Flux européens

The CJEU held yesterday in Case C-296/16P Dextro Energy (text of judgment available in French and German only at the time of posting), an appeal against the General Court’s ruling in T-100/15. The General Court had declined to annul the European Commission Regulation which refused to authorise certain health claims made on foods, other than those referring to the reduction of disease risk and to children’s development and health. Dextro Energy had wanted to include health claims such as  ‘glucose supports normal physical activity’ and ‘glucose contributes to normal muscle function’. The EC had refused: citing (in Regulation 1215/8)

‘Pursuant to Articles 6(1) and 13(1) of Regulation … No 1924/2006 health claims need to be based on generally accepted scientific evidence. Authorisation may also legitimately be withheld if health claims do not comply with other general and specific requirements of Regulation … No 1924/2006, even in the case of a favourable scientific assessment by [EFSA]. Health claims inconsistent with generally accepted nutrition and health principles should not be made. [EFSA] concluded that a cause and effect relationship has been established between the consumption of glucose and contribution to energy-yielding metabolism. However, the use of such a health claim would convey a conflicting and confusing message to consumers, because it would encourage consumption of sugars for which, on the basis of generally accepted scientific advance, national and international authorities inform the consumer that their intake should be reduced. Therefore, such a health claim does not comply with point (a) of the second paragraph of Article 3 of Regulation … No 1924/2006 which foresees that the use of claims should not be ambiguous or misleading. Furthermore, even if the concerned health claim was to be authorised only under specific conditions of use and/or accompanied by additional statements or warnings, it would not be sufficient to alleviate the confusion of the consumer, and consequently the claim should not be authorised.’

The General Court performed its standard review in the face of a wide discretionary room for manoeuvre for the EC, and decided the EC had not exceeded its authority in holding as it did – even in the face of more lenient EFSA recommendations. The Court of Justice has now entirely sided with the General Court. The Judgment is a good reminder of aforementioned standard test (no de novo or merits review; annulment in the event of manifest transgression of power or error in judgment only), and readers best refer to reading the judgment itself.

10One consideration however, I should like to highlight: Dextro Energy had suggested the health claims needed to be assessed in light of the target group (determined in the product’s advertising), which, it was suggested, were physically active people for whom consumption of the glucose tablets in question is not harmless. The Court rejected this approach: the population as a whole, for whom the product is available, are the group which the EC justifiably seeks to protect. The manufacturer’s target group is not the relevant group to consider (do bear in mind that this is a product which is widely available and not restricted in any way at points of sale):

At 76-77: si les allégations de santé en cause étaient autorisées, elles s’adresseraient à la population en général, pouvant ainsi encourager la consommation de sucres par les personnes autres que les hommes et les femmes bien entraînés. Dans ces conditions, le Tribunal n’a pas commis d’erreur de droit lorsqu’il a rejeté, au point 57 de l’arrêt attaqué, l’argument de Dextro Energy, selon lequel c’était le groupe cible qui importait aux fins de l’appréciation des allégations de santé en cause.

Geert.

 

 

Entrée en fonctions d’un nouveau Membre au Tribunal de l’Union européenne

Entrée en fonctions d’un nouveau Membreau Tribunal de l’Union européenne

King
Libre circulation des personnes
L’avocat général Tanchev considère qu’imposer à un travailleur de prendre un congé avant de pouvoir savoir s’il a droit à être rémunéré au titre de ce congé est incompatible avec le droit de l’Union

Dextro Energy / Commission
Environnement et consommateurs
La Cour confirme que plusieurs allégations de santé relatives au glucose ne peuvent pas être autorisées

A.S.
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Dans les circonstances exceptionnelles de la crise des réfugiés, l’avocat général Sharpston considère que l’État membre dans lequel une demande de protection internationale a été introduite en premier est responsable de l’examen de cette demande

Another posting for the ‘comparative conflicts /dispute resolution’ binder. In order not to be found to have voluntary appeared (‘submitted to jurisdiction’), civil procedure rules worldwide require defendants to flag their opposition to jurisdiction early on in the proceedings. Indeed at the threshold of the litigation: in limine litis.

In EU law, the Court of Justice ruled in Elefanten Schuh that where civil procedure of the Member States requires a defence on the merits at the very earliest opportunity, such defence does not jeopardise objection to jurisdiction made at the same occasion. (Case-law now reflected in the wording of the Brussels I Regulation and its Recast successor).

There is as yet however no CJEU case-law on what level of interaction with the courts leads to submission.

In England, Zumaz Nigeria v First City [2016] EWCA Civ 567 recently held that application for disclosure does not entail submission: for one may need those very documents to contest jurisdiction.

Thank you RPC for now flagging Shenzhen CTS International Logistics Co Ltd v Dajiang International Investment Co Ltd. The court found that by applying to strike out the claim and seeking security for costs (to include the period after the hearing of the stay application), defendant had invoked the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts. As always of course the decision was based on factual merit which RPC’s David Smyth and Hannah Fletcher  summarise very well in the posting hyperlinked above.

Beware before you engage with the courts, if you do not wish to be seen as having submitted.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.7.

I have reported earlier on the action of MNL Capital against the Belgian Vulture Fund Act of 12 July 2015 (Offical Gazette here, my EN translation here), on which I have a paper here.

Thank you Quentin Declève for alerting me to the Constitutional Court’s judgment on a related action (where MNL were joined by Yukos) namely against the act of 23 August 2015 which introduced Article 1412quinquies in the Belgian Judicial Code. It is noteworthy that the action against the Act of July has not yet been decided by the Court (that case number, for the aficionados, is 6371), at the least I have not been able to locate any judgment).

As Quentin summarises, as a general rule, Article 1412 quinquies of the Belgian Judicial Code provides that assets located in Belgium that belong to a foreign State are immune from execution and cannot be subject to enforcement proceedings by creditors. Exceptions to that rule are possible if very strict conditions are met: a party wishing to seize the assets belonging to a State needs to obtain a prior authorisation from a judge. This judge will only authorise the seizure if (i) the foreign State has “expressively” and “specifically” consented to the seizure of the assets; (ii) the foreign State has specifically allocated those assets to the enforcement of the claim which gives rise to the seizure; and (iii) the assets are located in Belgium and are allocated to an economic or commercial activity.

The Court has now annulled the word ‘specifically’ but has otherwise left the Act intact. Quentin summarises how the Court found that this proviso is not part of international law on State immunity.

Now, picking up where Quentin left: part of applicants’ arguments relate to Brussels I Recast. The argument is made that Belgium with its Act re-introduces exequatur, now that is has been abolished by the Recast. Belgium’s Government seems to argue that the law relating to seizure has public order character and hence is covered by the ordre public exception of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, and that seizure in Belgium which would go against public international customary law on State immunity, along the same lines would be covered by the ordre public exception of the Recast (para A.5.2, p.6).

The Court (at B.29.1 ff, .34 ff) deals with the Brussels I arguments very very succinctly: it refers to Article 41(1) which other than the substantive requirements of title III, makes recognition and enforcement subject to the law of the State of enforcement. The Court also says enforcement is not entirely obstructed: some of the foreign entities’ assets remain subject to seizure; and there are other ways of enforcement other than seizure. Finally the Court suggests that the Brussels I Recast surely must not be applied in a way which would be incompatible with international customary law. By rejecting the suggestion for a prelimary reference to Luxembourg (suggestion made by the Belgian State, unusually), the Court clearly believes that call is not one that has to be made by Luxembourg. Pitty: that would have been an interesting reference.

Again, NML Capital’s action against the Vulture Fund Act is still ongoing, lest I have missed withdrawal. As I noted in my paper, this Act I believe is wanting on various grounds, including some related to the New York Convention and the Brussels I Recast.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16, Heading 2.2.16.1.4.

L’8 e il 9 giugno 2017 si terrà all’Università di Milano-Bicocca un seminario pratico sul tema della sottrazione internazionale di minori, nel quadro del progetto EU Judiciary Training on Brussels IIa Regulation: from South to East, co-finanziato dalla Commissione europea e guidato da Costanza Honorati.

Intervengono Martina Erb-Klünemann (Tribunale di Hamm), Maria Domenica Maggi (psicologa e giudice onorario presso il Tribunale dei minorenni di Milano), Sara Lembrechts e Katrien Herbots (KeKi – Children’s Right Knowledge Centre di Ghent), Michael Ford (MiKK – International Mediation Centre for Family Conflict and Child Abduction), Costanza Honorati (Univ. Milano-Bicocca), Maria Caterina Baruffi (Univ. Verona), Cristina Gonzalez Beilfuss e Maria Alvarez Torné (Univ. Barcellona), Mirela Zupan (Univ. Osijek), Ivana Kunda (Univ. Rijeka), Agne Limante (Law Institute of Lithuania).

La locandina dell’evento è disponibile qui.

Ergo, Brogsitter, Granarolo...There is a long list of cases in which the CJEU is asked to decide whether a relationship between parties is contractual, with special jurisdiction determined by Article 7(1) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, or one in tort, subject to Article 7(2) of same.

In C-249/16 Saale Kareda v Stefan Benkö Bot AG opined end of April. The Court is asked to rule on whether a recourse claim brought between jointly and severally liable debtors under a credit agreement constitutes a contractual claim. And if it is, the Court will have to examine whether such an agreement may be classified as an agreement for the provision of services, which will, as the case may be, lead it to determine the place of performance of its characteristic obligation.

I still think that what I dubbed the ancestry or pedigree test of Sharpston AG in Ergo, is a most useful litmus test to distinguish between 7(1) and 7(2):  what is the ancestry of the action, without which the parties concerned would not be finding themselves pleading in a court of law?: she uses ‘centre of gravity’ (‘the centre of gravity of the obligation to indemnify is in the contractual obligation’); ‘rooted in’ (‘the recourse action by one insurer against the other…is rooted in the contracts of insurance’); and ‘intimately bound up’ (‘[the action] is intimately bound up with the two insurers’ contractual obligation‘). (at 62 of her Opinion in Ergo). I am not sure though whether the Court itself follows the test.

Before the Austrian courts, Stefan Benkö, an Austrian national, is bringing a recourse claim against Saale Kareda, an Estonian national and his former partner, seeking payment of EUR 17 145.41 plus interest and costs. While they were living together in Austria, the applicant and the defendant bought a house in 2007 and for that purpose took out three loans totalling EUR 300 000 (‘the loan’) from an Austrian bank. They were both borrowers and the referring court states that they were both jointly and severally liable debtors. Ms Kareda broke up with Mr Benkö, moved back to Estonia, and ceased her loan payments. Being sued for the arrear payments by MR Benko, she now claims that the Landesgericht St. Pölten (Regional Court, St. Pölten), the court seised by the applicant, lacked territorial jurisdiction in so far as the loan was made by an Austrian bank and the place of performance for that loan, the bank’s registered office, is not located in the judicial district of that court.

Is it possible to ‘detach’ from the credit agreement the legal relationships arising between jointly and severally liable debtors following the conclusion of that agreement, or does this form an inseparable whole? (at 28) Bot AG suggests it is the latter and I believe he is right. I agree that it would be artificial, for the purposes of the application of the Brussels I Recast. to separate those legal relationships from the agreement which gave rise to them and on which they are based.

I am less convinced by the reference, at 32 and 33, to the need for consistency between Brussels I Recast and Rome I: regular readers of this blog will not be surprised by this. (But I believe I am fighting a losing battle there). The AG refers to Article 16 of Rome I, entitled ‘Multiple liability’, which provides inter alia that, ‘[i]f a creditor has a claim against several debtors who are liable for the same claim, and one of the debtors has already satisfied the claim in whole or in part, the law governing the debtor’s obligation towards the creditor also governs the debtor’s right to claim recourse from the other debtors’.

Having decided that the issue is contractual, the AG suggests the credit agreement is an agreement for the provision of services, and that in the context of a credit agreement, the characteristic obligation leading to jurisdiction is the actual granting of the sum loaned. The other obligation entailed by such an agreement, namely the borrower’s obligation to repay the sum loaned, exists only through the performance of the service by the lender, as repayment is merely its consequence.

The final element to consider is then the actual place of performance of the characteristic obligation. In the AG’s view, only the place where the creditor has its place of business is capable of ensuring that the rules are highly predictable and of satisfying the objectives of proximity and standardisation pursued by the second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012.  That place will be known by the parties from the time of the conclusion of the agreement and will also be the place of the court having the closest connection with that agreement. (at 46).

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2, Heading 2.2.11.2.9

Il 23 giugno 2017 si terrà a Lucca un seminario pratico sul regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 concernente la competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale (Bruxelles I bis).

Durante il seminario, organizzato nel contesto del progetto European Civil Procedure for Lawyers (su cui vedi questo post), gli avvocati saranno chiamati a partecipare attivamente alla discussione e risoluzione di casi pratici in applicazione del regolamento n. 1215/2012.

Tra i relatori Giampaolo Benedetti Pearson (foro di Lucca), Elena D’Alessandro (Univ. Torino) e Silvana Dalla Bontà (Univ. Trento).

La locandina dell’evento è reperibile qui.

 

Many thanks to Jan von Hein for flagging the ultimate judgment (the link is to a press release) of the Bundesarbeitsgericht in Nikiforidis. I had of course reported earlier my serious misgivings about the CJEU’s judgment in same, upon preliminary review.

The judgment eventually declined to employ the opening left by the CJEU, to take Greek law into account ‘as a matter of fact’. Thank you, but no thank you: there was no suitable point of entry in German law to take account of the Greek austerity laws. Still, as Jan points out, the judgment in Luxembourg undoubtedly will feature as precedent in future cases.

Geert.

 

Lounes
Citoyenneté européenne
Selon l’avocat général Bot, un ressortissant d'un État non UE, membre de la famille d’un citoyen de l’Union, peut bénéficier d’un droit de séjour dans l’État membre dans lequel ce citoyen a séjourné avant d’en acquérir la nationalité et de développer une vie de famille

The 59th edition of the Urbino annual seminar on comparative and European Law will run from 21 August to 2 September 2017. The program is available here. For further information, see here.

Si svolgerà ad Urbino, dal 21 agosto al 2 settembre 2017, il 59ème Séminaire de droit comparé et européen. Il programma della nuova edizione è disponibile qui. Per ulteriori informazioni si veda a questo indirizzo.

Il 30 maggio 2017 l’Università di Valencia ospita il convegno BRIaTra: Brussels Ia and Transport. In occasione dell’evento verranno esposti i risultati di una ricerca finanziata dall’Unione europea nel quadro del programma Giustizia civile. Maggiori informazioni sono disponibili nel flyer, reperibile qui.

On 30 may 2017 the University of Valencia will host the conference ‘BRIaTra: Brussels Ia and Transport’. The outcome of a research project supported by the Civil Justice Program of the European Union will be presented during the event. Further information is available here.

Many thanks to KU Leuven law student Dzsenifer Orosz (she is writing a paper on the issues for one of my conflict of laws courses) for alerting me to the French Conseil D’Etat having referred ‘right to be forgotten’ issues to the European Court of Justice.  I have of course on occasion reported the application of data protection laws /privacy issues on this blog (try ‘Google’ as a search on the blog’s search function). I also have a paper out on the case against applying the right to be forgotten to the .com domain, and with co-authors, one where we catalogue the application of RTBF until December 2016. See also my post on the Koln courts refusing application to .com.

The Conseil d’Etat has referred one or two specific Qs but also, just to be sure, has also asked the Court of Justice for general insight into how data protection laws apply to the internet. The Court is unlikely to offer such tutorial (not that it would not be useful). However any Advocate General’s opinion of course will offer 360 insight.

One to look forward to.

Geert.

 

Parental Care and the Best Interests of the Child in Muslim Countries, edited by / a cura di Nadjma Yassari, Lena-Maria Möller, Imen Gallala-Arndt, SPringer, 2017, ISBN 9789462651739, pp. 353, EUR 145,59

 

This book is the first analysis of parental care regimes in Muslim jurisdictions, both in a comparative and country-specific sense. It contains the proceedings of a workshop on Parental Care and the Best Interests of the Child in Muslim Countries that the Max Planck Research Group “Changes in God’s Law: An Inner-Islamic Comparison of Family and Succession Law” hosted in Rabat, Morocco in April 2015. This workshop saw a total of 15 country reports presented on questions of custody, guardianship and their development within different Muslim jurisdictions (ranging from Indonesia to Morocco), a number of which are included in full in the book. Each of these country reports contains a historical perspective on the evolution of domestic rules regarding custody and guardianship, and on the introduction and development of the notion of the best interests of the child. Most importantly, the prevailing legal norms, both substantive and procedural, are explored and particular attention is given to legal practice and the role of the judiciary. In addition to a selection of country reports from the workshop, the volume includes two comparative analyses on questions of parental care in both public and private international law. With a high practical relevance for legal practitioners working in the area of cross-border custody disputes and the most up-to-date assessment of parental care regimes beyond a pure analysis of statutory law, this book combines a number of country reports authored by experts who have worked or are still based in the respective countries they are reporting on and thus contains in-depth discussions of legal practice and custody law in action.

Venerdì 30 giugno 2017 si terrà a Torino un convegno intitolato Il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione di decisioni e lodi arbitrali stranieri: trends e sviluppi recenti, organizzato dell’Union Internationale des Avocats, dall’Ordine degli Avvocati di Torino e dal Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Torino.

La locandina dell’evento è disponibile qui.

Makhlouf / Conseil
Relations extérieures
Le Tribunal de l’UE confirme que le gel de fonds prononcé à l’encontre de Rami Makhlouf, cousin de Bachar al-Assad, doit être maintenu pour la période 2016-2017

This is one for the conflict of laws anoraks. In C-29/16 HanseYachts the Court of Justice held (on 4 May) that an application for proceedings to preserve or establish, prior to any legal proceedings, evidence of facts on which a subsequent action could be based, does not constitute a proceeding within the meaning of (now) Article 32(1) Brussels I. If it had, it would trigger the lis alibi pendens regime of that Article, impacting therefore on any future substantive proceedings.

At 33 the Court defers to the insight into the relevant provisions of French judicial procedure, offered by the French Government: Although there may indeed be a connection between the court seised on the basis of that article and the court having jurisdiction to hear the substance of the case with a view to which the measure of inquiry was ordered, the fact remains that such proceedings for the taking of evidence are independent in relation to the substantive procedure which may, if necessary, be brought subsequently. The Court’s ruling however is dependent (at 34) upon the French courts confirming this interpretation of French civil procedure: for the CJEU does not offer final interpretations on internal State law.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.14.1.