In C‑106/17 Hofsoe, the CJEU held late January that the Brussels I Recast Regulation jurisdictional rules for jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance, do not apply in case of assignment to a professional party. A B2C insurance contract assigned to a professional party therefore essentially turns into a B2B contract: the rules for protected categories are meant to protect weaker parties only. The Court also rejects a suggestion that the assignee ought to be able to prove that in fact it merits the forum actoris protection (on account of it being a sole insurance practitioner with little practice): the weakness is presumed and not subject to factual analysis.
Conclusion: at 43: ‘a person such as Mr Hofsoe, who carries out a professional activity recovering insurance indemnity claims against insurance companies, in his capacity as contractual assignee of such claims, should not benefit from the special protection constituted by the forum actoris.’
Predictability, and restrictive interpretation of the Regulation’s exceptions to the actor sequitur forum rei rule, are the classic lines along which the CJEU holds the case.
I for one continue to find it difficult to get my head round assignment not leading to the original obligation being transferred full monty; including its jurisdictional peculiarities. The referring court in this respect (at 28) refers to the applicable national law which provides for as much:
‘In that regard, the referring court points out, under Article 509(2) of the Civil Code, ‘all rights associated with the claim …shall be transferred with the claim’. In those circumstances, the assignment of the claim should include that of the benefit of jurisdiction.’
Indeed in Schrems the Court emphasises the impact of the assignor’s rights on the rights of the assignee. By contrast in Hofsoe, the assignee’s qualities (here: as a professional) call the shots. The Court essentially pushes an autonomous and not necessarily consistent EU law on assignment here. In Rome I, the issue has triggered all sorts of discussions – not least the relevant BICL study and the EC 2016 response to same. Under Brussels I Recast, the discussion is more silent.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.8.
I applied for funding 2 years back to have someone conduct a thorough review of recent development in State Immunity. Funding was not granted: quelle horeur!. Reviewers suggested there was no need to revisit an area where law and practice is settled: quelle erreur!
Needless to say both statutory and case-law developments have proven reviewers wrong since. I would still be happy by the way to supervise research in the area (happier still for someone to fund it).
Now, coming to the point: in 16-22.494 Congo v Commisimpex the French Supreme Court essentially held that the French Sapin II law applies retroactively. State assets employed iure imperii are only available for seizure following express and property-specific waiver. The Court’s decision does not reflect unisono developments in other States (neither indeed, I agree with Victor Aupetit), does it help France with regulatory competition in civil procedure: quite a few jurisdictions have taken a more relaxed and wide approach to contractual waiver of State immunity.
Geert.
The Court of Appeal, referring powerfully ia to VTB, has confirmed (albeit with dissenting opinion) lack of the English courts jurisdiction in [2018] EWCA Civ 191 Okpabi et al v Shell. I reviewed the High Court’s decision in same here. Plenty of the High Court’s considerations. e.g. (pro inspiratio) joinder under Brussels I Recast, and the optionally distributive lex causae rule under Article 7 Rome II, do not feature in the Court of Appeal’s approach.
The crucial take-away from the judgment is that the English courts do not believe that headquarter instructed mandatory compliance, equates control. This runs along the lines of Scheindlin USDJ’s approach in Apartheid.
Geert.
(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8, Heading 8.3.
Arnold van Steenderen and Milan Simić have complete and concise review here of judgment of the Rotterdam court of December 2017 in re the Belo Horizonte (officially Cefetra et al v Ms ‘IDA’ Oetker Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MbH & Co KG et al). The case is a follow-up to 2015 proceedings. In these the Rotterdam court had first sanctioned seizure, and then rejected further action for claimant had not formally requested access to the documents.
Arnold and Milan summarise the facts very very helpfully – I am much obliged for the judgment is in Dutch (although as the judgment shows, the proceedings were actually conducted in English: a nice example of the use of regulatory competition in civil procedure) and their efforts have saved me a lot of translation time:
The decisions of the Rotterdam Court are a result of the carriage under bill of lading
of soya beans on behalf of Cefetra B.V. (Netherlands based) on board of the “Belo
Horizonte” from Argentina to the United Kingdom. Cefetra supplies raw materials to
the feed, food, and fuel industries. Cefetra Ltd. (UK based) was the holder of the
b/l’s and English law applied to the b/l’s. The vessel is owned by MS ‘IDA’ Oetker
and is time chartered by Rudolf A Oetker (both German based, together addressed
as Oetker). MS ‘IDA’ Oetker is the carrier under the b/l’s. London arbitration is
agreed upon for any dispute rising from the contract of carriage and the b/l’s.
Following engine failure, ‘(d)uring the voyage, experts commissioned by both Cefetra and Oetker visited the “Belo Horizonte” to preliminary assess the condition of the vessel and its engines. Further investigation was conducted upon arrival in England. Oetker, however, only granted permission for inspection of the engine room and refused to disclose the documents on board. Crew interviews were not allowed as well. Subsequently, Cefetra obtained leave to attachment for the purpose of preserving evidence in the Netherlands on 27 October 2015. The leave was effected by the bailiff on 28 October 2015 on board of the “Belo Horizonte”. Several documents were seized and handed over to a sequestrator. Cefetra initiated proceedings’ to gain access to the seized documents.
The dispute in the main is arbitrable in London.
Oetker disputes jurisdiction of the court at Rotterdam on the basis of defendants’ domicile in Germany. Cefetra argue in favour of jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(1), alternatively 7(2) or indeed Article 35 Brussels I Recast:
The Court does not at all entertain Cefetra’s arguments on the basis of 7(1) or 7(2). Wrongly so: plenty of not at all obvious contracts or torts could qualify as same under these provisions, to not address them at all does not make them simply go away.
The court first of all (5.7 in fine) rejects relevance of the arbitration exclusion on the basis of C-391/95 Van Uden Deco-Line. It then sticks to a very restrictive approach to Article 35, with the classic provisionary (not covered by Article 35) v provisional (covered) nature of measures, as also discussed in C-104/03 St. Paul Dairy/Unibel (to which the Court refers). In the words of the court: seizure of evidence is provisional; actual access, copy or extract is not (5.8): the court suggests this is not provisional since it allows the party to gauge the evidentiary position of the party and hence is irreversible.
I disagree -and I have at least a shelf in my library to support the discussion.
Ireversibility in fact (once the evidence seen, the party can never wipe it from its memory, so to speak) does not equate ireversibility in law. The court takes a very limited view of Article 35 and I do not believe it is the right one.
There are not that many national judgments covering Article 35 quite so expressly. This is one to treasure.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.15.
Allow me a succinct grumble about the precautionary principle. A recent Guardian item on trade talks post-Brexit refers ia to proponents of Brexit wanting to use future trade talks eg with the US, to ditch the precautionary principle. It states the proponents’ strategy ‘also advocates tearing up the EU’s “precautionary principle”, under which traders have to prove something is safe before it is sold, rather than waiting for it to be proved unsafe’.
Reversing the burden of proof (also known as the ‘no data no market rule’) is not a necessary prerequisite of the precautionary principle. If it were, public authorities’ task in regulating health, safety and the environment would look very different than it does today, as would the regulation of new technologies such as nano or synthetic biology (indeed even AI). Only in specific sectors, has the burden of proof been reversed. This includes, in the EU, REACH – the flagship Regulation on chemicals. In others, it was discussed (e.g. in the reform of the EU’s cosmetics Directive into a Regulation), but eventually dismissed.
Neither does the EU’s approach to the precautionary principle imply ‘when in doubt, opt out’, or ‘when in doubt, don’t do it’. One need only refer to the recent decision to extend the licence for glyphosate to show that the EU does not ban what is not proven safe (the least one can say about glyphosate is that its health and environmental safety is not clearly established). I blame Cass Sunstein’s Laws of Fear, superbly reviewed (critically) by Liz Fisher in the 2006 Modern Law Review for misrepresenting the principle – such that even its proponents often misunderstand its true meaning.
Precaution is not an alternative to science. It is a consequence of science.
Geert.
EU environmental law (with Leonie Reins), Edward Elgar, soft cover edition 2018, p.28 ff.
In [2017] EWHC 3368 (QB) Kennedy v National Trust for Scotland, Eady J considers two important (for this blog at least) issues leading to dicta: when a prima facie domestic case may turn out to be international really; and following his ruling on same, the application of forum non conveniens intra-UK. I reviewed the latter issue, also intra-UK, in my analysis of Cook & McNeil (v Virgin & Tesco).
First the issue of the case being purely domestic or international. It is only when it is the latter, that the Brussels I Recast regime is engaged and, per Owusu, forum non conveniens excluded.
The Claimant, who is domiciled in Scotland, seeks damages and other remedies in this jurisdiction against the National Trust for Scotland in respect of a number of allegations published in both jurisdictions as well as in Italy, France and Brazil. He relies not only on defamation but also on negligence and on alleged breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998. The dispute arises over the Claimant’s attendance at Craigievar Castle in Aberdeenshire on 23 February 2012, when he took a series of photographs of a naked model for commercial purposes. He claims that he did so pursuant to an oral contract, entered into with a representative of the Defendant, which expressly authorised that activity. Some years later, this episode came to the attention of the daughter of Lord Sempill who had gifted the castle to the Defendant (more than 50 years ago) and she protested that it had been used for the purpose of taking nude photographs. Her remarks caught the attention of a journalist who made enquiries and was given a statement by or on behalf of the Defendant on 24 February 2016 which was reported in the Scottish Mail on Sunday of 28 February. Thereafter, the Defendant also issued a press release which denied that the taking of the photographs had been authorised. This was sent to a number of media outlets including a reporter on the (London) Metro newspaper.
Claimant suggests that this is not “a purely domestic case” by referring to re-publication of the defamatory words in France and Italy. At 51 Eady J, with reference to the aforementioned Cook v Virgin Media, suggests the purpose of the regulation, and of the rule of general jurisdiction in particular, is to regularise issues of jurisdiction as between different states, and that no such question arises here, because the only potential competition is between the courts of Scotland and England & Wales (i.e. internal to the United Kingdom). I do not think this is the effect of CJEU precedent, Lindner in particular, as well as Maletic and Vinyls Italia (the latter re Rome I). The potential competition between the England and Scotland only arises if, not because, the Brussels I Regulation does not apply: the High Court’s argument is circular. In Linder and in Maletic, the CJEU upheld the application of Brussels I even though competing jurisdiction elsewhere in the EU was only potential, not actual. Given the potential for jurisdiction with courts in France and Italy, I would suggest the Lindner logic applies.
Eady J though applies forum non conveniens to establish Scotland as the more appropriate forum in the UK, and to stay the English case.
He then obiter (had FNC not applied), at 86 ff suggests the court develop a novel sub-national model of Shevill, such that only courts of the sub-national place where the publisher is domiciled would have jurisdiction to award global damages – and all other courts within the United Kingdom would be restricted to awarding damages for harm occurring within their relevant regions. Importantly, even for post-Brexit use, Eady J suggest the importation of CJEU case-law in applying English law of conflicts is appropriate for Parliament has approved rules in parallel to those under the Recast Regulation.
A little gem of a judgment.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.2.1.
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