration of the impact and relevance of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (the discussion begs the question whether the Inter-American Court of Human Rights will be seised to consider surrogacy in ways similar to its European cousin) and two reflective discussions on the work and aims of international surrogacy projects. The current situation in the Americas highlights ever more starkly the need for the international community to come together to consider whether a multilateral framework might be agreed upon which enable states to work together to uphold the human rights of all concerned. Only a holistic analysis by the global community can begin to determine whether international frameworks can achieve these aims.

Yet there are limitations with possible international approaches. There are also limits to what is considered to be morally acceptable. It is rightly posited that it is for each state to consider its national approach to surrogacy (which may include prohibition) but public policy is not an empty vessel and it cannot be deployed as a blanket defence when legal parent-child relationships are established abroad. There is an acceptance that surrogacy is not going to go away, so consideration ought to be given to the more complex and important human rights considerations it raises, which means focusing on the interests of children, as well as those of the surrogate (who in the volume is intentionally not referred to as the surrogate mother) herself.

The book returns, as it were, to Mexico and concludes with a proposed model of regulation in Mexico of cross-border surrogacy arrangements through a private international law lens.

The book is a fascinating read – it would interest anyone from lay readers with an interest in surrogacy to academics, lawyers and other professionals.

Dr. Michael Wells-Greco

In lieu of its originally scheduled programme, the Hague Academy of International Law recently announced its first online programme, the invitation to which reads as follows:

The Hague Academy of International Law is pleased to announce the launch of its very first online programme: an entirely online session of its Centre for Studies and Research. This session will take place between September 1st, 2020, and June 1st, 2021, on the theme of Epidemics and International Law.  The working language will be English.

The Directors of Research, Professor Shinya Murase (Sophia University, Tokyo) & Ms. Suzanne Zhou (McCabe Centre for Law and Cancer, Melbourne) invite applications from researchers including students in the final phase of their doctoral studies, holders of advanced degrees in law, political science, or other related disciplines, early-stage professors and legal practitioners.

Selected participants will each write an article on a sub-topic related to the overall theme of Epidemics and International Law. The research work will start in September 2020 and, following a very strict planning, the articles should be finalized in April/May 2021. Interested applicants must therefore be available to conduct their research and write their contribution in the coming months. The best articles will be included in a book to be published in August 2021 approximately.

Applications can be sent in between July 1st and September 1st, 2020. As the Academy expects to receive a large number of applications, the application deadline might already close on August 1st, 2020. Interested candidates are therefore encouraged to apply as soon as possible using the appropriate online form.

For more information on this programme, please consult the poster, as well as the web pages related to the Centre for Study and Research – Online.

German version here.  English version here.

This post introduces my case note titled ‘A Dangerous Chimera: Anti-Suit Injunctions Based on a “Right to be Sued” at the Place of Domicile under the Brussels Ia Regulation?’ which appeared in the July 2020 issue of the Law Quarterly Review at page 379. An open access version of the case note is available here.

In Gray v Hurley [2019] EWCA Civ 2222, the Court of Appeal (Patten LJ, Hickinbottom LJ and Peter Jackson LJ), handed down the judgment on the claimant’s appeal in Gray v Hurley [2019] EWHC 1972 (QB). The appellant appealed against the refusal of an anti-suit injunction.

The appellant (Ms Gray) and respondent (Mr Hurley) had been in a relationship. They acquired property in various jurisdictions using the appellant’s money, but held it in either the respondent’s name or in corporate names. The relationship ended and a dispute commenced over ownership of some of the assets and properties. The appellant was domiciled in England; the respondent lived in New Zealand after the relationship ended and was no longer domiciled in England. He initiated proceedings there for a division of the property acquired by the couple during the relationship. The appellant issued proceedings in England seeking a declaration that she was entitled absolutely to the assets. She also applied for an anti-suit injunction to restrain the defendant from continuing with proceedings in the courts of New Zealand. Lavender J held that England was the appropriate forum for the trial of the appellant’s claims but that the respondent’s New Zealand claim could not be determined in England. He rejected her argument that Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation obliged him to grant an anti-suit injunction to prevent the respondent from litigating against her in a non-EU state.

The appellant argued that Samengo-Turner v J&H Marsh & McLennan (Services) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 723, [2007] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 813 and Petter v EMC Europe Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 828, [2015] C.P. Rep. 47 were binding authority that Article 4(1) provided her with a right not to be sued outside England, where she was domiciled, obliging the court to give effect to that right by granting an anti-suit injunction.

The Court of Appeal considered that the issue was not acte claire and sent a preliminary reference to the CJEU (pursuant to Article 267 TFEU) asking whether Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation provided someone domiciled in England with a right not to be sued outside England so as to oblige the courts to give effect to that right by granting an anti-suit injunction.

The case note examines the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gray v Hurley [2019] EWCA Civ 2222. It offers a pervasive critique of the argument that the general rule of jurisdiction under the Brussels Ia Regulation gives rise to a substantive right to be sued only in England and that this right is capable of enforcement by an anti-suit injunction. It is argued that the previous decisions of the Court of Appeal in Samengo-Turner v J&H Marsh & McLennan (Services) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 723 and Petter v EMC Europe Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 828 were themselves wrongly decided. In light of this, it will be even more difficult to justify the broader application of a similar result in the present case.

Indeed, the law would take a wrong turn if the present case is allowed to build on the aberrational foundations of the developing law on anti-suit injunctions based on rights derived from the Brussels Ia Regulation. Essentially, a chimerical remedy based on a fictitious right would not only infringe comity but would also deny the respondent access to justice in the only available forum. The note also anticipates the CJEU’s potential findings in this case.

An open access version of the case note is available here.

On 7 July 2020, the Members of the Committee on Legal Affairs will vote on the provisional agreement resulting from the interinstitutional negotiations on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers. The text is available here.

Here are some points of interest (and a few on-the-spot comments).

1. The resulting document will be a directive not intended to replace the enforcement mechanisms contained in previous legal acts listed in Annex I, among which the GDPR.

2. The Directive will cover both domestic and crossborder infringements, in particular when consumers affected by an infringement live in one or several Member States other than the Member State where the infringing trader is established.

3. As announced in the Commission’s proposal (referred to here), the Directive should not affect the application of nor establish rules on private international law regarding jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of judgments or applicable law (NoA: how long have academics and the CJEU, AGs included, been warning about the PIL rules being utterly inadequate for collective redress? Apparently not enough).

4. Qualified entities should be allowed to bring representatives actions in the Member State where they have been designated as well as in another Member State.

5. When a qualified entity brings a representative action in another Member State than the one of its designation, that action should be considered a cross-border action.

6. When a qualified entity brings a representative action in the Member State where it is designated, the action is considered a domestic representative action even if that action is brought against a trader domiciled in another Member State or even if consumers from several Member States are represented within that action. (NoA: if I am understanding this correctly, the action against a trader domiciled in another Member State is domestic for the purposes of the Directive, although from a PIL perspective it is definitely not domestic).

7. Principle of origin: for the purpose of cross-border representative actions, qualified entities should comply with the same criteria across the Union. It should be for the designating Member State to ensure that the qualified entity designated for the purpose of cross-border representative actions fulfils the criteria, to assess whether it continues to comply with them and, if necessary, to revoke the designation of the qualified entity.

8. Legal standing: Member States should ensure that cross-border representative actions can be brought in their courts (or administrative authorities) by qualified entities designated for the purpose of such representative actions in another Member State.

9. Qualified entities from different Member States should be able to join forces within a single representative action in front of a single forum, subject to relevant rules on competent jurisdiction (NoA: usually who the claimant is has no impact on jurisdiction, so the caveat has to refer to something different. In any event, is this a lost opportunity to reflect on extended rules for related claims?).

10. The mutual recognition of the legal standing of qualified entities designated for the purpose of cross-border representative actions should be ensured

11. When bringing a representative action, the qualified entity should provide sufficient information on the consumers concerned by the action to the court or the administrative authority. The information should allow the court (or the administrative authority) to establish its jurisdiction and the applicable law.

12. Cooperation and exchange of information between qualified entities from different Member States have proven to be useful in addressing in particular cross-border infringements (NoA: has it?). There is a need for continuing and expanding the capacity-building and cooperation measures to a larger number of qualified entities across the Union in order to increase the us representative actions with cross-border implications.

13. The Commission should draw up a report, accompanied if appropriate by a relevant proposal, assessing whether cross-border representative actions could be best addressed at Union level by establishing an European Ombudsman for collective redress (NoA: not sure what his/her role would be).

In [2020] EWHC 1626 (TCC) Engie Fabricom, O’Farrell J essentially had to hold whether the primary activity at an energy from waste plant is power generation or waste treatment. The classification of waste to energy – W2E as either waste recovery (see Waste Framework Directive Recovery Annex, R1 ‘used principally as a fuel or other means to generate energy’) or waste disposal is a classic in EU waste law, with specific implications for shipments permits. It also of course has an impact on a Member State’s waste targets and renewable energy targets. Aside from the Waste Framework Directive, the Industrial Emissions Directive 2010/75 is also involved – although oddly no CJEU authority is mentioned in the judgment.

In the case at issue an interesting extra element is that the plant at issue received funding via the European Regional Development Fund ERDF (at 145) however ERDF funding was for the generation of electricity from the biodegradable part of waste based on advanced fluidised bed gasification technology, which at the time of the application was expected to be 84.65% of the fuel. However, subsequently the plant changed to use refuse derived fuel or RDF without any waste wood which reduced the biodegradable percentage of the waste to 50%.

At 149 Justice O’Farrell concludes that the primary activity at the Energy Works Hull facility is power generation, for the reasons listed there. Of particular relevance is her comment that ‘the plant was not developed or intended to be operated in furtherance of any particular waste or energy policy, although it was consistent with both policy initiatives.’

There is an interesting expert evidence issue to the case, as Gordon Exall discusses here. I am suspecting one or two of the issues involved could be chewed over upon appeal, with reference to CJEU case-law.

Geert.

Handbook of EU Waste law, OUP, second ed, 2015.

Refuse-derived fuel – RDF.
Whether the primary activity at an energy from waste plant is power generation or waste treatment.
Held: in casu: power generation.
Considers ia EU waste framework Directive and ERDF funding.
Impacts ia VAT and adjudication process. https://t.co/2FskpGblDj

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 25, 2020

Peer Zumbansen edited The Many Lives of Transnational Law – Critical Engagements with Jessup’s Bold Proposal, published by Cambridge University Press.

The blurb reads:

In 1956, ICJ judge Philip Jessup highlighted the gaps between private and public international law and the need to adapt the law to border-crossing problems. Today, sixty years later, we still ask what role transnational law can play in a deeply divided, post-colonial world, where multinationals hold more power and more assets than many nation states. In searching for suitable answers to pressing legal problems such as climate change law, security, poverty and inequality, questions of representation, enforcement, accountability and legitimacy become newly entangled. As public and private, domestic and international actors compete for regulatory authority, spaces for political legitimacy have become fragmented and the state’s exclusivist claim to be law’s harbinger and place of origin under attack. Against this background, transnational law emerges as a conceptual framework and method laboratory for a critical reflection on the forms, fora and processes of law making and law contestation today.

The individual contributions are authored by Stephen Minas, Christopher A. Whytock, Thomas Schultz, Niccolò Ridi, Karsten Nowrot, Gregory Shaffer, Carlos Coye, Francis Snyder, Zhouke Hu, Lili Ni, Florian Grisel, Bryan Horrigan, Shahla Ali, Paul Schiff Berman, Antoine Duval, Ivana Isailovic, A. Claire Cutler, Jothie Rajah, Natasha Affolder, Larry Catá Backer, Prabhakar Singh, Ralf Michaels and Vik Kanwar.

The book’s table of contents can be found here. For further information see here.

A new book (in Spanish) on surrogacy in private international law and comparative law, edited by the indefatigable Mercedes Albornoz, and freely available online.

 

The European Parliament (JURI Committee) has released a draft opinion with recommendations to the Commission on the Establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (PE652.513v01-00). You can read it here

AG Bobek delivered today his opinion in case C‑826/18 (LB, Stichting Varkens in Nood, Stichting Dierenrecht, Stichting Leefbaar Buitengebied v College van burgemeester en wethouders van de gemeente Echt-Susteren, joined parties: Sebava BV), which is about the Aarhus Convention and access to justice:

“(1) Article 6 of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, signed in Aarhus on 25 June 1998 […], Article 6 of Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment […] and Article 24 of Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) confer full participation rights only to ‘the public concerned’ within the meaning of those instruments, but not to ‘the public’ at large.

(2) Neither Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention, nor Article 11 of Directive 2011/92, nor Article 25 of Directive 2010/75, nor Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are opposed to the exclusion of ‘the public’ who do not fall within ‘the public concerned’ within the meaning of those instruments, from access to court.

(3) Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention, Article 11 of Directive 2011/92 and Article 25 of Directive 2010/75 preclude a condition in national law which makes the right of access to justice for ‘the public concerned’ within the meaning of those instruments dependent on prior participation in the procedures subject to Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention, Article 6 of Directive 2011/92, and Article 24 of Directive 2010/75”

Source: here

The Graduate Programm “Dynamic Integration” at the Faculty of Law of Humboldt-University Berlin offers a PhD fellowship in private (international) law. The fellowship is (generously) funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft). In addition, Humboldt-University offers an outstanding research environment.

For more information see here.

Ilaria Viarengo and Pietro Franzina have edited The EU Regulations on the Property Regimes of International Couples – A Commentary, published by Edward Elgar in its Elgar Commentaries in Private International Law series.

The publisher’s abstract reads as follows.

This article-by-article Commentary on EU Regulations 2016/1103 and 2016/1104 critically examines the uniform rules adopted by the EU to deal with the property relations of international couples, both married and in registered partnerships. Written by experts from a variety of European countries, it offers a comprehensive side-by-side discussion of the two Regulations to provide context and a deeper understanding of the issues of jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition of judgements covered.

The authors of the commentary are Giacomo Biagioni, Andrea Bonomi, Beatriz Campuzano Díaz, Janeen Carruthers, Sabine Corneloup, Gilles Cuniberti, Elena D’Alessandro, Pietro Franzina, Martin Gebauer, Christian Kohler, Silvia Marino, Cristina M. Mariottini, Dieter Martiny, Csongor I. Nagy, Jacopo Re, Carola Ricci, Andres Rodríguez Benot, Lidia Sandrini, Ilaria Viarengo and Patrick Wautelet.

More information available here.

Thank you Maxime Barba for flagging the judgment in the Paris Court of Appeal Sodmilab et al. (Text of the judgment in Maxime’s post). The case concerns the ending of a commercial relationship. Part of the contract may be qualified as agency with lex causae determined under the 1978 Hague Convention. On this issue, the Court of Appeal confirmed French law as lex causae.

Things get messy however with the determination of that part of the contract that qualifies as distribution (a mess echoing DES v Clarins), and on the application of Rome II.

The Court of Appeal first (at 59) discusses the qualification of A442-6 of the French Code du commerce, on unfair trading practices (abrupt ending of a commercial relationship), dismissing it as lois de police /overriding mandatory law under Article 9 Rome I. As I noted in my review of DES v Clarins, this is a topsy turvy application of Rome I. The qualification as lois de police is up to the Member States, within the confines of the definition in Rome I. The Court of Appeal holds that A442-6 only serves private interests, not the general economic interest, and therefore must not qualify under Rome I. Hitherto much of the French case-law and scholarship had argued that in protecting the stability of private interests, the Act ultimately serves the public interest.

Next (as noted: this should have come first), the Court reviews the application of A4f Rome I, the fall-back position for distribution contracts – which would have led to Algerian law as lex causae. It is unclear (62 ff) whether the Court reaches its conclusion as French law instead either as a confirmation of circumstantial (the court referring to invoicing currency etc.) but clear choice of law under Article 3, or the escape clause under Article 4(3), for that Article is mentioned, too.

Rome I’s structure is quite clear. Why it is not properly followed here is odd. That includes the oddity of discussing French law under Article 9 if the court had already confirmed French law as lex causae under A3 or 4.

Finally, corners are cut on Rome II, too. Re the abrupt ending of the relationship (at 66ff). French law again emerges victorious even if the general lex locus damni rule leads to Algerian law. The court does not quite clearly hold that on the basis of Article 4(3)’s escape clause, or circumstantial choice of law per A14. The court refers to ‘its findings above’ on contractual choice of law, however how such fuzzy implicit choice under Rome I is forceful enough to extend to choice of law under Rome II must not be posited without further consideration. Particularly seeing as Article 6 Rome II excludes choice of law for acts of unfair trading.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2, Heading 2.2.11.2.9; Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.8, Heading 3.2.8.3; Chapter 4).

 

The Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament reached on 30 June 2020 a provisional agreement on the modernisation of Regulation 1206/2001 on the taking of evidence abroad, and Regulation 1393/2007 on the service of judicial and extra-judicial documents (see here and here for contributions appeared on this blog regarding the reform).

The provisional agreement now needs to be submitted for endorsement by Member States’ representatives.

The purpose of the amendments under discussion is, generally, to improve the efficiency and speed of cross-border judicial proceedings by taking advantage of digitalisation and the use of modern technology, and by these means advance access to justice and fair trial for the parties.

Changes include the mandatory use of an electronic decentralised IT system, composed of interconnected national IT systems, for the transmission of documents and requests between Member States. The new regulations will also task the Commission with the creation, maintenance and future development of a reference software which Member States can choose to apply as their back end system, instead of a nationally-developed IT system.

As to the service of documents, the envisaged new rules provide that documents can be served electronically and directly on an addressee with a known address in another Member State, when his or her express consent is given in advance. The service can be performed through qualified electronic registered delivery services or, under additional conditions, by e-mail.

The new rules also aim to promote the use of videoconferencing or other distance communication technology in the taking of evidence.