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Procédures civiles d'exécution

As readers of this blog know, the first EAPIL (Virtual) Seminar, devoted to the impact of Brexit on Private International Law, will take place tomorrow from 11 am to 1 pm (MET). For more information on the event, see here.

Registrations to the Seminar are now closed. The login details have been sent to the registered participants by e-mail this morning (if you can’t find our e-mail, please check your spam folder or get in touch with us at blog@eapil.org).

Just published in Recueil Dalloz: a “cri d’alarme” by Professors Lagarde, Gaudemet-Tallon, Kessedjian, Jault-Seseke and Pataut concerning the fate of the useful International Commission on Civil Status. Here is a translation of their call to action:

The International Commission on Civil Status in Danger[1]

POINT de Vue Recueil Dalloz issue N° 42 of 3 December 2020,  p. 2355 by Paul Lagarde, Professor emeritus Paris I University, Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, Professor emeritus Paris II University, Catherine Kessedjian, Professor emeritus Paris II University, Fabienne Jault-Seseke, Professor at  Paris Saclay University, and Étienne Pataut, Professor at the Sorbonne Law School

Civil status issues are a crucial element of a person’s identity. Solving these issues is an essential component of the protection of the right to private and family life, and a gateway to everyone’s recognition as a person before the law. This is why many efforts are made, for instance, to promote birth registration[2]. From birth to death, the legal existence of a person is conditioned by civil status.

Recognition of civil status documents from one State to another is fundamental to ensure the continuity of personhood when people cross international borders. International cooperation is essential to allow a correct understanding and interpretation of civil status documents and facilitate their circulation (both regarding their form (instrumentum) and their content (negotium)).

This is the purpose of the International Commission on Civil Status (CIEC/ICSS), an intergovernmental organization created in the aftermath of the Second World War. The five founding States are Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Switzerland. Although not operating in the spotlights, this organisation has a most respectable track record. It has enabled the adoption of thirty-four conventions and eleven recommendations on birth, name, nationality, gender change, marriage, partnership, refugees, civil status services, among others. Many of these instruments provide for cooperation of competent authorities or facilitate the understanding of civil status acts, in particular by establishing multilingual forms and allowing their electronic transmission. They have been successful and proved to be very useful. Convention No. 16 is a convincing example[3]. It binds twenty-four States, including States that are not members of the ICCS. It abolishes both legalisation and apostille requirements.

At some point, the ICCS had up to seventeen members (including States outside the EU such as Mexico and Turkey). But despite the undoubted success of the ICCS, Member States have withdrawn from the Organisation one after the other. The withdrawal by the Netherlands in 2018 and France in 2019 may deliver the final blow to the ICCS.

These withdrawals are incomprehensible.

It has been suggested that they have budgetary reasons. This seems hardly credible since the annual budgetary contribution of France to the CIEC amounted to € 33,000, whilst a further reduction to € 15,000 had already been agreed. Moreover, the ICCS has recently decided to dispense with the contribution of its members until 2025. So, this, hardly convincing, argument does not hold.

No more convincing is the idea that the European Union, because of EU regulation 2016/1191 ensuring the circulation of civil status documents in the Union (inspired by ICCS’s work), would have taken over ICCS’s mission. EU regulations do not bind third States; yet, due to migration flows, the EU Member States are often faced with questions concerning the civil status of nationals from countries in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, among others.

Moreover, by signing the Global Compact for Migration in 2019, France has committed itself to promote cooperation in the field of international migration. As the Global Compact itself reminds us, this commitment draws from actions to “Improve civil registry systems, with a particular focus on reaching unregistered persons and our nationals residing in other countries, including by providing relevant identity and civil registry documents, strengthening capacities, and investing in information and communications technology solutions, while upholding the right to privacy and protecting personal data…”.

This is precisely the role of the ICCS, currently launched in ambitious electronic communication projects on civil status documents – supported, moreover, by the European Union.  Now is the time for States (and for the European Union, which is now in a position to become itself an ICCS member) to reinvest in the ICCS – and definitely not to give up!

[1] For a detailed argument, see H. van Loon, Requiem or transformation? Perspectives for the CIEC / ICCS and its work, Yearbook of private international law, vol. 20 (2018/2019), p. 73-93 (this article predates France’s withdrawal).

[2] See Art 7 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

[3] Convention on the issue of multilingual extracts from civil-status records, signed in Vienna, 8 September 1976. This Convention has, moreover, been reviewed and modernized by Convention No 34, signed in Strasbourg, 14 March 2014.

The author of this post is Michiel Poesen, PhD candidate at KU Leuven.

This post tells a short story about the fate of European private international law’s neutrality paradigm… Our story starts where you probably would not expect it: the 2019 Belgian company law reform.

In 2019, the Belgian legislature reformed the Company Law Code in a bid to attract more investors to Belgium. (For the record, the previous government also launched the idea of offering businesses an interesting venue for transnational litigation–the Brussels International Business Court or BIBC, which did not make it through).

One of the reform’s key elements was to make company law leaner and more flexible. Facilitating this flexibilisation, the legislature also revised the Belgian private international law provisions pertaining to company law. In sympathy with the well-known CJEU case law on the freedom of establishment in the EU, the legislature traded the seat principle for the incorporation principle as the connecting factor for the law applicable to and adjudicatory jurisdiction over companies (Articles 109–110 Code of Private International Law; Article 111 contains a list of legal questions governed by the lex societatis).

Clearly, the incorporation principle gives up on the traditional idea that the connecting factor for companies should be based on a physical element such as the presence of a company’s place of administration (see R Michaels, ‘Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law and the Challenge from Europeanization and Globalization’ in M Stolleis & W Streeck (eds), Aktuelle Fragen zu politischer und rechtlicher Steuerung im Kontext der Globalisierung (Nomos 2007) 142).

Interestingly, the statute provides for one carve-out concerning adjudicatory jurisdiction (I should thank Professor Joeri Vananroye and Professor Stijn De Dier for bringing it to my attention). Claims relating to the personal liability of directors towards third parties can be brought in the Belgian courts if the company has its ‘main establishment’ in Belgium and has a merely formal connection the state where it is incorporated:

… the Belgian courts have jurisdiction over actions concerning the liability of directors of corporations resulting from Article 2:56, §1, of the Corporations and Associations Code towards third parties other than the corporation that arose out of acts committed in the performance of their administrative function, provided that the main establishment of the legal person is in Belgium, while the legal person is incorporated outside if the European Union [or indeed an EFTA state that ratified the Lugano II Convention] and has a merely formal connection to that state [Translation by the author, the authentic text is available in Dutch and French in the Belgian state gazette].

The main establishment ‘is determined by taking into account primarily the place of administration, as well as the centre of its business and activities, and in subsidiary order the statutory seat’ (Article 4, §3 Code of Private International Law, available in English here – although not yet reflecting the 2018 overhaul). This, in fact, is a special tort jurisdiction rule that seeks to shield Belgian residents from companies who operate in Belgium but are incorporated outside of the EU (e.g. for fiscal or organisational purposes).

The Belgian legislature enacted this provision to strike a balance between a company’s freedom to choose the forum pursuant to the incorporation principle and the protection of general interests in Belgium, such as environmental protection or the fight against tax fraud (see here, at 144–145).

Private international lawyers will be interested to know that finding the physical ‘seat’ (Sitz in classical Savignyan terms) of the tortious relationship between a director and a third party, however, was not part of the legislature’s motives. This is quite interesting. For it demonstrates how the legislature sought to balance material interests through the law of conflict of jurisdictions (see Michaels, supra, 140–141).

Hence, the legislature was not enticed by European private international law’s traditional focus on finding the legal relationship’s geographical connection (which one American realist provocatively called ‘transcendental nonsense’ long before the Belgian company law reform; FS Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1935) 35 Columbia Law Review 811).

Written by Fieke van Overbeeke[1]

On 1 December 2020 the Grand Chamber of the CJEU ruled in the FNV/Van Den Bosch case that the Posting of Workers Directive(PWD) is applicable to the highly mobile labour activities in the road transport sector (C-815/18). This judgment is in line with recently developed EU legislation (Directive 2020/1057), the conclusion of AG Bobek and more generally the ‘communis opinio’. This question however was far from an ‘acte clair’ or ‘acte éclairé’ and the Court’s decision provides an important piece of the puzzle in this difficult matter.

The FNV/Van Den Bosch case dates back all the way to the beginning of 2014, when the Dutch trade union FNV decided to sue the Dutch transport company Van den Bosch for not applying Dutch minimum wages to their Hungarian lorry drivers that were (temporarily) working in and from its premises in the Netherlands. One of the legal questions behind this was whether the Posting of Workers Directive is applicable to the road transport sector, for indeed if it is, the minimum wages of the Netherlands should be guaranteed if they are more favourable than the Hungarian minimum wages (and they are).

At the Court of first instance, the FNV won the case with flying colours. The Court unambiguously considered that the PWD is applicable to road transport. Textual and teleological argumentation methods tied the knot here. The most important one being the fact that Article 1(2) PWD explicitly excludes the maritime transport sector from its scope and remains completely silent regarding the other transport sectors. Therefore the PWD in itself could apply to the road transport sector and thus applies to the case at hand.

Transport company Van Den Bosch appealed and won. The Court of Appeal diametrically opposed its colleague of first instance, favouring merely the principles of the internal market. The Court of Appeal ruled that it would not be in line with the purpose of the PWD to be applied to the case at hand.

The FNV then took the case to the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), at which both parties stressed the importance of asking preliminary question to the CJEU in this matter. The Supreme Court agreed and asked i.a. whether the PWD applies to road transport and if so, under which specific circumstances.

The CJEU now cuts this Gordian knot in favour of the application of the PWD to the road transport sector. Just as the Court in first instance in the Netherlands, the CJEU employs textual and teleological argumentation methods and highlights the explicit exception of Article 1(2) PWD, meaning that the PWD in itself could apply to road transport.

As regards to the specific circumstances to which the PWD applies, the CJEU sees merit in the principle of the ‘sufficient connection’ (compare CJEU 19 December 2018, C-16/18 Dobersberger, paragraph 31) and rules:

‘A worker cannot, in the light of PWD, be considered to be posted to the territory of a Member State unless the performance of his or her work has a sufficient connection with that territory, which presupposes that an overall assessment of all the factors that characterise the activity of the worker concerned is carried out.’

So in order to apply the PWD to a specific case, there has to be a sufficient connection between worker and temporary working country. In order to carry out this assessment, the CJEU identifies several ‘relevant factors’, such as the characteristics of the provision of services, the nature of the working activities, the degree of connection between working activities of a lorry driver and the territory of each member state and the proportion of the activities compared to the entire service provision in question. Regarding the latter factor, operations involving loading or unloading goods, maintenance or cleaning of the lorries are relevant (provided that they are actually carried out by the driver concerned, not by third parties).

The CJEU also clarifies that the mere fact that a lorry driver, who is posted to work temporarily in and from a Member State, receives their instructions there and starts and finishes the job there is ‘not sufficient in itself to consider that that driver is “posted” to that territory, provided that the performance of that driver’s work does not have a sufficient connection with that territory on the basis of other factors.’

Finally, it is important to note that the Court provides a helping hand regarding three of the four main types of transport operations, namely transit operations, bilateral operations and cabotage operations. A transit operation is defined by the Court as a situation in which ‘a driver who, in the course of goods transport by road, merely transits through the territory of a Member State’. To give an example: a Polish truck driver crosses Germany to deliver goods in the Netherlands. The activities in Germany are regarded as a ‘transit operation’. A bilateral operation is defined as a situation in which ‘a driver carrying out only cross-border transport operations from the Member State where the transport undertaking is established to the territory of another Member State or vice versa’. To give another example, a Polish truck driver delivers goods in Germany and vice versa. The drivers in those operations cannot be regarded as ‘posted’ in the sense of the PWD, given the lack of a sufficient connection.

By referring to Article 2(3) and (6) of Regulation No 1072/2009, a cabotage operation is defined by the CJEU as ‘as national carriage for hire or reward carried out on a temporary basis in a host Member State, in conformity with that regulation, a host Member State being the Member State in which a haulier operates other than the haulier’s Member State of establishment’. For example, a Polish lorry driver carries out transport between two venues within Germany. According to the CJEU, these operations do constitute a sufficient connection and thus will the PWD in principle apply to these operations.

In short, the CJEU gives a green light for transit- and bilateral operations and a red light for cabotage operations. The CJEU however remains silent regarding the fourth important road transport operation: cross-trade operations. A cross-trade operationis a situation in which a lorry driver from country A, provides transport between countries B and C. The sufficient connection within these operations should therefore be assessed only on a case-by-case basis.

At large, the judgment of the CJEU is in line with the road transport legislation that has been adopted recently (Directive 2020/1057). This legislation takes the applicability of the PWD to road transport as a starting point and then provides specific conflict rules to which transport operations the PWD does and does not apply. Just like the judgement of the CJEU, this legislation determines that the PWD is not applicable to transit- and bilateral operations, whereas the PWD is applicable to cabotage operations. Cross-trade operations did not get a specific conflicts rule and therefore the application of the PWD has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, to which the various identified factors by the Court could help.

All in all, the Gordian knot is cut, yet the assessment of the applicability of the PWD to a specific case will raise considerable difficulties, given de wide margin that has been left open and the rather vague relevant factors that the CJEU has identified. Hard and fast rules however seem to be impossible to impose to the highly mobile and volatile labour activities in the sector, and in that regard the CJEU’s choice of a case by case analysis of a sufficient connection seems to be the lesser of two evils.

***

[1] Fieke van Overbeeke, Legal Counsel at the International Institute for International and Foreign Law – the Netherlands and research fellow at the University of Antwerp – Belgium. On 13 December 2018 successfully defended her PhD on the topic of the applicability of the Posting of Workers Directive to the road transport sector. The PhD (in Dutch) is fully available online. Disclaimer: Fieke van Overbeeke has been a  legal expert on the side of the FNV during the trials in the Netherlands and at the CJEU.

The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered yesterday (8 December 2020) its judgment in case C‑626/18 (Republic of Poland v European Parliament), which is about the posting of workers, including in relation to Rome I.

Background: “By its application, the Republic of Poland asks the Court, principally, to annul Article 1(2)(a) and (2)(b) and Article 3(3) of Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services […] (‘the contested directive’), and, in the alternative, to annul that directive in its entirety”.

Relevant part of the case: “the Republic of Poland refers to Article 9 of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation and considers that the contested directive does not constitute a lex specialis, within the meaning of Article 23 of that regulation.

131 On that point, it must be observed that Article 8(1) of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation establishes a general conflict-of-law rule that is applicable to employment contracts, the designated law being the law chosen by the parties to such a contract, and that Article 8(2) of that regulation provides that, where such a choice has not been made, the individual employment contract is to be governed by the law of the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his or her work, that country not being deemed to have changed if the employee is temporarily employed in another country.

132 However, Article 23 of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation provides for the possibility of derogation from the conflict-of-law rules established by that regulation, where provisions of EU law lay down rules on the law applicable to contractual obligations in certain areas, while recital 40 of that regulation states that the ‘Rome I’ Regulation does not exclude the possibility of inclusion of conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations in provisions of EU law with regard to particular matters.

133 Given both their nature and their content, both Article 3(1) of the amended Directive 96/71, with respect to posted workers, and Article 3(1a) of that directive, with respect to workers who are posted for a period that, in general, exceeds 12 months, constitute special conflict-of-law rules, within the meaning of Article 23 of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation.

134 Further, the drafting process of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation demonstrates that Article 23 of that regulation covers the special conflict-of-law rule previously laid down in Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71, since, in the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (COM(2005) 650 final) of 15 December 2005, the Commission had annexed a list of special conflict-of-law rules established by other provisions of EU law, which mentions that directive.

135 Last, while the Republic of Poland considers that Article 3(1a) of the amended Directive 96/71 does not comply with Article 9 of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation, suffice it to state that the latter article, which must be interpreted strictly, refers to ‘overriding mandatory provisions of the law’ of the Member States, namely mandatory provisions respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests (judgment of 18 October 2016, Nikiforidis, C‑135/15, EU:C:2016:774, paragraph 41 and 44). There is nothing in the documents submitted to the Court to indicate that Article 3(1a) of the amended Directive 96/71 is contrary to such overriding mandatory provisions of law”.

Source: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=235183&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=17610010

Par un arrêt du 18 novembre 2020, la première chambre civile décide de soumettre à la Cour de justice une délicate question relative à la mise en œuvre de la règle de compétence subsidiaire énoncée par l’article 10, point 1, du règlement du 4 juillet 2012.

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Guest Post by John Coyle, the Reef C. Ivey II Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law

One tried-and-true way of obtaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign person that otherwise lacks minimum contacts with a particular U.S. state is to require the person to agree ex ante to a forum selection clause.  This strategy only works, however, if the forum selection clause will be enforced by the courts in the chosen state.  To date, scholars have written extensively about the enforceability of “outbound” forum selection clauses that redirect litigation from one court to another.  They have devoted comparatively less attention to the enforceability of “inbound” forum selection clauses that purport to provide a basis for the chosen court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.

In a recent paper, Katherine Richardson and I seek to remedy this deficit.  We reviewed 371 published and unpublished cases from the United States where a state court was asked to assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant on the basis of an “inbound” consent-to-jurisdiction clause.  In conducting this review, we documented the existence of several different enforcement frameworks across states.  The state courts in New York, for example, take a very different approach to determining whether such a clause is enforceable than the state courts in Florida, which in turn take a very different approach to this question than the state courts in Utah.

These differences in enforcement frameworks notwithstanding, we found that consent-to-jurisdiction clauses are routinely given effect.  Indeed, our data suggest that such clauses are enforced by state courts approximately 85% of the time.  When the courts refuse to enforce these clauses, moreover, they tend to cite just a handful of predictable reasons.  First, the courts may refuse to enforce when the clause fails to provide proper notice to the defendant of the chosen forum.  Second, the courts may conclude that the clause should not be given effect because the parties lack a connection to the chosen forum or that litigating in that forum would be seriously inconvenient.  Third, a clause may go unenforced because it is contrary to the public policy of a state with a close connection to the parties and the dispute.

After mapping the relevant terrain, we then proceed to make several proposals for reform.  We argue that the courts should generally decline to enforce consent-to-jurisdiction clauses when they are written into contracts of adhesion and deployed against unsophisticated counterparties.  We further argue that the courts should decline to enforce such clauses in cases where the defendant was never given notice as to where, exactly, he was consenting to jurisdiction.  Finally, we argue that the courts should retain the flexibility to decide whether to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens even when a forum selection clause specifically names the jurisdiction where the litigation is brought.  Each of these reforms would, in our view, produce fairer and more equitable results across a wide range of cases.

Although our research focused primarily on state courts, our reform proposals are relevant to federal practice as well.  Federal courts sitting in diversity are required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(a) to follow the law of the state in which they sit when they are called upon to determine whether to enforce a consent-to-jurisdiction clause.  If a given state were to revise or reform its rules on this topic along the lines set forth above, the federal courts sitting in that state would be obliged to follow suit.

The post below was written by Peter Mankowski, who is Professor of Private International Law at the University of Hamburg. Apart from one section, the post is based on the author’s German-language case note in the Lindenmaier Möhring Kommentierte BGH-Rechtspechung. The translation into English was permitted courtesy of C.H. Beck Verlag, München.

This is the fourth contribution to the EAPIL online symposium on the ruling of the Court of Justice in the case of Wikingerhof v. Booking.com. The previous posts, authored by Matthias Lehmann, Adrian Briggs and Gilles Cuniberti, can be found here, here and here. 

Readers are encouraged to share their views by making comments to the posts. Those wishing to submit longer contributions for publication are invited to get in touch with the managing editor of the blog, Pietro Franzina, at pietro.franzina@unicatt.it.

The boundary between contract and tort, between Article 7 pts. (1) and (2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, has been a mine-field for years.

The CJEU has continued to defer it to the detriment of tort and to the benefit of contract (see paradigmatically Brogsitter, paras 24-27, and flightright, paras 59-64; cf. also Holterman Ferho, paras. 70-71, and Feniks, paras 40-49). This generates enormous uncertainty (see only Baumert, EWiR 2014, 435; Slonina, ecolex 2014, 790; Wendenburg/Maximilian Schneider, NJW 2014, 1633; Dornis, GPR 2014, 352; Brosch, ÖJZ 2015, 958; Wendelstein, ZEuP 2015, 624; Reydellet, RLDA 111 [2016], 33; Pfeiffer, IPRax 2016, 111).

According to the CJEU, for a matter to be contractual, it is sufficient that there has been a breach of contractual obligations because it appears essential for the interpretation of the contract to determine whether the conduct at issue in the main proceedings is lawful or unlawful (Brogsitter, paras 24-27).

The national courts struggle with this and in some cases even make express ‘Brogsitter reservations’ (see in particular OGH ÖJZ 2015, 1051 with note Brenn; discussed by Mankowski, EuZA 2016, 368). By submitting its reference, the German Bundesgerichtshof (GRUR 2019, 320 — booking.com) sought certainty and a general decision from the CJEU on how far the CJEU intends to stick to Brogsitter (Mankowski, EWiR 2019, 157, 158). The CJEU has acknowledged and recognised that the concrete reference for a preliminary ruling in Wikingerhof is important in terms of legal policy, as is clearly evidenced by the fact that the Grand Chamber with the President and Vice-President of the CJEU decides, the fullest brass possible below the full plenum (the latter being reserved for rather constitutional matters).

Article 7 pt. (2) Brussels I bis Regulation refers to any action seeking to establish liability for damage on the part of the defendant and which does not relate to ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of Article 7 pt. (1) (Kalfelis, para. 18; Löber, para 19). An autonomous interpretation is required for both ‘contract’ and ‘tort’, which is more abstract from national understandings (paras 30 et seq.).

Both Article 7 pts. (1) and 2 are exceptions to the general jurisdiction of Article 4 Brussels I bis Regulation and are therefore to be interpreted strictly. According to Recital (16) of the Regulation, they are both justified from the point of view of particular proximity to the facts and evidence. An action therefore has as its object ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of Article 7 pt. (1) if an interpretation of the contract between the applicant and the defendant appears indispensable in order to determine whether the conduct alleged by the applicant against the defendant is lawful or, on the contrary, unlawful (Brogsitter, para. 25).

This is the case, inter alia, of an action based on the provisions of a contract or on legislation applicable under that contract (Holterman Ferho, para. 53, and Kareda, paras 30-33). On the other hand, where an applicant relies on the rules on liability in tort, delict or quasi-delict, that is to say, a breach of a legal obligation, and it does not appear necessary to examine the content of the contract concluded with the defendant in order to assess whether the conduct alleged against the defendant is lawful or unlawful, since that obligation on the defendant exists independently of that contract, an tort falls within the scope of the action within the meaning of Article 7 pt. (2).

In the present case, Wikingerhof relies on an infringement of German antitrust law, which generally prohibits the abuse of a dominant position irrespective of a contract or other voluntary commitment. More specifically, because of Booking.com’s strong position on the relevant market, Wikingerhof had no choice but to conclude the agreement at issue and to be subject to the effects of the subsequent amendments to Booking.com’s General Sales Conditions, even though some of Booking.com’s conduct was unfair.

The central legal question is therefore whether Booking.com has abused a dominant position for the purposes of antitrust law. In order to determine whether the practices alleged against Booking.com are lawful or unlawful under that competition law, it is not essential to interpret the contract between the parties to the main proceedings, since such an interpretation is, at most, necessary in order to establish the existence of those practices (para. 35).

It follows that, subject to verification by the referring court, the action brought by Wikingerhof, in so far as it is based on the statutory obligation not to abuse a dominant position, must be regarded as constituting a tort.

That is consistent with the objectives of proximity and the sound administration of justice pursued by the Brussels I bis Regulation. The court having jurisdiction under Article 7 pt. (2) — in cartel cases, that of the market affected by the alleged anti-competitive conduct — is best placed to rule on the main question of the merits of that allegation, in particular with regard to the collection and assessment of the relevant evidence (para 37 with reference to Tibor-Trans,  para. 34, and VKI v Volkswagen, para. 38).

The CJEU is trying to engineer a cautious move away from Brogsitter without formally abandoning Brogsitter, and indeed by repeating the central statement from Brogsitter. In any event, for antitrust cases Brogsitter should not pass through.

In a very important situation, the CJEU restores its right to jurisdiction in tort. However, the gain in legal certainty is not as great as if a more general statement had been made. This is because the restriction to a specific situation still leaves the initial question open to all other situations. It may even induce the national courts to make even more complicated attempts to reveal, by comparison parallels or divergences with antitrust law for the situations to be assessed by each of them. AG Saugmandsgaard Øe had launched nothing less than a frontal full-force attack on Brogsitter or at least on a ‘maximalist’ reading of Brogsitter (Opinion of 10 September 2020, paras. 74-115).

Yet the CJEU has not endorsed this and has not distanced itself from Brogsitter at the general level. Wikingerhof does not overrule Brogsitter. It does not finally break with Brogsitter (Matthias Lehmann, Wikingerhof: CJEU Reestablishes Equilibrium between Contract and Tort Jurisdiction). It even cites with seeming approval to the Brogsitter formula – yet eventually opts for partially breaking free from that formula, namely for claims based in antitrust law. On the other hand, Wikingerhof does not firmly shut the door to future deviations from Brogsitter in other fields or in general.

In the age of private enforcement in particular, antitrust law is not a good ground for — as the CJEU is now trying to do — dissolving contract law in particular, but not in general.

Civil actions in the field of antitrust, especially since actions for damages or injunctions to use certain General Terms and Conditions will often come from suppliers or customers of the cartel participants or of the dominant enterprise. They therefore operate in the context of contractual relations. The cartel and abuse of power will be reflected in an arrangement of the contractual terms (service, consideration or conditions) favourable to the cartel or dominant undertaking. Antitrust induced nullity of the contract leads to more than one stage. The cartel or abuse of power becomes the background to the contract in question, and vice versa, it becomes almost a preliminary question of the cartel effect or abuse of power. It is therefore precisely in the case of cartels or abuse of power that contracts are the rule, not the exception (see to a similar avail Briggs, Wikingerhof: A View from Oxford).

However: Preliminary questions do not determine the classification of the main question. Nor do they do so with regard to the distinction between the contract and the tort for the main issue. There is no specific qualification for the main question (Pfeiffer, IPRax 2016, 111).

The CJEU’s departure from Brogsitter in antitrust law and the establishment of a tort/delict qualification could possibly give rise to an argumentum a maiore ad minus (tentatively in a similar direction the comment of Simon Horn to Matthias Lehmann’s post on this blog). If one is already moving in antitrust law with its relative proximity to the contract in tort law, it is necessary to move even more safely into tort law in the case of torts less close to the contractual realm.

However, this would be an attempt to assess parallels to, or divergences from, antitrust law by comparing them. Wikingerhof may indicate a reversal of the trend. The previously seemingly unstoppable rise of contract at the expense of tort/delict does not progress any further at least. However, a full reversal of the trend has not yet been completed, but rather requires further probation samples. But Wikingerhof might be some beginning. That tort regains some ground at the expense of contract is not akin to a catastrophe (but cf. Briggs, Wikingerhof: A View from Oxford), but a necessary correction of the previous over-stretching of ‘contract’ by Brogsitter.

If different, but concurring claims in contract and tort happen to exist, the best way to treat them might possibly be the introduction of annex competences rather than re-characterisation or deferring boundaries by characterisation.

Yet this enters another difficult field of striking balances of competing interests right (Mankowski, in: Ulrich Magnus/Mankowski, Brussels I-bis Regulation [2016] Art. 7 notes 34-35). Re-characterizing certain claims in tort as claims in contract if they can be said to be based on a breach of contractual obligations – in essence what Brogsitter boils down to –, and the result that two claims in contract compete would be not more than a bypassing escape strategy (Baumert, EWiR 2014, 435, 436; Kiener/Neumayr, ZFR 2015, 505, 506-507; Mankowski, in: Ulrich Magnus/Mankowski, Brussels I-bis Regulation [2016] Art. 7 note 35).

Unfortunately, the CJEU in Wikingerhof completely fails to look at the sister area of conflict of laws as well. The mere existence of Article 6(3) Rome II Regulation and the clear attribution of private antitrust law to the unlawful acts in the realm of conflict of laws have provided very strong arguments for classifying private law specifically in tort/delict.

In that realm, Recitals (7) of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations require that the Brussels I bis Regulation be interpreted as well. Unfortunately, there is no parallel Recital in the Brussels I bis Regulation. At the occasion of the next recast, a future Brussels I ter Regulation should receive such a Recital in order to draw the current missing third line to the interpretation triangle with Rome I and Rome II and make the triangle so obvious that it can no longer be ignored by the CJEU.

A major part of the discussion subsequent to Wikingerhof, in particular on Conflictoflaws.net, has focused on whether ‘contract’ has the same meaning throughout the entire Brussels I-bis Regulation, i.e. in essence, whether Wikingerhof gets also relevant for insurance, consumer or employment contracts; opinions are divided (see Lutzi, Briggs, Van Calster, Poesen, Álvarez-Armas ).

Undeniably, there is a certain tendency particularly in Králová, paras. 58-63, pointing towards the CJEU tentatively favouring different notions of ‘contract’ for the purposes of Article 7 pt. (1) Brussels I bis Regulation, on the one hand, and Article 17 of the same Regulation, on the other (a then isolated predecessor might be found in Ilsinger, paras 56-57). AG Saugmandsgaard Øe expressed such tendency even more clearly in Wikingerhof (Opinion of 10 September 2020, para. 113).

Furthermore, Brogsitter has some counterparts extending the domain of consumer contracts to claims which under national law might have their fundament in tort (see in particular BGH NJW 2011, 532; BGH NJW 2011, 2809; BGH IPRax 2013, 168, 171; BGH WM 2012, 646; BGH ZIP 2013, 93). Reliantco, decided after Králová, is the current highwater mark (see paras. 58-73). In the background informing Article 17(1) in general, the desire for adequate consumer protection – mandated by Art. 153 TFEU – is a strong and specific influence. Yet ‘contract’ should follow the same concept throughout which is essentially based on economic ideas and categories of voluntary or involuntary creditorship plus cooperating mechanisms and the meeting of the minds (in detail Mankowski, ‘Ein eigener Vertragsbegriff für das europäische Internationale Verbraucherprozessrecht?’, GPR 2021 sub III). ‘Consumer contract’ adds the B2C element to ‘contract’, but is nevertheless based on ‘contract’ (in detail Mankowski, ‘Ein eigener Vertragsbegriff für das europäische Internationale Verbraucherprozessrecht?’, GPR 2021 sub IV).

Broken down from the high and abstract plane to the small change: The poster titles on Wikingerhof in the relevant internet publications have the tenor ‘Hotels can sue in Germany’ (in particular LTO, 24 November 2020; Hamburger Abendblatt, 25 November 2020).

In fact, under Article 7 pt. (2) Brussels I bis Regulation, the Court of Justice of the European Union establishes a market jurisdiction for the victims of the cartel. However, there is no reason why it should apply only to certain sectors, or even only to hotels, and not to all sectors, as Article 7 pt. (2) does not differentiate anywhere according to bananas, nor does Article 6(3) Rome II Regulation in the conflict of laws.

However, the counter-reaction seems obvious for cartels and dominant companies if it has not been implemented proactively for a long time: in its own general terms and conditions for contracts with suppliers or customers, by means of a jurisdiction clause, the courts have exclusive jurisdiction in their own place of residence. This is because Article 7 pt. (2) Brussels I bis Regulation creates only a ground of special jurisdiction and not a ground of exclusive jurisdiction which would bar any derogation. Article 7 pt. (2) gives way to Art. 25 Brussels I bis Regulation, and the Brussels I bis Regulation does not provide protection against derogating choice of court agreements (on antitrust claims and jurisdiction agreements under Article 25 Brussels I bis Regulation / Article 23 Brussels I Regulation, see Cartel Damages Claims, and Apple Sales International; see also Mankowski, EWiR 2015, 687; id., TBH 2020, 45; Stammwitz, Internationale Zuständigkeit bei grenzüberschreitenden Kartelldelikten [2018] pp. 391-437; Pfeiffer, LMK 2018, 412366; C. Krüger/Seegers, WuW 2019, 170; Goffinet/R. Spangenberg, J. dr. eur. 2019, 199).

However, this is not yet the final step in the assessment. The market power of internet portals in particular is a well-known phenomenon and a significant problem. In turn, it has provoked a specific counter-reaction by the European legislator. This counter-reaction is the P2B Regulation, i.e. Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services.

That said, the P2B Regulation only grants protection to business users by means of (unsystematic) individual standards (Nadine Schneider/Kremer, WRP 2020, 1128, 1129; Stefan Ernst, CR 2020, 735, 739), but not comprehensive. It requires transparency and mandatory content in general terms and conditions. On the other hand, it refers only exceptionally to orders for annulment in respect of general terms and conditions, in particular in Article 3(3) P2B Regulation. In particular, it does not lose any word on choice-of-court agreements. This fits with the general line that recent EU special acts for the online sector – e.g. the Geo-Blocking Regulation in its Article 1(6) – in principle respect the Brussels I bis Regulation (see e.g. Recital (9) P2B Regulation).

It is true that the P2B Regulation favours mediation as the preferred method of dispute resolution. However, Art. 12 (5) P2B Regulation expressly states that the P2B Regulation does not affect the enforcement of rights by way of court action. The Brussels I bis Regulation protects its species, namely Articles 15, 19 and 23. However, only typically weaker parties with derogation bans, but not business users within the meaning of the P2B Regulation and small enterprises such as the Wikingerhof Hotel.

The market-based jurisdiction under Article 7 pt. (2) Brussels I bis Regulation, which has now been confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, thus enables cartel victims against foreign internet portals to form a forum actoris, a forum actoris at their own domicile, but is subject to a derogation. In the broad legal policy perspective, de regulatione ferenda it can be considered to include special protection standards for SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) in a future Brussels I ter Regulation, i.e. to treat C2SME contracts as a separate category.

This is, however, a new round of the game, to be played in the future, and would in any event be the subject of a major debate which will certainly feature fiercely competing lobbying interests, with an uncertain outcome as to the final result.