
The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in Case C‑729/19 (TKF v Department of Justice for Northern Ireland), which is about the Maintenance Regulation:
“1. Article 75(2)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations must be interpreted as applying only to decisions given by national courts in States which were already members of the European Union on the date of adoption of those decisions.
2. Regulation No 4/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that no provision of that regulation enables decisions in matters relating to maintenance obligations, given in a State before its accession to the European Union and before the date of application of that regulation, to be recognised and enforced, after that State’s accession to the European Union, in another Member State”.
Advocate General Tanchev delivered today his opinion in case C‑508/19 (M.F. v J.M., joined parties: Prokurator Generalny, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich), which is about the Rule of Law:
“The right to a tribunal established by law, affirmed by the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted in the sense that, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, a person appointed to the position of judge of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court), Disciplinary Chamber, does not comply with that requirement if his act of appointment was delivered in flagrant breach of national rules governing the procedure for the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court, which is a matter for the referring court to establish. In the context of that assessment, the referring court must appraise the manifest and intentional character as well as the gravity of the breaches in question.
The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU in the light of Article 47 of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that a court chamber does not constitute an independent and impartial tribunal, within the meaning of those provisions, when the objective conditions in which it was created, its characteristics as well as the manner of appointment of its members are capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of that chamber to external factors, and, in particular, to the direct or indirect influence of the legislature and the executive, and as to its neutrality with respect to the interests before it and, thus, whether they may lead to that chamber not being seen to be independent or impartial with the consequence of prejudicing the trust which justice in a democratic society must inspire in subjects of the law. It is for the referring court to determine, in the light of all the relevant factors established before it, whether that applies to a court such as the Disciplinary Chamber of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court).
In such a situation, the principle of the primacy of EU law must be interpreted as requiring the referring court to disapply national law provisions which reserve jurisdiction to rule on actions, such as the one in the main proceedings, to such a chamber, so that those actions may be examined by a court which fulfils the requirements of independence and impartiality referred to above and which would have jurisdiction were it not for those provisions”.
Une personne détenue en vue de l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen relève de l’article 5, § 1, f) de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, de sorte que la chambre de l’instruction, saisie du contentieux de l’exécution d’un tel mandat aux fins de poursuites, n’a pas à s’assurer de l’existence d’indices graves ou concordants à l’encontre de la personne recherchée.
Le Parquet européen, nouvel organisme chargé de lutter contre la grande criminalité transfrontière portant atteinte au budget de l’Union européenne, devrait commencer ses activités le 1er juin 2021, selon un communiqué publié le 7 avril dernier.
Thank you indeed Gilles Cuniberti for flagging and discussing the end of March decision (Press Release only) by the Paris Court of First Instance in which it held that an action against an arbitrator for damages following his failure to disclose a conflict of interests, which led to the annulment of the award, fell within Brussels Ia despite its arbitration exception.
I have more sympathy for the decision than Gilles. At the very least I am not surprised national courts should be confused about the demarcation. Brussels Ia inserted the Smorgasbord of confusion following West Tankers, by collating an even prima facie conflicting array of ins and outs in its recital 12. Even before the entry into force of Brussels Ia, Cooke J in Toyota v Prolat held that recital 12 is of no use. Other than in fairly straightforward cases such as Premier Cruises v DLA Piper Russia, good argument might exist on many conceivable cases.
Deciding the demarcation with help from the New York Convention itself (one might have suggested that what is included in New York, should not be included in Brussels Ia) does not help in the case at issue for as ia Tadas Varapnickas notes, Uncitral and New York are silent on the status of the arbitrator.
Assuming BIa applies, there must be little doubt there is a contractual relation, even between the arbitrator and the party who did not appoint her or him, in the BIa Article 7(1) sense, following CJEU flightright.
Curial seat was Paris, yet hearings and deliberations had taken place in Germany. Forum contractus as a provision of services was held to have been Germany.
This is where Burkhard Hess, at the request of Gilles, took over: Burkhard further discusses the findings on arbitration, agrees with Germany as the forum contractus per ia CJEU Wood Floor Solutions, and suggests (see similarly Mann J in Philips v TCL) the German courts are bound by the Paris’ court’s findings per CJEU Gothaer.
Much relevant. I do not know whether appeal is being sought.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.3.4, para 2.110 ff.;
As announced in this blog (here), Jean-Sylvestre Bergé (University of Côte d’Azur and French University Institute) has just published a monograph titled “Situations in Movement and The Law – A Pragmatic Epistemology” (Les situations en mouvement et le droit – Essai d’une épistémologie pragmatique, Dalloz, 2021).
The author has provided the following abstract in English:
The ambition underpinning this text is to establish a pragmatic epistemology for each time the law faces situations in movement.
The movement of goods and persons across territories and through space, understood in its broadest sense, challenges the law in its primary task of locking situations into predefined legal frameworks, whether at a local, national, European, international or global level (laws on the freedom of movement, transport, trade, mobility, flows, international or European situations, etc.).
This reflection is all the more important given that phenomena in movement now come in extreme forms with the increasingly observed hypothesis of circulation provoked by humans but completely out of their control (greenhouse gas emissions, spread of products and organisms of all kinds, pandemics, and the circulation of information, persons, data, capital, waste, etc.).
What we know and don’t know about the law on circulation and its control merit discussion.
A renewed approach to the assumptions about and mechanics of situations in movement is perhaps needed. All sorts of antecedents – magical, liberal, social, ontological, fundamental and modal – potentially at work allow us to lay down the terms and stakes of how we address the risk, most often denied or minimised, of losing control over flows.
This essay is intended for both legal scholars and practitioners. It may also appeal to anyone from other disciplines interested in the way in which the law can be understood through its approach to dynamic phenomena, from the smallest to the largest scale.
More information here.
Dans un arrêt concernant la Belgique, la Cour conclut à la violation de l’article 5, § 1, combiné avec l’article 3 en raison de l’internement de détenus atteints de troubles mentaux dans des établissements pénitentiaires ordinaires sans le bénéfice de soins appropriés. En outre, les recours existants sont jugés pour partie ineffectifs.
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