In an unprecedented manner, the UK has dealt with its problems around Brexit and its relations with the Contracting States to two HCCH Conventions on the international plane. The Depositary (i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) has just announced that the UK has withdrawn its instruments of ratification of the HCCH Child Support Convention and instrument of accession to the HCCH Choice of Court Convention, together with its declarations and extension to Gibraltar, which actually never came into effect and were apparently only a backup option to a no-deal Brexit; see our previous posts (“some Brexit news” part 1, part 2 and part 3 and the more recent post “Brexit: No need to stop all the clocks” here).
As stated in the notification, the reason for the withdrawal of the instruments is the following: “Since the deposit of the Instrument of [Ratification and Accession], the United Kingdom and the European Union have signed, ratified and approved a Withdrawal Agreement, which will enter into force on 1 February 2020 (the “Withdrawal Agreement”). The Withdrawal Agreement includes provisions for a transition period to start on the date the Withdrawal Agreement enters into force and end on 31 December 2020 (the “transition period”). In accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement, during the transition period, European Union law, including the Agreement, will continue to be applicable to and in the United Kingdom” (our emphasis).
In its Note, the UK adds that it intends to deposit new instruments of ratification of and accession to the above-mentioned Conventions prior to the termination of the transition period. It remains to be seen whether the UK will submit the same declarations and whether it will extend those Conventions to Gibraltar.
The Depositary’s notifications are available here for the Child Support Convention and here for the Choice of Court Convention.
The last issue of the Revue critique de droit international privé has been released. It is a special edition on the Cloud Act and the General Regulation on Data Protection.
The abstracts of the articles, authored by Marie-Elodie Ancel, Patrick Jacob, Régis Bismuth and Théodore Christakis, are available here.
A full table of contents is available here.
As of today, Brexit has become reality – one more reason to think about the EU’s Judicial Cooperation with third states:
The largest proportion of EU economic growth in the 21st century is expected to arise in trade with third countries. This is why the EU is building up trade relations with many states and other regional integration communities in all parts of the world. The latest example is the EU-MERCOSUR Association Agreement concluded on 28 June 2019. With the United Kingdom’s exit of the Union on 31 January 2020, extra-EU trade with neighboring countries will further increase in importance. Another challenge for the EU is China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”, a powerful global development strategy that includes overland as well as sea routes in more than 100 states around the globe.
The increasing volume of trade with third states will inevitably lead to a rise in the number and importance of commercial disputes. This makes mechanisms for their orderly and efficient resolution indispensable. China is already setting up infrastructures for commercial dispute resolution alongside its belts and roads. In contrast, there seems to be no elaborate EU strategy on judicial cooperation in civil matters with countries outside of the Union, despite the DG Trade’s realisation that “trade is no longer just about trade”. Especially, there is no coherent plan for establishing mechanisms for the coordination of cross-border dispute resolution and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments. This is a glaring gap in the EU’s policy making in external trade relations (see also, in an earlier post by Matthias Weller on CoL on this matter: Mutual trust and judicial cooperation in the EU’s external relations – the blind spot in the EU’s Foreign Trade and Private International Law policy?).
This is why the Bonn group of PIL colleagues – Moritz Brinkmann, Nina Dethloff, Matthias Lehmann, Philipp Reuss, and Matthias Weller – are hosting a conference on Friday and Saturday, 25 and 26 September 2020, at the University of Bonn that seeks to explore ways in which judicial cooperation in civil matters between the EU and third countries can be improved by the Hague Judgments Convention of 2019 as an important driver, if not game changer, of legal certainty in cross-border commercial relations.
The list of speakers includes internationally leading scholars, practitioners and experts from the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), the European Commission (DG Trade, DG Justice), and the German Ministry of Justice and for Consumers (Bundesjustizministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz).
For the HCCH as co-host, the event will be the European stop on their roadshow around the world to discuss their new Convention. The Conference will be further co-hosted by the Zentrum für europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht at the University of Bonn and The International Litigation Exchange (ILEX).
The Organizers will kindly ask participants to contribute with € 75.- to the costs of the event.
Date:
Friday, 25 September 2020, and Saturday, 26 September 2020.
Venue:
Bonner Universitätsforum, Heussallee 18 – 22
Draft Programme
Friday, 25 September 2020
1.30 p.m. Registration
2 p.m. Welcome note
Prof Dr Wulf-Henning Roth, University of Bonn, Director of the Zentrum für Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht (ZEW)
2.10 p.m. Part 1: Chances and Challenges of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019
Chairs of Part 1: Matthias Weller / Matthias Lehmann
Keynote: Hague Conference’s Perspective and Experiences
Hans van Loon, Former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Hague
1. Scope of application
Prof Dr Xandra Kramer, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
2. Judgments, Recognition, Enforcement
Prof Dr Wolfgang Hau, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich
Discussion
3.30 p.m. Coffee Break
4.00 p.m. Part 2: Chances and Challenges of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 continued
Chairs of Part 2: Nina Dethloff / Moritz Brinkman
3. Jurisdictional filters
Prof Dr Pietro Franzina, Catholic University of Milan
4. Grounds for refusal
Prof Dr Paco Garcimartín, University of Madrid
Discussion
5.30 p.m. Part 3: Panel Discussion – Prospects for Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters between the EU and Third Countries, 60 min:
Chairs of Part 3: Matthias Weller / Matthias Lehmann
Colin Brown, Unit Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of Trade Policy, DG Trade (tbc); Andreas Stein, Head of Unit, DG JUST – A1 “Civil Justice”; Dr. Jan Teubel, German Ministry of Justice and for Consumers; RA Dr. Heiko Heppner, Attorney at Law (New York), Barrister and Solicitor Advocate (England and Wales), Chair of ILEX, Head of Dispute Resolution, Partner Dentons, Frankfurt, and perhaps more…
Discussion
7 p.m. Conference Dinner
Saturday
9.30 a.m. Part 4: The context of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019
Chairs: Moritz Brinkmann/Philipp Reuss
5. Relation to the HCCH 2005 Convention Choice of Court Agreements
Prof Paul Beaumont, University of Stirlin
6. Relations to the Brussels Regime / Lugano Convention
Prof Marie-Elodie Ancel, Université Paris-Est Crétei
7. Brexit…
Dr Pippa Rogerson, Reader in Private International Law, Faculty of Law, Cambridge
Discussion
11:00 a.m. Coffee Break
11:30 a.m. Part 4: The context of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 continued
Chairs: Nina Dethloff / Matthias Lehman
8. South European Neighbouring and Candidate Countries
Prof Dr Ilija Rumenov, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Macedonia
9. MERCOSUR – EU
Dr Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Director of Internationalisation, Senior Lecturer in International Private Law, School of Law, University of Edinburgh
10. Relations to International Commercial Arbitration
Jose Angelo Estrella-Faria, Former Secretary General of UNIDROIT, Senior Legal Officer UNCITRAL Secretariat, International Trade Law Division Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations (tbc)
Discussion
1 p.m. Closing Remarks
Matthias Weller
Written by Jonathan Fitchen.
‘The time has come’; a common enough phrase which may, depending on the reader’s mood and temperament, be attributed variously to Lewis Carroll’s discursive Walrus, to Richard Wagner’s villainous Klingsor, or to the conclusion of Victor Hugo’s epigrammatic comment to the effect that nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time has come. In the present context however ‘the time has come’ refers more prosaically to another step in the process described as ‘Brexit’ by which the UK continues to disentangle itself from the EU.
On the 31st of January 2020 at 24.00 CET (23.00 UK time) the UK ceases to be an EU Member State. This event is one that some plan to celebrate and other to mourn. For those interested in private international law and the conflict of laws in the EU or in the legal systems of the UK, celebration is unlikely to seem apt. Whether for the mundane reason that the transition period of the Withdrawal Agreement preserves the practical application and operation of most EU law concerning our subject in the UK and within the EU27 until the projected end point of 31st December 2020, or for deeper reasons connected with the losses to the subject that the EU and the UK must each experience due to the departure of the UK from the EU. If celebration is not appropriate must we therefore opt to mourn? This post suggests that mourning is not the only option (nor if overindulged is it a useful option) and sets out some thoughts on the wider implications for the private international laws of the UK’s legal systems and the legal systems that will comprise the EU27 consequent on the UK’s departure.
This exercise is necessarily speculative and very much a matter of what one wishes to include in or omit from the equation under construction. If too little is included, the result may be of only abstract relevance; if too much is included, the equation may be incapable of solution and hence useless for the intended purpose of calculation. Such difficulties, albeit expressed in a non-mathematical form, are familiar to private international lawyers who while engaging with their subject routinely consider the macroscopic, the microscopic and many points in between. In what remains of this post I will offer some thoughts that hopefully will provoke further thoughts while avoiding useless abstraction and (at least for present purposes) ‘useless’ incalculability.
The loudest calls for the UK to leave the EU did not arise from UK private international law, nor from its practitioners; few UK private international lawyers appear to have wished for Brexit as a means of reforming private international law. Whatever appeals to nostalgia may have swayed opinions in other sectors of the UK and may have induced those within them to vote to leave, they were not expressed with reference to matters of private international law. Few who remember or know the law as it stood in any of the UK’s legal systems prior to the implementation of the UK’s accession to the Brussels Convention of 1968 would willingly journey back to the law as it then stood and regard it as an upgrade. Mercifully, aspects of this view are, at present, apparently shared by the UK Government and account for its wish, after ‘copying and pasting’ most EU law and private international law into the novel domestic category of ‘retained EU Law’, to then amend and allow that which does not depend on reciprocity to be re-presented as a domestic private international law to be applied within and by the UK’s legal systems: thus the Rome I and Rome II Regulations will be eventually so ‘imitated’ within the legal systems of the UK. Unfortunately, many other EU provisions do require reciprocity, and thus cannot be ‘saved’ in this manner; for these provisions the news in the UK is less good.
There are however other available means of salvage. Because the UK will no longer be an EU Member State at 24.00 Brussels Time it may, but for the Withdrawal Agreement, thereafter participate more fully in proceedings and projects at the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The UK plans to domestically clarify the domestic understanding of certain existing Hague conventions, e.g. 1996 Parental Responsibility Convention, via the recently announced Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill 2019. Earlier in 2018 the UK deposited instruments of accession concerning conventions it plans to ratify at the end of the Withdrawal Agreement’s transition period to attempt to retain prospectively the salvageable aspects of certain reciprocity requiring EU private international law Regulations lost via Brexit: thus, the UK plans to ratify the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the 2007 Maintenance Convention. After these ratifications it may be that the UK will also consider the ratification of the 2019 judgment enforcement convention, particularly it the EU takes this option too. In the medium and long term however, the UK, assuming it wishes to participate in an active sense, will have to accept the practical limitations of the HCCH as it (the UK) becomes accustomed to the differences, difficulties and frustrations of private international law reform via optional instruments that all the intended parties are entitled to refuse to opt-in to or ratify.
Over the medium term and longer term, it should additionally be noted that though the UK has left the EU it has not cast-off and sailed away from continental Europe at a speed in excess of normal tectonic progress: there may therefore eventually be further developments between the two. It may be that the UK can be induced at some point in the future, when Brexit has become more mundane and less politically volatile within the UK, to cooperate in relation to private international law in a deeper sense with the EU27; whether by negotiating to join the 2007 Lugano Convention or a new convention pertaining to aspects of private international law. If this last idea seems too controversial then maybe it would be possible for the UK to eventually negotiate with an existing EU Member State as a third country via Regulation 664/2009 or Regulation 662/2009 or perhaps via another yet to be produced Regulation with a somewhat analogous effect? Brexit, considered in terms of private international law, may well re-focus a number of existing questions for the EU27 pertaining to the interaction of its private international law with third States, whether former Member States or not.
What is however unavoidably lost by Brexit is the UK’s direct influence on the development and particularly the periodic recasting of the EU’s private international law: this loss cuts both ways. For the EU27 the UK will no longer be at the negotiating table to offer suggestions, criticisms and improvements to the texts of new and recast Regulations. For the EU27 this loss is somewhat greater than it might appear from the list of Regulations that the UK did not opt-in to as the terms of the UK’s involvement in these matters permitted it to so participate without having opted-in to the draft Regulation.
The suggested loss of influence will however probably be felt most acutely by the private international lawyers in the UK. Despite the momentary impetus and excitement of salvaging that which may be salvaged and ratifying that which may be ratified to mitigate the effect of Brexit on private international law, the reality is that we in the UK will have lost two of the motive forces that have seen our subject develop and flourish over decades: viz. the European Commission and the domestic political reaction thereunto. Post-Brexit, once the salvaging (etc.) is done, it seems unlikely that the UK Government will continue to regard a private international law now no longer affected by Commission initiatives or re-casting procedures as retaining its former importance or meriting any greater legislative relevance than other areas of potential law reform. The position may be otherwise in Scotland as private international law is a devolved competence that devolution entrusted to the Scottish Government. It may be that once the dust has settled and the returning UK competence related reforms have been applied that the comparatively EU-friendly Scottish Government may seek to domestically align aspects of Scots private international law with EU law equivalents. For he who would mourn for the effect of Brexit on the subject of private international law, it is the abovementioned loss of influence of the subject at both the EU level and particularly at the domestic level that most merits a brief period of mourning. After this, the natural but presently unanswerable question of, ‘What now?’ occurs. Though speculation is offered above, all in the short term will depend on the progress in negotiations over an unfortunately already shortened but technically still extendable transition period during which the EU and UK are to attempt to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement: thereafter for the medium term and long term all depends on the future political relationship of the EU and the UK.
Today, 31 January 2020, at midnight (11 PM GMT), the United Kingdom will leave the European Union. This is a historic event with innumerable implications, amongst others, for private international law.
However, during the transition period – which expires earliest at the end of 2020 – most things will stay the same. This is thanks to the Withdrawal Agreement, which governs the UK’s divorce from the Union.
The UK will apply EU law, and the EU will, in principle, treat the UK as if it were a Member State (Article 127(1) and (6) of the Withdrawal Agreement). The main exceptions are some institutional provisions, e.g. the participation of the UK in EU bodies, where it will no longer have voting rights (see Article 7(1) and 128(1) of the Withdrawal Agreement).
What will happen after the end of transition period, nobody knows for sure, as the EU and the UK have just started negotiating their future relationship. However, the Withdrawal Agreement makes some provision for the post-transitional period.
Basically, the Regulations on Judicial Cooperation (Brussels I bis, II bis, Rome I, II, the Insolvency Regulation, the Maintenance Regulation, amongst others) will continue to apply to proceedings that have been “instituted” before the end of the transition period, i.e. before 31 December 2020 (Article 66-69 of the Withdrawal Agreement).
Naturally, those EU texts to which the UK was never subject will also not apply after 2020, such as the Succession Regulation.
These transitory provisions seem rather straightforward. However, as always, the devil is in the detail. For starters, it is not easy to determine when proceedings are ‘instituted’ (see this study for the European Parliament, p. 15-16). Moreover, Article 66-69 of the Withdrawal Agreement originally referred only to provisions on ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘recognition and enforcement’. The provisions regarding lis pendens have been later included at the beginning of Article 67 of the Withdrawal Agreement. This is not a model for clear drafting!
One must also not forget that Brexit will change the UK’s relation to non-EU Member States, such as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. With the withdrawal from the EU, the Lugano Convention will no longer apply to the UK. As a consequence, British judgments will be subject to the recognition procedure under national law in the three Lugano States Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, and vice versa. This effect already applies as of tomorrow (1 February 2020)!
The Withdrawal Agreement between the EU and the UK has no impact on this, as it only concerns the relationship between those two parties. Article 129(1) of the Withdrawal Agreement binds the UK to “the obligations stemming from the international agreements concluded by the Union”, but cannot impose obligations on third parties.
The UK has, however, received assurances by Switzerland, Norway and Iceland that they support the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention before the end of the transition period. What is missing so far is the EU’s consent.
One can only hope that the relevant political actors will come to their senses and reestablish the network of binding texts as soon and as comprehensively as possible. Judicial Cooperation is about much more than trade deals. It directly affects every day life of ordinary people.
The first 2020 issue RabelsZ has just been released. It features the following articles:
Magnus, Robert, Unternehmenspersönlichkeitsrechte im digitalen Raum und Internationales Privatrecht (Corporate Personality Rights on the Internet and the Applicable Law), pp. 1 et seq
Companies can defend themselves against defamatory and business-damaging statements made on the internet. German case law in this area is based primarily on the concept of a corporate right relating to personality, which has some similarities but also important differences to the personality rights of natural persons. A corresponding legal right is also recognised in European law. However, determining the applicable law for these claims proves to be difficult. First of all, it is an open though not yet much-discussed question whether the exception in Art. 1(2) lit. g Rome II Regulation for “violation[s] of privacy or personal rights” is limited to the rights of natural persons or whether it applies also to the corresponding claims of legal entities. Moreover, the determination “of the country in which the damage occurs” in accordance with Art. 4(1) Rome II Regulation is hotly debated with respect to violations of rights relating to personality, especially when the violations were committed via the internet. The thus far prevailing mosaic principle produces excessively complex results and therefore makes it unreasonably difficult to enforce the protected legal position. This article discusses alternative concepts for the determination of the applicable law for these actions and analyses the scope and background of the exception in Art. 1(2) lit. g Rome II Regulation.
Thon, Marian, Transnationaler Datenschutz: Das Internationale Datenprivatrecht der DS-GVO (Transnational Data Protection: The GDPR and Conflict of Laws), pp. 24 et seq
This article analyses the territorial scope of the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and addresses the question whether Article 3 GDPR can be considered as a conflict-of-law rule. It analyses the possibility of agreements on the applicable law and argues that Article 3 GDPR qualifies as an overriding mandatory provision. It finds that the issue of the applicable national law is no longer addressed by the GDPR and that a crucial distinction should therefore be made between internal and external conflicts of law. It argues that the country-of-origin principle is the key to determining which national data protection law applies. Furthermore, the article analyses Article 3 GDPR in more detail from the perspective of private international law. It finds that the targeting criterion is helpful in mitigating the problem of information asymmetries in view of the applicable data protection law. However, it criticizes the establishment criterion because it puts European companies at a competitive disadvantage. Finally, the article proposes to incorporate a “universal” conflict-of-law rule into the Rome II Regulation which should be accompanied by a general conflict-of-law rule specifically addressing violations of privacy and rights relating to personality.
Voß, Wiebke, Gerichtsverbundene Online-Streitbeilegung: ein Zukunftsmodell? Die online multi-door courthouses des englischen und kanadischen Rechts (Court-connected ODR: A Model for the Future? – Online Multi-door Courthouses Under English and Canadian Law), pp. 62 et seq
Will conflict management systems based on the model of companies such as eBay and PayPal soon become a part of civil proceedings before German state courts? Recently, some thought has been given to the development of a new “expedited online procedure” designed to provide an affordable and fast alternative to traditional civil litigation for small consumer claims, thus broadening access to justice. After a brief outline of the current barriers to the justice system and the shortcomings of the private ODR platforms consumers often turn to instead, this article explores the concept of online procedures which other legal systems have developed in response to similar challenges. The analysis of typical, trendsetting examples of e-courts – the Civil Resolution Tribunal under Canadian Law as well as the Online Court that is currently being established in England – reveals a new model of court-connected ODR that is based on the integration of private ODR structures into the justice system. By harnessing digital technologies and integrating methods of dispute prevention and consensual dispute resolution into the state-based proceedings, such online courts offer enormous potential for lay-friendly, accessible civil justice while at the same time using scarce judicial resources sparingly. On the other hand, online technology alone is not a panacea. Establishing online procedures in Germany poses challenges which go beyond the technical dimension. These procedures may conflict with constitutional requirements and procedural maxims such as the principle of open justice, the right to be heard before the legally designated court and the principle of immediacy. However, a well thought-out design and minor modifications of the English and Canadian models would avoid these conflicts without losing the benefits of the innovative procedure.
Monsenepwo, Justin, Vereinheitlichung des Wirtschaftsrechts in Afrika durch die OHADA (The Unification of Business Law in Africa Through OHADA), pp. 97 et seq
In the 1980s, legal and judicial uncertainty prevailed in most western and central African countries, thereby impeding local and foreign investments. To improve the investment climate and further legal and economic integration in Africa, fourteen western and central African States created the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, OHADA) on 17 October 1993. As per the preamble of the Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, OHADA aims to harmonize business laws in Africa through the elaboration and the adoption of simple, modern, and common business law regulations adapted to the economies of its Member States. Nearly two decades after its creation, OHADA has developed ten Uniform Acts and three main Regulations, which cover several legal areas, such as company law, commercial law, security interests, mediation, arbitration, enforcement procedures, bankruptcy, transportation law, and accounting. This article analyses the historical background, the institutions, and the main provisions of some of these Uniform Acts and Regulations. It also recommends a few legal areas which OHADA should make uniform to increase legal certainty and predictability in civil and commercial transactions in Africa.
Symeon Symeonides compiled a bibliography, available on SSRN, of books and articles in English in the field of private international law published 2019.
This bibliography covers private international law or conflict of laws in a broad sense. In particular, it covers judicial or adjudicatory jurisdiction, prescriptive jurisdiction, choice of forum, choice of law, federal-state conflicts, recognition and enforcement of sister-state and foreign-country judgments, extraterritoriality, arbitration and related topics. It includes books and law journal articles that appeared in print during 2019, or earlier but were not included in the 2018 bibliography. It does not include articles or essays published in books (as opposed to journals), or writings appearing only in electronic form.
A postdoctoral fellowship at the Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University is available for the academic year of 2020-2021. The position is part of the “Old Identities, New Times: Does the Common Legal Identity Withstand Modernity?”, a research project headed by Dr Sharon Shakargy and funded by the Israeli Science Foundation (grant 835/18).
The research project deals with items of personal status, such as age, sex, religion, marital status, parenthood, legal capacity, and the changes in the regulation and perception thereof. The project investigates these items of personal status comparatively, focusing on Western legal systems but not limited to them. More details on the project are available here.
Scholars interested in perusing independent work related to the questions mentioned above are invited to apply.
Qualifications:
Position Details:
Interested applicants should submit a 2-page long research proposal, their CV and publication list, and 1-2 letter(s) of recommendation to Sharon.Shakargy@mail.huji.ac.il by March 15, 2020. Please indicate “postdoc position” in the subject line.
The University of Milan announces the first edition of the Master Programme on International Trade Compliance Control (IntTradec) to be held in Milan at the Department of International, Legal and Historical-Political Studies,
The Programme aims to train professional figures called to work within the Export Control Program, with a specific focus on International Trade Law, Private International Law, Customs Law and Tax Law. It includes teaching activities and workshops for a total of 500 hours, and a training period of 300 hours.
More information is available here (in Italian).
Director: Prof. Angela Lupone, University of Milan
Scientific Committee: Prof. Giovanna Adinolfi (UNIMI), dr. Cristian Battistello (consulente aziendale), prof. Andrea Carati (UNIMI), dr. Maurizio Castello, dr. Antonio Ciavatta (Baker Hughes), dr. Simone Dossi (UNIMI), prof. Manlio Frigo (UNIMI), prof. Alessandra Lang (UNIMI), prof. Laurent Manderieux (Università Bocconi), dr. Luca Moriconi (adjunct prof.), avv. Marco Padovan (Padovan Law Firm), dr. Marco Piredda (ENI S.p.a.), prof. Marco Pedrazzi (UNIMI), prof. Francesca Villata (UNIMI).
Stages and internships: Baker Hughes, Nuovo Pignone International S.r.l., Banca Popolare di Sondrio, Caleffi Hydronic Solutions, Comecer S.p.a., Elantas Europe S.r.l; Fratelli Cosulich S.p.a.; Modo Customs Services S.r.l.; Omal S.p.a., Sabaf S.p.a., StMicroelectronics S.r.l, Studio Legale Padovan (Milano).
Contacts: direzione.intgiurpol@unimi.it
Deadline: 3 February 2020 (2 p.m.) with possibility of extention.
Lydia Lundstedt and Erik Sinander (both Stockholm University) have published Enhancing Critical Thinking in Private International Law in The Law Teacher.
The abstract reads:
This article describes and evaluates the reforms that the authors (as course managers) introduced to enhance critical thinking in the compulsory course on private international law in the Master of Laws programme at Stockholm University. The reforms were made in response to a decision by the Stockholm University Law Faculty Board to develop the “Stockholm Model” in an effort to strengthen students’ critical and scientific approach to law. The Stockholm Model aims to place law in a broader context so students can understand its relation to and impact on society. It also shifts the focus from an orthodox teaching of the doctrinal subject areas to facilitating the students’ ability to apply legal and other social science methods to analyse and develop the law. The article evaluates the success of the measures and reflects on what more can be done to improve critical thinking.
The article can be read here.
by José Antonio Briceño Laborí, Professor of Private International Law, Universidad Central de Venezuela y Universidad Católica Andrés Bello
In 2019 the Venezuelan Private International Law (hereinafter “PIL”) academic community made clear that, despite all the difficulties, it remains active and has the energy to expand its activities and undertake new challenges.
As an example of this we have, firstly, the different events in which our professors have participated and the diversity of topics developed by them, among which the following stand out:
However, this year’s three most important milestones for our academic community occurred on Venezuelan soil. Below we review each one in detail:
The Venezuelan PIL Act, the first autonomous legislative instrument on this subject in the continent, entered into force on February 6, 1999 after a six months vacatio legis (since it was enacted in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Venezuela on August 6, 1998).
This instrument has a long history, as its origins date back to the Draft Law on PIL Norms written by professors Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren, Joaquín Sánchez-Covisa and Roberto Goldschmidt in 1963 and revised in 1965. The Draft Law was rescued in 1995 on the occasion of the First National Meeting of PIL Professors. Its content was updated and finally a new version of the Draft Law was sent by the professors to the Ministry of Justice, which in turn sent it to the Congress, leading to its enactment (for an extensive overview of the history of the Venezuelan PIL Act and its content, see: Hernández-Bretón, Eugenio, Neues venezolanisches Gesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht, IPRax 1999, 194 (Heft 03); Parra-Aranguren, Gonzalo, The Venezuelan Act on Private International Law of 1998, Yearbook of Private International Law, Vol. 1 1999, pp. 103-117; and B. de Maekelt, Tatiana, Das neue venezolanische Gesetz über Internationales Privatrecht, RabelsZ, Bd. 64, H. 2 (Mai 2000), pp. 299-344).
To celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Act, the Private International and Comparative Law Professorship of the Central University of Venezuela and the “Tatiana Maekelt” Institute of Law with the participation of 7 professors and 9 students of the Central University of Venezuela Private International and Comparative Law Master Program.
All the expositions revolved around the Venezuelan PIL Act, covering the topics of the system of sources, vested rights, ordre public, in rem rights, consumption contracts, punitive damages, jurisdiction matters, international labour relations, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements, transnational provisional measures and the relations between the Venezuelan PIL Act and international arbitration matters. The conference was both opened and closed by the professor Eugenio Hernández-Bretón with two contributions: “The Private International Law Act and the Venezuelan university” and “The ‘secret history’ of the Private International Law Act”.
On the occasion of the XVIII National Meeting of Private International Law Professors, the Private International and Comparative Law Master’s Degree Program of the Central University of Venezuela launched its website and the first issue of its yearbook. This specialized publication was long overdue, particularly in the Master’s Program context which is focused on educating and training researchers and professors in the areas of Private International Law and Comparative Law with a strong theoretical foundation but with a practical sense of their fields. The Yearbook will allow professors, graduates, current students and visiting professors to share their views on the classic and current topics of Private International Law and Comparative Law.
This first issue included the first thesis submitted for a Master’s Degree on the institution of renvoi, four papers spanning International Procedural Law, electronic means of payment, cross-border know-how contracts and International Family Law, sixteen of the papers presented during the Commemoration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Venezuelan Private International Law Act’s entry into force, and two collaborations by Guillermo Palao Moreno and Carlos Esplugues Mota, professors of Private International Law at the University of Valencia (Spain), that shows the relation of the Program with visiting professors that have truly nurtured the students’ vision of their area of knowledge.
The Call of Papers for the 2020 Edition of the Yearbook is now open. The deadline for the reception of contributions will be April 1st, 2020 and the expected date of publication is May 15th, 2020. All the information is available here. The author guidelines are available here. Scholars from all over the world are invited to contribute to the yearbook.
On December 3rd, 2019 was launched a book to pay homage to Professor Eugenio Hernández-Bretón. Its magnitude (4 volumes, 110 articles and 3298) is a mirror of the person honored as we are talking about a highly productive and prolific lawyer, professor and researcher and, at the same time, one of the humblest human beings that can be known. He is truly one of the main reasons why the Venezuelan Private International Law professorship is held up to such a high standard.
The legacy of Professor Hernández-Bretón is recognized all over the work. Professor of Private International Law at the Central University of Venezuela, Catholic University Andrés Bello and Monteávila University (he is also the Dean of the Legal and Political Sciences of the latter), Member of the Venezuelan Political and Social Sciences Academy and its President through the celebration of the Academy’a centenary, the fifth Venezuelan to teach a course at The Hague Academy of International Law and a partner in a major law firm in Venezuela (where he has worked since his law school days) are just some of the highlights of his career.
The contributions collected for this book span the areas of Private International Law, Public International Law, Comparative Law, Arbitration, Foreign Investment, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Tax Law, Civil Law, Commercial Law, Labor Law, Procedural Law, Penal Law, General Theory of Law, Law & Economics and Law & Politics. The book closes with six studies on the honored.
The contributions of Private International Law take the entire first volume. It includes the following articles:
As we see, the contributions are not just from Venezuelan scholars, but from important professors and researchers from Latin America, USA and Europe. All of them (as well as those included in the other three volumes) pay due homage to an admirable person by offering new ideas and insights in several areas of law and related sciences.
The book will be available for sale soon. Is a must have publication for anyone interested in Private International Law and Comparative Law.
As reported previously, the ECtHR was asked by the French Cour de cassation for an advisory opinion on the legal parentage of children born through surrogacy arrangement. In its answer, the Court considered that the right to respect for private life (article 8 of ECHR) requires States parties to provide a possibility of recognition of the child’s legal relationship with the intended mother. However, according to the Court, a State is not required, in order to achieve such recognition, to register the child’s birth certificate in its civil status registers. It also declared that adoption can serve as a means of recognizing the parent-child relationship.
The ECtHR’s opinion thus confirms the position reached by French courts: the Cour de cassation accepted to transcribe the birth certificate only when the intended father was also the biological father. Meanwhile, the non-biological parent could adopt the child (See for a confirmation ECtHR, C and E v. France, 12/12/2019 Application n°1462/18 and n°17348/18).
The ECtHR advisory opinion was requested during the trial for a review of a final decision in the Mennesson case. Although it is not compulsory, the Cour de cassation has chosen to comply with its recommendations (Ass. plén. 4 oct. 2019, n°10-19053). Referring to the advisory opinion, the court acknowledged that it had an obligation to provide a possibility to recognize the legal parent-child relationship with respect to the intended mother. According to the Cour de cassation, the mere fact that the child was born of a surrogate mother abroad did not in itself justify the refusal to recognize the filiation with the intended mother mentioned in the child’s birth certificate.
When it comes to the mean by which this recognition has be accomplished, the Cour de cassation recalled that the ECtHR said that the choice fell within the State’s margin of appreciation. Referring to the different means provided under French law to establish filiation, the Court considered that preference should be given to the means that allow the judge to exercise some control over the validity of the legal situation established abroad and to pay attention to the particular situation of the child. In its opinion, adoption is the most suitable way.
However, considering the specific situation of the Mennesson twins who had been involved in legal proceedings for over fifteen years, the Court admitted that neither an adoption nor an apparent status procedure were appropriate as both involve a judicial procedure that would take time. This would prolong the twins’ legal uncertainty regarding their identity and, as a consequence, infringe their right to respect for private life protected by article 8 ECHR. In this particular case, this would not comply with the conditions set by the ECtHR in its advisory opinion: “the procedure laid down by the domestic law to ensure that those means could be implemented promptly and effectively, in accordance with the child’s best interest”.
As a result and given the specific circumstances of the Mennessons’ situation, the Cour de cassation decided that the best means to comply with its obligation to recognize the legal relationship between the child and the intended mother was to transcribe the foreign birth certificate for both parents.
The Cour de cassation’s decision of October 2019 is not only the final act of the Mennesson case, but it also sets a modus operandi for future proceedings regarding legal parentage of children born trough surrogate arrangements: when it comes to the relation between the child and the intended mother, adoption is the most suitable means provided under domestic French law to establish filiation. When such an adoption is neither possible nor appropriate to the situation, judges resort to transcribing the foreign birth certificate mentioning the intended mother. Thus, adoption appears as the principle and transcription as the exception.
Oddly enough, the Court then took the first chance it got to reverse its solution and choose not to follow its own modus operandi.
By two decisions rendered on December 18th 2019 (Cass. Civ. 1ère, 18 déc. 2019, n°18-11815 and 18-12327), the Cour de cassation decided that the intended non-biological father must have its legal relationship with the child recognized too. However, it did not resort to adoption as a suitable means of establishing the legal relationship with the intended parent. Instead, the court held that the foreign birth certificate had to be transcribed for both parents, while no references were made to special circumstances which would have justified resorting to a transcription instead of an adoption or another means of establishing filiation.
The Court used a similar motivation to the one used in 2015 for the transcription of the birth certificate when the intended father is also the biological father. It considered that neither the fact that the child was born from a surrogate mother nor that the birth certificate established abroad mentioned a man as the intended father were obstacles to the transcription of the birth certificate as long that they complied with the admissibility conditions of article 47 of the Civil Code.
But while in 2015 the Court referred to the fact that the certificate “did not contain facts that did not correspond to reality”, which was one of the requirements of article 47, in 2019 this condition is no longer required.
Thus, it seems that the Cour de cassation is no longer reluctant to allow the full transcription of the foreign birth certificate of children born of surrogate arrangements. After years of constant refusal to transcribe the birth certificate for the non-biological parent, and just a few months after the ECtHR advisory opinion accepting adoption as a suitable means to legally recognize the parent-child relationship, this change of view was unexpected.
However, by applying the same treatment to both intended parents, biological and non-biological, this reversal of solution put into the spotlight the publicity function of the transcription into the French civil status register. As the Cour de cassation emphasized, a claim for the transcription of a birth certificate is different from a claim for the recognition or establishment of filiation. The transcription does not prevent later proceedings directed against the child-parent relationship.
But the end is still not near! On January 24th, during the examination of the highly sensitive Law of Bioethics, the Sénat (the French Parliament’s upper house) adopted an article prohibiting the full transcription of the foreign birth certificates of children born trough surrogate arrangements. This provision is directly meant to “break” the Cour de cassation’s solution of December 18th 2019. The article will be discussed in front of the Assemblée nationale, the lower house, and the outcome of the final vote is uncertain.
The conflict over the legal parentage of children born trough surrogate arrangements is not over yet. To be continued…
A collection of essays edited by Elisabetta Bergamini (University of Udine) and Chiara Ragni (University of Milan) has recently been published by Intersentia under the title Fundamental Rights and the Best Interest of the Child in Transnational Families.
The blurb reads:
Families in Europe are increasingly shaped by the mobility of persons and multicultural backgrounds. This book is focusing on the protection of children in cross-border situations. What are the fundamental rights of children in transnational families, what is in their ‘best interest’, and how can their rights be safeguarded? There is much controversy on these rights and the accompanying uncertainty has resulted in considerable practical difficulties for those trying to implement them. In order to provide a clearer scope and insights into the nature of children’s fundamental rights and their best interests, this book examines solutions provided by both EU and international law to the questions raised by the increasing incidence of transnational families as regards the protection of minors. It covers both substantive and conflict-of-laws rules. Differences in the substantive family laws of Member States still prevent an effective protection of the child or its family unit. This includes cases of migration, asylum, forced marriage, kafalah, but also rainbow families. Further, the role of human rights (mutual recognition of status and surrogacy agreements, adoption) and procedural rights (child abduction, Brussels II bis recast) in cross-border cases must be considered carefully.
The table of contents can be found here.
In [2020] EWHC 75 (QB) Lenkor Energy Trading v Irfan Iqbal Puri, Davison M rejected the ordre public arguments made by claimant against recognition of a money judgment of the Dubai First Instance Court.
Reflecting global understanding of ordre public, it is the judgment and not the underlying transaction upon which the judgment is based which must offend (here: English) public policy. That English law would or might have arrived at a different conclusion is not the point (Walker J in Omnium De Traitement Et De Valorisation v Hilmarton [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 222).
The ordre public arguments made, were (1) illegality, (2) impermissible piercing of the corporate veil and (3) penalty.
Re (1), the argument is that the underlying transaction is illegal. Master Davison acknowledged there are circumstances where an English court might enquire into the underlying transactions which gave rise to the judgment. However such court must do so with extreme caution and in the case at issue, defendant’s familiarity with Dubai and its laws argued against much intervention by the English courts.
On (2), the veil issue, submission was that defendant was being made personally liable for the debts of IPC Dubai, which was the relevant party (as guarantor) to the Tripartite Agreement and the holder of the account upon which the cheques were drawn. The cheques had not been presented or had been presented out of time – or there was at least an issue about that. The combination of these matters was, it was suggested, to impose an exorbitant liability on Mr Puri for sums which he had not agreed to guarantee – in contravention of established principles of English law.
Here, too, Davison M emphasised defendant’s familiarity with Dubai law. The case against Mr Puri in Dubai was resolved according to the rules which the laws of Dubai apply to Dubai companies and to individuals who write cheques on Dubai accounts. Dubai law may be different than English law on this point, but not repugnantly so.
Finally on (3) the sums in particular the interest charged were suggested to be exorbitant hence a form of unenforceable punitive damages. However, 9% interest is only 1% higher than the judgment debt rate in England and only ¼% higher than the current rate under the Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998. (At 31) ‘In the light of this, to characterise the interest rate of 9% as amounting to a penalty is unrealistic.’
Geert.
The project on Gender and Private International Law (GaP) at the Hamburg Max Planck Institute, jointly organized by Ivana Isailovic and Ralf Michaels, will end the academic year with a bang! After the inaugural workshop (see Asthma Alouane’s report here) and three successful reading sessions in the fall, there will be a whole day workshop with three themes and six fabulous conveyors who will enable a truly crossdisciplinary event.
A call for applications to take part is here. Note that some travel and accommodation money is available for emergent scholars!
Thank you Pailler Ludovic for signalling the French Supreme Court’s judgment in 18-24.261 A and X v et al B and Y et al. The Court annulled the Court of Appeal’s (Versailles) decision which had accepted for recognition and enforcement a Cameroonian judgment in a Cameroonian-French adoption case.
Legal basis for the refusal is Article 34 of the relevant 1974 FR- Cam Treaty. Specically, the classic ordre public international hurdle to recognition and enforcement: ‘Elle ne contient rien de contraire à l’ordre public de l’Etat où elle est invoquée ou aux principes de droit public applicables dans cet Etat.’
The Supreme Court held that absence of Agrément does not infringe French ordre public international (Agrément is required by French adoption law and needs to be sought by the prospective adoptant). Yet fraus (fraude à la loi) might and needs to be properly examined, which the Court of Appeal had failed to do. Suggestion is made in the case that the adoption was engineered with the sole purpose of facilitating the French rights of residence of the adopting father’s partner, who is the mother of the children.
The case emphasises the relevance of fraus omnia corrumpit. Whether of course fraus will be proven in the new proceedings before the Paris Court of Appeal remains to be seen.
Geert.
In Hong Ziyun v Chan Kwan Ming [2019] HKCFI 2125, Chan J at the end of August summed up the Hong Kong approach (as it is that of the common law) to consolidation of jurisdiction at 31: ‘the approach of the courts should be to favor resolution of all disputes associated with a transaction in one jurisdiction.’ That is the so-called one stop shop or one stop principle (whether or not hyphenated).
As Herbert Smith Freehills note, in a host of related loan documents only one of the documents contained an express jurisdiction clause (in favour of the court of Xiamen in Mainland China). The defendants applied for and obtained a stay of proceedings in Hong Kong in favour of Mainland China. HSF summarise the reasoning (the judgment itself is not too long and logically structured) helpfully as follows:
Geert.
I am no expert in all things insolvency and restructuring. I have an interest in it because of the conflict of laws issues (see the Insolvency Regulation) and the relationship with Brussels Ia. I am also interested in the labour law implications of corporate restructuring. These trigger highly relevant ethical, economic, and legal concerns.
Directive 2001/23 protects employees’ rights in the event of transfer of undertakings. The position of employees of course may be seen by potential investors as a hurdle to get onboard. Employees are inevitably on their cost cutting horizon. (For emperical Dutch research see Aalbers et al here and review in NL of same on Corporate Finance Lab).
The Directive exempts (Member States may provide otherwise) bankruptcies ‘proper’ and analogous insolvency proceedings. (They have to be under the management of what the Insolvency Regulation now calls an insolvency practitioner: an insolvency trustee, in other words). In C-126/16 Smallsteps, the Court held that pre-packs also known as ‘hushed bankruptcies’ do not qualify: since such a procedure is not ultimately aimed at liquidating the undertaking, the economic and social objectives it pursues are no explanation of, or justification for, the employees of the undertaking concerned losing the rights conferred on them by Directive 2001/23 (at 50).
Frederik De Leo reported here more extensively and with more knowledge of the issues, on the implications of Smallsteps, including implications for both the Dutch and the Belgian Statutes and proposals on pre-packs and corporate restructuring. On the Dutch implications, Robert van Moorsel had interesting insight here (in Dutch).
In Heiploeg, which was initiated before judgment in Smallsteps but is still being litigated (by Trade Unions), the Dutch Supreme Court /Hoge Raad is now essentially asked to apply the various conditions which the Court of Justice imposed for the bankruptcy exception of Directive 2001/13 to apply. Its procureur-generaal (essentially here fulfilling the role of an Advocate-General at the CJEU) opined in a well-documented Opinion on 1 November 2019 (apologies for late reporting: the Opinion traveled all sorts of corners in my briefcase) and proposes that the Supreme Court annul the lower court’s application of Smallsteps (which had found that the conditions for exception from the employees’ rights Directive did apply).
The Opinion is not I fear accessible to non-Dutch speakers – I am hoping proper experts will report more extensively once the Hoge Raad’s judgment is out.
Geert.
The Law Department at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) is pleased to host a Public Lecture by Visiting Professor Hannah Buxbaum, on ”Reasonableness’ Limits in Extraterritorial Regulation’.
About the topic:
Extraterritorial regulation has become commonplace. States frequently apply their laws to foreign conduct in order to protect local economic interests—and sometimes to advance shared interests, such as the protection of human rights. Are there limits to these exercises of state authority? If so, what is the source and content of those limits? This lecture will investigate the role of “reasonableness” as a limitation on extraterritorial regulation. It will focus in particular on developments in the United States, where the recently adopted Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law has reframed the role of international law in limiting the reach of national legislation.
About the speaker:
Professor Hannah Buxbaum is Vice President for International Affairs, the John E. Schiller Chair in Legal Ethics and a Professor of Law at Indiana University. Professor Buxbaum is an expert on cross-border regulatory litigation and extraterritoriality, U.S. securities and competition law, and foreign relations law.
Thursday 30 January 2020 6:30pm to 8:00pm
Hosted by the LSE Department of Law
Chair: Dr. Jan Kleinheisterkamp (LSE)SUMEET VALRANI LECTURE THEATRE LSE Centre Buildings (CBG.1.01)
The Lecture is open to all; there is no need to register. For more information, please contact Jan Kleinheisterkamp (LSE) or Jacco Bomhoff (LSE).
By Dr Lukas Schmidt (PhD EBS Law School), law clerk (Rechtsreferendar) at the Regional Court of Wiesbaden, Germany
In cross-border insolvencies questions of international jurisdiction might arise either in relation to the opening of an insolvency proceeding as such, or – further down the road – in relation to proceedings deriving from already opened insolvency proceedings. In both cases the European Insolvency Regulation Recast (Regulation 2015/848) provides for answers: According to Article 3 of the Regulation the courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor’s main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings. Article 6 of the Regulation provides that the courts in such Member States shall have jurisdiction as well for actions deriving directly from insolvency proceedings and closely linked with them. Both kind of decisions are to be automatically recognized in all other member states, either through Art. 19 (judgments opening insolvency proceedings) or through Art. 32 (other judgments).
Whereas Article 3 is also to be found in the old EIR (Regulation 1346/2000) as is Article 19 (Article 16) and Article 32 (Article 25), Article 6 is a new provision, however based without any doubt on the ECJ´s settled case law (Seagon, C-339/07 and Schmid, C-382/12) on the old EIR. Still on the old regulation, but with effect also for Art. 6 and 32 EIR, the ECJ has now specified in the case UB v. VA and others (C-493-18) the scope and the exclusive nature of the vis attractiva concursus as (now) laid down in Art. 6 of the EIR.
Some facts are necessary to understand the case:
The insolvent debtor UB, a Dutch citizen, owned an apartment and a property complex in France. Although his assets had been frozen by an English court he and his sister VA signed an acknowledgement of debt by which UB acknowledged owing VA the sum of EUR 500 000 in respect of various loans. UB undertook to repay that sum by 22 August 2017 and subsequently mortgaged, in favour of VA, the apartment and the property complex which he owned in France. In March 2010 he had sold the apartment to Tiger, a company founded by VA. On 10 May 2011 insolvency proceedings were opened against UB in the United Kingdom by the Croydon County Court. The Croydon County Court authorised the insolvency administrator, to bring an action before the courts in France in order to obtain a ruling that the sale of the properties and the mortgages granted over those properties were avoidable under the relevant United Kingdom bankruptcy law provisions. The insolvency administrator made use of this authorisation and succeeded before the French Regional Court and the Court of Appeal. However, the Court of Cassation referred the question of international jurisdiction of the French courts (and its recognition) to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
By answering the first two referred questions the ECJ has made clear – rather not surprising – that an action brought by the trustee in bankruptcy appointed by a court of the Member State within the territory of which the insolvency proceedings were opened seeking a declaration that the sale of immovable property situated in another Member State and the mortgage granted over it are ineffective as against the general body of creditors falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the first Member State.
The ECJ has pointed out that for determining whether actions derive directly from insolvency proceedings not the procedural context of the action is decisive, but its legal basis (the trustee asked the French courts to rule on a declaration of ineffectiveness rather than on an action to set the transactions aside).
Equally insignificant for international jurisdiction to hear an action for the restitution of immovable property to the bankruptcy estate is where those assets are located. The court underlines that the objective of improving the efficiency and speed of cross-border insolvency proceedings is only consistent with concentrating all the actions directly related to the insolvency proceedings before the courts of the Member State within the territory of which those proceedings were opened.
More intriguing and not yet subject to the ECJ’s case law is the question whether a court can confer its international jurisdiction according to Art. 6 EIR. Eventually, this is what the Croydon Country Court did by authorizing the administrator to bring an action before the French courts in order to obtain a ruling that UB´s deals regarding the French properties were avoidable transactions under the relevant United Kingdom bankruptcy law provisions. The referring Court of Cassation therefore asked in his third question if the UK court’s decision authorizing the insolvency administrator to bring an action before the French courts could be classified as a judgment concerning the course of insolvency proceedings within the meaning of Article 25 (now Article 32), which may, on that basis, be recognised with no further formalities, pursuant to that article.
The court’s answer to this question is in line with its decision in Wiemer & Trachte v. Tadzher (C-296/17) in which it already confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings have been opened for set aside actions. Hence, the ECJ refused the UK court’s approach quite quickly stating that Article 25 (now 32) EIR cannot be interpreted in such a way as to call into question the said exclusive nature of the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State within the territory of which the insolvency proceedings were opened to hear actions which derive directly from those proceedings and which are closely connected with them. According to the ECJ Article 25 EIR merely allows for the possibility that the courts of a Member State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings have been opened may also hear and determine an action which derives directly from those proceedings and is closely connected with them, whether that be the court which opened the insolvency proceedings under Article 3(1), or another court of that same Member State having territorial and substantive jurisdiction.
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