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The ILA reminds you to join the celebration of yet another landmark – the Seventy7th Biennial International Conference 2016 – which is set to take place from the 7-11 August 2016 in Sandton, South Africa.

Come join an illustrious panel of distinguished local and international speakers, fellow law professionals, business leaders, academics, as well as young scholars from different parts of the world.

Judge Navi Pillay, who will participate in the panel on international criminal law, and former UN High Commissionar for Human Rights, will deliver the key note address at the opening session of the conference.

If you’ve not yet registered, please see the programme online and join us in Sandton. Should you have registered already, additional speaker sessions have been added and high profile speakers confirmed!The regular registration closes 30 June 2016.

Register, by clicking here.

In  AVOTIŅŠ v Latvia, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR at Strasbourg held late May that Article 6 ECHR (right to fair trial) was engaged but not infringed by the Latvian’s Supreme Court’s application of Article 34(2( Brussel I (now Article 45(1) b Brussels I Recast).

The Article reads ‘A judgment shall not be recognised: (…) 2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so;…

In the case at issue applicant sought refusal by the Latvian court of recognition of a Cypriot judgment issued against him. After review of the Regulation’s core pedigree of mutual recognition and mutual trust, burden of proof particularly exercised the Court: at 121:

‘The fact that the applicant relied on that Article (34(2), GAVC) without having challenged the judgment as required necessarily raised the question of the availability of that legal remedy in Cyprus in the circumstances of the present case. In such a situation the Senate was not entitled simply to criticise the applicant, as it did in its judgment of 31 January 2007, for not appealing against the judgment concerned, and to remain silent on the issue of the burden of proof with regard to the existence and availability of a remedy in the State of origin; Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, like Article 34(2) in fine of the Brussels I Regulation, required it to verify that this condition was satisfied, in the absence of which it could not refuse to examine the applicant’s complaint. The Court considers that the determination of the burden of proof, which, as the European Commission stressed (see paragraph 92 above), is not governed by European Union law, was therefore decisive in the present case. Hence, that point should have been examined in adversarial proceedings leading to reasoned findings. However, the Supreme Court tacitly presumed either that the burden of proof lay with the defendant or that such a remedy had in fact been available to the applicant. This approach, which reflects a literal and automatic application of Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation, could in theory lead to a finding that the protection afforded was manifestly deficient such that the presumption of equivalent protection of the rights of the defence guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 is rebutted. Nevertheless, in the specific circumstances of the present application the Court does not consider this to be the case, although this shortcoming is regrettable.’

Those ‘specific circumstances’ include in particular the applicant’s professional background: at 124:

‘the applicant, who was an investment consultant, should have been aware of the legal consequences of the acknowledgment of debt deed which he had signed. That deed was governed by Cypriot law, concerned a sum of money borrowed by the applicant from a Cypriot company and contained a clause conferring jurisdiction on the Cypriot courts. Accordingly, the applicant should have ensured that he was familiar with the manner in which possible proceedings would be conducted before the Cypriot courts (…). Having omitted to obtain information on the subject he contributed to a large extent, as a result of his inaction and lack of diligence, to bringing about the situation of which he complained before the Court and which he could have prevented so as to avoid incurring any damage’. 

I am not convinced by the Court’s view on the burden of proof ad on the national court’s duty to assess the law in the State of origin sua sponte. Judges Lemmens and Briede, jointly concurring but for different reasons as the court, in my view have the better argument where they say

‘If the applicant wanted to argue that no remedy had in fact been available to him in Cyprus, in our opinion it would have been for him to raise this issue explicitly before the Supreme Court. We question whether he could expect the Supreme Court to raise that issue of its own motion. And we definitely consider that he cannot complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the lack of an explicit response to an argument that was not explicitly made.’

The end result is the same at the ECtHR. For future application of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation however it makes a big difference.

Geert.

The EBS Law School in Wiesbaden, Germany, is looking for a highly skilled and motivated research fellow on a part-time basis (50%).

The position will entail research within the team of the Chair for Civil Law, Civil Procedure and Private International Law (Prof. Dr. Matthias Weller, Mag.rer.publ.) and within the EBS Research Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR) on a number of new and ongoing projects focusing on Private International Law, Transnational Commercial Law and International Civil Litigation.

The position includes teaching and programme management for the “EBS Law Term” on Transnational Commercial Law, an intense academic programme in English from September to December each year for incoming international students from all over the world, mainly from the partner law faculties of the EBS Law School. For further information on this programme: http://www.ebs.edu/lawterm.

Requirements: 

• a university law degree (e.g. JD, preferably the German “Erste Juristische Prüfung”)
• qualifications or at least substantial interest in Private International Law and Transnational Commercial Law
• excellent English language skills

The position is limited to two years but can be prolonged. The work location is Wiesbaden, a city close to Frankfurt, Germany. The work involves 19,75 hours per week (50%). The payment is subject to negotiations with the University, depending on the level of qualifications, but will not be lower than the average payment for research fellows (Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter) there. The faculty offers to obtain a doctoral degree on the basis of a thesis (Dissertation) if the faculty’s requirements for admission are met.

How to Apply:

Please send your application with reference to “ZRV_WiMi_Law Term” via email to antonella.nolten@ebs.edu. The application should include a cover letter, a CV containing, if applicable, list of publications and/or teaching evaluations and electronic copies of all relevant certificates. Please do not hesitate to contact Antonella Nolten in case of further questions.

We are looking forward to hearing from you!

by Lukas Schmidt, Research Fellow at the Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR) of the EBS Law School, Wiesbaden, Germany.

Claudia Pechstein, an internationally successful ice speed skater, claims damages against the International Skating Union (ISU) because of a two-year-suspension for doping. The essential question was whether an arbitration agreement signed by Pechstein is effective. This agreement includes amongst other things the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne. Pechstein claimed that the arbitration agreement was invalid under § 19 GWB (German Antitrust Legislation) because the ISU (nationally and internationally only the ISU organizes competitions in ice speed skating) has abused its dominant position. Pechstein had to sign the arbitration agreement to be admitted to the competition. She claimed that the list of arbitrators of the CAS, from which the parties must each select an arbitrator, has not been prepared impartially because the sports federations and Olympic committees have a clear predominance in creating the list.

However, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) does not agree with these propositions. The Court, by its decision of 7 June 2016, docket no. KZR 6/15, ruled that the action is inadmissible because of the arbitration agreement. The Court held that the ISU is indeed dominant in the organization of international speed skating competitions, but has shown no abusive conduct because the associations and the athletes do not confront each other as guided by fundamentally conflicting interests. There was no structural imbalance in the composition of the tribunal ruling on Pechstein‘s  suspension. Furthermore, in the Court’s view,  Pechstein has signed the agreement voluntarily in the sense of Art. 19 GWB, even if she otherwise could not have participated in the contest. A consideration of the mutual interests justifies the application of the arbitration clause. However Pechstein is entitled to invoke the internationally competent Swiss courts following the arbitral procedure.

I contratti internazionali di agenzia e distribuzione dall’Europa all’Oriente è il titolo dell’incontro in programma il 23 giugno 2016 a Vicenza, promosso dalla locale sezione dell’Associazione Italiana Giovani Avvocati (AIGA) con il patrocinio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Vicenza.

L’incontro vedrà il susseguirsi di interventi in tema di liquidazione dell’indennità di fine rapporto nei contratti internazionali di agenzia e distribuzione nella giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia (Silvia Petruzzino, Foro di Lugano), di agenzia e distribuzione in Vietnam e in Iran (Federico Vasoli, Foro di Milano) e di distribuzione e commercio elettronico in Cina (Roberto Luzi Crivellini, Foro di Verona).

Maggiori informazioni sull’incontro e sulle modalità d’iscrizione sono consultabili sulla locandina, qui disponibile.

Despite the fact that thousands of legal persons and personal relations are subject to Liechtenstein Private International Law, Liechtenstein law has retained some unique features.  Whether the unique features should be maintained, or provide the reasoning for a reform agenda, will be discussed at the 2nd Liechtenstein Conference on 30 June 2016 organised by the Propter Homines Chair for Banking and Securities Law at the University of Liechtenstein.

The presentations will deal with Liechtenstein international company, foundation and trust law,  conflicts of law relating to banks, prospectus liability and collectus investment schemes, as well as matters of succession and the potential of Liechtenstein as an arbitration venue. All presentations will be held in German.

Please find further information here.

In case of interests please contact: nadja.dobler@uni.li

Does Article 21 TEU on EU citisenship, facilitate one’s acquiring names bearing the tokens of nobility, acquired in one Member State (here: the flexible ‘deed poll’ regime available to citisens of the United Kingdom), for subsequent use in another Member State less keen on such (token or real) titles? In Case C-438/14 Bogendorff the CJEU held that it does not.

Applicant at issue had acquired UK nationality over and above German nationality (which he held by birth). Subsequent adoption but especially vanity had led to a change in first name and surname by deed poll, a very flexible name change regime available to UK citisens. German authorities however refused to recognise the name change upon the occasion of registration of applicant’s daughter, citing public order considerations in particular Germany’s long-standing objection against aristocratic titles, real or vanity, so as to emphasise equality before the law.  The court’s approach on free movement and names in my view has taken a better turn since Vardyn, Case C-391/09, where it left its insistence that only copy /paste recognition of names by authorities in other Member States can safeguard citisens free movement rights.

In the case of aristocratic titles, however, the court has always recognised in particular Austria’s and Germany’s right to extend domestic policies to incoming citisens, on the basis of public policy considerations. Current case differs from Sayn-Wittgenstein, C‑208/09. The latter concerned Austrian law, which has a strict prohibition on the use and transmission of titles of nobility. Under German law by contrast all privileges and inequalities connected with birth or position have been abolished in Germany. Titles of nobility which were actually borne when the Weimar Constitution entered into force may continue as elements of a name and may be transmitted as a fact of personal status. The creation of new titles of nobility and the grant of such titles are prohibited.

Hence for Germany to refuse to recognise such titles where they have been accidentally obtained abroad (by birth, marriage or adoption) would run counter EU citisenhip. By contrast, it would run counter to the intention of the German legislature for German nationals, using the law of another Member State, to adopt afresh abolished titles of nobility. Systematic recognition of changes of name such as that at issue in the main proceedings could lead to that result.

Name dropping undoubtedly will continue. Name shopping has been halted.

Geert.

Con un decreto depositato il 17 maggio 2016, il Tribunale per i minorenni di Bologna si è pronunciato sul riconoscimento di una sentenza di adozione emessa negli Stati Uniti con la quale era stata disposta l’adozione piena di una minore, cittadina americana, in favore della moglie della madre biologica.

Nel novembre del 2014, lo stesso Tribunale aveva sollevato una questione di legittimità costituzionale degli articoli 35 e 36 della legge 4 maggio 1983, n. 184, in materia di adozione, nella parte in cui non consentono al giudice di valutare, nel caso concreto, se risponda all’interesse del minore adottato all’estero il riconoscimento della sentenza straniera che abbia pronunciato la sua adozione da parte del coniuge del genitore, a prescindere dal fatto che il matrimonio abbia prodotto effetti in Italia (in proposito si veda questo post).

La Corte costituzionale, con sentenza n. 76 del 7 aprile 2016, aveva dichiarato inammissibile la questione. I giudici costituzionali hanno preso le mosse dalla ricostruzione dell’art. 41 della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato, che prevede due diversi procedimenti per il riconoscimento di provvedimenti stranieri in materia di adozione. Accanto al riconoscimento “automatico” contemplato attraverso il richiamo agli articoli 64, 65 e 66 della stessa legge, la norma stabilisce, al secondo comma, che “restano ferme le disposizioni delle leggi speciali in materia di adozione dei minori”, ossia gli articoli 35 e 36 della legge 184/1983.  Secondo la Corte “l’applicazione della legislazione speciale in materia di riconoscimento della sentenza di adozione internazionale di minori – che richiede un previo vaglio giudiziale, ad opera del Tribunale per i minorenni – non può che escludere il contemporaneo rinvio alle disposizioni ordinarie sul riconoscimento ‘automatico’ dei provvedimenti stranieri”.

In virtù di tali rilievi, il Tribunale per i minorenni di Bologna – escludendo l’applicabilità della procedura di riconoscimento di cui all’art. 36, comma 4, della legge n. 184/1983 (che estende il controllo giudiziale del minore ad una particolare ipotesi di adozione di minori stranieri in stato di abbandono da parte di cittadini italiani), poiché al momento dell’adozione tanto la ricorrente quanto la minore erano cittadine americane – ha considerato che il provvedimento straniero dovesse essere sottoposto a riconoscimento automatico mediante trascrizione a cura dell’ufficiale di stato civile. Il Tribunale, evidenziando tuttavia che la Consulta ha disatteso il rilievo in merito alla cittadinanza (anche) italiana della ricorrente al momento della domanda, ha escluso la propria potestas decidendi non sussistendo i presupposti di cui all’art. 41, comma 2, della legge n. 218/95 per derogare alla competenza della Corte d’appello con riguardo al riconoscimento di provvedimenti stranieri e, di conseguenza, ha dichiarato l’inammissibilità della domanda.

Affinché la ricorrente possa poi “conseguire il risultato sperato”, il Tribunale ha infine suggerito di trarre spunto da un caso analogo a quello di specie e giunto dinanzi alla Corte d’appello di Milano (la decisione è consultabile qui).

Si ringrazia l’avv. Claudio Pezzi per la segnalazione.

The new 2007 Lugano Convention, establishing parallelism with the Brussels I Regulation (Reg. 44/2001), had just entered into force in Switzerland in 2010 when it faced a new challenge in the form of the Recast Regulation (Reg. 1215/2012). Therefore, in 2014, CIVPRO (University of Bern), CCR (University of Luzern) and the Swiss Institute for Comparative Law (Lausanne) invited professors, researchers, civil officers and practitioners from all over Europe to discuss the future of European civil procedure with a special focus on Lugano and third states. Alexander Markus (Bern), Andreas Furrer (Luzern) and Ilaria Pretelli (Lausanne) have now published the (English/German) volume containing the keynote speeches and the subsequent contributions to this conference as well as the reports on the discussion in the various panels. This book presents and analyzes the past, the present and the alternative conceivable futures of the Lugano model of a “parallel” convention. For further information, click here.

Institute of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society has recently come to my attention thanks to Juliett Hatchett over at Baker: her analysis is spot on and I am happy to refer to it. She summarises the case as the district court confirming that perpetrating and funding piracy and unsafe navigation are within the scope of ATS jurisdiction, but holding that there is no enforceable international norm against whaling or financing terrorism.

The case is not easy to find however Sea Shepherd tend to link to court documents in their updates on the litigation.

I flag the case mainly to bring it to readers’ attention that CSR litigation can be done proactively: one need not wait for alleged violations of relevant legal standards to seek to seize a court. Exactly a point I assessed in the context of vulture fund litigation, end of May. (And in forthcoming paper).

Geert.

Clayton P. Gillette, Advanced Introduction to International Sales Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, ISBN 9781784711870, pp. 160, GBP 58,50.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Providing a concise overview of the basic doctrines underlying the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Clayton Gillette explores their ambiguities and thus considers the extent to which uniform international commercial law is possible, as well as appraising the extent to which the doctrines in the UN Convention reflect those that commercial parties would prefer. With its compelling combination of doctrine and theory, this book makes an ideal companion for students and legal scholars alike.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

This post has kindly been provided by Dr. Susanne Gössl, LL.M.

“This post is meant to remind that the deadline for applications for the Young PIL Scholars’ Conference in Bonn, Germany, in April 2017 is approaching.

We accept applications of junior researchers to present a paper until 30 June 2016. The topic is “Politics and Private International Law (?)”. We envisage presentations of half an hour each in German language with subsequent discussion on the respective subject. The presented papers will be published in a conference transcript by Mohr Siebeck.

Please send an exposé of maximum 1,000 words to nachwuchs-ipr(at)institut-familienrecht.de. The exposé shall be in German language and composed anonymously that is without any reference to the authorship. The author including his/her position or other affiliation shall be identifiable from a separate file.

Additional information can be found at https://www.jura.uni-bonn.de/en/institut-fuer-deutsches-europaeisches-und-internationales-familienrecht/pil-conference/call-for-papers/

If you have any further questions, please contact Dr. Susanne Gössl, LL.M. (sgoessl(at)uni-bonn.de).”

On 24 June 2016, the University of Lincoln will host the conference titled Private and Public International Law: Strengthening Connections”.

As the final event of a two-year research project led by academics in Edinburgh and Lincoln, the conference aims at exploring the connections existing between Private and Public International Law across a wide range of interdisciplinary topics.

Subjects covered include jurisdiction, State immunity, corporate social responsibility, arbitration, and trade in medical services.

The full program of the conference is available here.

Further information can be found here.

In C-222/15 Hőszig Advocate General Szpunar opined using the sensible route, on the application of Article 23 of Regulation 44/2001 . His excursus though on Article 25 of the Brussels I Recast and the new lex fori prorogati rule is the part of his judgment which I read with most interest.

First things first: can choice of court made in underlying documentation in the context of a tender, for which Hőszig entered a winning bid, be considered valid under Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation (now: Article 25 Brussels I Recast). Pursuant to Clause 23.1 of these ‘general conditions of purchase’, headed ‘applicable law and settlement of disputes’, ‘[t]he Order shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with French law. The application of the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods dated April 11, 1980 is excluded. Any dispute arising out of or in connection with the validity, construction, performance or termination of the Order, which the parties are unable to settle amicably shall be finally and exclusively settled by the courts of Paris, including in the case of a summary procedure, injunctions or conservatory measure.’

Hőszig tried to sue instead in what it considered to be the place of performance of the contract, per Article 5(1) (now 7(1) in the Recast). Its torpedo of the choice of court included in the general conditions of purchase, was based on recourse to Article 10(2) Rome I, which holds that the putative law of the contract does not apply to consider a party’s consent if it would not be reasonable to do so. In such case the law of the habitual residence of said party applies. Here this would lead to Hungarian law rather than French law and Hungarian law, it is argued, would not accept such incorporation of general terms and conditions. Szpunar AG however simply refers to the fact that choice of court agreements are excluded from the Rome I Regulation. Recourse to Article 10(2) is barred by that exclusion.

What needs to be considered under Article 23 Brussels I is whether parties have reached consensus, ‘clearly and precisely demonstrated’, the AG suggests. This wording is typically associated with choice of law under Rome I however I would support its use in the context of the Brussels I (and Recast) Regulation, too, for that is what the Court’s case-law on the Article amounts to. Applying Case 24/76 Colzani mutatis mutandis, and taking into account that express reference to the general terms and conditions in documents exchanged between the parties prior to the tender being awarded, the AG concludes that agreement had been reached.

Now, is the expression ‘courts of Paris’ sufficiently precise? Szpunar AG suggests it is and I would concur, albeit that the last word on  that is probably not yet said. The Advocate General refers to Capotorti AG in Case 23/78 Meeth, who had advised that a clause worded such as here, refers by implication to the system of rules of territorial jurisdiction (typically on the basis of a combination of value and subject-matter) to determine precisely at which court proceedings must be instituted. The Court itself did not at all elaborate in the eventual judgment. Szpunar AG suggests it must have taken Capororti’s suggestion for granted. Therefore (at 44 of the Opinion) it is French procedural law which governs the question of precisely which Paris court is competent.

This leaves open the question, though (which I understand is not sub judice here) whether parties can employ choice of court to trump national rules of civil procedure. What if they agree that the courts of say province X in Member State A are preferable to settle the issue, e.g. because of perceived know-how, even if national civil procedure would ordinarily assign the case to province Y? Not an issue which to my knowledge has been settled by EU case-law.

By way of sign-off, the Advocate General then reviews whether the new text, Regulation 1215/2012, has in any way altered or added to the discussion on choice of court agreements. Readers will be aware (via this blog or the Handbook or otherwise) that the new Regulation refers to the lex fori prorogati to determine the validity of the choice of court agreement:  ‘[i]f the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member State’ (emphasis added by Szpunar AG).

Under Brussels I, various options were defended. Szpunar AG refers to Slynn AG having defended lex fori prorogati in Case 150/80 Elefanten Schuh,  and Szpunar AH himself suggest (at 47 in fine) lex fori additi under the Brussels I Regulation (44/2001).

The AG is most certainly correct in my view that the lex fori prorogati is not meant to cover all aspects of the validity of the agreement. In my Handbook I distinguish between the expression of consent (harmonised by Article 25), and the formation of consent (not touched upon by Brussels I and now subject to the lex fori prorogati). He then suggests that the insertion of lex fori prorogati was meant to align the Brussels I (Recast) with the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, to which the EU have now acceded. I do not recall any such reference in the travaux preparatoires of Regulation 1215/2012 – however it has been a while since I consulted them extensively and the AG presumably has.

The Court of course will be much more succinct than its AG.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9Heading 2.2.9.4. Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.2 .

On 25 May 2016, the European Commission presented its long-awaited proposal for a regulation on addressing geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market (COM[2016] 289 final).

In the Commission’s words, “[t]he general objective of this proposal is to give customers better access to goods and services in the Single Market by preventing direct and indirect discrimination by traders artificially segmenting the market based on customers’ residence. Customers experience such differences in treatment when purchasing online, but also when travelling to other Member States to buy goods or services. Despite the implementation of the non-discrimination principle in Article 20(2) of Directive 2006/123/EC 3 (“Services Directive”), customers still face refusals to sell and different conditions, when buying goods or services across borders. This is mainly due to uncertainty over what constitutes objective criteria that justify differences in the way traders treat customers. In order to remedy this problem, traders and customers should have more clarity about the situations in which differences in treatment based on residence are not justifiable. This proposal prohibits the blocking of access to websites and other online interfaces and the rerouting of customers from one country version to another. It furthermore prohibits discrimination against customers in four specific cases of the sale of goods and services and does not allow the circumventing of such a ban on discrimination in passive sales agreements. Both consumers and businesses as end users of goods or services are affected by such practices and should therefore benefit from the rules set out in this proposal. Transactions where goods or services are purchased by a business for resale should, however, be excluded in order to allow traders to set up their distribution systems in compliance with European competition law.”

From a conflicts perspective, the question that is most interesting is how the prevention of geo-blocking and similar techniques will relate to the “directed-activity”-criterion that the European legislature has used both in the Rome I Regulation (Article 6(1)(b)) and in the Brussels I (recast) Regulation (Article 17(1)(c)). In a series of cases starting with the Alpenhof decision of 2011 (ECLI:EU:C:2010:740) the CJEU has developed a formula for determining the direction of a trader‘s activity by focusing on its subjective intention to deliver goods or services to consumers in a certain country, i.e. that it “should be ascertained whether, before the conclusion of any contract with the consumer, it is apparent from those websites and the trader’s overall activity that the trader was envisaging doing business with consumers domiciled in one or more Member States, including the Member State of that consumer’s domicile, in the sense that it was minded to conclude a contract with them.” If standard techniques of geo-blocking or the use of different sets of general conditions of access to their goods or services are now banned as discriminatory, how will this affect the test developed by the CJEU; in other word, is it reasonable to infer that a trader has actually been “minded to conclude a contract” and consented to being sued in the state of the consumer’s domicile if the trader has no legal option not to offer goods or services to the customer? The drafters have noticed this obvious problem and inserted a pertinent clause into Article 1 no. 5 of the proposal, which reads:

“This Regulation shall not affect acts of Union law concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters. Compliance with this Regulation shall not be construed as implying that a trader directs his or her activities to the Member State where the consumer has the habitual residence or domicile within the meaning of point (b) of Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 and point (c) of Article 17(1) of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012.”

In light of the highly controversial experience with similar reservations – it suffices to think of Article 1(4) of the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) or Recital 10 of the recently withdrawn CESL proposal (COM[2011]635 final) –, I have doubts whether the separation between the two areas of law will work as smoothly as the Commission seems to imagine: if a trader is legally coerced to serve consumers in a certain state, any test aimed at determining his or her “state of mind” to do so necessarily becomes moot – which, on the other hand, may be a good opportunity for the CJEU to rethink its frequently criticized approach. Considering the (non-)treatment of Recitals 24 and 25 of the Rome I Regulation in Emrek (ECLI:EU:C:2013:666), however, I am inclined not too expect much deference from the Court to interpretative guidance provided by the European legislators…

The title exaggerates. However the CJEU will have an opportunity in C-136/16 SMD v Banco Santander to hold how ‘international’ a case has to be to trigger application of the European private international law Regulations. In both Owusu and Lindner the Court suggested a flexible approach to the ‘international’ character of a case (hence to the Regulations being easily engaged). The case referred is reminiscent of Banco Santander Totta at the High Court. In that case, however, jurisdiction was not contested and analysis focused on the reach of Article 3(3) Rome I (relating to ‘purely domestic contracts’).

I have copy/pasted the questions referred below. No doubt the CJEU will not entertain them all.

Crucial questions, are: is choice of court ex the country enough for the  case to be considered ‘international’; if it is, can forum non conveniens-type considerations lead to the (national) Court seized ignoring choice of court; if it is not, what other international elements need to be present and does choice of law play a role in this assessment.

Exciting. Once private international law engaged, literally the whole world opens up to contracting parties. If it is not, one is stuck with national law.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.2.1

In a dispute between two national undertakings of a Member State concerning agreements, does the fact that such agreements contain clauses conferring jurisdiction to another Member State constitute a sufficient international element to give rise to the application of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 1 and Regulation No 1215/2012 to determine international jurisdiction, or must there be other international elements?

May application of the jurisdiction agreement be waived where the choice of the courts of a Member State other than that of the nationality of the parties causes serious inconvenience for one of those parties and the other party has no good reason to justify such choice?

In the event that it is held that other international elements are necessary in addition to the jurisdiction agreement:

Do the swap agreements concluded between [Sociedade Metropolitana de Desenvolvimento, S.A.] (‘SMD’) and Banco Santander Totta have sufficient international elements to give rise to the application of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 and Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 in order to determine which courts have international jurisdiction to settle disputes relating to them where:

(a)    Those entities are nationals of a Member State, Portugal, that concluded two swap agreements in Portugal consisting of an ISDA Master Agreement and two confirmations, negotiated by the Autonomous Region of Madeira on behalf of SMD;

(b)    In that negotiation, the Autonomous Region of Madeira, assisted by Banco BPI, S.A., and by a law firm, invited more than one international bank to submit proposals, one of those invited banks being JP Morgan;

(c)    Banco Santander Totta is wholly owned by Banco Santander, with domicile in Spain;

(d)    Banco Santander Totta acted in its capacity as an international bank with subsidiaries in various Member States and under the single brand Santander;

(e)    Banco Santander Totta was considered in the ISDA Master Agreement as a Multibranch Party, able to make and receive payments in any transaction through its subsidiaries in London or Luxemburg;

(f)    Under the terms of the ISDA Master Agreement concluded, the parties may, in certain cases, transfer their rights and obligations to other representative offices or subsidiaries;

(g)    The parties to the swap agreements specified that English law was applicable and concluded jurisdiction agreements that confer exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts;

(h)    The agreements were drafted in English and the terminology and concepts used are Anglo-Saxon;

(i)    The swap agreements were concluded with the objective of covering the risk of variation in the interest rates of two financing agreements, both drafted in English and concluded with foreign entities (one based in the Netherlands and the other in Italy), and in one of the financing agreements it is provided that borrowers’ payments must be made to the HSBC Bank Plc account in London, on dates defined by reference to the London time zone and subject to English law and the English courts;

(j)    Banco Santander Totta acted as an intermediary of the international market, having concluded hedging agreements in the context of the international market?

Many thanks to Dr Eva Lein, Herbert Smith Freehills Senior Research Fellow in Private International Law, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, who has shared this information and provided the link below. 

Are there general principles of European conflict of laws? Looking at the myriad of EU regulations in the area, one may well doubt it. And this explains why a new book edited by Stefan Leible is so topical. It addresses themes and concepts that reoccur across different conflicts regulations, but so far have not yet come under detailed scrutiny as to whether they follow a coherent approach. Among them are the usual suspects such as preliminary questions, characterisation, renvoi, party autonomy, the determination of habitual residence and the application of overriding mandatory rules, to name but a few. They are complemented by broader topics such as the role of recognition as a substitute for conflict of laws and economic efficiency in European private international law. The idea of treating those themes in one volume chimes with Leible’s idea of a ‚Rome 0’ Regulation, which he has expounded earlier together with Michael Müller (14 (2012/13) Yearbook of Private International Law 137). The book is a logical follow-up on this proposal. It analyses issue by issue whether there is indeed enough material that deserves to be treated in a ‘General Part’ of European private international law. The authors of the book are well-known experts in the field, such as Peter Mankowski, Heinz-Peter Mansel and Jan von Hein. The only criticism one may level is that they are almost exclusively from Germany. It would be interesting to see how lawyers from other countries react to the – quite Germanic – idea of an ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ for the European conflict of laws.

Find the table of contents here.

Virginia Pardo Iranzo, Competencia, Reconocimiento y Ejecución de Resoluciones Extranjeras en la Unión Europea, Tirant lo Blanch, 2016, pp. 351, ISBN: 9788491193005, Euro 34,90.

[Dal sito dell’editore] Hace apenas un año entró en vigor el Reglamento 1215/2012, sobre competencia, reconocimiento y ejecución de resoluciones extranjeras en la Unión Europea. El mismo, además de fijar los criterios para la determinación de la competencia judicial internacional tiene la virtud de eliminar el exequatur como trámite previo a la ejecución de títulos extranjeros. El presente libro analiza el citado reglamento y lo hace desde una perspectiva práctica, dando respuestas a las dudas interpretativas que su articulado está planteando. Junto con este instrumento, de carácter general, se analizan entre otros la reciente orden europea de retención de cuentas (Reglamento 655/2014) o el problemático Reglamento 4/2009, relativo a la obligación de alimentos, cuyo ámbito de aplicación es específico.

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Veerle Van Den Eeckhout has written a working paper version of an article on the Proposed  Revision of the Posting Directive. It is written in Dutch.  The working paper is entitled “Toepasselijk arbeidsrecht bij langdurige detachering volgens het voorstel tot wijziging van de Detacheringsrichtlijn. Enkele beschouwingen vanuit Ipr-perspectief bij het voorstel tot wijziging van de Detacheringsrichtlijn” (in English: “The Law Applicable to Long-Term Postings According to the Proposal for a Directive Amending the Posting Directive. Some Reflections from a Private International Law Perspective on the Proposal for a Directive Amending the Posting Directive”).

In this contribution, the author formulates some reflections from the perspective of Private International Law on the proposal for a revision of the Posting Directive, focusing on the issue of the law applicable to long-term postings.

You can download Prof. Van Den Eeckhout’s paper here.

Régimes matrimoniaux de participation aux acquêts et autres mécanismes participatifs entre époux en Europe, a cura di Elena Lauroba Lacasa e Maria Esperança Ginebra Molins, LGDJ, 2016, pp. 296, ISBN: 9782365170581, Euro 28,00.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – L’adoption par l’Allemagne et la France d’un régime matrimonial commun de participation aux acquêts, dont il a été pris acte lors du douzième conseil des ministres franco-allemand le 4 février 2010, donne tout son intérêt à l’étude comparative et approfondie de cette situation. Ce livre regroupe ainsi les contributions présentées lors du colloque qui s’est tenu les 7 et 8 novembre 2013 à la Faculté de Droit de Barcelone. Le défi était de présenter une cartographie comparatiste des différents régimes économiques matrimoniaux de participation aux acquêts, ainsi que d’identifier les mécanismes adoptés par des systèmes ayant fait le choix de consacrer un régime de séparation de biens – exemple pris de la Catalogne – non sans faciliter une communication participative des gains des époux. C’était aussi l’occasion d’étudier d’autres initiatives européennes et formules participatives, parmi lesquelles les options ouvertes aux couples de fait.

 Ulteriori informazioni sul volume sono disponibili qui.