Eastern Pacific Chartering Inc v Pola Maritime Ltd [2021] EWHC 1707 (Comm) is a highly unusual case which shows that dormant Conventions can be awoken from their slumber. I merely dabble in EU external relations law, I am no expert in it. The application of that law in the context of private international law is an issue I have tasked one or two students with – let’s just say they find it challenging.
On the specific issue at hand, parties agree that consequential to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (Gibraltar) Order 1997, matters of jurisdiction between the E&W Courts and the Supreme Court of Gibraltar are governed by the Brussels Convention 1968 and that this remains the case notwithstanding Brexit. That core issue of external relations law pre and post Brexit is therefore not sub judice. One imagines that had it been, it could have led to extensive to and fro, among others within the context of the UK having revoked the 1968 Convention per the jurisdiction and Judgments Exit Regulations SI 2019/479, and of the Withdrawal Agreement.
In July 2020, claimant had a ship arrested in Gibraltar, with the purpose to serve as security for claims under a charterparty between both, claims that were to be brought in London, consistently with an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the charterparty. Roberston DJ classifies that action as one for provisional measures under Article 24 Convention (35 of the Brussels Ia Regulation). The legality of that arrest (which ended upon claimant releasing it) continues to be disputed (ia viz the actual ownership of the ship).
Claimant (not domiciled in a 1968 Convention Contracting State) now sues in E&W (pursuant to the choice of court) Defendant (domiciled at Cyprus) for outstanding monies. In current proceedings it applies to dismiss and strike out that part of the Defendant’s counterclaim at the E&W courts which seeks to advance claims in tort based on the alleged wrongful Gibraltar arrest. In essence claimant submits that the High Court court has no jurisdiction to try the Defendant’s tort claims and should decline jurisdiction in favour of the Supreme Court of Gibraltar.
After a swipe [18 ff] at both parties having engaged, without court approval, experts on Gibraltarian law (which, she holds, bear no relevance for the jurisdictional issues anyways), Roberston DJ proceeds to discuss the lis pendens issue.
Defendant’s primary case is that, on the facts of this case, Article 17 Convention (A25 BIa) applies to confer jurisdiction, because the exclusive jurisdiction clause is broad enough to cover the tort claims. The Defendant’s fallback position is that, if that is wrong, the Court nevertheless has jurisdiction in respect of its counterclaims, not on the basis of A5(3) Convention (the Claimant (defendant on the counterclaim) not being domiciled in a Convention State) either because that necessarily follows from the Claimant’s decision to litigate its own claims here, or because Claimant has taken steps since service of the Defence and Counterclaim which waived any right to object to jurisdiction in respect of the counterclaims.
The discussion revolves around the contractual and statutory interpretation of the action radius of choice of court. This also involves the classic issue of tort claims between contractual parties (compare Wikingerhof) with the judge opting for the one stop shop approach (distinguishing ia Ryanair Ltd v Esso Italiana Srl [2015] 1 All ER (Comm) 152): 42: ‘there is a clear causal connection [between the contractual and tort claims, GAVC], which seems to be sufficient for the purposes of a clause worded “in connection with“.’ In conclusion: [52]: ‘whether damages are recoverable for an allegedly wrongful arrest made in seeking security for claims under the charter, ..is a claim “in connection with” the charter’ hence the E&W courts have jurisdiction. [39]: this ‘allows a single accounting, as regards the overall financial position of the parties as a result of the legal relationship created between them by the charter, and their dispute about what rights and obligations properly flow from that legal relationship.’
Obiter jurisdiction on the alternative grounds, under English residual rules, is also accepted (with the interesting note of the absence, in the Convention, of a gateway for counterclaims, in contrast with Brussels I and Brussels Ia).
Coming then to lis pendens under Article 21 Convention, this is dismissed. [70] The arrest claim plainly does not involve either the same cause of action or the same object as the Defendant’s tort claims seeking to recover damages for wrongful arrest, which are advanced solely by way of counterclaim in E&W. The factual and legal foundation for that counterclaim needs, on any view, to travel substantially beyond the matters the Claimant relies on for its own cause of action and the object of the counterclaim is to recover damages.
Neither [73] is an acknowledgment of service in the Gibraltar arrest proceedings does not amount to a submission to that jurisdiction which would preclude the Defendant from raising its distinct tort claims in E&W.
A stay on ‘related proceedings’ (Article 22 Convention) is also rejected for the reasons listed at [83]. Core reference here is Research in Motion v Visto [2007] EWHC 900 (Ch).
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Chapter 1 Heading 1.7, Chapter 2 para 2.375, 2.469.
Eastern Pacific Chartering v Pola Maritime [2021] EWHC 1707 (Comm)
Interesting and unusual case involving the UK and Gibraltar and applying the 1968 Brussels Convention (!)
Lis pendens, choice of court (charterparty), whether issues arises out of samehttps://t.co/eNp2jpl4Zw
— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 28, 2021
Advocate General M Szpunar delivered today his opinion in case C‑422/20 (RK v CR), which is about the Succession Regulation. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):
« L’article 6, sous a), et l’article 7, sous a), du règlement (UE) nº 650/2012 […] doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la juridiction de l’État membre dont la compétence est censée résulter d’un déclinatoire de compétence de la juridiction préalablement saisie n’est pas habilitée à vérifier, premièrement, si la juridiction préalablement saisie a, à juste titre, considéré que la loi de cet État membre a été choisie ou est réputée avoir été choisie pour régir la succession, deuxièmement, si l’une des parties à la procédure a présenté une demande au titre de l’article 6, sous a), de ce règlement devant la juridiction préalablement saisie et, troisièmement, si la juridiction préalablement saisie a, à juste titre, considéré que les juridictions dudit État membre sont mieux placées pour statuer sur la succession, lorsque ces trois conditions ont été vérifiées par la juridiction préalablement saisie ».
Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered today his opinion in case C‑289/20 (IB v FA), which is about Brussels II bis. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):
« L’article 3, paragraphe 1, sous a), du règlement (CE) no 2201/2003 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que, aux fins de l’attribution de compétence, chaque conjoint ne peut se voir reconnaître qu’une résidence habituelle.
Quand un conjoint partage sa vie entre deux ou plusieurs États membres de telle sorte qu’il n’est aucunement possible de considérer l’un de ces États comme étant celui de sa résidence habituelle au sens de l’article 3, paragraphe 1, sous a), du règlement no 2201/2003, la compétence judiciaire internationale doit être déterminée conformément à d’autres critères prévus par ce règlement et, le cas échéant, conformément aux critères résiduels en vigueur dans les États membres.
Dans ce même cas de figure, la compétence peut être exceptionnellement attribuée aux juridictions des États membres d’une résidence non habituelle d’un conjoint, lorsque l’application du règlement no 2201/2003 et des fors résiduels ne fait ressortir la compétence internationale d’aucun État membre ».
In a note verbale of 22 June 2021, recently transmitted to the Swiss Federal Council as Depository of the Lugano II Convention, the European Commission has notified that “the European Union is not in a position to give its consent to invite the United Kingdom to accede to the Lugano Convention”.
The note verbale may be found on the website of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (EDA in German), https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/fr/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/autres-conventions/Lugano2/20210701-LUG-ann-EU.pdf
Josiya & Ors v British American Tobacco Plc & Ors [2021] EWHC 1743 (QB) is the first shot in an important business and human rights case, accusing the defendants of being responsible for working conditions said to include the widespread use of unlawful child labour, unlawful forced labour and the systematic exposure of vulnerable and impoverished adults and children to extremely hazardous working conditions with minimal protection against industrial accidents, injuries and diseases.
I briefly want to flag the 25 June order by Spencer J for it highlights a point I often make when teaching, or sharing my practice experience on, strategic and public interest litigation: that most of these cases are won not by an eloquent speech on grand principles, delivered in Hollywood fashion. Rather, by the dogged determination of invested lawyers, with a keen eye for detail across civil procedure (including standing, statutes of limitation, service, timely filing of procedural , third party and other ways of financing, tort and other applicable law).
The order at issue dismisses an application for strike-out which was essentially based on an alleged lack of documentary proof of claimants’ link to the defendants, leading to claim said to be an abuse of process.
Brussels IA applies to the claim (claim form was filed on 18 December 2020, the particulars of claim – POC on 12 January 2021): claimants aim to avoid forum non conveniens although of course Articles 33-34 might still be raised. Locus causae is said to be Malawi law [19]. Claimants concede [23] they do not at this stage have documentary evidence that categorially links each individual Claimant to one or more of the Defendants or companies within the Defendants’ corporate groups. They tried to obtain this unsuccessfully in pre-trial disclosure.
Claimant’s counsel, Richard Hermer QC, successfully argued a distinction [41] between what is required for a party to plead the case; and what is required for a party to prove the case at trial.
Held: the claim form without specific identification of the link between individual claimants and specific defendants is not an abuse of process under the circumstances. An application for disclosure may and must be prepared.
Geert.
European Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Chapter 7.
#bizhumanrights
Unsuccessful strike-out application viz particulars of claim – POC, alleged lack of documented claimants' involvement in Malawi tobacco
Held discussion of intensity of proof suited to discovery application, not strike-out of POC
Josiya ea v BAT ea [2021] EWHC 1743 pic.twitter.com/Dn1u0PSoH3
— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 25, 2021
As I seem to be in a comparative mood today, consider Hydrodec Group Plc [2021] NSWSC 755, in which a suggestion of COMI in the UK, of a company incorporated there, was dismissed in favour of COMI in the US. Cooper Grace Ward have the relevant background here. The result of the order is that the company will be wound up under Australian law.
Hydrodec Group Plc is the parent company for a corporate group comprised of: subsidiaries located in the UK, Australia and Japan that were not trading; and a sole trading subsidiary located in the United States of America, which owns valuable assets. As CGW report, Hydrodec contended that its COMI was in the UK because, among other things: it has an address in the UK; its affairs are administered in the UK by directors that reside in the UK; its main asset was its shareholding in a subsidiary, in the UK; and the majority of its creditors are in the UK.
The judge however reportedly (see the CGW overview; I have not been able to locate judgment at this stage) disagreed on the following grounds. COMI must be identified by reference to criteria that are objective and ascertainable by third parties (ditto in the EU under the EIR). The A16(3) UNCITRAL Model Law presumption of COMI in the place of registered office does not apply seeing as the corporation has two of these. The only trading entity within the corporate group controlled by Hydrodec was in the USA. Hydrodec described the USA as its ‘key market’ and the focus of Hydrodec’s plans for growth. The principal creditor of the corporate group controlled by Hydrodec was in the USA. The administration of the affairs of Hydrodec involved, in substance, the administration of the operations of the USA subsidiary. Finally, Hydrodec’s primary focus was the re-financing of its operations in the USA.
The judgment shows the specificity of determining COMI in the case of a corporation which itself does not have a market focus.
European Private International law, 3rd ed. 2021, 5.65 ff.
A short post for comparative conflicts purposes. Readers might be aware of the minimum contacts rule in US jurisdictional analysis. Rice J excellently summarises the issues in his order denying a strike-out application (‘motion to dismiss’) on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.
‘Under the Due Process Clause, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant only where “the defendant ha[s] certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” [Picot v. Weston, 9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., [1945])….
Personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant may take two forms:
general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction requires connections with the forum “so continuous and systematic as to render the foreign corporation essentially at home in the forum State (Ranza). Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, may only be exercised “when a case aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”
Shandong essentially argue that they are kept at arm’s length from US jurisdiction because they are not the one importing the tires into the US: a separate corporation imported, a third distributed. The judge however (in the process dismissing Shandong’s assertion that the goods were shipped FOB – Free on Board), found that Shandong delivered tires into the stream of commerce, was involved, in consequence of its contractual duties, in shipping the tires to Washington ports, and has taken steps for creating tires compliant with state and federal law to arrive in Washington pursuant to the supply agreement. This echoes the EU jargon of ‘directing activities at’ the state of Washington.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 2.460, para 4.48 ff.
Comparative law claxon, special jurisdiction, product liability
Court finds Shandong delivered tires into US commerce, was involved in shipping them to WASH ports, has undertaken to comply with US state, federal law per supply agreement with Bridgestonehttps://t.co/AcGzp4hw9D https://t.co/WkGT25CnGM pic.twitter.com/VDcxBGYTEm
— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 14, 2021
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