EAPIL blog

On 14 of February 2020 a new law undermining the independence of judiciary in Poland (a so-called “muzzle law“) entered into force.

The Act of Law of 20 December 2019 bars judges from, among other things, contesting the status of other judges or the legality of their appointment (an English version of the draft Act, almost identical to the Act as adopted, is available here) .

The act is a reaction to (i) the CJEU judgment of 19 November 2019 in the AK case, by which the Court asked Polish judges to verify the conformity of the new Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court with EU law, and (ii) the subsequent judgment of another chamber of the Polish Supreme Court of 5 December 2019 finding that the Disciplinary Chamber does not comply with EU law (an English version can be found here).

According to the new Act, judgments corresponding with the one laid down by Supreme Court on 5 December 2019 would be prohibited. Defecting judges can be removed from the profession.

The law has provoked strong reactions from the European institutions already at the stage of the legislative process.

The Vice-President of the European Commission, Věra Jourová, wrote on 19 December 2019 a letter to the Polish President, the Prime Minister and the Presidents of both chambers of the Parliament. The letter states that the rules of the new legislation “touch upon matters such as judicial independence, further raising the Commission’s existing concerns in this area”.

In the letter, Ms Jourová also encouraged “the Polish authorities to consult the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission on this draft legislation”, and invited “all State organs not to take forward the proceedings on the new draft legislation before carrying out all the necessary consultations”.

On 11 January 2020 a “March of 1000 Gowns” demanding “the right to independence, the right to Europe” took place in Warsaw. Polish judges supported by 50 judges from other European countries, together with thousands of citizens, protested against the draft law.

The Venice Commission adopted on 16 of January 2020 an urgent joint opinion on the draft law. The remark is made in the opinion that, by virtue of some of the amendments to the law, “the judges’ freedom of speech and association is seriously curtailed”: Polish courts will be effectively prevented from examining whether other courts within the country are ‘independent and impartial’ under the European rules”.

On 28 January 2020, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) opened a monitoring procedure for Poland over the functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law. In its resolution 2316(2020) it declared that recent reforms in Poland “severely damage the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law”.

The law was adopted anyway. An open question is what impact it will  have on the mutual trust and the mutual recognition of judgments in the European Union. Polish ‘reforms’ resulted already in the rebuttal of the presumption of mutual trust in the context of recognition of judgments in criminal matters (judgment of 25 July 2018 in the LM case, analysed here). But the restriction of the independence of the judiciary has a potential impact on all acts providing for the mutual recognition of judgments, in both criminal and civil matters.

It can be particularly challenging for judges applying norms of EU Private International Law. 

Recognition of civil judgments given by a court or tribunal of a Member State should take into account that the CJEU treats a “court” as an autonomous concept of EU law.

The CJEU elaborated on this notion, among other rulings, in Ibrica Zulfikarpašić (§43) and Pula Parking (§53), where it stated that due to the principle of mutual trust, EU law requires “that judgments the enforcement of which is sought in another Member State have been delivered in court proceedings offering guarantees of independence and impartiality”.

The above-mentioned doubts expressed by the European Commission and PACE appear to challenge that requirement.

Photo: Courtesy of Jakub Włodek / Agencja Gazeta

Dário Moura Vicente (University of Lisbon) has published the second edition of his monograph on international intellectual property (A Tutela Internacional da Propriedade Intelectual).

The books covers the traditional issues of jurisdiction and applicable law. It also discusses the merits and limits of international harmonisation in the field, and extra-judicial remedies.

More details are available here.

The last issue of the Revue critique de droit international privé for 2019 has just been released. It contains numerous casenotes and one article by Poul F. Kjaer (Copenhagen Business school) on the sociological idea of connectivity and private international law (L’idée de “connectivité” et le droit international privé).

The article is a revised translation of a paper by the same author titled Constitutionalizing Connectivity: the Constitutional Grid of World Society.

Global law settings are characterized by a structural pre‐eminence of connectivity norms, a type of norm which differs from coherency or possibility norms. The centrality of connectivity norms emerges from the function of global law, which is to increase the probability of transfers of condensed social components, such as economic capital and products, religious doctrines, and scientific knowledge, from one legally structured context to another within world society. This was the case from colonialism and colonial law to contemporary global supply chains and human rights. Both colonial law and human rights can be understood as serving a constitutionalizing function aimed at stabilizing and facilitating connectivity. This allows for an understanding of colonialism and contemporary global governance as functional, but not as normative, equivalents.

A full table of contents is available here.

No hearings on requests for a preliminary ruling concerning private international law are scheduled for March 2020. Conversely, several opinions and one judgment will be delivered.

On March 24, AG Tanchev (Bulgaria) will give his Opinion in JE. The case concerns the interpretation of Article 10 of the Rome III Regulation on the law applicable to divorce and legal separation. The issue is whether the expression ‘the law applicable pursuant to Article 5 or Article 8 makes no provision for divorce’ is to be interpreted as merely referring to a situation where the applicable foreign law makes no provision for any form of divorce, or rather as including a situation where the applicable foreign law permits divorce, but does so in extremely limited circumstances.

The original action was brought in Romania in 2016. The applicant filed a petition for divorce claiming that the parties’ marriage should be dissolved, the applicant should return to using the name borne prior to the marriage, parental responsibility in respect of the minor child should be exercised jointly, the minor child should reside with the mother in Italy, and the defendant should be required to pay maintenance and the costs of proceedings.

After some hesitations regarding the general jurisdiction of the Romanian courts and the specific venue, the point was settled and the discussion moved to the applicable law under the Rome III Regulation. According to the court, the matter was governed by Italian law pursuant to Article 8(a) of the Regulation, since the parties were habitually resident in Italy. The court considered that the criteria laid down in Article 8(a) are framed in a hierarchical manner: if the conditions of the first criterion are satisfied, there is no need to look at the following ones.

The national court considered that that the grounds for divorce raised by the applicant are not available under the Italian legislation on divorce, and that that grounds different to those foreseen by the provision can be applied for only where there has been a legal separation of the spouses, which must be established or ordered by a court, and that the delay prescribed by the said legislation has passed since the legal separation itself. Since no provision is made for legal separation proceedings under Romanian law, the Romanian court concluded that those proceedings must be conducted before the Italian courts and therefore any application to that effect made before the Romanian courts is inadmissible.

The applicant lodged an appeal against that judgment, pointing out that, from her point of view, the criteria provided for in Article 8 of the Rome III Regulation are alternative in nature. She also stated that in the light of Italian legislation, the first sentence of Article 10 of the Rome III Regulation is applicable in the case (in my view, if I understand correctly the arguments of the Romanian court, she could have added that the absence of provisions on separation under Romanian law does not allow the court to declare itself incompetent).

The judgment in Primera Air Scandinavia is scheduled for 26 March 2020. The request for a preliminary ruling comes from District Court of Prague. It concerns the interpretation of in Article 5(1) and Articles 15 to 17 of the Brussels I Regulation.

The issue submitted to the CJEU arose in the context of an action for compensation brought under Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 by a passenger domiciled in the Czech Republic against an airline established in Denmark, on account of the long delay of a flight operated by that airline, but sold to that passenger, in conjunction with accommodation, by a Czech travel agency.

The opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe (Denmark), of 7 November 2019, proposes the CJEU to answer that Article 5(1) covers an action for compensation brought by a passenger against the operating air carrier, even though those parties had not entered into a contract between them, and although that flight formed part of a package of services supplied under a contract entered into between the applicant and a third party.

On the contrary, Articles 15 to 17 of that regulation must be interpreted as meaning that they are not applicable to such an action. No surprise, considering the previous case law of the Court.

The Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona regarding the EE case, on the Succession Regulation, will also be issued on 26 March 2020.

The Supreme Court of Lithuania referred six question to the CJEU. Questions number 2 and 3, on the characterization of notaries as “courts” for the purposes of the Regulation, have already been addressed in the case of WB, still pending at the time of the referral.

By the remaining questions, the Lithuanian court conveys to the CJEU doubts related to the cross-border nature of a given succession (linked to that, to the applicability of the regulation when, in the light of the circumstances, its application would not facilitate the assertion of the rights of the heir, but rather the contrary); to the choice of law (implicit, and made during the transitional period), and to the choice of court.

The case concerned the estate of a Lithuanian national, married to a German national, who had moved to live in Germany together with her son (EE, also a Lithuanian national).

While living in Germany, EE’s mother had drawn up a will at a notary office in Kaunas (Lithuania), whereby she designated EE as the heir to her entire estate – an apartment in the same country. After the death of his mother, E.E. moved back to Lithuania, where he contacted the notary office in the City of Kaunas requesting the succession procedure be initiated, and the issuance of a certificate of succession rights. The notary refused to perform the notarial act, for, according to the Succession Regulation, the habitual place of residence of the testatrix was Germany. EE challenged the notary’s refusal before the court of first instance.

The Kaunas district court ruled in favour of EE, annulled the notary’s decision refusing to perform the notarial act, and ordered the notary to open the succession procedure in accordance with the place where the property was registered and to issue a certificate of rights of succession to the estate of the deceased mother.

The court stated that, even though the appellant’s mother had declared her departure to Germany, she was still a Lithuanian national and, on the day of her death, owned immovable property in Lithuania; she had not severed her links with Lithuania, and had visited the country and drawn up her will there.

The Kaunas regional court set aside the ruling of the court of first instance following an appeal lodged by the notary and turned down the appellant’s application. Among other, it stated that the court of first instance had, in annulling the notary’s decision under challenge, unreasonably relied on general principles. The appellant lodged an appeal in cassation against this judgment.

AG Saugmandsgaard Øe’s Opinion in this case is scheduled for 26 March 2020, as well.

The Dutch referring court asks about the Brussels I bis Regulation and the meaning of “civil and commercial matters” in a case where an international organisation brings an action to (i) lift an interim garnishee order levied in another Member State by the opposing party, and (ii) prohibit the opposing party from levying, on the same grounds, an interim garnishee order in the future and from basing those actions on immunity of execution.

A public hearing was held in Luxembourg on 12 December 2019, where the CJEU learnt that the Dutch Appellate Court had granted immunity of jurisdiction to Shape and JCFB only two days before. The judges and AG wondered whether a reply to the preliminary reference would still be of any use. The Dutch decision on immunity, the request to the CJEU and the hearing in Luxembourg have been addressed by Geert van Calster in his blog, with a last update on January 2020.

The European Association of Private International Law will hold its founding conference in Aarhus on 14, 15 and 16 May 2020. We have invited the speakers to talk in turn about the topic of their presentations and briefly address the issues they will be discussing in Aarhus. The first speaker we host in this series is Matthias Lehmann, of the University of Bonn. His presentation, on Blockchains and Smart Contracts, is part of a block devoted to ‘Digitalization and European Private International Law’.

Blockchain and smart contracts are based on Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), which combines the decentralised storage and validation of information with the use of modern cryptography. Both blockchain and smart contracts pose novel and unique challenges to Private International Law (PIL).

The first challenge is getting a proper grasp of the technology, which comes in many different forms and shapes. The benefits and potential applications are often widely exaggerated, while the real working is not fully understood. Evidently, there are obstacles in the communication between coders and lawyers. These difficulties are compounded by the fact that the technology is constantly evolving, creating the risk of any legal analysis being quickly outdated.

What is relevant for lawyers is that the blockchain allows to record new types of “crypto assets” and to transfer them easily around the globe. It can also be used for the transfer of copyrights, data or real-world assets, such as commodities or real estate. Given the value of the crypto assets, and their vulnerability to attacks (e.g. through hacks or fraud), it is necessary to put them under some sort of legal protection. Which legal protection is granted depends on the applicable national law, which must be determined first.

Smart contracts are computer programmes grafted onto the blockchain. In their most common application, they are used to automatically enforce obligations, excluding any resistance by the debtor. In such applications, they do not create or amend legal rights but shift the factual situation without either party being able to stop the process. The execution of the programme may deviate from the parties’ agreement (e.g. due to some malfunction or the input of false data). This situation must be treated by the law. There is also a very different type of smart contract: These are agreements concluded exclusively through the workings of machine, and therefore are also called “algorithmic contracts”. In such cases, the need to determine an applicable law is even more obvious and challenging.

From a PIL perspective, a major problem is shoehorning the new phenomena into the categories of conflicts of laws. Crypto assets are intangible and have no obvious counterpart in the real world. They are legal chameleons oscillating between currencies, securities, and claims. Smart contracts can either be used to automatically enforce the obligations under a contract or to create a binding agreement through algorithms. All of this is new and, so far, has no parallel in PIL.

Once a category has been found or a new one created, it will be challenging to find proper connecting factors. These difficulties stem from the fact that the creators have designed DLT as being “a-national” in the double sense that it shall work without the law and be independent of any legal system. The information is spread on computers and servers all around the world and often there is no operator controlling the process. For these reasons, finding the most significant or closest connection for the blockchain and smart contracts creates considerable headaches, more so than the internet did at the time of its introduction.

The presentation will address these issues one by one. It will analyse the applicability of existing regulations (such as Rome I, Rome II or the Succession Regulation) and explore the need for new ones. But it will also ask whether the EU is the appropriate venue to deal with these questions or whether it would be preferable to look for a world-wide solution given the global nature of DLT.

— More information about the EAPIL founding conference in Aarhus is available here. If you want to register, click here. 

Milana Karayanidi is the author of Rethinking Judicial Jurisdiction in Private International Law, the most recent release in the Hart Publishing’s series Studies in Private International Law.

The abstract reads:

This book explores the theory and practice of judicial jurisdiction within the field of private international law. It offers a revised look at values justifying the power of courts to hear and decide cross-border disputes, and demonstrates that a re-conceptualisation of jurisdiction is needed. Rather than deriving from territorial power of states, jurisdiction in civil and commercial cross-border matters ought to be driven by party autonomy. This autonomy can be limited by certain considerations of equality and critical state sovereign interests. The book applies this normative view to the existing rules of jurisdiction in the European Union and the Russian Federation. These regimes are chosen due to their unique positions towards values in private international law and contrasting societal norms that generate and accommodate these values. Notwithstanding disparate cultural and political ideas, these regimes reveal a surprising level of consistency when it comes to enforcement of party autonomy. There is, nevertheless, room for improvement. The book demonstrates to scholars, policy makers and lawmakers that jurisdiction should be re-centred around the interests of private actors, and proposes ways to improve the current rules.

For further information, see here.

Following the adoption of the Judgments Convention, on 2 July 2019, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has resumed its exploratory work on the possible elaboration of an instrument dealing with jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters (the Jurisdiction Project).

From 18 to 21 February 2020, the Experts’ Group set up for this purpose met in the Hague.

The Group was pleased with the progress made and concluded that matters relating to jurisdiction, including parallel proceedings, warrant further work and study.

The Experts’ Group has recommended to the Council on General Affairs and Policy, which will meet form 3 to 6 Mars 2020, that the Group continue its work.

Triggered by recent events, notably the Dieselgate scandal, collective redress is now back on the EU civil justice agenda (see here). It is also the subject matter of requests for preliminary rulings addressed to the CJEU (see, concerning a situation with cross-border implications, the currently pending case C-709/19, Vereniging van Effectenbezitters).

A conference on the topic, organised by the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law in cooperation with ERA – Academy of European Law, will take place on 16 and 17 April 2020 in Trier.

The conference will: introduce the proposed EU Directive on representative action; provide a platform for debate on topical issues of this key Directive; analyse major case law of the CJEU and national Supreme Courts on collective redress; look at the mismatch of EU law and collective redress; present the most recent hands-on experience with collective redress; debate funding issues, namely contingency fees and third-party funding.

The event is chiefly meant for legal practitioners specialised in the field of consumer law and policy, litigators involved in mass damage cases, representatives of business and consumer organisations, ministry officials, and academics.

For more information please see here.

On 29 January 2020, the Rechtbank Rotterdam (a Dutch court of first instance) ruled on the law applicable to claims by investors against the Brazilian company Petrobas. The case concerns the long-disputed localisation of financial or economic loss under Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations. The Dutch court has added a new piece to the puzzle by adopting a market-based approach.

The claims of the investors are related to the so-called Petrolāo scandal (Portuguese for “big oil”, also known as “operation car wash” because it was first exposed by the owner of a car wash service with money exchange), which has shattered Latin America and involves well-known figures, such as the former Brazilian president Lula da Silva.

The allegations centre on money laundering and endemic corruption in Petrobas, which has led to a steep fall in its share price. The investors try to recoup their corresponding losses. The litigation has a global dimension given that Petrobas’ securities are listed around the world, including in Argentina, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, and the United States (in the form of American Depository Receipts – ADR).

The proceedings before the Rechtbank Rotterdam had been preceded by litigation in the US, where the District Court for the Southern District of New York threw out the claims of investors who had bought securities listed outside the United States as early as 2015. After that, a Dutch foundation (“stichting“) was created to pursue the claims of these investors in the Netherlands. No Petrobas shares were traded there: The choice of venue was entirely attributable to the favourable attitude of the Dutch legal system towards collective actions. By a decision of 19 September 2018, the Rechtbank Rotterdam accepted international jurisdiction over the foundation’s claim against Petrobas. Now it had to decide over the applicable law to the claims of the investors’ litigation vehicle.

The facts underlying the claim stretched over a period of ten years (2004-2014). Due to the inapplicability of the Rome II Regulation to events before 12 January 2009 (see Articles 31 and 32 and the CJEU decision in Homawoo), these were submitted to the Dutch Private International Law, more precisely to the Dutch Act on Conflict of Laws for Torts (Wet Conflictenrecht Onrechtmatige Daad – WCOD).

As Article 3(1) of WCOD refers to the place where the unlawful conduct occurred, the Rotterdam court ruled that Brazilian law applies to the entirety of the facts occurring before 12 January 2009.

Events occurring on or after 12 January 2009 are subject to the Rome II Regulation. To determine the applicable law, the Dutch court looked to Article 4 of Rome II, the first paragraph of which refers to the country in which the damage occurs. Thus, the court was facing the well-known problem of locating purely economic loss.

The court reviewed two decisions of the CJEU in Kolassa and Universal Music (leaving aside Löber). These cases concerned jurisdiction under the Brussels I bis Regulation but had to be consulted as well under the Rome II Regulation under the paradigm of parallel interpretation (see Recital 7 of Rome II).

In Kolassa, the CJEU had to determine the place where the damage occurs in case of investments made on the basis of a misleading prospectus. The CJEU had ruled that the damage occurred at the place of establishment of the bank managing the account from which the investor has payed the securities.

However, the Rotterdam court saw the importance of Kolassa as being severely limited by the decision in Universal Music. In the latter case, the court had held that the Kolossa decision was made in the specific context which gave rise to that judgment and that purely financial damage which occurs directly in the applicant’s bank account cannot, in itself, be qualified as a relevant connecting factor (CJEU, Universal Music, margin nos 37 and 38).

The Rotterdam court in Petrobas instead preferred a completely different approach. In its view, the closest connection of the claim is with the place where the securities acquired by the investors are listed and traded offered. In the opinion of the court, it was there that the investors suffered property damage because their assets were directly affected by an unlawful act. The application of the law in force at this place would also serve the dual objectives of certainty and predictability because the law so identified would be foreseeable for both the issuer and the investors of the securities.

This “market-based theory” has been discussed for quite some time and enjoys strong support in the literature (see e.g. T Arons, (2008) Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 481, 486; H Kronke, (2000) 286 Recueil des cours 245, 308-12; F Garcimartín Alférez, (2011) Law and Financial Markets Review 449, 453; Sarah Sánchez Fernández, El folleto en las ofertas públicas de venta de valores negociables (OPV) y responsabilidad civil: ley aplicable (La Ley, Madrid: 2015, p. 330–339)).

The market theory’s advantage is that it concentrates the applicable law in one country or – in case of dual listings – in a few jurisdictions. This is especially important in case of collective actions, which would be utterly unmanageable if each claim were governed by the law of the place of the investor’s bank account. While the market-based approach is clearly preferable from a policy perspective, it is less clear whether it can be justified under Art 4(1) Rome II, at least in its current interpretation by the CJEU.

First, it is doubtful whether the investors really suffer direct loss at the place where the securities are listed or traded. Investors usually do not purchase their securities directly on the exchange, but through intermediaries. It is also not sure that the sell them at the exchange after suffering loss – they can equally decide to keep them. The connection to the market where the securities are traded is therefore a more abstract one.

Second, it seems that the Rechtbank Rotterdam overly restricts the importance of the Kolassa decision. After all, this judgment arose from a case of wrong capital markets disclosure, which is  much more similar to the subject matter of Petrobas than the fact pattern in Universal Music, which concerned a failed calculation in a precontractual negotiation. Moreover, in both Kolassa and Petrobas, the investors had voluntarily paid the price of the securities, which afterwards declined in value, while in Universal Music the wrong information tainted the payment by the victim (on this point, see Johannes Ungerer, 24 (2017) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 448, 452).

In Kolassa, the CJEU decided implicitly against the market-based theory by ruling in favour of the localisation of the invidividual investor’s loss. The reasoning in Universal Music is not different on that point. The Rotterdam Rechtbank would therefore have done well to submit a question for a preliminary ruling, rather than simply trust its own opinion. Such a reference would have helped clarify the authorities of the CJEU in this currently uncertain area of law.

Applying Article 4(1) of Rome II has the further downside that the exception of Article 4(2) of Rome II must be respected, which results in the application of a different law to the claims of those parties that are domiciled in the same country as the defendant (in the case at hand: Brazilian investors). This illogical result could have been avoided by adopting the market theory under the escape clause (Article 4(3) of Rome II). Such an approach would however have its own problems because it could be seen as contradicting the need for a restrictive interpretation of the escape clause.

Overall, the market-based solution suggested by the Rechtbank Rotterdam could be a useful innovation for locating purely economic loss under Rome II. It would have been interesting to see how the CJEU will position itself in this respect. Unfortunately, the court has missed the opportunity to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling. Perhaps a recent submission by the Hoge Raad in the case VEB v BP concerning investor claims under Article 7(2) of Brussels I bis will bring some clarification for the Rome II Regulation as well.

The proceedings of the symposium held in June 2019 on the Paris international commercial chambers were published in a special issue of the Revue Lamy Droit des Affaires which can be freely download on the website of the Paris Court of Appeal.

The presentations were made in French, and the proceedings are written in the same language.

The Court has provided the following summary in English:

A little more than a year after the signature of the procedural protocols establishing the international commercial chambers in the Commercial Court and the Paris Court of Appeal, the symposium was opened to a large audience by Mrs Chantal Arens, First President of the Paris Court of Appeal, who, among other things, announced the forthcoming publication of a bilingual procedural guide before these chambers, with the aim of presenting the proceedings in a detailed and didactic manner, and called for the regulatory consolidation of the jurisdiction of the Paris Court of Appeal.

Mr Gille Cuniberti, Law Professor at the University of Luxembourg and moderator of the roundtables, pointed out that the creation of international commercial chambers forms part of an international competition between courts from which one of the issues at stake is the attractiveness of French law.

After a reminder of the origins of the commercial chambers by Mr Guy Canivet, Honorary First President of the Court of Cassation, and of the options chosen by the Ministry of Justice presented by Mr Thomas Andrieu, Director of Civil Affairs for the French Ministry, Ms Marie-Aimée Peyron, Chairman of the Paris Bar Association, went back on the support of the Paris bar in the creation of these chambers.

Students at the Sciences Po Law school of Paris (Mr Félix Briant, Ms Auriane Clement, Mr Mathieu Larroque, Ms Charlotte Muller) presented the fruit of their work done during one year with the International Commercial Chamber of the Court of Appeal by providing an overview of the choices made abroad in the creation of international commercial courts in Europe and in the world.

This symposium allowed to set out how to access to the international chambers in France, their jurisdiction and the applicable procedure, stressing in particular the desire to give greater importance to predictability in the conduct of the trial, the orality of the proceedings, the possible use of foreign languages and, in particular, the use of the English language.

Mr François Ancel, Ms Fabienne Schaller and Ms Laure Albert, all three judges in the International Commercial Chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal intervened to develop these various points, as have the President of the International Commercial Chamber at the Paris Commercial Court, Mr Philippe Bernard, and Mr François Vaissette, Avocat Général representing the General Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Paris Court of Appeal , which was able to clarify the role of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in these chambers.

Mr Alban Caillemer du Ferrage and Ms Emilie Vasseur, members of the Paris Bar, stressed the important role of the creation of these chambers and the will of the bar to promote the stipulation of clauses conferring jurisdiction to the benefit of the Paris courts (in particular in the choice of ISDA to open its Master Agreement to the jurisdiction of French courts and French law) and inisted also on the judicial administration of evidence and the voluntary appearance of the parties and witnesses.

Finally, scientific insight was given by Ms Marie-Elodie Ancel, Law Professor at the University of Paris Est Créteil on the first decisions handed down by the International Chamber of the Court of Appeal and by Professor François Mailhé, Deputy-Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the Picardie Jules Verne University, who asked in particular how to meet the needs of economic stakeholders (use of the English language, set up of a procedural timetable; compulsory production of evidence; cross-examination).

During his executive summary, Mr Emmanuel Gaillard, Visiting Professor at the Yale Law School and at the Harvard Law School, called for pursuing the movement initiated by the creation of these chambers, in particular in favour of the use of the English language without translation and by implementing an adequate communication to raise awareness of these chambers, considering that France could usefully offer a high-quality public service of justice within a reasonable time and in accordance with international standards.

The fourth research seminar of the IFITIS Research Project, led by Jean-Sylvestre Bergé, will take place in Nice on 13 March 2020.

The IFITIS Project explores, generally, a phenomenon that the project leaders call “full movement beyond control”.

The expression refers to the movement of persons, goods, services etc. across territories. The phenomenon is understood to have a “full” dimension in that it calls for the attention and action of public and private actors (States, companies, individuals) at local, national and international levels. And it is regarded as “beyond control” in the sense that, in specific or short-term situations, like those of crisis, institutions with responsibility for such movement do not have full control over it.

The seminar, titled Antecedent and Modal Approaches to Circulation, is concerned with the understanding and representations of the notion of movement and with the modalities of movement in different areas of knowledge.

Speakers include Christian Rinaudo (Univ. of Nice), Jeremy Heymann (Univ. Jean Moulin – Lyon 3), Alain Strowel (Catholic Univ. of Louvain), Philippe Billet (Univ. Jean Moulin – Lyon 3), Marina Teller (Univ. of Nice), Jean-Yves Carlier (Catholic Univ. of Louvain), Sophie Robin-Olivier (Univ. Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne) and Jean-Sylvestre Bergé (Univ. of Nice).

See here for further information.

The first issue of the Journal du droit international for 2020 has just been released. It contains two articles and several casenotes relating to private international law.

In the first article, Johanna Guillaumé (University of Rouen) explores the obligation of notaries to apply rules of private international law (L’office du notaire en droit international privé).

The English abstract reads:

The notary is more and more confronted with the presence of foreign elements and, consequently, with the implementation of conflict of law rules. Studies generally focus on the content of these rules and how they are to be implemented. However, this presupposes the resolution of a preliminary question : Is the notary obliged to implement the rules of private international law ? This is the question of the notary’s obligations when faced with a foreign element. No text provides an answer to this question. Case law is also very rare. The article attempts to define the office of the notary in private international law. The analogical approach is first taken, in order to see whether the obligations of the judge or the office of the civil registrar, which are better defined, can be extended to the notary. As the notary does not exercise the judicial mission of the former and does not have the bureaucratic dimension of the latter, the answer is negative. Therefore, only a functional approach can define the obligations of the notary in private international law, that is, an approach which takes into account the obligations that characterize the notarial activity : the obligation to draw up legal and effectives deeds on the one hand, and the obligation to issue instruments on the other. What is the scope of these obligations if there is a foreign element ?

The second article, authored by Guillaume Kessler (University of Chambery), discusses the evolution of the private international law of parentage in new family configurations (Le droit international privé à l’épreuve du renouveau de la filiation).

The abstract reads:

In recent years, parentage law has been undergoing a disruption due to the combined effect of major social and technological developments that have led to the emergence of new family configurations such as co-maternity, multiple parenthood, surrogate motherhood, parentage without sexuality or same-sex adoption. French private international law has not yet really taken note of this renewal and continues to be based on rules that were already open to criticism in their time and that can now be considered obsolete. A change of connecting factor, with a preference given to the law of domicile rather than that of nationality, would be a first step towards resolving some of the difficulties created by this ongoing revolution. The development of the recognition when the status has been established abroad would be a second one. However, the importance of the issue and the complexity of the problems may require an even more radical methodological change and make it necessary to strengthen international cooperation in an area that might seem resistant to multi-state agreements.

A full table of contents can be downloaded here.

On 29 November 2019, the Council of the European Union adopted a general approach regarding the recast of Regulation 1393/2007 on the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents abroad. On 7 February a new Council document was published, featuring the Annexes of the future Recast Regulation.

The new Regulation, which will likely be adopted in the Summer or Autumn of 2020, is not expected to bring about major changes to the current legal landscape.

A comparison is provided below between some key features of the Commission’s proposal of 31 May 2018, on the one hand, and the corresponding solutions envisaged in the compromise text elaborated by the Council, on the other.

1. The Commission proposed to clarify by an additional paragraph in Article 1 that the Regulation does not apply “to service of a document on the party’s authorised representative in the Member State where the proceedings are taking place regardless of the place of residence of that party”, thereby moving to the body of the Regulation what was already stated in Recital 8 of the 2007 Regulation. Concurrently, the Commission envisaged to introduce a new provision – Article 7a – requiring the recipient to appoint a representative for the purpose of service in the forum State for all documents following the one introducing proceedings. The Council took the view that both innovations should be dropped.

2. The Commission Proposal aimed to enhance electronic communication between Transmitting and Receiving Authorities, suggesting the establishment of national IT systems (Article 3a). This provision was partially amended, following the concerns of national delegations with respect to the sustainability of a decentralized mechanism.

3. The Proposal introduced a new provision, aiming at a more active assistance of Member States authorities towards a smoother and more efficient search of the whereabouts of the defendant (Article 3c). The provision underwent minor amendments by the Council.

4. The Proposal added two paragraphs to Article 8. One was meant to extend the delay by which the recipient may refuse service, while the other intended to specify the duty of the court of the forum to examine whether the refusal was founded. The Council’s compromise text retained the former suggestion, while rejecting the latter.

5. The Proposal introduced two additional paragraphs in Article 14 on service by post, suggesting the use of a specific acknowledgment of receipt, and deeming postal service as validly effected when served to adult persons living in the same house with the recipient. The Council rejected the proposed amendments. With reference to Article 14, two additional points should be stressed: first, the wording of the provision has changed in a way that leads to the conclusion that postal service does not have to pass through transmitting authorities / court channels; second, postal service may be resorted to not only for persons domiciled, but also for those who are merely present in the country of destination.

6. The Commission Proposal attempted to pose an obligation to all Member States to provide information on professions or competent persons permitted to effect direct service. The Council deleted this part of the proposal almost in its entirety. The efforts of the Commission towards extending direct service in all Member States met with the adamant refusal of the Council.

7. The Proposal introduced a provision on electronic service (Article 15a). The Council adopted in principle the proposal as Article 14a, slightly modifying its wording. It also stated the obligation of Member States to specify the conditions under which electronic service will be accepted.

8. The Commission proposed two innovations on Article 19, regarding the situation where the defendant fails to enter an appearance: an additional tool of communication for the purposes of Article 19(2), i.e. sending an e-mail or a message to an address or an account known to the court seised, and a streamlined approach to the delay within which an application for relief must be filed with the court (2 years following the date of the judgment). Both proposals were discarded by the Council.

As a general conclusion, it may be stated that the innovative steps proposed by the Commission were met with reservation both by the European Parliament and the Council. What hopefully will improve is the cooperation between Member States authorities in the preliminary field of transmission. This will of course depend on the willingness and preparedness of Member States.

Regarding actual service of process, the situation remains the same. A divide among Member States will continue to exist in regards to direct service; e-service will heavily depend on the conditions set out by Member States; a unified approach regarding the term within which an application for relief was rejected; finally, the obligation of the claimant to serve everything abroad will continue to exist, save for the exceptions provided for by the Regulation (legal representative and unknown residence), confirmed by the CJEU in the Alder case.

The EAPIL founding conference, scheduled to take place in Aarhus on 14, 15 and 16 May 2020, is fast approaching.

We are happy to announce that all law students without a final master degree in law may now register to the conference at a reduced fee of 30 Euros.

The reduced fee gives access to all lunch breaks and the reception.

Those wishing to also take part in the conference dinner are asked to pay for the full dinner fee (50 Euros).

Further information can be found here.

Which rules are more important to determine the protection of weaker parties in financial disputes – the Brussels I bis Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments, or the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)?

That is, in a nutshell, the question faced by the CJEU in Petruchová v. FIBO Group Holdings, a case decided on 3 October 2019.

Mrs Petruchová, a Czech resident, had entered into a framework agreement with a Cypriot brokerage company, allowing her to conclude highly speculative transactions in the market for foreign exchange (FOREX). The agreement contained a clause giving jurisdiction for any dispute under the contract to Cypriot courts. When a trade went awry, Mrs Petruchová nevertheless sued the brokerage company in the Czech Republic.

The solution seemed straightforward. It seemed obvious that Mrs Petruchová was a consumer in the broad sense, as defined by Article 17(1) of Brussels I bis, given that she had speculated outside her trade and profession for her private account. Under Article 25(4) of Brussels I bis, forum selection agreements with consumers are valid only where they meet the conditions set out in Article 19, which was not the case.

However, there was a nagging problem. MiFID provides for a much more nuanced protection of weaker parties to financial transactions than Brussels I bis. Not only does it distinguish between three different categories of investors (retail investors, professional investors, and eligible counterparties), it also uses different criteria to determine the investor’s sophistication. Among them are the client’s wealth, the number of trades she has previously executed, and any experience she might have in the financial industry. In addition, the investor can to some extent choose to upgrade or downgrade her categorisation.

In Petruchová v. FIBO Group Holdings, the CJEU gave priority to Brussels I bis. It stressed that the knowledge and information that a person possesses in a certain field do not matter for the purposes of determining whether she requires consumer protection (para 55-56). Nor do the value of her transactions, the risks associated with them, or her active conduct (para 59).

The Justices admitted the need for consistency of EU law, which could involve taking into account other legislative provisions when defining the “consumer” (para 61). Yet, the parallel concept of the retail investor in MiFID did not appeal to them. Their ‘killer argument’ was that the definition under MiFID also covers legal persons – a major ‘no-no’ for consumer protection (para 71).

The CJEU also did not follow a parallel to Article 6(4) of the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations, which the Czech court of first instance had invoked to exclude disputes over financial instruments from the scope of consumer protection. To overcome this point, the CJEU distinguishes between the purposes of Rome I and Brussels I bis (para 64).

Instead of this complex and debatable argument, the Court of Justice could have relied on a proper reading of Article 6(4)(d) of Rome I, which excludes rights and obligations which constitute a financial instrument only “in so far as these activities do not constitute provision of a financial service”. FIBO Group Holdings had clearly rendered a financial service to Mrs Petruchová.

The upshot of the case is that the concept of the consumer in the Brussels Ia Regulation remains uniform and does not differ in financial disputes. This result has the benefit of clarity.

But one may reasonably ask why an investor defined as a ‘professional’ for the purposes of MiFID is permitted to ignore jurisdiction agreements she has entered into. Are not the latter much easier to understand than the obligations under complex financial instruments? Perhaps one could argue that the investor is only a “part professional”: professional in financial matters but an amateur in legal matters, such as forum selection clauses.

Regretfully, the CJEU has not entered into this discussion.

On 10 February 2020, the European Commission announced its intention to open a process of consultation to get feedback from citizen and stakeholders on whether the EU should join the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters (the Hague Judgments Convention). 

In the words of the Commission, the EU has put in place a highly developed internal acquis for the cross-boder recognition and enforcement of judgments, as a necessary complement to its single market. By way of contrast, at the international level the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters has, until recently, not been successfully regulated, even if some bilateral agreements between States exist.

Currently, civil or commercial judgments rendered by courts in the European Union can be recognised and enforced in a third country only in a limited number of situations, namely: (i) based on the 2005 Choice of Court Convention, which has a limited scope; (ii) in Iceland, Norway and Switzerland based on the Lugano Convention; (iii) based on a limited number of bilateral treaties between individual Member States and third States; (iv) based on multilateral treaties related to particular matters; or (v) on the basis of the national law of third States, sometimes subject to reciprocity. 

The Commission believes that the adoption in July 2019 of the Hague Judgments Convention may change the situation just described. Moreover, it claims that a future proposal for EU accession to the Judgments Convention would be in line with the objectives set out in the Political Guidelines for the European Commission (2019-2024), in particular related to “An economy that works for people”.

The policy objectives of the EU accession to the Judgments Convention would be: to enhance access to justice for EU businesses and citizens through a system that facilitates the recognition and enforcement of judgments everywhere in the world where the debtor happens to have assets; to increase legal certainty for those involved in international trade and investment; to reduce costs for businesses and citizens involved in international dealings or in international dispute resolution; to allow the recognition and enforcement of third-country judgments in the EU only where fundamental principles of EU law are respected, such as for instance the right to a fair trial, and which do not affect the EU acquis related to the internal recognition and enforcement of judgments.

As for the policy options, the Commission puts forward the following:

Option 0: Baseline scenario: no policy change. The Union will thus not accede to the Judgments Convention and the current status quo will continue. However, given the EU’s active involvement in these negotiations and the fact that its results reflect EU’s policy interests, this scenario is taken into account mainly as a benchmark in order to assess the other options.

Option 1a: The Union will accede to the Judgments Convention without making any declaration.

Option 1b: The Union will accede to the Judgments Convention, excluding certain matters reflecting the EU’s policy objective of protecting weaker parties, such as consumers, employees or, in matters relating to insurance, the policyholder, the insured or the beneficiary, or/and certain matters falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of EU courts, for instance with regard to disputes relating to tenancies or commercial lease of immovable property.

Option 1c: The Union will accede to the Judgments Convention excluding State entities from the application of the Convention

Option 1d: A combination of options 1b and 1c

The Commission’s preliminary assessment of acceding to the Convention points to a positive outcome in economic terms, coupled with an improvement of growth and investment, thus of employment (the Commission acknowledges nontheless that as trade and investment of companies from outside the EU might also increase, some negative economic impacts in the short term cannot be excluded for EU competitors).

From the point of view of access to justice, signing the Convention would have postive implications as well. In terms of administrative burdens, the Commission is once again optimistic: although some Member States with a simple system for recognition and enforcement would face some negative impact if the new system based on the Judgments Convention is implemented, the Commission believes that such possible negative impacts would be offset by the important economic benefits.

The public consultation on the above-mentioned policy objectives and options, and on the likely impacts of signing the Convention, will be launched in March/April 2020 and run for a minimum period of 12 weeks. It will be available via the Commission’s central public consultations page; the questionnaires will be available in English, French and German but the replies can be made in any of the 24 official languages.

An in-depth Study on the Hague Judgements Convention Draft of November 2017, requested by the JURI Committee of the EU Parliament, to a large extent, still valid under the final version, can be downloaded here; it includes a chapter devoted to the relationship with the EU rules, and policy recommendations on the position of the EU vis-à-vis the Convention. A detailed explanation of the Convention as adopted is provided by A. Bonomi (Professor at the University of Laussane) and C. Mariottini (Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute Luxembourg) at the Yearbook of Private International Law, vol. 20 (2018/2019), pp. 537-567. 

The 12th edition of the leading French treatise on private international law of Prof. Pierre Mayer (Panthéon-Sorbonne University) is out. The book is now primarily updated  by Vincent Heuzé (Panthéon-Sorbonne University) and Benjamin Remy (Cergy Pontoise University).

The book covers all traditional dimensions of the conflict of laws and, in keeping with the French tradition, the law of citizenship and immigration.

More details can be found here.

Maria Caterina Baruffi and Matteo Ortino (both University of Verona) have edited Trending topics in international and EU law: legal and economic perspectives.

The book collects the proceedings of the #TILT Young Academic Colloquium, held in Verona on 23-24 May 2019. The event, targeted to Ph.D. students and early career scholars, was organised by the Law Department of the University of Verona in collaboration with the Ph.D. School of Legal and Economic Studies and the European Documentation Centre.

The volume is divided into four parts, respectively devoted to public international law, including papers on human rights, international criminal law and investment law; private international law ; EU law, both in its general aspects and its policies; and law and economics.

The table of contents can be found here. See here for further information.

Luis de Lima Pinheiro (university of Lisbon) has posted Public Policy and Private International Law – Portugal on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

The present report is aimed at describing the concept, legal framework, and features of the public policy clause in the Portuguese legal order, and at giving an account of the main applications of this clause in modern Portuguese case law and literature (marriage, children, custodianship, succession, contract, non-contractual obligations, property, intellectual property, and corporate).

The report deals mainly with choice of law, but reference is also made to the recognition of foreign judgments, since the public policy features and applications are to a large extent common in both contexts.

Portuguese courts tend to respect the exceptionality of the public policy clause. In recent case law, only a few judgments have deviated from this guideline, namely concerning the right of some heirs to a legal portion of the estate. In the vast majority of situations, the arguments based upon international public policy considerations were not accepted by the courts.

The paper is forthcoming in Public Policy and Private International Law (Olaf Meyer ed., Edward Elgar). It can be downloaded here.

In 2006 a German patient received, in Germany, defective breast implants manufactured by Poly Implant Prothèse SA (‘PIP’), a French undertaking that is now insolvent. The patient seeks compensation before the German courts from Allianz IARD SA, the French insurer of PIP.

In France, manufacturers of medical devices are under a statutory obligation to be insured against civil liability for harm suffered by third parties arising from their activities (see Article L.1142‑2 of the Public Health Code). That obligation led PIP to conclude an insurance contract with Allianz, which contained a territorial clause limiting the cover to damage caused on French territory only. Thus, PIP medical devices that were exported to another Member State and used there were not covered by the insurance contract.

In this context, the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main enquires whether the fact that PIP was insured by Allianz for damage caused by its medical devices on French territory only, to the exclusion of that potentially caused in other Member States, is compatible with Article 18 TFEU and the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality contained therein.

The referring court asked first whether Article 18 has a direct third-party effect; subsidiarily, it asked about an indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality on the side of the competent French authority – as an emanation of the State -, who did not object to the territorial clause mentioned above (two further questions followed, for the case of an affirmative reply to the first one).

AG’s Bobek opinion on the case (case C-581/18) was published on 6 February 2020. It contains principally reflections on the autonomous application of Article 18 TFUE. Additionally, in response to a first point of disagreement among the parties presenting observations, it explores the criteria determining whether a subject matter falls under the scope of application of EU.

Mr. Bobek rejects an interpretation of Article 18 TFEU as an autonomous provision creating enforceable obligations not already laid down by one of the four fundamental freedoms, or specifically provided for in any other instrument of EU law: and this, for structural reasons (as he says, in order to respect the regulatory logic of the internal market). According to Mr. Bobek (at 110), otherwise Article 18 TFEU would be turned

into a limitless provision, by virtue of which any issue, however remotely connected to a provision of EU law, could be harmonised by judicial means. It would furthermore turn regulatory competence within the internal market on its head, generating irreconcilable future conflicts of competence between the Member States.

He goes on to say (at 112) that

it is also clear from the discussion of the present case that if Article 18 TFEU were allowed to operate as a free-standing, substantive obligation in the way implied by the referring court in its questions, its reach would go beyond anything that the free movement case-law ever contemplated, including the case-law on goods pre-Keck. Interpreted in that way, there would be no limit to the scope of Article 18 TFEU: that provision would be turned into a Dassonville formula on steroids. In today’s interconnected world, sooner or later, there is inevitably some sort of interaction with goods, services or persons from other Member States. If that were enough to trigger the independent applicability of Article 18 TFEU, every single rule in a Member State would be caught by that provision.”

And adds later (at 114, 115)

the rules on free movement, as well as Article 18 TFEU, logically only cover the free flow of goods or services across borders, including exit and entry. Unless expressly harmonised by the EU legislature, the rules on their subsequent use are a matter for the Member States where they are used (…). In other words, the fact that goods once came from another Member State is not a sufficient reason to suggest that any matter later concerning those goods is covered by EU law.

From a legal point of view, the opinion is most probably correct (the practical outcome, “vous auriez dû aller vous faire soigner en France”, may be morally regrettable; but an expansive interpretation of Article 18 is not the appropriate way to avoid it). However, I have to admit I do not follow him when he seeks support on PIL arguments. This happens at 113, where he puts forward a possible consequence of an independent applicability of Article 18 TFEU:

To take just one example: imagine that, while drafting this Opinion, I am injured — hopefully not too seriously — because the computer I am typing on explodes. The various parts of the computer are likely to have been produced in a Member State other than Luxembourg, more likely even, in the age of integrated supply chains, in several Member States, if not also third countries. Absent any specific contractual terms concerning applicable law and jurisdiction between the producer of that computer and myself, therefore assuming normal rules on tort (delict) were to apply, the applicable law governing any damages claim is likely to be Luxembourg law, as the law of the State in which the accident occurred. Should I then, if I were to find Luxembourg law unsatisfactory for my damages case, have the possibility of relying on Article 18 TFEU in order to invoke the law of the place of production of the computer, or perhaps even the place of production of any of the components of the computer, and have my claim enforced before a Luxembourg court?

Nor do I understand either, at 115, why his recollection of the statutory doctrine:

If that logic were to be embraced, by a questionable interpretation of Article 18 TFEU, the movement of goods in Europe would become (once again) reminiscent of medieval legal particularism, whereby each product would, like a person, carry its own laws with it. Goods would be like snails, carrying their homes with them in the form of the legislation of their country of origin, to be applicable to them from their production to their destruction.

I was looking for conflict-of-law echoes in the Opinion, thus I was happy to find them; but (surely my fault) I fail to see the link of this line of argument with the case at hand. Anyway, one does not need to agree with each single point of an Opinion to approve of it. And it is always fun to read Mr. Bobek.