Flux des sites DIP

Edited by Professors Jürgen Basedow, John Birds, Malcolm A. Clarke, Herman Cousy, Helmut Heiss and Dr. Leander D. Loacker, the second expanded edition of “Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL)” has just been released. The updated volume is based on no less than 15 years of cooperative research in the field of cross-border insurance law, which was initiated at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law (Hamburg) under the guidance of Director Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Jürgen Basedow, LL.M. (Harvard), and involved legal scholars from 14 Member States of the European Union as well as Switzerland. In 2009, the Project Group “Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law” first published the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL), which provided model rules for a common European insurance contract law in the form of an optional instrument.

While the first edition set out provisions regarding general insurance law, the new expanded volume also covers rules on liability insurance, life insurance and group insurance. In addition, the book contains translated versions of the PEICL rules in Chinese, Czech, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Polish, Portuguese, Serbian, Slovak, Spanish, Swedish and Turkish.

For further information, please see the publisher’s website here.

La Corte di Giustizia è stata recentemente investita di un rinvio pregiudiziale volto a chiarire l’incidenza del diritto primario dell’Unione europea sulle norme che disciplinano, a livello nazionale, il riconoscimento della modifica di un cognome intervenuta sulla base delle regole di un diverso Stato membro (Causa C-541/15, Mircea Florian Freitag).

Il dubbio del giudice remittente concerne l’interpretazione degli articoli 18 e 21 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione. La prima di tali norme vieta, nel campo di applicazione dei trattati, “ogni discriminazione effettuata in base alla nazionalità”, mentre la seconda garantisce ad ogni cittadino dell’Unione “il diritto di circolare e di soggiornare liberamente nel territorio degli Stati membri”.

Il quesito — che dovrebbe consentire alla Corte di sviluppare gli orientamenti delineati (in un contesto non identico) nella sentenza Grunkin e Paul  del 2008 (C-353/06) — punta a sapere se le norme testé richiamate impongano alle autorità di uno Stato membro di “riconoscere la modifica del cognome di un cittadino di tale Stato se questi è nel contempo cittadino di un altro Stato membro e in tale Stato ha (ri-)acquisito, a seguito di una modifica del cognome non legata a una variazione dello stato di famiglia, il proprio cognome originario ricevuto alla nascita, benché l’acquisizione di tale cognome non sia avvenuta quando il cittadino aveva la residenza abituale nell’altro Stato membro e sia avvenuta dietro sua richiesta”.

The University of Milan will host on 4 March 2016 the final conference of a project co-funded by the Civil Justice Programme of the EU: “Towards the Entry into Force of the Succession Regulation: Building Future Uniformity upon Past Divergencies“.

The project, lasting from April 2014 to March 2016, focuses on the impact of Regulation 650/2012 on national legal systems and the related national and European case law with the aim of assessing the changes that it introduces to legal practice, arising awareness within the legal professionals (notaries, lawyers and court judges), providing training and disseminating information in order to promote future uniformity in the application of its provisions. Video footage of the conferences and seminars organized in the frame of the project are available on its website, as well as a database of caselaw and legislation related to succession matters.

The sessions of the final conference will be held in English and Italian (with simultaneous interpreting). Here’s the programme (available as a .pdf file):

Welcome addresses – Presentation of the Project

• Stefania Bariatti (Univ. of Milan)
• Domenico Cambareri (Notary in Milan)
• Petra Jeney (EIPA, Luxembourg)

SESSION 1: Scope and definitions. Chair: Alegría Borrás (Univ. of Barcelona)

• Introduction to the Regulation and to Its Scope, Domenico Damascelli (Notary in Turi and Univ. of Salento)
• The Definition of “Succession” and Habitual Residence Within the Meaning of the Regulation (EU) 650/2012, Peter Kindler (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)

SESSION 2: Applicable law. Chair: Roberta Clerici (Univ. of Milan)

• Applicable Law: Choice of Law, Ilaria Viarengo (Univ. of Milan)
• Agreements as to Successions, Jacopo Re (Univ. of Milan)
• Public Policy and Overriding Mandatory Rules, Francesca C. Villata (Univ. of Milan)
• Renvoi, Luigi Fumagalli (Univ. of Milan)
• Practice Paper, Daniele Muritano (Notary in Empoli)

SESSION 3: Jurisdiction and recognition. Chair: Alexandra Irina Danila (Notary in Romania)

• Jurisdiction: General Rules and Choice of Court, Ilaria Queirolo (Univ. of Genoa)
• Jurisdiction: Other Grounds, Stefania Bariatti (Univ. of Milan)
• Recognition of Judgments, Stefano Dominelli / Francesco Pesce (Univ. of Genoa)
• European Certificate of Succession: First Remarks concerning its Application, Carlo Alberto Marcoz (Notary in Turin)

SESSION 4: Round Table: The Impact on Member States and Third Countries. Chair: Stefania Bariatti (Univ. of Milan)

• Isidoro Calvo Vidal (Notary in Coruña)
• Cyril Nourissat (Univ. Jean Moulin Lyon 3)
• Peter Kindler (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
• Andrew Godfrey (Russell-Cooke, London)
• Paul Beaumont/Jayne Holliday (Univ. of Aberdeen)

Further information and the registration form are available on the conference’s webpage.

L’Università di Milano, assieme alla Fondazione Italiana del Notariato ed altri enti, organizza per il 4 marzo 2016 un convegno dal titolo Il diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni. Si tratta dell’evento conclusivo di una ricerca dedicata al regolamento n. 650/2012 sulle successioni mortis causa, co-finanziata dalla Commissione europea.

Il convegno si articolerà in quattro sessioni, dedicate rispettivamente all’ambito di applicazione del regolamento e alle nozioni di cui esso si serve, alle norme sui conflitti di leggi, a quelle sulla giurisdizione e il riconoscimento delle decisioni e all’impatto della disciplina uniforme sugli ordinamenti statali.

Interverranno, fra gli altri, Stefania Bariatti (Univ. Milano), Paul Beaumont (Univ. Aberdeen), Alegría Borrás (Univ. Barcellona), Roberta Clerici (Univ. Milano), Peter Kindler (Univ. Monaco), Luigi Fumagalli (Univ. Milano), Cyril Nourissat (Univ. Lyon), Ilaria Queirolo (Univ. Genova), Francesca Villata (Univ. Milano) e Ilaria Viarengo (Univ. Milano).

Il programma può leggersi qui.

La partecipazione – gratuita – richiede la registrazione al sito www.suxreg.eu.

At the Institute for Foreign and Private International Law of the Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg im Breisgau (Germany), a vacancy has to be filled at the chair for private law, private international law and comparative law (chairholder: Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein), from 1 April, 2016 with

a legal research assistant (salary scale E 13 TV-L, personnel quota 50%)
limited for 2 years.

The assistant is supposed to support the organizational and educational work of the chairholder, to participate in research projects of the chair as well as to teach his or her own courses (students’ exercise). Applicants are offered the opportunity to obtain a doctorate.

Applicants are expected to be interested in the chair’s main areas of research. They should possess an above-average German First State Examination (at least “vollbefriedigend”) or a foreign equivalent degree and be fluent in German. In addition, a thorough knowledge of German civil law as well as conflict of laws, comparative law and/or international procedural law is a necessity. Severely handicapped persons will be preferred provided that their qualification is equal.

Please send your application (curriculum vitae, certificates and, if available, further proofs of talent) to Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein, Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Abt. III, Peterhof, Niemensstr. 10, D-79098 Freiburg (Germany) no later than 1 March, 2016.

As the application documents will not be returned, applicants are kindly requested to submit only unauthenticated copies. Alternatively, the documents may be sent as a pdf-file via e-mail to ipr3@jura.uni-freiburg.de.

A collection of papers from the 11th Regional Private International Law Conference held in Osijek, Croatia, on 11-12 June 2014 is out now. The book, edited by Professor Mirela Župan, contains scientiffic contributions by prominent authors on topics ranging from analysing the role and/or meaning of different connecting factors (habitual residence, nationality, party autonomy) to commenting on the effects which ECtHR case law may have on the interpretation of the Hague Abduction Convention. In addition, the book contains six national reports on the operation of the Hague Abduction Convention in the region.
The links to the books in .pdf and .epub formats are available here.

Readers of our blog might recall that Jan von Hein and I convened a conference on coherence in European private international law in Freiburg i.Br. (Germany) in October 2014 (see our previous post). Today, we are happy to report that the findings of the conference have just been published by the German publishing house Mohr Siebeck.

The  volume critically assesses the current state of European private international law including the law of international civil procedure. It sheds light on existing incoherences, describes the requirements for a more coherent regulation and discusses perspectives for a future European codification in the field of Private International Law. In addition, the volume contains English language summaries of each contribution as well as detailed discussion reports.

More information is available on the publisher’s website. The table of contents reads as follows:

Part 1: Grundlagen

• Jürgen Basedow, Kohärenz im Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht der Europäischen Union: Eine einleitende Orientierung
• Anatol Dutta, Gemeinsame oder getrennte Kodifikation von IPR und IZVR auf europäischer Ebene: Die bisherigen und geplanten Verordnungen im Familien- und Erbrecht als Vorbilder für andere Rechtsgebiete?
• Thomas Kadner Graziano, Gemeinsame oder getrennte Kodifikation von IPR und IZVR: Das schweizerische IPR-Gesetz als Modell für eine europäische Gesamtkodifikation – Lehren für die EU?

Part 2: Der räumliche Anwendungsbereich des europäischen IPR/IZVR

• Burkhard Hess, Binnenverhältnisse im Europäischen Zivilprozessrecht: Grenzüberschreitende v. nationale Sachverhalte
• Tanja Domej, Das Verhältnis nach „außen“: Europäische v. Drittstaatensachverhalte
• Andrea Schulz, Die EU und die Haager Konferenz für Internationales Privatrecht

Part 3: Subjektive und personale Anknüpfungspunkte im europäischen IPR/IZVR

• Felix Maultzsch, Parteiautonomie im Internationalen Privat- und Zivilverfahrensrecht
• Frauke Wedemann, Die Verortung juristischer Personen im europäischen IPR und IZVR
• Brigitta Lurger, Die Verortung natürlicher Personen im europäischen IPR und IZVR: Wohnsitz, gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt, Staatsangehörigkeit

Part 4: Objektive Anknüpfungsmomente für Schuldverhältnisse im europäischen IPR/IZVR

• Michael Müller, Objektive Anknüpfungsmomente für Schuldverhältnisse im europäischen IPR und IZVR: Die Behandlung vertraglicher Sachverhalte
• Haimo Schack, Kohärenz im europäischen Internationalen Deliktsrecht

Part 4: Schutz schwächerer Parteien und von Allgemeininteressen im europäischen IPR/IZVR

• Eva-Maria Kieninger, Der Schutz schwächerer Personen im Schuldrecht
• Urs Peter Gruber, Der Schutz schwächerer Personen im Familien- und Erbrecht
• Moritz Renner, Ordre public und Eingriffsnormen: Konvergenzen und Divergenzen zwischen IPR und IZVR

The November 2015 draft ‘Judgments project’ of the Hague Conference on private international law, otherwise known as the draft convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to civil and commercial matters, is a very ambitious project which at the same time risks exposing some of the inherent weaknesses of the modus operandi of the Hague Conference. This is not the right forum for an exhaustive analysis. Rather, with input from other members (Elsemiek Apers in particular) at Leuven PIL institute, I would like to flag some areas of interest. Inevitably, an obvious point of reference is the European Union’s Brussels I (Recast) regime.

First, the text itself. The Working Group’s report, which accompanies the draft, explains the history and development of the text and the various options taken. No need to repeat it here. The approach of the Convention is the same ‘mission creep’ which the 1968 Brussels Convention had to resort to, to enhance the free movement of judgments between Member States. Given that the most widespread reason for refusal of recognition and enforcement (R&E), are accusations of excessive or inappropriate exercise of jurisdiction, one can only truly co-ordinate R&E if one also co-ordinates jurisdiction. The Hague Convention takes this route in Articles 5-6, (Exclusive) bases for recognition and enforcement. Following this co-ordination of jurisdictional rules, Article 7 then limits the ground upon which R&E may be refused.

Of note is that Article 4(2)’s ban on merits review (when assessing the possibility of recognition and enforcement), probably does not extend to judgments issued by default. The Article is not clear on what is meant exactly: the first para of Article 4(2) rules out ‘review of the merits’. The second para suggests ‘The court addressed shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by default.’ Not being bound by findings of fact does not necessarily entail a possibility for merits review, and the text can probably do with clarification at this point.

Article 5(e)’s special jurisdictional rule for contracts, has been clarified compared with earlier versions, however the text remains subject to plenty of room for debate.

Article 8’s room for refusing R&E when the exclusive jurisdictional rules of the Convention were infringed, or where matters excluded from the Convention were at issue, could in our view do with tidying up. It currently mingles scope for refusal of R&E as such, in the case of infringement of the exclusive jurisdictional rules, with discussion of excluded matters as ‘preliminary issues’ only – a clear reference to the EU’s experience with arbitration. Without editorial perfection, however, this article, in combination with Article 2’s excluded matters, risks similar and protracted debate as was /is the case under Brussels I (and the Recast).

Further, the modus operandi, and institutional consequences of the Convention. As indicated, an exhaustive review of the Convention is not possible here. That is due in large part to the extensive comments which one could address vis-a-vis each individual entry of the text. Rather like in the case of each individual provision of the Brussels regime. In the case of the latter, the CJEU is exercised on a very regular basis with the determination of the precise meaning of the heads of jurisdiction. In the Hague process, there is no such institution. One has to rely on the application of the Convention by the signatory States. At some point, one has to assess whether it is tenable not to have some kind of review process at The Hague, lest one risks the Convention being applied quite differently in the various signatory States. Coupled with the additional lawyer of complication were the EU to accede (which it is bound to; however would it really be progress to create additional layers of differentiation?), the CJEU itself might have difficulty accepting a body of judicial review, where the text to be reviewed borders so closely unto the Brussels regime.

Geert.

Federica Falconi, La legge applicabile ai contratti di assicurazione nel regolamento Roma I, Cedam, 2016, pp. 272, ISBN 9788813358297, Euro 24,50.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Il volume si propone di condurre un’analisi critica della disciplina di conflitto dettata dal regolamento Roma I in relazione ai contratti di assicurazione, alla luce delle modifiche di carattere sostanziale, oltre che sistematico, apportate da tale strumento rispetto alla normativa previgente. L’esegesi delle norme del regolamento è perciò svolta mettendo in evidenza i nodi interpretativi che tuttora permangono, per poi cercare di suggerire alcune possibili soluzioni nella prospettiva di un’ulteriore, più radicale riforma.

L’indice dell’opera e ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

On 24 and 25 March 2017 the Observatory on the European area of freedom, security and justice, based at the Department of Legal Sciences of the University of Salerno, will host an international conference titled 60 years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome: developments and perspectives on the construction of the area of freedom, security and justice.

The Observatory is launching a call for contributions of scholars and experts in EU Law of any nationality. Abstracts, written either in English or in Italian, and relating to aspects of the European area of freedom, security and justice, including judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, should be sent to slsg@unisa.it by 30 June 2016.

Selected papers will be published in the first issue of the review The European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; the authors of particularly innovative contributions will be invited to attend the conference as speakers.

The call is available here.

Il Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche dell’Università di Verona, unitamente all’Ordine degli Avvocati e alla Camera Minorile di Verona, organizza per il giorno 11 febbraio 2016 un incontro formativo dal titolo Il minore nel contesto giuridico internazionale: responsabilità genitoriale, giurisdizione e legge applicabile, riconoscimento ed esecuzione delle decisioni.

L’incontro, che si terrà presso la sede del Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, sarà coordinato da Ernesto D’Amico (Trib. Verona) e vedrà susseguirsi le relazioni di Maria Caterina Baruffi e di Francesca Ragno (entrambe Univ. Verona).

Per maggiori informazioni si veda qui.

Con sentenza 1° febbraio 2016, n. 1863, la Corte di cassazione si è pronunciata sul ricorso di un uomo contro la decisione con cui la Corte di appello di Firenze aveva accordato all’ex moglie un assegno di mantenimento, all’esito di un autonomo procedimento,  successivo a quello di scioglimento del matrimonio svoltosi nella Repubblica Ceca.

Con il primo motivo di ricorso l’uomo lamentava la falsa applicazione degli articoli 5 e 9 della legge 1° dicembre 1970 n. 898 sulla disciplina dei casi di scioglimento del matrimonio. L’art. 5, comma 6, di tale legge, stabilisce che con la sentenza che pronuncia lo scioglimento, il tribunale – tenuto conto delle condizioni dei coniugi – “dispone l’obbligo per un coniuge di somministrare periodicamente a favore dell’altro un assegno quando quest’ultimo non ha mezzi adeguati o comunque non può procurarseli per ragioni oggettive”. L’art. 9 disciplina invece i casi di revisione (successivi, dunque, al divorzio) delle disposizioni concernenti l’affidamento dei figli e di quelle relative alla misura e alla modalità dei contributi economici.

Sulla base di tale disciplina, l’uomo riteneva che la donna non potesse avviare in Italia un procedimento autonomo rispetto a quello di divorzio, avente ad oggetto l’assegno (tra l’altro, ella aveva già presentato una richiesta di assegno in sede di procedimento di divorzio dinanzi a un giudice ceco, ma tale domanda non era stata ritenuta proponibile in quella sede, prevedendo la legislazione ceca la possibilità di proporre un separato giudizio per le questioni di carattere economico).

Con il secondo motivo di ricorso, l’ex marito rilevava inoltre che, poiché ai sensi dell’art. 21 del regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 relativo alla competenza, al riconoscimento e all’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale (Bruxelles II bis), la sentenza di divorzio pronunciata nella Repubblica Ceca doveva essere riconosciuta automaticamente in Italia, questa dovesse essere equiparata ad una decisione italiana e, pertanto, assoggettata alle medesime preclusioni processuali che impediscono l’accertamento del diritto all’assegno divorzile.

La Corte ha sottolineato come la pronuncia contestuale dello scioglimento del matrimonio (o della cessazione degli effetti civili del matrimonio) e delle statuizioni relative ai figli e alle condizioni economiche “non risponde a un principio costituzionale che imponga la regolamentazione contestuale dei diritti e dei doveri scaturenti da un determinato status”, portando ad esempio la sentenza non definitiva di divorzio che si pronuncia sullo status e rinvia al successivo corso del giudizio per l’adozione dei provvedimenti conseguenti.

La Corte ha inoltre stabilito che la richiesta di corresponsione dell’assegno divorzile di cui all’art. 5 della l. 898/1970 si configura “come domanda (connessa ma) autonoma rispetto a quella di scioglimento del matrimonio”: pertanto, la parte che non l’abbia avanzata nel corso del procedimento di divorzio, ben può proporla successivamente senza che a ciò sia ostacolo la sopravvenuta pronuncia di scioglimento del vincolo di coniugio.

La Corte ha osservato infine come il riferimento al regime del riconoscimento automatico di cui al regolamento n. 2201/2003 corrobori questa interpretazione: esso comporta la ricezione nel nostro ordinamento del contenuto specifico della decisione ceca, che si è limitata ad accertare le condizioni per lo scioglimento del matrimonio ed a pronunciarlo, lasciando aperta la possibilità di far valere le pretese economiche in un separato procedimento.

Alla decisione ceca, infatti, per il Supremo Collegio, non può attribuirsi “il contenuto di un accertamento implicito sulla insussistenza delle condizioni per il riconoscimento di un assegno divorzile e neanche quello di un giudicato costituente una preclusione processuale alla proposizione di una successiva domanda di assegno divorzile basata sulle condizioni economiche degli ex coniugi anche se coincidenti con quelle esistenti al momento della pronuncia di divorzio”.

In Ranza v Nike, the Court of Appeal for the ninth circuit confirmed the high hurdle to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in the US, following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Kiobel and Bauman /Daimler. Trey Childress has good summary here and I am happy largely to refer.

Loredana Ranza is a US citisen, resident in the EU (first The Netherlands; Germany at the time of the court’s decision). She seeks to sue against her Dutch employer, Nike BV, and its parent corporation, Nike inc. for alleged violation of federal laws prohibiting sex and age discrimination. The Dutch equality Commission had earlier found the allegations unfounded under Dutch law.

Of particular interest are the Court’s views on the attributability test /piercing the corporate veil following Daimler and Kiobel. The Court held (p.15 ff) that prior to Daimler, personal jurisdiction over the mother company could be established using either the agency or the alter ego test, with the former now no longer available following Daimler. Under the Agency test, effectively a type of abus de droit /fraus /fraud, plaintiff needed to show that the subsidiary performed services which were sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services. Daimler, the Court suggested in Ranza, held that the agency test leads to too broad a jurisdictional sweep. That leaves the alter ego test: effectively, whether the actions prima facie carried out by the subsidiary, are in fact carried out by the mother company for it exercises a degree of control over the daughter which renders that daughter the mother’s alter ego. Not so here, on the facts of the case: Nike Inc, established in Oregon, is heavily involved in Nike BV’s macromanagement, but not so ‘enmeshed’ in its routine management of day-to-day operation, that the two companies should be treated as a single enterprise for the purposes of jurisdiction.

For good measure, the Court also confirmed application of dismissal of jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens.

Geert.

Barclays v ENPAM has been travelling in my briefcase for some time – apologies. Reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Alexandros, and the High Court in Nomura , Blair J in October 2015 employed national courts’ room under Article 27/28 of the Brussels I Regulation (the lis alibi pendens and related actions rules) to refuse a stay of English proceedings in favour of proceedings in (of course) Italy. Litigation like this will be somewhat less likely now that the Brussels I Recast applies. As readers will be aware, the current version of the Regulation has means to protect choice of court agreements against unwilling partners (see however below).

Claimant, Barclays Bank PLC, is an English bank. The defendant, Ente Nazionale di Previdenza ed Assistenza dei Medici e Degli Odontoiatri (“ENPAM”) is an Italian pension fund. A dispute has arisen between them as to a transaction entered into by way of a Conditional Asset Exchange Letter from ENPAM to Barclays dated 21 September 2007 by which ENPAM exchanged fund assets for securities which were in the form of credit-linked notes called the “Ferras CDO securities”. ENPAM’s claim is that it incurred a major loss in the transaction, and that it is entitled in law to look to Barclays to make that loss good.

On 18 May 2015, Barclays issued a summary judgment application on the basis that there is no defence to its claim that the Milan proceedings fall within contractual provisions giving exclusive jurisdiction to the English courts. ENPAM began proceedings against Barclays and others in Milan on 23 June 2014. Barclays says that this was in breach of provisions in the contractual documentation giving exclusive jurisdiction to the English courts. It issued the proceedings reviewed here seeking a declaration to that effect and other relief on 15 September 2014. On 20 April 2015, ENPAM applied pursuant to Article 27 or Article 28 of the Brussels I Regulation for an order that the English court should not exercise its jurisdiction in these proceedings on the basis that Milan court was first seised.

The High Court refused. Reference is best made to the judgment itself, for it is very well drafted. Read together with e.g. the aforementioned Alexandros and Nomura judgments, it gives one a complete view of the approach of the English courts viz lis pendens under the Regulation. (E.g. Blair J has excellent overview of the principles of Article 27 (Article 29 in the Recast) under para 68).

Discussion of what exactly Barclays could recover from the English cq Italian proceedings, was an important consideration of whether these two proceedings were each other’s mirror image. (see e.g. para 82 ff). This is quite an important consideration for litigators. Statements of claims are an important input in the lis pendens analysis. Be careful therefore what you ask for. Restraint in the statement of claims might well serve you very well when opposed with recalcitrant opposing parties, wishing to torpedo your proceedings. (Let’s face it: the likelihood of such opposition is quite high in a litigious context).

Finally, it is often assumed that precedent value of the case discussed here and other cases with it, has diminished drastically following the Brussels I Recast. It instructs all courts not named in a choice of court agreement, to step back from jurisdiction in favour of the court named (Article 31(2)). Yet what is and what is not caught by a choice of court agreement (starting with the issue of non-contractual liability between the parties) depends very much on its wording and interpretation. Article 31(2) is not the be all and end all of litigation between contracting parties.

Geert.

The latest issue of “Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht  – The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law” (RabelsZ) has just been released. It contains the following articles:

Armin Steinbach, Investor-Staat-Schiedsverfahren und Verfassungsrecht (Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Constitutional Law)

Investment treaties allow foreign investors to claim damages against states before tribunals of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). More frequently, such dispute settlement procedures tend to replace proceedings before national courts. This has given rise to the heated debate surrounding the ongoing negotiation about the free trade agreements between the European Union and the United States of America. This article identifies and discusses the constitutional law implications of such tribunals. The composition of the tribunals of private persons, the lack of a legal ground for public policy reasons to override investors’ rights, the dynamic development of the adjudication based on vague legal terms and the lack of publicity and transparency in the proceedings – all this raises questions from the perspective of democratic principle and rule of law. Based on democratic principle doctrine, this article classifies rulings of tribunals as acts of public authority and highlights the lack of material and personal legitimacy and examines whether a state monopoly of adjudication can be derived from the separation of powers principle. It discusses the publicity and control of ISDS tribunals as an obligation enshrined in the democratic principles and highlights the missing legal reviewability of ISDS rulings compared to tribunals established under German administrative law. Finally, the article explores possible compensatory instruments addressing the identified deficits based on an application of investments treaties in line with constitutional law principles.

Reinhard Zimmermann, Das Ehegattenerbrecht in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive (The Intestate Succession Rights of the Deceased’s Spouse in Historical and Comparative Perspective)

The coordination of the position of the surviving spouse with that of the deceased’s (blood-) relatives is one of central problems faced by the intestate succession systems of the Western world. While the succession of the relatives essentially follows one of three different systems (the “French” system, the three-line system, and the parentelic system) which have remained relatively stable, the position of the surviving spouse has, over the centuries, become ever more prominent. Roman law, at the time of Justinian, took account of the surviving spouse only in exceptional situations, medieval customary law often not at all. Today, on the other hand, she (much more often than he) has worked her way up, in most countries, to the position of main beneficiary under the rules of intestate succession, for small and medium-sized estates sometimes even to the position of exclusive beneficiary.

The present essay (based on the author’s Rudolf von Jhering lecture at the University of Gießen) traces this development. In doing so it attempts, in the spirit of Jhering, not to line up the laws in the various epochs of our legal history “like pearls on a pearl string” but to look at them as part of a development and to trace their interconnections. The same idea can also be applied to comparative law in view of the fact that the modern national legal systems do not coexist in isolation but in a “system of mutual contact and influence” and, as may be added, on the fertile soil of a common legal culture. Today we find a wide-spread desire to allow the surviving spouse to remain in her familiar environment and to continue to enjoy the standard of living she has become accustomed to. Legal systems still differ as to the way in which best to achieve this aim, i.e. as to the details of the surviving spouse’s intestate succession right. An important guideline for assessing the various solutions to be found in the national legal systems is what the average deceased typically regards as reasonable, as far as the distribution of his estate is concerned. This can sometimes be gauged from the way in which wills are commonly drafted, and it has indeed guided the reforms in a number of countries. In Germany, the so-called “Berlin will” is particularly popular. Nonetheless, it does not appear to offer a satisfactory cue for the regulation of the law of intestate succession. In spite of a certain degree of arbitrariness inherent in this way of proceeding, the surviving spouse will have to be given a share (e.g. one half ) of the estate. In addition, she should be granted the right to retain the right to continue to live in the family home.

Talia Einhorn, The Common Law Foundations of the Israeli Draft Civil Code – A Critical Review of a Paradigm-Shifting Endeavor

(no English abstract available)

Diegeo P. Fernández Arroyo, Main Characteristics of the New Private International Law of the Argentinian Republic

(no English abstract available)

On 11 February 2016, the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) will host an event titled International Protection of Adults – the Current Legal Framework Under Scrutiny.

[From the website of the Institute] – Despite the 2000 Hague Convention, practical problems arise in cross-border scenarios, involving public policy and human rights considerations. On a practical level, private mandates are not accepted by financial institutions and there is no mechanism for enforcement. Speakers will discuss strengths and weaknesses of the current legal framework, prospects for future ratification of the 2000 Hague Convention, and initiatives of the European Parliament and Council of Europe to improve matters for European citizens.

Speakers include Philippe Lortie, Adrian Ward, Claire Van Overdijk, Richard Frimston and Alex Ruck Keene.

More information available here.

The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law has just published two Practical Handbooks:
* Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Service Convention (4th edition);
* Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Evidence Convention (3rd edition).

Both publications are for sale in e-Book format on the Hague Conference website here.

Here is the announcement by the Permanent Bureau, as published in the news section of the Conference’s website:
“The new editions of these Handbooks bring together and synthesise the wealth of case law and commentary on the Convention on the one hand, as well as the work of the Special Commission and practice communicated by Contracting States on the other. Furthermore, in recent years, new issues have arisen with respect to the operation of the Conventions, many of which are the result of unprecedented technological developments. Thus, these new editions also include comprehensive research and analysis relating to the use of information technology in the operation of the Conventions, an area that continues to evolve.

Before their official release, both Handbooks were formally approved by the Council on General Affairs and Policy, the highest organ of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. This of course only increases the authoritative value of these Handbooks as a secondary source of information on the operation of these important Conventions.
For more information, please see the Service and Evidence Sections of the Hague Conference website.”

I have reported before on the narrow possibility, within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, for refusal of recognition of judgments from fellow national courts in the EU (Diageo; Trade Agency). The High Court confirmed the exceptional character of the exercise in Smith v Huertas. Following conviction in a criminal court, Dr Smith had been instructed by the French courts to pay Huertas a considerable sum following fraudulent payments made by a new insolvent company, of which Dr Smith was a director. The argument on ordre public grounds was made viz alleged bias and hostility in one particular court hearing; the long duration of the trial; and one or two alleged procedural inadequacies (in particular, the refusal to interview Dr Smith on a number of occasions).

Most if not all of the complaints were taken by Dr Smith to the ECtHR, which decided not to proceed with the case (such decisions are made in summary manner and one therefore has to guess whether either the claims were found to be manifestly unfounded, or not of a nature as having actually put the applicant at a disadvantage).

Importantly, Cooke J emphasises the responsibility of applicant (seeking refusal of recognition) to raise matters which might conceivably lead to a refusal of recognition, in the Member State of origin: at 21:

Where the factors relied on as being contrary to public policy in England are factors which the court has already considered in the foreign jurisdiction or are factors which could have been raised by way of objection in that jurisdiction, it appears to me self-evident that the foreign jurisdiction must be treated as the best place for those arguments to be raised and determined. To do otherwise would be contrary to the spirit of the Convention and, where issues of unfairness are raised which are capable of being the subject of appeal in the foreign jurisdiction, the court in the enforcing jurisdiction would be much less able to assess them than the original court which was familiar with its own forms of procedure. It is plain that an enforcing court will have much more difficulty in understanding the overall foreign system and its procedures for ensuring that justice is done than the appeal court of the original jurisdiction itself. There is moreover a highly unattractive element in a defendant not raising points which he could have raised in the original jurisdiction, by way of appeal against the judgment and only seeking to raise those matters when the judgment is exported to an enforcing jurisdiction under the Convention as matters of public policy for that court.

Dr Smith’ task therefore was to (at 26) not only … show an exceptional case of an infringement of a fundamental principle constituting a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order in this country or of a right recognised as being fundamental within it but that the system of legal remedies in France did not afford a sufficient guarantee of his rights. Dr Smith must overcome the strong presumption that the procedures of the courts of France, another Contracting State, are compliant with Article 6…

A task which in the end Dr Smith failed to accomplish and summary judgment for recognition and enforcement was issued. Review by Cooke J may seem lengthy to some however CJEU case-law emphasises the ad hoc nature of the ordre public exception: that requires some case-specific assessment, of course.

Geert.

Objective
This seminar will provide participants with a detailed understanding of the most recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) related to family law matters.

The spotlight is centred on Article 8 (respect for private and family life) in conjunction with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 12 (right to marry). The case law of the ECtHR concentrates not only on the legal implications but also on social, emotional and biological factors.

Key topics
Notion of family life – current definition and interpretation by the ECtHR
International child abduction
Balancing children’s rights, parents’ rights and public order
Surrogacy parenthood
Home births and assistance rights
Abortion
Same-sex relationships and trans individuals’ gender recognition

Who should attend?
Lawyers specialised in family law, human rights lawyers, judges dealing with family law matters, ministry officials, representatives of NGOs and child’s rights organisations.

See the full programme here.

L’Istituto Ellenico di diritto internazionale e straniero ha comunicato attraverso il suo sito, il 28 gennaio 2016, la decisione di sospendere, per ragioni finanziarie, la pubblicazione della Revue hellénique de droit international.

Fondata nel 1948, la Revue hellénique ha rappresentato il principale veicolo di diffusione della dottrina greca nel campo del diritto internazionale pubblico e privato, oltre che nel campo del diritto dell’Unione europea, in lingua francese e inglese.

Rispetto alle tematiche internazionalprivatistiche, la rivista ha ospitato, oltre a numerose cronache della giurisprudenza greca, molti contributi scientifici importanti, di studiosi greci e non (le coordinate bibliografiche degli scritti apparsi sulla rivista sono reperibili a questo indirizzo).

La sospensione delle pubblicazioni della Revue hellénique, se non dovesse essere solo temporanea, costituirebbe una perdita significativa per la comunità scientifica degli internazionalisti europei. Essa in ogni caso riflette le condizioni di straordinaria difficoltà in cui sono costretti a lavorare gli studiosi greci, dopo la drammatica crisi che ha colpito il loro paese.