Flux européens

Rzecznik Praw Dziecka e.a. (Suspension de la décision de retour)
Le droit de l’Union s’oppose à ce que des autorités nationales puissent obtenir sans justification la suspension d’une décision définitive de retour d’un enfant

HYA e.a. (Motivation des autorisations des écoutes téléphoniques)
Rapprochement des législations
Une décision autorisant une mise sur écoute téléphonique peut ne pas contenir de motifs individualisés

Tráficos Manuel Ferrer
Concurrence
Actions en dommages et intérêts pour infractions au droit de la concurrence : le droit de l’Union en la matière ne s’oppose pas à une règle nationale selon laquelle, en cas d’accueil partiel de la demande, les dépens demeurent à la charge de chaque partie, qui supporte alors la moitié des frais communs

Commission / Italie
Droit institutionnel
La Cour confirme l’illégalité de deux avis de concours EPSO limitant le choix de la seconde langue aux langues anglaise, française ou allemande

Belaeronavigatsia / Conseil
Relations extérieures
Le Tribunal confirme les mesures restrictives adoptées à l’encontre de l’entreprise étatique gérant l’espace aérien en Biélorussie

Austrian Power Grid e.a. / ACER
Énergie
Le Tribunal confirme les pouvoirs renforcés de l’Agence de l’Union européenne pour la coopération des régulateurs de l’énergie (ACER) pour prendre des décisions individuelles sur des questions transfrontalières

I am mopping up draft posts so forgive me if some of them are a touch late compared to my original report on them on Twitter.  Asian Offshore Services v Self Elevating Platform ECLI:NL:RBROT:2023:34 of the Court of First Instance at Rotterdam is an interesting illustration of the positive conflicts rule of Article 4 juncto Article 63 Brussels Ia.

Article 4’s domicile rule is supplemented by Article 63’s definition of domicile for legal persons:

Article 63:

1.   For the purposes of this Regulation, a company or other legal person or association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has its: statutory seat [Dutch: statutaire zetel]; central administration; [Dutch: hoofdbestuur] or principal place of business [Dutch: hoofdvestiging].

2.   For the purposes of Ireland, Cyprus and the United Kingdom, ‘statutory seat’ means the registered office or, where there is no such office anywhere, the place of incorporation or, where there is no such place anywhere, the place under the law of which the formation took place.

3.   In order to determine whether a trust is domiciled in the Member State whose courts are seised of the matter, the court shall apply its rules of private international law.

A63 may lead to so-called positive conflicts: more than one court considering itself to be the domicile of the defendant. This is interesting nota bene in the case of business and human rights cases where claimants may want to forum shop and sue in the EU, such as in Anglo American.

In the case at issue, the court first of all [4.2] dismisses the parties’ awkward consensus [4.1] that neither Brussels Ia, nor any international Treaty determines jurisdiction. Clearly Brussels Ia does apply (claimant is domiciled at Kuala Lumpur; defendant registered in Curaçao) and the Court applies it proprio motu.

The court then points to the statutory seat in Curaçao, and [4.9] notes SEP’s lack of contestation that Sliedrecht is its ‘fixed place of business’ as testified by an extract from the local commercial register. Now I a may be a stickler for language here but a fixed place of business is not the same as the principal place of business (which implies main business activities). It is the latter which the Regulation requires.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.131 ff.

First instance Rotterdam
Held Netherlands have A4 Brussels Ia 'domicile' jurisdiction because on the facts, 'principal place of business' of Curaçao incorporated corporation is in The Netherlands

ASIAN OFFSHORE SERVICES v SELF ELEVATING PLATFORM N.V.https://t.co/Luf7qg1tnR

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 17, 2023

UniCredit Bank Austria
Rapprochement des législations
Le droit du consommateur à bénéficier, en cas de remboursement anticipé de son crédit immobilier, d’une réduction du coût total du crédit n’inclut pas les frais indépendants de la durée du contrat

Carpatair / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal annule la décision de la Commission européenne validant les aides roumaines à l’aéroport international de Timișoara en faveur de Wizz Air

Aquind e.a. / Commission
Marché intérieur de l’énergie et liste des projets d’intérêts commun de l’Union : le Tribunal rejette le recours du groupe Aquind

Confédération paysanne e.a. (Mutagenèse aléatoire in vitro)
Rapprochement des législations
Techniques de modification génétique : la Cour précise le statut de la mutagenèse aléatoire in vitro au regard de la directive OGM

In Zenith Energy Amsterdam B.V. and Exolum Amsterdam BV v The Netherlands a Dutch judge last week rejected the challenge by fuel traders of the Dutch ban on export of fuels to non-EU (particularly Ecowas) countries of fuels falling short of the EU requirements under Directive 98/70. The Dutch Statute is the culmination of established Dutch studies of the sector (The Netherlands being a prime tank storage country) and of repeated EOWAS calls that the export causes issues on their territories.

A first test is the duty of care under the Dutch environmental laws, which in summary obliges industry et al to prevent and /or limit the environmental and public health impacts of their production. The judge [4.10] refers to the travaux and recitals of the Act which contains the duty of care, as having recognised the global, one might say ‘extraterritorial’  impact of Dutch and European industrial activities, and emphasises that the duty of care requires a dynamic interpretation in line with societal and technical developments.

In 4.13 the judge emphasises that Directive 98/70 does not harmonise export outside of the EU and that the Directive therefore does not impede national rules on export and in 4.14 the rule is said not to force duties upon third States who themselves have signalled the difficulties. The judge also explicitly refers to Urgenda and UNEP to emphasise that looking after the environment and public health elsewhere, is an expression of the State’s own duty of care. 4.16 ‘fuel leakage’ (the drug dealer defence: trade will just move elsewhere, Antwerp in particular) has not been made out on the facts, quite the opposite, the State can show that the majority of traders already export cleaner fuel from Dutch ports.

Of note is also that the judge, Vetter J, in commendable Dutch style, does not exhaust himself in the arguments, rather cutting straight to the chase.

A judgment of note. Geert.

Judge OKs Dutch fuel export ban, prohibiting export of fuel already banned in EU, in particular to ECOWAS countries
Extends corporations' duty of care to health, environment abroad; rejects Qs of extraterritoriality and 'drug dealer defence'

Judgment (NL) https://t.co/qd08kZbYYc https://t.co/ya28uy9CxB

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 28, 2023

In Public Institution for Social Security v Ruimy & Anor [2023] EWHC 177 (Comm) Jacobs J rejected both a forum non conveniens argument and an (acquired Brussels Ia) Article 34 Brussels Ia argument (raised by a Luxemburg-based defendant).

My paper on the Article 34 genesis and case-law hitherto is here.

Current claims are related to earlier jurisdictional challenges, culminating in The Public Institution for Social Security v Banque Pictet & Cie SA & Ors [2022] EWCA Civ 29 which I discuss here.

PIFSS is a Kuwaiti public institution responsible for Kuwait’s social security system and pension scheme. The claims involve alleged corruption of PIFSS. Director General by international financial institutions and intermediaries in return for causing or influencing PIFSS to invest substantial funds with or through those institutions and intermediaries (or related entities).

Following the Court of Appeal’s decision in January 2022 to uphold the successful jurisdictional challenge by some of the parties (‘the Mirabaud parties’), PIFSS have commenced proceedings against three of the Mirabaud parties (Banque Mirabaud, Mr Pierre Mirabaud and Mr Fauchier-Magnan) in Switzerland. These Swiss proceedings no longer, include a claim in respect of one of the schemes, the ‘Aerium’ scheme. Instead, the claim in those proceedings concerns a large number of other schemes in which the Mirabaud parties are alleged to have participated or assisted.

The forum non arguments are discussed [43] ff and are of course only possible because the United Kingdom are no longer party to the Lugano Convention (and the Swiss proceedings initiated post Brexit). At the heart of the forum non conveniens argument of some of the defendants in current claim, incl. Ruimy, is the proposition that the Aerium Scheme claims should be heard in Switzerland alongside the other claims advanced against the Mirabaud parties. [65] ff Jacobs J holds that defendants have not shown that Switzerland was clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum.

I do not discuss forum non in detail for the interest of the post lies more with the Article 34 analysis.

This is discussed briefly [118] ff with the judge unfortunately albeit obiter following defendants’ concession that failure of the forum non argument would also sink Article 34. The reasoning seems to be that Article 34’s “necessary for the proper administration of justice” test fails if the third State at issue is not shown to be  the clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum. As I discuss in my paper, this is wrong, and it falls into the same trap as the first instance judge in Municipio. While considerations relevant to the forum non test may play a role in Article 34, it is wrong to conflate the two tests.

As noted this view is made obiter only for the formal reason for the judge to reject the Article 34 defence is his decision that Article 34(1)’s condition  that an action be ‘pending before a court of a third State at the time when a court in a Member State is seised of an action which is related to the action in the court of the third State’, has not been met. Per the Court of Appeal in Municipio, “The action in the third state must be pending before the third state court when the member state court becomes seised of the action” (see also Henshaw J in Viegas v Cutrale[149]).

[122] Swiss proceedings which might potentially be considered to be relating to the English proceedings came too late, they were most definitely not pending at the time of the current English claims.

The only potentially relevant “proceedings”, in the context of Article 34, are the proceedings commenced by the service of the commandements de payer, however, they are held not to qualify: [129]

I agree with PIFSS that the request and issue of the commandements de payer did not mean that proceedings were “pending before a court” of Switzerland. In short, this is because there was no document lodged with any court. Commandments de payer are issued by administrative authorities, not a court. …a commandement de payer is at most a precursor to an action in court. In the present case, there was an objection by the recipient, with the result that court proceedings were then necessary if the requesting party wanted to take matters forward. This is what happened in the present case, when PIFSS did issue civil proceedings against the Mirabaud parties in 2022. But there were no relevant court proceedings issued by PIFSS in Switzerland prior to that time.

A judgment of note.

Geert.

Espagne / Commission
Aide d'État
Aides d’État : la Cour annule partiellement la décision de la Commission concernant le « régime espagnol de leasing fiscal »

Freikirche der Siebenten-Tags-Adventisten in Deutschland
Les subventions publiques versées aux écoles privées confessionnelles peuvent être réservées aux églises et sociétés religieuses reconnues par l’État membre concerné

A short note to refer to this post on the Wave News which focuses on third party litigation funding and how it might be used in climate change litigation, with input by Yours Truly. A good introductory summary of the opportunities and points of attention of third party funding generally, too.

Geert.

Of #climatelitigation note and happy to have contributed. https://t.co/tOYu0Lqr9N

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 1, 2023

 

Puig Gordi e.a.
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Une autorité judiciaire d’exécution ne peut pas, en principe, refuser l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen en se fondant sur le défaut de compétence de la juridiction appelée à juger la personne recherchée dans l’État membre d’émission

In Bravo & Ors v Amerisur Resources Ltd (Re The Amerisur plc Putumayo Group Litigation) [2023] EWHC 122 (KB) claimants, who live in remote rural communities in the Putumayo region of Colombia, seek damages from the defendant pursuant to the Colombian Civil Code, and in reliance on Colombia Decree 321/1999, in respect of environmental pollution caused by a spill (or spills) of crude oil on 11 June 2015. The claimants’ two causes of action are pleaded under the headings (i) guardianship of a dangerous activity and (ii) negligence. It is common ground between the parties that the oil spillage was the result of deliberate acts by terrorist organisation, FARC.

Steyn J yesterday held on preliminary issues, including statute of limitation. Defendant contends that the two year limitation period provided by relevant Colombian law re Colombian group actions (‘Law 472’), applies to the claim. Parties agree that in substance, Colombian law is lex causae per A4 and A7 Rome II.

Claimants rely on two points of English law and one of Colombian law. First, they contend that the relevant Article of Law 472 is a procedural provision within the meaning of A1(3) Rome II, and therefore it falls outside the scope of Rome II. I believe they are right but the judge did not. Secondly, they refute the defendant’s contention that this action should be treated as a group action under Law 472. Thirdly, even if they are wrong on both those points, they submit that application of the time limit of Law 472 would be inconsistent with English public policy, and so the court should refuse to apply it pursuant to A26 Rome II.

All but one links to case-law in this post refer to my discussion of same on the blog, with pieces of course further linking to the judgment. Apologies for the pat on my own back but it is nice to see that all but one (Vilca, where parties essentially agreed on the Rome II issue) of the cases referred to in the judgment all feature on the blog.

For claimants, Alexander Layton KC referred to Wall v Mutuelle de Poitiers Assurances and Actavis UK Ltd & ors v Eli Lilly and Co (where the issues were discussed obiter). Defendants rely on Vilca v Xstrata Ltd [2018] EWHC 27 (QB), KMG International NV v Chen [2019] EWHC 2389 (Comm), Pandya v Intersalonika General Insurance Co SA [2020] EWHC 273 (QB), [2020] ILPr 44 and Johnson v Berentzen [2021] EWHC 1042 (QB).

My reception of the High Court’s conclusions in KMG, Pandya, and Johnson was not enthusiastic, and in my review of Pandya in particular I also suggest that the same scholarship relied on in this case, did not actually lend support to the  defendant’s arguments, and I stand by that, too.

Hence Steyn J’s conclusion [102] that Article 15 Rome II

contains a list of matters which are ‘in particular’ to fall under the designated law, irrespective of whether they would be classified as matters of substance or procedure

and [106]

that the provisions of article 15 of Rome II should be construed widely

in my view is wrong. (Note the linguistic analysis in [110] will be of interest to readers interested in authentic interpretation of multi-lingual statutes).

 

[109] The key question then is which Colombian limitation period applies to these English proceedings, which brings the judge to discuss [115] ff ia Iraqi Civilians v Ministry of Defence (No.2). Here the judge, after discussing Colombian law evidence, holds [137]

that this action has not been brought under Law 472, and it does not fall to be treated as if it had been brought as a Colombian group action. Therefore, this action is not time-barred pursuant to article 47 of Law 472.

Hence claimants lost the argument on Rome II’s procedural exception but won the argument on application of Colombian law.

[139] ff whether the limitation rule should be disapplied pursuant to A26 Rome II is discussed obiter and summarily, with reference of course to Begum v Maran which I discuss here. The judge holds A26’s high threshold would not be met.

Both parties have reason to appeal, and one wonders on which parts of Rome II, permission to appeal will be sought.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, ia para 4.80.

 

Successful claimants (represented ia by @alexwlayton instructed by @leighdayintl) in Amerisur Putumayo Group Litigation -Colombia crude oil spill
Preliminary Rome II issues include qualification of issues as procedural, public policy

[2023] EWHC 122 (KB)https://t.co/X139KicNzR

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 27, 2023

Engagement solennel devant la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne de six nouveaux membres de la Cour des comptes européenne

Inspecţia Judiciară
Relations extérieures
Organes disciplinaires judiciaires : selon l’avocat général Collins, le droit de l’Union s’oppose à une législation nationale qui confie à l’inspecteur en chef adjoint la charge de superviser l’examen des plaintes déposées contre l’inspecteur en chef