in BVC v EWF [2019] EWHC 2506 (QB) claimant applied for summary judgment in a claim for misuse of private information and harassment. The privacy claim arises from internet publication, on a website created by the defendant, of his account of his relationship with claimant. The harassment claim arises from a series of email communications from the defendant to claimant over a period of some two years, and from publication of the website itself.
An ex parte injunction had been granted earlier. The Defendant was restrained from contacting or harassing claimant, from publishing the website or any of its contents to the world at large, and from publishing any of the information set out in a confidential schedule, or any information which was liable to or might identify the claimant as a party to the proceedings or as the subject of the confidential information
In current proceedings defendant (a UK national) submits he is domiciled in Switserland. This triggers the Lugano Convention.
Parkes J clearly had to consider Article 5(3) Lugano’s special jurisdictional rule for tort (the BIa equivalent of course is now Article 7(2), hence also applying e-Date and Bolagsupplysningen. Steyn DJ had earlier rejected defendant’s arguments. At 33: ‘She held, in short, that the Claimant had a good arguable case that this jurisdiction was the state in which he had the centre of his interests, and that in any event a real and substantial tort (namely misuse of private information) had been committed within the jurisdiction. She also ordered that the steps already taken to bring the Claim Form and orders of 27 June and 4 July 2018 to the Defendant’s attention (namely, service by email) constituted good service on him, notwithstanding that he claimed he was domiciled in Switzerland at the date of receipt of the documents, not (as had been believed) in this jurisdiction.’
Defendant (praised nb by Parkes J for his ‘brief but enlightening written submissions’) however continues to challenge the jurisdiction, jumping at the chance to bring it up again when claimant referred to his centre of interests in his PoC (Particulars of Claim), and employing the distinction which the CPR makes between challenges to existence and exercise of jurisdiction (notwithstanding authority (see at 39) that despite the distinction claims viz the two need to be brought concurrently).
He essentially (at 43) posits the court reconsider
‘whether Article 7(2) RJR is ‘to be interpreted as meaning that a natural person who alleges that his personality rights have been infringed by the publication of information concerning him on the internet may have his centre of interests in a Member of State where he is not habitually resident, where he has no ongoing professional connections or employment, no home, no income and no immediate family’. In his letter to the court of 18 June 2019, the Defendant puts it this way: ‘… with no permission to appeal the judgment of Karen Steyn QC, if the court continues to accept the Claimant’s centre of interests is in England and Wales despite very clear evidence to the contrary then it is necessary to refer the question of interpretation to the ECJ pursuant to Article 267 of the TFEU’.
At 44 Parkes J dismisses the suggestion of preliminary review to Luxembourg. That route is ‘not designed to provide a route of appeal against judicial evaluation of evidence of fact.’ In conclusion, re-opening of the discussion on jurisdiction is rejected, referring finally to Lord Green in Kaefer:”it would not be right to adjourn the jurisdiction dispute to the full trial on the merits since this would defeat the purpose of jurisdiction being determined early and definitively to create legal certainty and to avoid the risk that the parties devote time and cost to preparing and fighting the merits only to be told that the court lacked jurisdiction“.
Arguments on submission to the jurisdiction where not entertained: whether service of a defence, and the making of an application to strike out qualify as ‘submission’ becomes otiose when that jurisdiction has already been unsuccessfully challenged.
Then follows extensive discussion of the substance of the matter, which is less relevant for the purposes of this blog. Hence fast forward to 150 ff where the issue of jurisdiction to issue an injunction prohibiting re-publication of the material is discussed (in case: re-offering of the website on WordPress or elsewhere). At 158 ff this leads to a re-discussion of Bolagsupplysningen where the Court held that where a claimant seeks an injunction to rectify or remove damaging material from the internet, he can only do so only in a State with full jurisdiction. Parkes J at 160 suggests this is only in the state where the defendant is domiciled (the general rule, as stated by Art 2(1) Lugano and Art 4(1) RJR), or (by virtue of the special jurisdiction: Art 5(3) Lugano and Art 7(2) RJR) in the state where he has his centre of interests, and not before the courts of each member state in which the information is accessible.
I believe Parkes J on that point omits locus delicti commissi. At the time of my review of Bolagsupplysningen I suggssted the judgment was bound to create a need for further clarification: Shevill and e-Date confirm full jurisdiction for the courts of the domicile of the defendant, and of the locus delicti commissi, and of the centre of interests of the complainant. These evidently do not necessarily coincide. With more than one court having such full jurisdiction positive conflicts might arise.
Of more importance here is that Parkes J (obiter) at 163 suggests that the requirement of full jurisdiction, also applies to orders restraining any further publication and not just as the Grand Chamber held limited by the facts in Bolagsupplysningen, to orders for rectification and removal. In doing so he follows the in my view correct suggestion made by Dr Tobias Lutzi (‘Shevill is dead, long live Shevill!’, L.Q.R. 2018, 134 (Apr), 208-213) viz divisible cq indivisible remedies.
Conclusion: Claimant is entitled to summary judgment for a final injunction to restrain further misuse of his private information
Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.
This book is published as part of Hart’s Studies in Private International Law- Asia series. It is edited by Anselmo Reyes who is a Guest Professor at the Law Faculty of Doshisha University and an International Judge of the Singapore International Commercial Court.
The publisher’s blurb is as follows:
“This collection offers a study of the regimes for the recognition and enforcement of foreign commercial judgments in 15 Asian jurisdictions: mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India. For practising lawyers, the book is intended as a practical guide to current law and procedures for enforcing judgments in the selected jurisdictions. However, it does not stop at describing current law and practice. Of interest to academics and students, it also analyses the common principles of the enforcement regimes across the jurisdictions, and identifies what should be regarded as the norm for enforcement in Asian countries for the purpose of attracting foreign direct investment and catalysing rapid economic development.
In light of the common principles identified, the book explores how laws in Asia may generally be improved to enable judgments to be more readily enforced, while ensuring that legitimate concerns over indirect jurisdiction, due process and domestic public policy are respected and addressed. With this in mind, the book discusses the potential impact that the adoption of the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements might have on Asian jurisdictions; it also considers the potential impact of the convention for the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters presently being drafted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
This timely book argues that it is imperative to adopt a uniform system for the recognition and enforcement of judgments throughout Asia if there is to be traction for the enhanced cross-border commerce that is expected to result from endeavours such as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), CPTPP (also known as TPP-11), and RCEP.
Anselmo Reyes is Guest Professor at the Law Faculty of Doshisha University in Kyoto and an International Judge of the Singapore International Commercial Court.”
Many commentators were wrong-footed on reading Advocate-General Szpunar’s Opinion in C-505/17 Google Inc v Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), concerning the territorial limits to right to have search results delisted, more popularly referred to as ‘the right to erasure’ or the ‘right to be forgotten’ (‘RTBF’ – a product of the CJEU in Google Spain). Far from ruling out ‘extraterritorial’ or worldwide force of the right, the AG saw no objection to it in principle, even if he suggested non-application to the case at issue (he did so again in his Opinion in C-18/18 Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook, which I review here and on which judgment is forthcoming next week).
The Court yesterday held (the Twitter storm it created was later somewhat drowned by the UK Supreme Court’s decision in the prorogation case) and overall confirmed the AG’s views. As with the AG’s Opinion, it is important to read the Judgment for what it actually says, not just how the headlines saw it. For immediate analysis, readers may also want to read Daphne Keller’s and Michèle Finck’s threads and Dan Svantesson’s impromptu assessment.
It is again important to point out that the French data protection authority’s (CNIL) decision at issue, 2016/054 is a general CNIL instruction to Google to carry out global delisting in instances where natural persons request removal; not a case-specific one.
I have a case-note on the case and on C-137/17 (judgment also yesterday) forthcoming with Yuliya Miadzvetskaya, but here are my initial thoughts on what I think is of particular note.
1. The Court of Justice (in Grand Chamber) first of all, unusually, examines the questions in the light of both Directive 95/46, applicable to the facts at issue, and the GDPR Regulation ‘in order to ensure that its answers will be of use to the referring court in any event’ (at 41).
2. Next, at 52, the Court dismisses a fanciful distributive approach towards the computing reality of data processing:
Google’s establishment in French territory carries on, inter alia, commercial and advertising activities, which are inextricably linked to the processing of personal data carried out for the purposes of operating the search engine concerned, and, second, that that search engine must, in view of, inter alia, the existence of gateways between its various national versions, be regarded as carrying out a single act of personal data processing. The referring court considers that (and the CJEU clearly agrees, GAVC), in those circumstances, that act of processing is carried out within the framework of Google’s establishment in French territory.
3. At 55, the Court points out that de-referencing carried out on all the versions of a search engine would meet the objective of data protection in full, particularly (at 56) given the fact that ‘(t)he internet is a global network without borders and search engines render the information and links contained in a list of results displayed following a search conducted on the basis of an individual’s name ubiquitous (the Court restating here its finding in both Google Spain and Bolagsupplysningen).
At 58 the Court employs that finding of ubiquitousness to ‘justify the existence of a competence on the part of the EU legislature to lay down the obligation, for a search engine operator, to carry out, when granting a request for de-referencing made by such a person, a de-referencing on all the versions of its search engine.’ No grand statements on public international law’s views on adjudicative extraterritoriality /universality. Just a simple observation.
The Court subsequently however (at 59-60) notes other States’ absence of a right to de-referencing and their different views on the balancing act between privacy and freedom of speech in particular. At 61-62 it then notes
While the EU legislature has, in Article 17(3)(a) of Regulation 2016/679, struck a balance between that right and that freedom so far as the Union is concerned (see, to that effect, today’s judgment, GC and Others (De-referencing of sensitive data), C‑136/17, paragraph 59), it must be found that, by contrast, it has not, to date, struck such a balance as regards the scope of a de-referencing outside the Union.
In particular, it is in no way apparent from the wording of Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive 95/46 or Article 17 of Regulation 2016/679 that the EU legislature would, for the purposes of ensuring that the objective referred to in paragraph 54 above is met, have chosen to confer a scope on the rights enshrined in those provisions which would go beyond the territory of the Member States and that it would have intended to impose on an operator which, like Google, falls within the scope of that directive or that regulation a de-referencing obligation which also concerns the national versions of its search engine that do not correspond to the Member States.
In other words the Court has adopted the same approach as the United States Supreme Court has done in Morrison v. National Australia Bank; and Kiobel: there is a presumption against extraterritoriality, however it is not excluded. In the absence of indications of the legislator wish to extend the right to delisting extraterritorially it does not so exist in the current state of the law.
4. At 63 the Court hints at what might be required as part of such future potential extraterritorial extension: EU law does not currently provide for cooperation instruments and mechanisms as regards the scope of a de-referencing outside the Union – in contrast with the regime it has intra-EU. This also hints at the CJEU taking a more multilateral approach to the issue than its SCOTUS counterpart.
5. At 69 the Court then adds that intra-EU, a delisting order covering all of the search engine’s EU extensions is both possible and may be appropriate: co-operation between authorities may lead to ‘where appropriate, a de-referencing decision which covers all searches conducted from the territory of the Union on the basis of that data subject’s name.’
6. A final twist then follows at 72:
Lastly, it should be emphasised that, while, as noted in paragraph 64 above, EU law does not currently require that the de-referencing granted concern all versions of the search engine in question, it also does not prohibit such a practice. Accordingly, a supervisory or judicial authority of a Member State remains competent to weigh up, in the light of national standards of protection of fundamental rights (references to CJEU authority omitted, GAVC), a data subject’s right to privacy and the protection of personal data concerning him or her, on the one hand, and the right to freedom of information, on the other, and, after weighing those rights against each other, to order, where appropriate, the operator of that search engine to carry out a de-referencing concerning all versions of that search engine.
Here I do not follow the Court: one could argue that the harmonised EU’s approach is currently not to extend the right to delisting extraterritorially. The Court on the other hand seems to be suggesting that the extraterritoriality issue was not discussed in the Directive or Regulation, that EU law does not occupy (‘pre-empt’) that regulatory space and consequently leaves it up to the Member States to regulate that right.
I shall need more detailed reading of the GDPR’s preparatory works to form a view as to whether the extraterritorial element was considered, and rejected, or simply not discussed. However I also want to already point out that if the decision is left to the Member States, the case-law and theory of pre-emption clarifies that such national action has to be taken in full compatibility with EU law. including free movement of services, say, which Google may rightfully invoke should there be a disproportionate impact on the Internal Market.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.2, Heading 2.2.8.2.5.
Written by Mayela Celis
A meeting on the international transfer of maintenance funds was held in The Hague, the Netherlands from 16 to 18 September 2019. The Conclusions and Recommendations are available here.
Among the solutions contemplated were the establishment of a centralised point for international transfers for both incoming and outgoing transfer of funds, the abolishment of the usage of cheques and how to increase transparency and cost reduction to the transfer of funds. The meeting also discussed the benefits and disadvantages of bundled payments, as well as the use of blockchain and other payment transfer solutions.
While the Experts’ Group discussed solutions and good practices in the context of the 2007 HCCH Child Support Convention, these are equally important to the United Nations Convention of 1956 on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance Obligations, Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, and other regional or bilateral instruments.
It should be noted that pursuant to its Article 49, the 2007 HCCH Child Support Convention prevails over the 1956 United Nations Convention in so far as its scope of application as between the relevant States coincides with the scope of application of the 2007 HCCH Convention.
The European Union, as a Regional Economic Integration Organisation, approved the 2007 HCCH Child Support Convention, which entered into force for the EU on 1 August 2014 (with the exception of Denmark which has not yet acceded to it)
The HCCH news item is available here.
Written by Saloni Khanderia
Associate Professor Saloni Khanderia (Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India) recently published a new paper in the Commonwealth Law Bulletin, titled The Hague judgments project: assessing its plausible benefits for the development of the Indian Private International Law.
The author talks about the two international instruments which come under the esteemed Hague judgments project: the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements [the HCCA] and the recent Proposed Draft Text on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments [the Draft Convention], with specific reference to India. The question that the author raises is whether India should endorse the above two instruments. Even though India is a Member of the Hague Conference, it a non-signatory to any treaty or Convention regarding the international jurisdiction of courts and the consequent recognition and enforcement of foreign verdicts. Thus it becomes interesting to see the stance India should take. Initially, the author provides an overview of the judgments project, followed by the role of the HCCA and the Draft Convention and their applicability and contribution to transnational trade. The article presents a position of India in the sphere of private international law. It further analyses the role of the two instruments on the development of India’s private international law.
The author welcomes the freedom of choice of a forum that is granted to the parties in India in respect of civil and commercial transnational matters. However, there is a need for certainty in several matters. Looking at the jurisprudence it can be seen that the Indian courts have been dismissing cases where the parties have not chosen them as a governing forum. Conversely, the courts have taken cognizance and assumed jurisdiction where the same has been conferred upon them by the agreement. Ratification to the HCCA tends to solve this problem as would subject the Indian private international law to a fixed and consistent set of rules on (dis)regarding the choice of court agreements. HCCA also lays down exceptions in cases on an exclusive choice of court agreements, therefore, its incorporation in the Indian laws would guide the court as to when to disregard the choice of court agreement. The ratification would also help in the holistic development of the private international law by easing the need the file fresh suits for recognition and enforcement.
Indian’s archaic rules on private international law make it necessary for the country to endorse the Draft Convention as it would prevent the Indian courts from enforcing a foreign judgment that has been rendered in violation to such an agreement, on coming into effect. Like the HCCA it would ease the process of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments as one would not have look
through the domestic laws before moving the courts. It would provide certainty to the litigants as would provide answers to inconsistent judgments and parallel proceedings. Although
[contact-form]the ground of public policy is seemingly recognized in India, the Draft Convention would enhance the predictability with respect to enforcement as it explicitly confers the requested court with the right to deny the enforcement, for this reason. The above arguments by the author clearly lay out the conclusion that India should endorse the HCCA and the Draft Convention under the Hague’s Judgment Project.
in [2019] EWHC 2115 (Ch) Office Depot BV et al v Holdham SA et al, the High Court in August (I had promised posting soon after the Tweet. That did not quite happen) held on issues of lis alibi pendens (and, alternatively, a stay on case management grounds) in a follow-on cartel damages suit arising from the European Commission’s cartel finding in the envelopes market. That’s right: envelopes. Cartel cases do not always involve sexy markets. But I digress (and I also confess to finding stationary quite exciting).
Sir Geoffrey Vos’ judgment deals with the fate of the Office Depot claimants’ follow-on proceedings in England against certain Bong (of Sweden) corporate defendants, after the Bong parties had commenced Swedish proceedings for negative declarations as to their liability. In March 2019 the relevant Swedish court said in effect that Article 8 Brussel I a was not engaged so that the Swedish Bong proceedings for negative declarations could only proceed against the locally domiciled Office Depot company, which was Office Depot Svenska AB, but not the non-Swedish Office Depot entities. Parties at the time of Sir Geoffrey’s decision (Swedish followers may be able to enlighten us on whether there has been a decision in the meantime; at 23 the expected date is mentioned as ‘the autumn’) were awaiting a certiorari decision by the Swedish Supreme Court.
CJEU C–406/92 The Tatry of course is discussed, as is CDC. Sir Geoffrey also discussed C-129/92 Owens Bank, in particular Lenz AG’s Opinion (the CJEU did not get to the part of the Opinion relevant to current case). Discussion between the parties, at Sir Geoffrey’s request, focused on the issue of the judge’s discretion under lis alibi pendens for related actions, rather than on whether or not the actions are related (it was more or less accepted they are; see ia at 43 ff).
At 46 ff the Court then exercises its discretion and finds against a stay, on the basis in particular of the expected length of the Swedish proceedings: at 54: ‘the grant of a stay would be contrary to justice in that it would delay unreasonably the resolution of proceedings that can only be tried in England and already relate to events many years ago‘, and at 48: ‘The stage in the Swedish proceedings is a long way behind these. It will be between one and two and a half years before jurisdiction is resolved there, two courts already having refused jurisdiction. It will be perhaps between three and five years before the substantive litigation in Sweden is resolved, if it ever gets off the ground.‘
Swedish courts do not tend to get used for torpedo actions. Yet the swiftness of English court proceedings yet again comes in to save the day (or indeed, scupper the stay).
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12.1
Over the course of the last few decades, the European legislature has adopted a total of 18 Regulations in the area of private international law, including civil procedure. The resulting substantial legislative unification has been described as the first true ‘Europeanisation’ of private international law, and even as a kind of ‘European Choice of Law Revolution’. However, it remains largely unclear whether the far-reaching unification of the ‘law on the books’ has turned private international law into a truly European ‘law in action’: To what extent is European private international law actually based on uniform European rules common to all Member States, rather than on state treaties or instruments of enhanced cooperation? Is the manner in which academics and practitioners analyse and interpret European private international law really different from previously existing domestic approaches to private international law? Or, rather, is the actual application and interpretation of European private international law still influenced, or even dominated, by national legal traditions, leading to a re-fragmentation of a supposedly uniform body of law?
In bringing together academics from all over Europe, How European is European Private International Law? sets out to answer – for the first time – these crucial and interrelated questions. It sheds light on the conspicuous lack of “Europeanness” currently symptomatic of European private international law and discusses how this body of law can become truly European in character in the future.
The book was edited by Jan von Hein, Eva-Maria Kieninger and Giesela Rühl and published by Intersentia. It is based on a conference that took place in Berlin in March 2018, see here and here.
Written by Alexia Pato, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Bonn
On 10 September 2019, I had the immense pleasure to attend a Conference on the role of private international law (PIL) academia in Latin America (LATAM), which took place in the fast-paced environment of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law (MPI) in Hamburg. The Conference was organised and chaired by Ralf Michaels and Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm. I thank them both for their warm welcome and congratulate them for the success of the Conference, which honours the long-standing PIL tradition in LATAM and encourages collaborative learning beyond borders.
This well-structured event encompassed two roundtables: whereas the first one dealt with PIL culture in LATAM, the second one discussed the impact of PIL schools of thought. Speakers of both roundtables prepared short handouts and submitted research questions to the audience, which created a fertile ground for interactions. The following paragraphs summarise the content of the presentations, as well as the follow-up discussions.
The PIL Culture in LATAM
The first roundtable discussed the specific features of academia in LATAM. In particular, María Mercedes Albornoz highlighted that many PIL scholars cumulate academic and professional positions. This might be unfortunate, as the time dedicated to research tends to decrease. A call for more interactions between PIL scholars around the world was made, in order to foster the exchange of ideas and the search for solutions to global concerns. This could be achieved through, e.g. the introduction of double university degrees or visiting programs for professors.
In that respect, the specific role of both the MPI and the Uruguayan Institute of Private International Law (IUDIP) was emphasised by Gonzalo Lorenzo Idiarte and Jan Peter Schmidt. First, Gonzalo Lorenzo Idiarte explained the key role of law Institutes in promoting scientific activities. Additionally, they help universities to deal with the increasingly higher number of students and the corresponding teaching workload. In particular, the IUDIP is active in organising academic events – such as conferences and reports – and regularly drafts PIL texts. The IUDIP is trying to acquire more visibility and encourage scholars to visit.
As for the MPI, Jan Peter Schmidt pointed out that the Institute has contributed to fruitful academic exchanges. On the one hand, many PIL scholars in LATAM visited the MPI and hence, participated to the diffusion of Latin American PIL in Europe. They often helped the MPI in its role of providing legal opinions to German courts on the application of foreign, Latin American law. Indeed, scholars are of utmost importance, as they provide access to “remote” literature and court decisions. On the other hand, renown PIL experts, such as Jürgen Samtleben, Paul Heinrich Neuhaus and Jürgen Basedow, reinforced the links of the MPI with LATAM countries.
Finally, Inez Lopes insisted on the role of ASADIP (Asociación Americana de Derecho Internacional Privado), which gives LATAM countries a voice at the global level. The influence of such an association is potentially huge. Vertically, it can assist LATAM countries in implementing international conventions and advise governments. Horizontally, since ASADIP takes part in several international organisations – such as the HCCH, UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL and OAS – it has a chance to participate in the decision-making process.
The language in which scientific works should be written was extensively discussed with the audience. In particular, should LATAM scholars publish in English? On the one hand, it was highlighted that English is a language that enables Latin American PIL to gain a global dimension. Indeed, the diffusion of knowledge in a globalised setting mainly takes place in that language. On the other hand, legal English describes the law of common law countries. Therefore, using English to describe PIL in LATAM could be perceived as a cultural mismatch.
The Impact of PIL Schools of Thought in LATAM
The second roundtable highlighted the fundamental role of scholars in drafting PIL acts and conventions. In Argentina, Ramírez, Vargas Guillemette and Alfonsín fostered the development of PIL, thanks to their rather avant-gardist ideas, as Cecilia Fresnedo de Aguirre explained. More recently, outstanding scholars contributed to the elaboration of PIL rules within the framework of international organisations, such as the HCCH, UNIDROIT and the OAS.
Although academia boosts the creation of PIL, parliaments tend to blatantly disregard PIL issues and texts. For example, Gonzalo Lorenzo Idiarte and Cecilia Fresnedo de Aguirre explained the challenging legislative path of the Uruguayan General Private International Law Bill. Academics drafted this text and presented it to the parliament, which rejected it three times (!). Its approval is still pending at the time I write those lines.
In Venezuela, the same trend is observable, as Javier Ochoa Muñoz explained. The Venezuelan Private International Law Bill was first drafted in 1965 but only approved in 1999, thanks to the work and energy of Tatiana Maekelt. Here too, an academic supported the development of PIL. Additionally, Tatiana Maekelt encouraged the creation of the ASADIP in 2007 and set up a successful Master Program in Private International and Comparative Law.
At the regional level, the Inter-American Specialized Conferences on Private International Law (CIDIP), organised under the auspices of the OAS, played an important role in the codification and harmonisation of PIL in LATAM. Today, however, this process stalls and, as a consequence, Valesca Raizer Borges Moschen asked if and how the role of the OAS should be redefined. She noted the increasing role of the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the preference for the creation of flexible PIL instruments.
Since international codifications came to a standstill, Sebastián Paredes explained that, in the recent years, LATAM countries have engaged in individual, uncoordinated efforts to codify and modernise their PIL rules. This certainly created coordination issues and further complicated the quest for harmonised solutions to collective problems.
Finally, in his closing speech, Jürgen Samtleben talked about his first steps as a PIL academic in LATAM. He delighted the audience with many anecdotes and a touch of humour.
International and public law, ethics and economics for sustainable development – LEES is the name of the doctoral study programme jointly offered by the University of Milan, the University of Maastricht and the University of Rijeka. There are 6 scholarships available to excellent candidates who wish to conduct interdisciplinary research relevant to sustainability, including that related to private international law.
The call closes on 14 October 2019, and the studies commence as of the beginning of November 2019 in Milan. Further information and instruction is available here.
On Friday 27 September 2019, the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg will host a workshop on Cross-Border Debt Recovery in the EU – Application of the “second generation” regulations in France and Luxembourg. The workshop is organised in the framework of the IC2BE Project, conducted by a European consortium comprising the MPI Luxembourg and the Universities of Antwerp, Freiburg (coord.), Madrid, Milan, Rotterdam, and Wroclaw. Funded by the Justice Programme (2014-2020) of the European Commission, this Project (JUST-AG-2016-02) aims to assess the working in practice of the “second generation” of EU Regulations on procedural law for cross-border cases, i.e., the European Enforcement Order (Regulation (EC) No 805/2004, “EEO”), the European Order for Payment (Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006, “EPO”), the European Small Claims Procedure (Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 2015/2421, “ESCP”) and the European Account Preservation Order (Regulation (EU) No 655/2014, “EAPO”) Regulations.
The workshop will address the application in practice of such Regulations in Luxembourg and France. Mr. François Biltgen (CJEU), Prof. Burkhard Hess, and Prof. Cyril Nourissat will chair the workshop’s Sessions. As was the case with the previous workshop hosted by the MPI Luxembourg on 8 June 2018, this event will bring together academics from various institutions, judges, bailiffs, lawyers and representatives from consumer organisations.
This workshop is conceived as a closed event. However, people having a special interest in the topic may apply for admission provided they submit a short explanation to motivate their request. The working languages will be English and French.
Contact address: veerle.vandeneeckhout@mpi.lu
The case law database of the IC2BE project is available here (in progress).
For the National seminars that will be hosted in the participating countries, see here.
For information on the IC2BE final conference, that will be held in Antwerp on 21-22 November 2019, see here and here.
The Dutch Court of Appeal‘s confirmation of the Court of First Instance at The Hague judgment in the climate litigation case, should stand. So advised two senior court advisors to the Supreme Court last week (they also announced a full English translation to be posted to the site today, Friday. Again quite a service from the Dutch judiciary!) As in the European Court of Justice, their opinion is not binding, but it is highly authoritative.
Others for whom this issue is their daily bread and butter no doubt will analyse the Opinion in great detail, discussing as it does issues of trias politica, direct effect of international law etc. Of particular note are their concluding remarks, where they emphasise the importance of the ECHR in the action, and (in trias politica context) the fact that the courts cannot and must not directly instruct the political class to legislate. All it can do is point out what is needed and where the Government fell short. That will leave the claimants with the task of pondering how to operationalise the judgment should the Supreme Court follow.
Geert.
Within the ongoing EU Justice Project “Personalized Solution in European Family and Succession Law”, shortly known by the acronym PSEFS, the first stage of research has resulted in several publications. One of the most important is the e-book consisting of 28 reports by for the EU Member States concerning the forms of couples relations and patrimonial consequences thereof and succession regimes, which is accessible here. It also includes several questions regarding the private international law.
This massive publication has been summarised into the PSEFS Atlas provided for each EU Member State, containing information about the property regimes of married couples and registered partners and rules of succession. Designed as an informative tool for legal professionals and an effective support for citizens, it is accessible by clicking to the territory of the selected EU Member State on the map.
In the attempt to reach the public the team members also created two brochures, one with general information about the three regulations: the Succession Regulation, the Matrimonial Property Regulation and the Registered Partnership Property Regulation, and the other with case studies explaining the functioning of these regulations. The brochures are available in 5 languages by clicking on the pictures of their front pages under the respective results/information and support to the citizens section of the Project webpage.
The Project developments may also be followed on the PSEFS Facebook page. One of the forthcoming activities is the Ljubljana PSEFS Project Events. It is expected to gather close to hundred participants as it is open to both academics and practitioners interested in the topic regardless of their involvement in the PSEFS Project.
The Piraeus Court of Appeal refused recognition and enforcement of two English orders awarding damages for breaching a choice of court and a settlement agreement due to violation of the Greek procedural public policy.
Apostolos Anthimos
INTRODUCTION
The ruling forms part of the famous The Alexandros T saga. It comes as the expected step forward, after the judgment rendered by the English CoA in the case Starlight Shipping Company v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T [2014] EWCA Civ 1010. The latter decision has been already reported and criticized in our blog by Martin Ilmer. An extensive presentation and critical analysis of the judgment is also included in the doctoral thesis of my blog colleague, Mukarrum Ahmed, pp. 142-151. For a concise, however complete presentation of the case in its previous stages, see here. For a view in favor of the outcome in the UK courts, see here.
THE FACTS
The application for the declaration of enforceability concerned two orders issued by a judge of the High Court of England in 2014, awarding damages (amounting to 300.000 £) for breach of a choice of court and a settlement agreement between the parties. The orders were issued on the basis of a judgment of the High Court [Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG [2014] EWHC 3068 (Comm) (26 September 2014), see also [2015] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 747; [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 579], which granted declaratory relief in favor of the insurers, and specific performance and damages for the solicitors’ and adjuster’s, on the basis that the proceedings in Greece were in breach of the settlement agreements and the exclusive jurisdiction clauses of both the settlement agreements and the underlying policies.
The Piraeus 1st Instance Court granted exequatur [Nr. 3461/2015, unreported]. The Greek shipping company appealed pursuant to the Brussels I Regulation, seeking revocation in accordance with Article 45, in conjunction with Art. 34.1 Brussels I Regulation.
THE RULING
Initially, the Piraeus CoA engaged in an analysis of the Brussels regime, starting from the Brussels Convention. It then focused on the public policy defense under Article 34.1 Brussels I Regulation. In this context, the court underlined the significance of Article 8 of the Greek Constitution, which reads as follows: No person shall be deprived of the judge assigned to him by law against his will. Finally, the court made reference to the institution of anti-suit injunction, concluding what is already common ground for continental legal orders, namely that recognition of such measures may not be tolerated.
With respect to the issue at stake, the reasoning of the Piraeus CoA is brief and to the point. The court stated verbatim the following:
It is true that both the English court and the Judge issuing the orders did not issue anti-suit injunctions. However, judgments hindering the progress of litigation initiated in Greece by ordering damages, and warnings for further damages against the claimants in the Greek proceedings, are included both in the ruling and the orders aforementioned. Consequently, the above contain ‚quasi‘ anti-suit injunctions, which pose barriers towards free access to Greek courts, in violation of Article 6.1 ECHR and Articles 8.1 & 20 of the Greek Constitution, the provisions aforementioned belonging to the core of public policy in Greece.
Piraeus Court of Appeal, Nr. 371/1.7.2019
COMMENTS
The ruling of the Piraeus court does not come as a surprise. The reasoning might be laconic, nevertheless it is crystal clear, and in line with the comments made by Martin Ilmer & Mukarrum Ahmed.
For the time being, no information is available on a possible final appeal lodged by the English side. I would however tend to believe that a final appeal is to be expected for the following reasons:
In the last decade, the European Union has unified large segments of private international law for its Member States. However, existing treaties concluded by Member States with Third States enjoy priority over European private international law rules. This priority rule hampers the uniform application of EU law and creates friction with harmonised procedural rules. In addition, the legal relationships for large numbers of Third State citizens are not governed by EU private international law but by rules laid down in international treaties, which often dates back to the beginning of the 20th century.
The implications of this pluralism on the functioning of the rather new European private international law rules have not yet been explored in depth. The various international treaties or conventions concluded by the current Member States have neither been comprehensively collected nor has their content been analysed in a systematic manner. This book, published by Intersentia, aims to fill this gap in part. It is the fruit of a research group led by Anatol Dutta (LMU München) and Wolfgang Wurmnest (Universität Augsburg).
Focused on the area of succession law, a field of law chosen in an exemplary manner, the book analyses the scope and effect of treaties and conventions with Third States on the functioning of the European Succession Regulation (Regulation No 650/2012). There are country reports from selected EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden) on the treaty law and its application. To understand if and how Third States apply and interpret these treaties and conventions, there are also reports form selected Third States (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey). In addition, the book contains a chapter on the competences of the EU and of the Member States to revise the treaty law. The study concludes with a comparative report, which explores the background of the treaty law and discusses various policy options at the national and the European level to ameliorate the legal framework for cross-border succession cases.
To lay the foundation for a cross-border analysis of the treaty law, the book compiles 27 bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions dealt with by the national reports in the area of succession law. The relevant rules of these sources were also translated into English. Such a comprehensive collection and translation of the treaty law thus far does not exist.
The following authors were part of the working group and contributed to the book:
Davor Babi?, Andrea Bonomi,Slavko ?or?evi?, Anatol Dutta, Stéphanie Francq, Pietro Franzina, Samuel Fulli-Lemaire, Biset Sena Güne?, Markku Helin, Tena Hoško,Dirk Looschelders, Julie Mary, Zlatan Meški?, Magdalena Pfeiffer, Walter Pintens, Claudia Rudolf, Wolfgang Wurmnest, Nadjma Yassari.
Advocate General Saugmandsgaard ØE in C-272/18 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v TVP Treuhand opined early September (I have been busy) that the Rome Convention’s and Rome I’s lex societatis exception does not apply to ‘Treuhand’ (a trust-like construction) contracts between investors and the corporation they entrust to manage investment in real estate companies located in Germany. The relevant choice of court rule follows the standard Rome I (cq Convention) rules.
At the time of adoption of the Rome Convention, the Giuliano Lagarde Report went into a bit more detail as to what is and is not excluded:
Confirming this exclusion, the Group stated that it affects all the complex acts (contractual administrative, registration) which are necessary to the creation of a company or firm and to the regulation of its internal organization and winding up, i. e. acts which fall within the scope of company law. On the other hand, acts or preliminary contracts whose sole purpose is to create obligations between interested parties (promoters) with a view to forming a company or firm are not covered by the exclusion.
The subject may be a body with or without legal personality, profit-making or non-profit-making. Having regard to the differences which exist, it may be that certain relationships will be regarded as within the scope of company law or might be treated as being governed by that law (for example, societe de droit civil nicht-rechtsfahiger Verein, partnership, Vennootschap onder firma, etc.) in some countries but not in others. The rule has been made flexible in order to take account of the diversity of national laws.
Examples of ‘internal organization’ are: the calling of meetings, the right to vote, the necessary quorum, the appointment of officers of the company or firm, etc. ‘Winding-up’ would cover either the termination of the company or firm as provided by its constitution or by operation of law, or its disappearance by merger or other similar process.
At the request of the German delegation the Group extended the subparagraph (e) exclusion to the personal liability of members and organs, and also to the legal capacity of companies or firms. On the other hand the Group did not adopt the proposal that mergers and groupings should also be expressly mentioned, most of the delegations being of the opinion that mergers and groupings were already covered by the present wording.
Particularly in KA Finanz, the Court could have done a lot to clarify the scope of the Convention, but did not. Current case however offered a lot less beef to that particular bone for only with a stretch in my view could the issue be considered to fall under the corporate exception. The argument made was that given that the contracts instruct the Treuhand to manage the companies, and that there was ‘alignment’ (‘imbrication’ is the word used in the French version of the Opinion at 36; no English version yet exists) between the contacts and the by-laws of the companies concerned: these were geared in part specifically to facilitate the investment in the companies by the Treuhand.
The AG points out that there is no European code for company law hence no possibility to use harmonised substantive law to help interpret private international law. He relies therefore on the general interpretative rules, including predictability, and sides in my view justifiably with the issue, in essence, being about contractual obligations: not life and death of companies. A link alone with questions relating to corporate law (at 53) is not enough.
Geert.
Written by Jos Hoevenaars, Erasmus University Rotterdam (postdoc researcher ERC project Building EU Civil Justice)
An earlier post reported on the volatile situation of legal aid reform in the Netherlands in which I discussed the plans by Dutch Minister of Legal Protection Sander Dekker for the overhaul of the Dutch system for subsidized legal aid. The Dutch Bar Association is now once again sounding the alarm about the social advocacy. Pro Deo lawyers are paid so little in legal aid that more and more of them consider quitting or already have thrown in the towel. Since 2015, a reported 350 lawyers have already quit and 70% of the remaining lawyers says they consider stopping if the situation doesn’t change.
The general dean of the bar has therefore sent an urgent letter to Minister Dekker in which the Minister is being criticised for experimenting with new forms of justice administration and systemic changes to the legal aid scheme while effectively ignoring the acute problems that persist today.
The 2017 Van der Meer report already concluded that the Dutch system for subsidized legal aid, in which lawyers are awarded compensation based on a point-system, suffers from ‘overdue maintenance’ and that the actual time spent by lawyers no longer corresponds at all to the number of points awarded.
The reasons for this are diverse, but the report indicates that legislation and regulations have become much more complex, that those seeking justice are more demanding and that public administration is creating more legal conflicts than ever before. It also emphasized that the compensation for legal aid in the law of persons and family law is the most out of step. As concluded by Herman van der Meer, the president of the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam, and chair of the Committee, the award system still relies on standards of two decades ago: “If you look at family law, for example, it was quite common at the time of a divorce for the children and the house to go to the wife and for the husband to pay alimony. This is no longer the case these days. As a result, the judge, and therefore also the lawyer, has a lot more work to do with a case.”
The critique voiced by the Bar Association today, although perhaps more pressing now, is not new. In the past year the Dutch Association Pro Deo Lawyers (VSAN) has repeatedly and openly criticized the Minister’s reform plans, especially his sole focus on long-term goals while failing to address acute existing problems. According to VSAN, the new system in which there will be experimented with so-called legal assistance packages, will become an irresponsible system of trial and error, to the detriment of those seeking justice. The volatile situation has on several occasions lead to punctuality actions by pro deo lawyers, and again the bar is threatening such actions, or even general strikes if the Minister fails to address their concerns. In the words of the Dean: “If this call doesn’t work, the minister is actually saying that he doesn’t care.”
It is clear that the complex portfolio of the overhaul of the Dutch legal aid system will not go by unnoticed and continues to cause resistance and critique.
Written by Christiane von Bary, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich
The 8th edition of the biannual Journal of Private International Law Conference took place at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich from 12-14 September 2019, organized by Professor Anatol Dutta in cooperation with the editors of the journal, Professor Paul Beaumont and Professor Jonathan Harris.
The call for papers by the organisers resulted in a record number of applications and thus papers presented. More than 190 participants registered for the conference and delivered 114 papers over the course of the three days in Munich. With participants coming from around 50 jurisdictions ranging from Australia to Venezuela, all speakers had a truly international audience and were able to benefit from questions, insights and remarks by a very diverse group of private international law scholars. The diversity of the participants and speakers not only covered a wide variety of geographical backgrounds but also every stage of the academic career from doctoral candidate to senior professor. Due to the unexpectedly high interest in the conference, sadly some people who were interested could not attend due to space constraints – even despite a video transmission of the plenary session.
On Thursday and Saturday, a total of 28 parallel sessions took place. Blocks of seven alternative sessions happened at the same time and participants where free to choose according to their interests. This was a challenge not only for the participants who were spoilt for choice but also from an organisational perspective. In each session, up to four speakers presented their papers on related topics. There were several panels on topics related to jurisdiction, judgments or family law but also on subjects like child abduction, judicial cooperation, arbitration, technology or CSR. The presentations were all followed by lively and fruitful discussions each chaired by an expert in the relevant field. The animated debate often continued in the cafeteria and the sunny courtyard during the coffee breaks. Two speakers who were unable to attend in person even had the chance to participate via video call and answered questions remotely.
The plenary sessions on Friday allowed for a larger audience for four panels. Particularly interesting and thought provoking was the session on “Women and Private International Law” with Professors Roxana Banu, Mary Keyes, Horatia Muir Watt, Yuko Nishitani and Marta Pertegás Sender. Their contributions focussed on gender issues in private international law and provided a broad variety of perspectives in an area that has – so far – been largely neglected by the private international law community. The very existence of this community was addressed by Professor Ralf Michaels and Dr. Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm who spoke about what the heart of the endeavour of private international law is. During the days in Munich, which were not only filled by intellectual debate but also by colleagues and friends (re)connecting, the existence of an international community of private international law felt very much real.
The conference website (https://jprivintl2019.de/) will remain active and offers an overview of all papers as well as abstracts from many speakers. Finally, it was revealed that the next Journal of Private International Law Conference will take place in Singapore in 2021, organised by Professor Adeline Chong, which will be the first time the private international law community gathers in Asia.
From 12 to 14 September 2019, the Journal of Private International Law held its 8th Conference at the University of Munich, perfectly hosted and organized by our Munich-based colleague Anatol Dutta. Nearly 150 colleagues gathered from all over the world, amongst them many of the Conflictoflaws.net editors.
This was the perfect occasion to meet for us for dinner on the first evening. Some of our editors had never met personally before, and all of those present could exchange views and news on PIL as well as on the blog.
The bottom line of the meeting certainly was: onwards and upwards with our blog – it is worth it! The PIL community will have many occasions to get together in the near future, inter alia in Aarhus in May 2020. We will keep you posted!
For now, however, we are presenting to you our views and news from the Munich conference. The following short observations should give you some impressions of the fantastic panels and presentations. These are not meant to be a comprehensive conference report, all the more so, because there is one in the pipeline for the blog by Christiane von Bary, Research Fellow with Anatol.
Here we go:
Plenary Sessions (Friday)
Matthias Weller
The first of the plenary sessions was opened by Matthias Lehmann, University of Bonn, Germany. He presented on the complex relations between “Regulation, Global Governance and Private International Law” with a view to: “Squaring the Triangle”. First of all, Lehmann explained the respective peculiarities of each of the poles of this triangle: PIL as an area of law that, as a reaction to cross-border legal relationships, is primarily rights-driven, based on a notion of equivalence of the selected laws, ideally resulting in multilateral connecting factors. And regulatory law as a reaction to public interests, managed by administrative agencies under a principally unilateral approach by territorially limited administrative acts or mandatory rules. Finally, both areas of law working together to achieve global governance of the respective subject-matters such as e.g. securities antitrust, data protection, environmental or cultural property protection law. Indeed, in all of these areas, the public-private divide is increasingly blurred (see also e.g. Burkhard Hess, The Private-Public Law Divide in International Dispute Resolution, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 388, Boston 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-8096_pplrdc_ej.9789004361201.C02). Lehmann then referred to central techniques of private international law to deal with regulatory rules such as e.g. Articles 3(3) and (4) or 9 of the Rome I Regulation and Article 14(2) of the Rome II Regulation. He also referred to Currie’s governmental interest analysis and Ehrenzweig’s local data theory, to a certain extent reflected by e.g. Article 17 Rome II Regulation. Lehmann pleaded in favour of overcoming (more strongly) the “public law taboo”. As a consequence, a more sophisticated approach for the application of public law in cross-border settings would be needed, as Lehmann further explained, e.g., by making use of auto-limitations or by creating parallel connecting factors for public and private law aspects of the respective subject-matter. Lehmann presented Article 6(3) of the Rome II Regulation for antitrust matters as an example. All of that should be coordinated to serve the public interest. Under such an approach, the question may of course arise as to what extent notions of private enforcement come into play (on this aspect see e.g. Hannah Buxbaum, Regulation and Private Enforcement in a Global Economy: Strategies for Managing Conflict, Collected Courses of the Academy 399, Boston 2019, http://conflictoflaws.net/2019/out-now-hannah-l-buxbaum-public-regulation-and-private-enforcement-in-a-global-economy-strategies-for-managing-conflict/).
In the following session, Ralf Michaels, Hamburg, and Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Edinburgh, posed the question “Is Private International Law International?”. The presenters envisaged a kind of “invisible college” along the lines of Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 217 (1977 – 1978), perhaps in contrast to the somewhat disillusioned “Divisible College of International Lawyers” by Anthea Roberts, Is International Law International?, Oxford University Press 2017, Chapter 1 – another contribution to which the presenters made reference. Against this background, the “Private International Law for Laypersons Project” (PILL) was explained, on the premise that any non-PIL lawyer counts as a layperson in this sense. Within the project, interviews with PIL lawyers were conducted, including questions like “what belongs to PIL” or “what is the question of PIL”. All of that and more should result in (re-) building a truly international community, after phases of division and “parochialization” during the conflicts revolution in the USA, as well as later in EU PIL. Such a community may meaningfully devote itself to both a deep analysis of foundations as well as to working on practical solutions for cross-border settings. Otherwise, it was suggested, diplomatic conferences such those at The Hague on PIL projects and its preparatory works would suffer too much from a lack of common language for successful discourse and negotiation. The audience was pleased to be informed that a conference like the one on which this post is reporting may well count as an almost ideal “invisible college”.
Máire Ní Shúilleabháin, Dublin, presented on “Habitual Residence in Private International Law: Core Elements and Contextual Variability”. According to her analysis of the respective EU instruments and the case law, the term “habitual residence” strongly depends on its context, and these contextual elements are not sufficiently taken into consideration, which in turn leads to “mechanical” and irrational results. As an example, she referred to the English case of Marinos v. Marinos [2007] EWHC 2047 (see e.g. https://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed907) a divorce proceeding under the Brussels II bis Regulation between a Greek husband and an English wife in which the question arose whether there could be two places of habitual residence. Shúilleabháin then identified a set of “context dependent elements” of the notion of habitual residence such as e.g. exclusivity, voluntariness, absence of any habitual residence etc., that should be applied as appears appropriate in differing normative contexts (e.g. divorce, child abduction, succession etc.).
Finally, Dicky Tsang, Hong Kong, gave a fascinating presentation about an ongoing empirical review of Chinese court practice in respect of choice of law. The underlying assumption of the project is, as was explained by the presenter, that Chinese courts do not apply foreign law, at least as long as there is no agreement on the choice of foreign law by the parties. Tsang introduced the audience to the respective steps of Chinese legislation on PIL over the years and could indeed show that not more than around 1.3% of all the cases reviewed with a foreign element so far applied foreign law and, to date, all of these cases relied on a choice of law agreement. Tsang called for improvement and considered new guiding principles by the Supreme People’s Court of China (SPC), which are guidelines for interpretation of an authoritative character. Such guidelines could bring about a more appropriate interpretation of openly-worded connecting factors such as e.g. the characteristic performance or the closest connection.
Giesela Rühl
The first of the Friday afternoon plenary sessions was devoted to an unprecedented and largely unexplored topic: Women in Private International Law. In fact, while gender issues have been studied widely in other disciplines, there is a striking gap in the private international law literature. Is this because the field has been predominantly shaped by men (in both scholarship, jurisprudence and practice)? Or is this because private international law, as a discipline, does not need a gender / feminist perspective, because it is, traditionally, understood to be neutral and detached from substantive policies and values?
The impressive panel of five female private international law scholars – Roxana Banu (University of Western Ontario, Canada), Mary Keyes (Griffith University, Queensland, Australia), Horatia Muir Watt (Ecole de droit Sciences-po, Paris, France), Yuko Nishitani (Kyoto University, Japan) and Marta Pertegás Sender (University of Antwerp, Belgium, and University of Maastricht, The Netherlands) – set out to answer these and related questions. And, in so doing, they did a remarkable job in demonstrating that private international law is not – and has never been – gender neutral. Roxana Banu and Mary Keyes, for example, showed how gender archetypes shaped traditional private international law, notably in the use of connecting factors in family law. And Horatia Muir Watt, Yuko Nishitani and Marta Pertegás Sender demonstrated how a feminist perspective, including through critical theory, can shed new light on private international law and help to better understand our discipline.
After the session attendants agreed that they had just witnessed something very special, something that might well one day be remembered as the birthdate of gender studies / feminist legal theory in private international law. In any event, the panel made clear that gender and feminist issues belong on the agenda of private international law. It is, therefore, to be hoped that after this conference scholars from across the board (women and men) will jump on the bandwagon to embark on a challenging journey that promises unexpected and fascinating insights into an old discipline.
Saloni Khanderia
The second of the Friday afternoon sessions comprised of a mixed range of contemporary issues that have been attracting considerable attention among policy-makers at the transnational level. The first two discussions chiefly concerned the challenges involved in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in other jurisdictions. Adeline Chong from the Singapore Management University asserted that there were certain commonalities in the rules on the subject among the member countries, in which divergences were in terms of interpretation rather than principle. While there some other significant differences, namely the requirement of reciprocity and the status of foreign non-monetary judgments, she argued that the harmonisation of conflict-of-law rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments among the ASEAN countries was feasible. In doing so, Chong illustrated the application of the rules in Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Laos, Myanmar and India, to name a few.
In a related vein, Nadia de Araujo and Marcelo De Nardi from PUC-Rio / UNISINOS Brazil, focused their discussion on the significance of the Hague Judgments Project on the development of the Brazilian law on the recognising and enforcement of foreign judgments. Based on a survey conducted by De Araujo and De Nardi among arbitrators, judges and academics, the study depicted the broad ranging benefits for the jurisdiction in ratifying the Hague Conference’s Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments after its coming into effect. The third presentation in the session pertained to the Control of Foreign Direct Investments and Private International Law where Peter Mankowski from the University of Hamburg drew attention to the implications of the Rome Regulation (EU) 2019/452 for the screening of FDI into the Union. The fourth and last presentation of the Plenary session in the afternoon by Gerald Mäsch from the University of Münster was devoted to the complexities in the ascertainment of the applicable law to a Decentralised Autonomous Organisation.
Rui Dias
As was already discussed by Saloni Khanderia, the third presentation in the session pertained to the Control of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and Private International Law. The following lines add some additional thoughts to this session where Peter Mankowski from the University of Hamburg drew attention to Regulation (EU) 2019/452, on the basis of which the notion of FDI was defined (see Art. 2 pt. (1)). While in the past FDIs were widely welcome, with many host States even supporting FDIs through substantial subsidisation of private foreign investors, we seem to be witnessing a change in perspective with the growing presence and importance of State funds, state owned enterprises and enterprises instrumentalised for State purposes. Needless to say, trade wars and political antagonisms play an important role in this context. That is why some counter reactions are taking place, in the form of a rising level of control, namely in regards to key industries and strategic industries of host States.
After giving a concise but broad panorama of existing control regimes in national laws, Professor Mankowski addressed Regulation (EU) 2019/452 as a European framework setting a uniform screening template, even though the content of this screening will hinge on national laws. The last part of the presentation analysed the subject from the perspective of PIL, noting how FDI control law is typically a case of internationally mandatory laws, as defined in Art. 9(1) of the Rome I Regulation. Whereas there seems to be a clear case for the application of a Member State’s own lois de police as a host State, according to Art. 9(2), the application of other State’s law is more doubtful, given Art. 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation, where questions arise in the determination of the place of performance, particularly in share deals, as well as in the assessment of the fulfilment of the illegality requirement, after an actual interdiction is in place.
The fourth and last presentation of the Plenary session in the afternoon, by Gerald Mäsch from the University of Münster, was devoted to the complexities in the ascertainment of the applicable law to a DAO, an abbreviation for Decentralised Autonomous Organisation. Professor Mäsch explained how a DAO literally lived in the ether, meaning on the blockchain of Ethereum, one of bitcoin’s rival crypto currencies. Interested investors sent digital coins to the fund and voted on whether money should be put in a given project, so that funds would flow automatically to that project after the approval of a proposal.
The fact that decision-making took place in cyberspace, totally decentralized, under no corporate structure, where governance rules were automated and enforced using software, in particular smart contract code, raises difficult localization issues, and thus puzzle even the most skilful private international lawyers. In fact, it is not clear which law should be applicable to ae DAO: an exercise of characterization might lead us to identify a partnership, a company (but where is the seat or the place of incorporation of this ethereal entity?), or even a contract (even though Art. 1 (2) f of the Rome I Regulation might leave it out of its scope of application). If for the actual, original DAO a trust company was incorporated in Switzerland, not every future DAO will have the same specifics, which leaves us all with the defying question: are there law-free corners in cyber space?
Parallel Sessions (Thursday and Saturday)
On Thursday as well as on Saturday, there was a large number of parallel sessions, and we collected the following selected views and news:
Corporate Social Responsibility
Adeline Chong
This session dealt with a very timely topic given greater awareness on issues such as climate change and the exploitation of workers in developing countries. Three papers explored the relationship between private international law and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The first paper by Bastian Brunk of the University of Freiburg looked at “Private International Law for Corporate Social Responsibility” and focussed particularly on violations of human rights. Brunk discussed the modes by which the CSR agenda could be implemented (eg, by international soft law regulation) and grappled with issues arising from the fact that CSR is not a separate category in the conflict of laws. The second paper by Nguyen Thu Thuy of Nagoya University considered transnational corporations and environmental damages in Vietnam. Vietnamese law has provisions dealing with environmental pollution, but enforcement of the law is not robust. Vietnamese law also does not have any rules dealing with the piercing of the corporate veil which may enable local victims to sue non-Vietnamese parent companies. She suggested several ways in which the law could be reformed to ensure better protection for local residents against environmental pollution by transnational corporations. The last paper was by Eduardo Alvarez-Armas of Brunel Law School. He considered the significant case of Lliuya v RWE in which a Peruvian farmer sued RWE, a German energy company, in Germany, claiming that RWE’s contributions to global warming contributed to the melting of a glacial lake near his home. Alvarez-Armas highlighted the impact of Article 17 of the Rome II Regulation on climate change litigation, which may enable defendants to escape or reduce their liability. A lively discussion followed the papers raising thought-provoking questions such as the extent to which each of us, as fellow contributors to climate change, ought to be held responsible, and the proper balance to be struck between the rights of victims of climate change and the rights of energy corporations who are, after all, producing a necessary resource.
Child Abduction
Apostolos Anthimos
In one of the morning sessions, chaired by Prof. Nishitani, Kyoto University, Child Abduction was scrutinized from a different perspective by Prof. Lazic, Utrecht University & T.M.C. Asser Institute, and Dr. Jolly, South Asian University New Delhi. Prof. Lazic elaborated on the expected repercussions of the forthcoming Regulation 2019/1111 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction
(Brussels II bis Recast), whereas Dr. Jolly focussed on the situation in her jurisdiction, explaining the reasons why India has still not ratified the Hague Convention.
In the ensuing discussion, Prof. Beaumont expressed in an adamant fashion his reservations in regards to the added value of Chapter III (Articles 22-29) of the new Regulation. Practical aspects of the interdependence between relocation and child abduction were also debated, on the occasion of a very recent ruling of the Greek Supreme Court on the matter.
ADR
Apostolos Anthimos
The noon session, chaired by Prof. de Araujo, Pontifical Catholic University, Brazil, included four presentations on ADR issues. Dr. Lederer, Hogan Lovells, Munich, presented the recent efforts of the EU in the field of ODR. Dr. Meidanis, Meidanis Seremetakis & Associates, Athens, and Ms. Saito, Kobe University, examined the issue of the recognition and enforcement of mediation settlement agreements in the EU and the Hague Judgments Convention respectively. Finally, Dr. Walker, Warwick University, focussed on the interrelationship between ADR & Hague Children’s Conventions. In addition, she reported on the treatment of the subject matter from a UK perspective.
The nature of MSA (Mediated Settlement Agreements) monopolized the ensuing discussion. Interesting interventions and insightful views were voiced by Prof. Pertegás Sender, Maastricht University, and Prof. Hau, Munich University.
“Technology 1”
Ivana Kunda
Technology was one of the common denominators for the presentation in the last Thursday term for parallel sessions. Chaired by Prof. Matthias Weller, University of Bonn, this session touched upon three different technology-related topics. The first one, presented by the author of these lines, attempted to raise awareness about the lack of PIL in the EU Digital Single Market strategy. This being said, the development on the PIL plane are increasingly related to digital environment, and especially internet, which is intrinsically cross-border. Following the chair’s question, the conclusion was that an integral approach is warranted particularly because the traditional connecting factors often lead to illogical results or are impossible to apply altogether. This has been confirmed also by Prof. Koji Takahashi, Doshisha University, who analysed in depth the issue of Blockchain-based crypto-assets from the PIL perspective. He discussed contractual issues, in particular difficulties related to characterisation and characteristic performance, and tort and quasi-delicts focusing on the constant problems of localisation. He was reluctant to accept localisation of the platform’s by the owners’ headquarters, as suggested from the audience in the course of discussion. Further, he pointed to the property-related dilemmas in the context of bankruptcy which came into spotlight due to the Tokyo District Court case Mt. Gox, and restitution claim subsequent to theft. Last speaker Dr. Marko Jovanovic, University of Belgrade, reopened the issue of online defamation, providing a fresh look at some policy aspects thereof. He rejected the link to the tortfeasor arguing that will result in statute shopping. He also addressed the pros and cons of the place where the damage occurs, place of the victim’s habitual residence, and the centre of interest of the victim (borrowed it from the jurisdiction area, what is the already practiced by the Dutch courts as prof. Aukje van Hoek, University of Amsterdam, commented). One of the points raised concerned also the role of the private acts of harmonisation, which the online platforms seem to be relying on.
“Jurisdiction V”
Ekaterina Pannebakker
The last and actually fifth parallel session on Jurisdiction, chaired by Alexander Layton QC, started with an overview of the new PIL rules in Japan, South Korea and China, including the Japanese Civil procedure law of 2012, Korean Private International Law act of 2018, the Legal Assistance project in Japan and others. In her overview, Eonsuk Kim from Bunkyo Gakuin University, Tokyo, traced down the borrowings between these countries’ PIL laws and – most interestingly – the influence of the uniform EU PIL rules on the developments of PIL in these countries. Thereafter, Alexander Layton QC, in his capacity as the chair of the session, presented the paper prepared by Dr. Ling Zhu from Hong Kong Polytechnic University, who could not attend the conference. Dr. Ling Zhu’s contribution addressed the conflicts between the jurisdiction of the maritime Courts and the People’s Courts in China. Finally, it was my own turn to zoom in on the nuances in the definition of the autonomous concept of ‘habitual residence of the child’ in the rules on jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility of Brussels IIa.
The “Jurisdiction” Track of the Conference (“Jurisdiction I to V”)
Tobias Lutzi
Many of the parallel sessions were held together by a common thread, allowing participants to put together a relatively coherent line of panels, if they so wished. This concept certainly worked very well as far as the “jurisdiction” track of the conference was concerned, which connected a series of five panels in total. They created highly stimulating discussions and a genuinely fruitful exchange of ideas between panelists and members of the audience, many of whom consequently found themselves in the same room more often than not.
The discussion was particularly lively in those panels that managed to bring together multiple papers engaging with the same or similar questions, such as the two panels on jurisdictions clauses (which offered theoretical analysis (Brooke Marshall, who took a deep dive into the possible conceptual bases, and Elena Rodriguez Pineau), new angles (Sharar Avraham-Giller and Rui Dias, who addressed the particularities of intra-corporate litigation), and numerous national perspectives (Inez Lopes, Valesca Raizer, Tugce Nimet Yasar, and Biset Sena Gunes) or the panel on the Brussels Ia Regulation (combining a discussion of recent trends in its interpretation by the CJEU (Michiel Poesen, regarding Art 7(1), and Laura van Bochove, regarding Art 7(2)) with somewhat more basic questions as to its interplay with national law (my own paper).
Two further panels then added a large variety of additional aspects and ideas, including inter alia a discussion of the need for, and adequacy of, the so-called gateways for service-out jurisdiction in English law (Ardavan Arzandeh), the new Israeli legislation on international jurisdiction (Iris Canor), the apparent convergence of international discussions in Japan and Korea (Eonsuk Kim), the elusive concept of the habitual residence of the child in the Brussels IIa Regulation (Ekaterina Pannebakker), and the future work of the HCCH with regard to “direct” jurisdiction (Eva Jueptner; as opposed to “indirect” jurisdiction in the sense of the 2019 Convention).
It is hardly surprising that this wide panorama of international jurisdiction featured many cases and controversies that had also been discussed on this blog, including, for example, the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Haaretz.com v Goldhar (http://conflictoflaws.net/2018/supreme-court-of-canada-israel-not-ontario-is-forum-conveniens-for-libel-proceedings/) (discussed by Stephen Pitel), the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Brownlie v Four Seasons (http://conflictoflaws.net/2018/uksc-on-traditional-rules-of-jurisdiction-brownlie-v-four-seasons-holdings-incorporated/) (discussed by Ardavan Arzandeh) or the European Court of Justice’s decisions in Feniks (http://conflictoflaws.net/2018/forcing-a-square-peg-into-a-round-hole-the-actio-pauliana-and-the-brussels-ia-regulation/) (discussed by Michiel Poesen) and Schrems (http://conflictoflaws.net/2018/fifty-shades-of-facebook-blue-ecj-renders-decision-on-consumer-jurisdiction-and-assigned-claims-in-case-c-49816-schrems-v-facebook/) (discussed by Laura van Bochove).
Outlook
The 8th Conference of the Journal of Private International Law again was a great success, both scholarly as well as socially. The next conference in 2021 will be hosted by one of the blog’s editors Adeline Chong in Singapore. We are looking forward to it!
Genova’s court ruling in Weco Projects ASP v Zea MArine Carier GmbH is remarkably similar to the Belo Horizonte (Cefetra et al v Ms ‘IDA’ Oetker Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MbH & Co KG et al) ruling at the Court of Rotterdam, which I reviewed here. Transport is of a yacht is the issue, sinking the event, and London arbitration the agreed dispute resolution. What powers do the courts in ordinary still have to order interim measures?
The court could have discussed the arbitration /Brussels Ia interface, as well as Article 35’s provisional measures. Instead, it mentions neither and relies entirely on an Italian Supreme Court precedent as Maurizio Dardani and Luca di Marco review excellently here (many thanks to Maurizio for forwarding me the case). An exciting, and missed opportunity to bring these issues into focus.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15.
The HCCH is seeking to retain a Consultant who will conduct a study and draft a further Report on specific aspects relating to the HCCH’s ongoing legislative project on Tourists and Visitors.
Interested? For more information, follow this link to the vacancy announcement.
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