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Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2023

Conflictoflaws - jeu, 02/29/2024 - 13:59

The thirty-seventh annual survey on choice of law in the American courts is now available on SSRN. The survey covers significant cases decided in 2023 on choice of law, party autonomy, extraterritoriality, international human rights, foreign sovereign immunity, adjudicative jurisdiction, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. So, on this leap day, we thought we would leap into the new month by looking back at the old year.

Choice of Law

The Eighth Circuit applied Mexican law to a suit against General Motors over a car crash in Mexico, while an Ohio state court applied South African law to invalidate a marriage. A Washington state court interpreted an Irish forum selection clause to require dismissal of statutory claims against Microsoft despite the facts that Microsoft was not party to the agreement and the clause arguably did not cover statutory claims. Meanwhile the Fifth Circuit enforced a forum selection clause in an insurance contract choosing British Virgin Island courts despite evidence that the claims stood little chance in those courts.

Extraterritoriality

The Supreme Court decided two important extraterritoriality cases. In Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, the Court interpreted civil RICO’s “domestic injury” requirement to apply to a domestic judgment confirming a foreign arbitral award, a decision that brings another tool to bear to help enforce foreign awards and judgments. In Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc., the Court held that the Lanham Act applies only to domestic conduct infringing U.S. trademarks and, in so doing, provided important guidance about how to apply the federal presumption against extraterritoriality.

Meanwhile, lower courts struggled with how to fit the Supreme Court’s 1922 decision in United States v. Bowman, which addresses the scope of federal criminal statutes, into its current extraterritoriality framework. The Eleventh Circuit held that Bowman provides an alternative framework that courts may apply instead of the current presumption to determine the reach of criminal statutes, whereas the Ninth Circuit held that Bowmancould be considered part of the relevant “context” at step one of the Court’s present two-step framework. As Bill has explained, both solutions seem doubtful, and the issue may be headed to the Supreme Court.

International Human Rights

In an important decision, the Ninth Circuit held that Chinese practitioners of Falun Gong could sue Cisco Systems and some of its executives for aiding and abetting their torture by designing and building a surveillance system for the Chinese government. The court held that plaintiffs had alleged sufficient conduct in the United States to support their Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claim and that the Tort Victim Protection Act (TVPA) permitted aiding and abetting claims against the corporate executives. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court interpreted the aiding and abetting provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh to require conscious and culpable participation, thereby shielding social media platforms from liability based on the use of their platforms by terrorist groups.

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

In Tu?rkiye Halk Bankasi, A.S. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) does not apply to criminal prosecutions. The Court remanded for further consideration of Halkbank’s claim of immunity under federal common law.

In Bartlett v. Baasiri, the Second Circuit held that a foreign company can acquire immunity under the FSIA if it becomes majority-owned by a foreign government after a lawsuit is filed. That decision is in some tension with the Supreme Court’s decision in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson (2003) holding that status as an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is determined at the time of filing.

Adjudicative Jurisdiction

In Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, the Second Circuit held that the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act is unconstitutional because it permits the assertion of personal jurisdiction based on an activity—making payments to terrorists and their families—that cannot be understood as consent to jurisdiction. The court applied the Supreme Court’s newest personal jurisdiction decision, Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. (2023), which is also discussed in the survey. Congress could not, the court held, simply take an activity and label it consent to jurisdiction without providing something in return.

In Lewis v. Mutond, the D.C. Circuit dismissed a U.S. citizen’s torture claim against officials of the Democratic Republic of Congo, rejecting an argument that the vitality of the TVPA as a statutory scheme should factor into the court’s personal jurisdiction analysis. The court also reiterated the D.C. Circuit’s position that the limits imposed on federal courts by the Fifth Amendment are the same as those imposed on state courts by the Fourteenth, with Judge Rao suggesting in a concurring opinion that the court should reconsider that position en banc.

Interpreting the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the Tenth Circuit held that a foreign forum is not available if only the moving party, but not the other defendants, has consented to jurisdiction there. In another case, the Fourth Circuit held that a foreign forum was not adequate because it could not address the plaintiff’s American trademark claims.

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

Virginia has adopted the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, but because that act applies only to money judgments, the Fourth Circuit had to apply Virginia common law to decide whether to recognize a Ghanaian divorce decree. The court held that Virginia’s common law requirements were met, even though Virginia might not have granted a divorce under the same circumstances. Meanwhile, a Texas state court held that a Canadian judgment did not violate Texas public policy even though it awarded speculative damages.

Finally, the Tenth Circuit (applying Colorado law) joined the growing number of courts that have held that a court may order a debtor or third-party garnishee to bring assets held abroad into the United States if the court has personal jurisdiction over the debtor or third-party.

Conclusion

The annual survey on choice of law was admirably maintained by Symeon Symeonides for three decades. The present authors are pleased to have extended this tradition for the last three years.

John Coyle (University of North Carolina School of Law)
William Dodge (University of California, Davis School of Law)
Aaron Simowitz (Willamette University College of Law)

[This post is cross-posted at Transnational Litigation Blog]

Cross-Border Dispute Resolution Conference in Dubrovnik

EAPIL blog - jeu, 02/29/2024 - 08:00

A Conference on Cross-Border Dispute Resolution will be held in Dubrovnik on 8-10 May 2024 organized by the Law Schools of the University of Pittsburgh, Verona and Zagreb.

The Conference will deal with cross-border professional responsibility and privilege, aspects of international arbitration and international litigation. Each day will include discussion-oriented presentations and workshops on practical international arbitration and litigation issues.

Speakers include Ron Brand, Marco Torsello, Franco Ferrari, Milena Đorđević, Dora Zgrabljić Rotar and Giesela Ruhl.

The full programme is available here.

For registration and further info see here and here.

An Answer to the Billion-Dollar Choice-of-Law Question

Conflictoflaws - mer, 02/28/2024 - 16:48

On February 20, 2024, the New York Court of Appeals handed down its opinion in Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. v. MUFG Union Bank, N.A. The issue presented—which I described in a previous post as the billion-dollar choice-of-law question—was whether a court sitting in New York should apply the law of New York or the law of Venezuela to determine the validity of certain bonds issued by a state-owned oil company in Venezuela. The bondholders, represented by MUFG Union Bank, argued for New York law. The oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), argued for Venezuelan law.

In a victory for PDVSA, the New York Court of Appeals unanimously held that the validity of the bonds was governed by the law of Venezuela. It then sent the case back to the federal courts to determine whether the bonds are, in fact, invalid under Venezuelan law.

Facts

In 2016, PDVSA approved a bond exchange whereby holders of notes with principal due in 2017 (the “2017 Notes”) could exchange them for notes with principal due in 2020 (the “2020 Notes”). Unlike the 2017 Notes, the 2020 Notes were secured by a pledge of a 50.1% equity interest in CITGO Holding, Inc. (“CITGO”). CITGO is owned by PDVSA through a series of subsidiaries and is considered by many to be the “crown jewel” of Venezuela’s strategic assets abroad.

The PDVSA board formally approved the exchange of notes in 2016. The exchange was also approved by the company’s sole shareholder—the Venezuelan government—and by the boards of the PDVSA’s subsidiaries with oversight and control of CITGO.

The National Assembly of Venezuela refused to support the exchange. It passed two resolutions—one in May 2016 and one in September 2016—challenging the power of the executive branch to proceed with the transaction and expressly rejecting the pledge of CITGO assets in the 2020 Notes. The National Assembly took the position that these notes were “contracts of public interest” that required legislative approval pursuant to Article 150 of the Venezuelan Constitution. These legislative objections notwithstanding, PDVSA followed through with the exchange. Creditors holding roughly $2.8 billion in 2017 Notes decided to participate and exchanged their notes for 2020 Notes.

In 2019, the United States recognized Venezuela’s Interim President Juan Guaidó as the lawful head of state. Guaidó appointed a new PDVSA board of directors, which was recognized as the legitimate board by the United States even though it does not control the company’s operations inside Venezuela. The new board of directors filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) against the trustee and the collateral agent for the 2020 Notes. It sought a declaration that the entire bond transaction was void and unenforceable because it was never approved by the National Assembly. It also sought a declaration that the creditors were prohibited from executing against the CITGO collateral.

The choice-of-law issue at the heart of the case related to the validity of the 2020 Notes. Whether the Notes were validly issued depended on whether the court applied New York law or Venezuelan law. The SDNY (Judge Katherine Polk Failla) ruled in favor of the bondholders after concluding that the issue was governed by the laws of New York. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified the choice-of-law question to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reformulated this question to read as follows:

Given the presence of New York choice-of-law clauses in the Governing Documents, does UCC 8-110(a)(1), which provides that the validity of securities is determined by the local law of the issuer’s jurisdiction, require the application of Venezuela’s law to determine whether the 2020 Notes are invalid due to a defect in the process by which the securities were issued?

In a decision rendered on February 20, 2024, the Court of Appeals unanimously concluded that the answer was yes.

Section 8-110

The court began with the New York choice-of-law clauses in the Indenture, the Note, and the Pledge Agreement. Under ordinary circumstances, it observed, New York courts will enforce New York choice-of-law clauses by operation of Section 5-1401 of the New York General Obligations Law. That statute provides that the parties to any commercial contract arising out of a transaction worth more than $250,000 may select New York law to govern their agreement even if the transaction has no connection to New York. In this particular case, however, a different part of Section 5-1401 dictated a different result.

Section 5-1401 also states that even when parties choose New York law, that law “shall not apply . . . to the extent provided to the contrary in subsection (c) of section 1-301 of the uniform commercial code.” UCC 1-301(c)(6) states, in turn, that if UCC 8-110 “specifies the applicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted.” Finally, UCC 8-110(a)(1) states that “[t]he local law of the issuer’s jurisdiction . . . governs . . . the validity of a security.”

After following the chain of choice-of-law rules from Section 5-1401 to UCC 1-301(c) to UCC 8-110, the court observed that the validity of a security is governed by the law of the issuer’s jurisdiction. The court further observed, based on the statutory text, that Section 8-110 was a mandatory rule that could not be altered by a choice-of-law clause. Against this backdrop, the court held that “because UCC 8-110 is applicable here, any issue of the validity of a security issued pursuant to the Governing Documents is determined by the law of the issuer’s jurisdiction. In this case, the issuer is a Venezuelan entity, so the law of Venezuela is determinative of the issue of validity.”

Validity

The court next addressed the meaning of “validity” as used in Section 8-110. The bondholders argued that this term did not sweep broadly enough to encompass the requirement in Article 150 of the Venezuelan Constitution, which provides that the National Assembly must approve all “contracts of public interest.” They argued that the word encompassed only the usual corporate formalities for issuing a security. PDVSA argued that “validity” could be interpreted to include constitutional provisions that bear on the issue of whether a security was duly authorized. The Court of Appeals agreed.

In reaching this conclusion, the court first observed that the issue of “validity” had to be distinguished from the issue of “enforceability.” The first term refers to the “nature of the obligor and its internal processes.” The second term refers to “requirements of general applicability as going to the nature of the rights and obligations purportedly created, irrespective of the nature of the obligor and its processes.”  The court cited usury laws and anti-fraud laws as examples of laws that dealt with enforceability rather than validity. Although these laws may prohibit a court from enforcing a contract, they do not bear on the validity of that same contract because they do not address the procedures that must be followed for the contract to be duly authorized.

The court then distinguished between (1) validity and (2) the consequences of invalidity. While Section 8-110 stated the controlling choice-of-law rule with respect to the validity, it was not controlling with respect to the consequences stemming from that invalidity. “Even if a court determines that a security is invalid under the local law of the issuer’s jurisdiction,” the court held, “the effects of that determination will depend on New York law.”

With these distinctions in mind, the court held that “Article 150 and its related constitutional provisions could potentially implicate validity because they speak to whether an entity has the power or authority to issue a security, and relatedly, what procedures are required to exercise such authority.” In particular, the court observed that this constitutional provision required the approval of the National Assembly before certain contracts could be executed. Since Article 150 identified procedural requirements rather than substantive ones, the court reasoned, it spoke to the issue of validity rather than enforceability. In so holding, the court reasoned that the term “validity,” as used in Section 8-110, could implicate constitutional provisions of the issuer’s jurisdiction that speak to whether a security is duly authorized.

Caveats

After holding that the issue of validity was governed by the law of the issuer’s jurisdiction, and that Section 150 of the Venezuelan Constitution might be relevant to the issue of validity, the court went on to announce several important caveats.

First, the court stated that the application of Venezuelan law on these facts must be “narrowly confined.” It held that the “exception provided by UCC 8-110 provides no opportunity for the application of foreign laws going to the enforceability of a security, nor does it affect the adjudication of any question under the contract other than whether a security issued by a foreign entity is valid when issued.”

Second, the court emphasized that “none of this is to say that plaintiffs will ultimately be victorious.” It noted that the federal courts would still have to determine whether the securities were, in fact, invalid under the laws of Venezuela.

Third, the court went out of its way to emphasize the fact that—issues of validity notwithstanding—New York law governs the transaction in all other respects, including the consequences if a security was issued with a defect going to its validity.

Conclusion

This long list of caveats suggests that the Court of Appeals wanted to apply to New York law in this case to the maximum extent possible. Enforcing New York choice-of-law clauses, after all, generates business for New York lawyers, and the generation of such business ultimately benefits the State of New York. The Court was, however, unable to find an interpretive path that permitted it to apply New York law in light of the text of Section 8-110.

In the days following the court’s decision, several news outlets reported that the value of the PDVSA bonds at issue had fallen precipitously. This decline in price presumably reflects the market’s perception that the bondholders are less likely to gain access to the CITGO assets anytime soon (if at all) if Venezuelan law governs the validity issue. TLB will report on developments in this case going forward.

[This post is cross-posted at Transnational Litigation Blog.]

The Japanese Yearbook of International Law (Vol. 66, 2023)

Conflictoflaws - mer, 02/28/2024 - 09:55

The latest volume (Vol. 66, 2023) of the Japanese Yearbook of International Law (formerly Annual Yearbook of Private International Law) – published by the International Law Association of Japan – has recently been released. It contains the following articles, case notes, and English translations of some court decisions relating to or relevant to private international law.

MOBILITY AND BELONGING IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

Yuko Nishitani

Introductory Note (p. 169)

Nami Thea Ohnishi

Nationality and Citizenship in Relation to the Migration Phenomenon (p. 174)

Hirohide Takikawa

Free Movement and Nationality (p. 189)

Kiyoshi Hasegawa

Inclusion and Exclusion of Immigrants and Refugees in Japan: A Preliminary Study (p. 212)

KONDO Atsushi

Human Rights of Non-Citizens and Nationality — The Peculiarities of Japan’s Nationality Legislation from a Comparative Legal Perspective — (p. 245)

OBATA Kaoru

Beyond the Concept of “Human Rights of Permanently Domiciled Foreigners” in Japanese Public Law Theory — Taking Seriously of Ambiguity in Nationality in the Age of International Migration — (p. 272)

Yuko Nishitani

Personal Law in Contemporary Private International Law — The Changing Role of Nationality, Citizenship, and Habitual Residence — (p. 295)

 

CASES AND ISSUES IN JAPANESE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Shiho Kato

Dismissal of Proceedings on Account of Special Circumstances Under Article 3-9 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure (p. 445)

Ai Murakami

Extraterritorial Application of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act (p. 457)

 

Judicial Decisions in Japan

  1. Private International Law

Intellectual Property High Court, Judgment, July 20, 2022

Applicable Law — Patent Infringement — Territoriality Principle (p. 561)

Tokyo District Court, Judgment, April 12, 2021

Applicable Law to Tort Liability — Infringement of a Right of Child Custody (p. 565)

Tokyo District Court, Judgment, November 12, 2021

Applicable law — Jurisdiction — Liability of Internet Service Providers (p. 567)

Tokyo District Court, Judgment, March 23, 2022

State Immunity — Unrecognized States — Jurisdiction of the Place of Tort — forum necessitatis — Applicable Law to Tort Liability (p. 569)

Tokyo Family Court, Decision, January 4, 2021

Jurisdiction — Applicable Law — Action to Rebut the Presumption of Child in Wedlock (p. 577)

Tokyo Family Court, Adjudication, January 27, 2021

Applicable law — Jurisdiction — Joint Adoption by a Married Couple with Different Nationalities (p. 580)

 

The full table of contents can be viewed here under the “Current Issue” tab.

More information about the Yearbook and the content of its previous volumes can be found here under the “Past Issues” tab.

The full contents of Vols. 1~64 (1957-2021) are available on HeinOnline.

Digital Assets and Electronic Trade Documents in Private International Law: Call for Evidence

EAPIL blog - mer, 02/28/2024 - 08:00

On 22 February 2024, the Law Commission of England and Wales published a call for evidence to help them identify the most challenging and prevalent issues of private international law that arise from the digital, online, and decentralised contexts in which modern digital assets and electronic trade documents are used. They seek the views and evidence of a diverse body of stakeholders from a wide range of perspectives and jurisdictions to ensure their future work on this project will strike the appropriate balance between the theoretical aspect of the law and its practical application. The responses will inform the next steps. They seek responses by Thursday 16 May 2024.

The call for evidence can be downloaded here. A summary of the call can be downloaded here. Responses to the call for evidence should be submitted here.

The Law Commission describes the problem that their project aims to address as follows.

The Problem

When parties to a private law dispute are based in different countries, or the facts and issues giving rise to the dispute cross national borders, questions of private international law arise. In which country’s courts should the parties litigate their dispute? Which country’s law should be applied to resolve it? How can the judgment be enforced in another country? Private international law is the body of domestic law that supplies the rules used to determine these questions.

Problems of private international law are by no means a recent phenomenon. The conditions that give rise to problems of private international law date from at least the fourth century BC. The problems are, however, becoming more difficult and increasingly pervasive because modern technologies challenge the territorial premise on which the existing rules of private international law have been developed.

In this respect, the advent of the internet in the late 1980s has been a catalyst of socio-economic change that has posed significant challenges for private international law. More recent innovations, such as crypto-tokens and distributed ledgers, add novel and arguably intractable problems to these existing challenges.

[The Law Commission’s] project has a particular focus on crypto-tokens, electronic bills of lading, and electronic bills of exchange. This is because these assets are prevalent in market practice, whilst also posing novel theoretical challenges to the methods by which issues of private international law have traditionally been resolved.

The Project

In recent years, a significant aspect of the Law Commission’s work has focused on emerging technologies, including smart legal contracts, electronic trade documents, digital assets, and decentralised autonomous organisations (DAOs). [The Law Commission’s] work has shown that these technologies raise issues of private international law.

In [the Law Commission’s] final report and Bill for work on electronic trade documents, [the Law Commission] noted that there are private international law difficulties associated with electronic trade documents, in particular the inherent difficulties in determining the geographical location of the documents.

However, [the Law Commission] recognised that many of these issues arise in relation to digital assets more broadly. During the passage of the Electronic Trade Documents Act 2023, [the Law Commission] committed to considering these issues in a more general project on private international law and emerging technology.

In 2022, the UK Government asked the Law Commission to conduct this project considering how private international law rules will apply in the digital context. In particular, the Law Commission is asked to consider the disputes which are likely to arise in the digital context (including contractual, tortious and property disputes), and make any reform recommendations it considers necessary to Government.

Call For Papers: Second Postgraduate Law Conference of the Centre for Private International Law

Conflictoflaws - mar, 02/27/2024 - 16:58

The Centre for Private International Law (CPIL) of the University of Aberdeen is announcing its 2nd Postgraduate Law Conference of the Centre for Private International Law, which will take place online on 6 May 2024. Researchers are invited to submit abstracts by 29 February.

The Conference aims to provide young scholars with the opportunity to present their research before panels with relevant expertise and receive valuable feedback for further development of their work.

It has four panels, respectively on international family law, civil and commercial law, artificial intelligence and human rights linked to private international law.

For more information, please see the Centre’s website.

Inkreal: A View from Madrid

EAPIL blog - mar, 02/27/2024 - 08:00

The post below was written by Pedro De Miguel Asensio, who is Professor of Private International Law at the Complutense University of Madrid. This is the third contribution to the EAPIL’s online symposium on Inkreal, after the posts of Sergi Gimenez and Gilles Cuniberti.

The main contribution of the Inkreal judgment is to establish that Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation allows the parties to a contract, even if they are domiciled in the same Member State and all the elements of the contract are located in that State, to confer jurisdiction to settle the disputes arising from the contract on the courts of another Member State. In fact, this case has provided the Court of Justice with the opportunity to address a question which had been referred to it previously, but which it was unable to rule on at the time because the request for a preliminary ruling was withdrawn by the Portuguese Supremo Tribunal de Justiça and the case removed from the register (EU:C:2017:237).

In particular, among the questions already referred to the Court of Justice in case C-136/16, Sociedade Metropolitana de Desenvolvimento, in connection with the practice relating to the conclusion contracts under the terms of the ISDA Master Agreement, was whether, in a dispute between two national companies of a Member State concerning swap contracts, the existence therein of clauses conferring jurisdiction in favour of another Member State constitutes a sufficient international element to give rise to the application of the Brussels I bis Regulation. Now, the Inkreal judgment in the framework of case C-566/22 answers a similar question in the affirmative and clarifies that the mere agreement of the parties to a contract designating the courts of a Member State other than that of their common domicile as having jurisdiction is sufficient for the legal situation to have an international element for the purposes of the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

Although it is a criterion that could give rise to misgivings insofar as it could leave it to the parties to circumvent, within the limited framework of Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation, the jurisdiction of the courts of the only Member State with which the contract is connected (as the Advocate General emphasised in his Opinion in Inkreal, EU:C:2023:768) and may sometimes cause serious inconvenience to one of the parties (as raised in the second of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in case C-136/16), the approach adopted by the Court seems the better view. Its position reinforces: (a) consistency between the Brussels I bis Regulation and other Union instruments on judicial cooperation in civil matters (see I, infra); (b) the objectives of predictability and legal certainty in the application of the Brussels I bis Regulation (II, infra); and (c) the particular significance of the Union’s private international law instruments as an element of integration (III, infra).

I. Consistency between the Brussels I bis Regulation and Other Union Instruments on Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters

The judgment confirms previous case law according to which the application of the rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels I bis Regulation is in any case subject to the existence of an international element, which corresponds to the fact that it is an instrument relating to judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, in the terms of Article 81(1) TFEU. However, the judgment not only confirms that for such international element to be present it is sufficient that the situation raises “questions relating to the determination of the jurisdiction of the courts in the international sphere” (para. 22 referring to the IRnova judgmen, EU:C:2022:648), but also adds as a novelty the clarification that such a circumstance is present whenever the parties to a contract are established in a Member State other than the court seised on the basis of the relevant jurisdiction agreement, insofar as in such situations the question arises of determining the courts of which of those Member States has international jurisdiction to hear the dispute in question (paras. 23-25).

In order to reach that conclusion, the judgment attributes a particular relevance to the definition of “cross-border cases” in Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 creating a European order for payment procedure, which provides that “a cross-border case is one in which at least one of the parties is domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State other than the Member State of the court seised”. Apart from the relevance given in the judgment to the coordination between the Brussels I bis Regulation and Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006, the approach taken by the Court of Justice also seems to be supported by the content of Regulation (EC 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I Regulation).

Recital 15 to the Rome I Regulation states:

Where a choice of law is made and all other elements relevant to the situation are located in a country other than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice of law should not prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that country which cannot be derogated from by agreement. This rule should apply whether or not the choice of law was accompanied by a choice of court or tribunal.

Consequently, Recital 15 and Article 3(3) of the Rome I Regulation seem to be based on the assumption that the parties to a contract may choose a court of a Member State as having jurisdiction, even if all the relevant elements of the situation prior to their choice of forum (and law) are located in another Member State (regarding the interpretation of Article 3.3 Rome I Regulation in the context of insolvency proceedings, see CJEU Judgment of 8 June 2017, Vynils, C-54/16, EU:C:2017:433, concerning an apparently domestic Italian contract that conteined “a clause stating that English law is the chosen law and a clause choosing the jurisdiction of the London Maritime Arbitrators Association”, para. 20).

In so far as the judgment in Inkreal holds that the rules of jurisdiction in the Brussels I bis Regulation apply only where there is an element of internationality, for which it is sufficient that a purely domestic contract designates a court of another Member State as having jurisdiction, since such a situation “raises a question relating to the determination of international jurisdiction” (para. 24), it is also consistent with the approach underlying the Rome I Regulation. A sort of parallel may be drawn mutatis mutandis between that category and that of a situation “involving a conflict of laws” as regards the field of applicable law. Also, under the Rome I Regulation, in the different context of the applicable law, it is necessary to determine in which situations a foreign element is present, since the rules of the Rome I Regulation only apply “in situations involving a conflict of laws” (as stated in Article 1(1) and recently examined by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 14 September 2023, Diamond Resorts Europe and Others, C‑632/21, EU:C:2023:671, para. 51).

II. Objectives of Predictability and Legal Certainty in the Application of the Brussels I bis Regulation

The judgment highlights that making the application of Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation subject to a finding that the contract has additional links (beyond the agreement conferring jurisdiction) with the Member State of the chosen court would undermine the objective of legal certainty and predictability. It would make it difficult for the designated court before which the action is brought to determine its jurisdiction and increase the risk of parallel proceedings and irreconcilable judgments (paras. 27 to 31).

Although the lis pendens rules of the Brussels I bis Regulation would significantly reduce the risk of parallel proceedings, there is no doubt that the requirement to identify additional elements capable of demonstrating the cross-border impact of the dispute would constitute a significant factor of uncertainty. Illustrative in that respect was the list of potential international elements in addition to the jurisdiction agreement contained in the third of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in case C-136/16 in relation to the swap contracts at issue. Such elements included the fact that foreign companies were invited to submit proposals to participate in the contracts, that one of the parties is owned by a foreign entity, that under the terms of the contract the parties may transfer their rights and obligations to subsidiaries in other countries, that the contracts at issue had certain connections to contracts concluded with foreign entities, etc.

Moreover, hypothetically, it should be noted that if it had been decided that Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation requires additional factors of internationality to be applied, a particularly broad interpretation in the context of the Union would have been justified. The outcome in practice might not be very different from that resulting from the new judgment.

For example, why would the following not be sufficient connections. First, the mere fact that for one of the parties the contract in question has connections to a different international contract which are relevant to that party. Second, the fact that one of the contracting parties belongs to a group of companies with connections to the Member State in which the designated court is located (for instance, this seemed to be the situation -perhaps with some additional elements- in the notorious El Majdoub judgment, concerning a contract between parties domiciled in Germany with a jurisdiction clause in favour of a court in Leuven (Belgium), see paras 10, 13 and 16 of CJEU Judgment of 21 May 2015, El Majdoub, C‑322/14, EU:C:2015:334).

III. Significance of EU Private International Law rules as an Instrument of Integration 

The broad scope of Article 25 Brussels I bis Regulation is also justified by the Court of Justice as reflecting mutual trust in the administration of justice within the Union and contributing to the development of an area of freedom, security and justice (para. 35). Indeed, the development of civil judicial cooperation within the Union, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments, has led to the creation of a judicial area, many elements of which are closer to the treatment of purely internal situations than to strictly international ones. This is reflected, for example, in the contrast between the treatment of situations in which lis pendens arises between Member States of the Union and those concerning parallel litigation in a Member State and a third State.

The criterion adopted in Inkreal is a further step in this direction of overcoming state borders, which is projected onto areas where party autonomy prevails and the choice of the courts of a Member State without any apparent connection with the dispute will typically respond to the legitimate interests of the parties. In practice, moreover, the choice of a court of that other Member State will normally go hand in hand with the choice of its law as the law applicable to the contract. As regards the position of the Member State in which all other elements of the contract are located, Article 3(3) of the Rome I Regulation will be relevant. According to that provision, the choice of law (and court) by the parties does not prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be derogated from by agreement. Consequently, the mandatory rules applicable to the contract will be those of the Member State where all the other elements relevant to the contract are located and not those of the Member State whose courts adjudicate the case and whose law has been chosen by the parties (without prejudice, of course, to the effectiveness of the mandatory rules under Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation).

Given the specificity of the Union’s integration framework, and the particular scope of judicial cooperation in civil matters, the Court is justified in expressly rejecting that the provisions of the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements should constitute a point of reference in the interpretation of Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation. Pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Convention, its jurisdiction rules only apply either if the parties are not resident in the same State, or if some element relevant to the dispute other than the location of the chosen court has a connection with some other State (see “Explanatory Report” by T. Hartley and M. Dogauchi, paras. 41-43).

Hence, the broad interpretation of Article 25 of the Brussels I a Regulation and its application to purely domestic contracts does not apply to jurisdiction agreements designating the courts of a third State, even if it is a State with which the Union and its Member States are bound by the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Nor does it apply directly in situations where the effectiveness of jurisdiction agreements in favour of a third State is governed by the domestic law of the Member State seised.

Concluding remarks

Unlike in case C-136/16, Sociedade Metropolitana de Desenvolvimento, the Court was not requested in Inkreal to clarify if the application of such a jurisdiction agreement may be waived where the choice of the courts of a Member State other than that of the nationality of the parties causes serious inconvenience for one of those parties and the other party has no good reason to justify such choice. However, the reasoning by the Court seems to support the view that within the specific framework of the Brussels I bis Regulation (and its interplay with the Rome I Regulation) such a concern is of limited significance. This is without prejudice that the possible review of the regulatory framework in order to provide certain protection to small or medium-sized enterprises in a position of contractual imbalance against choice of forum agreements unilaterally imposed on them, is an issue that merits special attention. In any event, such protection would be especially necessary with regard to jurisdiction agreements in favour of the courts of a third State, which in principle fall outside the scope of the Brussels I Regulation.

— This post is based on the post published in Spanish by the author on 8 February 2024, and a short case comment to be published in the journal La Ley Unión Europea.

Inkreal: Bypassing National Rules Governing Jurisdiction Clauses?

EAPIL blog - lun, 02/26/2024 - 14:00

This is the second contribution to the EAPIL Online Symposium on Inkreal. The first contribution was written by Sergi Gimenez.

As reported earlier on this blog, the CJEU ruled in Inkreal s.r.o. v. Dúha reality s.r.o. (Case C‑566/22) that Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation applies to clauses stipulated in domestic contracts if such clauses provide for the jurisdiction of the court of another Member State.

The CJEU held that domestic contracts providing for the jurisdiction of the court of another Member State have, for that reason alone, an international element which suffices to trigger the application of the Brussels I bis Regulation in general and Article 25 in particular. The clause is thus validated and effective.

Geert van Calster is delighted about this excellent judgment, that Pedro de Miguel Asensio and Matthias Weller also welcome. I disagree.

International Element Required?

The judgment recalls that an international element is required to trigger the application of the Brussels I bis Regulation. The Brussels I bis Regulation was adopted on the basis of Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which gives competence “in civil matters having cross-border implications”. As a result, the court ruled in Owusu that there should be an international element to trigger the application of the Regulation.

The CJEU finds that an international element exists in this case for two reasons. The first is that the proceedings were initiated in a another Member State. The second is the jurisdiction clause itself, which designates a foreign court.

Both of these elements are purely subjective, insofar as they are the result of the will of the parties. Party autonomy suffices to create the international element. And, indeed, the will of a single party, the plaintiff, seems to suffice, as the initiation of the proceedings in another State is deemed sufficient. In this respect, the court relies on the definition of cross border litigation in the European Order of Payment Regulation which refers to the initiation of the proceedings in another Member State. But in the context of the Brussels I Bis Regulation, what really matters is party autonomy and the provision of a jurisdiction clause. In the absence of such a clause, the application of the objective rules of jurisdiction will always grant jurisdiction to the only Member State connected with the dispute, irrespective of where the proceedings were initiated. In contrast, enforcing jurisdiction clauses could be a real game changer.

Adopting subjective criteria such as the inclusion of a jurisdiction clause suggests that, although it cannot rule that the Regulation applies to domestic disputes, the court is ready to interpret the cross border implications test as broadly as possible, so that it can, in effect, extend the reach of the Regulation to domestic disputes.

So what will come next? What will be the other subjective criteria justifying the application of the Regulation and Article 25? Will it be enough for the parties to provide “this is an international contract” in the preamble of their contract? And what about remote objective criteria? For instance, what about the foreign grand parent of one of the local parties to the contract?

The End of the National Rules governing Jurisdiction Clauses?

Many member States have national rules limiting the enforceability of jurisdiction clauses in domestic disputes. In France, for instance, such clauses are only enforceable among certain categories of professional parties (‘commercial people’), and they need to be stipulated in “very apparent characters”.

After Inkreal, it will be possible to bypass those rules by providing, in domestic contracts, the jurisdiction of a Belgian or Luxembourg court. What is the legitimacy of the EU to disapply those rules? One could debate whether party autonomy should be promoted and local parties should always be allowed to choose their preferred court. But certain Member States have made the policy decision that choosing the competent court can have far reaching consequences, and party autonomy should only be allowed between sophisticated actors where it can be established that the parties made an informed choice. What is the legitimacy of the CJEU to cancel this policy decision?

Of course, one could think that national rules will remain applicable and prevent the same parties from including a similar clause providing for another city within the same Member State. But will they? Maybe not, if the parties insisted in their contract that they strongly feel that it is, or want it to be, an international contract.

Coherence with Hague Convention irrelevant

Interestingly, the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements provides that it only applies to international cases, which are defined objectively:

Art. 1 (2) For the purposes of Chapter II, a case is international unless the parties are resident in the same Contracting State and the relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, regardless of the location of the chosen court, are connected only with that State.

The Court, however, rules that the same definition is not found in the Brussels I bis Regulation, and that there is no reason to seek a coherent interpretation. Instead, as already mentioned, the court prefers to seek coherence with the European Order for Payment Regulation, because it relates to judicial cooperation in civil matters. But is it really convincing, given that this regulation does not include any rule validating party autonomy?

Irrespective of these poor contextual arguments, the result is disastrous. For parties and lawyers providing for jurisdiction clauses (and choice of law clauses) in international contracts, it is critical to avoid developing different legal regimes and to interpret the relevant instruments (Brussels I bis, Rome I, 2005 Hague Convention) coherently whenever it is possible. Most practitioners have a hard time understanding some of the most basic concepts of private international law. They do not need these extra subtleties.

Summer School “Consumer and Market Law in the European Circular Economy” in Udine, Italy

Conflictoflaws - lun, 02/26/2024 - 12:03

An invitation to participate in the Summer School on Consumer and Market Law in the European Circular Economy has been opened for all interested candidates.

The following topics are particularly addressed: Consumer protection and empowerment; Private international law; Dispute resolution and redress issues; and Market regulation. The goals of the summer school are:
• To offer a blended and intensive training, focusing on transnational developments at the EU level;
• To promote the sharing of knowledge, experiences and practices between participants from different countries;
• To help participants in developing incisive reasoning skills and other soft skills such as team working, problem solving and argumentative reasoning.

The school is taking place in a picturesque Italian setting at the premises of the University of Udine from 11 to 19 July 2024. Additional details are available at the Call for applications and the School Brochure.

This summer school has a long tradition since 2008 and is organised by University of Udine, along with its partners: University of Essex, University of East Anglia, De Montfort University of Leicester, University of Belgrade, University of Rijeka, University of Szeged, University of West Timisoara.

New EU Digitalisation Regulation: A Stepping Stone to Digitalised EU?

Conflictoflaws - lun, 02/26/2024 - 10:34

Author: Martina Ticic, assistant at the University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law and doctoral student funded by the Croatian Science Foundation (Hrvatska zaklada za znanost – HRZZ)

On 13 December 2023, two years after the first legislative proposal has been published, the new Regulation (EU) 2023/2844 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters, and amending certain acts in the field of judicial cooperation (Digitalisation Regulation) has been adopted. While the process of digitalisation of judicial cooperation and cross-border procedures in the EU has been ongoing for some time already, the new Digitalisation Regulation represents a major step for advancing digitalisation practices in the EU.

Main features
The Digitalisation Regulation establishes a uniform legal framework for the use of electronic communication and digital tools in cross-border legal proceedings. Particularly, it lays down rules on:
– communication between competent authorities/natural or legal persons and competent authorities
– the use of videoconferencing or other distance communication technology
– the application of electronic signatures and electronic seals
-the legal effects of electronic documents
– electronic payment of fees.
The Regulation establishes that communication between competent authorities of different EU Member States, as well as communication between competent authorities of different Member States and between a national competent authority and EU body or agency, shall be carried out through a decentralised IT system whenever possible. On the other hand, for communication between natural or legal persons and competent authorities in civil and commercial matters, a European electronic access point shall be established on the European e-Justice Portal. The Regulation also provides for the possibility of participating in a hearing through videoconference or other distance communication technology, depending on certain circumstances, e.g., the availability of such technology, parties’ opinion on the use of such technology, or appropriateness of the use of technology. Moreover, the Regulation makes a reference to the eIDAS Regulation in terms of electronic signatures and electronic seals, equates the legal effects of electronic documents with effects of non-electronic ones, and provides for the possibility of electronic payment of fees. Finally, it also amends relevant provisions of other legal instruments, including European Enforcement Order Regulation, European Order for Payment Regulation, European Small Claims Procedure Regulation, European Account Preservation Order Regulation, Regulation on mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters, Insolvency Regulation, Service of Documents Regulation, and Regulation on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders.

Entry into force
The entire legal framework set by the Regulation, however, will not be fully operational until quite some time. The Regulation will apply from 1 May 2025 – with some exceptions. The Regulation requires the adoption of certain implementing acts by the European Commission, which would mainly set out various technical specifications and requirements. Article 10(3) of the Regulation sets out a timetable for the adoption of different implementing acts, ranging from January 2026 to January 2029.
Articles 3 and 4 of the Digitalisation Regulation, which regulate electronic communication (both between competent authorities and between natural or legal persons and competent authorities in civil and commercial matters) will only apply after two-year period has passed from entry into force of the corresponding implementing acts. These Articles will also only apply to proceedings initiated from that same day. It could be concluded that the Regulation will not be applicable in its entirety for the next seven years, until 2031. However, this only holds true in relation to the provisions on electronic communication. The other regulated aspects, i.e., the provisions on the use of videoconferencing, electronic signatures and seals, legal effects of electronic documents and electronic payment of fees, will all be applicable from May 2025.

Remaining challenges
While certainly a big step forward for the e-Justice developments in the EU, some challenges still remain even after the Digitalisation Regulation becomes fully applicable. Perhaps the biggest issue is fragmentation – both at the EU level and at the national level.
At the EU level, fragmentation is reflected in a complex EU framework and a number of different regulatory sources on different aspects of digitalisation of justice. There are multiple legal acts that address various aspects relevant for the process of digitalisation in the EU, including eIDAS Regulation, e-CODEX Regulation, Directive on Digitalisation of Judicial Cooperation, General Data Protection Regulation, Regulation on processing of data by EU institutions, etc. Moreover, a number of regulations offer specific provisions on digitalisation aspects in a particular procedure, such as European Order for Payment Procedure Regulation, Service Regulation, Evidence Regulation, etc. It is therefore expected that the new Digitalisation Regulation will add to already existing legal framework as an ‘umbrella regulation’, given that it covers a wide range of issues in various steps of legal proceedings in civil, commercial and criminal matters. It should, however, be noted that it will not apply to two crucial procedural aspects of the intra-EU cross-border relations: the service of documents pursuant to the Service Regulation (despite introducing certain amendments to it) nor to the taking of evidence pursuant to the Evidence Regulation, as highlighted in the Recital 17 of the Preamble.
At the national level, while COVID-19 pandemic certainly urged all of the EU Member States to accelerate the usage of digital tools in all aspects of society, there are still varying levels of digital developments in different jurisdictions. This can clearly be seen from the EU Justice Scoreboard, which includes a specific section on digitalisation developments in the Member States. It must be highlighted, however, that a significant improvement over the years is visible when comparing the yearly reports. With the new Digitalisation Regulation, in addition to all the other work that the EU is currently doing to promote digitalisation, the digital tools and digitalisation practices of the Member States will surely only be getting more advanced.
This having been said, diversity of national procedural rules, different e-justice domestic solutions and different levels of the development and usage of digital tools in the proceedings all may still pose problems. It can be expected that the period of the next few years will be especially difficult, as EU Member States will have a lot of work to do – national access points to the e-CODEX will have to be established; harmonised technical standards adopted; and all participants will have to get accustomed to the functionalities of new digital tools and practices. The Digitalisation Regulation partly touches upon this problem by providing that EU Member States must also offer necessary training to competent authorities and professionals concerned in order to ensure efficient use of the IT system and distance communication technology.
In order to ensure that adequate information on national particularities is available for all potential parties, the EU Member States are bound to communicate relevant information to the European Commission, including details of national IT portals, description of national laws and procedure on videoconferencing, information on fees, details on electronic payment methods, etc. Such information will be made available on the e-Justice Portal. On the assumption that the relevant information is regularly updated, the e-Justice Portal will be of great help with the smooth functioning of digital legal framework set by the Digitalisation Regulation.
Thus, while challenging period may be ahead, the result will surely be worthwhile.

What about the parties outside of the EU?
While the Digitalisation Regulation definitely brings important changes to the justice system of the EU and its Member States, potential implications for parties and countries outside of the EU should not be overlooked. Member States are now obliged to work on their national IT portals and digital tools, to train legal staff, and to generally provide for the usage of digital tools in the course of the procedure. Such national developments may then also assist in all cross-border cases, including those with countries outside of the EU. This means that the obligations that the Digitalisation Regulation sets for the Member States can also indirectly allow for better usage of IT tools in the course of cross-border procedures with all of the other countries that make use of such tools as well. On the other hand, for those countries that still lack in the department of digitalisation in law and legal system, this may serve as an incentive for further development in order to make cross-border procedure easier for all. After all, promotion of best practices and cooperation with international partners is one of the EU’s aims, as highlighted in the 2020 Communication from the Commission on the Digitalisation of Justice in the EU.

“Digital Assets and Private International Law” – Conference in Vienna on 11 and 12 April 2024

Conflictoflaws - lun, 02/26/2024 - 08:09

 

On 11 and 12 April 2024, an international conference on the current topic of the appropriate approach to digital assets in PIL cases will take place at the University of Vienna in a hybrid format. For the impressive speakers list, including internationally renowned academics as well as representatives from UNIDROIT and the HCCH, please refer to the conference announcement below, which was kindly provided by the organizers:

Digital Assets and Private International Law Conference 11 and 12 April 2024 in Vienna

 

Outline

Digital assets, such as cryptocurrencies, stablecoins and other tokens, have become important as objects of investment and trade. They are recorded on the blockchain, an electronic ledger held in identical form on servers (nodes) all over the world. Therefore, the determination of the governing law presents particular challenges. This conference will explore whether Private International Law methodology can be successfully applied to digital assets or whether it needs to be changed in light of the ‘blockchain revolution’.

Date      11 and 12 April 2024

Place     Juridicum, Schottenbastei 10-16, A-1010 Vienna, roof top floor

Format

The conference will take place in a hybrid format. Speakers and participants will meet in the Juridicum. The proceedings will be streamed simultaneously online. Registration (both for physical attendance and online participation) can be made until 6 April 2024 by email at the following address: service.rechtsvergleichung@univie.ac.at. Participation is free but registration compulsory.

 

Programme

 Thursday, 11 April 2024

Time Topic Speaker 13.00 Registration and Coffee 14.00 Inauguration Prof. Brigitta Zöchling-Jud,

Dean of the Law School of the University of Vienna 14.10 Welcome Address Dr. Thomas Gstädtner, President of Supervisory Board, EBI 14.15 Introduction Prof. Matthias Lehmann,
University of Vienna and Radboud University of Nijmegen  

Part 1 – Overarching Issues 14.30 Do We Need a ‘Blockchain Revolution’ in Private International Law? Prof. Andrea Bonomi, University of Lausanne 14.45 Proprietary Rights in Digital and Other Assets and the Conflict of Laws Prof. Christiane Wendehorst, University of Vienna 15.00 The Law Applicable to Payments, Tokenisation and Contracting on Cross-border Digital Platforms Prof. Dr. Gérardine Goh Escolar, Hague Conference on Private International Law 15.15 Which Role for Consumer Law in Blockchain Transactions? Prof. Teresa Rodriguez de las Herras Ballell, UNIDROIT/University Carlos III Madrid 15.30 Discussion 16.00 Coffee Break  

Part 2 – Law Applicable to Digital Assets 16.30 Money or Securities as the Paradigm for Digital Assets? Dr. Burku Yüksel, University of Aberdeen 16.45 A Single Law for the Blockchain vs.  Layer-, Protocol- or Asset-Specific Law Dr. Augustin Gridel, University of Lorraine 17.00 Choice of Law for Digital Assets –Technical Possibilities and Legal Conditions Prof. Florian Heindler, Sigmund Freud University Vienna 17.15 Discussion 17.45 Summary and Conclusion of the First Day Prof. Matthias Lehmann, University of Vienna and Radboud University of Nijmegen 19.00 Speakers’ Dinner

  

Friday, 12 April 2024

Time Topic Speaker 08.30 Coffee Part 3 – Law Governing Blockchain Transactions 09.00 The Determination of the Law of Custody and Its Importance for Digital Assets Prof. Matthias Haentjens, University of Leiden 09.15 Secured Transactions in Digital Assets Prof. Spiridon Bazinas, Sigmund Freud University Vienna (online) 09.30 The Law Applicable to Staking Dr. Fabio Andreotti, Bitcoin Suisse AG 09.45 Decentralized Finance (DeFi) –  Which Law is Governing the Entities, which the Transactions? Dr. Pascal Favrod-Coune, Aegis Partners 10.00 Discussion 10.30 Coffee Break Part 4 – Law Governing Particular Issues 11.00 The Law Governing Private Relations and Liability on the Network Prof. Tobias Lutzi, University of Augsburg 11.15 The Law Governing Trade Finance Tokens Prof. Koji Takahashi, Doshisha University (online) 11.30 Determining the Law Governing Smart Contracts Dr. Jasper Verstappen, University of Groningen 11.45 Discussion

  12.15 Summary and Conclusion Prof. Matthias Lehmann, University of Vienna and Radboud University of Nijmegen

 

About the Interdisciplinary Association of Comparative and Private International Law (IACPIL)

IACPIL is a platform for discussing issues in comparative law and private international law. The association is based in Vienna, where it organises events on current topics, fundamental issues, and methodological questions. Its members reflect a broad professional base rooted in the academic, judicial, and administrative fields, and are also joined by translators and specialists from international organisations.

The association is a critically scrutinising forum. Interdisciplinary topics with legal, political, historical, social, economic, and cultural dimensions are frequently considered. In this way, IACPIL endeavours to promote a modern, humane, and social regulation of cross-border conflicts.

 

About the European Banking Institute (EBI)

The EBI is an international centre based in Frankfurt for banking studies resulting from the joint venture of Europe’s preeminent academic institutions which have decided to share and coordinate their commitments and structure their research activities in order to provide the highest quality legal, economic and accounting studies in the field of banking regulation, banking supervision and banking resolution in Europe.

EBI aims to become a point of reference in the research of banking regulation research in Europe. By promoting the dialogue between scholars, regulators, supervisors, industry representatives and advisors in relation to issues concerning the regulation and supervision of financial institutions and financial markets from a legal, economic and any other related viewpoint, the close relationship with regulators, supervisors, and private sector is expected to guarantee a one-of-its-kind academic research production.

Inkreal: Freedom of Choice of Courts of EU Member States?

EAPIL blog - lun, 02/26/2024 - 08:00

This is the first contribution to the EAPIL’s Online Symposium on Inkreal. It is authored by Sergi Gimenez, who is an Associate Lecturer of Private International Law at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona and a partner in the law firm Augusta Abogados.

In its judgment of 8 February 2024 in Inkreal (Case C-566/22), the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has concluded that there is no impediment for parties to a contract established in the same EU Member State (e.g. Spain) to agree on the jurisdiction of the courts of another Member State (e.g. Germany) to settle their contractual disputes, even if the contract in question has no other connection with the designated Member State. The doctrine established by the CJEU, perhaps questionable in some respects, opens up interesting prospects for companies to choose the dispute resolution mechanism that suits them best, even in purely domestic contractual relations.

Background

Between June 2016 and March 2017, an individual (“FD”) residing in Slovakia lent money to the Slovak company Dúha reality s.r.o. (“Dúha”). The two loan agreements signed between the parties contained a clause whereby the parties agreed that any disputes arising from the loans would be settled “by a court of the Czech Republic having substantive and territorial jurisdiction”.

In early December 2021 FD transferred the claims under the loan agreements in favour of Inkreal s.r.o. (“Inkreal”), a company also incorporated under Slovak law and established in Slovakia.

Since Dúha did not repay the loans, Inkreal sued Dúha before the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court of the Czech Republic at the end of the same month of December, as foreseen in the above mentioned clause.

Doubts then arose as to the possible invalidity of the above-mentioned attribution agreement. Since the dispute concerned a contract governed by Slovak law and was between two Slovak companies, with no connection to the Czech Republic, the Court questioned its possible lack of international jurisdiction. In view of the doubts that arose, the Czech Supreme Court turned to the CJEU for clarification.

The Question

The Czech Supreme Court’s doubts arose from the fact that neither the loan agreements nor the disputing parties have any connection with the Czech Republic. However, the case-law of the CJEU has consistently required that there be an “international element” in the disputes in order for the Brussels I bis Regulation to apply. Thus, the referring court wondered whether the mere will of the parties, by including a clause submitting to the courts of another State, was sufficient to confer an international character on their contractual relationship. If that is not the case, the situation would be purely internal and the EU regulation would not be applicable. In such a case, the possible jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction of the Czech courts would have to be examined in the light of the internal rules of the Czech Republic itself.

Judgment

In addition to hearing the arguments submitted by the parties involved and analysing the Opinion of the Advocate General (who expressed a view contrary to that reflected in the judgment), the CJEU also took into account the observations submitted by the European Commission and some States that wished to participate. The CJEU concluded that a jurisdiction agreement by which the parties to a contract established in the same Member State agree that the courts of another Member State shall have jurisdiction to hear disputes arising out of that contract falls within the scope of Article 25(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation even if that contract has no connection with that other Member State.

Reasoning of the CJEU

The CJEU reaches the above conclusion using reasoning that is questionable in some cases but imbued with an undoubtedly practical sense. Although the CJEU insists on its settled case law to the effect that the application of the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I bis Regulation requires the existence of an “international element”, the truth is that the final decision greatly relativises this requirement.

According to the CJEU, the dispute between Inkreal and Dúha falls within the definition of the concept of a “cross-border case” since the parties are established in a Member State other than that to which the Czech court seised on the basis of the agreement conferring jurisdiction in question belongs (para 23). The CJEU adds that the fact that the main dispute raises a question concerning the determination of international jurisdiction (that of the Czech Supreme Court) reinforces the idea of the existence of a cross-border element (Recital 24).

Paragraph 25 of the judgment contains the key to the CJEU’s decision in determining that

the existence of an agreement conferring jurisdiction on the courts of a Member State other than that in which the parties are established in itself demonstrates the cross-border implications of the dispute in the main proceedings.

In this way, the CJEU opens the way for the parties to a contract to decide, solely by their own free will, to “internationalise” a situation that from any other point of view would be considered purely internal.

To justify its view, the CJEU relies on eminently practical reasons: maintaining that the clause on submission to foreign courts is covered by the Brussels I bis  Regulation allows the plaintiff and the defendant to easily determine the court before which they can sue and be sued, and it also allows the court seised to easily rule on its own jurisdiction. According to the CJEU, the alternative of the court having jurisdiction being determined in accordance with the national rules of private international law of the Member States concerned would lead to greater legal uncertainty, since the application of different national rules could lead to divergent solutions.

Commentary and Possible Implications

Until now, in contractual matters, individuals could “internationalise” a domestic situation with regard to the law applicable to their contract. Indeed, Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 (Rome I ) gives a wide freedom of choice of the law applicable to contracts by stating that the contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. Thus, in principle, even the parties to a purely domestic contract can choose a foreign law. Notwithstanding this freedom of choice of law, Article 3(3) of the same Rome I Regulation provides for a corrective mechanism to prevent possible abuses or excessively opportunistic choices: if all the relevant elements of the contract (e.g. the place of establishment of the parties, the place of performance of the services or delivery of the goods, etc.) are located in a country other than the country whose law is chosen, the mandatory rules of the first country will continue to apply. Thus, in purely domestic contracts the foreign law chosen by the parties will only apply in those respects in which the law to which the contract is objectively linked does not contain mandatory rules. Article 3(4) of the Rome I Regulation provides for an identical limitation for purely intra-EU cases: if all the elements of the situation are located in two or more EU Member States and the parties choose the law of a third State, such a choice does not prejudice the application of mandatory rules of Community law.

The restrictions provided for in the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to the contract are not transferable to forum selection clauses. In fact, in its decision, the CJEU has not imposed any kind of limitation on the choice of the courts of another Member State (beyond the restrictions on exclusive and protective forums or those relating to public policy provided for in Article 45). Thus, two or more companies located in the same Member State and concluding a purely internal contract can now decide that any disputes between them will be settled by the courts of a different Member State. And it should be remembered that, by submitting a case to the courts of another Member State, the latter acquire exclusive jurisdiction to hear the case, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.

Until now, in order to transfer a purely domestic dispute to another State, the parties had the mechanism of arbitration at their disposal, agreeing that the seat of the arbitration tribunal would be in another country. With the new doctrine set by the CJEU, the parties may also opt for the ordinary courts of another EU Member State if they consider it appropriate, whether for reasons of speed, efficiency, cost, specialisation or any other reason. Obviously, before making a decision, other aspects must be taken into account, including possible adverse elements such as language difficulties, the added complexity involved in making notifications or taking evidence abroad or even the problems arising from the need to prove to the foreign judge the content of the substantive rules chosen by the parties if these rules are not those of the designated judge.

Recent Developments in Private International Law: the US and Beyond

Conflictoflaws - lun, 02/26/2024 - 02:13

As the 118th American Society of International Law (ASIL) Annual Meeting approaches, the ASIL Private International Law Interest Group will organize a fireside chat on Thursday, April 4 from 3:30 PM to 4:30 PM ET in Washington D.C.

During this fireside chat, our esteemed speakers will discuss recent developments in private international law in the US and beyond. Professor Ronald A. Brand will analyze the developments at the Hague Working Group, which is currently pursuing a convention on parallel proceedings and related actions or claims. Ms. Sarah Prosser will provide an overview of recent developments in the private international law efforts of the U.S. Department of State in 2023, with insights into initiatives planned for 2024. Professor Carlos M. Vázquez will focus on developments in the United States, including such recent decisions as Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co, Cassirer v. TBM, and the Mexican Gun Litigation. The fireside chat will adopt a relaxed format, ensuring a casual and enjoyable experience for both speakers and the audience.

Speakers (alphabetized by surname):

Ronald A. Brand
Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg University Professor
Academic Director, Center for International Legal Education
University of Pittsburgh School of Law

Sarah Prosser
Assistant Legal Adviser for
Private International Law (L/PIL)
Office of the Legal Adviser
U.S. Department of State

Carlos M. Vázquez
Associate Dean for Graduate and International Programs
Scott K. Ginsburg Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center

Chair: Dr. Jie (Jeanne) Huang, Co-Chair of the ASIL Private International Law Interest Group and Associate Professor at the University of Sydney Law School

Time: Thursday, April 4 at 3:30 PM – 4:30 PM ET
Venue: TBD at the Washington Hilton

• Happy Hour
We invite Private International Law Interest Group members, newsletter editors, and friends to join us for a casual happy hour gathering at McClellan’s Sports Bar located at the Washington Hilton. Please find event details below:

4:30 PM- 5:30 PM ET, Thursday April 4, 2024
Social & Networking Event
McClellan’s Sports Bar
No Host Bar
We look forward to learning any PIL (and non-PIL) inspirations from you for the more exciting years to come. Everyone is welcome to stop by.

Online Symposium on Inkreal

EAPIL blog - dim, 02/25/2024 - 20:03

On 8 February 2024, the CJEU ruled in Inkreal s.r.o. v. Dúha reality s.r.o. (Case C‑566/22) that Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation applies to clauses stipulated in domestic contracts if such clauses provide for the jurisdiction of the court of another Member State.

Most early commentators have welcomed this judgment, including Geert van Calster, Pedro de Miguel Asensio and Matthias Weller.

The Advocate General, however, had opined differently. Should Inkreal be praised for promoting party autonomy? Should it be criticised, instead, for extending the reach of EU law beyond its competence?

In the coming days, the EAPIL Blog will host an online symposium on Inkreal. Readers interested in participating should contact the editors of the blog (blog@eapil.org), or directly comment on the posts in the symposium.

AMEDIP’s upcoming webinar: The role of Private International Law in the development and deployment of digital currencies (29 February 2024 at 14:30 Mexico City time) (in Spanish)

Conflictoflaws - dim, 02/25/2024 - 18:44

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on Thursday 29 February 2024 at 14:30 (Mexico City time – CST), 21:30 (CET time). The topic of the webinar is the role of Private International Law in the development and deployment of digital currencies and will be presented by Dr. Israel Cedillo Lazcano (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/83223220677?pwd=ejcyTysxbUFwLzRIMFhYRGkzV2VpQT09

Meeting ID: 832 2322 0677

Password: AMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

Emiliou AG in BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux. A solid narrow reading of CJEU GAT v LUK (patent infringement) and a most optimistic, contra legem reading of reflexivity.

GAVC - sam, 02/24/2024 - 12:13

Emiliou AG opined the day before yesterday in C‑339/22 BSH Hausgeräte GmbH v Electrolux AB. I flagged the case and discussed its context here.

The case in essence concerns two issues: the extent of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Article 24(4) court in infringement (as opposed to direct invalidity actions); and the question whether A24 works reflexively: ie whether the surrender of jurisdiction should also be applied in cases where the A24(4) court is not in an EU Member State.

The AG’s extensive contextualisation has the merit of summarising established authority on Article 24(4). This allows the AG for instance to reflect on the oddity of GAT v Luk. Despite the ‘object of the proceedings’ often being infringement of intellectual property rights, the CJEU held in that case that the moment the validity of the patent (or other relevant intellectual property rights) is at issue, exclusive jurisdiction of the A24(4) court is triggered. The CJEU rather unsuccessfully attempted to justify the distinction with its approach on the remainder of A24 eg in CJEU BVG.

The AG justifiably signals his disapproval with the fall-out of the GAT v Luk authority, seeing ia that (54)

the judgment in GAT makes the consolidation of infringement claims concerning the different ‘parts’ of a European patent before those courts an unattractive option. It encourages patent holders to start separate proceedings in the various States of registration of those ‘parts’ instead, since, at least, it is certain that the courts of those States are competent to rule on both the infringement and validity of ‘their part’ (as explained in points 26, 28 and 29 above). This creates, in turn, a risk that different courts take contradictory views on the same infringement dispute.

Also note (59) the strong rebuke of the GAT v LUK line in terms of the very nature of private international law

…such considerations do not reveal why, with respect to proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, those courts should have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. In particular, the patent law of the State of registration is not so unique that only the courts of that State would have the ability to comprehend it. While it may be harder for them to do so, the courts of another Member State are perfectly capable of applying such a foreign law. To imply the contrary would be tantamount to questioning the very foundations of the Brussels regime (and the entire field of private international law). …

Ia (64) the AG however points out that unfortunately any call for the CJEU to reverse is futile seeing as Brussels Ia has codified it.

The extent of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Article 24(4) court in infringement proceedings.

Ia (37) the remaining unclarity therefore lies in the GAT v Luk consequences. National practice varies. Some courts practice a stay of the infringement proceedings until the A24(4) court holds on validity, and then insist on a return to the ‘infringement’ court: the “narrow reading” of GAT v LUK. Others carry out a complete referral of the case, including infringement, to the A24(4) court: the “broad” reading”.

In both of these scenarios the stay or referral decision is precarious (73) for there is no procedure under EU law for such referral or mutually respected temporary stay: there is no guarantee the court referred to will act as the first seized court might prefer.

The AG is in favour of the narrow reading: (69) this fits with the exceptional nature of A24; (71) it serves predictability (an echo of A24(2) in BVG): in the broad reading the reach of the jurisdiction of the court seized would depend on the invalidity  raised or not raised as a defence; (73) the possibility under national civil procedure rules to raise an invalidity defence even for the first time upon appeal would lead to a constant threat of torpedoing and once the proceedings stayed, the court first seized loses all grip on the claim and (74) by the time the case returns at all, claimant’s case in infringement proceedings started afresh may meet with statutes of limitation.

(77) ff bifurcation or as the AG calls it the ‘split’ in the proceedings is far from ideal, as (78) is the general implication of GAT v LUK that it forms an exception to the principle that points of defence ought not to impact on jurisdiction, or the reliance on national CPR, the delays etc. Yet the AG calls this route even if ‘less than ideal’, the ‘lesser of two evils’.

He then offers practical guidelines, seeking to give these a foundation in (88) the TRIPS Agreement, the finding in CJEU C‑365/88 Hagen that national CPR must not impact the effet utile of EU law, the TRIPS Agreement, Directive 2004/48, on the patent holder side the right to an effective remedy and, on the alleged infringer’s side, the rights of defence, both protected under Article 47 of the Charter.

(92) the AG suggests in particular that courts should only consider granting a stay where that challenge has a genuine prospect of success (taking into account the presumption of validity following the patent office’s assessment).

In general I have much sympathy for the AG’s narrow reading of GAT v LUK (and one would have hoped the review of Brussels Ia might trigger a proposal to solidify it in the Regulation). I am also genuinely curious to see how far the CJEU will go in picking up some of the guidelines.

The reflexivity issue.

The CJEU 3 judge chamber in IRNova f FLIR was very brief on this question and answered it promptly in the negative. The AG (97) agrees the answer is obvious in the sense that BIa cannot instruct third States courts to hear specific cases.

Unlike the AG however in my view the answer to the question that ‘in essence’ (98) is implied (whether A24(4) deprives Member State courts of the power to adjudicate the validity of third-State patents in the same way that those courts are deprived with respect to patents registered in other Member States) is, rebus sic stantibus, also obvious. Namely that unless the conditions of Articles 33-34 (the forum non conveniens “light” regime) are fulfilled, Article 4 domicile jurisdiction simply stands. Or as the Commission puts it (113), the Courts are “bound” to exercise A4 jurisdiction save in a narrow set of circumstances (i.e. the A33-34 set).

The AG (108) refers to IRNova to suggest A24-25 BIa cannot apply, as such, to dispute having connections of the kind envisioned therein with third States.

The AG posits ia that (117) BIa was not designed to take into account circumstances such as these and that the CJEU therefore should fill the gap. First of all I believe this is incorrect. A4 BIa arguably is a well documented express policy choice to accept EU courts jurisdiction in principle even over matters prima facie strongly linked with territory etc out off the EU. Further, that only A33-34 (and then only in the recital of the Regulation) entertain the possibility to take into account exclusive non-EU courts jurisdiction is a very strong a contrario statutory argument against CJEU freewheeling. The suggestion (118) borrowed from Briggs and Mills that “nothing in the wording of those provisions or in the related recitals indicates that they are meant to regulate exhaustively the possibility for Member State courts to decline jurisdiction in favour of the courts of third States”, echoes Ferrexpo and  imho is simply wrong, and neither Coreck Maritime (121) nor Mahamdia (122) have displaced Owusu.

The AG’s link (128) to public international law and the general appeal of the Moçambique rule are interesting but really just to remote in my view from Brussels Ia’s travaux and statutory provisions and the AG does not I believe properly present A33-34’s travaux or intention (139) ff.

The “implicit derogation from the mandatory effect of Article 4(1)” BIa which the AG posits (147) ff for both A24 and A25 (choice of court) jurisdiction, even construed as a “narrow discretion” (159) ff, is a most optimistic view on inviting the CJEU to rewrite Brussels Ia.

In conclusion, while the CJEU is likely to follow the AG on the narrow reading of A24(4), I would wager it will succinctly reject the arguably contra legem reflexive effect construction. But then as I have said before, I am not a betting man.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.217 ff.

1/2 ! Emiliou AG on 'reflexive effect' of exclusive jurisdictional rule (EU courts declining jurisdiction where third States would have had exclusive jurisdiction, had they been in the EU)https://t.co/naD1t51NQb
C‑339/22 BSH Hausgeräte

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 22, 2024

Hybrid conference in Vienna on 12 April 2024: Reforming Brussels Ibis

Conflictoflaws - ven, 02/23/2024 - 13:07

We are happy to share the following announcement from the organisers.

On 12 April 2024, a hybrid conference will take place at the Skylounge of the University of Vienna to discuss the reform of the Brussels Ibis Regulation; the fundamental reference-instrument of cross-border judicial cooperation in civil matters within the European Union. The reform is expected to begin this year under the new European Commission. The conference is organised by the Institute for Civil Procedure and continues the work already done within the European Association for Private International Law (EAPIL) and the former Max Planck Institute (MPI) Luxembourg.

In 2021, Burkhard Hess wrote a Working Paper on a possible reform of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, identifying problems and suggesting solutions. In the same year, a Working Group was set up within the network of the EAPIL. The members of the Working Group provided information on the application and possible shortcomings of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in their jurisdictions by means of a questionnaire. The results of the questionnaire provided the basis for the conference on the Brussels Ibis reform held at the former MPI Luxembourg on 9 September 2022, where more than 80 participants discussed reform proposals in five panels (report).

Following the 2022 Luxembourg conference, Burkhard Hess and a team of researchers of the MPI prepared a second Working Paper, which put forward 32 proposals for the reforms of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Members of the EAPIL Working Group were invited to express again their opinion and to vote on these proposals in an online poll. The poll was later opened to the public, as announced on the EAPIL-blog and ConflictofLaws.net. The purpose of this poll was to give the academic public as well as other stakeholders an opportunity to express their view on the proposals. An extensive documentation and analysis of the poll will be published soon, which serves as a basis for discussion at the upcoming conference.

The 2024 Vienna conference features speakers from various parts of the European Union. In the morning, the prospects of the reform process and overarching issues of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are addressed by Andreas Stein (EU Commission), Astrid Stadler (Konstanz), Cristina González Beilfuss (Barcelona), Gilles Cuniberti (Luxembourg), as well as Karol Weitz and Bartosz Wo?odkiewicz (Warsaw). The various proposals for the reform of the Brussels Ibis Regulation will be addressed from a practical perspective in the afternoon during a roundtable featuring, inter alia, Anthony Collins (EU Court of Justice), Georg Kodek (Austrian Supreme Court), Petra Leupold (VKI), Sabine Leupold (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer) and Andreas Stein (EU Commission). The full program can be found on the flyer.

Burkhard Hess, Christian Koller and Paul Oberhammer of the Institute of Civil Procedure look forward to your participation in the Vienna conference. Please send your registration to reformingbrussels-Ibis.zvr@univie.ac.at and indicate whether you will participate in person or online.

Digital Assets and Private International Law

EAPIL blog - ven, 02/23/2024 - 08:00

The question which law applies to the blockchain and assets recorded thereon, such as cryptocurrencies, stablecoins or other token, is one of the most hotly debated issues in the conflict of laws (see e.g. the recent book ‘Blockchain and Private International Law‘).

A conference on this topic will take place on 11 and 12 April 2024 in Vienna and remotely. It is organised by the University of Vienna, in cooperation with the Interdisciplinary Association of Comparative and Private International Law (IACPIL) and the European Banking Institute (EBI).

The conference will bring together academics, technology experts, and lawyers, from various EU member states, the UK, Switzerland, and Japan. Two of the international organisations active in this field – the HCCH and UNIDROIT – will also be represented.

Topics include the law governing crypto-custody, secured transactions in digital assets, and the law applicable to Decentralized Finance (DeFi). Fundamental issues such as the need for a ‘blockchain revolution’ in Private International Law or the role of consumer law will also be discussed.

The full programme can be downloaded here. Participation is free of charge. Please register for either physical attendance or online participation by 6 April 2024 at service.rechtsvergleichung@univie.ac.at.

Bahraini High Court on Choice of Court and Choice of Law Agreements

Conflictoflaws - ven, 02/23/2024 - 06:27

I. Introduction

It is widely recognized that choice of court and choice of law agreements are powerful tools for structuring and planning international dispute resolution. These agreements play an important role in “increasing legal certainty for the parties in cross-border transactions and reducing incentives for (the harmful version of) forum shopping.” (Alex Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law (CUP, 2018) p. 75). However, the realization of these objectives depends on the enforcement of the parties’ choice. Unfortunately, general practice in the MENA (North Africa and the Middle East) region shows that, with a few exceptions, the status quo is far from satisfactory. Choice-of-court agreements conferring jurisdiction on foreign courts are often disregarded or declared null and void. Similarly, the foreign law chosen as the governing law of a contract is often not applied because of the procedural status of foreign law as a matter of fact, the content of which must be ascertained by the party invoking its application. The recent judgment of the High Court of Bahrain (a first instance court in the Bahraini judicial system) in the Case No. 2/13276/2023/02 of 17 January 2024 is nothing but another example of this entrenched practice that can be observed in the vast majority of countries in the region.

 

II. Facts

X (plaintiff, an English company) entered into a pharmaceutical distribution and sales agreement with Y1 (defendant, a Bahraini company), in 2017 in Bahrain. The agreement provided that disputes arising out of or in connection with the agreement would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales. The parties also agreed that English law should be the governing law.

Following Y1’s failure to make due payments as agreed, X initiated legal proceedings against Y1, Y2 and Y3 (both Bahraini nationals and partners in Y1) in the High Court of Bahrain, seeking payment and some other related costs under Bahraini law. The defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the Bahraini court based on the forum selection clause, but did not present any claim as to the merits of the case.

 

III. The Ruling

The High Court ruled as follow to affirm its jurisdiction and the application of Bahraini law:

[Regarding international jurisdiction]

“[The defendants] challenge the jurisdiction of the Bahraini courts to hear the dispute on the basis that the contract contains a jurisdiction clause which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts to hear any dispute arising out of or relating to the contract. However, according to Articles 14 and 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Bahraini courts have jurisdiction over actions brought against Bahraini nationals, regardless of the nature of the dispute, as long as they have Bahraini nationality at the time the action is brought, without any further conditions, except for in rem actions relating to immovable property located outside Bahrain. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Bahraini courts is based on personal nexus, i.e. the nationality of the defendant, and any agreement to deviate from this jurisdiction is inadmissible because of its connection with public policy. This is because it is the State that determines the jurisdiction of its courts in order to serve the public interest, i.e. to ensure justice, which is one of its primary functions, and to maintain order and peace within its territory. (Underline added).

[Since Y1 is a Bahraini limited liability company and Y2 and Y3, who are partners in Y1, are Bahraini nationals,] it is not permissible to waive the jurisdiction of the Bahraini courts, which retain jurisdiction over the [present] dispute.

[Regarding the applicable law]

It is clear from the contract that the parties agreed that any disputes arising out of the contract should be governed by the laws of England and Wales. Pursuant to Article 4 of Law No. 6 of 2015 on Conflict of Laws in Civil and Commercial Matters with Foreign Elements, the parties may choose the applicable law. [However], Article 6(a) of the same law requires the parties to the dispute to submit the text of the applicable law, failing which Bahraini law shall be deemed applicable. [In the present case], neither party has submitted the agreed law governing the dispute, and X, which [as the foreign party] , requested the application of Bahraini law and relied on the provisions of the Bahraini Commercial Companies Law in its statement of claim. Since the court is not required to ask the parties [to provide the content] the applicable law, as this obligation rests with the parties themselves, Bahraini law shall be applied to the [present] dispute”.

 

IV. Comments:

  1. Sources of Law

It should be indicated from the outset that in Bahrain, rules governing international jurisdiction are primarily found in the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of 1971  (hereafter referred to as “CCCP,” articles 14-20). Regarding choice of law rules, those concerning family law and successions (i.e., personal status) are included in the CCCP (articles 21 and 22), while those concerning civil and commercial matters, including rules pertaining to general theory, are laid down in a special Law on Conflict of Laws in Civil and Commercial Matters with Foreign Elements (Law No. 6 of 2015).(*)

(*) One may wonder about the reasons behind keeping the choice of law rules in matters of family law and successions within a law dealing with civil and commercial procedure, especially since the Bahraini legislator codified the conflict of law rules in an autonomous act dealing with conflicts of laws (choice of law). There have been some calls to consolidate all private international law rules (including choice of law, international jurisdiction) in a single act dealing with legal relationships involving foreign elements (see eg., Awadallah Shaiba Al-Hamad Al-Sayed, “An Analytical and Critical Study of the Law No. 6 of 2015 on the Conflict of Laws in Civil and Commercial Matters – Kingdom of Bahrain”, Legal Studies, Vol. 2, 2019, pp. 224 ff (in Arabic)), however, no actions have been taken so far to implement this proposal.

 

  1. International Jurisdiction

Interestingly, the rules of international jurisdiction contained in the CCCP deal mainly with actions brought against non-Bahraini nationals, either on the basis of their domicile/residence in Bahrain (general jurisdiction, Article 14 of the CCCP) or in certain other matters depending on the category of dispute (special jurisdiction, Article 15 of the CCCP). The fact that the rules on international jurisdiction refer only to foreign defendants raised the question of whether Bahraini courts could assume jurisdiction based on the nationality of the defendant (Cf. Hosam Osama Shaaban, Treatises on Bahraini Private International Law (Al-Bayan Media, 2016), p. 277 [in Arabic]).

In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has ruled in the affirmative. For example, in a decision issued in 2014, the Bahraini Supreme Court held that “even if the Bahraini legislator did not establish the rules of international jurisdiction of the Bahraini courts in the CCCP with regard to lawsuits filed against Bahraini nationals, it is understood that the jurisdiction of the national courts over [such lawsuits] stems from the consideration of [judicial jurisdiction] as a manifestation of the sovereignty of the State, which extends to what falls under this sovereignty” (Supreme Court, Appeal No. 531/2013 of 15 April 2014). In another case, the Supreme Court confirmed its ruling by considering that “persons holding Bahraini nationality are subject to the jurisdiction of Bahraini courts as a manifestation of the state’s sovereignty over its citizens”, thus recognizing the jurisdiction of Bahraini courts over Bahraini nationals even if they hold a second nationality and are not resident in Bahrain (Supreme Court, Appeal No. 77/2017 of 11 April 2018).

In this regard, it can be said that the High Court’s decision commented here is fully consistent with the well-established case law of the Supreme Court.

 

  1. Choice of Court Agreements

With respect to the admissibility of choice of court agreements, it should be noted that agreements with prorogative effect, i.e., choice of court agreements that confer jurisdiction on Bahraini courts that are not otherwise competent, are generally admitted (see article 17 of the CCCP [dealing with explicit or tacit submission to the jurisdiction of Bahraini courts]; article 19 of Legislative Decree No. 30 for the year 2009 with respect to the Bahrain Chamber for Economic, Financial and Investment Dispute Resolution (BCDR) [on the jurisdiction of the BCDR based on the agreement of the parties]. See also, eg, Supreme Court, Appeals Nos. 154 and 165/2017 of 20 May 2017 [tacit submission to the jurisdiction of Bahraini courts]).

However, with respect to agreements with derogative effect, although the law is silent on the matter, the Supreme Court has ruled against their admissibility. This is particularly the case of the Supreme Court ruling in a decision rendered in 2006 (Supreme Court, Appeal No. 231/2005 of 27 February 2006). The case concerned a lawsuit filed by a former foreign employee against his Bahraini employer, claiming overdue employment rights. The employer relied on a choice of forum clause in favor of the English court, arguing that Bahrain’s rules on international jurisdiction (articles 14 and 15 of the CCCP) apply only in the absence of a written agreement between the parties when one of them is a foreigner, and that rules on international jurisdiction do not concern public policy; therefore, nothing should prevent the parties from displacing the jurisdiction of Bahraini courts in favor of a foreign court. The Supreme Court disagreed. However, instead of framing its decision in the particular context of the employment relationship, where the employee – as the weaker party – deserves special protection, the Court proclaimed the principle that any agreement by which the parties derogate from the jurisdiction Bahraini courts conferred under Bahraini law “shall be deemed null and void and shall not be invoked” to challenge the jurisdiction of courts in Bahraini (Supreme Court, Appeal No. 231/2005 of 27 February 2006).

The High Court’s decision commented here is consistent with this ruling. In fact, the underlying part of the first paragraph of the High Court’s decision quoted above is almost a verbatim copy from the Supreme Court’s decision of 27 February 2007 mentioned above.

Finally, it should be indicated that the position of the Bahraini courts on this issue is broadly similar to that of other countries in the region, as noted in the Introduction. (For a brief overview of some relevant Supreme Court decisions from various MENA Arab countries and the implications of this position for the enforcement of foreign judgments in the region, see Béligh Elbalti, “Perspective of Arab Countries,” in M. Weller et al. (eds.), The 2019 HCCH Judgments Convention – Cornerstones, Prospects, Outlook (Hart, 2023), p. 188.)

 

  1. Party Autonomy – Principle

The principle of party autonomy is enshrined in Article 4 of Law No. 6 of 2015, which states that the “[p]arties may agree to choose the applicable law […]”. Bahraini courts have recognized the principle of freedom of parties to choose the applicable law (eg, Supreme Court, Appeal No. 641/2011 of 27 May 2011). The courts did so even in the absence of legislative guidance prior to the adoption of the current applicable rules (see eg, Supreme Court Appeal No. 143/1994 of 4 December 1994). The High Court in the present case did not deviate from this “well-established” principle, which is rooted in both Bahraini statutes and case law. (For a detailed study based on Bahraini case law, see Béligh Elbalti & Hosam Osama Shabaan, “Bahrain – Bahraini Perspectives on the Hague Principles”, in D. Girsberger et al. (eds.), Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts – Global Perspective on the Hague Principles (OUP, 2021), pp. 414 ff).

 

  1. Party Autonomy – Practice

In practice, however, as demonstrated by the High Court decision, there is a gap between the affirmation of the principle of party autonomy on the one hand and the actual application of the chosen law to a concrete case on the other. This gap arises from the fact that, under Bahraini  law as regularly confirmed by case law,  foreign law is treated as a fact, the content of which must be determined by the party requesting its application (see eg, Article 6 of Law No. 6 of 2015. For further details and examples, see Elbalti & Shaaban, op cit., at 420-421). Consequently, failure to ascertain the content of the foreign law would normally result in the application of Bahraini law. The same principle applies even in cases where the parties have made a choice of law agreement. For example, in the aforementioned Supreme Court decision in the Appeal No. 143/1994 of December 4, 1994, although the Court recognized that the parties had (implicitly) agreed on Pakistani law as the applicable law, it ultimately excluded the application of the chosen law because its content had not been established. (For further details and examples, see Elbalti & Shaaban, op cit.). The High Court did not deviate from this general approach showing by this some degree of consistency in the Bahraini courts’ practice.

 

  1. Epilogue

In the case commented here, the court justified the application of Bahraini law on the grounds that the content of the law chosen by the parties had not been submitted to the court. To some extent, it may be questioned whether such a justification is acceptable, as it could be argued that there was a tacit agreement to apply Bahraini law instead of the chosen law (on the issue of tacit choice of law under Bahraini law and the relevant Supreme Court cases, see Elbalti & Shaaban, op cit., pp. 423-425). However, as evidenced by the facts of the case, the defendants in this case did not present any arguments on the merits, but merely challenged the jurisdiction of the Bahraini court. The mere fact that the plaintiff based its claim on Bahraini law by relying on the relevant provisions of the Bahraini Commercial Companies Law does not in itself constitute an “implied” agreement to apply Bahraini law.

On this particular point, it is interesting to compare the decision of the High Court discussed here with another decision issued by the same court just thirteen days earlier in a case involving similar legal issues, namely the admissibility of a choice of court agreement in favor of the Cayman Islands courts and the application of Cayman Islands law as the law chosen by the parties (High Court, Case No. 5/11341/2023/02 of 4 January 2024). In this case, the High Court ruled in exactly the same way as in the present case with regard to the admissibility of the choice of court agreement. However, with respect to the application of Cayman Islands law, the court held that there was an implied agreement to apply Bahraini law in lieu of the chosen law because both parties based their claim on the provisions of Bahraini law and relied on relevant Supreme Court decisions.

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Great Lakes

Conflictoflaws - jeu, 02/22/2024 - 15:39

On February 21, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Company, LLC.

The question presented was whether, under federal admiralty law, a choice-of-law clause in a maritime contract can be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the “strong public policy” of the U.S. state whose law is displaced. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court concluded that the answer to this question was no. It held that choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable as a matter of federal maritime law. It further held that while there are narrow exceptions to this rule, state public policy is not one of them.

Facts

Great Lakes Insurance SE (GLI) is a corporation organized under the laws of the Germany that is headquartered in the United Kingdom. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC (Raiders) is a company organized under the laws of Pennsylvania. GLI insured a yacht owned by Raiders. The marine insurance contract signed by the parties contained the following choice-of-law clause:

It is hereby agreed that any dispute arising hereunder shall be adjudicated according to well established, entrenched principles and precedents of substantive United States Federal Admiralty law and practice but where no such well-established, entrenched precedent exists, this insuring agreement is subject to the substantive laws of the State of New York.

After the yacht ran aground in Florida and sustained significant damage, Raiders filed a claim. GLI denied the claim on the ground that the yacht’s fire-extinguishing equipment had not been recertified or inspected. Although the damage to the yacht was not caused by fire, GLI took the position that Raiders had misrepresented the vessel’s fire suppression system’s operating ability, thereby making the policy void from inception.

After denying the claim, GLI filed an action for a declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. It asked the court to hold that the policy was void due to the alleged misrepresentations by Raiders with respect to the fire extinguishers. In response, Raiders asserted five counterclaims against GLI: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) bad faith liability under 42 Pa. Const. Stat. §8371, and (5) violation of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.

GLI moved for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the fourth and fifth counterclaims. It argued that these claims were not viable because the policy’s choice-of-law provision had designated New York as the governing law in the absence of applicable federal maritime law. Because the claims were based on Pennsylvania statutes, it argued, they were barred by the choice-of-law clause. Raiders opposed this motion. It argued that the choice-of-law clause was unenforceable because it was contrary to Pennsylvania’s strong public policy of punishing insurers who deny coverage in bad faith.

The trial court ruled in favor of GLI. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of Raiders. The Supreme Court granted GLI’s cert petition and heard oral arguments on October 10, 2023.

Decision

The Court held that the issue of whether a choice-of-law clause in a maritime contract is enforceable is governed by federal law. In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that it had previously held that the enforceability of forum selection clauses in these contracts is governed by federal law. It would be strange, the Court reasoned, to adopt a different rule with respect to choice-of-law clauses. The Court further held that choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts were “presumptively enforceable.” Again, this conclusion logically followed from the fact that the Court had previously held that forum selection clauses in maritime contracts are “prima facie valid.”

After discussing why the Court’s decision in Wilburn Boat Company v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (1955) did not dictate a different outcome, the Court turned its attention to the question of when a choice-of-law clause in a maritime contract should not be enforced. It held that courts should disregard these clauses in situations where applying the chosen law would “contravene a controlling federal statute” or “conflict with an established federal maritime policy.” It also held that these clauses should not be given effect when there was no “reasonable basis” for selecting the law of the chosen jurisdiction. However, the Court expressly rejected the argument advanced by Raiders that a choice-of-law clause in a maritime contract was unenforceable if applying the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state with a greater interest in the dispute.

In rejecting this argument, the Court explained that a federal presumption of enforceability “would not be much of a presumption if it could be routinely swept aside based on 50 States’ public policy determinations.” It reasoned that the “ensuing disuniformity and uncertainty caused by such an approach would undermine the fundamental purpose of choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts: uniform and stable rules for maritime actors.” The Court also noted that nothing in its previous decisions relating to the enforceability of forum selection clauses in maritime contracts suggested that state public policy was relevant to whether these clauses should be given effect.

Finally, the Court declined to adopt the argument—advanced by me and Kim Roosevelt in an amicus brief prepared with the assistance of the North Carolina School of Law Supreme Court Program—that it should resolve the question of enforceability by looking to Section 187(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. The Court reasoned that the rule laid down in Section 187 “arose out of interstate cases and does not deal directly with federal-state conflicts, including those that arise in federal enclaves like maritime law.” The Court also pointed out that Section 187 was a “poor fit” for maritime cases in part because it would “prevent maritime actors from prospectively identifying the law to govern future disputes.”

Analysis

I had two great fears going into this case. Thankfully, neither was realized.

First, I was concerned that the Court might take the test it had previously articulated for determining whether a forum selection clause should be given effect as a matter of federal maritime law and apply that test to choice-of-law clauses. This is, in essence, what the Third Circuit did in its decision below. Such an approach would, in my view, have generated a great deal of mischief. Although choice-of-law clauses and forum selection clauses are often invoked in the same breath, they are not the same and the courts should utilize different tests to evaluate whether they should be enforced. I was relieved that the Court chose not to go down this path. The test laid down in Great Lakes for determining whether a choice-of-law clause in a maritime contract is enforceable is distinct and different from the test for determining whether a forum selection clause laid down in The Bremen and Carnival Cruise.

Second, I was concerned that the Court’s test for enforcing choice-of-law clauses might be couched in such broad language that it would eventually supplant Section 187 in non-maritime cases. This is essentially what happened when the Court decided The Bremen in 1972. Although that decision only applied to forum selection clauses in maritime contracts, the sweeping language utilized by the Court ultimately brought about a significant change in practice in non-maritime cases. The language in Great Lakes, by comparison, is much more carefully drawn. Throughout the opinion, Justice Kavanaugh consistently frames the issue as whether a choice-of-law clause is enforceable in a maritime contract rather than in a more general sense. The rationales articulated by the Court for declining to adopt the rule laid down in Section 187 are similarly encouraging. The Court stated that Section 187 was not the right rule because it “arose out of interstate cases and does not deal directly with federal-state conflicts.” This language suggests that Section 187 should provide the relevant rule of decision in cases relating to the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses when the conflict of laws is between two states—or between a state and foreign country—rather than between state and federal law.

[This post is cross-posted at Transnational Litigation Blog]

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