The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑307/19 (Obala i lučice d.o.o. v NLB Leasing d.o.o.), which is about Brussels I bis, notaries and recovery of unpaid parking ticket on public roads. It applies Articles 1 and 7.1 whilst rejecting the application of Article 24.1. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):
“1) L’article 1er, paragraphe 1, du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que relève de la notion de « matière civile et commerciale », au sens de cette disposition, une action en recouvrement d’une redevance portant sur un ticket journalier de stationnement sur une place de parking, qui est délimitée et située sur la voie publique, diligentée par une société qui a été mandatée par une collectivité territoriale pour la gestion de telles places de parking.
2) L’article 24, point 1, du règlement no 1215/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens que ne relève pas de la notion de « baux d’immeubles », au sens de cette disposition, une action en recouvrement d’une redevance portant sur un ticket journalier de stationnement sur une place de parking délimitée, située sur la voie publique.
3) L’article 7, point 1, du règlement no 1215/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens, d’une part, que relève de la « matière contractuelle », au sens de cette disposition, une action en recouvrement d’une redevance qui est née d’un contrat ayant pour objet le stationnement sur l’une des places de parking délimitées, situées sur la voie publique, organisées et gérées par une société mandatée à cette fin et, d’autre part, que ce contrat constitue un contrat de fourniture de services, au sens de l’article 7, point 1, sous b), second tiret, de ce règlement ».
The Court of Justice delivered today its very interesting judgment in case C‑603/20 PPU (SS v MCP) on Article 10 Brussels II bis.
The question: “By its question, the referring court seeks to ascertain, in essence, whether Article 10 of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that, if the finding is made that a child has acquired, at the time when the application relating to parental responsibility is brought, his or her habitual residence in a third State following abduction to that State, the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before his or her abduction, retain their jurisdiction indefinitely”.
The response: “Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 […] must be interpreted as meaning that it is not applicable to a situation where a finding is made that a child has, at the time when an application relating to parental responsibility is brought, acquired his or her habitual residence in a third State following abduction to that State. In that situation, the jurisdiction of the court seised will have to be determined in accordance with the applicable international conventions, or, in the absence of any such international convention, in accordance with Article 14 of that regulation”.
Source:
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=239243&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=353488The JURI Committee released today an Opinion on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on amending Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (Rapporteur: Jiří Pospíšil, PE661.912v02-00, 23 March 2021)
Source: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/JURI-AD-661912_EN.pdf
On Access to Justice, the EU and the Aarhus Convention, see, for example, E. Guinchard and M.-P. Granger, Sisyphus in Luxembourg, in E. Guinchard and M-P Granger, “The New EU Judiciary”, Kluwer, December 2017. 375, spec. p. 377 in fine ff. (available at https://europeanciviljustice.files.wordpress.com/2021/02/sisyphus-in-luxembourg.pdf).
On 22 March 2021, the JURI Committee of the European Parliament (Adrián Vázquez Lázara, on behalf of) asked a question to the European Commission (Question for oral answer O-000022/2021) on the Accession of the UK to the Lugano II Convention:
“Cooperation between the EU and the UK on civil and commercial justice is fundamental for citizens, businesses and public administrations alike. The lack of provisions in this regard in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement has given rise to legal uncertainty for all Member States.
The UK applied to accede to the Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters on 8 April 2020. According to Article 72(3) of the Convention, the European Union must endeavour to give its consent at the latest within one year after the transmission by the Depositary to the Contracting Parties of the application made by the United Kingdom. This deadline will expire on 14 April 2021.
1. What is the Commission’s position on the possible accession of the United Kingdom to the Convention?
2. What requirements does the Commission consider that the UK should meet for its application to be accepted?
3. According to the Commission, to what extent would the Hague Conference allow for the same level of cooperation on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters?”
One eagerly waits for the response!
Source: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/O-9-2021-000022_EN.html
Earlier this month, the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the HCCH met, from 1 to 5 March 2021. Work continues on several legislative projects whilst others seem only now legislative in name as no binding instrument properly speaking is foreseen anymore. Signature of the 2019 Judgments Convention is growing.
conclusions-decisions-cgap-hcch-march-2021DownloadThe conclusions and decisions are attached.
Source: https://www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=794
Many thanks Alain Devers for alerting us back in October to the French Supreme Court’s judgment in PWC Landwell v LY, on agreements to arbitrate and the consumer rights Directive 93/13. Apologies for late posting.
The Supreme Court held [20 ff] that the contract between a client, domicoled at France, and PWC Landwell’s Spanish offices (Landwell used to be the trading name of the law firm side of this multidisciplinary practice), fell within the consumer title of Brussels IA. The Court of Appeal’s judgment had clearly run through the CJEU-sanctioned ‘directed at’ test and found it satisfied in the case at issue (the Landwell website boasting international coverage of its services as well as international contact numbers as strong indicators).
The SC also held that the requirement to turn to arbitration was incompatible with the Consumer Rights Directive 93/13, in particular its A6 which per CJEU C‑147/16 Karel de Grote — Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen confirmed in C-51/17 OTP Bank et OTP Faktoring is of ordre public character. The SC agreed with the CA that the clause, despite the client having been in the presence of a bank employee when the contract was put to her, was not properly negotiated and qualifies as a clause abusif.
Geert.
EU Private International Law 3rd ed 2021, para 2.277.
French SC on EU consumer rights Directive and #arbitration agreements. https://t.co/SD5A8foNQM
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 11, 2020
NB v MI [2021] EWHC 224 (Fam) engages capacity to marriage. A marriage was formed on 1 June 2013 in Pakistan under sharia law between the parties. 18 years earlier, when she was 6, the wife was involved in a serious accident which left her among others badly neurologically damaged. She only slowly recovered from these injuries, to the extent that expert evidence suggested she does now, but did not have capacity in all the areas of life canvassed including to marry and enter sexual relations, at the time of her 2013 marriage.
Mostyn J considers the issues of whether partners understand the constituent elements of what it means to get married, starting with Durham v Durham [1885] 10 PD 80 and of course noting the changed approaches to the institute of marriage since. The core test then is to check whether at the time of marriage, the partners understood what it means to get married: financially, emotionally, sexually.
Mostyn J upon review of the evidence held that the wife lacked awareness of the difference between Islamic and English marriage; or the financial consequences depending on the contract; or her husband’s potential claims against her estate; or her husband’s proposed living arrangements. Yet that these say nothing at all about her capacity to marry [37]: ‘They may say quite a lot about her wisdom in getting married, but that is not the issue I have to decide.’ Although reference is made to KC & Anor v City of Westminster Social & Community Services Dept. & Anor [2008] EWCA Civ 198 I find the conflict of laws analysis could have been made clearer: is the overpowering engagement of English law a finding of confirmation of lex domicilii (the lex patriae of the wife is not mentioned but might be British), entirely disregarding a role for the lex loci celebrationis?
This is not my core area – I imagine others may have a more expert insight.
Geert.
Validity of Pakistani marriage valid under #sharia law, per English law, on grounds of mental capacity following neurological injuries suffered earlier in life. https://t.co/VXrfjiIDVl
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 8, 2021
A quick post on an issue I actively published on last year, including with Kathleen Garnett: the innovation principle. My post here is a bit of a documentation gateway on same. I just wanted to draw readers’ attention to two developments.
First, the European Risk Forum which stood at the cradle of a proposed innovation ‘principle’ has been rebranded into the ‘European Regulation and Innovation Forum’ – ERIF. This of course even more than ‘Risk Forum’ is meant to conjure up positive feelings: who could possibly be against Regulation let alone innovation? It calls itself a think tank but it is in fact a trade association – interest group.
Further, the focus of the campaign has now changed. No longer it seems is the introduction of a new innovation principle the aim of the campaign. Rather, a restrictive take on regulation using cost benefit analysis and ‘proportionality’ – both existing principles of e.g. EU environmental law and at odds e.g. with the recently proposed essential use idea within the EU’s chemicals policy. It seems ERIF looks among others to the EU’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board to keep proposed laws in check.
Worth keeping an eye on, I suggest.
Geert.
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